



HAL
open science

Cooperation in Green R&D and Environmental Policies: Taxes or Standards

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin, Natacha Raffin

► **To cite this version:**

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin, Natacha Raffin. Cooperation in Green R&D and Environmental Policies: Taxes or Standards. 2023. hal-03610541v3

HAL Id: hal-03610541

<https://normandie-univ.hal.science/hal-03610541v3>

Preprint submitted on 12 Dec 2023

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Cooperation in green R&D and Environmental Policies: Tax or Standard

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin*, Natacha Raffin†

December 12, 2023

Abstract

In this article, we compare a tax and a standard as environmental tools depending on firms' R&D strategy and the government's ability to credibly commit to its policy. We consider a duopoly model where production is polluting and in an effort to mitigate emissions, firms invest in green R&D (in the presence of technological spillovers) either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. We explore two policy games in which the regulator establishes an emission tax or an emission standard either before or after firms engage in R&D. We endogenize both the firms' R&D strategy and the regulator's choice of policy instrument. We find that when firms choose not to cooperate, an emission standard is socially preferable. Conversely, a tax is the better choice when firms collaborate in green R&D.

Key words: R&D Cooperation, Spillovers, taxes, standards, Cournot competition, policy games.

Code JEL: L13, O32, P48, Q55.

1 Introduction

Over the past 20 years or so, political initiatives have been undertaken in many OECD countries to encourage R&D spending through binding environmental policies that force firms to reduce polluting emissions. These initiatives can be assessed in light of Porter's hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), seemingly confirmed by recent empirical studies (Acemoglu et al., 2016), according to which firms can exploit environmental constraints by investing in profitable pollution abatement activities.

In this article, we instead investigate, from a theoretical point of view, how the cooperative or non-cooperative nature of environmental R&D may affect the effectiveness of environmental policies, depending on the chosen instrument and the government's ability to commit to its policy *ex-ante*.

* *Corresponding author*, Univ Rouen Normandie, Normandie Univ, LERN UR 4702, F-76000 Rouen, France. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9295-309X> (marie-laure.cabon-dhersin@univ-rouen.fr)

† ENS Paris-Saclay, CEPS, 4 avenue des sciences, 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette, France. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7279-4119> (natacha.raffin@ens-paris-saclay.fr)

As described by Requate (2005), pollution can be limited by command and control or market-based instruments. Command and control instruments, which are the most common, typically involve environmental standards (technological, emission or relative) and caps on firms' emissions. In contrast, market-based instruments in the form of emission taxes, subsidies for emissions abatement or tradeable permits, "provide incentives to reduce emissions through prices, and firms are free to decide how much they want to emit or to abate" (Requate (2005), p.178). This article focuses on two widely used policy instruments: i) an emission standard, and ii) an emission tax. In the presence of these binding environmental policies, firms decide how much to invest in green R&D on end-of-pipe technologies, either to minimize the costs associated with the tax or to ensure compliance with the specified cap in the case of an emission standard.

An established property of R&D in the literature is that it generates technological externalities (*i.e.* spillovers). These spillovers tend to discourage firms from investing in R&D because some of the knowledge generated is appropriated by their rivals (Arrow, 1962). Nevertheless, cooperative R&D is now recognized as an efficient incentive for innovation, as illustrated by the regulations adopted by the EU (Article 85 of the EEC treaty) and the United States (National Cooperative Research Act) to authorize agreements between competing firms. The seminal contribution on R&D cooperation in the presence of spillovers is d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (AJ from now on), and this article has formed the basis of a vast and expanding literature.¹ In the AJ model, two firms first choose a level of cost-reducing R&D investment, cooperatively or not, before competing in quantities. The main result is that above a specific spillover threshold, cooperative R&D investments yield a higher total surplus than non-cooperative R&D. Furthermore, R&D investments increase with the level of spillovers when firms cooperate but decrease when they do not. The crucial insight underlying this result is that cooperative firms internalize the effects of spillovers on aggregate profits while R&D rivals only consider the competitive effect of R&D flows on their respective costs. As shown by Kamien et al. (1992), investments in cooperative R&D are driven by two types of externalities: the 'competitive-advantage' externality, which involves free-riding and is unambiguously negative, and the 'combined-profits' externality, which can be positive or negative and accounts for the impact of each firm's R&D spending on the profits of all firms. This externality is internalized when firms cooperate in R&D and has a net positive effect when spillovers are sufficiently large.

In this article, we examine the impact of cooperation in green R&D on the effectiveness of environmental policies, depending on whether the instrument is a emission tax or an emission standard. To our knowledge, this issue has not yet been thoroughly explored in the literature, despite its relevance to the recent trend toward collaborations in green R&D. A representative example of such a collaboration is the "Research Association of Refinery Integration for Group-Operation (RING)" in Japan: this research program involving 20 companies from the oil and chemical industries developed technologies to reduce the environmental impact of production processes. Another example of a collaborative R&D initiative in the environmental domain is the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the United States, whose mandate is to coordinate multi-

¹See Marinucci (2012) for a review of the literature on R&D cooperation.

company collaborative R&D in the energy sector. Recent studies have considered these green R&D agreements, but only when the environmental policy instrument is a tax, by comparing cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies. However, the combination of R&D cooperation and an environmental standard has never been studied. Therefore, evaluating the performance of a standard and a tax in the context of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D allows us to shed new light on the optimal choice of environmental policy instrument. More broadly, these findings pave the way for an examination of endogenous decisions on the conduct of R&D and on the selection of environmental policy tools.

Another relevant dimension that should be taken into account when comparing standards and taxes, given whether firms collaborate or not in R&D, is the government's ability to enforce its policy. This issue of enforcement has been widely studied in the literature. First, uncertainty about the importance of environmental issues for future governments may limit regulators' commitment to enforcing present policies (Ulph and Ulph, 2013). Second, firms may strategically use innovation to lower regulatory constraints and increase profits (Gersbach and Glazer, 1999). Third, firms do not necessarily have the same innovation agenda as regulators. These reasons all affect the regulator's ability to commit to its policy. We therefore consider two specific policy game timings: i) the regulator adopts its environmental policy before firms choose their R&D investments (referred to as the *precommitment* policy game); ii) the firms choose their R&D efforts before the regulator chooses which policy instrument to use (referred to as the *time-consistent* policy game). Some famous examples of precommitment and time-consistent environmental policies in the automobile and nuclear industries are described in Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001), Puller (2006), Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2016) and Ouchida and Goto (2022).

The question we address relate the joint issues of the most appropriate environmental policy instrument and the adoption of cooperative R&D for the provision of end-of-pipe technologies depending on the timing of policy games. We do not compare the effectiveness of R&D cooperation versus non-cooperation (since this has already been investigated when the government adopts a tax), nor do we compare the performance of the two policy games. Instead, we explore different scenarios along three dimensions: *i*) the nature of the instrument (a standard or a tax); *ii*) the firms' R&D strategy (cooperation or non-cooperation); and *iii*) the timing of the policy game (precommitment vs. time-consistent). Based on the equilibrium outcomes obtained for each scenario, we compare the performance of the two environmental policies based on whether firms cooperate or not in R&D and on regulator's ability to commit *ex-ante*. This analysis builds on existing literature and provides further insights, in particular regarding environmental standards when firms cooperate in R&D in both policy games. Table 1 offers an overview of the literature on the three dimensions mentioned above. Our contribution complements these studies and provides a set of equilibrium outcomes allowing us to endogenize firms' strategies and the regulator's choice of policy instrument. Lastly, we expand our framework by considering the effects of the regulator authorizing or banning cooperation in green R&D before the firms make their strategic decisions.

We present a theoretical model of a multi-stage game. In both policy games, in stage

| | | R&D strategy | |
|-------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | Non-cooperation | Cooperation |
| Green policy tool | Tax | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lambertini et al. (2017) [<i>PC*</i>] • Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999, 2001) [<i>PC vs TC</i>] • Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002) [<i>PC vs TC</i>] • Montero (2011) [<i>TC</i>] • Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015, 2016) [<i>PC vs TC</i>] | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chiou and Hu (2001) • McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2017) [<i>PC</i>] • Ouchida and Goto (2016a,b) [<i>PC</i>] and [<i>TC</i>] • Ouchida and Goto (2022) [<i>PC vs TC</i>] • Poyago-Theotoky (2007) [<i>TC</i>] |
| | Standard | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015, 2016) [<i>PC vs TC</i>] | |

*: PC, precommitment; TC, time-consistent.

Table 1: Literature review.

