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Venice and the defense of the Regno di Cipro. Giulio Savorgnan's Unpublished Cyprus Correspondence (1557-1570). Including Ascanio Savorgnan's Descrittione delle cose di Cipro from the Collections of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation

Gilles Grivaud

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VENICE AND THE DEFENCE OF THE *REGNO DI CIPRO*

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& Gilles Grivaud
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GILLES GRIVAUD

with the collaboration of Evangelia Skoufari

VENICE AND THE DEFENCE
OF THE *REGNO DI CIPRO*

GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S UNPUBLISHED
CYPRUS CORRESPONDENCE (1557–1570)

INCLUDING

Ascanio Savorgnan's *Descrittione delle cose di Cipro*
from the Collections of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation

Translated from the French by Joe Cunningham



THE BANK OF CYPRUS CULTURAL FOUNDATION
NICOSIA 2016

Ἡ Πρόδοος οἰκοδομὴ εἶναι μεγάλη – φέρει
καθεῖς τὸν λίθον του· ὁ εἷς λόγους, βουλὰς, ὁ ἄλλος
πράξεις – καὶ καθημερινῶς τὴν κεφαλὴν της αἶρει
ὑψηλοτέραν. Θύελλα, αἰφνιδιὸς τις σάλος

ἔὰν ἐπέλθῃ, σωρηδὸν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐργάται
ὀρμῶσι καὶ τὸ φροῦδον των ὑπερασπίζοντ' ἔργον.
Φροῦδον, διότι καθενὸς ὁ βίος δαπανᾶται
ὑπὲρ μελλούσης γενεᾶς, κακώσεις, πόνους στέργων,

ἵνα ἡ γενεὰ αὐτὴ γνωρίσῃ εὐτυχίαν
ἄδολον, καὶ μακρὰν ζωὴν, καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ σοφίαν
χωρὶς ἰδρώτα ποταπὸν, ἢ δούλην ἐργασίαν.

Ἄλλ' ἡ μυθώδης γενεὰ οὐδέποτε θὰ ζήσῃ·
ἡ τελειότης του αὐτὴ τὸ ἔργον θὰ κρημνίσῃ
κ' ἐκ νέου πᾶς ὁ μάταιος κόπος αὐτῶν θ' ἀρχίσῃ.

Κωνσταντῖνος Π. Καβάφης, «Κτίσται» [1891]

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FOREWORD

The present publication forms part of the series “Collections of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation” and falls well within the major goals of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, namely the study and publication of written sources in an attempt to elucidate the history of Cyprus.

This research programme was inaugurated in 1987 and consists of nine separate publications based on materials from the collections of the Cultural Foundation, which include manuscripts, incunabula, and books published from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. The goal of the programme is to record these materials, translate them and produce critical editions of these basic historical sources so that they will be available to the public.

The oldest manuscripts in the collections are dated between 1407 and 1512. They are individual letters written by merchants, and they concern trade and the movement of goods in the Eastern Mediterranean. The printed materials, mainly early books, include rare accounts by travellers, as well as historical and geographical works published between the early sixteenth and the twentieth centuries.

The present publication looks at a manuscript (*BCCF B-197*) that describes conditions in Cyprus a few years before the 1570 Ottoman conquest of the island. The manuscript was written by Ascanio Savorgnan, who was the youngest brother of Giulio Savorgnan, the military engineer who built the Venetian walls of Nicosia. Ascanio Savorgnan visited Cyprus in 1562 and wrote a report on the conditions that prevailed on the island at the time. Although his written account was well known to specialists, it was not known to other scholars or the wider public. The aim of this book is not only to produce a critical edition of the manuscript but also to place it within the wider context of the defensive works and practices of Cyprus during the last fifteen years of Venetian domination on the island. Special emphasis is of course laid on the process of the construction of the fortifications of Nicosia, which took place from 1567 to 1570 under the direction of Giulio Savorgnan. Apart from the manuscript in the collection of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, *Venice and the Defence of the Regno di Cipro* is also based on information drawn from new sources from Italian archives and libraries.

Warm thanks are due to Mrs Sylvia Ioannou for her generosity to donate Ascanio Savorgnan’s manuscript to our collection in 1995; to the author, Gilles Grivaud, Professor of Medieval History at the University of Rouen, for his dedication and many years of research related to the Venetian sources and Ascanio Savorgnan’s manuscript; and to Evangelia Skoufari for translating the manuscript as well as for the chapter on the eulogies for Savorgnan’s masterwork. Thanks are also due to Joe Cunningham for the English translation of the text and to Anagramma and Myrto Bali for the design of the book. Costoula Sclavenitis

meticulously completed the general editing of this book despite all difficulties arising from its multilingual nature.

We are certain that this publication will be useful to scholars, as well as to all those who take pleasure in acquainting themselves with primary sources of the history of Cyprus.

PROFESSOR VASSILIKI KASSIANIDOU
*Chairperson of the Board of Directors
of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation*

PREFACE

On 11 November 1576, faced with a plague epidemic killing thousands in Venice and all across the *Terraferma*, Giulio Savorgnan decided to look back over his life and draw up his spiritual will. That day, his sixty-sixth birthday, in the *rocca di Osoppo* family palace in Friuli, Giulio gave Orazio Governa the task of gathering together all the documents that would be required to map out the venerable military leader's career. This endeavour, Giulio underlined, would be a continuation of a family tradition going back several generations. To accomplish this mission, Governa was ordered to visit any place that may have been holding texts necessary to piecing together the succession of wars, missions and construction projects that Giulio had taken part in; even though Giulio's memory was showing no sign of weakness, his long career in the service of Venice could not be retraced without consulting the family archives.

At the same time as drawing up his will, Giulio had a tomb built on one of the *rocca* terraces overlooking the Tagliamento valley. In accordance with Renaissance tastes, Giulio had a monumental Roman-style sarcophagus built into the rock, adorned with sculpted acroteria depicting the San Marco lion. Around the terrace walls there were five marble plaques into which Savorgnan's titles and functions had been engraved in Latin.¹ In building this immortal monument to himself, Giulio Savorgnan was preparing for his passage to the next world; little did he know that he would live for nineteen more years before being put to rest in his self-designed tomb.

For Giulio, the aim of charting his biography in such a way was not to vainly exalt his remarkably long and illustrious military career, but rather to preserve its memory for posterity, giving his nephews – particularly Germanico Savorgnan, who was also born on 11 November, in 1554, forty-four years after Giulio – an example to follow. It seems to have been written in the stars that Giulio and Germanico would share a wealth of spiritual affinities, in a special bond that was as strong and significant as their blood ties. Giulio saw his nephew as his true heir, someone who would further the family's prestige and the work his uncle had done. Giulio took Germanico to Cyprus in April 1567 to give him an experience of military discipline, teach him morals and offer him an initiation to military architecture. The fortification of Nicosia has forever been recognized as the work of Giulio Savorgnan, but it was his young nephew who drew the magnificent plan of the city's walls

¹ Cf. infra, figs 13–15; Gio. Giuseppe Capodagli, *Udine illustrata da molti suoi cittadini così nelle lettere come nelle armi famosi, e non tanto per dignità ecclesiastiche e secolari*, Udine: N. Schiratti, 1665, pp. 385–386; F. Caro, *Istoria de' signori Savorgnani detti del Monte, Conti di Belgrado, Castel Nuovo &...*, Udine 1771, p. 78; G. G. Liruti, *Notizie delle vite ed opere scritte da letterati del Friuli*, Venice 1760–1830, vol. 3, p. 31; E. Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani dei secoli 16 e 17. I Savorgnano*, Rome 1913, pp. 165–169, tables VI–VII.

which can now be found in Turin's archives; Germanico used this plan as a model when he built the Casale Monferrato fortress for the duke of Mantua, Vincenzo Gonzaga, in 1590.²

Initially written for the moral edification of Giulio Savorgnan's nephews, the volume compiled by Orazio Governa today resides in the Venetian public archives.³ Orazio – a man of modest means, and probably from a non-literary family – was able to observe Savorgnan's day-to-day life for a long period of time: he began serving Giulio in July 1558, then joined his *lanze spezzate* company in 1560; from this point on, Governa never left his master's side, becoming his orderly and accompanying him on each of his various missions both in the *Terraferma* and the *Stato da Mar*. Orazio was closely involved in Giulio's construction projects, and the latter acknowledged the two men's deep-rooted, thirty-seven-year partnership in his 25th of May 1595 will, wherein he thanked him and left him the drawings and plans of the projects on which they had worked together.⁴

Orazio Governa was therefore in the perfect position to carry out his master's wishes, and began to sort through Giulio's personal archives picking out all the documents he judged useful in telling the story of the military leader's career and public life: series of correspondence, reports written for various Venetian administrations, copies of official documents, *copialettere*, and maybe even diaries (*almanacchi*), most probably found in the Savorgnan family archives, as Orazio does not mention having searched anywhere else than in Osoppo.⁵

2 Cf. *infra*, pp. 550–551, and figs 39, 56. 3 The collection is currently preserved in the ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, 214 ff.; concerning this manuscript's turbulent history (Austrians took it to Vienna before it was later returned to Venice), see T. Gar, 'I codici storici della collezione Foscarini conservata nella imperiale Biblioteca di Vienna', *Archivio storico italiano* V (1843), pp. 456, 458; F. Cavazzana Romanelli, 'Dalla Marciana ai Frari. Manoscritti contesi e controversie identitarie fra archivisti e bibliotecari ottocenteschi', in S. Rossi Minutelli (ed.), *Il bibliotecario inattuale. Miscellanea di studi di amici per Giorgio Emanuele Ferrari bibliotecario e bibliografo marciano*, Padua 2007, vol. 1, pp. 161–200. 4 BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 150^{r-v} (copy of G.S.'s will); ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 15^r; a copy of Orazio Governa's autobiography can be found in the BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 689c*, vol. 3, Documenti e studi sui Savorgnan, fasc. *Supplica del Capitan Horatio Governa da Pordenone, 1606*; cf. the extract *infra*, doc. 115; see also A. Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars fortificatoria* a Venezia', in *Cultura, scienze e tecniche nella Venezia del Cinquecento. Atti del convegno internazionale di studio Giovan Giovanni Battista Benedetti e il suo tempo*, Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti (ed.), Venice 1987, p. 233; L. Casella, *I Savorgnan. La famiglia e le opportunità del potere*, Rome 2003, p. 168. 5 G.S.'s motivations and Orazio Governa's methods are detailed in: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction ff. 13^r–15^r. There is no mention anywhere of Governa having carried out his research in the homes the Savorgnans owned in Venice. There is evidence of Savorgnan *memoriali*, in which diverse information regarding a family's history would be gathered together, from the mid-fifteenth century onwards; cf. I. Zancola Pastore, 'La memoria familiare e gli archivi', in *I Savorgnan e la Patria del Friuli dal XIII al XVIII secolo*, Udine 1984, p. 310. Several sixteenth-century Savorgnan *memoriali* have been preserved, but none pertain to the Savorgnan del Monte branch of the family: ASU, *Archivio Savorgnan*, b. 7, fasc. 4 (*Libro de memorie de messer Francesco Savorgnan, quondam messer Zuanne notato de mia man propria 1525–1547*), fasc. 5 (*Memoriale 1547–1553*), fasc. 6 (*Memorie relative a vari aspetti scritte di pugno del Zuanne Savorgnano 1557*), fasc. 7 (*Libro de memorie tratte per messer Francesco Savorgnan quondam messer Zuanne 1525*); also, BCJ, *fondo principale*, *cod. 949* (*Memorie generali importanti di mano de Giovanni Pietro dai Vaschi, agente di Ca' Savorgnan, 1561, concerning Urbano Savorgnan*). Some interesting remarks concerning the Savorgnans' unique family culture are made by Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 169; she explains that the Savorgnans were different from Venice's other patrician families, who left very few

In his compilation, Governa never explains the origins of the documents he has copied, and says he has merely put the texts in chronological order and given a table of contents at the start of the volume; nor does he explain the criteria he has used in choosing the documents and letters included in his compilation, which stretches from 1527 to 1575, and was finished sometime before summer 1579.⁶ A comparison of the collection with an archive of letters having belonged to Francesco Michiel, a faithful correspondent of Giulio's from 1566 to 1570, indicates that Orazio mostly chose documents and letters that show his master in a favourable light, or which highlight his various relations with leading figures of Venetian or Italian political spheres. Conversely, Orazio deliberately omitted letters in which Savorgnan expresses his consternation at the Venetian administrative system, denouncing the daily corruption and scheming patrician factions. Out of the twenty-four letters sent from Nicosia to Francesco Michiel, Orazio included just one, that dated 15 October 1567.⁷ Governa's collection hides the anxiety of an officer who worried about how his work would be judged; not only does it not contain any mention of the fits of jealousy directed at Girolamo Martinengo and Paolo Orsini, both given promotions sooner than he, but it also erases the angry condemnations of the numerous intrigues eating away at Venice's coffers and threatening the public good. Orazio paints a picture of a public man and a great military leader, one who, seven years after returning from Cyprus, remained a key figure in the defence of the Venetian State, which in return showered him with honours.

The collection of letters addressed to Francesco Michiel gives a much more balanced image of Giulio Savorgnan than that portrayed by Governa, unveiling the anxious nature of a man who was moulded by an acute sense of public duty, justice and family honour but who, despite the distinguished offices he held, was constantly confronted with the misery of egotistical individuals, as well as the ravages of age. In his friendship with Francesco Michiel, founded on the links between the two families' previous generation,⁸ and which does not seem entirely free of ulterior motives, Giulio was free to speak of military and political secrets; for proof, one only needs compare the letters Savorgnan wrote on the same day to other correspondents.⁹

The confidence Giulio held in Francesco Michiel was founded on a close affiliation dating back to the period Michiel spent in Udine as *luocotenente* from 15 March 1551 to 8 September 1552; in the report he presented before the Senate on 26 January 1553, Michiel spoke firmly in favour of the Savorgnans and their plans to reinforce the Osoppo fort's hydraulic infrastructure.¹⁰ Shortly before leaving Udine for Corfu and Cyprus, Giulio in-

libri di famiglia, as noted by A. Bellavitis, *Identité, mariage, mobilité sociale. Citoyens et citoyennes à Venise au XVI^e siècle*, Rome 2001, pp. 280–282; J. S. Grubb, 'Introduction', in id. (ed.), *Family Memoirs from Venice (15th–17th centuries)*, Rome 2009, pp. xi–xxix. ⁶ ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 181^{r-v}, where, in a letter dated 31 August 1579, G.S. recalls how the volume was put together; it was finished after the collection had been established, as it contains letters from 1581: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, introduction, ff. 15^v–16^r.

⁷ ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 80^r–82^v, and *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 79^{r-v}, given infra, doc. 40.

⁸ According to the letter given infra, doc. 30. ⁹ For example infra, docs 25–27, 36–37, 40–41, 44–45, 51–52, 55–56. ¹⁰ *Relazioni dei rettori veneti in Terraferma* I, no. 6, pp. 35–50, where Michiel states: "per questo li

formed Michiel of a similar plan he had for the hydraulic system in Friuli, insisting that the Tagliamento could be diverted.¹¹ The relationship between these two men thus seems to have been well established by 1551 / 1552, and, when faced with violent clashes between Friuli's aristocratic factions, a worried Francesco Michiel most probably turned to the Savorgnans.¹² There is not enough firm evidence amongst the documents available to say that the ties between the two men stayed this close; it is nevertheless certain that their correspondence continued right up until Michiel's death in 1587.¹³

Aside from this direct bond with the Savorgnan brothers, Francesco Michiel does not seem to have held any personal interest in Cyprus and what went on there, even though several members of the various branches of the Michiel family held military and political offices on the island in the mid-sixteenth century: Merchio / Melchiore was captain of Famagusta from 1540 to 1542, and ordered Alessandro Podocataro to deliver a report on the 1570 / 1571 siege of Famagusta;¹⁴ Salvador Michiel (1505–1555 / 1556) was *luocotenente* in Famagusta from 1548 to 1550;¹⁵ Antonio, Salvador's son, was a provveditor for Cyprus from October 1562 to April 1563, and, although this did not require him to move away from Venice, he formed real ties with the Cypriot nobility when in 1566 he married Emilia Podocataro, the heiress of the Nicosia archbishop, Cesare Podocataro;¹⁶ Zuan, also a son of Salvador, was the Cyprus *camerlingo* from March 1558 to March 1560, then Cerines

preffati Magnifici Savorgnani richiesero la Serenità Vostra in materia de far una cisterna per questo bisogno, condutture de la materia che vi andasse a tal opera, como del tutto ne diedi notitia a quella con particular informatione si come lej mi comesse” (p. 40). Details of Michiel himself are quite sparse, and matters are further complicated as there were several men of the same name in the same public sphere at the same time (Francesco *di Almorò*, Francesco *di Iacomo*, Francesco *di Tomaso*); it is known, however, that our Francesco, son of Nicolò, was born on 15 November 1517 into the Michiel *da San Polo* branch of the family. In 1537 he married one of Zuanne Contarini *di Francesco's* daughters, and from the same year onwards he held a seat in the Grand Council. He was elected to many different offices in which he exerted control over Venetian political and economic life: after being *luocotenente* in Udine in 1551 / 1552, he was *inquisitore di stato* in May 1554 and *censore* in May 1555; he then served in the *collegio del sal*, was a *provveditore sopra banchi* in 1564 / 1565, a member of the *Dieci savi alle decime* college from November 1566 to June 1567, then a member of the *Collegio* in September 1568 and *savio grande*; his name also figures amongst the members of the conclaves that elected Francesco Venier (on 11 June 1554) and later Pietro Loredan (on 26 November 1567) as doge. He died on 3 November 1587: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 9^v–10^r, 238^r, reg. 4, ff. 104^v–105^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 22^r; Marco Barbaro, *Arbori de' patritii veneti*, ASV, *Miscellanea codici*, *Storia veneta*, reg. 17–23, vol. IV, p. 101; see also infra, doc. 30. 11 ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (a letter written in Udine on 8 January 1567). 12 ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Lettere di condottieri e di gente d'arme, b. 308 (letter written by Francesco Michiel in Udine on 21 May 1551). 13 The last known correspondence between the two men is from 30 April 1586 (letter written by G.S. in Bergamo): BAM, *cod. D 191 inf.*, ff. 105^r–106^r. 14 Concerning Podocataro, see infra, doc. 65 n. 10. 15 Salvatore Michiel was born in 1505, into the San Ziminiano branch of the family. From 1527 onwards he held numerous public offices, notably sitting on the *Quarantia criminale*, then later becoming a *savio* of the Council of Ten, duke of Candia in 1543, *governatore del magistrato delle entrate* in 1545, and *luocotenente* in Cyprus. He died on 19 May 1556: Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. IV, p. 99. The report on his mandate in Cyprus can be found in the ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 61, reg. 1, ff. 94^r–95^r. 16 ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 87^v–88^r, reg. 4, ff. 46^v–47^r; id., *Notarile*, Atti, b. 8137, f. 694^{r-v}; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 2685*, s.f.; AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 37 no. 6; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. IV, p. 99.

castellan from July 1564 to July 1566, before being appointed consul in Alexandria in December 1569;¹⁷ Polo, another son of Salvador, was also the Cerines *castellan* in 1567–1568;¹⁸ Antonio, son of Tomaso, was twice a proveditor for Cyprus, from April 1556 to April 1557, then from October 1562 to October 1563;¹⁹ finally, Marco, also a son of Tomaso, was captain of Famagusta from 1567 to 1569.²⁰

Despite this wealth of information concerning the Michiels in Cyprus, there is no real evidence to show that the involvement of the family in the affairs of the island was a deliberate policy of occupying public offices with the intention of controlling particular sectors of commerce, as had been the strategy used elsewhere in the Venetian *Stato da Mar*.²¹ Given that the original Michiel lineage branched out endlessly during the final centuries of the Middle Ages, neither can it be said with certainty that the various branches of the Michiel family kept close relations with one another, or maintained any kind of active solidarity.²² Nevertheless, it can safely be said that Francesco Michiel was for Giulio Savorgnan a knowledgeable correspondent who had access to more sources of information than just the usual hierarchic system of Venetian administration.

The importance of Francesco Michiel's series of correspondence, composed almost exclusively of letters he received from Cyprus, is thus clear;²³ it is not known, however, why Michiel archived this series, or how it ended up in Giacomo Contarini's collection, most probably soon after Michiel's death in 1587.²⁴ Possibly due to the fact that he was born

17 ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 172^v–173^r, reg. 4, ff. 185^v–187^r. 18 Concerning Polo Michiel, see *infra*, doc. 48 n. 1. 19 ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 87^v–88^r, reg. 4, ff. 103^v–104^r. 20 Concerning Marco Michiel, see *infra*, doc. 36 n. 9. 21 M. O'Connell, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime Empire*, Baltimore 2009, pp. 57–74. 22 There is no monograph on the Michiel family, but certain things are known about them: the family was part of the *case vecchie* of the Venetian patriciate, and its name appears in sources dating as far back as the ninth century; three of its members became doges in the eleventh and twelfth centuries – Vitale I (1096–1102), Domenico (1117/1118–1130) and Vitale II (1155–1172) –, and the family continued to be linked to the corridors of power in the late Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: Benedetto Pucci, *Genealogia degl'Illustrissimi Signori Frangipani Romani ... da cui etiandio nasce l'Illustrissima casa de' Michieli Venetiana, quella del Friuli, e d'altre nobilissime in Italia e fuori*, Venetia: appresso Barezzo Barezzi, 1621, pp. 31–33; Dal Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia*, pp. 56–60, 63–66; G. Cracco, "Un altro mondo": *Venezia nel Medioevo, dal secolo XI al secolo XIV*, Turin 1986, pp. 40, 42, 45–46, 110, 116, 124; É. Crouzet-Pavan, *Sopra le acque salse. Espaces, pouvoir et société à Venise à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Rome 1992, pp. 279, 283; D. Raines, *L'invention du mythe aristocratique. L'image de soi du patriciat vénitien au temps de la Sérenissime*, Venice 2006, vol. 1, pp. 111, 429–431, 435–436, 438, 442. 23 ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, archives 195 ff.; it consists of 44 letters G.S. sent from Cyprus between 1567 and 1569, 9 he sent from Corfu between 1566 and 1567, one he sent from Zara in 1570, one from Spalato in 1570 and one from Osoppo in 1579. It also contains 8 documents related to Cyprus, including a letter from Giacomo de Nores, another from *Luocotenente* Nicolò Dandolo, one from Captain Andrea del Berettino and one from Captain Lorenzo Badassin, all sent from Nicosia; plus, finally, a letter from Captain Andrea Nigrisoli sent from Candia. The history of this correspondence series is similar to that of Orazio Governa's collection; cf. Gar, 'I codici storici', and Cavazzana Romanelli, 'Dalla Marciana ai Frari'. 24 Giacomo, the son of Piero and Cecilia Bragadin, was from the *Santi Apostoli* branch of the Contarini family. He led a successful career: first he was put in charge of fortifying the Venice Lido in 1572, then was made the Bergamo *podestà* in 1579; he became an arsenal proveditor in 1593, and later was a member of the Council of Ten. He died on 4 October 1595, three months after G.S., and left behind him a

in Nicosia, on 24 July 1536, Contarini was able to observe closely how the island's situation developed, and took part in the March 1562 deliberations concerning the fortification of Famagusta and Cerines; five years later, by which point he was a member of the Venetian embassy in Rome, Contarini had begun a correspondence with Francesco Michiel, who sent him copies of letters from Giulio Savorgnan accompanied by drawings of the Nicosia fortress.²⁵

The series of letters to Michiel, practically a step-by-step guide to a model fortification project, was of interest to patricians working for the Venetian State who in some area or other of their work concerned themselves with defensive structures; a common taste for studies, mathematics, mechanics and architecture gathered together around Contarini a particularly remarkable circle of men of letters, architects and scientists, to all of whom Savorgnan's letters made sense.²⁶ Giulio Savorgnan began to frequent this circle quite late on, at the end of the 1570s, and it was there that in March 1581 he met Buonaiuto Lorini, who after 1593 was put in charge of building Palmanova. For this group of people in search of innovation, Savorgnan's letters were a highly valuable source of information, and through them much of Giulio's experience could be passed on; this explains the care taken in preserving them, even if it is impossible to know to what extent these documents were circulated.

Standing the collection left by Orazio Governa side by side with Francesco Michiel's series of correspondence allows us to understand the remarkable richness of Giulio Savorgnan's work, in which all of the various facets of his character can be seen: he was at once a military leader and an officer with public duties, an architect and an engineer, an administrator and an accountant, a defender of his family heritage and a close observer of historical developments. Hailing from Friuli, he fully understood the importance of borders, Osoppo being situated at the mouth of the Alpine valleys through which Habsburg troops came en route to Italy. This awareness of the strategic dimension of any territory predisposed Giulio to think of the cohesion of Venice's whole defensive system, from Lombardy to Friuli, Dalmatia to Corfu, and Cythera to Cyprus.

remarkable library and art collection, as well as the manuscript of the treatise he wrote on fortifications based on G.S. and Buonaiuto Lorini's experiences: Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. II, p. 461; P. L. Rose, 'Jacomo Contarini (1536–1595), a Venetian patron and collector of mathematical instruments and books', *Physis* (1976), pp. 117–130; M. Tafuri, *Venezia e il Rinascimento. Religione, scienza, architettura*, Turin 1985, pp. 198–204; A. Manno, 'Bonaiuto Lorini e la scienza delle fortificazioni', *Architettura. Storia e documenti* I/2 (1985), p. 45; M. Zorzi, *La libreria di San Marco. Libri, lettori, società nella Venezia dei Dogi*, Venice 1987, pp. 184–187; M. Hochmann, 'La collection de Giacomo Contarini', *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome – Moyen Âge / Temps modernes* 99/1 (1997), pp. 447–489, where, on p. 482, an inventory of the collection's drawings is given, including two drawings related to Famagusta ('Disegno di Famagosta con la pianta del baloardo', 'Disegno della città di Famagosta'); M. F. Tiepolo's brief biography: ASV, *Inventario del fondo Archivio Proprio Giacomo Contarini*: http://www.archiviodistatovenezia.it/siasve/documenti/311_4_Arch_proprio_G_Contarini_revis_Rossi. 25 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, f. 22^{r-v}; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (letter written by Francesco Michiel in Venice on 25 October 1567). 26 Concerning Contarini's circle, frequented by Daniele Barbaro, Gian Vincenzo Pinelli, Andrea Palladio and Galileo Galilei, see Tafuri, *Venezia e il Rinascimento*, pp. 200–208; Hochmann, 'La collection de Giacomo Contarini', pp. 447–451, quoted supra, n. 24.

Nicosia was a major landmark in Savorgnan's overseas career, and the biggest project the architect ever led; he transformed the city's old, medieval walls into a brilliant eleven-bastion enceinte reflecting some of the most audacious thinking in Renaissance engineering at the time. The Ottoman capture of the city thirteen months after Giulio's departure did somewhat dim the project's success, and robbed Savorgnan of the glory that should by right have been bestowed upon his pioneering achievement; nevertheless, Giulio's time in Cyprus was the culmination of his career both as an architect and a military leader (thanks to the power Venice had accorded him), and he spoke of the Nicosia fortress until the day he died.

The exceptional success of the 1567–1569 Nicosia construction project can be ascribed to Giulio's ever-evolving understanding of the Cypriot terrain, which had begun ten years earlier with the time he spent studying the maps, plans, models and reports that Venetian officers delivered to Venice upon returning from their missions. Savorgnan was on several occasions asked for his opinion on the fortification of Famagusta or the Cerines castle, and became something of an 'armchair expert' on the island's defences; he finally went to the island in summer 1562, and led his first mission alongside his younger brother Ascanio, also a fortification expert. The report Ascanio submitted did not appear to have any immediate impact on the organization of the island's defences, but, for reasons unbeknownst to its author, it would become a reference point in its field; around a hundred copies were sent to libraries across Western Europe between 1563 and 1575. Ascanio and Giulio Savorgnan left an indelible mark on the island, and the present study will attempt to define their role in the history of both Cyprus and Venice in the mid-sixteenth century. Through their various writings – be it reports or letters – carrying messages addressed to various audiences, one can appreciate how their individual careers fit into the wider historical context, and how they were connected to both Nicosia's fractured society and the complex web of Venetian institutions.



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ABBREVIATIONS

ACU	Archivio Capitolare, Udine
ABS	Archivio Bonati Savorgnan, Padua
AMPM	Archivio del Museo del Palazzo Mocenigo, Venice
ASM	Archivio di Stato di Modena
AST	Archivio di Stato di Torino
ASU	Archivio di Stato di Udine
ASV	Archivio di Stato di Venezia
BAM	Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan
BCCF	Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation
BCJ	Biblioteca Civica Joppi, Udine
BNF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
BNM	Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice
CMC	Civico Museo Correr, Venice
<i>DBI</i>	<i>Dizionario biografico degli Italiani</i> , Rome 1960–
G.S.	Giulio Savorgnan (used in footnotes and in English summaries of documents)

b.	busta	ms	manuscript
c.	carta	m.v.	more veneto
cf.	confer	n.	note
cod.	codex/codice	no.	number
col.	colonna(s)	p.	page
doc.	document	r	recto
ead.	eadem	reg.	registro
ed.	editor	s.d.	sine die
f.	folio	s.f.	sine folio
fasc.	fascicolo	s.p.	sine pagina
ibid.	ibidem	s.v.	sub voce
id.	idem	v	verso
ill.	illustration	vol.	volume

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Venetian weights and measures according to A. Martini, *Manuale di metrologia, ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli*, Turin 1883, pp. 817–818.

Length measures: 1 *piede* = 0,34 m; 1 *passo* = 5 *pie di* = 1.73 m; 1 *miglio* = 1000 *passi* = 1738,67 m.

Volume measures: 1 *passo cubo* = 125 *pie di cubi* = 5,25 m³.

Units of capacity for solids: 1 *stajo* = 83.31 l; 1 *moggio* = 4 *staia* = 333.26 l.

Unit of capacity for liquids: 1 *botte* = 751.17 l.

Units of capacity for oil: 1 *miro* = 15.78 l; 1 *migliaio* = 40 *miri* = 631.59 l.

Large units of weight: 1 *libbra grossa* = 0.47 kg; 1 *centinaio* = 100 *libbre* = 47.69 kg.

Mediæval Cypriot weights and measures according to E. Schillbach, *Byzantinische Metrologie*, Munich 1970, pp. 132–137.

Unit of capacity for grains: 1 *moggio* = 32 l.

Unit of capacity for salt: 1 *moggio* = 24.9 l.

Unit of capacity for liquids: 1 *botte* = 300 l.

Unit of capacity for oil: 1 *cantaro* = 431 l.

INTRODUCTION

GIULIO SAVORGNAN AND HIS BROTHERS

The bastioned fortress that Giulio Savorgnan designed and brought to completion in Nicosia between June 1567 and April 1569 gave him lasting fame. This was the first time a large-scale piece of urban planning had left a city completely transformed; Nicosia's old fourteenth-century stone walls were replaced with an earthen fortress designed with geometric perfection, the likes of which no Western city or town had ever known. In one of history's strange paradoxes, Nicosia, the capital of the most far-flung of all of the Venetian State's territories, and the last vestige of Eastern Latin power, was suddenly at the forefront of Renaissance military architecture. This was the result of an astounding concurrence of collective interest and personal initiative, and, upon reading the related documents still available to us today, one is constantly amazed by Giulio Savorgnan's role in the project. There was little to suggest that this very conservative Friulian nobleman would ever undertake such an ambitious fortification project, nor that the names of three members of the Savorgnan family would come to be associated with the history of Cyprus in the 1560s.

The family heritage

The earliest known document mentioning a fief-holding member of the Savorgnan family is dated 8 April 921; the Savorgnans, though, were able to consistently and skilfully maintain a preeminent position in the Friulian aristocracy from the High Middle Ages right up to the Napoleonic era, and this was the eminent feature of the family's history.¹ Laura Casella has produced a fundamental study of the political, social and economic contexts in which the Savorgnans developed the lineage strategies needed to maintain their elevated stature right up to the eighteenth century, successfully linking their power to that of the Republic of Venice. As she points out, it was a symbolic moment when, on 6 June 1420, the Venetian army came to take Udine from the Holy Roman Empire with its flag carried by Tristano Savorgnan; this was a clear illustration of the alliance which had been formed between the family and the *Serenissima*, now that the latter was replacing the Aquileia Patriarchate.²

The strategic location of Friuli, between the Duchy of Austria, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Venice (fig. 1), was always a decisive factor in the outlook of the local aristocracy, who had been granted their estates by the Aquileia Patriarch and then subse-

¹ ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, ff. 1^r-2^r; ACU, fondo Bini, *Miscellanea*, vol. 4, p. 375; BCJ, *Fondo principale*, cod. 1502, vol. 1; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 15. Francesco Sansovino gives a mythical version of the family's origins in *Origine e fatti delle famiglie illustri d'Italia*, p. 503. ² Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 19-20; for more information on Tristano, see the same author's brief biography, 'Tristano Savorgnan', in *Nuovo Liruti* 2, vol. 2, pp. 2274-2283, complete with bibliography.

quently wooed by foreign monarchs seeking to establish influence outside their own borders. The Savorgnans were no exception to this: before the family sided with Venice, Tristano's grandfather, Francesco Savorgnan, had taken the side of the Holy Roman Empire, notably through various marriages, and in 1362 Charles IV had granted him the title of Count Palatine, with the right to pass it on to his heirs. With this acquisition of a title envied by the rest of the local aristocracy, Francesco had taken advantage of favourable political circumstances to strengthen his family's authority, even though this left Venice concerned as to what his true intentions were.³ Francesco's successors, beginning with his son Federico, preferred to support Venice, but the loyalty of the Friulian *castellani* was constantly called into question: the case of Antonio Savorgnan del Torre, who led the revolt of the *zobia grassa* in Udine on 27 February 1511, is an example of how changing political and military circumstances could see alliances shift, or even be completely turned around against Venice's interests.⁴

It was Federico Savorgnan's generation that saw ties between Venice and the Savorgnans solidify: on 3 April 1385 Federico received the rare privilege of being made part of the Venetian patriciate, and though this act did not mean he could hold any governmental office within the Venetian State, it did signify the coming together of two political entities, each looking to further each other's interests on a long-term basis. Through the Savorgnan family, Venice was able to strengthen its influence amongst the power-holders of a region that strategically bordered the Holy Roman Empire, and thus needed to be monitored in order to control transalpine trade routes, to defend the *Terraferma* and to prevent enemy access to the Venetian Lagoon. On the Savorgnans' side, Venice's support proved decisive in maintaining and strengthening their estates, their incomes and their titles within the region in the face of competition from other powerful families.⁵ With its hierarchical structure and its violent rivalries, the world of the feudal aristocracy was so institutionally unstable that alliances were essential; nevertheless, the relationship between Venice and the Savorgnans stood out for its incredible longevity, which was due to the fact that both parties frequently adapted themselves to one another's needs over the course of four centuries.

In the mid-fourteenth century the estates held by the Savorgnans brought them sizeable incomes, both from farming activities and from taxes on trade. Their properties, mainly scattered around the Friulian North, near to the Pinzano, Flagogna, Osoppo, Ariis, Forni di Sopra and Forni di Sotto castles, were originally granted to the Savorgnans by the Aquileian patriarchs, and when Friuli fell under Venetian rule the family's possession of these estates was reinforced: Tristano and Federico Savorgnan were accorded their feudal possessions first from Patriarch Giovanni di Moravia upon the death of their father in 1394, then again from

3 Ead., *I Savorgnan*, pp. 33–34. 4 This is further examined *infra*, n. 10. 5 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 31–33 and *passim* for an analysis, supported by various documents, of relations between Venice and the Savorgnans in the fifteenth century. Links between the divisions within the Friulian aristocracy and the alliances formed with Venice or the Empire have also been examined by Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, pp. 77–107; Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797*, chap. 2 and 3; Pezzolo, 'Nobiltà militare e potere', pp. 399–400; Conzato, 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', pp. 99–177; *id.*, *Dai castelli alle corti*.

Venice on 8 January 1421.⁶ These assets, extremely valuable in both a strategic and military sense, were carved up and shared between Tristano's four sons, first in 1442, then again in 1450; the heritage that their grandfather had intended to be kept undivided had been split apart, and subsequently the family also split apart, into two branches, the del Torre and the del Monte Savorgnans. The diminishing of the inheritance each heir received clearly limited the new generation's financial clout, as by the end of the fifteenth century they were lamenting their debts.⁷ Nevertheless, an official census taken at the time showed that 5,328 people were under the Savorgnans' jurisdiction, an illustration of their power in the region (fig. 5).⁸

The privilege of being made part of the Venetian patriciate received by Federico Savorgnan and his heirs did not mean they instantly joined the Venetian aristocracy, far from it. An examination of the marital alliances made by the Savorgnans shows the gradual nature of a process which only began to pay off in the second half of the fifteenth century. After Federico, his son Francesco wedded Agnese, the sister of Nicolò Marcello, who was doge from 1473 to 1474, but this was an exceptional union and, as no children were born from the marriage, it did not lead to the Savorgnans being accepted into Venice's aristocratic circles. As for the next generation, the marital strategies of the del Monte Savorgnans produced pairings exclusively with other Friulian families; it was not until the end of the fifteenth century that this trend was reversed, by a single member of the family, Girolamo Savorgnan del Monte, Giulio's father (fig. 2).⁹

Before looking at the major figure that is Girolamo, an aspect of the relationship between Venice and the Savorgnans that merits analysis is that of the military functions the latter held, and the family's role in the *Serenissima's* defensive system. Venice put several members of the family in command of its troops on different occasions, most often to guard communications over the Alpine passes. To give but one example, in 1413, during the conflict with the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Senate payed Tristano 300 ducats to keep soldiers at the Pinzano and Ariis castles, as well as giving him a monthly pay of 50 ducats and his brother, Francesco, one of 20 ducats. The Savorgnans' role went beyond just defending their family territory; Venice invested them with more important duties related to the general organization of the *Terraferma* armies, and the family was given *condotte* right up until the end of the Venetian Republic. In 1487 Nicolò Savorgnan del Torre, Tristano's grandson, was appointed captain of the *cernide*, peasant armies which were formed in each region; this post was not to the liking of Friuli's *castellani*, who sensed a threat to their influence over the men from their own estate. Nicolò's son, Antonio – he of the *zobia grassa* – inherited the office, and took care of recruitment and paying soldiers' wages during the war against the League of Cambrai (1508–1511); following his involvement in the popular revolt

6 These estates were already in the possession of their father Federico: Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 34–36, 51–52 and passim; a detailed description of their assets is given in Francesco's will, written on 2 July 1373: ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, ff. 14^r–23^r. 7 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 52–67, nuances the situation by putting these debts into the political context of the era. 8 Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, p. 81. 9 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 55, 228, table 5.

against the aristocracy in Udine, and for reasons which remain unclear, Antonio switched sides in favour of the Holy Roman Empire in September 1511, thus bringing the del Torre Savorgnan under the protection of the Habsburgs. Promptly found guilty of treason in Venice and stripped of his assets, on 27 May 1512, in Villach, Antonio was assassinated by Friulian *castellani* out for revenge.¹⁰

The complicated character of Antonio Savorgnan del Torre, abhorred by Venice at the end of his life, partly influenced the attitude of Girolamo Savorgnan del Monte; Girolamo, Laura Casella points out, seems to have intentionally made himself the opposite of his cousin.¹¹ The years of unrest in which Antonio broke free from Venice were precisely the years in which Girolamo strengthened his ties with the *Serenissima*, offering his proven skills as a soldier at a time when the Republic was facing serious threats along its borders. Born in 1466, and probably given a literary education, Girolamo quickly made a name for himself with his military exploits, which brought him ever closer to Venice (see fig. 2): as early as 1487 he led contingents of *cernide* to victory over the Holy Roman Emperor's armies, in reward for which Venice entrusted him with a *condotta* of 300 soldiers. In 1508 he took part in the operation to block the advance of Emperor Maximilian I in the Cadore Valley, paving the way for new Venetian conquests in eastern Friuli, and for this the *Signoria* rewarded him with an annuity, the rank of collateral-general and the castle of Belgrado (along with the accompanying countship) that had been taken from the enemy. The following year, the Venetian Senate made him an ambassador to Switzerland in order to recruit mercenaries there, then accorded him the rare, but in reality quite powerless, title of supernumerary senator, a privilege which aroused discontent amongst certain sections of the Venetian patriciate.¹²

The years marked by war on Friuli's eastern border cemented the importance of Girolamo's role in Venice's military organization: when, in early 1514, an imperial expedition reached the Marano Lagoon, from which point occupying Friuli becomes quite simple, Girolamo was there to resist them in Osoppo; there he held up a section of the enemy forces

10 Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, pp. 123, 125, 152–188; Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797*, pp. 81–107; Conzato, 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', pp. 113–116, 120–121; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 48–50; ead., "Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnan", p. 140; ead., 'Antonio Savorgnan', in *Nuovo Liruti 2*, vol. 2, pp. 2250–2255, with bibliography. **11** There is an abundance of biographies of Girolamo; consulted here are: Francesco Sansovino, *Origine e fatti delle famiglie illustri d'Italia*, pp. 509–513; Liruti, *Notizie dalle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 1–24; V. Joppi, 'Notizie sulla vita e sulle opere di Girolamo Savorgnan', in *Lettere storiche di Girolamo Savorgnan*, pp. i–xv; F. Nani Mocenigo, 'Girolamo Savorgnan', *Ateneo veneto* XXVII / 1 (1904), pp. 3–27; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 33–39; P. S. Leicht, 'La figura di Girolamo Savorgnano', *Memorie storiche forogiuliesi* 24 (1928), pp. 73–83; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Aspetti della personalità di Gerolamo Savorgnan', pp. 81–89; Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, pp. 124–126, 158–159, 238–244 and passim; Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797*, pp. 113–116; most notable are L. Casella's contextualized analyses: 'Al servizio di Venezia. Ruolo militare e potere nobiliare nelle lettere di Girolamo Savorgnan (1508–1528)', in C. M. Belfanti / F. Fantini d'Onofrio / D. Ferrari (eds), *Guerre, stati e città. Mantova e l'Italia padana dal secolo XIII al XIX*, Mantua 1988, pp. 13–32; ead., *I Savorgnan*, pp. 77–123, 131–133 and passim; ead., 'Girolamo Savorgnan', pp. 2258–2265. **12** According to Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, p. 180, and Casella, 'Girolamo Savorgnan', p. 2260.

for six weeks, from 17 February to 30 March, leaving the Holy Roman Empire too weak to contain Venice's armies elsewhere, and allowing Venice to recapture Udine and reoccupy nearly all of Friuli.¹³ This decisive resistance at Osoppo was a confirmation of Girolamo's skills as a military tactician, and saw him venerated as a loyal defender of Venice and her interests. These interests were closely tied to his own, and expanding his personal estate depended on the good will of the *Signoria*: shortly before the siege of Osoppo, the Council of Ten granted him the assets that had been confiscated from his cousin Antonio; and when his hunger for power was impeded by opposition from rural communities, Venice compensated him for his losses by according him, in February 1519, an annuity of 400 ducats.¹⁴

In this quest for power and prestige, Girolamo Savorgnan was helped not only by his undisputed excellence in the field of war and weapons, but also by the rhetorical skills given to him by his literary education, which brought him into close friendship with Pietro Bembo in the 1490s, and which he exploited to win over Venetian magistrates when defending his rights.¹⁵ Above all, he married strategically, and his choice of partners left no doubt as to his intentions: his first marriage in 1493, to Maddalena *di Raimondo* della Torre, was part of an attempt to reconcile the del Monte Savorgnans with another powerful Friulian family, and the couple bore four children before Maddalena's death in 1496. His second marriage, to Felicità *di Priamo* Tron, saw the shift towards Venice which Girolamo had been displaying in his public life made official; Felicità gave Girolamo three more children before she too died in 1501. His third wife, Bianca *di Piero* Malipiero *di S. Faustin*, was also from a Venetian patriciate family; she gave birth to five children, including Costantino, who became Girolamo's eldest son after the premature death of nine (six girls and three boys) of the twelve children he had from these first three marriages.¹⁶

Girolamo's lineage, and thus the perpetuation of the family name, descended from his fourth marriage, in 1509, to another member of the Venetian patriciate, Orsina *di Girolamo* Canal. From this marriage there were born twelve children, all of whom outlived their father, who died on 30 March 1529 in Venice, and was buried the following year in the San Pietro church built on the *rocca di Osoppo*. It logically became the duty of Girolamo's eldest child, Giulio, after Costantino's death in 1534, to maintain the Savorgnans' prestige by continuing to further the interests of both the family and the Venetian State. Girolamo may be con-

13 Cf. the letters from Girolamo Savorgnan relating these operations: Joppi, *Lettere storiche di Girolamo Savorgnan*, pp. 28–51. 14 Conzato, 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', p. 167, mentions the peasant protests against the taxes Girolamo was imposing; Girolamo's own protestations against the powers that be in Udine were just as virulent: Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797*, pp. 111–116. 15 Among the available texts written by Girolamo Savorgnan, the reader should consult the publication by Joppi mentioned supra, n. 11, as well as Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 51–58, and Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 279–317; for an inventory of everything he wrote, ead., 'Girolamo Savorgnan', p. 2265. Concerning the link with Pietro Bembo, see G. Beltramini/D. Gasparotto/A. Tura (eds), *Pietro Bembo e l'invenzione del Rinascimento* (exhibition catalogue), Venice 2013, pp. 88, 94–96. 16 Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 50, col. 88, 124; a family tree showing Girolamo's descendants is given in: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689d, s.f.; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 143–144, and Appendix 1, table 4; see here figs 3 and 4.

sidered the true founder of this ethos, having built a coherent moral and political framework for the whole Savorgnan del Monte lineage, a framework adhered to not only by himself but also, for example, by his youngest brother Giacomo, another *condottiere* in the service of Venice.¹⁷ The strong commitments Girolamo made for the Savorgnans' cause showed his offspring how they too should serve their family, making them aware of their place in history in the privileged position Venice had afforded them. He also extended his family's political horizons to include northern Italy, through his relations with the courts of Ferrara, Mantua and Urbino.

Furthermore, Girolamo drummed into his sons the threat of the Ottoman Empire, which had been made clear by the *akinci* stationed in the *paşalık* of Bosnia who ravaged Friuli between 1470 and 1478, then again in September 1499, when in a single expedition they set 132 villages ablaze and took around 10,000 prisoners; the extent to which this attack remained in Friulians' minds long afterwards is illustrated by the detailed discussion of the event in the letter Giulio Savorgnan wrote in Zara on 15 November 1570.¹⁸ In April 1520 Venice entrusted Girolamo with the defence of Friuli's eastern border, in particular against Ottoman incursions; this foreshadowed the missions they were to later confer upon Giulio, who was also ordered to contain the Ottoman threat, in Dalmatia, Corfu, Crete and Cyprus.¹⁹

The Savorgnan fraterna

When Girolamo Savorgnan died, he left behind him an inheritance containing numerous estates, although half of the assets stripped from Girolamo's cousin, Antonio, disappeared when they were restored to their rightful heirs in 1530. Exactly what Girolamo set out in his will remains unknown, but it had clear effects; the seven sons who outlived their father all agreed that they would keep their heritage united in order to consolidate their power.²⁰ It was at this point that the brothers tightened the family bond immensely by forming a fraternal community, or *fraterna*, which lasted up until 1578, when the youngest of the brothers, Ascanio, asked for the assets to be divided up. In fifteenth- to seventeenth-century Venetian aristocratic society, the Savorgnans were not the only family to protect their heritage by creating a *fraterna*; other examples were certain branches of the Pisanis, the Soranzos, the Barbaros, the Donàs and the Corner Piscopia *fraterna* which looked after the family's Cypriot estates.²¹ In a recent study, Dorit Raines proposes a distinction between two main

17 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 97–103. 18 ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 8; also, *Discorso circa la difesa del Friuli*, V. Joppi (ed.), Udine 1869, p. 7 (letter written in Zara on 15 December 1570). More generally: M. P. Pedani Fabris, 'I Turchi e il Friuli alla fine del Quattrocento', *Memorie storiche forogiuliesi* 74 (1994), pp. 203–224; Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, pp. 92–93, 128–129; Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797*, pp. 47–61. 19 BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 157/c. 97. 20 To be precise, Girolamo left two more sons behind him, but one of them, named after his father, died at the age of ten in 1522; another was a son born out of wedlock, nicknamed *il Turco*, whom Girolamo shunned: Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 131–135, 220, table 4. Marino Sanudo actually claims that Girolamo did not write a will: *I diarii*, vol. 50, col. 88. 21 Concerning the legal context of *fraterne* in Venetian

types of *fraterna* found within the Venetian patriciate, one associated with investments intended for commercial enterprises, and another, more oriented towards family administration of the assets they had inherited.²² Girolamo Savorgnan's sons were therefore following a contemporary trend when they adopted this style of association which guaranteed that all assets were shared equally amongst the fraternal community, and that the family heritage was preserved and strengthened, at the same time as being given a singularly ethical and political dimension. Before examining how the *fraterna* worked, and especially what role Giulio played in this family structure, however, a glance should first be cast at the careers of each of the Savorgnan *fraterna*'s members (figs 3 and 4).

COSTANTINO

The eldest son, Costantino, was born between 1506 and 1508 to Girolamo and his third wife, Bianca, and, as per his father's wishes, took up the task of guarding Osoppo after Girolamo's death.²³ Evidence shows that he was taking care of the family heritage as early as summer 1524, and it was in this role that Costantino grew in stature: in 1528 Venice put him in command of a company of 100 arquebusiers, and in 1534 he delivered a report to the *Signoria* concerning Friuli's borders. He was assassinated soon afterwards, on 17 July of that same year, in circumstances that remain unclear, but were possibly not at all related to the vendettas between different families of *castellani*.²⁴ The sparse details of the public life of the *fraterna*'s eldest brother paint the picture of a career determined by his father's wishes.

society, see: M. Ferro, *Dizionario del diritto comune e veneto*, vol. I / 2, Venice 1845, pp. 772–774; R.C. Mueller, *The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200–1500*, Baltimore/London 1997, pp. 96–110. Concerning the Pisani family: F. C. Lane, 'Family partnerships and joint ventures', *Journal of Economic History* IV (1944), pp. 178–196, cited in the Italian translation (*Società familiari e imprese a partecipazione congiunta*) in id., *I mercanti di Venezia*, Turin 1982, pp. 239–247. Concerning the Soranzos: id., *Andrea Barbarigo, merchant of Venice 1418–1449*, New York 1967, pp. 145–146. Concerning the Donàs: Davis, *A Venetian family and its fortune*, pp. 3–8. Concerning the Barbaro family: G. Trebbi, *Francesco Barbaro, patrizio veneto e patriarca di Aquileia*, Udine 1984, pp. 4–10, 382–384. Concerning the Corner Piscopias in Cyprus, see infra, doc. 114. *Fraterne* were not only found within the Venetian patriciate; they were also adopted by merchants and artisans to take care of their own paternal heritages, as shown by Bellavitis, *Identité, mariage, mobilité sociale*, pp. 269–274; ead., *Famille, genre, transmission à Venise au XVI^e siècle*, Rome 2008, pp. 150–153, 205. See also Megna, 'Grandezza e miseria della nobiltà veneziana', in *Storia di Venezia*, vol 7: G. Benzoni / G. Cozzi (eds), *La Venezia barocca*, Venice 1997, pp. 167–170. Finally, it should be noted that *fraterne* were also present in Greco-Venetian society: V. Kouri, 'Η αδελφοσύνη των χωρικών στην Κέρκυρα', *Τα Ιστορικά* 53 (2010), pp. 303–338.

22 Raines, 'La *fraterna* et la ramification en branches des familles du patriarcat vénitien, XV^e–XVIII^e siècles' in F. Boudjaba / C. Dousset / S. Mouysset (eds), *Frères et sœurs du Moyen Âge à nos jours*, Berne, forthcoming, which bases its analysis on the cases of three families, the San Trovaso Minios, the Querini Stampalias and the San Stae Trons. 23 In a letter he wrote on 15 May 1528 to the doge, Andrea Gritti, Girolamo stated: "Costantino mio primogenito resterà con l'altro fratello alla custodia di questo monte; al qual Costantino vorrei se così piacesse alla Sublimità Vostra, che fosse dato il modo di far 100 archibugieri, che tanti mi bastano per la difesa e sicurtà di questo monte [...]": Joppi, *Lettere storiche di Girolamo Savorgnan*, p. 137. 24 BC], *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. 6, no. 163 / cc. 53–54; id., *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 176–177; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Aspetti della personalità di Gerolamo Savorgnan', p. 86; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 117, 165.

GIULIO

Girolamo's second son, who after Costantino's death in 1534 became the eldest brother of the *fraterna*, was Giulio, born in Osoppo on 11 November 1510, the first child of Girolamo's marriage with Orsina Canal (fig. 10). Without going into aspects of his personality that will be looked at later, his youth was marked by a precocious military upbringing which, from 1526 to 1529, saw him enter battlefields from Lombardy to Rome. When peace was reinstated, Venice ordered him to serve in his homeland, Friuli, where he stayed until 1539 and was then sent to Dalmatia for six years, after which he returned to Friuli, and in 1546 was given his first *condotta*; for the next few years he lent his expertise to city fortification projects in both Dalmatia (Zara) and the *Terraferma* (Padua). After this, he was constantly consulted on defence projects, and ended up working on the fortification of Peschiera, on Lake Garda, in 1549. From 1550 onwards, Giulio's career seems to have been dependent on his health; apart from his time as governor in Corfu (from May 1551 to May 1553), up until 1562 he lived in Friuli and undertook various missions in the *Terraferma*, most often in the capacity of 'fortification expert', as was the case in Padua and Bergamo. However, following his first Cyprus mission in summer 1562, his professional sphere became the *Stato da Mar*: he lived in Crete from 1562 to 1566, then in Dalmatia from 1566 to 1567. He returned briefly to Friuli in the autumn of 1566, then was appointed governor of Corfu before reaching Cyprus, where from June 1567 to the summer of 1569 he led the construction of a new fortress for Nicosia.

The 1570 war took Giulio once more to Dalmatia, this time as army governor-general; he then returned to Venice, where in the summer of 1571, by which point he had been elevated to the rank of governor of the Venice Lido soldiers, he contributed to the installation of defensive structures for the Venetian Lagoon. Yet another homecoming to Friuli in 1572 signalled the start of a period in which he devoted himself to fortifying Osoppo and taking care of the family heritage. The pinnacle of his military career came in 1587 when he was appointed superintendent-general of Venice's artillery and fortresses. Right up until the end of his life, his expert advice was sought in various fields; he was mostly consulted on defensive architecture, and he contributed to the design of a project which he had been hoping to work on for a long time, the Palmanova fortress, the construction of which began on 7 October 1593. Giulio died in Venice on 15 July 1595 at the age of 85, and was honoured by the *Signoria* with an official funeral in the Santi Giovanni e Paolo church. By the end of his career, in which he reached the highest positions of Venetian military authority, Giulio had become an archetype of the ever-loyal soldier and servant of Venice.²⁵

MARIO AURELIO

Mario Aurelio was born in Venice one year after Giulio, on 8 December 1511.²⁶ Being so

²⁵ A detailed bibliography concerning G.S. is given *infra*, p. 53 n. 111; regarding the years after 1571, see Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 131–132. ²⁶ A relatively good deal of information is available concerning the life of Mario Savorgnan, thanks to various sources and studies: Francesco Sansovino, *Origine e fatti delle famiglie*

close in age did not, however, make the two brothers close in their respective upbringings and career paths; Mario received a literary education in Osoppo, where Marcantonio Amalteo and Janus Laskaris were teaching.²⁷ The schooling he received, a combination of Latin and Greek philology and mathematics, saw Mario become a man of letters, and in 1536 he published an Italian translation of a treatise on the art of war taken from Polybius' *Histories*.²⁸ This literary bent did not deter him from a military career, though; having probably learnt about war from his father, by 1530 he was already taking part in an inspection of Friuli's eastern defences led by the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, who was commander of Venice's armies. Soon after this, at the age of twenty, Mario was summoned, together with his uncle Nicolò Tiepolo, to the Diet of Augsburg by Charles V; this brought him into close contact with imperial circles, enabled him to travel around Germany and Flanders to examine different fortresses, and above all gave him a chance to frequent the courts of Paris, London, Cologne and Brussels. He was back in Friuli in 1532, and in 1535 defended his family's claims to the fiefdoms of Belgrado and Castelnuovo. In 1542 Mario

illustri d'Italia, p. 513; Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 37–46, vol. 4, pp. 212, 414; Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 462–463; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 91–101; F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Memorie di Casa Savorgnan', *Accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Udine*, serie VII, VIII (1966–1967), pp. 5–15 (offprint used); *Palmanova fortezza d'Europa*, pp. 420–422; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 138, 153, 168 and passim; R. Norbedo, 'Mario Aurelio detto Mario il vecchio Savorgnan del Monte', in *Nuovo Liruti 2*, vol. 2, pp. 2283–2288, with a list of the surviving written documents from his hand, p. 2287. More information can be found in short manuscript biographies, but several of these are not entirely trustworthy: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; id., *Fondo principale*, cod. 1503, ff. 44^r, 156^v. 27 Giano Laskaris, *Epigrammi greci*, pp. 58–59, no. 34, wrote an epigram dedicated to Mario, celebrating his beauty, vigour and wisdom, and his faith in culture: εἰς Μάρτιον τὸν Σαβορνιαδὸν | ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ζῶειν σοφίης ἄτερ οὐκ ἐτάλασσας | εὐμαθίην μεθέπων πᾶσαν, ἀναξ Μάριε. 28 *Libro della militia de' Romani et del modo di accampare tratto dall'Historia di Polibio*, [Venice] 1536. The translation is attributed to Mario by Francesco Sansovino, *Venetia città nobilissima et singolare*, ff. 277^v–278^r: "Mario Savorgnano Patrizio Veneto, figliuolo già del Conte Hieronimo, et Condottiero illustre di gente d'arme della Repubblica tradusse di Greco in volgare molte cose di Polibio. Composte etiandio 4 libri della Militia antica, et moderna. Et nel primo tratta dell'officio del Generale, et d'altri Capitani minori, et poi delle membra principali dell'essercito, come sono, fantaria, cavalleria, compartimenti, armi, istituzioni et essercitationi loro. Nel secondo ragiona dell'accampar degli esserciti, del guadagnar i lidi scendendo l'armate in terra, come si ritirino poi, et alloggino bene et sicuramente, rappresentando i modi che hanno osservato in queste attioni, gli antichi et moderni Capitani. Nel terzo discorre, delle giornate fatte da gli antichi et moderni, et perché siano all'una parte infelici, et all'altra felici. Nell'ultimo favella delle fortezze, et della qualità loro in tutte le parti. Dell'oppugnationi fatte sotto diverse città. Et finalmente describe la materia dell'artiglierie, con tutte le cose ad esse appartenenti". Marco is given quite a degree of authority in this publication; Raffaele Cillenio attributes another translation of Polybius to him, published in Venice in 1549: Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 44; G. Ferigo, 'Ce ch'al jodè, e a nol jodè, Blancon... Tre note su Girolamo Biancione', *Metodi e ricerche*, n.s. XXI/1 (Jan.–June 2002), p. 40. This attribution has, however, been questioned by some: Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 259–260, writes that the author was anonymous, and dedicated his translation to the duke of Urbino; L. Olivato, 'La teoria dell'arte militare nel Rinascimento veneto', in S. Polano (ed.), *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, Milan 1988, p. 83, states that the author of the translation was none other than Janus Laskaris, who indeed translated Polybius from Greek to Latin: *Opusculum de castrametatione Romanorum: De militia Romanorum et castrorum metatione, liber ex Polybii Historiis excerptus*, Parhisiis: apud Petrum Gromorsum, [1523 or 1524]; since a revised edition of Laskaris' Latin translation was later printed in Venice, in 1529, Mario Savorgnan could have made his own translation from Latin and not from Greek.

took up residence in France, in the service of Francis I, and participated in the capture of Landrecies (Artois), as well as possibly contributing to the restoration of the city's fortress, a project led by the engineer Girolamo Marini. He then went back to Friuli once more, and in the summer of 1544 voiced his desire to go and see the siege of Saint-Dizier, where French armies were resisting Charles V's troops. He was given the *Signoria's* permission to go to Lorraine, and when he surrendered to the imperial camp he came under the protection of Ferdinando de Gonzaga, viceroy of Sicily. Mario was accompanied on this voyage by an engineer named Antonio dal Tolmezzo, who designed an assault bridge to cross moats; for his part, Mario submitted a plan of a Saint-Dizier fortress reinforced with three new bastions.²⁹ Upon his return to Italy, he continued to offer his services to Pope Paul III and to Duke Ottavio Farnese, when fortification work was under way in Rome (1548), then to the Este family in Ferrara (1549).³⁰

In 1550 Mario returned definitively to Friuli and began to take care of the family estates. Though sources show him enthusiastically boasting of the quality of the *robolla di prosecco* produced on their vineyards, he appears to have found the domestic environment stifling; in a letter to the duke of Ferrara he speaks of his “desiderio di scappar fuori con qualche carico di guerra”. From 1551 to 1557 Mario offered his services to the Estes, and passed on to them “il disegno della machina veneziana da cavar fango”; he also attempted to enter into contact with the Valois ambassador at the court of Ferrara, unhappy at being restricted by the duties to Venice he had taken on in 1553.³¹ These duties included the command of a minor (containing only 25 horses) *condotta*, for which he received a yearly salary of 25 ducats; he was probably under the orders of his brother, Giulio, and succeeded Ludovico Roncone into a position of military command which maybe saw him travel to inspect fortresses in Zante and elsewhere in the *Stato da Mar*. Mario followed family tradition when in 1554 he delivered a report on the role of the cavalry in Venice's army; ten years later he led a company of soldiers in Friuli, and appears to have led the Friuli *milizia* in 1572. He spent the end of his life on the family estates, and passed away in Belgrade in May 1574.³² Thus, Mario Savorgnan's career was marked by a failure to obtain senior political, military or even diplomatic offices; in his forties he was still only reaching low-ranking positions of command, and in the fields of fortification and mechanics he was not skilled enough to achieve his goals (figs 6 and 7). However, thanks to his intellect Mario was able to form relationships with eminent humanists, as shown in the letter he wrote to Alvise Cornaro on 8 February 1562, which shall be

29 A.-A. Rozet / J.-F. Lembey, *L'invasion de la France et le siège de Saint-Dizier par Charles-Quint en 1544*, Paris 1910, pp. 620–622, 635, 698–699. 30 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written on 7 June 1549; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 94; Casella, “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, pp. 133–134. 31 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letters dated 8 March 1551, 31 August 1552, 3 February 1553, 4 January and 12 August 1554, 15 May 1555 and 4 January 1556; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 171 / c. 55, no. 172 / c. 59, no. 173 / c. 73. 32 ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 49^v, reg. 36, f. 104^v; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 181 / c. 51; Casella, “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, pp. 140–141; Conzato, ‘Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento’, p. 150, states that Mario Savorgnan succeeded Ludovico Roncone.

studied further later on.³³ Mario left his mark with the four texts he published, the most notable of which was his treatise on the art of war, written for the instruction of his nephews and published posthumously in Venice in 1599 (figs 8 and 9);³⁴ in this work his love for science is made clear, and he displays a great knowledge of tactics, fortification and artillery, interests that he shared with his brother Giulio.

GERMANICO

Girolamo's fourth son, Germanico, was born in Venice in February 1514; little is known about his life until August 1536, when he offered to the duke of Ferrara to serve as a soldier in his army, explaining to him that he had already fought for Venice.³⁵ In April 1538 he proposed to the French that they take back the three fortresses of Gorizia, Gradisca and Marano that had been occupied by the Holy Roman Empire, but it is not known in what military capacity he did so, nor what exactly his military activities were at the time.³⁶ He was an avid defender of his family's honour, and convinced the duke of Ferrara to expel, in late 1539, a Paduan held responsible for his brother Costantino's murder. He also revived the ancient *faida* between noble families when, in August 1547, in Venice, he assassinated three members of the Friulian Corbelli family after the rivalry between them and the Savorgnans had reached the courtroom in an attempt to settle a dispute over the ownership of land in the earldom of Belgrado; the Council of Ten subsequently banished Germanico from the Venetian State on 27 August of the same year.³⁷ Living in exile, he went first to the court of the duke of Ferrara, then crossed the Alps to join the armies of Henry II in France. The last stages of his military career saw him taken prisoner by the Holy Roman Emperor's troops in Sforza Castle in Milan, where in August 1552 he fell seriously ill. His brothers Mario and Ascanio thus asked the duke of Ferrara to convince Francesco Sforza to liberate him; the duke agreed,

³³ See *infra*, p. 48, 50; a commentary of Aristotle published by Francesco Robertello in 1552 was also dedicated to Mario: Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', p. 259. ³⁴ Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e marittima*. This work was still considered "uno de' più intendenti dell'età sua nelle cose della guerra" by M. Foscarini, *Della letteratura veneziana*, Padua 1752, p. 306 n. 2; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 166. Francesco Sansovino gives his opinion on this treatise *supra*, n. 28. As Mario did not manage to finish his work before his death, Tomaso Porcacchi was given the task, no doubt by G.S., of getting all of Mario's papers in order. When the 1576 plague did away with Porcacchi, the publication of the work was in the end pushed back to 1599, and finally completed by Cesare Campana: Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e marittima*, p. 4 of the dedication; Lirutti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 45; Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 265, 279. ³⁵ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written on 18 August 1536. Details of Germanico's life can be found in short manuscript biographies: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; *id.*, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 163 / c. 59, no. 165 / c. 79, no. 169 / c. 38, no. 171 / c. 55, no. 172 / cc. 59^v, 67^v; *id.*, *Fondo principale*, cod. 1503, ff. 44^r, 139^v (where it is stated that he also served the marquis of Marignan in Hungary and Marquis del Vasto in Lombardy); Lirutti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 53–56; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 107–115. ³⁶ N. Lemaître (ed.), *Correspondance du cardinal Georges d'Armagnac. Tome 1, 1530–1560*, Paris 2007, p. 123, letter written in Venice on 5 April 1538. ³⁷ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letters written on 28 November 1539 and 7 January 1540; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 114–115, 117.

Sforza was persuaded, and, most probably after a 10,000 ducat ransom was handed over, Germanico was freed. He next went to Piedmont, and then in September 1553 returned to France, where he was given the mission of inspecting fortresses in Picardy. His health remained fragile, however, and he died in Lyons on 6 May 1555, whilst preparing forces for a French campaign in Piedmont; his bones were later taken to Osoppo, where they were put into a marble urn.³⁸ Like those of his brothers, Germanico's life and career were founded on respect for and protection of his family and its traditions; he took this philosophy to the extreme, however, and his *faida* killings, carried out to defend the Savorgnans' honour, saw him expelled from his home by the highest authorities in the land.

MARC'ANTONIO

Concerning Girolamo's fifth son, Marc'Antonio, only fragmentary information is available.³⁹ He was born between 1515 and 1520, and followed the family tradition by serving in the Venetian army; he fought in the war against the Ottomans in Dalmatia, under Valerio Orsino, and made a name for himself with the outstanding bravery he displayed when helping to protect the Cattaro fortress in 1539, an operation in which he fought alongside his older brother Giulio.⁴⁰ He was implicated in legal proceedings in 1545, accused of bodily harm, but the trial was suspended the following year by the Council of Ten. His late marriage in 1550 to Antonia *di Panfilo* Valvason, a young Friulian noblewoman who boasted a substantial dowry, marked a turning point in his life; within the brotherhood, Marc'Antonio now assumed the role of 'penis of the family', to quote Carlo Emilio Gadda's happy expression, and made it his duty to ensure the continuity of the Savorgnan lineage and pass on the family tradition to his sons.⁴¹ Marc'Antonio fulfilled this role perfectly; he and Antonia bore seventeen children, and all were named after their Savorgnan ancestors. Their eldest child was baptized Girolamo (1551–1569), in honour of the founder of the del Monte branch of the Savorgnan family; the rest of their children were given the names of the existing brotherhood, in chronological order: Giulio (1552–1584), Mario (1553–1627), Germanico (1554–1597), Ascanio, Marc'Antonio, Costantino... (figs 3 and 4). As could only have been expected, most of Marc'Antonio's sons entered into a military career; for Girolamo this brought a cruelly premature death in Lyons in 1569, but for Mario and Germanico it brought honour and praise, in reward for their bravery at the Battle of Lepanto. Marc'Antonio's family duties limited his ability to hold public office in Friuli, but he did hold certain positions; although it

³⁸ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letters from Ascanio Savorgnan written on 7 June 1549 and 30 August 1552, from Germanico written on 24 August 1552 and 13 September 1553, and from Mario Savorgnan written on 10 June 1550 (sic); BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 171 / c. 55, no. 172 / cc. 65–66 (with a reprint of the funeral inscription). According to Mario Savorgnan, Germanico's expertise in siege warfare was particularly appreciated in France: Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e marittima*, p. 225; Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 271–272; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 108. ³⁹ BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f. ⁴⁰ ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 2^f. ⁴¹ Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 154–156, gives a detailed analysis of the marriage contract, and stresses the domestic, *pater familias* role which fell to Marc'Antonio.

is unclear which, they seem to have still been of a military nature in 1556. Marc'Antonio died in 1592, three years before Giulio.⁴²

GIROLAMO

Girolamo's sixth son, named after his father, took a completely different path, choosing an ecclesiastical career. He was born between 1515 and 1520, and as early as 14 August 1536 his brothers invested in him the ownership of the Flambro *pieve*, the Savorgnan's *juspatronata* abbey. He was then sent off to Padua, where he got a degree in canon law, and by 1544 he was in the service of Pope Paul IV in Rome. Girolamo stayed there for over a decade, until on 9 August 1557 the pope appointed him bishop of Sebenico. His service in Dalmatia was interrupted when he was sent to the court of Henry II in France, as an ambassador; in March–April 1559, along with Cardinal Antonio Trivulzio, he took part in negotiating the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, then he went to Trent, and from 1562 to 1563 followed the proceedings of the Council. Afterwards he returned to Sebenico and stayed there until January 1573, when he gave up the bishopry after fifteen years and went home to Friuli to take care of his family's assets. From 1581 to 1583 he was decisive in the process of settling his brother Ascanio's inheritance. He spent the last years of his life in Rome, where he died on 8 May 1591, also before his older brother Giulio.⁴³

ASCANIO

It was Ascanio, Girolamo's seventh and last son, who ended up breaking the *fraterna*.⁴⁴ His date of birth varies from source to source, but he was probably born in 1520.⁴⁵ There is little information available regarding his schooling, but he was most probably given a combination of literary teaching from tutors in Osoppo or Venice, and education in war and weaponry. It is not until 1547–1548 that Ascanio appears in documentation, involved in a duel which became a several-month-long affair; whilst Ascanio was living in Venice, he was challenged by Vincislao Buzzacarino, an exiled Dalmatian soldier who had settled in Padua after passing through Friuli, where, Ascanio claimed, he had committed murder. Accusing Ascanio of slander, Buzzacarino challenged him to a duel, via *cartelli* sent from Mantua; Ascanio refuted

42 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written on 4 January 1556; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VII, no. 186 / c. 8: will dated 8 April 1591, and codicil dated 5 May. 43 Girolamo's biography has been established by Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico', pp. 6–27. Further information can be found in the brief biographies given in the BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 173 / c. 73^v, and *Fondo principale*, cod. 1503, f. 44^r; Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 46–53. 44 Concerning Ascanio, see, above all, the biography given by L. Casella, 'Ascanio Savorgnan', pp. 2255–2257. For further information: Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 56–59; Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri militari italiani*, p. 464; the brief biography in the BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 121–124. 45 Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. VI, p. 581, gives 6 July 1525, whilst Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 220 table 4, and 'Ascanio Savorgnan', p. 2255, proposes 1521; 1520 is the date given in one of the BCJ's brief biographies, *Fondo principale*, cod. 1503, f. 44^v, and by Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 56, who prints a letter written in 1580 by Giovanni Garzoni in which the author states that his uncle is in his sixties (see below).

his opponent's allegations, labelling them vile taunts made by a man who had no status in society, on the battlefield or in any prince's court; a man whose absurd challenges were of no concern to a "gentil' homo Vinitiano di Città, per la Dio gratia, libera, Conte, & con la giurisditione di sudditi così ampia, come si sa, per mercè de miei signori Illustrissimi [...]". The affair was finally brought to a close by the duke of Ferrara, Ercole II of Este, who chose to expel the troublesome Buzzacarino, a man involved in several other trials in addition to the conflict with Ascanio Savorgnan. In a letter written on 29 December 1548, Ascanio unsurprisingly heaped fawning thanks upon the duke for the continuing affection and special treatment he gave to the Savorgnan family.⁴⁶

A year later, Ascanio was once again exalting the ties between the Savorgnans and the duke, this time in the hope of persuading Ercole to accept him into his armies, allowing him to serve alongside his brother Germanico; the duke rejected the idea, and again when Ascanio tried to convince him once more in 1552, despite Germanico having left for France. It was, perversely, Germanico's untimely death in Lyons in May 1555 that gave his brother what he had been seeking; in the condolence letter the duke sent to the family, he offered to ask his ambassador in France to recommend Ascanio to Henry II and convince him to give Germanico's newly vacant post to the youngest Savorgnan brother. Ascanio dispatched an agent to Paris to lead the negotiations concerning his *condotta*, and spent the following months travelling around Germany, Flanders and England to visit various fortresses and see the latest developments in military architecture.⁴⁷ He finally succeeded in entering the French court, and in 1557 fought in the French ranks against the Holy Roman Empire; on 10 August he only just escaped being taken prisoner during the Battle of Saint-Quentin.⁴⁸ It is not known how exactly Ascanio ended up back in Italy, but he was in Venice in August 1560, using his literary skills to have his brother Giulio excused following an unfortunate affair involving a horse requisitioned by the syndic of the *Terraferma*, Alvise Mocenigo.⁴⁹ Tasked with giving his thoughts on the defence of Cyprus, Ascanio went to the island with his brother Giulio from 9 June to 12 October 1562 (as will be explained in more detail later). Not long after this, in 1566, his expert opinion was sought on what kind of fortification was needed to defend Friuli; in the elegantly written report he delivered, Ascanio argued, like his brother Giulio, that fortifying Udine was useless, and the Strassoldo or Sant' Elia sites were technically and strategically superior.⁵⁰ Ascanio spent the 1550s gaining experience outside the

⁴⁶ Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, *cod. 46*, tomo 1, *Carte varie cavallaresche*, ff. 2^r–16^v, quotation in f. 4^r; ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293. ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, letters written by Ascanio Savorgnan on 5 June and 3 August 1549, 28 March 1552, 13 July 1555 and 7 November 1556 (in Gand); and a letter written by Mario Savorgnan on 4 January 1556; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 1502*, vol. VI, no. 169/c. 38, no. 170/c. 41^v, no. 173/c. 72^v. Ascanio appears to have enlisted more help trying to enter the French court: on 9 December 1556, Georges d'Armagnac, the former French ambassador to Venice, sent him a recommendation letter from Rome; N. Lemaitre (ed.), *Correspondance du cardinal Georges d'Armagnac. Tome 1*, pp. 381–382 (quoted supra n. 36). ⁴⁸ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written by Mario Savorgnan on 23 September 1557; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 1502*, vol. 6, no. 173/c. 73^v. ⁴⁹ BAM, *cod. G 273 inf.*, f. 175^r. ⁵⁰ ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 8, a report written by Ascanio

Venetian State, in the hope of earning for himself the titles and rewards required to hold the most coveted public offices. For reasons that are not entirely clear (might the *Signoria* have wanted to limit the Savorgnan's growing power within the Venetian military structure?), Ascanio was never given the positions he sought, leading in this respect a similar career to his older brother Mario.