0, firms decide whether to cooperate or not in R&D (sign a green R&D agreement or not). In contrast with previous studies, this decision is not exogenously given and may emerge as the equilibrium of the multi-stage game (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, SPNE). In stage 1 of the *precommitment* game, the regulator leads and optimally sets the level of the emission standard or the emission tax rate. Then, in stage 2, the firms (followers) invest cooperatively or non-cooperatively in green R&D before competing in quantities (in stage 3). Notice that if the regulator chooses to set an optimal emission standard, production levels depend on the equilibrium levels of (cooperative or non-cooperative) R&D: direct competition in quantities vanishes. In stage 1 of the *time-consistent* game, firms lead and optimally set their green R&D efforts. Then in stage 2, the regulator, as the follower, chooses the policy instrument and its stringency. Finally, in the last stage, the firms compete in quantities. We solve both games backward and determine equilibrium outcomes. Hence, for each policy game, we compare four different scenarios based on the firms' R&D strategy and the green policy tool. More precisely, depending on three relevant model parameters, namely the levels of spillover, environmental damage and R&D efficiency, we investigate the relative environmental performance of the two policy instruments. This is defined in terms of the difference in polluting emissions, from which we deduce differences in economic performance: R&D effort, output and welfare. We demonstrate that when firms cooperate in green R&D, an emission tax outperforms an emission standard in economic performance measures, regardless of the time-structure of the game. However, the environmental performance

of the tax can be lower than the standard's in the *precommitment* game. When the firms do not cooperate, i) the two environmental policy instruments are equivalent in terms of social welfare and environmental performance in the *precommitment* game, but ii) an emission standard can become the most socially and environmentally efficient policy in the *time-consistent* policy game provided R&D is relatively efficient. By resolving the SPNE for the two policy games, we conclude that two equilibrium strategies arise: when R&D cooperation is profitable for firms, the regulator implements an emission tax; conversely, when non-cooperation becomes more profitable for the firms, the regulator selects an emission standard.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3 and 4 respectively present the equilibrium results of the *precommitment* and *time-consistent* policy games. Section 5 compares the economic performance of taxes and standards as environmental policies. In Section 6, we solve the SPNE of both games and extend the benchmark model. Section 7 then concludes.

2 The model

Let us consider a duopoly where two identical competing firms, i, j , produce a homogeneous good with the same polluting production technology. Demand is described by a linear function $p(Q) = a - Q$, where $Q = q_i + q_j$ is the total amount of production (with $i \neq j$) and $a (> 0)$ is a measure of market size.

The production process in both firms is environmentally degrading: each unit of output generates exactly one unit of polluting emissions. However, the firms can reduce their emissions by investing in green R&D, z_i . Moreover, we assume that there are green R&D spillovers such that both firms benefit from their rival's pollution mitigation efforts in an exogenous proportion $\beta \in (0, 1]$, at no cost.² Accordingly, firm i 's net emissions after R&D investment can be expressed as:

$$e_i = e(q_i, z_i) = q_i - z_i - \beta z_j \quad (1)$$

Firm i 's cost function is additively separable and given by $C(q_i, z_i) = cq_i + \frac{\gamma}{2}z_i^2$, where c is the constant marginal cost of production ($c > 0$, $A \equiv a - c > 0$) and the R&D cost function is quadratic, leading to diminishing returns on R&D investments. In this context, γ is usually interpreted as a measure of R&D efficiency, with firms having to spend $\frac{\gamma}{2}z_i^2$ to reduce their emissions by z_i .

Given the firms' net emissions, the total level of emissions is $E = \sum_i^j e(q_i, z_i)$, and the level of environmental damage is $D(E)$. As usual in the literature, the damage function is assumed to be quadratic, with $d > 1$ being the slope of the marginal environmental

²In our approach, based on AJ's (1988), spillovers occur in abatement technologies and firms can freeride off their competitors' abatement efforts (*output spillover*). In Kamien et al.'s (1992) alternative approach, spillovers occur on the input side of the R&D process (*input spillover*). McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2017) have compared these two types of green R&D spillovers. They suggest AJ's model (1988) "*...is more suitable for modelling green technologies.*"

damage curve, *i.e.* the severity of the damage, $D(E) = \frac{d}{2}E^2$.³

To protect the environment, the government either implements an emission standard or a per unit tax on emissions. In what follows, we also investigate the effectiveness of these two environmental policy tools depending on the firms' green R&D strategy: non-cooperation ($h = nc$) or cooperation ($h = c$). We assume that competing firms are allowed to cooperate in R&D provided this is authorized by the regulator before the start of the game. This assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2.

- *When the regulator implements an Emission Standard Policy (ESP)*, in the absence of green R&D, firm i 's production level (*i.e.* its level of polluting emissions) is limited by the emission standard \bar{e}_i : $q_i = e_i \leq \bar{e}_i, \forall i, j$. Firms can produce more, $q_i > \bar{e}_i, \forall i, j$, provided they invest in R&D, but their net emissions must satisfy the following constraint: $\bar{e}_i = \bar{q}_i - \bar{z}_i - \beta\bar{z}_j, \forall i, j$.⁴ Therefore, once the cap on emissions is set by the regulator and the firms set their R&D efforts, per-firm outputs are governed by the following constraint: $\bar{q}_i = \bar{e}_i + \bar{z}_i + \beta\bar{z}_j, \forall i, j$. Because the firms are identical and the goods produced are homogeneous, we assume the same emission standard applies to both firms $\bar{e} = \bar{e}_i = \bar{e}_j$.⁵ When the firms do not cooperate in R&D ($h = nc$), the profit maximization program \mathcal{P}_1 is, $\forall i, j$:

$$\mathcal{P}_1 \begin{cases} \max_{\bar{z}_i} & \bar{\pi}_i = (A - \bar{Q})\bar{q}_i - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_i^2 \\ \text{s.t.} & \bar{q}_i = \bar{e} + \bar{z}_i + \beta\bar{z}_j \end{cases}$$

Alternatively, when the firms cooperate in R&D ($h = c$), they choose the level of green R&D that maximizes their joint profit under the two individual constraints defined by the emission standard.⁶ The program for the firms i, j is now:

$$\mathcal{P}_2 \begin{cases} \max_{\bar{z}_i} & \sum \bar{\pi}_i = (A - \bar{Q})(\bar{q}_i + \bar{q}_j) - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_i^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_j^2 \\ \text{s.t.} & \bar{q}_i = \bar{e} + \bar{z}_i + \beta\bar{z}_j \\ & \bar{q}_j = \bar{e} + \bar{z}_j + \beta\bar{z}_i \end{cases}$$

- *When the regulator adopts an Emission Tax Policy (ETP)*, the cap on emissions is replaced by a per unit tax on production (τq_i , with the emission tax $\tau > 0$) if they do not invest in green R&D. If they invest in green R&D on the other hand, the tax is applied on net emissions only. Therefore, they separately choose their levels of green R&D and production to maximize profits under the constraint given by

³In their analyses of an emission tax, Lambertini et al. (2017) and Ouchida and Goto (2016a, 2022) set a less restrictive threshold value for d of between 0.5 and 1. However, for our analysis of an emission standard in the time-consistent policy game, $d > 1$ is required to ensure strictly positive R&D efforts. See Section 4 below.

⁴All variables under an ESP are denoted by superscript \bar{x} .

⁵In this symmetric case, the results would nevertheless be the same if the firms had different emission caps.

⁶Our analysis also covers the case in which $\beta = 1$, that is when firms form a cartelized research joint venture (RJV) whereby they coordinate their R&D efforts and share all the resulting knowledge. This remark holds for both environmental policy instruments.

equation (1). In the non-cooperative scenario ($h = nc$), the profit maximization program is, $\forall i, j$:

$$\mathcal{P}_3 \begin{cases} \max_{z_i} & \pi_i = (A - Q)q_i - \frac{\gamma}{2}z_i^2 - \tau e_i \\ \text{s.t.} & e_i = q_i - z_i - \beta z_j \end{cases}$$

Alternatively, when the firms coordinate their green R&D investments ($h = c$), they maximize the sum of their profits with regard to $z_i, \forall i, j$, based on their own constraints and their rival's. Nevertheless, they still compete in production. The firms' program is thus:

$$\mathcal{P}_4 \begin{cases} \max_{z_i} & \sum \pi_i = (A - Q)(q_i + q_j) - \frac{\gamma}{2}z_i^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}z_j^2 - \tau(e_i + e_j) \\ \text{s.t.} & e_i = q_i - z_i - \beta z_j \\ & e_j = q_j - z_j - \beta z_i \end{cases}$$

The government chooses which policy instrument to use based on social welfare outcomes. In both scenarios, $h = nc, c$, the government maximizes its objective function and derives the optimal design of the standard or the tax. Under an ESP, social welfare (SW) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits minus environmental damage:

$$S\bar{W}^h = \underbrace{\frac{(\bar{Q}^h)^2}{2}}_{\text{Consumer surplus=CS}} + \underbrace{(\bar{\pi}_i^h + \bar{\pi}_j^h)}_{\text{Producer surplus=PS}} - \underbrace{D(\bar{E}^h)}_{\text{Environmental damage}} \quad (2)$$

Under an ETP, tax revenue needs to be included, such that:

$$SW^h = \frac{(Q^h)^2}{2} + (\pi_i^h + \pi_j^h) + \underbrace{\tau^h E^h}_{\text{Tax revenue}} - D(E^h) \quad (3)$$

Finally, we consider a multistage game with observable actions. To do this, we investigate two timing arrangements with either the government or the two competing firms choosing first (see Figure 1). Under both arrangements, the firms' choice to cooperate or not in green R&D at stage $t = 0$ is endogenous and can emerge as an equilibrium of the whole game. This hypothesis is consistent with real-life situations in which firms need to plan R&D partnerships in advance (signing R&D agreements is a potentially lengthy process) with no certainty regarding which environmental policy the government will chose.

The time structures of the game are described as follows:

1. In the precommitment game (indexed $\nu = PC$), the regulator commits to an emission standard or an emission tax depending on whether firms cooperate in green R&D or not (at stage $t = 0$). At stage $t = 1$, the government either sets the emission standard or the tax rate that maximizes social welfare. At stage $t = 2$, the firms set their green R&D efforts to maximize their profits (or their joint profit when they choose to cooperate in R&D at $t = 0$). At stage $t = 3$, the firms always set their production levels non-cooperatively.