After the War of Cyprus, sources show Ascanio living the life of a courtier; in 1571, the Friulian humanist, Raffaele Cillenio, dedicated a rhetorical treatise to him, eulogizing Ascanio's birth, military talents, scientific expertise and poetical skills.⁵¹ At this point, Ascanio was busier enjoying Venetian society than he was taking care of family matters in Friuli, and, again for reasons which remain unclear, at the ripe age of 58 years old he split from the *fraterna* to marry Bianca Giustinian, the daughter of the San Marco procurator, Giovan Battista. He put his decision to leave the brotherhood beyond repair when, in 1578, he initiated legal proceedings to carve up the family heritage in order to have a share of the assets for himself; following the deaths of Costantino, Germanico and Mario, this would be a quarter of the whole.⁵² The wedding with Bianca, a grandiose ceremony held on 15 October 1580,⁵³ connected Ascanio to a powerful patrician family, and provided him an amazing chance to climb the social ladder, which demanded he support himself financially (the *donatio propter nuptias* to be given by Ascanio was set at 5,500 ducats). The other members of the del Monte Savorgnan family did not, of course, approve, as illustrated in a letter written by one of Ascanio's nephews, Giovanni Garzoni, in Venice on 26 October 1580: Giovanni condemns his uncle's decision to marry a twenty-three-year-old when in his sixties, and hopes that the couple will have no children.⁵⁴ It did not take long for relations between Ascanio and his three brothers to likewise become fraught; sharing out the family estates and declaring incomes did not prove to be a smooth and simple process, and when Ascanio questioned the honesty of his brothers' fiscal declarations, the family solidarity was definitively broken.⁵⁵ The reaction to this collapse became quickly and brutally clear when, in the night of 2 October 1581, Germanico, Ascanio's nephew, savagely assassinated his uncle in the parlour of the Santi Cosma e Damiano monastery, in Giudecca in Venice, whilst the latter was visiting his sister, Felicita, a nun.⁵⁶ Bianca Giustinian was left widowed, and with a one-

Savorgnan, s.d., s.f.; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 123, judges the report to have been written in 1566–1567. ⁵¹ R. Cillenio Angeli, *Tabulae rhetoricae Raphaelis Cyllenii Angeli*, Venetiis: apud Iordanum Zilettum & socios, 1571, "Ascanio Savorniano Ode"; Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 4, p. 212; G. Ferigo, 'Ce ch'al jodè, e a nol jodè, Blancon ... Tre note su Girolamo Biancione', p. 40 (quoted supra n. 28). ⁵² ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, ff. 71^r–72^r; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VII, no. 182/c. 9. ⁵³ According to a note explaining that the city of Udine sent Francesco Masero to the wedding as its representative, and gave the couple a diamond worth 150 ducats: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f. The date of the wedding is revealed in Bianca Giustinian's will, as Casella notes, *I Savorgnan*, p. 160. ⁵⁴ Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 4, p. 56; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 159, and 'Ascanio Savorgnan', p. 2256. ⁵⁵ ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, f. 76^{r-v}. ⁵⁶ The events were documented: "Germanico Savorgnan del signor Marc'Antonio, imputato che conceptuto gravissimo odio contra la persona del Nobile huomo ser Ascanio Savorgnan suo barba, fratello di suo padre, per le cause come nel processo, essendo esso Signor Ascanio stato mandato a chiamar da sua sorella suor Felicita Savorgnan, monaca in San Cosmo e Damian alla Zudeca, per che venisse a parlarla, sia il predetto Germanico heri, che fu li 2 del presente, alle hore 23 in

month-old baby to take care of, who, in accordance with family tradition, was baptized Girolamo. Ascanio paid for splitting from his brothers with his life; but the carving up of the family heritage was confirmed when, on 16 June 1584, Ascanio and Bianca's son Girolamo was invested with his father's fiefdoms.⁵⁷

Despite the distinct personalities, skills and careers of each brother, the *fraterna* of Girolamo Savorgnan's seven sons, formed upon their father's death in March 1529 and held together until Ascanio's transgression, shared a common path which was profoundly determined by their father's wishes. Laura Casella underlines the importance of the upbringing and education Girolamo gave to his sons, bestowing upon them classical schooling first from the Friulian humanist Marcantonio Amalteo, in 1519–1520, then from the renowned Greek emigrate Janus Lascaris, who most probably frequented the Osoppo *palazzo* during his four-year residence in Venice from early 1521 to late 1524.⁵⁸ Exactly what this teaching involved is unknown, but Lascaris will undoubtedly have given precedence to classics, introducing the Savorgnan children to ancient languages and humanist culture. Giulio did not, it seems, take much from his Greek lessons, as his letters and reports written during his time in Cyprus reveal no understanding of the language whatsoever, and he even botches the island's place names. Mario's Greek skills, however, were far superior, and at the age of just 25 he completed a translation of Polybius. Only one of the seven brothers took up a language-oriented career, Girolamo, who entered the world of the Catholic Church at the age of 13; but all of them were keen writers, whether it was to draw up court documents required to protect and strengthen the family heritage or to respond to the many Venetian officials asking them to give their expert opinions or deliver reports. Their education in bureaucratic writing began very early; as early as

circa, dopo haver aspettato longamente nell'horto, entrato nel parlatorio delle monache con altri doi fin'hora incogniti, facendo star altri parti alla porta dell'horto di esse monache, et altri in una barca armata con archibusi et altre arme che l'aspittavano con altri fin'hora incogniti, nel qual parlatorio pensatamente et proditoriamente amazzò con molte ferite il predetto Nobile huomo Signor Ascanio Savorgnan suo barba, et tornato poi nella predetta barca con li sopradetti incogniti, se ne sia con essi fuggito": ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti criminali, reg. 13, f. 52^r. The murder is discussed by P. Molmenti, *I banditi della repubblica di Venezia*, Venice 1896, p. 108; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, scheda 12; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 159–160. ⁵⁷ ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, f. 84^{r-v}; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VII, no. 184/c. 32. Concerning Bianca and then Girolamo's descendants, see Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 160–163, where the historian gives a magnificent portrait of the young widow through an analysis of her will; the latter is printed in another study: 'Donne aristocratiche nel Friuli del Cinquecento tra strategie familiari e conflitti di fazione', in L. Arcangeli/S. Peyronel Rambaldi (eds), *Donne di potere nel Rinascimento*, Rome 2008, pp. 27–32. ⁵⁸ Giano Laskaris, *Epigrammi greci*, pp. 58–59, wrote two dedications, one to Mario and another to Giulio Savorgnan, which both display how well he knew the two pupils; cf. supra, n. 27, and infra, p. 53; Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 14, 22–24. Concerning Lascaris's activities in Italy, see B. Knös, *Un ambassadeur de l'hellénisme, Janus Lascaris, et la tradition gréco-byzantine dans l'humanisme français*, Uppsala / Stockholm / Paris 1945; J.-C. Saladin, *La bataille du grec à la Renaissance*, Paris 2000, pp. 103–122, and passim; M. Ceresa, 'Lascaris, Giano', *DBI*, vol. 63, pp. 785–791. Concerning Marcantonio Amalteo, see infra n. 113.

1538, Giulio and Mario took part in transcribing a memoir for Valerio Orsino.⁵⁹ Girolamo's sons, it can be seen, shared a common set of values formed by their education in classics and administration, a common intellectual grounding that brought them together and enabled all of the brothers to understand one another when they were defending their family's cause.

At the same time as seeing to their intellectual nourishment, Girolamo steered his sons towards a military career, in accordance with a seigneurial tradition that respected and aspired to the prestige of military leadership, and which was even more pertinent to the Savorgnans given that their family estates were located in a border area where armed combat was an essential duty. During their childhood, therefore, the boys were trained extensively in combat techniques, military tactics and offensive and defensive strategy. Their father came from a family whose men were famous for their military exploits, and the high points of his own military career came when he fought back the imperial siege of Osoppo in February–March 1514. As a result, he incessantly designed fortification structures to strengthen his castles, and, on a larger scale, studied what was required to properly defend the whole of Friuli, submitting reports, plans and scale models to the Venetian Senate.⁶⁰ Girolamo logically sent his sons in the same direction as he had taken himself, at a time when military training was no longer purely a feudal concern and had come to be a part of serving the State. To give his sons experience of military campaigns and of leading troops, Girolamo entrusted them to commanders who could take them into their companies, allow them to live a soldier's daily life and experience a true battlefield.⁶¹

Out of the six brothers, Giulio is the only one to have described, at a later date, his military education, which was controlled and financed by his father.⁶² To begin with, by the age of just fifteen or sixteen, Giulio was already fighting in the Venetian army against the Holy Roman Empire in the Lombardy wars, led by the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, and allied with the French; he took part in the capture of Lodi and Cremona (in September 1526), and was able to observe other *condottieri* such as Giovanni De' Medici and Janus Maria Fregoso. In the spring of 1527 Giulio was sent to the court of Mantua, where his father insisted that his son be promoted from the position of page, given to him by Federico Gonzaga, to being a member of a light cavalry company.⁶³ Soon afterwards, he was

⁵⁹ Giulio Savorgnan, *Discorso sulla difesa del Friuli*, ed. by V. Joppi, Udine, 1869, pp. 13–14. ⁶⁰ For example, in the *Collegio* on 16 June 1514, “Fo mostrato, per uno nontio di domino Hironimo Savorgnan, il modello di Oxopo e altri disegni di la Patria di Friul”: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 18, col. 275; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f. ⁶¹ In accordance with the development of feudal and military relations in the *Terraferma* from the fifteenth century onwards, as Pezzolo, ‘Nobiltà militare e potere’, pp. 397–398, and Casella, “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, p. 132, have remarked. ⁶² G.S. frequently recalls the many stages of his military career in reports he wrote; cf. infra, doc. 77. Orazio Governa gives an ample official biography, addressed to G.S.'s nephew, Germanico, and describes G.S.'s military education in a more structured fashion: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 14^{r-v}. Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 200–201, gives a more comprehensive version of more or less the same story. ⁶³ ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 14^v; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. st. it. 47*, f. 138^v; Colmalisio, ‘Giulio Savorgnan: aspetti inediti’, p. 17, mentions a letter written on 24 April 1527 in Udine to the duke of Mantua, of which Casella gives an analysis in ‘I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti’, pp. 397–398, and in ‘Giulio Savorgnan’, in *Nuovo Liruti 2*, p. 2266. It should be noted, however, that Orazio Governa's official

once more fighting in Venice's armies, again under the duke of Urbino and also another famous *condottiere*, Paolo Luzzasco; Giulio took part in several sieges and battles, from Lombardy to Tuscany and Rome. As Walter Panciera points out, after the Treaty of Barcelona, signed on 29 June 1529, and the Treaty of Cambrai, signed on 3 August 1529, chances for the young Savorgnans to practice their skills on the battlefield became quite rare; but before he had even reached twenty years of age, Giulio boasted a firm knowledge of military practices and comprehensive weaponry and artillery skills, having spent three years observing experienced armies from all over Europe fighting on Italian soil.⁶⁴

This maturity gained on the battlefield unquestionably developed young Giulio's personality, and at the age of eighteen he was already being spoken of by his father as a future military leader.⁶⁵ Although his brothers did not, it seems, receive such a long and intense military education, all of them except Girolamo became military leaders; this, Luciano Pezzolo underlines, befit their family tradition, their social status and the customs of the *Terraferma* aristocracy.⁶⁶ They fought for Venice (Giulio, Mario, Marc'Antonio and Ascanio), and were quick to offer their services to the dukes of Ferrara and the king of France (Mario, Germanico and Ascanio) as *condottieri*, taking advantage of the opportunities now presented by the Italian wars, which enabled aristocratic elites to gain new titles in spheres outside of Venetian politics. While Germanico sought success abroad because he had been banished from the State of Venice in 1547, Ascanio's departure from Venetian territory was more a case of the youngest of the family seeking glory for himself and himself alone.⁶⁷ It is nevertheless striking how much each of the brothers' careers complemented one another, and the accumulation of all of their experiences clearly strengthened the cohesion of the *fraterna*; the knowledge of fortresses and battles gained abroad by Mario, Germanico and Ascanio was shared amongst the family via the brothers' letters to each other, and Giulio repeated much of this knowledge in his writings, even though he had not travelled across Western Europe himself.⁶⁸ It was certainly mostly thanks to the rapid growth of the Venetian printing press that the progresses being made in the art of war were disseminated to a wider audience, but it cannot be denied that the Savorgnan brothers had a real family culture of sharing information on military matters, most of them composing reports thereupon, particularly on the topic of fortifications.⁶⁹

Here again, Girolamo's sons followed the same path as their father, and in some cases

biography of G.S. contradicts this, stating that G.S. witnessed the sack of Rome in that same month of April 1527. ⁶⁴ Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 200–201; id., 'Giulio Savorgnan e la costruzione della fortezza di Nicosia', p. 132. Until the end of his life, G.S. recalled the composition of the armies he observed during the years 1526–1529: BAM, *cod. D 34 inf.*, ff. 130^r–134^v (letter from Osoppo, dated 2 June 1581). ⁶⁵ Joppi, *Lettere storiche di Girolamo Savorgnano*, p. 137. ⁶⁶ Pezzolo, 'Professione militare e famiglia in Italia', pp. 344–345. ⁶⁷ Cf. Ascanio's remarks in a letter written in Gand on 7 November 1556: "desiderando d'esser' più utile servitor ch' io potessi, ho voluto far questo viaggio per li paesi de li principi vicini ala Francia, e così, sendo passato per la Magna, mi sono condotto qui in Francia, e non contento di questo intendo passar' e veder' Inghilterra prima che m'indizzi a la corte christianissima": ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293; see also, more generally, Pezzolo, 'Nobiltà militare et potere', pp. 401–402, 408–409. ⁶⁸ Cf. *infra*, docs 4 and 5. ⁶⁹ Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 245–288.

went further along it: they delivered numerous reports at the behest of Venetian officials, and, like Girolamo, proposed ideas for the defence of Friuli; Costantino became the first of the brothers to write a treatise on this subject, in 1534, shortly before his death.⁷⁰ Nearly twenty years later, Giulio too began to write seriously on this subject, turning his attention to Friuli's defensive system as a whole (1553, 1566, 1570, 1583) as well as to individual sites and projects worthy of special attention: Marano (1557), Udine (1553, 1566), changing the course of the Tagliamento (1567, 1592), and Palmanova (1593, 1594).⁷¹ Mario too delivered reports, on the Venetian cavalry (1554) and on the defence of Friuli; and Ascanio wrote one in 1566, also on the defence of Friuli, and the various sites that could potentially be fortified in the region.⁷² Giulio soon became an expert on fortifications, and his opinion was sought on projects all across the *Terraferma*: in Padua (1548), in Peschiera (1549, 1557), at the Verona *chiusa* (1557) and in Bergamo (1561); then outside of Italy in Zara (1547, 1566), Corfu (1557, 1566), Candia (1557, 1565, 1566) and Cyprus (1557, 1558, 1562).⁷³ Only Ascanio actually focused on fortresses overseas, in Cyprus in 1562. Mario, for his part, joined the experience he and his brothers Giulio and Germanico had accumulated on the ground to the knowledge of Greek and Latin authors such as Thucydides, Polybius and Julius Caesar in his *Arte militare terrestre e maritime*, an analysis of the strategies and tactics used in informative battles and sieges from throughout history; this work was intended as a *condottiere's* manual, illustrated with various annotated plates, which impressively brought together historical and contemporary knowledge.⁷⁴

The Savorgnan brothers' skilled leadership of troops and the expertise they boasted in the domain of fortification was the visible side of their military activities; the economic viability of the duties they performed for Venice, however, is questionable.⁷⁵ In the letters he wrote during his tenure in Cyprus, Giulio constantly complains about how the fixed salaries given to the *condotte* are not enough to cover the costs inherent to their position. The *fraterna* seems to have consequently sought other, more lucrative, forms of military work, such as breeding horses; this activity proved indispensable to the brothers on occasions when their other duties called for *lanze spezzate*, lightly armed and quick-moving cavaliers used for reconnaissance or to harass the enemy. Ascanio, in May 1552, and Mario, in late 1556, both offered horses to the duke of Ferrara, an act in no way stipulated by the *condotte* contract; and Mario explains that, a few years later, 30 mares and as many fillies were brought from the Kingdom of Naples to be bred with Spanish thoroughbreds in the Savorgnan estates in Ariis and the Udine region.⁷⁶

70 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 165, which refers to ABS, *cod. mss.* 15. 71 In addition to G.S.'s published works, of which a list is given here in Appendix B (pp. 639 ff), see also the unpublished reports contained in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5 and 11. 72 Casella, "Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana", p. 141; Mario Savorgnan's report on Friuli can be found in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5 (s.d.; however, this report was possibly written by Mario's nephew, also named Mario, the son of Marc'Antonio); Ascanio's report can be found in: id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 8. 73 Id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 5 and 11. 74 Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e maritima*; the references to his brothers can be found on pp. 225–226. 75 M. Mallett, *Signori e mercenari. La guerra nell'Italia del Rinascimento*, Bologna 1983, pp. 220–222; Pezzolo, 'Nobiltà militare e potere', pp. 398–399. 76 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written by Mario Savorgnan

Another of the Savorgnan *fraterna's* activities, still linked to the military sphere, was working an iron mine; on 28 November 1553 the brothers were granted a concession from the *Signoria* to extract iron from the Val Bombarina mountain, in a remote valley of the Friulian Alps.⁷⁷ How exactly they obtained this concession is unclear, but the Savorgnan brothers soon expanded their initial idea and purchased a furnace, in which they founded ingots and iron cannonballs. In just two years they produced some 200 *miara* (94 tonnes), and the cannonballs were used as currency to pay off the debts left by Germanico upon his death in Lyons in 1555, the *fraterna* giving the duke of Ferrara 3,000 ducats' worth of iron, at the market price of the time.⁷⁸

The question of how much money the brothers actually earned from their military activities is not answered in the available sources, but it may safely be said that these sums constituted a considerable portion of their financial resources; they did not, however, meet the expectations of Giulio, who felt he was being unfairly treated in comparison to other better paid military leaders such as Girolamo Martinengo and Paolo Orsini. In January 1581 Giulio wrote bitterly of how the offices he had held in the *Stato da Mar* had engendered costs three times greater than the salaries he had been paid. With a similar concern for money, an openly cynical Mario reproached his brother Girolamo for being the bishop of a see worth only 700 ducats a year.⁷⁹ Was it that the Savorgnans needed higher salaries to maintain the lifestyle of a brotherhood which, when including Marc'Antonio's children, was roughly twenty-strong, plus a sizeable household staff, giving a total of forty to sixty mouths to feed? It is difficult to say, but in December 1578 Giulio and his brothers stated the yearly income from the Belgrado castle to be just 280 ducats, despite the extent of its jurisdiction. The brothers notably bemoaned the huge amount of money they invested in the Osoppo fortress: 70,000 ducats until 1529, then a further 50,000 ducats between then and 1580.⁸⁰ Not knowing the exact nature or the amount of the incomes the brothers inherited from their father, it is hard to estimate how much the inheritance was worth; but maybe the insistence on it remaining undivided was due to the paucity of each individual income, which saw the brothers rush to serve in Venice's armies or those of other princes, fighting for the duke of

on 10 December 1556; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. 6, no. 171 / c. 51^v; Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e marittima*, p. 26; id., *Del governo della sua famiglia*, p. 14. Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 311–312, states that the *lanze spezzate* were often soldiers who had made a name for themselves in the wars against the Ottomans, or men recruited from a proveditor's guard of honour; they joined their new company when the lieutenant and herald positions became vacant. G.S. always preferred this kind of cavalry, and negotiated the inclusion of ten or so *lanze spezzate* in most of the *condotte* he led: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 2^v (*condotta* of 30 December 1546), 8^r (*condotta* of 10 February 1552), 25^r (*condotta* of 12 March 1562).

⁷⁷ BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f. ⁷⁸ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letters written by Marc'Antonio Savorgnan on 25 September and 20 December 1555; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 170 / c. 46^v, no. 172 / c. 68^v. ⁷⁹ ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 16^v; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 173 / c. 73^v; see also *infra*, docs 31, 43. As Pezzolo sees it ('Nobiltà militare e potere', p. 416), a *condotta* was more beneficial politically than economically. ⁸⁰ ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, ff. 74^r, 76^{r-v}; id., *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, f. 181^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction, f. 16^v.

Ferrara, the duke of Mantua, the king of France and even the Holy Roman Emperor. Evidence of a Savorgnan's disdain for the sharing of inheritances can be found in a letter written by Giulio in Osoppo on 24 June 1577, where he blames the poverty of Friulian families on the traditional dividing up of their assets on the occasion of a wedding, damning marriages made in the name of love.⁸¹

While not clarifying precisely how much the brothers' incomes amounted to, the relevant sources illustrate how the *fraterna* worked, administering the family assets with solidarity and rigorous discipline. As was usual at the time, the brothers solved problems of succession with guided marriages, which was to the disadvantage of Giulio, who as the eldest of the brothers after 1534 could have received the majority of the family heritage.⁸² The decision to impel Marc'Antonio alone to ensure the next generation of Savorgnans was the result of a collective discussion in which, Mario writes, a general consensus was reached in favour of the fifth brother; this is confirmed in Bishop Girolamo's will, written on 7 March 1590, when, upon leaving bequests, he gives precedence, of all his nephews, to Marc'Antonio's sons ("havendo il Signore Marc'Antonio pigliato moglie sopra la parola di tutti li fratelli, è il dovere che almeno in questo poco la sua parole sia avvantaggiata").⁸³ Consequently, Marc'Antonio's male offspring, who, as has already been noted, all bore the names of their uncles, were raised in accordance with the *fraterna*'s wishes, and the brothers had more say in their upbringing than the children's parents; this was a significant aspect of the Savorgnan *fraterna* which distinguished it from other patrician families.⁸⁴ In a letter he wrote to Alvise Cornaro in February 1562, Mario sings the praises of this collective approach to raising the young Savorgnans, and states that his four nephews are to go to Padua to learn ancient languages, mathematics and other sciences. Concerning his nephew Mario the younger in particular, though the boy is not yet even nine years old, his uncle decides that Mario shall go to Germany at the age of twelve or thirteen, and then on to France to study languages and acquaint himself with European mores; it thus becomes clear how the young Mario was to

81 "[...] sopra il tutto consigliarsi più per la qualità del parentato, et commodità di una buona dotta, che per appetito di esser più et manco bella donna, il che facendosi con il consiglio della signora madre, et de tutti li fratelli, non potereti errar in conto alcuno. Mi muovo a dirvi questo perchè tutto il nostro Friuli per tante divisione vienne in povertà, perchè se maritano quasi tutti per conto de innamoramenti; io do questo consiglio a vuoi, qual ho tolto per me, et per mei fratelli, et medesimamente lo darò a mei nipoti Savorgnani per quanto potrò": BCJ, *Fondo principale*, cod. 2646, f. 1^{r-v}. 82 Raines, 'La *fraterna*'. 83 "Primieramente noi siamo ora in 5 fratelli di 9 ch'eravamo, e li quali tutti abbiamo fatto un solo, e quel solo ha fatto tutti noi, perciocchè il terzo che di comune consenso eleggessimo a maritarsi, facendolo solo padrone, ha finora figliuoli sei che vivono, che portano gli stessi nomi che portiamo noi": Savorgnan, *Del governo della sua famiglia*, p. 10; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico', pp. 42-43; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 156. 84 The Donà and Barbaro families, already mentioned as examples of other Venetian *fraterne*, were less strict regarding marriages of family members than the Savorgnans, and several of the Donà and Barbaro brothers started their own families. The practice of carefully guiding marriages is mentioned by Fyne Moryson, an Englishman who visited Venice in 1593-1594: Davis, *A Venetian Family and its Fortune*, p. 93; Raines, 'La *fraterna*'. Concerning the different strategies each patrician family adopted regarding marriage and succession, see Megna, 'Grandezza e miseria della nobiltà veneziana', pp. 163-170.

follow in his uncle's footsteps, and was to receive, just like him, a wide-ranging education which saw him frequent the courts of various princes, rather than finding himself stuck in the exclusive service of Venice. For three generations, a calculated path of social reproduction was set for the young Savorgnan men; this strengthened the family identity, built on the Savorgnan heritage, which now existed as a *società fraterna*, or *repubblica piccola*, to use the expression Mario proudly coined.⁸⁵ For Marc'Antonio, writing in September 1555, it was perfectly clear that the *fraterna* included not only the five living brothers but also his first four sons, who had been entrusted with continuing the *società*. Also in the aim of perpetuating their *repubblica piccola*, the Savorgnans sought stability by serving in several Italian armies at once; in June 1549, for example, two brothers were serving Venice (Giulio and Marc'Antonio), two the Holy See (Mario and Girolamo) and one the duke of Ferrara (Germanico, whom Ascanio attempted to follow).⁸⁶

Inherent in serving Venice and other rulers, however, was the frequent need for several members of the *fraterna* to leave Friuli; when they left, arrangements had to be made to maintain the proper administration of the family's land. This land, it must be remembered, was not gathered into a whole; Osoppo, the traditional Savorgnan fiefdom situated at the mouth of several Alpine valleys, was far away from the Belgrado and Ariis castles in the lower Tagliamento valley. The *fraterna* was, from a legal point of view, ideally suited to the collective governing of the family heritage, as each brother held equal sway in any relations with courts or authorities. Consequently, no *fraterna* member was superior to any other, and the count of Belgrado title was shared by all of them, as shown on several occasions: for example, when, in April 1548, Ascanio was challenged to a duel by Vincislao Buzzacarino, he pointed to this title to exalt his nobility.⁸⁷ Later on, in 1560, when the *luocotenente* in Udine was handing over to the Savorgnan brothers the assets of their dead cousin Giacomo, who left no heirs, it was "Mario e fratelli" who were granted the succession on 21 September, then "Giulio e fratelli" who were chosen instead of Giacomo's mother and sister a day later, and finally "Marc'Antonio

⁸⁵ Mario Savorgnan, *Del governo della sua famiglia*, pp. 12–13: "Li 4 maggiori abbiamo però avanti cavati fuori dei nostri castelli, quasi serragli dove sono stati tenuti con istessa e diligente disciplina, e posti in questa nobilissima città di Padova attendono a imparare le lingue morte e le matematiche ed altre scienze, e come il terzo che porta il mio nome sia pervenuto all'età di 12 o 13 anni, disegno d'inviarlo in Germania dove impari quella lingua viva e le maniere migliori di quella milizia e di questo espedito anderà alla Corte di Francia [...]. La pratica di queste due nobili e bellicosissime nazioni credo io che sia per giovarli assai e prestare servizio utilissimo ai nostri Signori, i quali e questo e gli altri hanno finalmente a fermarsi dopo aver peragrato altre provincie e veduto fuori di casa le guerre che a tempi lor si faranno. Io me nutrisco molto di questa speranza che essi nostri giovani col mezzo di tali indirizzi sieno per fare riuscita tale che possano pagare li suoi e li nostri debiti insieme. E godo parimente assai il veder oltre il Magnifico Tiepolo nostro, che a gran passi camina per le pedate paterne, tre altre schiere di nepoti nati di sorella al numero de 13 sin ora tutti d'ingegni bellissimi, dei quali 8 si ritrovano in questo studio, cioè 4 di casa Barbar e 4 Venieri, li quali se insieme con li miei Savorgnani fussero alcuna volta ammessi in quel coro nostro"; see Casella's thoughts on this text in *I Savorgnan*, pp. 158–159. ⁸⁶ ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written by Marc'Antonio on 25 September 1555 and another written by Ascanio on 7 June 1549. ⁸⁷ Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, *cod. 46*, tomo 1, *Carte varie cavallaresche*, ff. 2^r–16^r.

e fratelli” who were given possession of the Ariis castle on 24 September.⁸⁸ Similarly, thanks to the flexibility of the legal context, Girolamo, the bishop of Sebenico, was able to obtain power of attorney for his absent brothers on 22 January 1563, whilst he was in Italy taking part in the Council of Trent.⁸⁹ Managing the *fraterna*’s business was thus the collective and lifelong duty of all of the brothers; however, Costantino could, of course, only contribute until his death in 1534. When one of the brothers died, their feudal estates became property of the *fraterna*, as shown when, on 3 January 1574, Mario’s estates were given to “Giulio e fratelli”.⁹⁰ If one of the brothers came into debt, this too was dealt with collectively, as when the duke of Ferrara asked Marc’Antonio for 300 ducats owed him by Germanico; after Germanico’s death in Lyons in May 1555, the duke insisted that his debts, which had increased tenfold in four years, be repaid.⁹¹ It was, furthermore, probably thanks to this principle of active solidarity between the brothers that Germanico’s ransom was paid in summer 1552, freeing him from the jail of Milan’s castle.⁹²

For the Savorgnan brothers, the main advantage of the rules of the *fraterna* in Venice was the flexible organization it allowed, perfectly suited to brothers who travelled frequently and were often away from Friuli.⁹³ They answered collectively to Venetian tax officials, dealt with various authorities interchangeably, and were all capable of replacing one another in military offices; for example, when, on 4 January 1556, Mario told the duke of Ferrara that he could give him horses but would not, due to other duties towards Venice, be able to fight for him in his armies, he nevertheless proposed “in mio luogo gli offerisco miei fratelli che sono liberi, et quando sapesse che la si volesse valere di loro, subito si inviaria il signor Marc’Antonio, lasciando ogni cura di casa insino che giungesse l’altro, che è il signor Ascanio, il quale a quest’hora penso che di Inghilterra sia arrivato in Franza”.⁹⁴ Despite their numbers, however, there were occasions when none of the Savorgnan brothers were able to fulfil an obligation; in 1565, for example, Marc’Antonio had to regretfully miss the deliberations of Udine’s *Patria del Friuli* parliament in order to manage his estates, and Giulio, Mario and Ascanio were all occupied with their military duties.⁹⁵

Within this organization of specifically male relationships, the role of Girolamo Savorgnan’s daughters befit the family’s general outlook, as Laura Casella has deftly illustrated.⁹⁶ Out of the eight daughters Girolamo had from his first three marriages, only two outlived their father, Virginia and Felicita; the two girls both entered the Santi Cosma e Damiano

88 ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, ff. 64^r–67^r; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 174 / c. 84–85.

89 Bonati Savorgnan d’Osoppo, ‘Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico’, p. 18. 90 ASV, *Provveditori sopra feudi*, b. 545, f. 70^v; F. di Colmalisio mentions other examples in 1560 and 1567: ‘Giulio Savorgnan: aspetti inediti’, p. 18. 91 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letters written by Marc’Antonio on 25 September and 18 October 1555; he states that, since Germanico had been banished, there was no legal obligation for the brothers to pay back his debts. 92 Cf. supra, p. 37–38.

93 See Casella’s remarks, *I Savorgnan*, p. 157, on how the *fraterna* made it easier to coordinate managing a family heritage, combining the family’s interests and the service of Venice; ead., “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, p. 133; Raines, ‘La *fraterna*’. 94 ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293. 95 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 157 (including the text mentioned). 96 Ibid., pp. 147–151.

convent in Giudecca, Virginia in 1547 and Felicita in 1554, and the Savorgnan brothers donated part of the girls' dowries.⁹⁷ The three girls from Girolamo's third marriage, to Orsina Canal (who died in 1556), had socially privileged lives, all of them marrying Venetian patricians: Savorgnana Fausta (1515–1584) was wed to Marco *di Francesco* Garzoni in 1538, Regina Olimpia (1516–1576) to Giovanni *di Giovanni* Garzoni in 1540, and Aurora (dates of birth and death unknown) to Angelo *di Michele* Venier in 1545. In each case, the Savorgnan brothers gave the highest dowry legally possible (4,000 to 4,500 ducats); upon the girls' death, part of this dowry would return to the brothers, as per official procedure. In the contracts drawn up for each of the Savorgnan girls' marriages, an example being the certificate signed in January 1586 establishing an annuity Giulio was to give to Felicita, all of the brothers assume collective responsibilities, demonstrating how the *fraterna* took care of all of Girolamo Savorgnan's descendants, not just the men.⁹⁸

Beyond managing the family heritage and creating this collective spirit, the Savorgnan *fraterna* had a uniquely educational bent; the brothers' efforts in maintaining and strengthening the Savorgnan heritage, both material and intellectual, make even more sense when one considers the task they had of passing this heritage on to the next generation, Marc'Antonio's children. Laura Casella gives a pertinent analysis of the aforementioned letter Mario Savorgnan wrote to Alvise Cornaro in February 1562 in which he details his idea of the Savorgnan *società fraterna o repubblica piccola*. Mario goes on to plan out his nephew Mario the younger's education, and, before the boy has even reached nine years of age, outlines career possibilities for him that closely resemble the careers of his uncles; in accordance with his own education, Mario the elder insisted upon his nephew learning armed combat before going on to the *aule* of Padua.⁹⁹ During these years of raising Marc'Antonio's children, Giulio took charge of teaching them to fight, and took a young Mario and Germanico with him to both Dalmatia and, afterwards, Corfu; aware of the dangers of long summer-time journeys, Giulio sent Mario home in April 1567, and kept just Germanico with him, displaying his concern to limit any risks to the *fraterna's* heirs.¹⁰⁰ Despite his tender age, Germanico played an active part in the fortification of Nicosia, and the tight bond that developed between him and his uncle over the course of two years saw Germanico become Giulio's spiritual son, for whom Orazio Governa compiled his biographical collection from 11 November 1576 onwards.¹⁰¹ Regardless of the affinity that strengthened certain relationships between uncles and nephews

97 BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico', p. 8, where it is stated that, on 5 May 1547, Giulio, Marc'Antonio and Girolamo all signed the donation certificate for Virginia's dowry; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 151–152. 98 *Ibid.*, pp. 147–148, 153. 99 Mario Savorgnan, *Del governo della sua famiglia*, pp. 10–11, especially p. 12: "e quando questo nostro successore sarà sufficiente di trattare le armi, potrà aspirar a onorati gradi nella milizia marchesca. E come abbiamo disegnato di accomodare il primo di questa maniera, così agli altri resterà tanta facoltà, giurisdizione e benefizj che potranno molto bene contentarsi, e maneggiando le armi dei nostri Signori, e chiericando menar nobilmente le vite loro"; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 167. The passing on of military technique from one generation to the next was a permanent feature of raising children in the *Terraferma* aristocratic families, as Pezzolo underlines, 'Professione militare e famiglia in Italia', pp. 345–346, 350. 100 Cf. *infra*, doc. 24. 101 Cf. *supra*, pp. 17–18.

– Mario the elder / Mario the younger, Giulio / Germanico –, it was an inviolable principle of the *fraterna* that every one of the brothers should be aware of the collective responsibility of bringing up Marc’Antonio’s children; this principle was made explicit when Mario dedicated his *Arte militare terrestre e maritime* to his five nephews (“Per istruttione de Signori suoi nepoti, li Conti Gieronimo, Mario, Germanico, Marcantonio & Hettore”) (fig. 9).¹⁰² The death of Costantino in 1534, the departure of Girolamo to Rome in 1544 and the banishment of Germanico in 1547 accentuated the role Giulio and Mario had in schooling their nephews in their respective fields of expertise. Whereas Marc’Antonio was the *pater familias* who ensured the perpetuation of the Savorgnan family, Mario embodied the *fraterna* theoretician, and Giulio the guarantor of a military tradition that was to be passed on as faithfully as possible.¹⁰³ As could have been expected, upon writing his wills Giulio entrusted the memory of the family lineage to his nephew Mario, leaving him the set of portraits of the Savorgnan ancestors; Giulio’s special fondness for Mario came, firstly, from the younger man being “maritato di mio consentimento”, and, secondly, from the family Mario had started, which was another firm step into the future for the Savorgnan name.¹⁰⁴

It must be underlined that the *fraterna*’s strategy was all a part of the Savorgnan brothers’ unquestioning respect for the arrangements Girolamo Savorgnan del Monte made for his descendants in the letter he wrote on 15 May 1528, a fact illustrating the omnipotence of the father of the family.¹⁰⁵ All of Giulio and his brothers’ initiatives vindicated the principle of passing on the dynasty’s cultural and material heritage to the next generation, preserving the unity of a family that reproduced itself in an almost identical way. It was entirely with this in mind that Marc’Antonio’s sons were integrated into the *fraterna*, and most of the boys subsequently followed in the footsteps of their uncles.¹⁰⁶ It thus becomes clear how devastating

102 In Mario’s words, the family heritage “da il modo abbondantemente di adempire i desiderj nostri d’intorno l’educazione di questi nostri nipoti: li quali come che abbiamo avuto l’essere da un solo di noi, la cura nondimeno e la diligenza di dar loro il ben essere è di noi tutti egualmente”: *Del governo della sua famiglia*, pp. 12–13; Casella, ‘I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti’, p. 401. **103** Cf. infra, doc. 59. **104** BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 148^v (G.S.’s will written on 19 January 1595). **105** Joppi, *Lettere storiche di Girolamo Savorgnan*, p. 137; in a letter he wrote on 7 June 1549 to the duke of Ferrara, Ascanio corroborates this obedience of Girolamo’s wishes for each of his sons: “quel signor mio padre ci comparti qual di noi a l’armi, qual a lettere”: ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293. Concerning Girolamo’s influence on his children’s upbringing, see Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 157. **106** Girolamo (1551–1569) was by 1564 already in command of a detachment (*banda*) of soldiers; he then served Venice in Zara, in Dalmatia, under Sforza Pallavicino, who acquainted him with military architecture. Afterwards he joined the king of France’s armies, before entering the court of the duke of Urbino; but Girolamo met a very early end in Lyons: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 49^v; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 1502*, vol. VI, no. 179 / c. 35, no. 180; id., *Fondo principale*, *cod. 1503*, f. 151^v; infra, doc. 95. ~ Mario (1553–1627) fought at Lepanto and, in keeping with the family tradition, was governor of the army of the new fortress in Corfu in 1582 / 1583, then led fortification projects in Friuli and Corfu (1600–1603) and also in Brescia (1611). He led another project at the Brescia castle in 1591, based on a scale model made by his uncle G.S., and dealt with ballistics; G.S. considered him “il maggiore, soldato intendente della fortificazione, buono, et obediente di questa Repubblica”: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 1502*, vol. V, no. 180 / c. 43; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 149–150; F. Bonati Savorgnan d’Osoppo, ‘Le fortificazioni del Friuli e di Udine in particolare’, *Bollettino dell’Istituto storico e di cultura dell’arma del genio* 114 (1972), pp. 201–224; id., ‘Mario Savorgnan e le for-

it was when Ascanio left the brotherhood in 1578; by demanding his personal share of the family heritage, with the clear aim of starting his own family, Ascanio shattered the stability that had patiently been cultivated over half a century, and his rebellion deprived Marc'Antonio's children of a quarter of their inheritance.¹⁰⁷ Though the three brothers' reaction is not expressed explicitly in any of the sources, the letter that Giovanni Garzoni wrote to his uncle, Giulio Savorgnan, on 26 October 1580 indicates that it was definitely negative.¹⁰⁸ In their wills, Bishop Girolamo and Giulio left Ascanio's son nothing more than a symbolic object, judging that fate had given him a decent enough situation and that he had no family to take care of.¹⁰⁹ One of the nephews affected by Ascanio's decision took the *fraterna's* animosity to the extreme, however; when Germanico assassinated his uncle on 2 October 1581, an act of *faida* fratricide belonging to a remote past, he knew that his actions would see him banished from the State of Venice, preventing him from ever enjoying the family heritage. After Ascanio had torn apart the *fraterna* by trying to carve up the family assets, Germanico shattered the hopes his uncle Giulio had of creating a dynasty of military architects in the service of Venice. Right up to the day before his death, Giulio called on the *Signoria* to be lenient with his nephew, in the hope that Germanico could lead the construction of the fortress that would protect Friuli from the Ottoman threat.¹¹⁰

tificazioni di Corfù e di Brescia', *ibid.* 125 (1974), pp. 1–14 (offprint used); Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βασιλέων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 251. ~ As for Germanico (1554–1597), see: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 1502, vol. VI, no. 180 / c. 43, and also the details of his career in F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Germanico Savorgnan architetto militare a Mantova', *Atti e memorie della Accademia Virgiliana di Mantova* 35 (1965), pp. 129–149; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 3, and *infra* pp. 549–551. ~ Marc'Antonio (1559–1623) was a colonel in charge of 3,000 soldiers, but was criticized by G.S. for practising different professions: Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 151. ~ Hettor (1566–1638) was, like his uncle Germanico, banished for violent misdemeanours: Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233. ~ Out of all of Marc'Antonio's ten sons, G.S. reserved the most affection for Mario, as, after marrying Domitilla Averoldi in 1591, he was the only one of the brothers to raise a family in G.S.'s lifetime; unsurprisingly, then, G.S. made Mario his legitimate heir in the codicil to his will, written on 13 July 1595: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 146^r, and Casella, *I Savorgnan*, table 5. **107** In 1578, after the death of Costantino (in 1538), Germanico (in 1555) and Mario (in 1574), the *fraterna* was made up of just Giulio, Marc'Antonio, Girolamo and Ascanio. **108** "Io all'incontro mi dolgo delle nozze del Signor Ascanio nostro zio, il quale di età di più di sessant' anni ha preso una giovane di ventitrè anni con speranza di figliuoli; ma meglio è, che ora l'abbi fatto, che nelli anni passati. Gran cosa per mia fè, che li sdegni contro a suoi fratelli abbino potuto tanto che l'abbino fatto precipitar in così fatta rissoluzione? Voglio sperar, che non abbi figliuoli [...]": Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 56. In the will he wrote on 7 March 1590, Bishop Girolamo recalls the hostility that arose between the brothers on this occasion: Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico', pp. 42–43. Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 159–163, analyses Ascanio and Bianca Giustignian's succession. It should be noted that Giovanni Garzoni remained close to G.S. until the latter's death: Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233. **109** BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 148^r (the will G.S. wrote on 25 May 1595); Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Gerolamo Savorgnan vescovo di Sebenico', pp. 42–43. **110** As early as 24 September 1586, G.S. asked the Council of Ten to allow Germanico back into Venetian territory: BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; and, for the last time, in the letter he wrote on 5 July 1595: Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233.

Giulio Savorgnan, the Regno di Cipro's Army Governor-General

Several inexhaustive biographies of the *fraterna's* eldest brother have been written over the centuries, although often by authors who have taken as a guide the 'official' version written by Orazio Governa, or the spiritual will Giulio wrote a few days before his death.¹¹¹ Walter Panciera has recently re-examined Savorgnan's career, and agrees with Laura Casella that there has yet to be any thorough analysis of the Osoppo ruler's place in Venetian scientific thought in the second half of the sixteenth century.¹¹² The present work will not go so far as to correct this omission, which above all concerns Giulio's life after he returned from Cyprus, but shall instead attempt to give an appraisal of Giulio's moral, intellectual and technical education in order to shed light on some of the principles he used in his work in Cyprus, particularly in Nicosia. An analysis of the correspondence he sent from Cyprus, and references in later writings, allow a better appreciation of Giulio's personality and character traits, which is essential to fully understanding his contribution to late-Renaissance military architecture.

Giulio retained little of the lessons his teachers gave him during his childhood in Osoppo. Marcantonio Amalteo, whom Girolamo Savorgnan recruited to teach his sons Latin in 1519–1520, considered Giulio the least gifted of the Savorgnan boys in exercises requiring memory and quick thinking.¹¹³ Giulio's next teacher, Janus Lascaris, was implicitly of the same opinion, judging from the epigram he wrote for the boy, which leaves little doubt as to Giulio's failings in classical studies, especially when compared to his younger brother, Mario:

εἰς Ἰούλιον τὸν Σαβορνιανόν
(πῶλον Βονκεράλα πανομίον εἶδος)

ἔργον Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸδ' Ἰούλιε κοῦτε σε πάτη
χωρεῖ· σαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἴσα μέτελθε κράτη.¹¹⁴

111 Concerning Orazio Governa's work, see ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction ff. 14^{r-v}, and supra, p. 18. G.S.'s spiritual will has been published by Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', pp. 230–234 [= BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, ff. 140^r–143^r]. Concerning G.S.'s life, leaving aside studies related to his contribution to the foundation of Palmanova, noteworthy amongst the short manuscript biographies are those of the BCJ, *Fondo principale*, cod. 1503, f. 43^v; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. st. it. 47*, ff. 138^v–148^v; and also: Sansovino, *Origine e fatti delle famiglie illustri d'Italia*, pp. 513–514; Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 381–386; Caro, *Istoria de' signori Savorgnani*, pp. 69–78; Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, pp. 24–37; Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri italiani*, pp. 403–428; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 67–104; Colmalisio, 'Giulio Savorgnan: aspetti inediti', pp. 17–22; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore', pp. 181–192; id., 'Giulio Savorgnan e le sue scritture', pp. 3–37; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', pp. 391–413; ead., *I Savorgnan*, pp. 138–139 *et passim*; ead., 'Giulio Savorgnan', pp. 2266–2273; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 197–212. 112 Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 166; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 197–212. 113 *Tre lettere inedite a Girolamo Savorgnano (1519–1527)*, nozze Giuseppe Brogli, Udine 1871, pp. 7–9 (letter written on 24 August 1519); Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', p. 397; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 200. Concerning Amalteo, see A. Scala, 'Un umanista e pedagogo pordenonese del Cinquecento: Marcantonio Amalteo': http://www.propordenone.it/pdf/06_09.pdf. 114 Giano Laskaris, *Epigrammi greci*, pp. 58–59, no. 35; this should be compared with the epigram written for Mario, given supra, n. 27. Some authors confuse Janus Lascaris and Costantino Lascaris, and state that the latter taught G.S. humanities and mathematics: S. Drake/

Lascaris eulogizes Giulio's flair for horseriding and using weapons, and encourages him to go on to serve great rulers as a *condottiere*, which is what Girolamo wanted for his eldest son.¹¹⁵ This almost exclusively military path which Giulio was steered towards is reflected in the clumsiness of his writing; for example, when in August 1560 he found himself in an awkward predicament with the *Terraferma* syndic, Alvise Mocenigo, Giulio, admitting "Io confesso non esser dotto ne haver mai studiato", struggled to explain himself and asked his younger brother Ascanio to write his own letters to Mocenigo to support him.¹¹⁶ In his writings, Giulio shows no interest in the literary culture of his age; the best he gives is an occasional stock Greek mythology reference.¹¹⁷ In all of the letters he sent from Cyprus, not once does he mention exchanges he might have had with humanists on the island, whether Venetian (Francesco da Ponte, Francesco Patrizi) or Cypriot (Florio Bustron, the Podocataros).¹¹⁸ Giulio was never involved in the worlds of antiquity and erudition, and there is no evidence of any answer from him when the Aquileia Patriarch, Daniele Barbaro, asked him to sift through the earth being dug up during work in Nicosia in search of archaeological discoveries. Giulio was, unsurprisingly, oblivious to any references to classical architecture, despite there being a Latin manuscript of Vitruvius in his brother Mario's library, and despite Daniele Barbaro himself having released an Italian edition of Vitruvius's treatise a few years earlier.¹¹⁹

Giulio's personality was clearly that of a soldier; at the age of fifteen or sixteen he was already fighting in Venice's armies, and, as has been said, he took part in several battles in the Italian wars, up until 1528–1529. He followed family tradition, and as early as 1526, still in his formative years, Giulio was put in command of 12 *cavalli leggieri*, his father taking care

I.E. Drabkin, *Mechanics in Sixteenth Century Italy*, Madison 1969, p. 253, followed by P.L. Rose, *The Italian Renaissance of mathematics*, Geneva 1976, p. 179. Costantino Lascaris was a Greek man of letters who was taken captive in Constantinople in 1453, then fled to Greece and Italy before settling in Messina, where he died around 1501: A. de Rosalia, 'La vita di Costantino Lascaris', *Archivio storico italiano*, s. III, IX (1957–1958), pp. 21–70; M. T. Manzano, *Costantino Lascaris. Semblanza de un humanista bizantino*, Madrid 1998; M. Ceresa, 'Lascaris, Costantino', *DBI*, vol. 63, pp. 781–785. ¹¹⁵ It should not be forgotten that Janus went to Osoppo during his time in Venice, from 1521 to 1525, and published his epigrams in Paris in July 1527; the opinion he had of Giulio was of the boy at eleven to fourteen years of age, before he made a name for himself on the battlefield. ¹¹⁶ BAM, *cod. G 273 inf.*, f. 174^{r-v}, no. 91 (letter written by G.S. on 14 August 1560, in Belgrado).

¹¹⁷ Cf. the references to Bacchus and Venus *infra*, doc. 24. ¹¹⁸ Over the course of his twenty-six months in Cyprus, G.S. met Francesco Patrizi, whom he employed as a messenger, cf. *infra*, doc. 101, and Francesco da Ponte, who taught philosophy in Nicosia and kept the incomes of the Misericordia priory, which was situated where the moat would later be built; cf. ASV, *Senato Mar.*, reg. 38, ff. 133^v–134^r; *id.*, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispaci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 203. Florio Bustron, Ettore and Ercole Podocataro were key figures in the island's literary landscape in the 1560s: Grivaud, *Entrelacs chiprois*, pp. 252–254. One of the small few new encounters that G.S. remembered from his time in Nicosia is mentioned in a letter he wrote in Venice on 2 January 1590: "Del 1568, essendo io in Cipro, capitorono tre baroni tedeschi ricchissimi uno di Prussia, l'altro di Stiria, et il terzo del contado de Tirolo che ritornavano dal Cairo di Jerusalem, essendo alloggiati in casa mia in Nicossia, si venne a parlar di conservare il formento in una fortezza che non si guastasse": ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 6, f. 1^r. ¹¹⁹ Cf. Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 44, the letter written by Daniele Barbaro *infra*, doc. 91, and his edition of Vitruvius, *I dieci libri dell'architettura* in 1556; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 120. G.S.'s lack of interest in humanities has already been underlined by Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 200.

of their equipment and seeing to their upkeep. Spending time around the great military leaders of his era, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, Paolo Luzzasco, Giovanni De' Medici and Janus Maria Fregoso, endowed him with remarkable experience and maturity, setting him in fine stead for the growing responsibilities he would assume during the 1537–1540 Ottoman–Venetian wars; before this, from 1528 to 1537, Giulio appears to have spent his time taking care of the family incomes, as well as commanding soldiers within the Friuli region.¹²⁰ In October 1539 he was back on the battlefield, at the head of a company of 350 men sent to relieve Cattaro; this expedition was his first in Dalmatia, and also signalled the true beginning of his military career.¹²¹

The following years saw Giulio hold a series of important offices in both the *Stato da Mar* and the *Terraferma*: from 1540 to autumn 1545 he was army governor in Dalmatia, residing in Zara; then in December 1546, back in Friuli, he was given his first *condotta*, thanks to Guidobaldo Della Rovere. At the age of thirty-six he was put in command of a company of 120 *cavalli leggieri*, and saw his yearly salary rise to 500 ducats, making him one of the *Terraferma*'s foremost military leaders.¹²² From this point on, Giulio was regularly asked to deliver reports assessing the type of fortification best suited to different places: he cast his expert gaze on Zara (report delivered on 10 January 1547), the Padua castle (report delivered on 20 July 1548) and finally Peschiera (report delivered in 1549), the first project he participated in, where he worked on the bastioned enceinte.¹²³ On 10 February 1552, after his period as governor in Corfu from May 1551 to May 1553,¹²⁴ his *condotta* was renewed, in a contract that increased his salary to 700 ducats, and the number of horses in his command to 160; he was now definitively one of the Venetian military's leading officials.¹²⁵

Possibly kept in Friuli because of health problems, Giulio now began to focus his energy on defending his region's eastern border against the Holy Roman Empire, and on writing more reports for the *Signoria*: he delivered one on Udine in 1553, followed by two more

120 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 16^v; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, ff. 138^v–139^v; in a letter written on 23 December 1528, Girolamo Savorgnan entrusted the Osoppo castle to his son Giulio “cum consiglio, et consentimento di Costantino”: Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, ‘Aspetti della personalità di Gerolamo Savorgnan’, pp. 86–88. 121 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 2^f; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 140^{r-v}; *Oratione del Signor Giovanni Battista Leoni*, pp. 4–5; Casella, “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, p. 140; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 201. 122 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 2^{r-v}; id., *Senato, Deliberazioni (Secreta)*, reg. 64, f. 93^f; BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, cod. 689a, s.f.; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 141^{r-v}; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 201; Pezzolo, ‘Professione militare e famiglia in Italia’, p. 342. 123 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 3^f–7^v; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, ‘Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan’, p. 187; G.S.'s report on Peschiera has been reprinted by id., ‘Giulio Savorgnan e le sue scritture’, pp. 29–36. 124 Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 74–75. 125 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 8^f; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 142^f; Casella, “Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana”, p. 140; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 201; his time as governor in Corfu most probably came to an end in summer 1552: ASM, *Archivio Segreto Estense*, Cancelleria ducale, Carteggi e documenti di particolari, b. 1293, letter written by Ascanio Savorgnan on 28 March 1552; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 83.

proposing reforms in Venice's armies (1554, 1557), and a series of reports in which he gave his opinion on the Verona *chiusa*, Peschiera and Marano (1557).¹²⁶ The year 1557 was indisputably a decisive one in Giulio's fortification career, seeing him move closer to the circles in charge of defending the Venetian State; this was most probably due to Sforza Pallavicino, who, the same year, had been made the main commander of Venice's garrisons and militia, and who had become an unquestioned authority in the domain of fortifications.¹²⁷ Pallavicino led the fortification of Bergamo, and for this purpose gathered together, in July 1561, a committee made up of the governor of Verona, Girolamo Martinengo,¹²⁸ the

126 ASV, *Materie Mistre Notabili* 11, ff. 12^r–15^r; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 581c*, f. 364^r; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Giulio Savorgnan e le sue scritture', pp. 19–20. 127 Sforza Pallavicino was born in 1500, into a family allied with the Farneses and protected by the papacy. Sforza began his soldier's apprenticeship at the age of just sixteen, fighting in Charles V's campaigns in Hungary (1542), then in Lombardy against the French (the Battle of Serravalle in 1544), in Germany during the Smalcald War (1545), and again in Hungary against the Ottomans, for Ferdinand I (1551). He was taken prisoner in the Battle of Palast, but was freed in return for a large ransom; however, he was not able to continue serving Rome, as he had been excommunicated for his role in the murder of Cardinal Martinuzzi, the voivod of Transylvania; this also saw his assets taken away from him at Castel San Archangelo. After being approached in Vienna by the Venetian ambassador, Lorenzo Tiepolo, he entered the service of Venice in 1557, and was given a salary of 2,000 ducats and the title *Capitano Generale della fanteria*; on 14 December 1559 he became *Governatore Generale*, the supreme leader of Venice's land forces, although tensions arose when, in 1562, Pallavicino and Giordano Orsini had to define their respective jurisdictions. Sforza was an expert in the field of military architecture, and delivered numerous reports concerning the defences of the Dalmatian coast (1559); he led the fortification of Bergamo in 1560–1561, and in 1566 wrote another report, on the fortification of Udine. His *condotta*, renewed in 1566, gave him supreme authority in the inspection of Venice's garrisons, artillery schools and militia, and he was systematically consulted on fortification issues, both in the *Terraferma* and in the *Stato da Mar*; his authority increased when he was appointed Zara's governor-general in May 1568. Although Pallavicino's role in the 1570/1571 war provoked controversy, Venice kept her confidence in him and renewed his contracts in 1573 and 1581. He died in February 1585: ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 7; id., *Materie Mistre Notabili* 7 and 8; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 116^{r-v}; Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri italiani*, pp. 447–463; V. Ghizzoni, 'Sforza Pallavicino, signore di Fiorenzuola', *Pagine storiche di Fiorenzuola d'Arda*, Sezione di Piacenza della deputazione di Storia Patria per le Provincie Parmensi (ed.), Fiorenzuola d'Arda 1969, pp. 41–48; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 127–134; Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 104n and passim; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 98–99. 128 Girolamo Martinengo was probably born in Brescia in 1519, and early on in his life was part of a tragic family affair: in 1533, whilst still a teenager, he was banished to Zara, in Dalmatia, after taking part in the murder of his father (who had killed his wife, Girolamo's mother). He displayed great bravery against the Turks in the third Ottoman-Venetian War, beginning in 1537, and personally financed the upkeep of 40 cavaliers, which meant he was able to return to Brescia in 1539. It was here that his military career began: from 1549 to 1551 he was governor-general *delle milizie* in Crete, where he showed his interest in military architecture by reinforcing a Candia bastion; his talents in fortification were quickly recognized, as were his talents as a *condottiere*. He met up with Baglioni and Pallavicino in Padua, in 1558, to decide whether or not to build a bridge for the castle; then in 1561 he was consulted on the Bergamo castle, as well as, in the same year, being appointed Pallavicino's *coadiutore* in Verona, which saw him put in charge of the construction work that had begun at the Sant'Agostino bastion. He led more construction work in 1565, in Bergamo, and the following year inspected fortresses in Istria. Governor-general *delle ordinanze di Terraferma* in January 1566, at the end of the same year he was asked to give his opinion on the fortification of Udine, along with Baglioni, Pallavicino and G.S. On 10 March 1567 he was sent to Crete to take charge of the island's defences, again as governor-general *delle milizie*, and now at the head of 500 troops; however, on 20 August 1568 he asked to be repatriated to Italy. When another war with the Ottomans was announced, he was

artillery captain, Agostino Clusone,¹²⁹ and Giulio Savorgnan, plus the engineers Francesco Orologi and Francesco Malacreda.¹³⁰ Between 1553 and 1561, at the same time as taking care of his family heritage and protecting the Friulian border from the Germans, Giulio became a military leader renowned for his strategic skills. In 1557 he delivered his first reports on Famagusta, Candia and Corfu, which extended his remit to defending the *Stato da Mar* as well as mainland Venetian territory.¹³¹

In March 1562 Giulio's *condotta* was renewed, and enlarged to 200 *cavalli leggieri* and 100 soldiers, as was his salary, increased to 1,200 ducats.¹³² His prestige thus greater in Venice's governing circles, he was now able to serve overseas; it was his new position amongst the State's leading officers that gave him the necessary authority to undertake the missions given him by the Council of Ten and the Senate when, not before having discussed the extent of his jurisdiction, they appointed him *soprintendente maggiore delli Regni di Cipro e di Candia*.¹³³ In this capacity, he was ordered to inspect the defences of Cyprus and, over the

chosen to lead a relief expedition, with 2,000 soldiers, to Famagusta, in Cyprus, in 1570; but he died en route, after the ship's stop in Corfu on 15 March: Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri italiani*, pp. 354–356; Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. I/2, pp. 333–334; Hill, *A history of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 899–900; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 4, pp. 947–948; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 106n and passim; G. Benzoni, 'Girolamo Martinengo', *DBI*, vol. 71, pp. 154–157. It should also be noted that the Martinengo family was first brought into the Venetian patriciate in 1448: Megna, 'Grandezza e miseria della nobiltà veneziana', p. 190. The Martinengos were ennobled for good in 1662: G. Gullino, 'Nobili di Terraferma e Patrizi veneziani di fronte al sistema fiscale della campagna nell'ultimo secolo della Repubblica', in *Venezia e la Terraferma attraverso le relazioni dei rettori (Atti del Convegno, Trieste 23–24 ottobre 1980)*, Istituto di storia economica dell'Università di Trieste (ed.), Milan 1981, p. 219. 129 Agostino Clusone served Venice as a *condottiere*. He was appointed *ordinanze* governor in Friuli in April 1549, and was later sent to Cyprus to replace Count Ercole Martinengo in charge of a company of 200 soldiers, gaining the title *governator general di tutta la fantaria dell'isola nostra di Cipro* and an annual salary of 1,000 ducats. He reached Famagusta on 13 March 1558, and initiated construction work on the Famagusta walls and the castle of Cerines. He fell severely ill at the beginning of the summer, but three months later he had regained his health and set off on a tour of the island's defences with Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier; he continued reinforcing the island's defensive system until his departure. In accordance with the Senate's decision on 28 January 1559, his post returned to Hercole Martinengo: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 20^v–22^r, 49^v–50^r, 227^v, and passim; ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 27, f. 27^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 82^{r-v}, reg. 35, ff. 48^v–49^r. He left several reports detailing his activities on the island: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, s.f. (three letters, two of which were written in Venice on 13 July 1559). Even when he returned to Italy, he continued to be asked for his expert opinion on the defence of Cyprus between 1560 and 1562: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 255^v–258^v (*Discorso circa le cose di Cypri, Candia, Cerigo et Corfu...*), ff. 264^v–270^v (*Altri discorsi di Cipro presentati adi xxvj di genaro 1562 nell'Eccellentissimo Collegio*); ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, f. 125^{r-v}.

130 Colmuto Zanella, 'La fortezza cinquecentesca di Bergamo', pp. 110–111; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 108–111; according to Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 201, Savorgnan took part in the construction work in Bergamo, under Martinengo. 131 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 15^v–18^r; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 581c*, ff. 364^r–365^v. G.S.'s report on Famagusta is reprinted infra, doc. 1; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Giulio Savorgnan: aspetti inediti', p. 18; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 201. G.S. probably left some minor writings concerning Corfu's fortification during his stay in 1551–1553: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βασιλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 90. 132 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 28^r; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 142^{r-v}. 133 The title given him by Girolamo Martinengo in a letter written on 28 March 1562: *ibid.*, f. 27^r; concerning the election of Giulio and the debate which accompanied it: Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare',

course of his three-month stay, submit ideas for the reinforcement of the Famagusta enceinte and the Cerines castle; his brother Ascanio accompanied him on this mission.¹³⁴ From October 1562 to March 1566 Giulio stayed in Crete, and, as governor-general of the *Regno di Candia*'s army, led work on Candia's walls, as well as supervising the reinforcement of the enceinte in Chania.¹³⁵ He had to struggle and wait for two years before being discharged and repatriated to Italy, but did receive 1,000 ducats in compensation; he was then tasked with visiting fortresses in Cythera, Corfu, Kotor, Budva and Zara, which led to another series of reports concerning the current state of these strongholds and the work to be done there.¹³⁶

Giulio returned to Venice on 16 May 1566, but almost immediately had to go back to the Adriatic after an Ottoman fleet sailed into the Otranto strait. Two months later, on 10 August, he was appointed governor-general of Dalmatia, which saw his salary increase to 1,600 ducats, and was ordered to prepare the 1,500-strong local army to repel the Ottomans.¹³⁷ The threat passed, however, and in September 1566 Giulio was able to return to the *Terraferma* and his beloved Friuli.¹³⁸ His four and a half years overseas clearly did nothing to dim Giulio's interest in the affairs of his homeland, as he delivered five reports concerning Friuli and Udine between 18 October 1566 and 13 January 1567; he was probably harbouring the ambition of becoming a leading member of the fortification project Venice was foreseeing in the Friuli region. In December 1566, however, Giulio was excluded from the project in Udine, for reasons evidently connected to the controversial place the Savorgnans held in the life of the capital city;¹³⁹ fortunately, though, his summer 1562 stopover in Cyprus, the almost four years he spent in Candia and the time he spent examining fortresses in the Adriatic helped Giulio to focus on the *Stato da Mar*.

Giulio's long-awaited return to the *Terraferma* proved shorter than he had hoped – less than six months – as he was recruited by the *Collegio* for a secret mission, to prevent a French adventurer from Ragusa from launching a suspected *coup de main* to capture Corfu. To disguise the true aims of his mission, on 31 January 1567 Giulio was appointed Corfu's *bailo* and proveditor-general; he took up residence within the Corfu fortress from 3 March to 16 April, but the fears of an attack faded. Though fanciful, this mission was significant in that,

p. 13. 134 Cf. *infra*, docs 7–11, 16. 135 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 36^r–48^r; Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1 / 1, pp. 138–139, vol. 1 / 2, pp. 329–332, 427; Ioanna Steriotou, *Τα βενετικά τείχη του Χάνδακα (τον 16ο και τον 17ο αι.)*, Herakleion 1998, pp. 22–29. 136 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, f. 110^v; *id.*, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, ff. 84^v, 91^r; *id.*, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 48^r–51^r; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 144^v. G.S.'s report on Cythera has been published by Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Giulio Savorgnan e le sue scritture', pp. 15–18. 137 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, ff. 98^v–99^r; *id.*, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 52^v–56^r; Turin, Biblioteca Reale, *cod. it. st. 47*, f. 146^r. 138 These are the dates given in Orazio Governa's diary; cf. *infra*, doc. 115. 139 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 115^v; *id.*, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 56^r–66^r; concerning G.S.'s not very coherent ideas about the Udine fortress, see Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 123–124 n. 65. The Savorgnans were often accused of arrogance, as has been mentioned already in relation to Girolamo in 1529: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 50, col. 88. Mario too has been portrayed as being, in 1544, particularly haughty and disdainful towards the rest of Friuli's *castellani*: Rozet / Lambey, *L'invasion de la France*, pp. 698–699, quoted above n. 29; another example, from 1545, is given in ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Lettere di condottieri e di gente d'arme, b. 308, letter written on 17 August 1545.

from this point on, Giulio enjoyed the *Signoria's* absolute trust; an immediate illustration of this came when, on 7 March 1567, Giulio was appointed army governor-general of Cyprus, reaching Cerines two months later, on 8 May.¹⁴⁰

When he arrived in Cyprus, at the age of 56, Giulio was an archetype of the military leader who had slowly built up his *cursus honorum* while other *condottieri* around him were gaining quicker access to senior offices.¹⁴¹ The trust placed in him by Sforza Pallavicino and the *Collegio* in January 1567, and then again in March, confirmed the importance of this experienced soldier, who had fought in the Italian wars and had commanded troops exclusively for Venice uninterruptedly since his adolescence. Unlike his brothers, Giulio never even contemplated serving the duke of Este or any other leader; his status as the eldest of the *fraterna* evidently encouraged him to loyally follow in his father's footsteps. It was undoubtedly this unfailing political loyalty that saw him appointed to offices overseas in Zara, Corfu and Candia, and brought into the circle of people in charge of Venice's general defensive strategy. As proof of his devotedness, on his fifty-seventh birthday Giulio wrote to the *Signoria* offering to take charge of defending Cyprus against the Ottoman threat, irrespective of the salary or military position he might or might not have received.¹⁴²

The first time, to our knowledge, that Giulio wrote about matters of fortification from a technical point of view was on 10 January 1547, when, during a stopover in Zara, he responded to the questions of the *provveditori alle fortezze*, Marcho Michiel and Alvis Gritti; in the report he gave, he proposes ways of cutting costs when restoring an enceinte, and ways of installing cannon batteries to improve a fortress.¹⁴³ Nowhere does he mention work that he possibly supervised during the first period he spent in the Dalmatian capital (1540–1545), and it is hard to know exactly where Giulio learnt the methods and language of military architecture.¹⁴⁴ He was undoubtedly initiated into the field directly by his father, but it is unclear whether or not he exchanged opinions on questions of design with Francesco Maria Della Rovere, the leading intellect behind Venice's defensive system from 1524 to 1538, and the author of a military treatise. Although it cannot be proven, it has been claimed that Giulio met Della Rovere,¹⁴⁵ and it was possibly thanks to him that Giulio was able to

140 Ibid., report delivered on 9 February 1566 m.v; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, ff. 76^r–77^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 25^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 66^{r-v}, see also infra, docs 25, 26, 115. The six-week stay in Corfu is mentioned in the report of Lorenzo Bernardo, *bailo* and *provveditor-general* in Corfu, dated 3 October 1568, wherein it appears that Savorgnan suggested the introduction of the *ferlini* system: Pagratis, *Οι εκδόσεις των βενετών βαίλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 133–134, 139. For an analysis of G.S.'s career after 1571, see Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 203–204. 141 Particularly Girolamo Martinengo, who was ten years younger than him, and Paolo Orsini, constantly the subject of G.S.'s indignation; cf. infra, docs 31 and 43. 142 Cf. infra, doc. 44. 143 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 3^r–4^v; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 204. 144 G.S. does mention a project in Zara, in which, several times, he led 2,000 men; but this seems rather to refer to his last stay in the city (1570–1571): ASV, *Materie Misti Notabili 5*, report dated 1 October 1593, edited by Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore', pp. 184–188. 145 Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, p. 17, claims that evidence of exchanges between G.S. and Francesco Maria is to be found in an introduction written some years later by Filippo Pigafetta to his translation of Guidobaldo dal Monte, *Le mecaniche dell'illustriss. sig. Guido Ubaldo*, dedication page. Pigafetta, born in 1533, met Savorgnan in Nicosia; cf. infra, p. 64; in his

form a relationship with Giangiacomo Leonardi, another fortification expert, who came from Urbino but lived in Venice until the mid-1540s, and whom Giulio still remembered when living in Nicosia.¹⁴⁶ Giulio tried working on a project from abroad when, on 27 November 1542, the *Signoria* granted him permission to order the men under his jurisdiction in Friuli to work on the Osoppo fortress; with the aid of his brothers, the edges of the *rocca*'s rugged walls were smoothed, and bastioned walls were added to the natural enceinte.¹⁴⁷

In 1548 / 1549 the *provveditori alle fortezze* sought Giulio's opinion on the current state of the Padua castle and on the transformation of the castle in Peschiera, sending him a series of precise questions.¹⁴⁸ It was in Peschiera, in 1549, that Giulio worked for the first time on a public construction project, but in what capacity it is not known; all we do know is that he was part of the project until 1557, and reported directly to Sforza Pallavicino. This mission taught Giulio the brilliance of the *ferlini* system in stimulating the workforce, and turned his mind towards the logistics of transferring the masses of earth removed when digging a moat.¹⁴⁹

There being no proof that Giulio took a significant part in work on the fortress in Corfu in 1551–1553,¹⁵⁰ it appears that he resumed his work in military architecture after a pause of around ten years, when Sforza Pallavicino summoned him to Bergamo in 1561. It is unclear what exactly Giulio contributed to the project, led by Girolamo Martinengo and supervised by Pallavicino, but he worked there for six months.¹⁵¹ It was not until 1562, in Candia, that Giulio first led a construction project; the work lasted two years (1563–1564), and saw the officer, commanding 2,000 sappers paid by the day, resume various improvements to the city's walls, notably the strengthening of part of the old enceinte, and the construction of a bastion, subsequently named after him, and a curtain wall. His ability to overcome technical problems and to move great amounts of earth over short distances allowed Venice to save 10,000 ducats, as the new bastion cost just 11,000 ducats, well below the usual price. Giulio's ingenuity and his knack for adapting to the terrain and old defensive structures put in front of him were brought to the fore, and he began to acquire a reputation as an efficient and cost-

1557 report on Corfu, G.S. makes no allusion whatsoever to the plans the duke had drawn up for the Corfu fortress in 1533: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 16^v–18^r. 146 Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 50–52, 135–155; cf. infra, doc. 66 n. 3; Leonardi also kept up a correspondence with Mario Savorgnan: Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 94. 147 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 13*, ff. 55^v–58^r. 148 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 4^v–7^v; it should be stated that Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, p. 382, and Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 68, write of G.S. leading fortification projects in Klis and Corfu in the 1540s, but no sources back this up; it would appear that the reputation G.S. earned for himself in the field of military architecture after 1569 has caused authors writing after the fact to make excessive claims about his activities. 149 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 15^r; Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan', p. 187.

150 It seems that the work in Corfu was planned in accordance with the projects made previously by the engineer Giangirolamo Sanmichele; G.S.'s contribution seems to have been limited to some technical improvements on a single cavalier; cf. the report of the *bailo* and proveditor-general Donato Malipiero written on 28 August 1553: Pagratis, *Οι εθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 89–90, 92, 98, 100, also on p. 110, where Proveditor-General Marchio Michiel mentions the 'Savorgnan cavalier', in his report dated 1559. 151 Cf. supra, n. 128, and infra, doc. 115.

saving architect, as the syndic, Pietro Bassadona, underlines in his November 1564 letters to Marco Michiel and Zuan Matteo Bembo. On this project, Giulio's efforts had to conform to the dispositions communicated previously, via letters and scale models, by the *provveditori alle fortezze*; therefore, rather than design the new installations himself, he merely had other people's work carried out, although he did bring innovations to the composition of the layers of earth used to build the curtains, heightening the latter's resistance to artillery fire.¹⁵²

Giulio remained in Crete until March 1566, continuing construction work and patiently devoting himself to the rational organization of Crete's military structures; he addressed questions regarding provisions for the island's fortresses and the organization of its troops and its peasant militia (*cernide*), and left precise orders for the continuation of the work on Candia's enceinte following his departure.¹⁵³ After leaving Crete, Giulio stopped in Corfu, where, in April 1566, he drew up a list of nineteen recommendations for the strengthening of the island's fortress.¹⁵⁴ Growing ever more skilled and experienced, he went on to Zara and, in July 1566, joined the project to restore part of the city's enceinte under the command of Sforza Pallavicino; Giulio was put in charge of 2,000 men, and paid them using the *ferlini* system, particularly well-suited to urgent situations.¹⁵⁵ Giulio's work from 1563 to 1566 earned him the status of an innovative technician; his methods of using several layers of packed earth underneath a light facing of cut stone made walls more resilient, and the cannon embrasures he built, using both lime and straw, could resist prolonged artillery fire.¹⁵⁶

Judging from the letter Sforza Pallavicino wrote in Castelmaggiore on 18 June 1566, Giulio's achievements in Crete brought him esteem and recognition from the *Signoria*;¹⁵⁷ his skills as a military leader had long been acknowledged, but now he was being praised for his talents in the field of construction, his ability to bring a soldier's eye to defensive architecture, and his knack for saving money and getting rapid results. It was around this time, in March–April 1567, that the *Collegio* entrusted him with his secret mission to Corfu, which also required him to work on two bastions, without the necessary means to do the job properly. Forced to leave the Ionian Islands after six weeks, Giulio was left frustratedly rueing a lost opportunity.¹⁵⁸ It is easy to appreciate, then, the great opportunity Giulio saw in the Senate's decision, in March 1567, to grant him complete authority in organizing the defence of Cyprus; he had never before enjoyed such freedom in making decisions and acting upon them. He did, it is true, still respect Sforza Pallavicino's recommendations, but, insofar as Pallavicino's orders were not restrictive, this respect was due to the deep-rooted intellectual and political bonds that linked the two soldiers; in return, Sforza put his complete faith in

152 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 37^v–40^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, ff. 18^r–19^r; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 231–232; id., 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 119–121. 153 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 42^r–48^r; Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1/2, pp. 332; Steriotou, *Τα βενετικά τείχη του Χάνδακα*, pp. 22–29. 154 ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, ff. 5^r–6^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 49^{r-v}. 155 Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan', p. 188; cf. infra, doc. 21. 156 Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 232–233. 157 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 49^r. 158 Id., *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, ff. 7^v–10^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 66^v–67^v, 68^v–69^v.