2. In the time-consistent game (indexed $\nu = TC$), the government cannot credibly commit to an environmental policy. At stage $t = 1$, the two firms choose their levels of green R&D having decided to cooperate or not at $t = 0$, and the government chooses the environmental policy instrument (standard or tax) at stage $t = 2$. Once the environmental policy instrument is chosen, the government sets the standard or the tax rate that maximizes social welfare. At stage $t = 3$, the firms set their production levels non-cooperatively.




Figure 1: Timing of policy games.

We solve the two policy games by backward induction for the two types of environmental policy (emission standard or emission tax) and R&D strategies (non-cooperation or cooperation). Notice however that the production stage vanishes under an ESP in both timing arrangements (see also Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015, 2016)). Only three stages remain since outputs are pre-determined once the regulator has set the emission standard and both firms have chosen their green R&D efforts (see the presentation of the emission standard instrument above).

3 Precommitment game

In this section, we present the equilibrium outcomes for the two environmental policies in the non-cooperative and cooperative R&D subgames after the regulator commits to its policy tool (see Figure 1a).

3.1 Equilibrium Results

3.1.1 ESP

Since under an ESP, the competitive production stage of the game vanishes, we can begin our analysis directly at stage 2.

When the two firms do not cooperate in green R&D, firm i chooses the level of R&D investment that maximizes its profits given its environmental constraint \bar{e} , but ignoring its rival's environmental constraint.⁷ The maximization program, $\forall i, j: \mathcal{P}_1$ allows us to derive the first-order condition (FOC)

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i} = \frac{\partial \bar{q}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i} (A - 2(\bar{e} + \bar{z}_i + \beta \bar{z}_j) - (\bar{e} + \bar{z}_j + \beta \bar{z}_i)) - \gamma \bar{z}_i = 0$$

By symmetry, $\bar{z}_i^{nc} = \bar{z}_j^{nc} = \bar{z}^{nc}(\bar{e})$ and the solution of the above FOC yields the equilibrium level of R&D investment:

$$\bar{z}^{nc}(\bar{e}) = \frac{A - 3\bar{e}}{3(1 + \beta) + \gamma} \quad (4)$$

As expected, the equilibrium level of green R&D increases with the stringency of the environmental policy: firms tend to increase their R&D efforts if the government lowers the emission cap. The equilibrium output level as a function of emissions can then be directly deduced from the firms' environmental constraint:

$$\bar{q}^{nc}(\bar{e}) = \frac{(1 + \beta)A + \gamma \bar{e}}{3(1 + \beta) + \gamma} \quad (5)$$

Quite intuitively, at equilibrium, the stricter the standard, the lower the production, but this effect is mitigated when spillovers are high. Using equation (4) and assuming it is positive, we can also claim that spillovers boost production, despite their disincentive effect on green R&D.

Considering now the case where the firms cooperate in R&D, at stage 2, they choose the level of green R&D that maximizes their joint profit under the two individual constraints defined by program \mathcal{P}_2 . Then, the FOC w.r.t z_i , can be written, $\forall i, j$ and $i \neq j$:

$$\frac{\partial \sum \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial \bar{q}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i}}_{=1} \left(\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{q}_i} + \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_j}{\partial \bar{q}_i} \right) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \bar{q}_j}{\partial \bar{z}_i}}_{=\beta} \left(\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_j}{\partial \bar{q}_j} + \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{q}_j} \right) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i}}_{=-\gamma \bar{z}_i} = 0$$

As mentioned above, R&D cooperation implies that when maximizing their joint profit with respect to z , the firms tie their hands on production levels. Since polluting emissions are constrained, it is as if the firms simultaneously choose their levels of production and of R&D investment in a cartel-like manner.⁸ This behavior also prevails in the time consistent policy game ($\nu = TC$).

⁷This amounts to assuming that firm i anticipates that it cannot influence its rival's level of production and thus \bar{z}_j . Therefore it takes \bar{q}_j as given.

⁸Notice that when $\beta = 0$, we obtain the FOC of a production cartel for i : $\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{q}_i} + \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_j}{\partial \bar{q}_i} = \gamma \bar{z}_i$.

In the symmetric equilibrium, $\bar{z}^c = \bar{z}_i^c = \bar{z}_j^c$, the solution of the above FOC yields the firms' equilibrium R&D level as a function of the emission standard:

$$\bar{z}^c(\bar{e}) = (1 + \beta) \frac{(A - 4\bar{e})}{4(1 + \beta)^2 + \gamma} \quad (6)$$

Similarly to the non-cooperative scenario, the firms invest more in R&D when the government lowers the emission cap. However, in the cooperative scenario, the emission standard has a stronger effect ($|\frac{\partial \bar{z}^c}{\partial \bar{e}}| > |\frac{\partial \bar{z}^{nc}}{\partial \bar{e}}|$). Furthermore, whereas spillovers always have a negative effect on the equilibrium R&D effort in the non-cooperative scenario, in the cooperative scenario, this effect becomes positive for sufficiently high values of γ . The equilibrium output level can be deduced from the firms' constraint in program \mathcal{P}_2 :

$$\bar{q}^c(\bar{e}) = \frac{(1 + \beta)^2 A + \gamma \bar{e}}{4(1 + \beta)^2 + \gamma} \quad (7)$$

It is straightforward to check that for a given \bar{e} , this equilibrium output is lower in the cooperative scenario than in the non-cooperative one (see equation (5)), thereby confirming the cartel behavior.

At stage 1, since the regulator credibly commits to its environmental policy, it maximizes social welfare based on the firms' R&D strategies (see Figure 1a). Then, equation (2) and the equilibrium levels $\bar{z}^h(\bar{e})$ and $\bar{q}^h(\bar{e})$ (with $h = nc, c$) yield social welfare as a function of the emission standard only:

$$S\bar{W}^h(\bar{e}) = 2 \left(A (\bar{q}^h(\bar{e})) - (\bar{q}^h(\bar{e}))^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} (\bar{z}^h(\bar{e}))^2 - d\bar{e}^2 \right) \quad (8)$$

The optimal standard chosen by the regulator is such that the marginal benefit measured by the reduction in environmental damage is exactly offset by the loss of economic performance measured by the reduction in consumer surplus (from lower output) and the increase in investment costs, both caused by a stricter standard. The equilibrium emission standard is obtained from the FOC with respect to \bar{e} in each scenario:⁹

$$\begin{cases} \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,nc} = \gamma \frac{4+\beta+\gamma}{X} A \\ \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c} = \gamma \frac{6(1+\beta)^2+\gamma}{W} A, \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

with $X = 2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)^2+\gamma(9+2\gamma) > 0$ and $W = 2d(4(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)^2+2\gamma(8(1+\beta)^2+\gamma) > 0$. The equilibrium outcomes in both scenarios $h = nc, c$ are obtained from equations (9) (See Table 2.)

3.1.2 ETP

In this section, we briefly present the equilibrium outcomes when the regulator implements a tax on polluting emissions. This setting has previously been explored by Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001), Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002), Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) and Lambertini et al. (2017) for non-cooperating firms

⁹The second-order conditions of the welfare maximization program are always satisfied and this holds for the remainder of the paper.

and notably by Ouchida and Goto (2016a, 2022) and McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2017) for R&D cooperating firms has also been investigated. We therefore summarize the main results and refer the reader to this literature to explore the effects of slightly different assumptions regarding spillovers, products and/or innovation competition settings.

At stage 3, firm i chooses the output level q_i that maximizes its profit $\pi_i = (A - Q)q_i - \frac{\gamma}{2}z_i^2 - \tau e_i$, using equation (1) as a constraint. Regardless of whether the firms cooperate in green R&D or not, the symmetric equilibrium production level is:

$$q(\tau) = \frac{A - \tau}{3} \quad (10)$$

At stage 2, for $h = nc$, the two firms maximize their own profit w.r.t. z (see the program \mathcal{P}_3). On the contrary, when $h = c$, they choose to coordinate their efforts in green R&D and maximize the sum of their profits (see the program \mathcal{P}_4). By symmetry, we find the standard literature results:

$$\begin{cases} z^{nc}(\tau) = \frac{\tau}{\gamma} \\ z^c(\tau) = (1 + \beta)\frac{\tau}{\gamma} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

Green R&D investments always increase with the tax rate, leading to a reduction in polluting emissions. Notice that under R&D cooperation, the incentive to invest in green R&D increases with the degree of spillover, which is not the case in the non-cooperative scenario. Indeed, R&D cooperation ensures that free-riding is internalized, as in Ouchida and Goto (2016a, 2022). When the regulator adopts an ETP, the optimal tax is selected to maximize social welfare taking into account how firms will respond to it. Using equation (1) and substituting equations (10) and (11) into (3) yields the regulator's net surplus as a function of the tax:

$$SW^h(\tau) = 2 \left(A \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} \right) - \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} \right)^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} (z^h(\tau))^2 - d \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} - (1 + \beta)z^h(\tau) \right)^2 \right) \quad (12)$$

The equilibrium emission tax is obtained from the FOC with respect to τ in both scenarios, $h = nc, c$:

$$\begin{cases} \tau_{PC}^{*,nc} = \gamma \frac{2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)-\gamma}{X} A \\ \tau_{PC}^{*,c} = \gamma \frac{2d(3(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)-\gamma}{Y} A, \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

where $Y = 2d(3(1 + \beta)^2 + \gamma)^2 + \gamma(9(1 + \beta)^2 + 2\gamma) > 0$. Additional equilibrium outcomes can be calculated using equation (13). (See Table 2.)