Giulio's Nicosia fortification project as soon as he heard about it.¹⁵⁹ Four years later (October 1571), Sforza and Giulio delivered a joint report on all the border-area fortifications throughout the Venetian State, both mainland and overseas; this report was the fruit of ten years of collaboration, which was reflected notably in the extreme closeness with which the two men worked together to introduce the innovation of using light artillery to arm fortresses.¹⁶⁰

Between 1549 and 1567, then, Giulio was schooled in military architecture in a rather unique way, different to the usual procedure of learning and respecting the rules of poliorcetics which had been the case for Francesco Maria Della Rovere and Sforza Pallavicino, who both led numerous fortress sieges. Giulio certainly witnessed several assaults during the Italian wars, but his direct knowledge of fortification structures did not go beyond having seen the walls of peacetime cities within the Venetian State, as shown when he compares the morphological qualities of the ground at the sites in Cerines, Peschiera and Bergamo.¹⁶¹ Although he never mentions having done so, he doubtless educated himself and kept up with developments in fortification architecture by reading specialist treatises printed in Venice;¹⁶² and he was most definitely kept informed of progress being made in the field of bastion building, both in France and Italy, via his brothers Mario, Germanico and Ascanio, as he implies in his 1557 report on Corfu's fortress.¹⁶³ His knowledge was further enhanced by news that soldiers brought from various battlefields, as shown when he gives details of Charles V's June 1535 landing at La Goulette.¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Giulio did learn about fortification quite empirically: he received a few principles of military architecture from his father and the duke of Urbino, whom, at the end of his life, he called "vecchio mio maestro";¹⁶⁵ this initial schooling was then expanded upon when Giulio was able to observe siege warfare during his youth, and he polished his knowledge with many long

159 Id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 8, ff. 55^v–56^r (letter written by Sforza Pallavicino to the doge, on 2 November 1567). 160 *Relazione alla Signoria sulle fortificazioni di Zante, Cefalonia, Corfù, Albania, Cattaro, Dalmazia, Istria, Friuli di Giulio Savorgnano e Sforza Pallavicino*, dated 8 October 1571, several copies available: ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 8; CMC, *cod. P.D. 581* and *cod. Cicogna 3098/XIX*. In January 1573, Sforza underlined how closely they shared opinions on strategy during the war in Cyprus: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 184^v. More evidence of the close alliance between the two military leaders has been given by Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 234–235, and Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 56, 202, 210–211; and there are yet more sources to illustrate the excellent relationship they had; cf. *infra*, docs 8, 10. It should also be noted that G.S. entrusted Sforza with one of his nephews, Girolamo, so that, under Pallavicino's command in Zara in 1567–1568, the young man could experience military life and architecture; cf. *infra*, doc. 95. Finally, it should be borne in mind that this close relationship was not immune to disagreements, for example concerning the use of *ferlini* during a project at the Venice Lido in summer 1571, as explained by A. Manno, 'Le mura di Venezia e la fortezza di San Nicolò al Lido', in *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, p. 199. 161 Cf. *infra*, doc. 9, 11. 162 Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 245–288. 163 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 17^r. 164 Cf. *infra*, doc. 3. 165 Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 232; throughout the Renaissance, empirical experience was common in the field of ballistics, as remarked by E. Gamba, 'Le scienze fisiche e matematiche dal Quattrocento al Seicento', in G. Arbizzoni / A. Brancati / M. Rosaria Valazzi (eds), *Pesaro nell'età dei Della Rovere*, Venice 2001, vol. 2, pp. 81–83.

years of patiently writing reports concerning Venetian fortresses, which developed his ability to interpret maps, drawings, scale models and other reports. He took part in fortification projects in Peschiera, Corfu, Bergamo and Zara, then led a project himself for the first time in Candia, although the work concerned no more than a section of the city's enceinte.

Put into the context of Giulio's career, then, it can be seen that the project he led on Nicosia's enceinte was the first, and only, time in his career that he was able to design and build a fortress from beginning to end, an undertaking which occupied him for two years. Nevertheless, in his reports Giulio generally did not propose any technical innovations with regard to defensive architecture; he limited himself to rationalizing the application of pre-existing principles, as in his 1557 report on the walls of Famagusta, when he suggests a general use of orillons to strengthen the towers.¹⁶⁶

Giulio's approach to military architecture was thus an empirical one, and saying that he was a part of the erudite circles in Venice or elsewhere in the *Terraferma* who specialized in the subject is no more than unproven hypothesis, regardless of the contact he may have had with the mathematician Nicolò Tartaglia, which shall be looked at later.¹⁶⁷ By way of illustration, Savorgnan's letters do not suggest he had any direct relationship with Giacomo Contarini before returning from Cyprus to Italy; Contarini was kept up to date with the project in Nicosia via Francesco Michiel.¹⁶⁸ It was only after the war in Cyprus, once he was back in Italy from Dalmatia, that Giulio began to enjoy the prestige that his technical gifts had rightfully brought him. He was put in charge of the project at the Forte di Sant'Andrea, on the Lido, in the summer of 1571, and was now in frequent demand due to his experience and expertise; as a consequence, he began to frequent the aforementioned erudite circles, including that of Giacomo Contarini, and formed relationships with other engineering specialists, such as Marquis Guidobaldo del Monte.¹⁶⁹ Upon returning to Italy from Cyprus, Giulio took up residence in Venice, which enabled him to enjoy a far more active social and intellectual life than he had done in Osoppo; despite this favourable climate, however, he never wrote or sponsored a single treatise on architecture, engineering or ballistics, although he did attract scholars and men of letters to Osoppo.¹⁷⁰

Giulio did not form his ideas on military architecture in total isolation, however; via his brothers' frequent travels, he was constantly kept up to date with progress being made in the

166 Cf. *infra*, doc. 1. 167 Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 230, argues that, on the contrary, G.S. was introduced to groups of scientists who gravitated around Nicolò Tartaglia.

168 ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (letter written by Francesco Michiel in Venice, on 25 October 1567); evidence shows that G.S. and Guidobaldo Del Monte were in direct correspondence with one another during the 1580s; cf. the letters contained in ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 19. 169 Rose, *The Italian Renaissance of Mathematics*, p. 232 (quoted above n. 114), and Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', pp. 398–399, bring together evidence of exchanges between G.S., Guidobaldo Del Monte and Giacomo Contarini. Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 238, and Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 204, claim that G.S. was a part of Giacomo Contarini's circle for a long time, but the letters available to us only show this to be true after 1580.

170 Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 238, believes that Pigafetta's translation of Guidobaldo Del Monte was ordered by G.S.; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', pp. 397–407.

field, for example via Mario and his aforementioned interest in engineering. Giulio was, moreover, a prolific inventor of machines, and paid particular attention to developments in the field of artillery, as Walter Panciera has rightly stated.¹⁷¹ Of the greatest interest to the understanding of Giulio's intellectual evolution are the twenty-nine questions on mathematics, physics and ballistics that he sent to the Brescian mathematician Nicolò Fontana (1499–1557), dubbed Tartaglia, in 1542 while in Zara, when a new phase of the fortification of Osoppo was beginning.¹⁷² To our knowledge, Tartaglia answered only one of these questions, when in 1546 he published one of the discussions between himself and Giulio, concerning a ballistics problem to do with the relationship between the diameter and the weight of a cannonball; some years later, in March 1551, Tartaglia dedicated to Giulio a book on hydraulics, which confirms that the two men had regular debates on matters related to mechanics.¹⁷³ For the rest of his life after this point, Giulio maintained a keen interest in engineering and ballistics, as shown by the correspondence he kept up later in his life with Filippo Pigafetta, with Francesco Michiel even, and above all his will, in which he left to Orazio Governa all his iron and brass instruments: compasses, set squares, astrolabes, armillary spheres, ovens for iron ingots, weight-lifting machines, spirit levels and digging instruments.¹⁷⁴ The quiet life Giulio led in Osoppo in the 1530s and then again in the 1550s gave him the time to study scholarly works of mathematics, which subsequently helped him to deal with engineering problems; as he said himself with regard to the projects he led in Candia and Nicosia, “non mi son meso a questi gran fatti alla ventura di Dio, ma con il fondamento dell'aritmetica, della geometria et della praticha particular di quello che pono far gl'huomini”.¹⁷⁵

It was from his sure knowledge of mathematics that Giulio drew his method of writing reports and other texts, and this knowledge also made up for his lack of talent, or lack of interest, for writing. The texts Giulio wrote on the subject of fortifications mainly follow the

171 Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 207–212. 172 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 13*, ff. 55^v–58^r (“Questi 29 quesiti Giulio Savorgnano li fece dimandare da un suo ragazzo nano al famoso Nicolò Tartaglia del 1542 a fine di farlo ragionare cose dilettevole”); Tiepolo (ed.), *Ambiente scientifico veneziano*, p. 35 no. 39; Manno, ‘Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia’, p. 230; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 121; M. Henninger-Voss, ‘Measures of success: Military engineering and the architectonic understanding of design’, in W. Lefèvre (ed.), *Picturing Machines 1400–1700*, Cambridge, Mass. / London 2004, pp. 164–168. 173 Nicolò Tartaglia, *Quesiti et inventioni diverse*, f. 34^r; concerning Tartaglia and what he contributed to mathematics and ballistics, see the studies made by G. B. Gabrieli, *Nicolò Tartaglia. Invenzioni, disfide e sfortune*, Siena 1986, and *Nicolò Tartaglia. Una vita travagliata al servizio della matematica*, Bagnolo Mella 1997; see also the thoughts of Panciera, who puts the matter in context: *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 121–123, 199; Manno, ‘Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia’, p. 230. 174 ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, f. 181^r, and partially reprinted by Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 230; BAM, *cod. D 34 inf.*, f. 128 (letter written by G.S. in Osoppo on 8 June 1581, to Filippo Pigafetta, concerning traction mechanisms); id., *cod. Q 122 sup.*, ff. 150^v–151^v (will dated 19 January 1595); Sandri, ‘Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge’, p. 233. See also the dedication Pigafetta wrote to G.S. in June 1581 in his Italian translation of Guidobaldo Del Monte, *Le mechaniche dell'illustriss. sig. Guido Ubaldo*: Casella, ‘I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti’, pp. 392–393, and Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 203. 175 BAM, *cod. D 191 inf.*, f. 102^r (letter written by G.S. on 4 May 1586, to Filippo Pigafetta); also: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 14*, f. 1^r; Henninger-Voss, ‘Measures of success’, p. 158.

structure of questions submitted to him by various Venetian authorities, primarily the *provveditori alle fortezze*;¹⁷⁶ otherwise, his unsolicited texts, in which he examines technical issues or proposes solutions, take the form of dialogues, doubtless inspired by Tartaglia's *Quesiti*, or numbered lists of propositions, as in his most all-encompassing work from his later years, the *Regule della fortificatione moderna*. These twenty-five rules, however, could in no way be considered a general treatise on the art of fortification, proof that Giulio never saw himself as a theoretician of military architecture; in this respect he was both the opposite of and complementary to his brother Mario, whose treatise on the art of war was founded upon a detailed analysis of the great works of the humanist era.¹⁷⁷ Giulio always remained a soldier of unequalled experience, who used this understanding to develop his ideas on the art of fortification; he planned on passing on his knowledge to his nephew Germanico, in the hope of keeping up a family tradition of military architects in the service of Venice, but after Germanico was banished for assassinating his uncle Ascanio, Giulio had to accept that his intellectual heirs would in the end be two foreigners, Orazio Governa and Bonaiuto Lorini. The former had been his loyal companion for forty years, and for the entirety of Giulio's career in military architecture; the latter was a young engineer who had come from Florence to serve Venice and had been enthralled by Giulio's work in Nicosia.¹⁷⁸

Thus Giulio approached fortification with empirical methods drawn from his comprehensive knowledge in the fields of mathematics and engineering, both of which enhanced his sense of discipline and the rigour of his reasoning. It should, however, be recognized just how much these choices were linked to the moral education Giulio had received from his father, which he shared with the whole *fraterna*. With this in mind, Giulio's letters to Francesco Michiel shed precious light on the mentality of the eldest brother, for whom living away from home in Cyprus was just a stepping stone in a career focused on heightening the fame of his family's name. It is hard to miss how, in his letters, Giulio does not speak much of Cyprus apart from the material and political issues surrounding the fortification project, and is frequently nostalgic for Friuli, in particular for his beloved Osoppo.

176 As in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5, reports dated 1 October 1566 [= *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 58^v–60^r] and 15 January 1567; also in *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 49^r–50^v, 56^r–57^v, and *Materie Miste Notabili* 18, ff. 8^v–27^r. 177 BAM, *cod. D 167 inf.*, ff. 6^r–12^v; edited by A. Gambuti, 'Invenzioni ed ammaestramenti di scienza militare nell'archivio mediceo', in C. Cresti / A. Fara / D. Lamberini (eds), *Architettura militare nell'Europa del XVI secolo. Atti del Convegno di Studi, Firenze, 25–28 novembre 1986*, Siena 1988, pp. 356–364; Greek translation by I. Steriotou, 'Giulio Savorgnano: 25 κανόνες τεχνικής στη σχεδίαση και την κατασκευή των φρουρίων', in *Τεχνονομία στη Δαυνοκρατούμενη Ελλάδα, Πολιτιστικό Τεχνολογικό Ίδρυμα ΕΤΒΑ* (ed.), Athens 1997, pp. 128–138. Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 234, argues that G.S. could not even conceive of a treatise on defensive architecture, as he did not consider architecture a science, but rather the product of unchangeable rules being followed time and again down the ages. This is why Manno rejects, rightly, in this author's eyes, the claim that G.S. was the author of the treatise which appears in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 14, ff. 1^r–21^v, and a copy in ff. 22^v–44^r, cf. Tiepolo (ed.), *Ambiente scientifico veneziano*, p. 36 no. 40 ("Discorso di Giulio Savorgnan sulle fortificazioni"); on this subject, see also Henninger-Voss, 'Measures of success', p. 154.

178 Manno, 'Buonaiuto Lorini e la scienza delle fortificazioni', p. 36; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', p. 406; Sandri, 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', p. 233.

Osoppo was deeply entrenched in Giulio's consciousness, in several respects, and emphasis must be placed on the physical makeup of this place which, under the aegis of his father, so affected his intellectual development. The *rocca* on which he was born showed Giulio the technical difficulties of joining bastioned walls to a large rock mass, in anticipation of a heavy artillery offensive; this was the genesis of Giulio's future expertise in the field of fortification (fig. 11).¹⁷⁹ As well as questions of defensive strategy, a recurring problem in Osoppo was that of supplying the place with water, which was met with the digging of cisterns. This was again valuable early experience for Giulio; he saw that the tactically crucial question of supplying a fortress, which, as Girolamo observed in Osoppo in February 1514, affected how long the enceinte could resist a siege, had to be taken into account when thinking of the strategic constraints of the fortress. Throughout the project he led in Nicosia, Giulio constantly stressed how urgent it was to stockpile provisions in the city's storehouses, in order to be able to resist attack for several months on end.¹⁸⁰ Finally, being able to observe the Tagliamento valley down below the *rocca* taught Giulio about controlling water courses, which was necessary in Osoppo to prevent flooding and to feed the diversion channels used to irrigate and fertilize the Friulian plains; here can be seen the origin of the importance Giulio placed on questions of hydrology and irrigation in Cyprus.¹⁸¹ Osoppo was the arena in which many of the architect's future ideas and principles were formed, a reference point in his scientific thinking, and he never forgot the purity of its climate, recalling his homeland when breathing in the fine air of Cerines.¹⁸²

Giulio's attachment to Osoppo was evidently part of his family culture, and the eldest brother took responsibility for maintaining, enhancing and enlarging the Savorgnan residence in order to pass it on to his nephews.¹⁸³ Osoppo was the home of all the Savorgnans who served Venice, and the *rocca* palace was the *lieu de mémoire* which contained the past and the present of the del Monte branch of the family, as Laura Casella has already shown. This palace was the repository of the family's history, eleven generations long, as Giulio

179 Concerning Osoppo's fortress and the improvements made to it over the course of the sixteenth century, see the description that Salaris attributes to Mario Savorgnan, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 102–104; also, the following studies: T. Miotti, *Castelli del Friuli*, vol. I: *Carnia, feudo di Maggio e capitaneati settentrionali*, Udine 1977, pp. 200–212; F. Micelli, 'Castello e monte di Osoppo (1510–1529). Per una storia della "Via da carri" tra Villaco e Portogruaro', in A. Del Col (ed.), *Società e cultura del Cinquecento nel Friuli occidentale. Studi*, Pordenone 1984, pp. 57–71. Concerning work done on the fortress after 1580, see Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 229. 180 On this point, see the reports delivered by the Udine *luocotenenti* Francesco Michiel (on 26 January 1553) and Girolamo Morosini (on 20 April 1559), reprinted in *Relazioni dei rettori veneti in Terraferma I*, pp. 40, 68–69. 181 ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 8, letter written by G.S. in Udine on 8 January 1567, to Francesco Michiel; id., *Capi dei Dieci*, Lettere di condottieri e di gente d'arme, b. 308, document dated 17 September 1567; G.S. used his skills in hydraulic matters early on in his career, in Padua and Peschiera as remarked by Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', p. 230.

182 Cf. infra, docs 9 and 12. 183 Cf. the codicil, written on 13 July 1595, to G.S.'s will, where it is stated that the palace will go to Marc'Antonio's sons Mario and Marc'Antonio, and, in the event of Marc'Antonio's sons all being gone, to Girolamo's son Ascanio: "questa fortezza [Osoppo] resterà in mano delli discendenti che furono del Signor Girolamo mio padre, senza poterne allienare né smembrare parte alcuna": BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 146'.

happily reminds Francesco Michiel in a letter written on 31 August 1579; there Giulio kept his tool and machine collections, an armour gallery and a series of portraits of members of the family. Giulio was particularly proud of the six artillery pieces that the *Signoria* had allowed him to install on the *rocca* in 1571; this was another example of him fulfilling his father's wishes, as when Girolamo had made the same request in 1514, Venice refused, despite the fact that officially he should have been allowed to keep for himself any cannons taken from the enemy. Obviously, the church next to the palace was the location of the family graves, containing the tombs of Giulio's father and all of the brothers Giulio outlived, including Germanico, whose remains were carefully brought back from Lyons after his death in 1555. For Giulio no other burial site would do; the construction of his tomb, built, however, on a terrace away from the rest of the family graves, began during the great plague of 1576 and was finished in May 1577.¹⁸⁴

Giulio travelled to many different places in the process of strengthening his family heritage, but Osoppo, invested with a symbolic dimension, remained his sole horizon, and he carried with him his family history in all latitudes. In the final report on his mission in Cyprus delivered to Pietro Loredan on 15 January 1570, Giulio merges past and present by associating the resistance effort his father led in Osoppo in 1514 against the Holy Roman Emperor's forces to the fortification of Nicosia against the Ottomans half a century later; by placing side by side two examples of the family's active loyalty to the *Signoria*, Giulio underlines the Savorgnan's status as tireless and long-standing servants of Venice, both in the *Terraferma* and the *Stato da Mar*.¹⁸⁵ It was beyond doubt that the family deserved special treatment for their loyalty, and Giulio constantly hoped for rewards as significant as the sacrifices he and his kin had made. He conveyed this ideology, which further emphasized the Savorgnan family spirit, to his 'clientele' in Nicosia, and the argument was adopted by both the count of Rochas, Eugenio Singlitico, Giovanni Podocataro and Paolo Flatro, in the public eulogy they gave to Giulio when the latter left Nicosia for the last time in May 1569.¹⁸⁶ The fact that Giulio promoted this family propaganda amongst people around him in Cyprus is a clear illustration of his intentions; it also shows, again, that he saw his time on the island as a stepping stone in a career that properly belonged on the mainland, as Giovanni Battista Leoni highlighted in the sermon he wrote for Giulio's funeral in late July 1595.¹⁸⁷

The analogy between Osoppo and Nicosia was more than just support for an ingratiating rhetoric aimed at advancing the Savorgnan's cause; Giulio applied the rigorous financial principles he had learnt at home to the work he did abroad, and was just as thrifty with

¹⁸⁴ ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 181^r; G. B. di Varmo (ed.), *Giulio Savorgnan a Varmilio di Varmo*, Mortegliano 1922, p. 3; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 168–169, 207; ead., 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', pp. 401–402; ead., "Nobilissima famiglia Savorgnana", pp. 134, 136. Concerning the family graves: Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 385–386; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 38–39, 72, 165–169 and tables VI and VII.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. infra, doc. 77. ¹⁸⁶ Cf. infra, Appendix A, pp. 609–638. ¹⁸⁷ *Oratione del Signor Giovanni Battista Leoni presidente dell'Accademia...*, Venice 1595, pp. 4–5.

Venice's money as he was with that of the *fraterna*. He constantly and steadfastly voiced his desire to limit the expenses that so strained the San Marco coffers, and this concern can be seen in various measures that he took: in Nicosia he imposed the results-based *ferlini* system of paying the workforce, guaranteeing quick and efficient labour, which he had observed in Peschiera in 1549 and used for the first time in Corfu;¹⁸⁸ he refused to dig moats out of overly resistant rock which demanded time, energy and money; and by using site plans on easily excavatable ground, he immediately reused excavated earth to build curtains, completely eliminating the cost of moving earth. Time and again Giulio proved his knack for cutting construction costs, watching every ducat spent.¹⁸⁹ Judging from the texts available to us, honesty and uprightness were Giulio's guiding principles in both his private and his public life, and though the officer filtered a lot of his writings, his moral integrity, instilled by his all-powerful father, is beyond doubt.

The discipline and rigourousness particular to military circles were drummed into Giulio throughout his upbringing, and never left him. He displayed a constant ardour in doing his duty, and doggedly respected Sforza Pallavicino's instructions; he even made do with four hours' sleep whenever it was necessary for his project in Nicosia. Idleness, which Giulio felt in Corfu and in Nicosia, left him profoundly unsettled, and brought out an irrational impatience when he had to wait for ships to arrive or for work to progress, an impatience which easily turned to anger. Giulio was undoubtedly an authoritarian commander to his subordinates; this did not, however, stop him from recognizing the abilities of the officers under his orders.¹⁹⁰ His talents as a military commander were unquestionable: he was a fine judge of a captain's personality, he praised the loyalty of soldiers who obeyed the orders of their superiors, he was a skilled motivator, and he also skilfully improvised rules of conduct to prevent violence amongst infantry soldiers in Nicosia, even using summary justice to set an example;¹⁹¹ furthermore, he showed himself to be a skilled tactician, who managed to exploit the contradictions of the Cypriot aristocracy in order to have them finance Nicosia's fortress in May 1567.¹⁹² His constant quest for efficiency saw him regularly propose improvements to Venetian military recruitment, be it for soldiers in the *Terraferma*, Crete or Cyprus, and he sought to secure better material conditions for the men so that they would better serve the *Signoria*.¹⁹³ Finally, Giulio was a remarkable organizer of construction work: he anticipated the requirements of his mission in Cyprus in April 1567 before he even knew exactly what the project was; he was exceptionally good at sharing out duties at each of the Nicosia enceinte's bastions; and he kept atop of progress being made on the project by visiting all of the eleven bastions under construction twice a day, even during the intense heat of the summer of 1567.¹⁹⁴

Being a soldier also ensured that Giulio had strong morals; as stated, he defended the

¹⁸⁸ Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan', pp. 187–188. ¹⁸⁹ Cf. *infra*, docs 42, 55, 77. ¹⁹⁰ Cf. *infra*, docs 31, 36, 46, 47, 49, 63. ¹⁹¹ Cf. *infra*, docs 50, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 70.

¹⁹² Cf. *infra*, docs 26, 28, 32. ¹⁹³ Cf. *infra*, docs 2, 14, and ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 12^r–14^v, 26^v–27^r. ¹⁹⁴ Cf. *infra*, docs 23, 28, 39.

public good with the same passion as he defended his family's heritage, and was an exemplary civil servant. Giulio's uprightness shows through time and again in his letters: he corrected false information given by certain officers seeking to win over Venetian authorities; he highlighted the flaws in the Venetian administration in Cyprus, and showed that applying the lessons learnt across the *Terraferma* would avoid and reduce waste; and he deplored carelessness on the part of colonial officers which saw their efforts hinder rather than help Venice, or which caused scandalous delays, for example in the affair of transporting cannons from Salina to Nicosia, or securing provisions for the future fortress.¹⁹⁵ His criticism of the military establishment was even more acerbic, Giulio judging the quality of both captains and soldiers to have got worse and worse; he saw this as an effect of lust for money, pointing the finger at captains mixed up in corruption and handling stolen goods, running a trade in arquebuses, armour and helmets. He was even more enraged by soldiers who managed to get away with misdeeds unpunished, through exploiting the distance between themselves and Venice, and by the protection given them by powerful men.¹⁹⁶ He was incensed at not having enough authority to punish thieves who stole from workers on the Nicosia construction sites, despite the sophisticated security system he had put in place;¹⁹⁷ and he was candidly resentful of how powerless he was to improve the heart-rending predicament of Nicosia's poor, the main casualties of the housing speculation triggered by the fortification project. Finally, he bemoaned being prevented from paying his workers as much as he wanted to because of the frequent shortage of coins, a situation he could not control.¹⁹⁸

Seeing day-to-day problems conflict with his strong moral principles caused Giulio great amounts of worry, exacerbated by his being so far away from Venice, the source of the political intrigues (the notorious *broglio*) he so denigrated.¹⁹⁹ The worry he was afflicted with seems to have been linked to his frail health; Giulio frequently suffered attacks of dropsy, and the merciless onset of age deprived him of various faculties, as he admitted in the cruel self-portrait he gave in the letter he wrote to the doge, Alvise Mocenigo, in Zara on 18 November 1570, some day after his sixtieth birthday.²⁰⁰ Time and again in the letters he wrote from Nicosia he expressed his desire to be back in Friuli, where he would leave behind his soldier's life and spend his days as a philosopher, which, indeed, he did after his return in 1572.²⁰¹

Even more than the ravages of age, Giulio feared the distance of Venice; his memories of his long stay in Crete, where he had to wait for over two years to be discharged and allowed to return home, were not at all fond. Similarly, despite his excitement and enthusiasm for his work in Nicosia, he worried that his time in Cyprus was a kind of banishment, and that decisions

195 Cf. infra, docs 23, 28, 53, 57, 58. 196 Cf. infra, docs 34, 40, 46, 47, 52, 55, 64, 69, 71, 72, 74. 197 Cf. infra, doc. 28. 198 Cf. infra, docs 39, 40, 45, 54. 199 Cf. infra, docs 28, 36, 43, 60, 64, 72; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria*', p. 228. 200 Cf. infra, docs 9, 65, 80, 81, and ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 146^v: "Giulio Savorgnano ha hormai 61 anno, et non è più atto a fare il servitio del carico che ha, perché è cominciato a deventar sordo, vede poco da lontano, et quando commanda un servitio, mal vien inteso per molti denti che li mancano, et quelli che ha, tutti li stanno per cadere. Non può più la fatica di camminare né star in pie né al vento né alla pioza, di modo che per dirlo in una parola è troppo vecchio, et forse anco della memoria et giuditio, che li vecchij secondo le nature sogliono patire et indisposition de stomaco". 201 Cf. infra, docs 65, 72.

would be made in Venice against his interests, leaving him helpless to defend himself.²⁰² Another risk in his estrangement from the city was that of him being lumped in with the corrupt officers he so admonished, and in many of his letters to Francesco Michiel, Giulio exonerates himself from the delays in the Nicosia fortification project.²⁰³ Not being in Venice made Giulio anxious about the advantages his rivals could draw from his mission in Cyprus: he complained that he was not being paid as much as his talents merited, that the title he had been given did not match the responsibilities he had, and that he was subjected to the sly tricks of low-ranking officers, who forced him to pay for the barley he needed to feed his horses; he also worried about the advantage his expatriation might give to the man he considered his main rival, Girolamo Martinengo, who was paid more than he, even though his questionable career as a military architect had cost Venice quite dear.²⁰⁴ In his letters, Giulio explained his decisions and described all the actions he took in order to convince his reader of his sound judgement; he never used the same arguments when writing to the doge, the *provveditori alle fortezze* or his most frequent and dear correspondent, Francesco Michiel, who was all the more valuable a friend for his ability to pass on information informally to members of the *Collegio*. Giulio did not deal well with being away from his homeland, and fretted hopelessly about what the *Signoria* would think of his interpretation of the instructions she had given him before his arrival in Cyprus. Due to the erratic naval links between Cyprus and Italy, it was not until July 1568 that he heard news that the Senate was pleased with his work in Nicosia; he had thus had to wait a whole year before receiving any praise, and his relief can be seen in his correspondence, which slowed down after this reassurance, showing that, for Giulio, in those first twelve months writing letters was the only way to maintain any influence in Venice.²⁰⁵

Over two thousand kilometres away from Venice, Giulio relied strongly on his brothers who were naturally eager to persuade Venetian authorities to defend his cause, or, if his brothers were unavailable, on his agents.²⁰⁶ He missed the family environment, and in his thirteen-year-old nephew, Germanico, Giulio saw a responsibility, not an aide. It is true that he assigned to a captain the task of teaching Germanico military discipline, but Giulio himself showed his nephew the tough life of a construction worker, as well as introducing him to the domain of artillery; in Germanico's name, Giulio financed the first cannon cast in Nicosia by Virgilio Alberghetto.²⁰⁷ Giulio had no one he could count on for support in Cyprus, and this did not overly bother him, as in terms of military rank he was on a par with the other senior officers who had been sent to Cyprus, each of them having their own defined jurisdictions and responsibilities. He relied, however, on his kin and on a solid network of

202 Cf. *infra*, doc. 51. 203 Cf. *infra*, docs 47, 51, 60, 77, 78. 204 Cf. *infra*, docs 30, 32, 38, 43, 46, 47, 56, 59. G.S. also seemed to be fiercely jealous of Paolo Orsini, from whom, in 1581, he stole the young Bonaiuto Lorini away to Osoppo, with evident delight: Tiepolo (ed.), *Ambiente scientifico veneziano*, p. 40 no. 49; Manno, 'Buonaiuto Lorini e la scienza delle fortificazioni', pp. 36, 45; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', p. 404. 205 Cf. *infra*, docs 63, 65. 206 Cf. *infra*, docs 48, 53, 71, 74, where Giulio explicitly asks Francesco Michiel to speak in his favour. 207 Cf. *infra*, docs 63, 65, 74.

friends and acquaintances to avoid rotting on the island and to get back to the pure air of Osoppo. Over a year went by before his request for repatriation was granted, and Giulio attributed this delay to underhandedness on the part of rivals he never explicitly named (the Corner Piscopias, the Barbarighis?), which seems to have provoked further intrigues led by Giulio's brother Ascanio and possibly Paolo Tiepolo and Giovanni Garzoni. The Savorgnan *fraterna* undoubtedly took part in the jostling amongst patrician factions, if only via the alliances formed by Giulio's three sisters with the Tiepolo and Garzoni branches. Reading his letters shows that Giulio received the support of Sforza Pallavicino, and the respect and consideration of Giulio Contarini and the brothers Daniele and Marc'Antonio Barbaro; with the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo, he formed a relationship that, judging from the letters of recommendation given, was a continuation of the old alliance with the Della Roveres dating back to the generation of Giulio's father's.²⁰⁸

Giulio also had a somewhat paternalistic relationship, bordering on patronage, with the captains he commanded; he knew the worth of each man personally, knew their physical and moral strengths and weaknesses, and, when reporting on their performance, displayed an astute awareness of all their efforts, even in the case of Friulian noblemen from outside of his guard, such as the young Count Silvio da Porcia.²⁰⁹ It cannot, however, be said with any certainty whether or not Giulio recruited his assistants from amongst networks of acquaintances he built up himself in Friuli or elsewhere; troops serving the *Serenissima* travelled around Venetian territory, both in the *Terraferma* and the *Stato da Mar*, so much that they would often meet each other in different garrisons all around the empire. Giulio's close ties with Leonardo Roncone and Captain Gregorio dated back eighteen to twenty years, though the origin and nature of this early relationship is unknown; elsewhere, the eagerness to serve the Savorgnans shown by Bernardin Polani, even though he was already captain of Salina, suggests that Giulio's status as a senior officer meant soldiers wanted to come and fight for him, or for the family, as Polani expressed a desire to join Germanico's company.²¹⁰ It was also the Nicosia fortification project that brought together Giulio and the twenty-four-year-old Filippo Pigafetta, who came to Osoppo in the late 1570s to discuss engineering matters with the old expert.²¹¹ There is much evidence to show that everywhere he went Giulio formed relationships that he kept up and made use of whenever it was necessary in furthering his interests; however, his success in enlisting troops on a local scale, in Friuli, contrasted with his powerlessness in the recruitment of the soldiers sent to the *Stato da Mar*, and another of Giulio's grievances was the inadequacy of the captains sent to Cyprus.²¹²

This tendency to build around himself and, more generally, his family, circles of people

208 Cf. *infra*, docs 53, 56, 66, 90–92, 99, 100, 104. 209 Cf. *infra*, docs 65, 69, 70. Conzato, in 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', p. 151, claims that the Savorgnans generally did not recruit their *cavallieri leggieri* from their Friulian circles. 210 Cf. *infra*, docs 28, 29, 96. 211 BAM, *cod. C 64 inf.*, f. 84^{r-v}, and *cod. R 121 sup.*, f. 14^v; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', p. 391. 212 Cf. *infra*, doc. 72; concerning the question of patronage-like relationships amongst the *condottieri*, see Pezzolo's remarks in 'Nobiltà militare e potere', pp. 411–415, and 'Professione militare e famiglia in Italia', pp. 345–346.

capable of furthering the Savorgnans' influence in society illustrates Giulio's constant desire for intermediaries via whom the family's honour could be furthered. Giulio's sense of honour was unquestionably the most decisive principle in both his private and his public life, and his desire to always remain respected and dignified illustrates his acute awareness of his role as the *fraterna's* eldest brother and a military leader. For example, writing in Belgrado on 7 August 1560, Giulio explains that, in his eyes, if so much as a single horse is missing or misbehaves during a review, the cavalier in question can be punished commensurately, but the cavalry commander in charge of keeping his men in check will be disgraced for life.²¹³ By way of further illustration, it was to defend "l'honor di casa mia" that Giulio vehemently rebuked the Udine *comunità* for taking water from a river belonging to the Savorgnans, and organizing protests and marches against the family. The unrest lasted until August 1545, and grew to such proportions that it was thought the *Signoria* was secretly supporting them; the Savorgnans were accused of treachery, and ignominy fell upon them. Giulio was on the verge of despair and, with his brother Mario left seriously ill by the whole affair, he asked the *Signoria* to speak out publicly to restore the family's honour.²¹⁴

Giulio placed the greatest importance on the idea of family pride, as his father had taught him. Each time a foreign sovereign came to Friuli, Giulio, either alone or with his brothers, made a point of receiving the illustrious guests: he welcomed Charles V in 1532 alongside Venice's ambassadors, and on 11 July 1574 Giulio, escorted by his brother Marc'Antonio and his nephews Giulio, Mario and Marc'Antonio, led a company of fifty cavaliers to celebrate Henry III of France's visit to Friuli on his way to Venice.²¹⁵ On this occasion Giulio organized an artillery salute in the king's honour, and spoke to Henry III of his brother Germanico, who died while fighting for the French in Lyons in 1555.²¹⁶ Meeting monarchs was a reinforcement of the Savorgnans' predominance in Friulian aristocratic society, and helped the family in their attempts to foster a courtly atmosphere in their homeland of Osoppo. Girolamo senior had already succeeded in bringing men of letters to Osoppo, with the visits (brief or lasting several years?) of Marcantonio Amalteo and Janus Lascaris in the early 1520s,²¹⁷ so Giulio was following in his father's footsteps when he brought Tomaso Porcacchi, Filippo Pigafetta and Buonaiuto Lorini to Osoppo in the 1570s.²¹⁸

213 BAM, *cod. G 273 inf.*, f. 172^{r-v}. 214 ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, *Lettere di condottieri e di gente d'arme*, b. 308, letter written on 17 August 1545. 215 BCJ, *Fondo Joppi*, *cod. 689a*, s.f. 216 Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 29; P. de Nolhac / A. Solerti, *Il viaggio in Italia di Enrico III re di Francia e le feste a Venezia, Ferrara, Mantova e Torino*, Turin 1890, pp. 80–81; Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, p. 70; F. di Colmalisio [F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo], 'Giulio Savorgnan. Aspetti inediti e poco noti della sua vita', *Bollettino della Società filologica friulana* XIII / 1-2 (1937), pp. 17–22. 217 Cf. supra, p. 42. 218 Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', pp. 391–413. Porcacchi's death in Osoppo in 1576 coincided with the great plague that prompted G.S. to ask Orazio Governa to begin compiling his biographical collection; cf. supra, p. 17. It remains to be seen whether or not G.S. had first entrusted this task to Porcacchi; cf. supra n. 34; in 1576 Porcacchi remained in Friuli, dedicating his time to writing historical works at the request of various noblemen, before being struck by the plague in Osoppo: A. Gerstenberg, *Thomaso Porcacchis L'Isole più famose del mondo. Zur Text- und*

Until the day he died, Giulio displayed a moral consistency and an intellectual rigour which, nevertheless, did not make him inflexible or obstinate; there were in his life several periods of self-analysis from which he drew new ways of looking at his career and his work. For example, before his second Cyprus mission in autumn 1566, at the behest of the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Giulio revisited what he had written concerning the island in the summer of 1562 to update his main conclusions.²¹⁹ Between 1567 and 1570 he twice summarized the reports he had written previously concerning the island's general situation, first in September 1568, then again in January 1570, and insisted on the logic of the arguments he had been proposing since 1562.²²⁰ Giulio was always able to cast a retrospective glance over his work and his past; on 11 November 1576 and then again on 5 July 1595, just days before he passed away, he sat down and wrote a justification of his career, without ever examining his conscience in any religious sense.²²¹ The explanation, or re-explanation, he gave depicts an exemplary career led for the enlightenment of his nephews, and of sceptics who questioned the integrity and honour of the *fraterna's* eldest brother. Giulio's achievements forever consolidated the Savorgnan family's status as selfless servants of Venice and her interests, as shown in Osoppo in 1514 and in the *Stato da Mar* in 1567. Giulio was highly aware of his family's role in the history of their homeland, Friuli, under Venetian rule; but he never entertained the megalomaniac delusions of his brother Marc'Antonio, who was convinced that the fate of all Christianity rested on the Nicosia fortress, and that, via Giulio, the Savorgnan *fraterna* would be the salvation of the entire world.²²²

As far as we can ascertain, Giulio appears to have been quite a conservative character, steeped in the traditional values of a provincial nobility whose main concern was to maintain their privileges and social status through loyal service to Venice, and to defend both their private and public interests, at the same time as keeping the principles of moral integrity and consistency behind everything they did. As a soldier and, above all, a senior army commander, Giulio imposed order and discipline on his men, and his desire to make the organization of Venice's armed forces more rational saw him propose new methods of fortification. His writings show a man confident of his superior technical expertise, which was the result of the experience he had acquired, much direct observation and the knowledge he had obtained from people around him, in addition to his unquestionable ability to assimilate experiments and contemporary technology into his work, especially in the field of artillery.²²³ This flair for

Wortgeschichte der Geographie im Cinquecento, Tübingen 2004, pp. 74–75. 219 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 28^v; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 1669*, pp. 40–42; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, p. 1. 220 Cf. infra, docs 68, 77. 221 Concerning the specific conditions that led to the compilation of Orazio Governà's volume in 1576, see supra, p. 17–19. In the letter-testament he wrote to the doge, as well as in the wills and codicils he wrote, G.S. never displays any particular feelings of religious piety: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, ff. 146^r–147^r, 148^r–151^v. His attitude to religion was a combination of sincere belief in Christian dogma and a marked distance from the clergy, whom he suspected of joining political factions: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, *Lettre di condottieri e di gente d'arme*, b. 308, letter written by G.S. on 17 August 1545. 222 Cf. infra, docs 32, 77, 98, 113. 223 As has already been underlined by Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria*', pp. 228–229, and Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 198–199, 209–210.

innovation was the outstanding aspect of an otherwise conventional military architect, and was what made the success of the Nicosia enceinte, an unexpected feat of brilliance in a career which, though exceptional for its achievements, was essentially quite conformist. In July 1562 Giulio concurred with the Venetian army's expert strategists in rejecting the idea of fortifying the Cypriot capital; five years later, with no concern for this contradiction, he led the supposedly unwarranted project himself.