3.2 Environmental performance in the precommitment policy game: ESP vs ETP

To compare the two environmental policy tools, we first focus on environmental performance only, on the basis that the primary goal of any environmental policy is to reduce environmental damage. We therefore compare equilibrium emission levels. Even though

environmental damage is a component of the social welfare function, we argue that considering the environmental measure separately is relevant as this is the regulator's main objective. Another motivation for this analysis is that the environmental measure has so far been rather neglected in the economic literature.

Using results from the previous subsections, we can derive two pairwise comparisons between individual equilibrium emissions¹⁰ depending on the firms' R&D strategy. The following proposition summarizes our first set of results:

Proposition 1 (Environmental performance). *For all admissible parameter values, when the government credibly commits ($\nu = PC$),*

- $e_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$;
- $e_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c} > 0$.

Proof. See Appendix A. □

We first justify the equivalency between an ESP and an ETP in the precommitment policy game as stated in Proposition 1. In the R&D/production stage, the firms compete in the same way under the two instruments. Under an ETP, the tax burden vanishes: the increase in tax from one additional unit of polluting production is exactly offset by the decrease in taxation due to one additional unit of R&D effort. The firms' only consideration when choosing their R&D investments is the trade-off between the direct cost of R&D and its benefit in terms of increased production. This is the same trade-off as under an ESP. The competition conditions are therefore exactly the same whether the policy instrument is an emission tax or an emission standard. Formally, for the same level of emissions under an ESP and an ETP $\bar{e} = e(\tau) = q(\tau) - (1 + \beta)z(\tau) = \frac{A}{3} - \frac{3(1+\beta)+\gamma}{3\gamma}\tau$, the green R&D efforts are identical ($z^{nc}(\tau) = \bar{z}^{nc}(e(\tau)) = \tau/\gamma$) and consequently, so are production levels ($q^{nc}(\tau) = \bar{q}^{nc}(e(\tau))$). Therefore, whether the government chooses an optimal tax or an optimal standard, its objective function is:

$$SW^{nc}(\tau) = S\bar{W}^{nc}(e(\tau)).$$

This directly implies that for a given optimal ETP, there is one and only one optimal ESP that yields an identical level of welfare. This result has already been partially reported in the literature (see Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015, 2016)). However, in our setup, it is obtained in a duopoly game rather than for a monopoly, and in the presence of R&D spillovers.

Interestingly, this correspondence between tax and standard vanishes when the firms cooperate in R&D: equilibrium emissions become lower under an ESP. The mechanisms involved under an ESP differ considerably from those under an ETP, particularly when the firms cooperate in green R&D. An ETP provides firms with an additional degree of freedom that does not exist under an ESP. Under an optimal ETP, the firms choose their R&D expenditure and their levels of production separately (which allows them to endogenize the level of emissions). Under an optimal ESP on the other hand, the firms

¹⁰To be precise, we compare after-tax equilibrium emission levels with equilibrium emission standards.

simultaneously choose their levels of production and R&D investment, since polluting emissions are limited by the cap on emissions. The firms' incentive is then to circumvent the environmental constraint by forming a cartel, choosing to produce less rather than invest in R&D, irrespective of the efficiency of green technology and spillovers (see Section 3.1.1). Faced with the economic costs of the firms' cartel behavior, and to mitigate the reduction in consumer surplus, the government is then inclined to enforce a tighter emission standard to benefit from reduced environmental damage. On the contrary, since R&D cooperation stimulates greater R&D efforts under an ETP, the government reacts by lowering the tax rate (Ouchida and Goto, 2016a). This further stimulates production and thus individual emissions.

4 Time-consistent game

In this section, we present the equilibrium outcomes for the two environmental policies as they arise in the non-cooperative and cooperative R&D subgames when the regulator is unable to commit to its policy tool (see Figure 1b).

4.1 Equilibrium results

4.1.1 ESP

Just as in the previous policy game, when the regulator implements an emission standard, stage 3 of the game vanishes. Recall also that in the time-consistent policy game the firms choose their optimal levels of green R&D before the regulator chooses which policy to implement. We therefore jump to stage 2 of the game where the regulator selects the emission standard that maximizes social welfare. The social welfare function is the same in both scenarios $h = nc, c$. Using the firms' environmental constraints and equation (2), social welfare can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} S\bar{W}(\bar{e}, \bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j) &= \frac{(\bar{q}_i + \bar{q}_j)^2}{2} + (A - \bar{Q})(\bar{q}_i + \bar{q}_j) - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_i^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_j^2 - \frac{d}{2}(2\bar{e})^2 \\ &= A(2\bar{e} + (1 + \beta)(\bar{z}_i + \bar{z}_j)) - \frac{1}{2}(2\bar{e} + (1 + \beta)(\bar{z}_i + \bar{z}_j))^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_i^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\bar{z}_j^2 - \frac{d}{2}(2\bar{e})^2 \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Maximizing this function w.r.t. \bar{e} , we obtain the equilibrium emission standard as a function of the two firms' R&D efforts:

$$\bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j) = \frac{A - (1 + \beta)(\bar{z}_i + \bar{z}_j)}{2(1 + d)} \quad (15)$$

Since the firms play first, the optimal emission standard becomes less stringent as the firms' R&D efforts decrease, whenever they choose to cooperate in R&D or not. In addition, this effect becomes larger as β increases and d decreases.

At stage 1, we can solve for the firms' equilibrium R&D levels, depending on their cooperation strategy and given that they anticipate the effect this choice will have on the regulator's decision.

Again, in the non-cooperative scenario ($h = nc$), the firms take no account of their rival's environmental constraint. Hence, inserting equation (15) into program \mathcal{P}_1 , the

FOC on \bar{z}_i is:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i} = \left(\frac{\partial \bar{q}_i}{\partial \bar{e}} \frac{\partial \bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j)}{\partial \bar{z}_i} + 1 \right) (A - 2(\bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j) + \bar{z}_i + \beta \bar{z}_j) - (\bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j) + \bar{z}_j + \beta \bar{z}_i)) - \gamma \bar{z}_i = 0$$

In the cooperative scenario ($h = c$), inserting equation (15) into program \mathcal{P}_2 yields the FOC on \bar{z}_i :

$$\frac{\partial \sum \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{z}_i} = \left(\frac{\partial \bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j)}{\partial \bar{z}_i} \left(\frac{\partial \bar{q}_i}{\partial \bar{e}} + \frac{\partial \bar{q}_j}{\partial \bar{e}} \right) + (1 + \beta) \right) (A - 2(2\bar{e}(\bar{z}_i, \bar{z}_j) + (1 + \beta)(\bar{z}_i + \beta \bar{z}_j)) - \gamma \bar{z}_i = 0$$

At the symmetric equilibrium, $\bar{z}_i = \bar{z}_j = \bar{z}$, the solutions of the above FOCs yield the equilibrium green R&D efforts in both scenarios:

$$\begin{cases} \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,nc} = \frac{(-1+4d^2+\beta-2d\beta)}{\Theta} A > 0, \\ \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,c} = (1 + \beta) \frac{d(d-1)}{\Psi} A > 0 \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

where $\Theta = 4\gamma(1+d)^2 + 6d(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta) > 0$ and $\Psi = \gamma(1+d)^2 + 4d^2(1+\beta)^2 > 0$. Finally, inserting equations (16) into (15), yields the equilibrium emission standards:

$$\begin{cases} \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,nc} = \frac{A-2(1+\beta)\bar{z}_{TC}^{*,nc}}{2(1+d)} = \frac{2\gamma(1+d)+(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta)}{\Theta} A, \\ \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,c} = \frac{A-2(1+\beta)\bar{z}_{TC}^{*,c}}{2(1+d)} = \frac{\gamma(1+d)+2d(1+\beta)^2}{2\Psi} A \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

Additional equilibrium outcomes can be calculated using equation (17). (See Table 3.)

4.1.2 ETP

Stage 3 of this policy game is identical to the one under precommitment: the equilibrium outputs are therefore given by equation (10). In stage 2, under an ETP and in both scenarios $h = nc, c$, the regulator considers the following social welfare function, obtained by inserting equations (1) and (10) into equation (3):

$$\begin{aligned} SW(\tau, z_i, z_j) &= \frac{(2q(\tau))^2}{2} + (A - 2q(\tau))(2q(\tau)) - \gamma \frac{z_i^2}{2} - \gamma \frac{z_j^2}{2} - \frac{d}{2} \left(2q(\tau) - (1 + \beta) \sum_i z_i \right)^2 \\ &= 2A \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} \right) - 2 \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} \right)^2 - \gamma \frac{z_i^2}{2} - \gamma \frac{z_j^2}{2} - \frac{d}{2} \left(2 \left(\frac{A - \tau}{3} \right) - (1 + \beta) \sum_i z_i \right)^2 \end{aligned}$$

The government's reaction function when selecting the welfare maximizing emission tax rate is:

$$\tau(z_i, z_j) = \frac{(2d-1)A - 3d(1+\beta)(z_i + z_j)}{2(1+d)} \quad (18)$$

The emission level as a function of the firms' R&D efforts can be deduced from equation (1):

$$\begin{aligned} e(z_i, z_j) &= q(\tau(z_i, z_j)) + z_i + \beta z_j \\ &= \frac{A - (d(1-\beta) + 2)z_i + (d(1-\beta) - 2\beta)z_j}{2(1+d)} \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

In contrast with the outcomes under an ESP, the firms' emissions do not necessarily mirror their R&D efforts. For high enough values of d ($> \frac{2\beta}{(1-\beta)}$) for instance, an increase in one firm's R&D effort increases emissions for both firms. Again, the welfare performance of an ETP when the regulator is forced to introduce a time-consistent emission tax has already been studied (Ouchida and Goto, 2016b, 2022; Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2015, 2016; Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2001; Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwanajak, 2002; Poyago-Theotoky, 2007). Hence, we only briefly describe the main results when the two firms set their R&D levels in stage $t = 1$, taking into account how the regulator will react to this. In the non-cooperative scenario, in line with program \mathcal{P}_3 , firm i maximizes its profits expressed as follows:

$$\pi_i(z_i, z_j) = (A - 2q(\tau(z_i, z_j)))q(\tau(z_i, z_j)) - \frac{\gamma}{2}(z_i)^2 - \tau(z_i, z_j)(q(\tau(z_i, z_j)) - z_i - \beta z_j)$$

In the cooperative scenario, firm i instead maximizes $\sum_i \pi_i(z_i, z_j)$ (see program \mathcal{P}_4). In both cases $h = nc, c$, $\tau(z_i, z_j)$ is given by equation (18).

At the symmetric equilibrium $z_i = z_j = z_{TC}$, the solutions of the FOCs yield the equilibrium green R&D efforts for $h = \{nc, c\}$:

$$\begin{cases} z_{TC}^{*,nc} = \frac{(2d-1)(1+d)+d(1+\beta)}{\Omega} A \\ z_{TC}^{*,c} = (1+\beta) \frac{\Omega}{\Delta} A \end{cases} \quad (20)$$

where $\Omega = 2\gamma(1+d)^2 + d(1+\beta)(3(3+\beta) + d(7+\beta)) > 0$ and $\Delta = 2\gamma(1+d)^2 + 4d(3+2d)(1+\beta)^2 > 0$.

The equilibrium emissions of each firm are obtained by inserting equations (20) into (19):

$$e_{TC}^{*,h} = \frac{A - 2(1+\beta)z_{TC}^{*,h}}{2(1+d)} \quad (21)$$

Interestingly, in the time-consistent policy game, the government reacts in the same way to the firms' prior R&D choices no matter what the chosen environmental policy tool or R&D strategy is: the lower the green R&D investment, the higher the emissions, by a factor $\frac{1+\beta}{1+d}$ (see also equation (17) for the ESP).

Notice also that all the equilibrium outcomes of this policy game can be deduced from equations (20) (see Table 3).

4.2 Environmental performance in the time-consistent policy game: ESP vs ETP

The results from subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 can be used to compare equilibrium emissions under an ESP and an ETP in the time-consistent policy game, depending on the firms' R&D strategy. The following proposition summarizes our second set of results:

Proposition 2 (Environmental performance). *For all admissible parameter values, when the government cannot commit ex-ante ($\nu = TC$),*

- $e_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,nc} \geq 0$ if $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)]$ and $e_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,nc} < 0$ if $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$;

- $e_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,c} < 0$,

with $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) = \frac{d(1+\beta)(2d-3)(2d+1-\beta)}{2(1+d)(4d-1)}$, $\bar{\gamma}'_{\beta}(\beta, d) > 0$ and $\bar{\gamma}'_d(\beta, d) > 0$ when $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) > 0$.

Proof. See Appendix B. □

In the time-consistent policy game, when the firms do not cooperate in green R&D, the relative environmental performance of the two instruments crucially depends on the parameters of the model: equilibrium emissions under an ESP can be lower than under an ETP when R&D efficiency is high (γ is low), but when γ is relatively high, emissions are always lower under an ETP. While a tax and a standard always have the same environmental performance in the precommitment game, this is only the case in the time-consistent game for $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$. Notice that the higher the degree of spillovers and/or the more severe the environmental damage is/are, the higher the threshold $\bar{\gamma}$ is.

Also in contrast with the results of the precommitment policy game (see Proposition 1), when the firms cooperate in green R&D, equilibrium emissions are higher under an ESP than under an ETP. Under an ESP, the firms' incentive is to diminish their R&D efforts in both policy games, albeit because of different underlying mechanisms. In the precommitment policy game, the firms, who play after the government, adapt to the environmental policy by reducing their R&D efforts, resulting in lower outputs – a manifestation of cartel behavior. In the time-consistent policy game, cartel behavior also arises, but here the firms proactively aim to influence the government's policy in their favor by advocating for a less stringent emission standard. This phenomenon is analogous to the 'ratchet' effect observed in US automobile emissions regulations in the 1970s: manufacturers' slowness in developing emission reduction technologies forced the Environmental Protection Agency to delay the implementation of regulations.

Under an ETP, the firms also use their leading role in the time-consistent game to shape government policy. However, in this framework, both firms will spend more on green R&D to mitigate their tax burden (see equation (18)). This increase in R&D efforts leads to a reduction in emissions, which become lower than under an ESP. In the following indeed, we show that under an ETP, R&D efforts are always higher, especially when the firms cooperate (see Proposition 3).

Together, propositions 1 and 2 show that neither of the two policy instruments is environmentally preferable under all circumstances, but rather than the timing of the policy game and the firms' R&D strategy play a crucial role in determining the relative performance of the policy instruments. The following section compares the two instruments in terms of innovation, output and social welfare.

5 Economic performance: ESP vs ETP

The differences in equilibrium emission levels allow us to directly compare the economic performance of the ESP and ETP in the two policy games and R&D scenarios. In particular, we can show that differences in economic performance in terms of innovation, production, and welfare are linearly related to the relative environmental performance of the two instruments. The following lemma formally establishes this result.

Lemma 1. *For all admissible parameter values, the equilibrium differences in R&D, production and social welfare can be expressed as functions of the equilibrium difference in emissions:*

- $z_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{z}_{\nu}^{*,h} = \frac{Z_{\nu}^h}{(1+\beta)}(e_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{\nu}^{*,h})$
- $q_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{q}_{\nu}^{*,h} = Q_{\nu}^h(e_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{\nu}^{*,h})$
- $SW_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{SW}_{\nu}^{*,h} = \mathcal{SW}_{\nu}^h(e_{\nu}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{\nu}^{*,h})$

with $\nu = \{PC, TC\}$, $h = \{nc, c\}$ and where $Z_{\nu}^h, Q_{\nu}^h, \mathcal{SW}_{\nu}^h$ are constants that depend on parameters d, γ , and β .

Proof. See Appendix C. □

Lemma 1 shows that $Q_{\nu}^h - Z_{\nu}^h = 1$ for all $h = \{nc, c\}$ and $\nu = \{PC, TC\}$ because of the binding environmental target presented in equation (1). These results can then be used to assess differences in welfare, leading to the four following pairwise comparisons:

Proposition 3 (Economic performance). *For all admissible parameter values and using the results of Propositions 1, 2 and Lemma 1,*

i) *When the government credibly commits ($\nu = PC$),*

- *for any values of Z_{PC}^{nc}, Q_{PC}^{nc} and \mathcal{SW}_{PC}^{nc} , $z_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{z}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$, $q_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{q}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$ and $SW_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{SW}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$;*
- *Z_{PC}^c, Q_{PC}^c and \mathcal{SW}_{PC}^c are positive. Hence, $z_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{z}_{PC}^{*,c} > 0$, $q_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{q}_{PC}^{*,c} > 0$ and $SW_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{SW}_{PC}^{*,c} > 0$.*

ii) *When the government cannot commit ex-ante ($\nu = TC$), Z_{TC}^h, Q_{TC}^h and \mathcal{SW}_{TC}^h are negative and identical for $h = nc, c$. Hence,*

- *$z_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,nc} \leq 0$, $q_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,nc} \leq 0$ and $SW_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{SW}_{TC}^{*,nc} \leq 0$ if $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)]$ and the opposite holds if $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$;*
- *$z_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,c} > 0$, $q_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,c} > 0$ and $SW_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{SW}_{TC}^{*,c} > 0$.*

Proof. See Appendix C. □

Obviously, the identical equilibrium emission levels when the firms do not cooperate and the regulator is able to commit ex-ante imply that the economic equilibrium outcomes are the same. The government is therefore indifferent between the two policy instruments. However, when the regulator implements a time-consistent policy, the differences in economic outcomes are of opposite sign to the difference in emissions (see Lemma 1). Since the difference in emissions is negative for $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the ETP performs better both from an environmental and an economic point of view. Obviously, when $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d))$, it is the ESP that performs better in both regards. To conclude, for all positive values of γ , one of the instruments always outperforms the other in terms of economic and environmental outcomes in the non-cooperative scenario.

Ultimately, irrespective of the game's timing, when the firms cooperate in green R&D, an ETP proves to be economically superior, as firms under an ESP tend to behave as a cartel. However, the potential divergence of economic and environmental outcomes should also be considered. In particular, an ETP encourages increased R&D efforts and higher production levels, contributing to overall welfare improvement. However, in the precommitment policy game, this also leads to higher emissions compared with the ESP. In contrast, in the time-consistent policy game under an ESP, the firms compel the government to loosen the emission standard. This influence is achieved through a greater decrease in green R&D investments than in outputs, which adversely affects environmental performance. Therefore, in the cooperative scenario in the time-consistent policy game, an ETP outperforms an ESP both from an economic and an environmental point of view.

6 SPNE: Cooperation or not in green R&D?

In this section, we first solve the SPNE of the whole game for the two policy games. We then consider an extension featuring a pre-game stage where the regulator chooses whether to allow or ban green R&D cooperation.