THE DOCUMENTS

PART ONE
GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S FIRST REPORTS
ON THE DEFENCE OF CYPRUS
(1557–1558)

VENICE AND THE DEFENCE OF CYPRUS IN THE 1550s

The nature of Venice's taking of Cyprus in the winter of 1473 / 1474 largely determined how the *Signoria* dealt with the defence of the island later on. It took just ten galleys and a landing of 700 troops in Famagusta on 31 December 1473 to overpower Catherine Cornaro's opponents and to impose Venice's authority across the whole island in less than six weeks. A century after the Genoese conquest of Famagusta, Venice showed the fragility, or obsolescence, of the defensive system of a centralized Frankish kingdom incapable of keeping up with the military progress of the great continental states. None of the armed forces in either Nicosia or Famagusta had been able to give a structured resistance to the powerfully armed, implacably determined Venetians.¹

Under the last Lusignan rulers the defence of Cyprus was based on a modest fortification network; only the town of Famagusta and the city of Nicosia were fortified, by structures built between the late thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries, and the harbour towns of Paphos, Limassol and Cerines were guarded by small castles, with insubstantial garrisons. The defence system was completed by a network of lookouts, with a few watchtowers scattered along the coastline and the prominent heights of the Troodos Mountains. The armies guarding the island were composed of several corps: around a hundred feudatories served in the feudal cavalry, the elite corps of the king's troops, which was supported by an auxiliary cavalry of around 200 turcopoles; the royal armies also contained mercenaries and other paid soldiers, who made up the garrisons of the five fortifications. Finally, the coast guard was partly provided by *francomati* peasants, as a requisition of specific services.² Thus in 1474 Venice inherited a limited military and defensive structure, which, moreover, was not backed by a fleet strong enough to repel external threats.

The distance between Cyprus and Venice was an insurmountable strategic problem for

1 The military operations that led to the establishment of Venetian authority have been contextualised by: S. Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, Venice 1853–1864, vol. 4, pp. 264–265; G. Magnante, 'L'acquisto dell'isola di Cipro da parte della repubblica di Venezia', *Archivio Veneto* 6 (1929), pp. 1–82; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 685–699; J. Richard, 'Chypre du protectorat à la domination vénitienne', in A. Pertusi (ed.), *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, Florence 1973, vol. 1, pp. 657–677 [reprint in J. Richard, *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Âge. Études et documents*, London 1977, study no. 12]; P. W. Edbury, 'Οι τελευταίοι Λουζινιανοί (1432–1489)', in Th. Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. 4: *Μεσαιωνικό βασίλειο. Ενετοκρατία Α'*, Nicosia 1995, pp. 247–258; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', *ibid.*, pp. 455–458; E. Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana (1473–1571). Istituzioni e culture nel regno della Serenissima*, Rome 2011, pp. 49–50. 2 Although there has been no overview dealing with the organization of the Frankish kingdom's defences under James II, much detailed information can be found in J. Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances de la Secrète du royaume de Chypre (1468–1469)*, Nicosia 1983, pp. xxiv–xxvi, and *passim*. For a recent general overview concerning the castles built under the Lusignans: J. Petre, *Crusader Castles of Cyprus: The fortifications of Cyprus under the Lusignans, 1191–1489*, Nicosia 2012, pp. 59–90.

the *Signoria*, as it took ships at least three weeks to sail the 2,000 km separating the island from the Lagoon, and Crete was a full eight to ten days away from Famagusta. These geographical constraints limited the options for the organization of the island's defences against an Ottoman attack; one possibility was to build several small fortifications across the island, giving a higher number of pockets of resistance against enemy troops, but this would entail arming a considerable section of the peasantry, which would create obvious social and political problems.³ The other solution favoured concentrating all the island's military resources on a single fortress, accessible from the sea, guarded by troops in the pay of Venice, and scrupulously controlled by Venetian officers. For a series of political, military and economic reasons, after 1474 Venice chose the latter option, and stood by it until the middle of the following century. This was a continuation of the *Signoria's* Adriatic defence policy, already deployed in the Ionian Islands and in Crete, areas where Venice's empire was built on a network of great maritime fortresses; Zara, Corfu, Chania and Candia were the centrepieces of this network, and Famagusta was added to the list of fortifications, following strategic principles which, in essence, had not changed since the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. The function of these relay points was to support the Venetian patriciate's commercial activities, ensure the Republic's independence on the seas and establish the defence of the territories it administered.⁴

The incorporation of Cyprus into the *Stato da Mar* did not, therefore, provoke any changes in the organization of the island's defences, despite the evident vulnerability of the latter's structures. Famagusta remained the island's true fortress, the "chiave del Regno" as the officers commonly called it, since the harbour was the only access point for any maritime rescue;⁵ for this reason, Famagusta was central to the island's defence system, the Cerines castle only playing a minor role. The upkeep and restoration of Famagusta's enceinte consequently became sources of constant concern for the *Signoria*, and the importance of the fortress was seen on an institutional level in new regulations that removed it from the jurisdiction of the Nicosia *regimento*; the city's captain, directly appointed by the Senate, enjoyed a level of power and capacity for action that gave him complete authority over the town, its harbour, its inhabitants, its enceinte and its two districts (*contrade*), Messarea and Carpasso. Appointed for a period of two years, the captain especially had to ensure that provisions and ammunition were secured for the fortress, making it capable of resisting a siege pending aid sent from Italy. The state of the city's defences was also his direct responsibility, and it was his duty, in particular, to organize the recruitment of labourers to work on

3 This solution was, for example, given by G.S. in his 1557 report; cf. *infra*, doc. 3. 4 Concerning the organization of the *Stato da Mar's* defensive system, see F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge. Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)*, Paris 1975, pp. 141–178, 243–255, 353–391; M. Knapton, 'Guerra e finanza (1381–1508)', in G. Cozzi / M. Knapton (eds), *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla guerra di Chioggia alla riconquista della Terraferma*, Turin 1986, pp. 287–300; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 285–325; G. Ravegnani, 'La Romania veneziana', in G. Cracco / G. Ortali (eds), *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, vol. II: *L'età del comune*, Rome 1995, pp. 221–227. 5 ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 12, ff. 173^v–174^r.

the town's enceinte; from 1506 onwards, his authority was extended to all the fortresses on the island.⁶

Venice's insistence on the upkeep of Famagusta's fortress meant that construction work never once stopped during the sixteenth century, such was the ageing state of the Frankish and Genoese walls, with their twelve old-style round towers and two gates (the Limassol Gate and the Sea Gate, cf. fig. 38).⁷ It was the captain's job to supply the workforce required yearly to clean the moats, repair breaches and adjust the parapets. The labourers were nearly always peasants, but at the beginning of the sixteenth century their mode of payment changed: at first paid by the day, following the system used with the galley chiuirms ordinarily called on to provide the workforce, in September 1506 the Council of Ten imposed upon all the *francomati* peasants of the Messarea and Carpasso *contrade* ten days of forced labour per year; men from eighteen to sixty years of age were obliged to serve, but anyone already working for the collective good in other areas (supplying biscuits, wood or coal) was exempt; the possibility of paying a fee instead of working was, however, stipulated, the price being five bezants per individual faction. This requisition saw some 10,000 men work for ten days a year on the Famagusta enceinte, and though it was at first an exceptional measure, it was progressively extended to include all of the island's *francomati* peasants, and became a regular occurrence, such was the frequency with which the fortress needed working on. Naturally, the requisition was seen by the peasants as an excessive duty, especially when it coincided with work in the fields. Even though the duration of the service was reduced to six days per year in 1528 (with the price of paying off the requisition reduced to three bezants), the *francomati* were forced to work on Famagusta's enceinte right up until 1560.⁸ The upkeep of the Cerines

6 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, ff. 29^r–31^v, 117^r, 143^v; the captain of Famagusta's functions are explained in more detail by L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Paris 1852–1861, vol. 3, pp. 454–472 (*commissione* of the first captain, Baldassare Trevisan), 849–851; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 732–733; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 247–258; id., 'L'eredità genovese a Cipro, 1464–1571', in L. Balletto (ed.), *Oriente e Occidente fra medioevo ed età moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pitarino*, Genoa 1997, vol. 1, pp. 25–29 [reprint in B. Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th Centuries*, Aldershot 2000, study no. XIII]; A. Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας από το Αρχείο της Βενετίας*, Nicosia 1990, vol. 1, pp. 42–43; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 78–81. For a recent and superficial overview of Famagusta's walls during the Venetian period, see G. Perbellini, 'The military architecture of Venetian Famagusta', in M. J. K. Walsh / P. W. Edbury / N. S. H. Coureas (eds), *Medieval and Renaissance Famagusta*, Farnham 2012, pp. 187–196. 7 Concerning Famagusta's Frankish enceinte, see in particular G. Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, Nicosia 1918, reprint 1983, pp. 105–115; N. Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', in J.-B. de Vaire / Ph. Plagnieux (eds), *L'art gothique en Chypre*, Paris 2006, pp. 351–366; Petre, *Crusader Castles of Cyprus*, pp. 151–192; under Venetian administration: Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 1, pp. 52–55; N. Patapiou, 'Οι οχυρώσεις της Αμμοχώστου επί Βενετοκρατίας (ΙΣΤ' αι.)', *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 25 (1999), pp. 79–130. 8 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from *Luocotenente* Marc'Antonio Trevisan dated 15 July 1543, s.f.; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, ff. 29^r–31^v, 143^v; Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, R. Fulin / F. Stefani / N. Barozzi / G. Berchet / M. Allegri (eds), Venice 1879–1903, vol. 22, col. 21, vol. 51, col. 442–443; more detail on the requisitions imposed on the *francomati* can be found in Patapiou, 'Οι οχυρώσεις της Αμμοχώστου', pp. 86–98.

castle was similarly administered, but this work was of more modest proportions than the Famagusta fortress.

As far as one can tell from reading dispatches sent by Venetian officers, the upkeep of Famagusta's fortress did not stimulate architectural innovation anywhere on the enceinte except for one specific point: the Limassol Gate, where the Ravelin, a demi-lune positioned in front of the gate, was built, intended to defend the south-eastern corner of the fortress and to protect the only terrestrial point of access to the city (figs 29, 30). Although a "Marco Paulo inzegner" proposed a project to build the Ravelin in 1510, it is not known who drew up the definitive plan, who led the successive stages of construction, or what was the possible influence of Captain Vincenzo Capello in 1512–1514; all that can be said about the Ravelin is that construction began in 1508 at an estimated cost of 12,000 ducats and that it was considered finished in 1529, even though some minor jobs were completed in 1544, according to a commemorative inscription.⁹

The building of the Ravelin and of two or three round towers, as bold as it may have been, is not sufficient proof for it to be said that Venice renovated the Cypriot defence system on the same scale as it did with systems situated in the *Terraferma* during the same period, according to Ennio Concina's analysis; following Venice's defeats first at the hands of the Ottomans, from 1499 to 1503, then at Agnadello in 1508, the *Signoria* modernized city fortresses with extensive construction projects aimed at regularizing enceintes and revising their outlines. Attention was focused on the main centres of the *Terraferma* (Padua, Treviso, Verona), where the first large-scale projects were launched, but the *Stato da Mar* was not completely omitted in this programme of defensive structure reinforcement, as modernization work began to be envisaged for Corfu in 1506, and Candia in 1518. Nevertheless, whilst projects to renovate fortresses and unify urban defence systems gathered speed when Andrea Gritti became doge in 1523, and when, the following year, the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, was promoted to the head of Venice's armies, no major construction work was carried out on Famagusta's enceinte; up until the 1540s Cyprus was not a part of the progress being made on several *Stato da Mar* fortifications.¹⁰

Work in Cyprus, therefore, remained small-scale and was mainly limited to the upkeep of the old Frankish walls. Evidence shows that in 1518, for instance, the Council of Ten advised *Luocotenente* Alvise d'Armer to have the Famagusta and Cerines walls lowered, and even to envisage fortifying the Saint Catherine rock, at the entrance to the harbour.¹¹ The bulk of the restoration work in Famagusta was still, however, financed locally, commensurate

⁹ Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 10, col. 107–110, vol. 27, col. 43; C. Enlart, *L'art gothique et la Renaissance en Chypre*, Paris 1899, vol. 2, p. 620; Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, pp. 106–108; Th. Mogabgab, 'Repair of ancient monuments', *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus* (1937–1939), pp. 174, 181–185, plates 1–7; Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', pp. 326–330; A. Olivieri, 'Cappello, Vincenzo', *DBI*, vol. 18, pp. 827–830. ¹⁰ Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 30–38; E. Concina / E. Molteni, "La fabbrica della fortezza". *L'architettura militare di Venezia*, Verona 2001, pp. 94–103, 108–123; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 92. ¹¹ Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 3, pp. 42–43 no. 9.

with the sums apportioned from the Cyprus *camera*'s budget; each month, between 300 and 800 ducats were accorded to Famagusta's fortress, and 50 to 200 ducats to the Cerines castle.¹² In 1529, *Luocotenente* Silvestre Minio remarked that 178,092 ducats had been spent on Famagusta between 1491 and 1528, and 33,868 ducats just on the Cerines castle, between 1504 and 1528.¹³ The sums invested, which were the equivalent of two years' revenue for the Cypriot *camera*, show how hard the *Regno* tried to ensure that the two fortifications maintain their original strategic function, in the absence of Venetian projects to give the island anything similar to the structures boasted by the main fortresses of the Adriatic region.

Throughout this period the engineers working on Famagusta's enceinte seem to have been Italians chosen in Venice and sent to the island, such as the "maestro Thomasso da Bressa inzegnier", whose opinion was sought following the caving in of a vault in Famagusta's castle; in March 1530, the inspection of the Cerines fortification was entrusted to the "magnifico Zuane proto et [...] molti altri protti et pratici stipendiati de Vostra Sublimità". No Italian architects seem to have travelled to Cyprus before the late 1540s, though Michele Sanmicheli did oversee work in Zara and take part in projects in Crete; in Cyprus, work appears to have most often been led by local master builders.¹⁴

The case of the Ravelin in Famagusta is an illustration of how Venice did not remain bound to a principle of blind continuity in defensive matters, and other initiatives were taken in two minor areas. In 1487 Venice introduced to the island a cavalry of *stradioti*; made up of around 300 men (Dalmatians, Albanians and Greeks), split into eighteen companies spread along the coasts, the mission of this auxiliary cavalry was to protect the coastal villages from corsair, Muslim or Christian incursions.¹⁵ This back-up corps, having proven itself for many years in Dalmatia, Albania and Greece, was esteemed for its mobility and its rapid intervention; these qualities justified establishing the corps in Cyprus, where, regardless of fluctuating troop numbers and a tendency for its soldiers to behave like veritable peasants, it played a constant role in the defence of the island, despite its limited numbers, progressively increased

12 ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 288, c. 281; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, f. 79^r; Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 3, col. 1120–1121, vol. 22, col. 41, vol. 26, col. 343, vol. 27, col. 666, vol. 49, col. 300; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 3, pp. 245–246 no. 123. 13 Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 51, col. 446; Captain Francesco Bragadino gives the same amount for military expenditure in Famagusta between 1490 and 1530 (190,000 ducats): ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 61, reg. 1, report from Francesco Bragadino, f. 123^r.

14 Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 1, pp. 380–381 no. 119, vol. 4, pp. 38–41 no. 4; J. Dimacopoulos, 'Sanmicheli nei territori veneziani del Mediterraneo orientale', in L. Puppi (ed.), *Michele Sanmicheli architetto. Opera completa*, Rome 1986, pp. 210–221; K. Prijatelj, 'Sanmicheli e la Dalmazia', in H. Burns / C. Luitpold Frommel / L. Puppi (eds), *Michele Sanmicheli. Architettura, linguaggio e cultura artistica nel Cinquecento*, Milan / Vicenza 1995, pp. 222–227. Gabriele Tadini da Martinengo was ordered to go to Cyprus in 1520: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 10, col. 107–110; but it is not certain that he actually went there, as Patapiou notes, 'Οι οχυρώσεις της Αμμοχώστου', pp. 94–95. 15 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, f. 65^{r-v}; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 773–775; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 478–479; N. Patapiou, 'Η κάθοδος των Ελληνοαλβανών stradioti στην Κύπρο (ΙΣΤ' αι.)', *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 24 (1998), pp. 168–175; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, p. 62.

to 400 men.¹⁶ To the series of innovations brought by Venice can also be added the arming of two galleys in the Famagusta harbour by Cypriot *sopracomiti*, in accordance with the request made by an embassy from the noble council (*università*) of Nicosia in August 1521; this measure, which involved the aristocracy in the financing of military spending, illustrates the growing interest elites were taking in the island's defences, and their desire to be consulted on the latter's organization.¹⁷

In the history of Venetian military institutions, the creation of the *provveditori alle fortezze*, in September 1542, was a direct consequence of Venice's defeat at the hands of the Ottomans, who took several fortresses (Nafplio, Monemvasia) after three years of combat (1537–1540), during which Cyprus was never seriously threatened.¹⁸ The realization of the specific needs of a fortress sparked a reorganization of political and technical duties within official circles, and in the same stroke revived deliberations concerning the overall design of the Venetian State's defensive system.¹⁹ In Cyprus this new impetus bore fruit, as, in late 1543, the captain of Famagusta, Nicolò Giustinian, resurrected the idea of a network of fortifications spread around the island, instead of concentrating resources solely on Famagusta's fortress; Giustinian notably proposed to restore the castles of Saint Hilarion, Buffavento, Cantara and Limassol.²⁰ Due doubtless to the enormous financial investment that such an ambitious project would demand, these strategic proposals never materialized, especially given that the *Signoria* continued to prioritize the *Terraferma* defensive system over that of the *Stato da Mar*. Despite everything, the theory of defending the island in a polycentric fashion took shape and gained increasing weight in the minds of the *Signoria*'s senators and military leaders from 1544 onwards. It might certainly be pointed out that the progress made was slow, compared to the work done in Corfu, Candia and especially Zara, where Michele Sanmicheli united military requirements with the ornamental functions of public monuments (figs 53–54).²¹ Nevertheless, though Cyprus was not a priority in Venice's overseas defensive system, the island was not left to its fate due to its peripheral location; in

16 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, f. 66^r; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 2, pp. 324–325 no. 167, vol. 3, pp. 90 no. 35; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 309–311. 17 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, f. 162^r. 18 The circumstances surrounding the creation of the *provveditori alle fortezze* are detailed by J. R. Hale, 'The first fifty years of a Venetian magistracy: the *Provveditori alle fortezze*', in id., *Renaissance War Studies*, London 1983, pp. 159–188 [= *Studi Veneziani* 10 (1968), pp. 160–161]; Concina / Molteni, 'La fabbrica della fortezza', pp. 149–153; concerning the 1537–1540 Ottoman–Venetian War, see Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 291–292; G. Cozzi, 'Venezia nei secoli XVI e XVII. Venezia nello scenario europeo (1517–1699)', in G. Cozzi / M. Knapton / G. Scarabello (eds), *La Repubblica di Venezia nell'età moderna. Dal 1517 alla fine della Repubblica*, Turin 1992, pp. 40–44; G. Gullino, 'Le frontiere navali', in *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, vol. 4: *Il Rinascimento. Politica e cultura*, Rome 1996, pp. 100–105. On the small Ottoman expedition against Salina and Limassol in 1539, see Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, p. 180. 19 E. Concina, 'Il rinnovamento difensivo nei territori della Repubblica di Venezia nella prima metà del Cinquecento: modelli, dibattiti, scelte', in *Architettura militare nell'Europa del XVI secolo*, p. 100. 20 ASV, *Miscellanea Gregolin*, b. 34, s.f. 21 Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1 / 1, p. 114, vol. 1 / 2 pp. 313–316; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 86–288; Prijatelj, 'Sanmicheli e la Dalmazia', pp. 222–227.

sending Giangirolamo Sanmicheli, in 1548, Venice showed its eagerness to push forward in the modernization of the island's defences, following a logic of gradual and measured progress, determined by local investment.²²

In the 1550s, however, the island's defensive system showed clear signs of fossilization, which did not go unnoticed by Venice's officers; this was the reason behind the radical changes of the end of that decade. Already in 1542 the syndic Cosmo da Mosto inspected the island's feeble armed forces, which were founded upon corps of 505 *stradioti* and 240 turcoples, not at all enough to protect an extended coastline.²³ In 1553, the *stradioti* cavalry was described as ineffective, as the cavaliers, partly remunerated with land concessions, were behaving more like demobilized peasants than dashing auxiliaries, causing the captain of Famagusta, Francesco Grimani, to doubt their military aptitude.²⁴ There were actually multiple organizational problems within the *stradioti* corps; in addition to the economic hardship of cavaliers who were granted no exemptions, the price of a horse was 40 to 50 ducats, forcing the men to relinquish their land; there were also problems with passing on a *stradiote's* duties upon his death, and differences in status within the corps that led to unequal levels of physical preparedness; the disorder was so evident that the captain of Famagusta's authority over the organization of the guards had to be reaffirmed in March 1553.²⁵ A year later the Senate expressed its desire to directly control the enrolment of new *stradioti* into the companies stationed in the Paphos region.²⁶ The desire to strengthen the *stradioti's* effectiveness illustrates the vigilance of the political leaders, which, that same year, was also reflected in the increase of the number of galleys in the Cypriot guard with the arming of two extra ships, joined to the Candia fleet for the winter period.²⁷ In the 1550s an increasing number of hints ensured that the *Signoria* paid more attention to the defence of the Great Island; this was seen, for example, in their enlargement of the Famagusta guard from 400 to 500 soldiers, on 19 January 1557.²⁸

The table detailing the armed forces tasked with protecting Cyprus in 1558, in the form given to us, with some exaggerations, by the young Leonardo Donà, shows that Venice did not fundamentally change its organization of the island's defences in over eighty years;²⁹ the military framework was composed of 400 *stradioti*, 200 turcoples, 60 paid cavaliers (*pro-*

22 Information concerning Giangirolamo Sanmicheli's first mission is imprecise and difficult to distinguish from details of his second mission; cf. infra, doc. 16 n. 26; on his way back, he wrote a report in Candia, dated 29 December 1548: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84. For earlier opinions on the defence: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 61, reg. II, ff. 42^r–44^v (report from *Luocotenente* Aloysius de Ripa, dated 15 December 1545). 23 F. Cavazzana Romanelli/G. Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542. The Great Map of Leonida Attar*, Nicosia 2006, p. 118. 24 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 62, reg. 1, f. 16^r; this opinion was voiced on other occasions up until 1558: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3558/11*, ff. 2^v–3^r. 25 ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 32, ff. 91^v–95^r [*Capitula stratia Cyprij*, dated 3 March 1553]; on 5 December 1556 the *stratia* governor, Dimitri Lascari, observed further anomalies in incomes paid in kind contained in the *stradioti's* salaries, which concerned 400 cavaliers divided into eleven companies, all led by Levantine chiefs: ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 16. Until August 1564, Lascari was governor of the *stratia* in Cephalonia: K. G. Tsiknakis, *Oi εκθέσεις των βενετών προνοητών της Κεφαλονιάς (16ος αιώνας)*, Athens 2008, pp. 30, 38.

26 ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 11 (16 April 1554). 27 Ibid, filza 11, 15. 28 Ibid, filza 16. 29 As confirmed by a Senate decision dated 6 March 1558: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 22^r–23^r.

visionati), 500 soldiers in Famagusta and 50 in Cerines, plus a feudal cavalry containing around 100 men and 200 horses; on top of that, four galleys and two brigantines patrolled the surrounding seas, defending the harbours and the coastline. As modest as these human and material resources might have been for an island measuring 9,251 sq. km, the salaries of these various corps along with the cost of the construction work in Famagusta and Cerines absorbed around 100,000 ducats per year, two thirds of the island's annual revenues.³⁰ The financial black hole represented by this military spending was all the more intolerable for the public finances when considering the state of the troops in question, who for most observers were not as prepared as they should have been. This quite unsatisfactory situation would lead to a revised organization of the local forces and a more profound transformation of Venetian strategy in the face of an increasingly pressing Ottoman threat.

Though the innovations seen in Cyprus from 1557/1558 onwards can in no way be attributed to any single person, it should be underlined that they coincided with the promotion to the head of Venice's armies of a *condottiere* who boasted many years of experience fighting the Ottomans: Sforza Pallavicino.³¹ In choosing this hardened officer renowned for his expertise in the art of fortification, the *Signoria* displayed her desire to respond to the expansion of Suleiman the Magnificent's empire, and it is most likely that there was a convergence in the analyses and proposals of both political and military leaders in this transitional period. Regarding the defence of Cyprus, decisions came swiftly: on 27 April 1557 the Senate ruled that a new bastion would be built in Famagusta, to be financed by the Cypriot *camera*, ordered to apportion 300 ducats per month to construction work and 200 ducats just to digging the moats; the San Marco bastion, at the north-west corner of the town's enceinte, would take an estimated four years to build, and the work, most probably planned by Giangirolamo Sanmicheli, was to be supervised by Count Ercole Martinengo, who would direct one of the most successful projects of Renaissance bastion architecture.³²

It was during this lively period that Giulio Savorgnan was first consulted on the military affairs of Cyprus, in 1557, when his opinion was sought on Famagusta's enceinte and harbour. At that time, Giulio's knowledge of the island's defensive system was limited to

³⁰ CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 45, f. 173^r; id., *cod. Cicogna* 3558/11, ff. 2^v-3^r; the figures presented by Leonardo Donà must, however, be compared to those given by Antonio Zane the following year, cf. *infra*, p. 113-114, and to the fiscal documents for the year 1559, which give minor amounts of money for military purposes: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80* (5767), ff. 182^v-186^r. ³¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 56. ³² ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 62, reg. 1, report from Pietro Navagier, ff. 94^v-95^r; id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Domenico Trevisan, f. 4^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 33, f. 118^{r-v}; Giorgio Vasari, *Le vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori*, Florence: appresso i Giunti, 1568, vol. 3, libro 5, p. 373; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 858-860; F. Cavazzana Romanelli / G. Grivaud, "Il zardin della regina". Ricordi cinquecenteschi di Caterina Cornaro nella toponimistica di Nicosia', K. Tsiknakis / G. Varzelioti (eds), *Miscellanea Chrysa Maltezou*, Athens/Venice 2013, pp. 231-232; G. Grivaud, 'The drawings, plans and models of Venetian military engineers on Cyprus', in G. Grivaud / G. Tolia (eds), *Cyprus at the Crossroads: Geographical Perceptions and Representations from the Fifteenth Century*, Athens 2014, p. 121. Ercole Martinengo was already in Cyprus in June 1566: ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 15; the plans to strengthen Famagusta's enceinte and the Cerines castle were restated on 25 July 1558: id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 60^v-61^v.

what he had learnt from accounts given by Venetian officers to the Senate upon returning from spells in Cyprus; he had doubtless also gleaned information from word of mouth amongst soldiers and officers met in garrisons on the mainland and overseas. His opinion was that of an expert who had served in the *Terraferma*, in Zara, Dalmatia and Corfu; prior to 1557 Giulio had already submitted several reports on the work to be done on the enceintes in Zara, Padua, Peschiera and Udine, and in 1557 his opinion on several fortifications (Udine, the Verona *chiusa*, Marano, Peschiera) was sought once again.³³

In his first report on Famagusta's fortress (doc. 1), Giulio puts forward several ideas aimed at modernizing the enceinte by flanking the proposed bastions with orillons; he declares himself in favour of limiting the number of defensive structures, so as not to give enemy cannons easy targets, and he also recommends using the earth dug up from the moats to build cavaliers. Finally, he advocates enlarging the harbour, based on soundings performed in the sea allowing the perimeter to be established. Giulio displays great prudence in his report, proposing architectural measures suited to combating a powerful army equipped with artillery; he was evidently unaware of the nature of the terrain, and limited himself to recommendations aimed at transferring fortification methods used in the *Terraferma* to overseas territories. That same year, other opinions were sought on Famagusta's enceinte, an indisputable sign of Venice's renewed interest in the fortress, given that, at the same time, the decision was taken to build the San Marco bastion.³⁴

Undoubtedly, the decisions taken to strengthen the island's defences came in the face of the Ottoman threat, and, following a scenario that was almost identical from one year to the next, the *Signoria* reacted to the news of the Ottoman armada leaving the Golden Horn at the end of each winter by adopting urgent measures for Cyprus. In 1557/1558 there were multiple initiatives in anticipation of potential damage from the enemy fleet;³⁵ several officers took part in work on the ground, including Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier, aforementioned, and Agostino Clusone, appointed infantry governor of Cyprus in February 1558. As soon as he got to Famagusta, on 13 March, Clusone initiated emergency work to enlarge the moat opposite the Carmelite tower, then proposed a series of measures for the Cerines castle.³⁶ In Venice, concern for Cyprus saw a similar mobilization of political and military power, the Senate holding deliberations over the state of the island's fortifications on 4 June. Revisiting proposals made in 1543, the senators restated the need to consolidate the Famagusta fortress and the Cerines castle, and returned to the notion of a polycentric defence system spread across the whole island; they reiterated the idea of reviving the three old castles in the Keryneia Mountains (Saint Hilarion, Buffavento and Cantara), and proposed the

33 Cf. supra, p. 56. 34 CMC, *cod. P. D. 398/27*, an account from Captain Peditus, dated 3 November 1557, and *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, ff. 7^r-13^r, from an anonymous author; see also Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 100. 35 Cf. the precautionary measures taken by the Senate on 6 March 1558, calling for 500 soldiers to be sent to the island, for Famagusta's provisions to be enhanced, and for possible spies to be rooted out: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni (Secreta)*, reg. 71, ff. 22^r-23^r, 24^v; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 100. 36 Details of Clusone's work in Cyprus in spring 1558 can be found in BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 49^v-50^r, 228^v-244^r; concerning Venier, see infra, pp. 102-103.

construction of three new fortifications along the coastline, in order to repel an Ottoman landing, to which end they suggested carrying out soundings at sites near Paphos, Cerines and Cape Gata (Saint Nicholas of the Cats), the Akrotiri peninsula.³⁷

Along with this reflection on the Cypriot defensive system as a whole came a series of concrete measures aimed at repelling an Ottoman attack, and the Senate made a succession of fundamental decisions in the spring and summer of 1558 to increase troop numbers in the island's various corps. On 29 May the *stradioti* cavalry were given an extra 200 horses, and on 16 July an entire programme of reorganization of the *stratia* was envisaged, aiming to leave the island's rapid reaction forces with 1,000 horses. The Senate finally decided to create a corps of 3,000 arquebusiers, recruited from amongst the *francomati* peasants and split into five companies, to be stationed in Cerines, Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol and Paphos.³⁸

This last measure indisputably signalled a new departure in the history of the island's defences, as backup forces could now be recruited from amongst the peasantry. Conscription not being possible without a precise census of the peasant population, Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier ordered that the census be taken on 11 July 1558, although logistical problems made it a tough task to carry out; despite these difficulties, Venier set in motion the process of bringing groups of peasants into the island's defence forces, organizing three companies, each containing 600 men. Arming the peasantry was obviously the source of much discussion amongst Venetian officers, who were doubtful of the peasants' loyalty to San Marco; despite this reticence, however, thought was given to the idea of introducing peasant militia (*cernide*) to Cyprus, as was the custom in the *Terraferma*.³⁹

The impetus created in spring 1558 continued uninterrupted until 1570, and the material expression of the final twelve years of Venetian domination in Cyprus came in the form of key construction projects completed in Famagusta, Cerines and Nicosia. As Antonio Manno has noted, in the global, general view of the island's defences that the political authorities regularly strived to maintain, the opinion of soldiers was favoured over that of military engineers.⁴⁰ Giulio Savorgnan thus found his opinion sought after, and he delivered two reports in the space of three weeks; the first, dated 20 May 1558, was a response to the problems regarding the *stradioti* cavalry reported in 1553, proposing that the corps be reorganized in small companies, and insisting that the cavaliers be trained and that they receive good-quality weapons and material conditions (doc. 2). The other report, dated 13 June, contains a series of proposals presented to the *Collegio*, and Giulio takes an overall view of the problems of defending the island (doc. 3); the coherence of his analysis is clear as, despite his unfamiliarity with the terrain, Savorgnan observes that the coastline is too easily reached from the sea to be successfully defended, and that an Ottoman landing would be unpreventable. Since concentrating military resources in Famagusta is not enough to protect

37 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 60^v–62^r, and the analysis given by Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 101–102. 38 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 29^{r-v}, 55^r–56^r; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, p. 321. 39 ASV, *Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti ad alcun archivio*, b. 6; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 143^v. 40 Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 101–102.

the Cypriot population, Giulio advocates building small earthen forts across the island, in which the peasantry could take refuge with their supplies, burning any crops remaining in the fields; this would delay the enemy's advance, and give Venice the time to send a rescue fleet. Savorgnan's opinion thus differs from traditional strategic thinking, envisaging a network of entrenchments to shelter the island's population, with the aim of avoiding a large-scale deportation of Cypriot peasants like the one carried out when the Ottomans invaded Corfu in 1537.⁴¹

In the days and weeks following the 13 June report, Giulio Savorgnan was invited to exchange opinions on the defence of Cyprus with three other Venetian military leaders, in accordance with the *Signoria's* custom of weighing up the opinions of several *capi di guerra* before taking a decision;⁴² Giulio met with Sforza Pallavicino, Girolamo Martinengo and Astore Baglioni, and the four men shared their ideas without any knowledge of the Cypriot terrain (doc. 4). Again, the defence of the island was viewed theoretically, and Giulio's opinion was accepted; the distance of Cyprus from Venice and the length of its coastline were insurmountable obstacles, and the island's defences thus had to be founded upon the construction of several fortresses, to give shelter to the Cypriot population and to support the island pending aid sent from Venice. Several sites were to be considered: Cape Gata (Saint Nicholas of the Cats), Cerines, and Paphos. The idea of fortifying Nicosia was ruled out, except by Girolamo Martinengo, who stressed the danger of allowing the enemy to take the *Regno* capital; building a medium-sized castle would give a guarantee of security to Nicosia's aristocracy and civilian population, whose loyalty to Venice deserved to be recognized. Other measures concerning the introduction of mounted arquebusiers were proposed, and the four men insisted on the urgency of rapidly recruiting labourers to ensure that the fortifications were operational by spring 1559.

The meeting between the four military leaders unquestionably illustrated Venice's desire to establish a coherent overall view of the island's defensive system, and the men's opinions were detailed, along with the measures the Senate decreed on 2 June, in the letter that the doge, Lorenzo Priuli, sent to the officers stationed in Cyprus on 30 July 1558.⁴³ However, as knowledgeable as they might have been, the *capi di guerra* were dependent on the opinions of officers living on the island, the only people who could provide the technical information required to make definitive decisions. Giangirolamo Sanmicheli was thus sent on his second Cyprus mission in August 1558 in order to produce maps and scale models of sites that had been or could be fortified; but the engineer died in Famagusta on 23 January 1559, leaving only sparse traces of his activities on the island.⁴⁴ Sanmicheli was not the only man who did this

41 Cf. *infra*, doc. 78. 42 Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 98–99 and *passim*; Concina / Molteni, «*La fabbrica della fortezza*», p. 90. 43 BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 252^r–254^r. 44 Four maps of Cerines bearing Giangirolamo Sanmicheli's signature, but no date, were deposited in the archives of the *provveditori alle fortezze* office in 1759; they seem to concern the 1558 campaign rather than the campaign of 1548: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, pp. 202–203; Grivaud, 'The drawings, maps and models of the Venetian engineers in Cyprus', p. 121. Sanmicheli built two models, one of Cerines and one of Paphos, and wrote a report on the Akrotiri peninsula, wherein he claims to respond to the observations of the four military leaders: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 246^r; ASV,

kind of work for the *Signoria*, as around a dozen reports on the various existing or potential fortification sites were drawn up between 1558 and 1559, evidence of the profound change in Venice's strategic policies regarding Cyprus. In this concurrence of opinions and ideas, Giulio Savorgnan was one of the men behind the reflection that brought the renovation of the island's defensive system, and nothing indicated that the Friulian military chief would have anything more to do with the project, especially when comparing him to Colonel Agostino Clusone, whose opinions were founded upon concrete knowledge of the Cypriot terrain.⁴⁵

The documents collected in this volume, whether Giulio Savorgnan's correspondence or texts that shed light upon his relations with Cyprus, do not present any particular literary interest, even though the style employed in the *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4* letters reflects the states of mind of the Friulian nobleman. Generally, the language used is hackneyed and no different from that displayed by Venetian officers in their administrative relations on the mainland. Consequently, the criteria of a philological publication have not been observed, especially where two or more transcripts were available. The texts reproduced in the book are faithful to those documents that may be accepted as closest to the originals: the *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4* versions have thus been favoured over those from the *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, which in turn have been preferred to other versions transcribed by secretaries from administrative offices. Changes made in the transcription process were limited to a few specific cases: though the spelling and grammar of the original documents has been scrupulously maintained, notably in the case of proper nouns, abbreviations have been reworked and upper case letters added to salutations. Punctuation and accents, however, have been adapted to the standards of a modern reader. In the rare cases of ambiguous readings, a transcription in brackets, with or without a question mark, is given.

Addresses from the *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4* letters, generally written on the verso of the document in question, have been given in italics, as have the addresses of the *Materie Miste Notabili 11* letters, which are generally written at the bottom of each document. Closing brackets () indicate titles or outer margin notes.

The vocabulary employed is rarely ambiguous, not diverging from the usual language of sixteenth-century Venetian and Italian administration, as codified in the *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana* (G. Bàrberi Squarotti [ed.], Turin 1961–2002, 21 vols. and 2 supplements). Terms from the Venetian dialect have been changed, in accordance with G. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, Venice 1856 (reprint Florence 1983). Definitions of technical architectural terms come from E. Concina, *Pietre, parole, storia. Glossario della costruzione nelle fonti veneziane (secoli XV–XVIII)*, Venice 1988.

Materie Miste Notabili 1 (notice bearing neither date nor page number); concerning Giangirolamo Sanmicheli, see also supra, n. 32, and infra, doc. 16 n. 26. Giangirolamo Sanmicheli was in Corfu until 1557, when the Senate sent to Cyprus the model he had built for the fortification of Famagusta; cf. the *ducale* dated 24 February. He went to Famagusta with his *cognato*, Alvise Brugnoli; he fell ill and died after six days of fever, at the age of 45, and was buried at San Domenico. ⁴⁵ Cf. infra, p. 115.

1 *G.S.'s opinions regarding Famagusta's fortifications, [Venice?], 1557*ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 15^v–16^v

G.S. declares himself in favour of building orillons at each bastion, except near the seaward wall, and of digging out a moat at least 15 passa [26 m] wide, cunette included. He wishes to avoid building anything above the cordon, as this would present an easy target to enemy cannons, which would thus be able to bombard such constructions and fill the moats with rubble, enabling an assault. To protect the piazze at each bastion, G.S. opts for building walls a little way back from the moat so that they do not fall in. Choosing earthen walls will cut out masonry costs for the parapets, usually one third of the total outlay of a fortress; the money saved may then be reinvested in the moat or the bastions. He suggests that the earth excavated from the moats be used to build cavaliers for increased protection. The orillons are essential, as they will protect soldiers without exposing them to enemy fire, enabling the sorties necessary to controlling the moats. If Famagusta's harbour is to hold 40 galleys, a 100 x 60-passa [173 x 104 m] basin must be installed, and soundings must be performed to establish whether the bottom is of rock or earth; if excavation is not possible, G.S. proposes the next-best solution of building a 20-galley harbour and a mole to protect the rest of the galleys stationed at sea.

FAMAGOSTA

] 1557 Famagosta.

] Consulti di fortificatione.

Di Famagosta dissi che la mia opinione era che si facessero li orecchioni in ogni modo a tutti quelli beluardi che si hanno da fare, ecetto in caso dalla parte da mar, et che quella che veniva nominata piatta forma di mezzo, in quella gran cortina, sia fatta con due cannonere¹ per banda con li suoi orecchioni,² et con la fossa almanco larga quindese passa, et quanto più profonda tanto meglio, et quella fossetta chiamata la cunetta³ in mezo alla fossa sta eccellentissimamente bene per causa delle mine; non me curarei che tutte queste fabbriche nove havessero sopra li cordoni⁴ molta robba né di muro né di terra, che siano dritte, perché per la verità fano all'artiglieria nemica troppo bella vista et pala o bersaglio di sé, di modo che con il batter che si usa al presente, con gran quantità de pezzi d'artiglieria et sforzati, si fa cader a terra ogni gran machina, la ruina della quale cade nella fossa, et se appoggia a quella muraglia non batutta, et fa schala a quella che è in piedi, et poi si monta facilmente su la batteria è

1 The *cannonere* was an embrasure, an opening set into the walls of a fortification, often into the parapet, enabling volleys from the artillery. 2 A term used in Renaissance military architecture to refer to the rounded projection formed at the side of a bastion; in Nicosia, there were two orillons at each bastion for increased protection. 3 A term used in fortress building to refer to a small moat dug at the centre of a larger and wider fortress moat, the purpose of which was to prevent the enemy from passing through. 4 In Renaissance military architecture this decorative detail consisted of an outer band of rounded stone running horizontally along the curtains on the upper section of the wall.

questa, è pur cosa chiara da antever, però vorrei non lassar metter robba, né materia molta sopra il cordone, e per coprirme le piazze delli beluardi et le cortine, vorrei o con muri o con terra cominciar sul orlo della muraglia et ritirarmi in dentro, alciantome con una scarpa grandissima, quasi come stano li coppi su li coperti delle case, et in questo modo, quello che non vederano dal cordon in giù non potranno batter, non la battendo mancho la potranno montar, et per conto delle scalle si fano poche facende, essendo li altri fianchi in esser, niuno ardirà servirse di schalle.

Quello che sarà veduto sopra il cordone, stando come ho detto così piano et ritirato in scarpa, se bene sarà batuto, non potrà cadere né mandar materia nella fossa a far scala, e per mia opinione, la vorrei di terra schitta più presto che de muro, li lassandoli nascer l'herba che saria proprio un recetaculo da balle nemiche, oltra che se venirà a sparagnar più del terzo della spesa che si fa in tutte le fortezze di Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime, perché non si sparagna solamente la spesa de quelle estreme muraglie grosse et alte, che vano sopra li cordoni, che è il terzo della spesa del tutto, quale si sogliono far massice, nelle qual li va tanta quantità di prede et calcine che è cosa incredibile, et costa tanto oro a Vostra Serenità, et per far che per far scalla solamente alli nemici, con darli in che batter, che facendosi al modo che io dico, stando di fora non haverano che batter, l'altro sparagno, e che tutta la muraglia dal cordon in giù non accade esser tanto grossa, non havendo da soportar quel peso tanto grave de quelli parapetti così grossi, e però per non giettar via tanto denaro, et reuscendo più forte, recorderia reverentemente che si dovesse tenir tal ordine, et la mittà de questo avanzo metterlo in più profondità della fossa et far quelli beloardi, come sul disegno è stato visto, ma prima rissolver dove hano da andar il resto / [16'] delli altri beloardi, acciò che tutte le difese rieschino in consonantia corespondente l'una all'altra molto più voluntieri, vorrei vedere a portar tutta la robba che si caverà nello slargar della fossa et nel profundarla dentro della terra per mezzo le gole⁵ delli beluardi tanto in dentro che non siano impediti, et li far nasser quelli monticelli per servirsene poi per cavalleri,⁶ dalli quali si può sempre cavar grandissimo utile per quelli di dentro, per batter et ingrosar la campagna con l'artegliaria, et far che li nemici perdino gran tempo, et non butarei di fuora via sopra la contrascarpa, se non pochissimo terreno, overo di quella roccha che si cava in detta fossa, essendo che ogni contrascarpa di terreno alta. Io ho per opinione che la sia più utile al nemico che di profitto alcuno alla fortezza, non dico però che non se li debba dar un pocca di gratia, ma piccola più presto per equalizar che il tutto sia a un par di fuora via che per altro.

L'altro giorno parlando avanti Vostra Serenità m'affatai di approvar che li orecchioni erano necessarij alli beluardi, ne mi sorvene all'hora una raggion potentissima che quando non vi fusse altra raggione, questa dovrebbe bastar che niuno altro loco delle muraglie si

5 In military architecture, the gorge was the lateral side of the bastion, at a tangent to the fortress wall; it was via the gorge that the bastion *piazza* was reached. 6 In the terminology of military architecture, a cavalier was a mass of raised earth. Its main function in the defensive system was to enable the setting up of cannon batteries; this gave the defending side increased domination over their enemy, and the artillerymen were sheltered by the front wall (see figs 63 and 68a).

pono cavar sortite sicure se non appresso li orecchioni, perché detti orecchioni assicurano le fantarie che ritornano da far qualche fatione, et non sono offesi da nemici che dietro detti orecchioni si danno adito l'un l'altro di poter entrar nelle sortite, quale sortite sono necessarissime in una fortezza, per uscir di notte et di giorno a disturbar il nemico dalle sue fationi, inchiodar artiglieria, tagliar le traverse che si fano nelle fosse, massime quando non si pono batter con l'artiglierie et far simili effetti, et le sortite sono proprie per tenir di continuo il nemico travagliato, però è necessario farle sicure, né altro loco è più sicuro che nel orecchion, sì che concludendo dico che per questa causa sola, quando non vene fusse dalle altre, portarrebbe la spesa di far li orecchioni, oltra che l'orechion copre le due cannonere vicine alla fronte del beluardo, così quella di basso, come quella di sopra et copre la mittà delle piazze da basso et di sopra.

Quanto al far del porto de Famagosta, caso chiaro è che a capir o ricever in se quaranta galee con li remi tesudi,⁷ non vorebbe esser manco longo di cento passa et largo sesanta, di questo bisogna riportarsi a chi sarà sul fatto di veder et cavar delli busi, come pozzi in diversi lochi dentro della terra per vedere sel fondi sarà de terreno o di sasso, e secondo quello si troverà governarsi, et se accadesse che tal grandezza di porto non si potesse far tutto dentro della terra, né facendolo tutto fora si potesse coprir dall'artiglieria delli nemici, si potrebbe pigliar una strada di mezo, come sarebbe a dire farlo mezzo dentro la terra per vinti galee, et mezzo di fora per altri vinti, quelle di dentro senza altro sarebbeno sicure della artiglieria nemica, et per coprir quelli vinti di / [16^v] fora, non credo che li andasse molta spesa, et farli un molo che le sicurerebbe dall'artiglieria nemica, presuponendo dico che in Famagosta li sia aqua in abbondanza anco per detta armata.



2 G.S.'s proposals for the Cypriot paid cavalry, [Venice?], 20 May 1558

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 18^v–19^r.

G.S. elaborates nine proposals to reform the Cypriot cavalry:

- *The cavalry must be divided into companies of 50 horses, each under the command of a chief who closely supervises training and discipline; Captain Lusi will nevertheless maintain the command of 200 horses, providing he splits them into four companies.*
- *Adequate quarters must be provided for cavaliers reaching Cyprus, so they may recover from the tiring journey; these quarters should be close together to make the captain's job easier.*
- *Means must be provided to ensure a stop at Zakynthos, to prevent horses from dying en route to Cyprus.*
- *Equipment, weapons and alla corvatta lances must be provided, and each company equipped with a saddler, a farrier and a trumpeter.*

⁷ Cf. *tesi*, i.e. 'open'; G.S. is envisaging a harbour with enough space for forty galleys to manoeuvre.

- *To boost the number of mounted arquebusiers, wages must be increased by four ducats per year, allowing the former to cover their costs and gain prestige.*
- *Soldiers exhibiting missing or poorly kept equipment must be fined one ducat.*
- *Care must be taken that the 500 cavaliers sent to Cyprus are amongst the best available, and that captains fix their length of service.*
- *The annual wages of a cavalier must be 30 ducats, as he has to pay for his attire plus the upkeep of his horse, and the price of a replacement horse (60 ducats) must be considered; Venice should also supply 24 stara [2000 l.] of barley each year, to spare soldiers from dealing with seasonal fluctuations in price. Good material conditions should be offered to soldiers destined for Cyprus, as the richer ones among them will not want to leave home for a poorer life abroad.*
- *Adequate supplies must be provided for the transporting of horses to Cyprus.*

CIPRO

] 1558. 20. Mazo.

] Consulto sopra la regulation de' soldatj.

1. Che tutta la cavallaria che ha da esser in Cipro sia divisa in compagnie de 50 cavalli l'una.
2. Dar ordine per li alloggiamenti delli cavalli in Cipro.
3. Dar ordine per il recever questi cavalli¹ al Zante o alla Zafalonia bisognando.
4. Far provigione de molte cose necessarie come lanze.
5. Far provigione de archabusetti da cavallo.
6. Castigar quelli che non portarno le sue arme.
7. Quello che li capitani ponno prometter alli soldati.
8. Circha il dar soventione.
9. Far provigione per il passaggio in Cipro.

Direi tutta la cavallaria che ha da andare in Cipro et quella che vi è al presente, fusse divisa sotto a capi de 50 cavalli per uno, essendo che se sarano de minor numero, non haverano forma della compagnia, et se sarano de maggior numero convengono de necessità alloggiar lontani dal suo capo, quale a un bisogno al sono della trombetta non li può unir presto, che essendo de 50 solamente in ogni villetta, potriano alloggiare col suo capo, qualcosa fa seguire tutti li buoni ordini, che si può desiderare, cioè esercitati de continuo, disiplinarli, non li permetter de far cose triste, che occorendo qualche inconveniente de licentiosi o de disobedienti, li capi non si ponno escusare di non haverlo saputo, et con maggior facilità se li asegniano le farni equale, et quelle compagnie che si hanno a fare da novo, facendosi de questo numero de 50 sarà cosa fatibile, e più perfetta e presta, et che il cavaglier Lusi, alquale sono stati assignati ducento cavalli, medemamente li divida in quatro compagnie pur sotto di sé.²

¹ *in Cipro* crossed out after *cavalli*. ² This is Thomas Lusi, the captain of the *stradioti* in Zara; the Senate ordered him to Cyprus on 29 March 1558 to form a company of 200 horses. His son Dimitri went with him, and his other son Zorzi stayed in Zara to command the company his father had left. Thomas was a member of the Venetian fraternity of Saint George of the Greeks. He died in 1561: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, f. 30^{r-v}; Patapiou, 'H

Che sia dato ordine in Cipro a bon' hora che al gionger delli cavalli in quel Regno trovino li alloggiamenti provisti, cioè il coperto libero, strame, orzi, et altre cose necessarie per il loro vivere per il suo dinaro, acìo possano restaurarse³ li cavalli del patimento havuto per il viaggio, havendo ad arivare sopra l'inverno, distribuendo li alloggiamenti talmente vicini che ogni capo possi havere la sua compagnia di 50 cavalli appresso di sé, per le ragioni sopra dette, perché quanta più cura si haverà di loro, tanta maggior utilità ne cavarà l'Excellentissimo Dominio.

Che parimente sia dato ordine per tempo, che capitando questa cavalleria al Zante, et che habbia bisogno di riposo sia accettata, et dattoli sufragio de dismontar per rihaverli, che la longhezza del viaggio non causi la morte delli cavalli.

Che sia fatta una grossa monitione di lanze alla corvatta con li suoi ferri,⁴ perché l'homo senza lanza è come mezzo homo, di targe alla corvatta, di capelli alla stradiotta, di celate da guerra per quelli che non vorano portar il capello, di spade per quelli di Cipro, di staffe, di morsi con uno maestro al mancho per farne di selle, et saria necessario haver un selaro per cadauna compagnia, perché si come non si può far di mancho di haver un mareschalcho per compagnia, per medicar et ferar li cavalli, così non si può far senza solaro, è necessario che ogni compagnia habbia il suo trombetta, però non li havendo quelli che sono in Cipro, sarà bono farli provigione perché è impossibile che il tante stia senza il tamburo et il caval leggiero senza trombetta. Si ricorda queste cose necessarie non sapendo come se ne trovi in Cipro.

Far una monitione di archobusetti da cavallo per venderli a quelli soldati che li rechiederano, essendo spesa buttati via a farli portar a quelli che non ne hanno delectatione, et perché detto archobusetto darebbe spesa al soldato, sì nel comprarlo come nel cunzarlo, che spesissimo si rompeno nelle saraglie, et li va spesa nel piombo et nella polvere, volendoli tenir esercitati. Però direi che quel soldato che porterà l'archobusetto et al ordine del tutto con la sua cassa de corame cotto per causa della pioggia, merita iustamente esser avvantagiato de un ducato per quartero, cioè 4 ducati all'anno, et tali dinari saranno eccellentissimamente spesi, tenendoli perfettamente esercitati, et doveriano esser in Cipro un par de maiestri per questo effetto solo de raconciarli a tanta cavalleria, perché sì come l'homo senza lanza è tenuto per mezo homo, così l'homo con l' / [19'] archobusetto oltra la lanza è tenuto per doi homini, però l'avantagio delli 4 ducati all'anno causerà che tuti o la maggior parte vorano portar l'archobusetto.

Così come il premiar di più quelli che portarano l'archobusetto causerà quel bon effetto, così quelli che si lassarano manchar o il capello da stradiotto per le cortelate, o la celata da guerra, o targa, o corsaletto overo brochero grande, per defenderse dalle lanzate, o la lanza quando sia fatta provigione che se ne trovi da comprare siano castigati, et dattoli deffetto di un ducato per quartero per cadauna sorte delle sopradette arme che li manchassero, et a

κάθοδος των Ελληνοαλβανών stradioti στην Κύπρο', pp. 179–180. Dimitri Lusi was later captain of *cavalli decimali* in Cephalonia in 1574–1584: Tsiknakis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών προνοητών της Κεφαλονιάς*, pp. 57, 79. ³ et crossed out after *restaurarse*. ⁴ An *alla corvatta* lance is, according to Mario Savorgnan, a particularly long lance: *Arte militare terrestre e maritima*, p. 22.

questo modo con il premiar quelli, et il punir questi, causerà che questa militia passerà con bon ordine.

Havendose da mandar in Cipro 500 cavalli,⁵ è da meterli ogni diligentia che li homini et cavalli siano bonissimi, per la gran spesa et incomodo che andar a condurli all'Illustrissimo Dominio, però bisogna resolver li capitani quello che hanno a fare, et quanto che hanno da prometter alli soldati che faranno per potergliolo osservare. Et prima per quanto tempo il soldato sia obligato a servir in Cipro, eccetto in caso di guerra che non è conveniente a limitar tempo all'hora.

Quanto soldo ha da havere un soldato al anno, havendo in consideratione il vestir suo anchora che sia positivo non può esser mancho di 18 ducati al anno, perché il caval legiero convien vestir de casacha de panno per il mancho, et non di colletto come il fante a piedi, come il gabanichio che è necessarissimo, sì per il star forte a cavallo su le selle turchesche, come per i coprirsene il giorno per la pioggia, e la notte per il dormir, et si usa per coperta al cavallo quando è sudato, un ducato li vole al anno al mancho per ferar il cavallo, et un'altro ducato per conto di sella, briglia, cengie et per non portar stafili, né stafe de corda, coperta di cavallo, capezza e sachetta, et altri fornimenti che mai manca che fare, e questi fanno la summa de ducati 20. Vole per la consumption del cavallo ducati 12 al anno, costando li cavalli chari come costano, et tirandola almancho in diece ducati al anno, essendo che più assai sono quelli cavalli che si guastano ananci che habbiano diece anni, cha quelli che servono boni più delli diece anni, et non cominciandosi a faticar fino alli quatro anni, il soldato non vien a goder un cavallo ordinariamente se non sei anni, et compartendo il costo d'un cavallo in sei parte da 60 ducati in su, per questa ragione se li mette de dischavedo⁶ iustamente diece ducati al anno, et agionti alli 20 di sopra in tutto sariano trenta ducati. Sarà bonissima cosa che Santo Marco dia ad ogni cavallo lì in Cipro 24 stara de orzo al anno. Resta il strame per il cavallo, che non so quello costarà, né posso saper quanti ducati andarano all'anno in far le spese al soldato di pane, vino, companatico, et altre cose per il viver humano, è bene da avvertire, chel soldato sempre vive a minuto, et se bene per un quartero del anno al tempo del recolto ha l'abondanza, ha poi la carestia in tutti tre li altri quarteri per non haver il modo di comprare tutta la robba in una volta al tempo del raccolto, ma vive alla giornata come è detto di sopra. Io ho voluto far questa particholar distinctione, acìò si habbia in consideratione ogni cosa, et la provigione sia fatta tale che quelli che andarano in Cipro vadano col bon animo, et non li rinresca il star fora di casa, et che gionti a quel servitio possino viver senza andar a rubare, e non far cridar quelli dell'isola, et che con ragione facendo errore possino esser castigati. Quelle prudentissime faciano quanto li

5 G.S.'s idea of sending 500 cavaliers to the island would appear to have been appropriate, as, in his report given before the Senate on 2 May 1559, Councillor Antonio Zane explained that the island's mounted defence amounted to 400 *stradioti*, 200 turcoples and 103 feudatories; most of them rode mules, as there were only 300 horses on the whole island: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Relatione d'A. Zane, ff. 2^v, 8^{r-v}, and published by V. Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise, documents, extraits, notices et études servant à éclaircir les rapports de la Seigneurie avec les Grecs, les Slaves et la Porte ottomane à la fin du XV^e et XVI^e siècle*, Saint Petersburg 1884 (reprint 1968), p. 616.

6 Disadvantage; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. *descavedo*.

pare, medesimamente le haverano in consideratione li soldati che sono in Cipro, acioché liberamente si possino esercitar.

Dovendosi mandar questi 500 cavalli in Cipro, si ha da considerare che pochi de richi vorano andar a obligarsi cavalli legieri in Cipro, dove che la maggior parte sarano poveri, che non hanno con che viver se non con il soldo che tochano. Però bisogna darli tal soventione che possino comprar li cavalli boni, quali costano come si sa charissimi, e bisogna haver in consideratione in quanto tempo haverano da scontar tal soventione, partendoli là in modo che li resti dinaro per il suo vivere. Bisogna ancho deliberar ciò che si haverà da fare de quelli soldati a quali morivano li cavalli, o si guastarano, che non sarano boni da adoperare, avanti che habbiano finito il scontar la soventione, massime che in Cipro non so a che modo potrano valerse di trovar altri cavalli.

Si farà ancho provigione a tempo de naviglij o arsiglij, biave da cavallo, strame, biscotto, et aque per condur questi cavalli in Cipro, avertendo che quanta più comodità se li darà di passaggio, tanta sarà maggior salvezza delli cavalli, chel tutto tornerà poi a utile della Illustrissima Signoria.⁷



3 G.S.'s opinions regarding the defence of Cyprus, Venice, 13 June 1558

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 19^v–21^v; id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, s.f.

First of all, G.S. remarks that Cyprus is 2,000 miglia [3,500 km] away from Venice, but only 60 to 80 miglia [100 to 140 km] away from Ottoman lands. The island has two fortresses, Famagusta and Cerines, to defend a population of 150,000, all unarmed and completely uneducated in war. 400 disarmed stradioti are stationed there, to be joined by 200 more brought by Captain Lusetto [Lusi]; the turcopole mounted guards cannot be relied upon; the feudatory cavalry has 400 horses. The island is very fertile, with beautiful mountains and countryside.

The circumference of the island is 500 miglia [870 km], 300 [520 km] of which are accessible coastline, making it impossible to prevent an Ottoman siege. Arming a fleet in Venice every year to come and fight back the enemy is inconceivable, as is keeping enough troops on the island to repel an enemy landing. The Ottoman coast is close enough for a campaign to be launched of up to 200 ships, bringing far more mounted troops than there are on the island. It is, moreover, unfeasible to dig trenches along the coast, since a strong enemy landing supported by artillery fire cannot be resisted, as illustrated by Charles V's siege of La Goulette, or the regular, unstoppable Ottoman raids on the coasts of Apulia and Calabria.

Despite this, and despite the fact that the fortresses will save no more than 10,000 people,

⁷ In March 1559 Merchio Michiel, provveditor-general in Corfu, recommended sending 60 *stradioti* from Corfu to Cyprus; this proposal can be seen as an acquiescence to G.S.'s request to increase the strength of the cavalry in Cyprus: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κύπρου*, p. 126.

one must not despair of defending Cyprus and let the Ottomans seize the island's riches and 150,000 inhabitants: at this point in time, it must be acknowledged that everything depends on Famagusta. The only possible way to resist a strong army is to build forts in which all of the country's harvests can be stored, feeding the besieged population and depriving the enemy army of resources. Furthermore, whatever cannot be stored must be destroyed, and wells should be poisoned as in Apulia. Securing provisions will then be a more difficult question for the Turkish troops, as everything will need to be brought from the continent.

It is reasonable to suppose that, if war breaks out, Venice will send a fleet to block the transport of Ottoman troops and supplies, discouraging them from attacking Cyprus. G.S. suggests building forts on the island, on new sites, using earth to avoid the extraordinary costs of fortress construction, which in certain cases in Italy have reached 300,000 ducats. Suitable sites should be found for the task of gathering civilians and their provisions together, depriving the Turks of the aid they may have secured on the island. In the event of one of the forts being seized, other forts would remain a threat to an enemy trying to tighten its grip on the territory. The Ottomans will not be able to launch a siege before the month of May, leaving Venice the time to send aid to Cyprus and organize diversions, avoiding any direct confrontation, as several Franco-Imperial conflicts in Italy and in France have taught.

G.S. thinks that, to be defended, the island must be fortified; but not in any hurry, as the people and the nobility may grow agitated if they realize that they are under threat. This being the case, fortifications and supplies will not cost Venice very much; the main outlay is paying soldiers' wages, a fee that varies depending on whether the island is at peace or at war, and forts defended by 40 to 50 soldiers could be built for little cost.

The number of these forts will have to be determined on the ground by Venetian officers who know the country, and G.S. recommends building at least two in the mountains, given that the purpose of these forts will above all be to save the population and make the conquest of the island more difficult. 4,000 men would be capable of defending them, depending on the size of the Ottoman army. The forts should also be supplied with artillery.

G.S. insists on the need for an effective cavalry, and numbers should be supplemented with at least 500 horses to repel enemy raids, burn harvests and harass the enemy in general; a cavalry is essential to organizing sorties to besieged villages, and to recruiting sappers. 200 cavaliers have a greater impact than 2,000 foot-soldiers as these valiant fighters can also serve without their horses.

One third of the cavalry to be sent to Cyprus must be stradioti, one third corvatti and one third Italians. Sending the latter will cost Venice a lot of money, but they will enliven the feudatories and show them the model Italian-style disciplined cavalry; the ordinance, and with them thoroughbred horses, should be brought to Cyprus, even if such a long voyage may be severe for the animals.

If an Ottoman landing cannot be stopped, the Turkish troops may rapidly form an army stronger than any on the island, especially if there is no cavalry present to oppose them. The enemy may build forts themselves, so it is best to do so before they do.

SOPRA L'ISOLA DI CIPRO ALLA SERENISSIMA SIGNORIA DI VENETIA

] 1558 alli 13 zugno.

] Consulto sopra l'isola di Cipro.

Respondendo io Iulio Savorgnano alla dimanda che mi è sta fatta in che modo si potrebbe defender il Regno di Cipro, essendo dui millia miglia lontano da Venetia et sessanta ovvero ottanta miglia solamente lontano dalla Caramania paese de Turchi, nellaqual isola non vi sono altre fortezze che Famagosta et Cerines, di quella capacità et fortezza che si sa, et nella detta isola sono circa 150 mille anime disarmate, et che non sanno ciò che sia guerra. Vi sono da 400 stradiotti disarmati et non ben a cavallo et malissimo,¹ il modo di mettervisi, lì saranno anche li 200 stradiotti novi del cavaglier Lussetto,² se potranno trovar cavalli, vi è certa sorte di gente detti turchopuli,³ quali sono adoperati per conto de garde et serveno a cavallo da non ne far per conto alcuno, vi sono li nobili feudatarij da 400.⁴ Questi non so come siano ben a cavallo, essendo le rasse tutte ruinate per causa delle mulle, pur de questi in qualche pocho de tempo si può sperar bene.⁵ Detto Regno de Cipro è fertilissimo de vittuaglie et vi sono campagne bellissime, et anche delle montagne.

L'isola circonda più de 500 miglia, de quali ne sono più de 300 di spiaggia tale che una armata al tempo del estade, che tutto il mare è porto, potrebbe dismantar et quando l'armata turchescha si attrovato in Arcipelago, come fa ogni anno per la sua vicinità, può andar a dismantar nel'isola de Cipro, avanti che se ne sapia nova qui in Venetia. Però chi volesse pensar di armar ogni anno in questa⁶ città una armata, qual fusse tanto grossa che fusse atta a

1 The number of *stradiotti* G.S. gives is corroborated by the Cyprus *camera*'s balance sheet for the year 1548, which shows that 8,000 ducats were paid out to the 401 *stradiotti* stationed on the island: BNM, *cod. ital. VII 377 (8663)*, f. 35^r. The number was still 400 *stradiotti* in 1558: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3558/11*, f. 2^v. In 1559 the figure of 400 is again given by Antonio Zane, who criticizes the soldiers' unpreparedness; cf. supra, doc. 2 n. 5; but in the same year, Agostino Clusone counts a total of 487, divided into 365 *stratiotti vecchi* and 122 *stratiotti nuovi*: BAM, *cod. A 48 inf.*, f. 250^v. The number of *stradiotti* was then increased, and in 1561 Domenico Trevisan gives a total of 732: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, f. 3^v. In 1562, Ascanio Savorgnan writes of there being 833 *stradiotti*, including the governor and the 18 chiefs; cf. infra, doc. 16 n. 103. Finally, in 1566 the Senate decided to set a limit of 800 on the number of *stradiotti*: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 228^r. On this matter, see the general reflections of Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 773–776, and Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 478–479. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 2, where the man's name is Lusi. 3 The turcoples were peasants granted certain franchises who served as mounted soldiers in one of the eleven companies spread across the island. In 1548 their number was 178; in 1556, 210; in 1558, 200; and in 1559, 172: BNM, *cod. ital. VII 377 (8663)*, f. 35^r; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, f. 73^r; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3558/11*, f. 2^v; BAM, *cod. A 48 inf.*, f. 251^r. Concerning the origins of this military corp, see J. Richard, 'Les turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: musulmans convertis ou chrétiens orientaux?', *Revue des Études islamiques* 56 (1986), pp. 259–270 [reprint in J. Richard, *Croisades et États latins d'Orient*, London 1992, study no. X]. 4 G.S.'s information concerning the feudal cavalry is inaccurate, as the 2 May 1557 *mostra generale* showed that only 67 feudatories were present out of the 111 expected, and that they brought only 115 horses, not 196: G. Grivaud/A. Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale* de la cavalerie féodale en Crète et en Chypre vénitiennes durant le XVI^e siècle', *Studi Veneziani* n.s. XII (1986), pp. 176–177. 5 The lack of purebred horses in Cyprus was a constant worry for Venetian officers; cf. infra, doc. 16 n. 112, and B. Arbel, '“The triumph of the mule” in Venetian Cyprus', *IVth International Cyprological Congress (Nicosia 29 April – 3 May 2008)*, forthcoming. 6 *terra* crossed out after *questa*.

resister et impedir che la turchescha non andasse in Cipro, sarebbe cosa di spesa infinita et per la⁷ distantia che è de qui in Cipro, havrebbe ancho del impossibile di haverla in ordine avanti la turchescha. Però per questa strada non accade pensar alla defesa de quel Regno.

Si potrebbe imaginar di voler divedarli le smontate nel'isola considerando li porti che vi sono, et pensarsi di metterli tanta fantaria et cavalleria, e far delli repari alle smontate et con questa via assicurar detta isola. A me pare per quel pocho che io so, che questo modo de defenderla habbia così del difficile et del mal sicuro, come l'altro modo detto di sopra, essendo che le dismontate sono tanto larghe et lontane dal'una da l'altra li cento miglia, et che li Turchi hanno da passare solamente una giornata di mare per la qual brevità / [20^e] di viaggio con le galere et con palandarie con numero de 200 vele, cossa fatibile a loro potranno portare una cavalleria superiore a noi de numero et una grosissima quantità de fantaria, et che per la prestezza delle armatte rispetto a quelli che saranno in terra per voler defender quelle marine, sempre che vorano governarsi con intelletto saranno alti ad inganare quelli che vorano defender la smontata, fingendo voler smontar in un locho per far correre a sé tutta la forze di terra, et poi levarsi et andar cento miglia lontani in 24 hore, cosa che la gente di terra non la potrà fare in 50 hore, sì che per diligenti capitani che fussero a detta difesa sempre potranno esser inganati per le ragioni dette di sopra. Et quando detti capitani fussero tanto diligenti, che sempre si potessero ritrovar con tutta la sua forza unità alla smontata di detta armatta, dico che in tal caso l'armatta metterà sempre che vorrà in terra la sua gente da piedi et da cavallo per forza, essendo che con l'artegliaria de 150 galere si farranno un tal largo in una spiaggia che sarà cosa impossibile, che per un miglio vi comparà banda alcuna di gente né a cavallo né a piedi per divedarli tal smontata. Et a voler farsi ripari o trincee in sitti di cento e ducento miglia e più, ha del impossibile, sì a farli come a esser a tempo per deffenderli quantonque li fosse grosissimo numero di gente, si vedeno in essemplichel Imperator Carlo smontato alla Goletta con il favor del artigliaria della sua armatta, che non ardirino li nemici con 14 o 16 milla cavalli farli inpedimento alcuno, medemamente smontò in Algier, et ogni anno si vede che l'armata turchescha dismonta, et mette in terra in Puglia, in Calavria, et dove là vole,⁸ anchora che in quel Regno sia tanto numero di bonna cavalleria et fanteria, et infinite fortezze, perché al impreviso vano a smontar dove voleno, cioè in lochi che non sono nelle genti, nelle fortezze, sì che è cosa difficile et a me pare impossibile il prohibire le smontate in spiagge.

7 *spesa* crossed out after *la*. 8 The references made to conflicts between the Spanish and the Turks pertain to several occurrences: Spanish troops landed between La Goulette and Carthage in June 1535, which resulted in the capture of Tunis by Charles V; a similar attempt from the Spanish monarch in Algiers in October 1541 was unsuccessful. For his part, Suleiman the Magnificent sent his fleet, led by Hayreddin Pasha (Barbarossa), to attack the coasts of Puglia in the summer of 1537; the fleet ended up gaining control of the whole Ionian Sea after winning the battle of Preveza (25 September 1538). Noteworthy is the description of the Spanish expedition to Algiers given by Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e maritima*, pp. 52–54. Concerning all these different military expeditions and their diplomatic context: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 3, pp. 396–398, 445–447; Cozzi, 'Venezia nello scenario europeo (1517–1699)', pp. 40–45; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 31–38; G. Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade. Mythe et réalité de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*, Paris 2004, pp. 222–231.

Perciò non dico che sia cura desperata in deffender quel isola tanto importante a questo Illustrissimo Stato, né peggio si pò fare quanto non li far provisione alcuna, et star a questo modo a discretione di altri che solamente portarebbe la spesa a Turchi di andar a guadagnar quelle 150 milia anime et tante ricchezze, essendo che in Famagosta e Cerines a pena se ne potrebbero salvare diece milia solamente, e poi come è detto di sopra, essendo Cerines in pochissima consideratione li restarebbe solamente Famagosta, della quale non accade dirne altro per adesso, sì che bisogna risolversi a farvi qualche provisione, laqual sia cosa fatibile, sì del tempo come della spesa.

Qual modo è quello che quasi tutti li Principi del mondo si risolvino di fare per conservation delli stati loro, et con la pocha gente resister alli grandi eserciti, facendoli perder tempo et in quel meso in comodarli delle vituvaglie, il qual modo è di farli delli forti con liquali si fanno più effetti bonissimi.

Prima si conducono tutte le vituvaglie di paese vicino in detti forti, sì per sustentar quelli che li hanno da deffendere et nutrire le anime che vi saranno dentro, come per levar⁹ dette vituvaglie al nemico che avesse a venir a perder tempo sotto detti forti. Et tutta quella vituvaglia che non si potesse ridur in detti forti, bisogna mediante le genti et cavalleria che saranno a quella deffessa, abrusciar et discipar tutta la campagna, et guastarli le acque come si fa in Puglia, talmentechel pocho numero de nemici non potria far effetto di gran momento, et il gran numero conveneria haver gran quantità de vituvaglie, e maxime li esserciti turcheschi quali fanno il suo primo fondamento nella cavalleria et però, se saranno abrugiate o conservate le vituvaglie di quel isola, sarà matteria difficile a condurli vituvaglia del tutto oltre mare da paesi turcheschi.