6.1 SPNE

At $t = 0$, the firms compare the equilibrium profits associated with the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. R&D cooperation is profitable if firms earn more profit than they would if they did not cooperate. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 4 (SPNE). *Equilibrium strategies arise from the SPNE outcomes for all admissible parameter values:*

- i) *When the government credibly commits ($\nu = PC$),*
 - *for $\gamma \geq \hat{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms cooperate in green R&D and the regulator implements an ETP;*
 - *for $\hat{\gamma}(\beta, d) \geq \gamma$, the firms do not cooperate in green R&D and the regulator is indifferent between an ESP and an ETP;*
- ii) *When the government cannot commit ex-ante ($\nu = TC$),*
 - *for $\gamma \geq \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms cooperate in green R&D and the regulator implements an ETP;*
 - *for $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) \geq \gamma \geq \underline{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms do not cooperate in green R&D and the regulator implements an ESP;*
 - *for $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) \geq \underline{\gamma}(\beta, d) \geq \gamma$, the firms cooperate in green R&D and the regulator implements an ETP.*

Proof. We first obtain the SPNE by solving the precommitment policy game by backward induction (see Figure 1a). From Proposition 3, we know that when the firms cooperate, social welfare is always higher under an ETP, so the regulator chooses to implement a tax. When the firms do not cooperate, the regulator is indifferent between an ETP and an ESP. The firms then compare their profits with and without R&D cooperation, depending on the instrument chosen by the regulator. Profits for non-cooperative firms are larger under an ESP (than under an ETP): $\bar{\pi}_{PC}^{*,nc} - \pi_{PC}^{*,nc} = -\tau_{PC}^{*,nc} \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,nc}$. The government therefore adopts an emission standard (rather than a tax). Indeed, although the two instruments are equivalent in terms of welfare, the regulator will tend to choose the instrument that leads to larger profits for the firms. The firms must therefore compare their individual non-cooperative profits under an ESP with their individual profits under an ETP with cooperation in R&D. Because the analytical expression for the profit difference $\pi_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{\pi}_{PC}^{*,nc}$ is not tractable, we plot $\hat{\gamma}(\beta, d)$ in Figure 2 such that $\pi_{PC}^{*,c}(\hat{\gamma}(\beta, d)) = \bar{\pi}_{PC}^{*,nc}(\hat{\gamma}(\beta, d))$. Hence, for $\gamma < \hat{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms choose not to cooperate and the regulator enforces an emission standard. On the contrary, when $\gamma > \hat{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms choose to cooperate and the regulator implements a tax. Second, we obtain the SPNE by solving the time-consistent policy game by backward induction (see Figure 1b). Again, from Proposition 3, we know that an ETP outperforms an ESP when the firms cooperate in green R&D since $SW_{TC}^{*,c} > \bar{SW}_{TC}^{*,c}$. When the firms do not cooperate in R&D, an ETP only dominates over an ESP if $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$. Then, the firms must compare $\pi_{TC}^{*,c} - \pi_{TC}^{*,nc}$ for $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$. Otherwise, they assess the following difference: $\pi_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{\pi}_{TC}^{*,nc}$. Following Poyago-Theotoky (2007), the firms always prefer R&D cooperation when the regulator implements a tax ($\pi_{TC}^{*,c} > \bar{\pi}_{TC}^{*,nc}$), that is for $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}(\beta, d)$. Because the analytical expression for the difference in profits $\pi_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{\pi}_{TC}^{*,nc}$ is not tractable, we plot $\underline{\gamma}(\beta, d)$ in Figure 3 such that $\pi_{TC}^{*,c}(\underline{\gamma}(\beta, d)) = \bar{\pi}_{TC}^{*,nc}(\underline{\gamma}(\beta, d))$. When $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) > \gamma > \underline{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms choose not to cooperate in R&D and the regulator enforces an emission standard. When $\gamma < \underline{\gamma}(\beta, d)$, the firms choose to cooperate in green R&D and the regulator implements a tax. \square




Figure 2: SPNE in the precommitment policy game.

Building on Proposition 4, we assert that only two equilibrium strategies can emerge. When firms opt for cooperation, the ETP is socially preferable. Conversely, when they




Figure 3: SPNE in the time-consistent policy game.

choose not to cooperate, an emission standard becomes the preferred option. Consequently, the equilibrium strategy of cooperating in green R&D and adopting an ESP (entailing cartel-like behavior in production) is excluded in both policy games. This aligns with the antitrust regulations implemented in many jurisdictions.

Figure 2 illustrates the fact that spillovers promote the "cooperation-ETP" combination in the precommitment policy game (see the gray areas that expand with increasing β). However, this sensitivity is marginal in the time-consistent policy game, as shown in Figure 3. Additionally, we observe that as environmental damage becomes more severe (high d), the "non-cooperation-ESP" combination becomes more likely at equilibrium in both policy games. Nevertheless, this trend does not hold if R&D is highly efficient in the time-consistent policy game.

In conclusion, although the γ thresholds are different, some parameter configurations lead to similar outcomes in both policy games: i) for high values of γ and moderate values of d , "cooperation-ETP" emerges as the SPNE; ii) for intermediate values of γ and relatively large values of d , "non-cooperation-ESP" prevails at equilibrium. The primary distinction between the two policy games lies in the corresponding d and γ ranges. When R&D is efficient in particular: "cooperation-ETP" is endogenously adopted only in the time-consistent policy game.

6.2 Extended Game: Preemptive Authorization or Ban on Green R&D Cooperation

Let us now assume that the regulator determines beforehand whether to permit or prohibit green R&D cooperation before the firms make their strategic decisions. This introduces an additional pre-game stage, ensuring that the firms' endogenous choices align with the regulator's interests. Moreover, this expanded time structure is justified by the relatively inflexible nature of regulations allowing or prohibiting cooperation, as these decisions occur at the very outset of the game. Using results from previous sections, we can claim the following:

Proposition 5 (Expanded SPNE).

- i) In the precommitment policy game, the regulator never prohibits cooperation in green R&D;
- ii) In the time-consistent policy game, the regulator should prohibit green R&D cooperation when R&D is highly efficient.

Proof. We solve the SPNE by backward induction. In the precommitment game, for $\gamma > \hat{\gamma}$, if cooperation is allowed, the firms cooperate and the government implements a tax. If R&D cooperation is prohibited, the regulator is indifferent between an ESP and an ETP. At the pre-game stage, the comparison is between $SW_{PC}^{*,c}$ and $SW_{PC}^{*,nc} = \bar{S}W_{PC}^{*,nc}$. Yet, from (Ouchida and Goto, 2016a, 2022), we know that cooperation promotes higher social welfare, so the regulator allows cooperation. In addition, when $\gamma < \hat{\gamma}$, the firms choose not to cooperate anyway. In the precommitment policy game therefore, the regulator should always allow green R&D cooperation. In the time-consistent policy game, when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}$, the firms cooperate and the regulator implements a tax. If R&D cooperation is banned and the firms do not cooperate, the regulator also implements an ETP. In the pre-game stage, the regulator then compares $SW_{TC}^{*,c}$ and $SW_{TC}^{*,nc}$. Poyago-Theotoky (2007) shows that $SW_{TC}^{*,c} > SW_{TC}^{*,nc}$ for $\gamma > \frac{d(1+\beta)^2(1-\beta)(3-2d)}{2(2d\beta(d+1)-\beta+d)}$. It is easy to show that this threshold value of γ is always lower than $\bar{\gamma}$. Hence, the regulator allows R&D cooperation. When $\bar{\gamma} > \gamma > \underline{\gamma}$, the firms do not cooperate and the regulator is indifferent between allowing and banning cooperation. Finally, when $\bar{\gamma} > \underline{\gamma} > \gamma$, the firms choose to cooperate and the regulator implements a tax. If R&D cooperation is prohibited, the firms do not cooperate but the regulator adopts an ESP. In the pre-game stage, the regulator compares $SW_{TC}^{*,c}$ and $\bar{S}W_{TC}^{*,nc}$ and we obtain a new threshold on γ , $\gamma^{Ban}(\beta, d)$, which is always higher than $\underline{\gamma}(\beta, d) \forall \beta, d$, so that $SW_{TC}^{*,c} < \bar{S}W_{TC}^{*,nc}$ (see Figure 4). Hence, for all $\gamma < \underline{\gamma}$, the regulator should prohibit green R&D cooperation.




Figure 4: Authorization versus ban, for $\beta = 0.3$

□

Overall, the regulator typically permits green R&D cooperation, except in cases where R&D is highly efficient in the time-consistent policy game. Under these circumstances, "non-cooperation-ESP" outperforms "cooperation-ETP". This outcome stems

from two key factors: i) as indicated in the literature, particularly by Poyago-Theotoky (2007), cooperation under an ETP is less favorable than independent R&D when R&D is highly efficient; ii) according to Proposition 3, when firms abstain from cooperation and γ is relatively low, an ESP performs better from an economic perspective.

In conclusion, one of the SPNE in the time-consistent policy game disappears when the regulator prohibits R&D cooperation before the firms make strategic decisions. Specifically, the "cooperation-ETP" area for low values of γ depicted in Figure 3 disappears and "non-cooperation-ESP" becomes the SPNE. The range of parameters for which "non-cooperation-ESP" emerges as the equilibrium of the whole game is thus extended. This result also has policy implications. The optimal environmental policy tool depends on firms' R&D strategy, regardless of the time-structure of the policy game: an emission standard is chosen when firms opt not to cooperate, while a tax is preferred when firms coordinate their green R&D efforts. Furthermore, considering the regulator's interest in green R&D cooperation (as examined by this extension of the game) suggests that public policy should also discourage collaborations in green R&D when R&D is sufficiently efficient.

7 Conclusion

Our theoretical model provides novel insights into the selection of environmental policies by encompassing firms' green R&D strategy and the regulator's ability to commit to policies *ex-ante*. To do this, we first compared two policy tools, an emission standard and an emission tax in terms of environmental and economic criteria. We then highlighted the equilibrium choices that emerge at the SPNE of the two policy games.

We show that when firms coordinate their green R&D efforts, an emission tax is the most socially desirable policy instrument, regardless of the time-structure of the policy game. Conversely, an emission standard is more desirable when the firms choose not to cooperate. This is a relevant insight for environmental policy recommendations.

This article paves the way for future studies. First, our findings are derived for a duopolistic market and need to be validated in an oligopolistic market. Second, an insightful extension of our framework would be to consider different forms of emission standards, including the concept of a "performance standard" (Amir et al., 2018; Montero, 2002). Further insights may also be gained by investigating other environmental policies, such as tradeable permits, and additional innovation policy instruments such as R&D subsidies. Building on the work of Biglaiser and Horowitz (1994), our framework could be extended to investigate environmental policies that combine a tax and an emission standard. Lastly, relaxing the assumption of symmetric firms and testing the robustness of our conclusions when firms differ in R&D efficiency, leading, as discussed in Strandholm et al. (2018), to asymmetric environmental policies, would also be interesting.

Appendices

A Proof of Proposition 1

From equations (1) and (10) and (11) the emissions generated by the two firms can be expressed as:

$$e(\tau_{PC}^{*,nc}) = \frac{A - \tau_{PC}^{*,nc}}{3} - (1 + \beta) \frac{\tau_{PC}^{*,nc}}{\gamma} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Using the equilibrium ETP (see equation (13)) we obtain:

$$e_{PC}^{*,nc} = e(\tau_{PC}^{*,nc}) = \gamma \frac{4 + \beta + \gamma}{X} A \quad (\text{A.2})$$

and we easily observe that $e_{PC}^{*,nc} = \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,nc}$.

We follow a similar reasoning when the firms cooperate. Equations (1), (10), (11) and (13) yield:

$$e_{PC}^{*,c} = e(\tau_{PC}^{*,c}) = \gamma \frac{4(1 + \beta)^2 + \gamma}{Y} A \quad (\text{A.3})$$

The emission differential for $h = c$ can then be expressed using equation (9):

$$e_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c} = \gamma(2d(1 + \beta)^2 + \gamma)(10(1 + \beta)^2 + 3\gamma) \frac{(1 + \beta)^2}{YW} A \quad (\text{A.4})$$

which is always positive.

B Proof of Proposition 2

We follow the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, but for the sake of simplicity we refer the reader to equilibrium results presented in Table 3. We then compare equilibrium emissions when the firms do not cooperate:

$$e_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,nc} = -(\gamma - \bar{\gamma}) \frac{(1 + \beta)^2}{\Omega\Theta} A, \quad (\text{B.5})$$

with $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) = \frac{d(1+\beta)(2d-3)(2d+1-\beta)}{2(1+d)(4d-1)}$, $\bar{\gamma}'_{\beta}(\beta, d) > 0$ and $\bar{\gamma}'_d(\beta, d) > 0$ when $\bar{\gamma}(\beta, d) > 0$. Hence, for $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}]$, $(e_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,nc}) > 0$, otherwise it is negative. Finally, we compare equilibrium emissions when the firms cooperate in green R&D and express the difference as follows:

$$e_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,c} = - (8d^2(1 + \beta)^2 + (1 + d)(5d - 1)\gamma) \frac{(1 + \beta)^2}{\Psi\Delta} A, \quad (\text{B.6})$$

which is always negative.

C Proof of Lemma 1

1) Precommitment Policy Game

1.1) *Non-cooperative Scenario*: Using the results from Proposition 1, in the precommitment policy game, because the equilibrium emissions are identical with a tax and with a standard, when the firms do not cooperate in R&D, all equilibrium outcome in terms of R&D, production and social welfare are also identical. The proof can be sketched out as follows. First, we show that the social welfare functions (8) and (12) are identical and then we claim that optimization yields only one possible relationship between the two environmental policy instruments. From equations (1), (10) and (11), we can write that $\bar{e} = e(\tau) = q(\tau) - (1 + \beta)z(\tau) = \frac{A}{3} - \frac{3(1+\beta)+\gamma}{3\gamma}\tau$. We then deduce that $S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e}) = S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e}(\tau))$.

1) Using equation (12),

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial SW_{PC}^{nc}(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{2}{9\gamma^2} (\gamma A(2d(3(1+\beta) + \gamma) - \tau(2d(3(1+\beta) + \gamma)^2 + \gamma(9 + 2\gamma))) \\ \text{cst}(SW_{PC}^{nc}(0)) = \frac{3}{9}A^2 \end{cases}$$

and using equation (8),

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e}(\tau))}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e}(\tau))}{\partial \bar{e}} \cdot \frac{\partial \bar{e}}{\partial \tau} = \frac{2}{9\gamma^2} (\gamma A(2d(3(1+\beta) + \gamma) - \tau(2d(3(1+\beta) + \gamma)^2 + \gamma(9 + 2\gamma))) \\ \text{cst}(S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e}(0))) = \frac{3}{9}A^2 \end{cases}$$

thus $SW^{nc}(\tau) = S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(e(\tau)) \quad \forall \tau$.

2) If $SW_{PC}^{nc}(\tau) = S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(e(\tau)) = S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}(\bar{e})$, the maximum values of $S\bar{W}_{PC}^{nc}$ and SW_{PC}^{nc} are the same and obtained for the same $\tau = \tau_{PC}^{*,nc}$. Therefore, we can easily deduce that $z_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{z}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$, $q_{PC}^{*,nc} - \bar{q}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$ and $SW_{PC}^{*,nc} - S\bar{W}_{PC}^{*,nc} = 0$ for any values of Z_{PC}^{nc} , Q_{PC}^{nc} and SW_{PC}^{nc} .

1.2) *The cooperative scenario*: Using results from Table 2, the difference in optimal R&D efforts when the firms cooperate can be expressed as:

$$z_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{z}_{PC}^{*,c} = \frac{Z_{PC}^c}{(1+\beta)} (e_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c}),$$

with $Z_{PC}^c = \frac{(12d(1+\beta)^4 + (1+7d)(1+\beta)^2\gamma + (1+d)\gamma^2)}{(10(1+\beta)^2 + 3\gamma)} > 0$. Hence, $z_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{z}_{PC}^{*,c}$ is always positive according to equation (A.4). In addition, from equation (1), it is straightforward to show that:

$$q_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{q}_{PC}^{*,c} = Q_{PC}^c (e_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c}),$$

with $Q_{PC}^c = \frac{[10(1+\beta)^2 + 12d(1+\beta)^4 + 3\gamma + (1+7d)(1+\beta)^2\gamma + (1+d)\gamma^2]}{10(1+\beta)^2 + 3\gamma} > 0$, which according to equation (A.4), is always positive, implying $\Rightarrow q_{PC}^{*,c} > \bar{q}_{PC}^{*,c}$.

Inserting equations (11) and (13) into (12) we obtain:

$$SW_{PC}^{*,c} = \frac{2d(1+\beta)^2(4(1+\beta)^2 + \gamma) + 4\gamma(1+\beta)^2 + \gamma^2}{Y} A^2 \quad (\text{C.7})$$

In addition, using equations (6), (7), (8) and (9), we have:

$$S\bar{W}_{PC}^{*,c} = \frac{2d(1+\beta)^2(6(1+\beta)^2 + \gamma) + 6(1+\beta)^2 + \gamma^2}{W} A^2 \quad (\text{C.8})$$

The difference in social welfare is thus:

$$SW_{PC}^{*,c} - S\bar{W}_{PC}^{*,c} = \mathcal{S}W_{PC}^c (e_{PC}^{*,c} - \bar{e}_{PC}^{*,c}),$$

with $\mathcal{S}W_{PC}^c = \left(\frac{2d(1+\beta)^2 + \gamma}{\gamma} A \right) > 0$. According to equation (A.4), $SW_{PC}^{*,c} - S\bar{W}_{PC}^{*,c}$ is always positive.

2) Time consistent Policy Game

Using equations (15) and (19), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} e(z_{TC}^{*,h}) - \bar{e}(z_{TC}^{*,h}) &= -\frac{(1+\beta)}{(1+d)} (z_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) \\ z_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h} &= \frac{\mathcal{Z}_{TC}}{(1+\beta)} (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}), \forall h = \{nc, c\} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.9})$$

with $\mathcal{Z}_{TC} = \mathcal{Z}_{TC}^h = -(1+d) < 0, \forall h = \{nc, c\}$. From equation (B.5), we easily deduce that for $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}]$, $(z_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,nc}) < 0$, otherwise it is positive. Using equation (B.6), we easily deduce that $z_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,c}$ is always positive. Then, from equation (1), we obtain:

$$q_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h} = (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) + (1+\beta)(z_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) = \mathcal{Q}_{TC} (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}), \forall h = \{nc, c\} \quad (\text{C.10})$$

with $\mathcal{Q}_{TC} = \mathcal{Q}_{TC}^h = -d < 0, \forall h = \{nc, c\}$. Using equation (B.5), we deduce that for $\gamma \in (0, \bar{\gamma}]$, $(q_{TC}^{*,nc} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,nc}) < 0$, otherwise it is positive. It follows from equation (B.6) that $q_{TC}^{*,c} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,c}$ is always positive.

Finally, from the social welfare function and equations (17), (21), (C.9) and (C.10) we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} SW_{TC}^{*,h} - S\bar{W}_{TC}^{*,h} &= 2A(q_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h}) - 2((q_{TC}^{*,h})^2 - (\bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h})^2) - \gamma((z_{TC}^{*,h})^2 - (\bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h})^2) - 2d((e_{TC}^{*,h})^2 - (\bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h})^2) \\ &= (q_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h}) (2A - 2(q_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h})) - \gamma(z_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h})(z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) - 2d(e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h})(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \\ &= (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \left((-d)(2A - 2(q_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{q}_{TC}^{*,h})) + \gamma \frac{(1+d)}{(1+\beta)} (z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) - 2d(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \right) \\ &= (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \left((-d)(2A - 2(A - d(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}))) + \gamma \frac{(1+d)}{(1+\beta)} (z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) - 2d(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \right) \\ &= (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \left(-2d^2(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) + \gamma \frac{(1+d)}{(1+\beta)} (z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) - 2d(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \right) \\ &= (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \left(-2d(d+1)(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) + \gamma \frac{(1+d)}{(1+\beta)} (z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) \right) \\ &= SW_{TC}^h (e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.11})$$

with $SW_{TC}^h = \frac{1+d}{1+\beta} \left[-2d(1+\beta)(e_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) + \gamma(z_{TC}^{*,h} + \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h}) \right] < 0, \forall h = \{nc, c\}$. The term inside the brackets is always negative for all $\beta \in (0, 1]$, and any values of $\gamma > 0$ and $d > 1$ since $\gamma \bar{z}_{TC}^{*,h} < 2d(1+\beta) \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}$ and $\gamma z_{TC}^{*,h} < 2d(1+\beta) e_{TC}^{*,h}$. Hence, when $(e_{TC}^{*,h} - \bar{e}_{TC}^{*,h}) < 0$, $SW_{TC}^{*,h} - S\bar{W}_{TC}^{*,h} > 0$ and conversely.

D Equilibrium results

| | Emission Tax Policy | | Emission Standard Policy | |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| | Non-cooperative R&D | Cooperative R&D | Non-cooperative R&D | Cooperative R&D |
| τ / \bar{e} | $\gamma \frac{2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)-\gamma}{X} A$ | $\gamma \frac{2d(3(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)-\gamma}{Y} A$ | $\gamma \frac{4+\beta+\gamma}{X} A$ | $\gamma \frac{(6(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)}{W} A$ |
| q | $\frac{2d(1+\beta)(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)+\gamma(3+\gamma)}{X} A$ | $\frac{2d(1+\beta)^2+\gamma(3(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)}{Y} A$ | $\frac{2d(1+\beta)(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)+\gamma(3+\gamma)}{X} A$ | $\frac{(2d(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)(4(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)}{W} A$ |
| z | $\frac{2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)-\gamma}{X} A$ | $(1+\beta) \frac{2d(3(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)-\gamma}{Y} A$ | $\frac{2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)-\gamma}{X} A$ | $(1+\beta) \frac{2d(4(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)-2\gamma}{W} A$ |
| E | $2\gamma \frac{4+\beta+\gamma}{X} A$ | $2\gamma \frac{4(1+\beta)^2+\gamma}{Y} A$ | $2\gamma \frac{4+\beta+\gamma}{X} A$ | $2\gamma \frac{(6(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)}{W} A$ |

Table 2: Precommitment policy game: Equilibrium outcomes under either an ETP or an ESP.

$A = (a-c)$, $X = 2d(3(1+\beta)+\gamma)^2+\gamma(9+2\gamma)$, $Y = 2d(3(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)^2+\gamma(9(1+\beta)^2+2\gamma)$, $W = 2d(4(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)^2+2\gamma(8(1+\beta)^2+\gamma)$

| | Emission Tax Policy | | Emission Standard Policy | |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| | Non-cooperative R&D | Cooperative R&D | Non-cooperative R&D | Cooperative R&D |
| τ / \bar{e} | $\frac{d(2d-3)(1+\beta)^2+2\gamma(2d^2+d-1)}{2\Omega} A$ | $\frac{d(2d-3)(1+\beta)^2+\gamma(2(d)^2+d-1)}{\Delta} A$ | $\frac{2\gamma(1+d)+(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta)}{\Theta} A$ | $\frac{(1+d)\gamma+2d(1+\beta)^2}{2\Psi} A$ |
| q | $\frac{2(1+d)\gamma+d(1+\beta)(7+4d+3\beta)}{2\Omega} A$ | $\frac{d(2d+5)(1+\beta)^2+\gamma(1+d)}{\Delta} A$ | $2 \frac{(1+d)\gamma+d(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta)}{\Theta} A$ | $\frac{(1+d)\gamma+2d^2(1+\beta)^2}{2\Psi} A$ |
| z | $\frac{(2d-1)(1+d)+d(1+\beta)}{\Omega} A$ | $(1+\beta) \frac{(1+d)(2d-1)+2d}{\Delta} A$ | $\frac{(2d-1)(2d+1-\beta)}{\Theta} A$ | $(1+\beta) \frac{d(d-1)}{\Psi} A$ |
| E | $\frac{2(1+d)\gamma+(1+\beta)(2+3d+d\beta)}{\Omega} A$ | $2 \frac{(1+d)\gamma+(1+\beta)^2(2d+1)}{\Delta} A$ | $2 \frac{2\gamma(1+d)+(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta)}{\Theta} A$ | $\frac{(1+d)\gamma+2d(1+\beta)^2}{\Psi} A$ |

Table 3: Time-consistent policy game: Equilibrium outcomes under either an ETP or an ESP.

$A = (a-c)$, $\Omega = 2\gamma(1+d)^2+d(1+\beta)(3(3+\beta)+d(7+\beta))$, $\Delta = 2\gamma(1+d)^2+4d(3+2d)(1+\beta)^2$, $\Theta = 4\gamma(1+d)^2+6d(1+2d-\beta)(1+\beta)$, $\Psi = \gamma(1+d)^2+4d^2(1+\beta)^2$.

References

- Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Hanley, D., and Kerr, W. (2016). Transition to clean technology. *Journal of political economy*, 124(1):52–104.
- Amir, R., Gama, A., and Werner, K. (2018). On environmental regulation of oligopoly markets: emission versus performance standards. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 70:147–167.
- Arrow, K. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In *The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors*, pages 609–626. Princeton University Press.
- Biglaiser, G. and Horowitz, J. K. (1994). Pollution regulation and incentives for pollution-control research. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 3(4):663–684.
- Chiou, J.-R. and Hu, J.-L. (2001). Environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 20(2):129–146.
- d’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. (1988). Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. *The American Economic Review*, 78(5):1133–1137.
- Gersbach, H. and Glazer, A. (1999). Markets and regulatory hold-up problems. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 37(2):151–164.
- Kamien, M. I., Muller, E., and Zang, I. (1992). Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. *The American Economic Review*, 82(5):1293–1306.
- Lambertini, L., Poyago-Theotoky, J., and Tampieri, A. (2017). Cournot competition and “green” innovation: An inverted-U relationship. *Energy Economics*, 68:116–123.
- Marinucci, M. (2012). A primer on R&D cooperation among firms. *Bank of Italy Occasional Paper*, (130).
- McDonald, S. and Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2017). Green technology and optimal emissions taxation. *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 19(2):362–376.
- Moner-Colonques, R. and Rubio, S. (2015). The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market. *Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales-Agricultural and Resource Economics*, 15(1):11–40.
- Moner-Colonques, R. and Rubio, S. J. (2016). The strategic use of innovation to influence environmental policy: Taxes versus standards. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 16(2):973–1000.
- Montero, J.-P. (2002). Permits, standards, and technology innovation. *Journal of Environmental Economics and management*, 44(1):23–44.

- Montero, J. P. (2011). A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit. *Energy Economics*, 33:S13–S19.
- Ouchida, Y. and Goto, D. (2016a). Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax. *Applied Economics Letters*, 23(5):324–331.
- Ouchida, Y. and Goto, D. (2016b). Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation. *Economic Modelling*, 55:179–188.
- Ouchida, Y. and Goto, D. (2022). Strategic non-use of the government’s precommitment ability for emissions taxation: Environmental R&D formation in a Cournot duopoly. *Australian Economic Papers*, 61(1):181–206.
- Petrakis, E. and Xepapadeas, A. (1999). Does government precommitment promote environmental innovation? In *Environmental regulation and market power*, pages 145–161. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Petrakis, E. and Xepapadeas, A. (2001). To commit or not to commit: Environmental policy in imperfectly competitive markets. *Typescript, Department of Economics, University of Crete*, <https://ideas.repec.org/p/crt/wpaper/0110.html>.
- Porter, M. (1991). America’s green strategy. *Scientific American*, 264:168.
- Porter, M. and Van der Linde, C. (1995). Green and competitive: ending the stalemate. *The Dynamics of the eco-efficient economy: environmental regulation and competitive advantage*, 33:120–134.
- Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2007). The organization of R&D and environmental policy. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 62(1):63–75.
- Poyago-Theotoky, J. and Teerasuwannajak, K. (2002). The timing of environmental policy: A note on the role of product differentiation. *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 21(3):305–316.
- Puller, S. L. (2006). The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 52(3):690–706.
- Requate, T. (2005). Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments—a survey. *Ecological economics*, 54(2-3):175–195.
- Strandholm, J. C., Espinola-Arredondo, A., and Munoz-Garcia, F. (2018). Regulation, free-riding incentives, and investment in r&d with spillovers. *Resource and energy economics*, 53:133–146.
- Ulph, A. and Ulph, D. (2013). Optimal climate change policies when governments cannot commit. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 56(2):161–176.