Si ha da pensar che con ogni pocho de tempo che si habbia in mano, questo Illustrissimo Dominio mandarà delli galioni o nave armate quale darano in quelli mari certa sorte di impedimento alli nemici, che li sarà di gran molestia al tragettar ogni cosa di terra ferma sull'isola per il viver d'uno essercito. In questo mezo di ragione questo Illustrissimo Stato metterà in ordine la sua armatta di tal sorte che, et da per sé, et forsi acompagnata darà tanto che pensar a Turchi che mentre che nell'isola de Cipro si metta tempo di mezo di qualche mese, si farà riuscir li pensieri vanni de chi vorà immaginarsi di offender quel Regno, et son di questo parere fermamente che havendo 3 o 4 000 milla guastattori come ne è tanta abbondanza in quel Regno, in spatio di 3 o 4 mesi si potrà far tal sorte de ridutti che, se saranno fatti da persone che intendeno bene tal mestier, più presto mi vorei trovare a deffender un tal locho novo fatto di terreno solamente ma con ragione senza spesa di San Marcho, che ritrovarmi / [20^v] in alcune fortezze de Italia che hanno fama di fortissime fatte con spesa di più di 300 milla scudi, et in questi tali forti facendoli per electione, trovando li sitti che siano di bon aria, di bon terreno, di aque sane et abbondante, et altri rispetti che bisogna havere in simil cose, che sul fatto poi si risolve il meglio, ridurli dentro la gente di quelle contrade vicine con le sue facultà, acioche venendo Turchi in quel isola, habiano da pensar di convenir portar il tutto per il suo viver, et non haver speranza di haver con facilità né vituvaglie, né altre robbe

9 *via* crossed out after *levar*.

nelle anime di quelli popoli, ma pensar di dover combater il tutto con grandissima difficoltà e tempo, come si farà di certezza se la cosa sarà guidata con maturo iudicio, et ogni volta che Turchi penserano di haver a sforzar uno di questi forti, bisogna che si pensino che dalli altri forti, che li restarano o per le spalle, o alli fianchi, sempre della cavalleria marchesca li sarà data molestia, et impedimento per de viver, come è detto di sopra.

Et pur che li deffensori mettino tempo di mezzo ogni pocho importa assai alla summa della conservation del Regno, essendo che l'armata turchesca non potrà andar a tal impresa se non del mese di maggio, che li resta di tempo fino allo inverno, se non cinque o sei mesi, et se vorà star fora l'inverno, si sa come diventa maxime l'armata turchesca, et in quel tempo San Marco si pò metter al ordine, come è già detto, et lo medemo inverno con nave a largo li pò mandar diverse sorte de provision et soccorsi da Venetia, oltra che se l'armata turchesca vorà atender tutta al'isola, è da creder che quella di San Marco non dormirà ma farà far qualche diversione al nemico, senza venir alla prima a risicho di far fatto d'arme, qual cosa si vede, quanto è pericolosa di ridursi a tali cimenti, et ne havemo di ciò infiniti esempi¹⁰ modernissimi, come è intravenuto a Francesi per convenir soccorer San Quintino, al Signor Pietro Strozzi per voler soccorer Sienna, al Marchese del Guasto per voler soccorer Carignano, et altri infiniti.¹¹

Però questa a me pare via sicura di fortificar talmente quell'isola che da sé si possa defender, ma farlo tanto per tempo che non si habbia causa da precipitar li soccorsi, o venir al pericolo del fatto d'arme, con il qual effetto si darà tal animo a quelli nobeli et popoli che sperarano ogni bene della sua vità et robba, cosa che forsi non fanno al presente, li leverà forsi il pensiero con queste difficoltà, a quelli che per la facilità erano invitati a far uno così facile e bel tratto per loro. Et se il far tal cosa che io propongo havessero del impossibile per la spesa di fabricar tali forti e vituvagliarli che sono li ponti principali, sarebbe un termine ma il vituvagliar e fortificar costarà a San Marco niente, o pochissimo, resta solamente la spesa della guarda, laqual al tempo di pace sarà quanto alle Illustrissime Signorie Vostre parerà, possendosi smantelar detti forti in bona parte, lassandoli del tutto senza guarda et come meglio parerà, quando si volesse preservali et non del tutto abandonarli, si potrà con poca spesa farli un picholo ridotto sicurro solamente da bataglia da man per guardarlo con 40 o 50 fanti, quando l'armata non sarà fora.

La quantità di questi forti per presentar tanta gente et vituarie non si puol far iudicio fondatto se non sopra il locho, ma havendo Vostra Serenità in quel isola tanti Clarissimi suoi Rettori, et specialmente il Clarissimo Veniero¹² di quella eccellente qualità che si sa esser di

¹⁰ *egregii* crossed out and *esempi* written above. ¹¹ These references show the importance of information concerning tactical errors on the battlefield in developing Italian officers' military brains. The three battles mentioned are from the period of hostilities between the kingdom of France and the Habsburg Empire from 1552 to 1559: the Battle of Saint-Quentin, in which Ascanio Savorgnan took part, ended on 10 August 1557 when Emmanuel-Philibert of Savoy, leader of the Spanish troops, defeated the constable of Montmorency's armies. The leader of the Franco-Sienese troops, Paolo Strozzi, was beaten in the 2 August 1554 Battle of Marciano by Gian Giacomo Medici's Florentine army. On 22 July 1544 the French vanquished the Holy Roman Emperor's troops led by Marquis del Guasto to take Carignano, in Piedmont. ¹² Since there were not many members of the

iuditio, di intelletto et di virtù, Sue Clarissime Signorie potranno risolver quali sitti, et quanti saranno quelli che haveranno bisogno a questo effetto. Al presente sarei di opinione di farne doi per il mancho, et per quello che se intende per la conservatione de tante anime, sono nelle Montagne aspre¹³ alcuni sitti da poterne salvar gran quantità con poca spesa, et pochi fanti di guarda. Né intendo che questi forti siano fatti solamente per la preservatione de tutte le anime ma ben di parte, et per far che l'impresa de tutta l'isola sij più difficile et quasi impossibile rispetto al tempo che li andrebbe a volerla occupar tutta.

Per la guarda de detti forti non mi pare che fosse troppo, dimandando se a Vostra Serenità che quel anno che si vede chel Turcho voglia armar, la mandasse 4000 fanti, che più assai ne bisognarebbero quando si pensasse, che fusse possibile, che la persona del Signor Turcho venisse con tutta la sua forza, cosa che non ha del verisimile, et quando non va la sua persona, le sue forze sono come quelle de un'altro Principe comune et non molto da temer. / [21^r]

Et così come li Regni non si ponno conservar senza fortezza, così le fortezze non si ponno conservar senza artiglieria, della quale bisognara provederli et a tempo.

Medemamente le fortezze quasi tutte del mondo diventano inutile se non hanno la cavalleria, quale è il mantenimento delli stati et la conservatione della pace, della quale quel Regno di Cipro in numero è a un certo modo fornito come è detto, che è da farne pocho conto per questi primi anni, però si dovrebbe mandar in quella isola al mancho 500 cavalli per haverli a tempo di poter servirse di loro, essendo che quel Regno per le sue piannure ha bisogno de bon numero de cavalli, quali sono boni per discoprir et dar aviso, et far unir presto tutta la cavalleria insieme per andar a impedir per quello che potessero le smontatte, quando non sono sforzate, et secondo li sitti ponno far e maggior e minor effetto, abusciar le vituvaglie alli nemici, tenerli ristretti, darli incommodità infinite, non li lassando andar né per legne né per aqua, romperli le strade, che venissero dalla marina al campo, la cavalleria è utilissima nelle fortezze per le sortitte accompagnata con la fantaria, qual cosa mette grandissimo tempo de mezo a ciascuna espugnatione de fortezza. Giova la cavalleria per far portar

Venier family who held office in Cyprus, it is sure that this is Sebastiano Venier, as Ascanio Savorgnan confirms; cf. infra, doc. 16. Sebastiano Venier stood out as a cultured man with great legal experience, and was elected proveditor-general on 12 March 1551; he was then *provveditore alle fortezze* in 1559 / 1560, and proveditor in Corfu in 1568. He was sent to Cyprus first as proveditor-general in 1562 / 1563, and a second time, on 16 October 1569, as *luocotenente*, but did not go, as he was appointed proveditor-general in Corfu the following winter. He became the procurator of San Marco *de ultra* on 15 May 1570, and a year and a half later, having been elected captain-general *da mar* on 13 December 1570, he was one of the military leaders who contributed to the Holy League's victory in the Battle of Lepanto in October 1571. He rounded off his career by becoming the doge of Venice on 11 June 1577, and died soon after, on 3 March 1578: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, ff. 45^r, 93^r, 112^r; id., *Maggior Consiglio*, reg. 4, ff. 182^v–183^r, 190^v; Da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia*, pp. 287–297; Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 851–852, revised by Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 1, p. 176. Details of Venier's activities in Cyprus are found in the letters written to him by Agostino Clusone in 1558 / 1559: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 233^v–237^r, 239^v–240^r, 242^r–244^r, 250^{r-v}. Concerning Sebastiano Venier's activities in Cyprus, see also: ASV, *Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti ad alcun archivio*, b. 6. ¹³ This is evidently a misunderstanding, as the White Mountains are the main massif of Crete. The error could be ascribed either to G.S. or the copyist, Orazio Governa.

le vittuarie nelle fortezze, maxime quando li popoli sonno in fuga pocho avanti la venuta di nemici che alhora bisogna farli far per forza. È perfettissima la cavalleria stando in un forte di molestar, et romper le strade a quelli che portassero vittuarie a uno essercito, che assediassero un'altra fortezza. È necessaria la cavalleria per far che li popoli e contadini d'un paese stiano obedienti alla fortificatione per conto de guastatori, quali sono necessarissimi da aiutar sempre le fortezze di cose che mai manchano, de reperi, fossi, cavallieri, trincee, gabbioni,¹⁴ et altro. Et molto più atti sono 200 cavalli in una fortezza di farsi obedir, et temer diece e quindeci miglia in campagna in torno di sé di quelle che potrebbono far in ciò doi millia fanti da sortir e mandar fora, mai la cavalleria lassa riposar li esserciti con farli dar a l'arme giorno et notte. Quando si vien alle strette delle battarie li soldati a cavallo secondo li sitti, che li boni capitani si sanno accomodar della cavalleria, si serveno di loro et a cavallo et a piedi, et quando sono a piedi per esser gente più eletta della fanteria, fanno benissimo l'officio del fante a piedi, come quelli che il più di loro sogliono haver fatto prima il mestier della guerra a piedi, et si hanno vedutti essempij assai di gente d'arme, et altra cavalleria, che hanno conservate fortezze assai modernamente.

La cavalleria da esser mandata in Cipro dovrebbe esser un terzo di stradiotti, un terzo de corvatti,¹⁵ et l'altro terzo d'Italiani alla borgognona in arme bianche.¹⁶ Porta la spesa a mandarli questo terzo d'Italiani per dar essemio, et incitatione alli nobili et feudatarij di quel Regno, quali essendo richi et de quelli animi alteri et nobeli più facilmente imitarano la cavalleria italiana challa corvatta o stradiotta, et havendo questo specchio ananci alli occhi secondo la intention del Illustrissimo Dominio si mettarano in fantasia, et sulle arme al modo de questi d'Italia, essendo che li soi cavalli hanno più presto del Italiano cha del Turcho né del corvatto, et questa sol causa dovrebbe / [21^v] resolver l'anime delle Illustrissime Signorie Vostre a mandarli oltra la raggione della difficoltà et carestia che si haverà di far tutta la cavalleria di cavalli turchi e beni, e per le raggioni dette di sopra con più diligentia detti nobelli attenderano alle razze dell'isola, et medesimamente dar ordine di introdur le ordinanze, come sono qui in Italia. Quanto a condur tal cavalleria in Cipro, è caso chiaro che il metter molti cavalli in una nave la estade sarà cosa pericolosa per il caldo che patirano, ma per un numero conveniente credo che si potranno condur sani, eccetto di caso di mala sorte che si facessero li viaggi longhissimi cioè più d'un mese, nelqual mese non credo che potessero patir molto, reportandome però de questo a chi è meglio informato di me, ben dico che in tal

14 In military architecture, this was a cylindrical basket or bag with no bottom, lined with branches and filled with earth or rocks; *gabbioni* were one to two metres high, and were used to fill in trenches or to form mobile parapets during a siege. 15 This was a type of light cavalry, named after the Croats (*Crovati*) who often filled its ranks. Their superior weapons meant that these cavaliers were better equipped than the *stradioti*, as Mario Savorgnan explains, *Arte militare terrestre e maritima*, p. 20: "il crovatto [...] porta il giacco in luogo di corsaletto e ha le maniche forti, la celata e la targa"; also Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, p. 311. 16 This cavalry corps was in all likelihood composed of well-armed Italians, with swords, lances and burgonets (light iron helmets built with a fin and a neck collar); Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo shared this opinion seven years later: M. Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo, proveditore generale e sindaco a Cipro', in Skoufari (ed.), *La Serenissima a Cipro*, p. 98.

bisogno, non si ha da guardar a risigo¹⁷ né a spesa, presuponendola pochissima, rispetto al danno et incomodo che ne potrebbe riuscir come son certo che il tutto molto bene considerano con la sua solita prudenza.

Sarà detto che non si potendo impedir le smontatte, il Turcho metterà in terra tanta cavalleria che sempre sarà superiore a quella del'isola, né se potranno far li effetti detti di sopra con la nostra cavalleria, si risponde che ogni sorte d'impedimento che darà detta nostra cavalleria sarà de grandissima importanza, essendo che in ogni cosa metterà tempo che è il nostro principal fondamento, né soldato alcuno pò negar che la pocha cavalleria non dia grandissimo travaglio alli essercitti a certi tempi, sì che con tutto ciò porta la spesa de haverli anci sonno necessarij.

Sarà ancora detto che Turchi a imitation de tali nostri forti ne farano loro ancora delli altri. Al che rispondo che li nostri si farano senza impedimento alcuno, et loro farano li soi con il continuo contrastar, e poi non è bona raggione a dire non se lo immaginarenno de farne, essendo che non manca loro che lo sapia et chi gli lo ricordi, se dimanda qual è meglio o mancho male, che noi ne habbiamo prima de fatti, et che loro habbiano a fare overamente star al modo che si sta al presente. Crederei che fusse il meglio a farli, ma bene se, et qualche uno sapesse ricordar di far qualche operation, qual fusse più sicura e migliore e fattibile, lauderei che si essequisse tal sua opinione, sì che in tutto mi riporto a meglio ricordo, lassandomi sempre governar alle raggione.

Di Venetia alli 13 zugno nel 1558.

Da Vostra Serenità fidelissimo servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



4 *Sforza Pallavacino, Girolamo Martinengo, Astore Baglioni and G.S. share their differing opinions regarding the fortification of Cyprus, [Venice?], 30 July 1558*

CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/2*, ff. 1^r–5^r; versions containing minor variations: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/10*; ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, s.f., dated 15 June 1558.

Sforza Pallavacino, Girolamo Martinengo, Astore Baglioni and G.S. present their opinions on the defence of the Regno di Cipro. They all agree that, given the difference in military potential between the two sides, it is impossible to prevent an enemy landing or to fight the enemy on the ground. Consequently, towns must be fortified to ensure several points d'appui, and to keep as many people from harm as possible. These fortified towns must be accessible from the sea, and must dispose of adequate terrain and water resources.

The Cape Gata (or Saint Nicholas of the Cats) site, yet to be visited, appears easy to fortify

¹⁷ Risk; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v.

and offers space enough for many people; the Saint Nicholas isthmus needs to be dug out from the western side, in order to transform the headland into an island. The fortress will then be built on the two banks, and will be defended by 250 to 300 soldiers and a ravelin / bastion to be installed on the north bank; to complete the defences, a bridge could be built on the eastward inlet.

The second site, at Cerines castle, is worth enlarging; the fortification supervisors will assess how this is to be done. If these two sites, Cape Gata and Cerines, are found to be unsuitable, other sites better fitted to the task must be found. Once the two sites are operational, thoughts may turn to fortifying a third town in the Paphos region.

Pallavacino, Martinengo and Baglioni think that the mounted cavalry charged with defending Cyprus must be reinforced with 150 to 200 cavaliers led by seasoned chiefs; the cavaliers could be taken from contingents that do not desperately need them (Cephalonia, Zakynthos, Corfu). 300 arquebusiers should also be sent, to be divided between the different fortified towns; they will use the horses already present on the island. Nevertheless, G.S. thinks it a better idea to send light cavalry rather than arquebusiers, to save money, as horses in Cyprus are expensive.

The Famagusta and Cerines garrisons will be reinforced if necessary; at Cape Gata and Paphos, the number of soldiers sent will depend on the circumstances. As regards the arquebusier militia (cernide), if the Signoria agrees to entrust them with weapons, groups will be formed in Cyprus and placed under the command of experienced, preferably Greek-speaking chiefs; their role, possibly at Cape Gata and Paphos, will also depend on the circumstances.

Concerning Nicosia, Pallavicino, Baglioni and G.S. advise against beginning construction and feel the inhabitants ought to be persuaded to leave, as defending the island depends on seaborne relief. An island's forces are always concentrated along the coastline, as in Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete and Corfu. Even if fortifying Nicosia were possible, saving it from the sea would not be. Building a castle would not protect many people at all, and would both increase expenses and surrender the city to the enemy, who would thus be able to take the countryside.

Martinengo is not of the same opinion regarding Nicosia: he maintains that, after landing, the enemy would head straight for the Regno's capital if it were not defended. He recommends building, without overly damaging people's houses, a moderately-sized castle to control the city. This would also be a way of showing the people and the nobility of the island, all very loyal to Venice, that they are being cared for as they expect. The Cerines fortress would then serve as a naval point d'appui in the defence of Nicosia, as it is only 18 miglia [31 km] away. Martinengo feels that not only the outer edges but also the centre of the island should be fortified.

The four experts conclude their discussion with a reminder that they have never been to Cyprus, and thus will seek the advice of men experienced in the dealings of the Regno. Finally, it must not be forgotten that, if the towns are to be securely fortified for the coming April or May [1559], 5,000 to 6,000 labourers will be needed for each one.

PARERI SOPRA LA FORTIFICATIONE DEL REGNO DI CIPRO ADI XXX DI LUGLIO 1558,
SCRITTA PER MANO DI MESSER ANDREA SORIANO SECRETARIO

Essendosi ridotti insieme l'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza Pallavicino,¹ Signor Girolamo Martinengo,² Signor Astor Baglioni,³ et il Signor Giulio Savorgnano per riflettere et metter' in scrittura le opinioni loro circa le cose di Cipro, et circa le previsionsi che giudicano necessarie per la difesa di quel Regno, secondo l'ordine datogli dall'Illustrissimo Collegio.

Primieramente quanto all'impedire che l'inimico, del quale si può haver sospetto, sbarchi nell'isola, tutti concordi hanno concluso non esser possibile d'impedirlo.

Ancor si accordano non si potere contendere con il detto nemico del pari in campagna nell'isola per le gran forze che esso vi può condurre.

Onde per loro parere è necessario ridursi al terzo rimedio, quale di far di forti nelli lochi opportuni, sì per mantenere il piede nell'isola come per salvar li popoli quanto più si possa.

Che questi forti si facciano a marina dove possono essere soccorsi con le forze da mare, intendendo però dove si habbino le comodità necessarie di terreno, acqua et altre cose, presuponendo che in quella spiaggia sempre si trovino aque, et che essi forti si facciano gagliardi et capaci di più numero di anime che sia possibile.

Quanto al sito di essi forti che per primo sia detto il Capo di San Nicolò, altrimenti chiamato delle Gatte, ogni volta / [1^v] che in quel loco vi sia comodità di terreno et di acque,

1 Concerning Sforza Pallavicino, see supra, p. 56 n. 127. 2 Concerning Girolamo Martinengo, see supra, p. 56, n. 128. 3 Astore Baglioni was born on 3 March 1526 in Perugia, a town that he left to escape the fratricidal disputes that tore apart his family. In 1540 he took part in the Hungarian Wars and the siege of Pest, alongside his uncle. He was sent to the court of Pier Luigi Farnese, and stayed in Parma until 1546, before reaching Germany, where he joined the Holy Roman Empire in the war against the Protestant Schmalkaldic League. He returned to Rome in 1547, whereupon Paul III appointed him governor of the city for three years; at the end of this period, Baglioni became a senator and was granted the hereditary privilege of Roman nobility. Later on he was part of the guard at Castel Sant'Angelo for the papal conclave of 1549, then in the spring of 1550 he participated in an expedition led against the corsair raider Dragut in Monastir (Tunisia). In 1551 Astore fought in the Farnese army against the Holy Roman Empire and the pope, and was taken prisoner in La Fontanella. He was liberated by Paul III, through the mediation of Ascanio della Cornia, on the condition that he no longer served the Farneses. He was seriously injured in the Battle of La Mirandola in June 1551, and then went to Venice. He was appointed governor of Verona for four years, and in 1565 founded there the *Accademia dei Filotimi*. His years of military experience saw him become an expert in fortification: he proposed a drawing of a fortress for Udine, and worked at the forts of Peschiera, Bergamo and Padua. He turned down an offer from Paul IV to be supreme commander of the papal army, and continued to serve the *Signoria*, who appointed him governor of Corfu and then, after a decree on 21 August 1568 by the Council of Ten naming him governor of the army, sent him to Nicosia to replace G.S. After realizing that his pay had been the same for over ten years, even though he had served the *Signoria* since 1555, Venice increased his annual salary by 500 ducats to 2,000 ducats per year. He did not reach Cyprus until May 1569, accompanied by his lieutenant and his nephew Federico, who was governor of Bergamo. He led Famagusta in the 1570 / 1571 siege, and was executed by Lala Mustafa Pasha on 5 August 1571: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 181^r, 199^r, 201^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, f. 76^{r-v}; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1; Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri italiani*, pp. 498–520; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 108–110; G. de Caro, 'Astorre Baglioni', *DBI*, vol. 5, pp. 197–199; Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 103 n and passim.

il che affermano non sapere non havendo veduto il loco, ma laudano quel sito per esser capace di molte anime, forte per natura, et facile ad esser compitamente fortificato.

Che si habbia a fare un taglio et tagliar quello stretto nel detto loco di San Nicolò, che è verso ponente, il quale taglio sia profondo per mettere quel loco in isola, et conservar in esso più facilmente una gran quantità di anime, il quale stretto però sia congiunto con una fortezza che abbracci l'una et l'altra ripa, et quella fortezza habbia a esser guardata per ordinario da 250 in 300 fanti, il corpo principal della quale sia sopra l'isola che si farà del loco di San Nicolò, et dell'altra parte verso il continente cioè dalla parte dell'isola principale di Cipri sia fatto un balovardo o rivellino,⁴ o quello che da quei che haveranno cura di ordinar tal fortezza sopra il luogo sarà giudicato necessario. Dalla bocca veramente già fatta verso levante sia fatto un luogo picciolo qual patisse quel sito per guardia di essa bocca con un ponte per adoperare, secondo l'occasione et il bisogno.⁵

Per il secondo sito, veramente essendo a Cerines già in essere un buon castello conengono in opinione che il luogo di Cerines sia aggrandito potendosi di quel modo che sarà giudicato / [2^r] da quei che saranno sopra il luogo, et facendosi questi duoi forti, i quali haveranno gli suoi castelli, et saranno capaci di molte anime, si accordano che si facci un'altro forte dalla parte di Paffo, in quel loco che sarà giudicato a proposito da quei che saranno sopra il luogo, il quale se ben non si facesse della grandezza de gli altri duoi sopradetti basterà che sia di mediocre grandezza, ma gagliardo et sicuro.

Et se nelli duoi sopradetti luoghi da Capo San Nicolò et Cerines non fossero la comodità del terreno et dell'aque et altre cose necessarie, laudano che si faccino li forti in altri luoghi opportuni, secondo l'intentione et secondo il fine per il quale si hanno da fare li sopradetti.

Quanto alle genti gli Illustrissimi Signor Sforza, Signor Hieronimo et Signor Astor sono concordi che non essendo possibile impedire la smontata nell'isola all'inimico et non potendosegli resistere in campagna, non si facci gagliarda provisione de cavalli in quell'isola, ma che ritrovandosi pur la Serenissima Signoria qualche numero di cavalli in Cipri di diverse qualità, si attendi a dargli regola et disciplina che si faccino utili a quel servitio, et che appresso a quello siano mandati solamente 150 fino 200 buoni cavalli sotto un buon capo, i quali siano come per maestri degli altri et secondo il parere del Signor Hieronimo et Signor Astor si potriano eleggere / [2^v] di quelli che sono alla Ceffalonia, al Zante et a Corfù, dove non sono necessarij per non dar maggior spesa al Serenissimo Dominio. Et appresso siano mandati fino

4 A ravelin was an external part of a fortress, detached from the main enceinte; it was composed of two faces forming a salient angle, and its function was to cover a curtain or a fort. It at once afforded increased protection against enemy attacks and allowed the besieged population to leave the fortress unexposed. In Cyprus the only ravelin the Venetians built was in Famagusta, before the Limassol Gate: Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, pp. 106–108; Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', pp. 326–330; see also fig. 29. 5 This project of turning the Akrotiri peninsula into an island by cutting through the tombolo on its western side illustrates the progressively changing nature of the geology in the Lake Limassol region; cf. A. Sophocleous, 'The evolution of a geographical phenomenon through a series of ancient maps of Cyprus', *Κυπριακά Σπουδαί* 48 (1984), pp. 99–105; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 45. Ascanio Savorgnan considered at length the possibility of fortifying this site; cf. infra, doc. 16.

a 300 arcobugieri a cavallo, che non conduchino però li cavalli di qua ma si servino delli cavalli dell'isola, quali arcobugieri siano compresi nel numero delli soldati che si haveranno a mandar per guardia di quei forti che sono, et che si faranno in Cipri, da essere distribuiti come parerà a quei che n'haverano carico, alli quali sia dato quell'avantaggio che si conviene acìò che habbino modo di tener il cavallo et possino esser condotti buoni soldati. Li capi loro veramente siano persone che habbino per fine l'honore, dalli quali arcobugieri oltre il servitio che faranno come fanti a piedi nelle fortezze, si potrà sperare quello istesso proffitto, che si potria sperare da altrettanti cavalli leggieri.

Il Signor Giulio Savorgnano veramente essendo concordo nel resto, cioè quanto al mandar cavalli, è di parere quanto alli arcobugieri che sia meglio che questi fossero tanti cavalli leggieri come si contiene nella sua scrittura, alla quale in tutto si riporta, perché in Cipri tanto costeranno li roncini, essendo la carestia che è nell'isola, quanto fuori di Cipri li buoni cavalli, et per sua opinione vorria più tosto haver 300 cavalli leggieri di vantaggio che gli arcobugieri / [3^v] per la prestezza delli buoni cavalli, et perché anco essi portano gli suoi arcobusi, et essendo soldati possono ancora loro nelle fortezze far il servitio di fante a piedi, della spesa veramente a considerare il tutto particolarmente ci sarà poca o niuna differenza.

Quanto alle genti a piedi in Famagosta et Cerines, vi è il presidio ordinario, il quale essendo abastanza sia conservato, come è, non essendo abastanza sia accresciuto di quel numero che parerà conveniente secondo le occasioni et secondo gli preparamenti del nemico. Nel forte del capo di San Nicolò, o quello che in cambio di esso si farà in tempo di quiete, basterà metter' tanta gente che guardi li castelli.

Nel forte veramente di Paffo, si provedi di guardia conveniente et sicura, secondo la grandezza sua, occorendo veramente li sospetti si provedi di più et manco genti, seconda la qualità delle sospetti.

Quanto a cernede, presupponendo che la Serenissima Signoria si possi confidare di dare le armi in mano a quelle genti, ne siano fatte in quel numero che parerà a Sua Serenità et siano mandati di qua di capi d'isperienza, che habbino la lingua loro se potranno avere, se non si eleggano degli altri che siano persone d'isperienza et siano tutte esse cernede di arcobugieri, le quali potranno servire in caso di bisogno dove accaderà, et anco per l'ordinario / [3^v] se ne potrà adoperare qualche quantità, se sarà giudicato necessario da quei che ne haverano la cura alla custodia delli forti del capo San Nicolò, et di Cerines, non intendendo però gli castelli, sì per essercitar esse ordinanze come per sicurtà di essi forti.

Quanto a Nicosia, l'opinione dell'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza, Signor Astor et Signor Giulio è che a quella città non sia fatta cosa alcuna, anzi che potendosi persuadere et operare con gli habitatori di essa che mutassero alloggiamento, et facendolo essi volentieri et senza grande rissentimento si dovesse attendere a persuadergli, movendosi detti Signori perché quel Regno è isola, et non ha forze da sé stesso da diffendersi senza soccorso, il quale gli ha da venire per mare, onde si vede che la forza di tutte l'isole sempre si fa nella marina, et l'esempio è manifesto dell'isola di Sicilia, Sardegna, Corsica, Candia, Corfù et altre, et quando si volesse fortificare la città vi resta la grandezza et il sito mal atto per quanto si dice et fatta che fosse la

città forte non potrebbe esser soccorsa per mare. Quando si volesse farvi un castello non sarà atto a conservar anime, et haverà la medesima difficoltà del soccorso, le quali sono due cose contrarie alla principal intentione che si ha da havere in questo caso, et così la fortificatione della città come quella di fare il castello accrescerà maggior spesa, lasciando veramente la città in questo modo si lascia all' / [4^f] inimico commodità d'una gran preda et d'un buono alloggiamento, del quale è poi cosa difficile a cacciarlo, essendo esso patrone della campagna.

Il Signor Hieronimo veramente considerando che nel centro di quel Regno non gli è alcuna sorte di fortezza, per il che si potrà molto dubitare che gli nemici smontati che fossero nell'isola non andassero a farsi un forte gagliardo in mezo quel sito, dove si vede che vi è il migliore et più abbondante paese di tutto il Regno, per il qual rispetto anco gli Re passati si accomodorono di esso, et vi fecero la città principale, nella quale al presente habitano tutti gli principali cavallieri. Lauderia che in quel luogo, cioè in una parte di quella città che fosse più sicura et dove si facesse manco danno alli habitazioni di essa, si facesse un castello di mediocre grandezza, quale non fosse per altro che per habitazione delli soldati che lo guardassero, dal qual castello si caveriano questi benefici che si batteria tutta la città, et si decederia che l'inimico non si potesse impadronire di essa senza molto disturbo, et quanto se ne fosse impadronito non havrebbe poi anche fatto nulla, havendo Sua Serenità la sua fortezza ancora in mano molto gagliarda, tenerebbe tutti gli cavalieri di quel Regno et li popoli che alloggiavano in quella città in officio, ancor che si crede che senza altro vivano molto devoti et obedienti a Sua Serenità, et non si / [4^v] trovi alcuna provincia che sia cara al suo Principe et che confini con un nemico gagliardo è più potente di lui, che nel centro di essa non vi sia una gagliarda fortezza, sarebbe questo castello aiutato et favorito dalla fortezza di Cerines, vicina a 18 miglia, quale li potrà facilmente subministrar quell'istesso soccorso che essa riceverebbe per la parte di mare, et non è dubbio che questa cosa apporterebbe grande riputatione et grande contento a quei sudditi nobili et altri, che vedessero il suo nido antico esser favorito da una fortezza tale.

Dicendo il predetto Signor Hieronimo che non sa qual cosa possa esser contraria all'haver suplito alla total sicurtà di un così importante Regno, havendo in questo modo Sua Serenità armato il petto e il cuore di quell'isola con haver fatto questa fortezza, che facendo solo le altre come di sopra verriano a star armate solamente le parti estreme, et non il corpo.

Queste sono le cose che li predetti Illustrissimi Signori dicono essergli occorso di ricordargli riverentemente a Sua Serenità, per obedire alli commandamenti Suoi, escusandosi se in alcuna parte havessero mancato, non essendo alcuno di essi stato in Cipri, che quando vi fossero stati ne haveriano facilmente potuto ricordare dell'altre, et fosse dire alcuna cosa diversa da quanto non hanno detto, però di tutte sempre si rimettono al giuditio di quei che siano meglio informati, et più intelligenti / [5^r] delle cose di quel Regno. Ne vogliono restare di aggiungere che gli forti che hanno ricordato ogni volta che si facesse provisione di 5 o 6 milla guastadori et si ritrovasse il sito disposto, si potriano far di terreno in spacio tale che per il mese d'aprile o di maggio prossimo potriano essere in buona difesa, et deliberando Sua Serenità di far detti forti, ricordano a mandar di là le cose necessarie.

PART TWO
GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S
EXPLORATORY MISSION TO CYPRUS
(9 JUNE – 29 SEPTEMBER 1562)

GIULIO SAVORGNAN IN THE FIELD

The circumstances surrounding Giulio Savorgnan's mission to Cyprus having been discussed earlier,¹ the following will be an examination of the general and local context in which the *soprintendente maggiore delli Regni di Cipro e di Candia* operated after his departure for Salina on 9 June. It should firstly be recalled that since the spring of 1558 initiatives to improve the island's defences had multiplied incessantly, and were implemented on the ground in particular by the *provveditori generali*; first Sebastiano Venier (1558–1559), then Andrea Duodo (1559–1560), followed by Zuan Matteo Bembo (1561–1562), all of whom devoted a great deal of energy into organizing the various corps whose duty it was to protect the island. In Nicosia and in Famagusta, they put into action the new trends in Venice's defence policies, and were backed by other officers, such as Count Ercole Martinengo, who replaced Agostino Clusone as army governor-general in January 1559.²

This acceleration of Venice's defensive strategy in Cyprus showed that the *Signoria* no longer viewed the island as separate from its other *Stato da Mar* territories.³ The consequences of this policy brought tangible results on the ground, but the question of building a new fortress, an oft-pondered subject since the mid-1540s, was left unanswered. One of the striking aspects of this period was a more systematic incorporation of Cyprus' different social strata into the island's general defensive system, which in just fifteen years saw nearly all of the Cypriot population become involved. This was not audacious political manoeuvring from the *Signoria*, but simply a realization of the material dimension of the problems raised by the application of its new strategy; increasing the number of soldiers and developing a polycentric fortification network demanded far more human and financial resources than Venice alone or the *camera del Regno* could provide. In 1559 Councillor Antonio Zane confirmed that two thirds of the *camera's* outgoing expenses went on military affairs: 16,000 ducats were accorded to the Famagusta and Cerines garrisons, 14,500 ducats to the *stratia* (composed of 400 *stradioti* and 200 turcopoles), 5,500 to the paid cavalry (*provisionnati*), and 8,500 to the construction of the Famagusta fortress and the Cerines castle, plus a further 3,600 ducats newly requested by the Senate, for the same purpose.⁴ Military spending reached proportions

1 Cf. supra, pp. 57–58. 2 ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 92^v. It should be noted that the Council of Ten had given Andrea Duodo full authority over all of the island's armed forces on 21 February 1558: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti comuni, filza 76, c. 198 / II; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 47^{r-v}, 82^{r-v}; id., *Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti ad alcun archivio*, b. 6. 3 Concerning Venice's defensive policy across its empire from 1555 to 1562, see: Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 98–106; M. Knapton, 'Tra dominante e dominio (1517–1630)', in G. Cozzi / M. Knapton / G. Scarabello (eds), *La Repubblica di Venezia nell'età moderna. Dal 1517 alla fine della Repubblica*, Turin 1992, pp. 326–352; Concina / Molteni, 'La fabbrica della fortezza', pp. 158–184. 4 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Antonio Zane, f. 2^v; it should be noted that an inventory of the *camera fiscale's* balance of payments for the year 1559 presents almost identical figures to those

untenable for the colony's budget, forcing Venice to enlist the help of local communities to apply its strategy, in accordance with a custom long held in the *Terraferma* and Crete.⁵ As expected, the overall degree of affluence of each social group brought different kinds of participation in the collective undertaking.

The effort required of the Cypriot elite took two complementary forms, each one accentuating the political role of the nobility in the decision-making process. Whilst work on the San Marco bastion continued in Famagusta under the supervision of Ercole Martingano, the question of building a new fortress was made the island's main topic of discussion by the Nicosia *università*, which sent two embassies to the Senate during the first two months of 1559. The first, a solemn affair, was led by Eugenio Singlitico, the count of Rochas, Giacomo de Nores, the count of Tripoli, and Andrea San Zuanne; on 7 January the three men at once asked the senators to choose the Cerines site for the building of a second fortress, as the Famagusta enceinte alone was not enough to protect the whole Cypriot population. The other requests the men made illustrate how the *università* took a global, general approach to the question of defending the island; it sought an increase in the number of horses in the cavalry, the creation of a 10,000-strong *francomati* militia, the sending of weapons, artillery and *provveditori generali*, and the possibility of minting coins to meet the island's needs. The Cypriot aristocracy kept up the pressure with a second embassy; on 24 February, seven procurators and delegates reiterated the demands of their predecessors, and also lodged complaints against the captain of Famagusta, accused of trampling on the nobility's feudal privileges.⁶

The resulting discussions in Venice are not reported in any detail, but they lasted several months; on 28 February 1559 the Senate partly acceded to some of the *università*'s requests, readily agreeing to the sending of weapons and the nomination of successors to Sebastiano Venier; it also accepted the idea of an equestrian corps made up of around 1,000 horses in total, and agreed to raise the number of militiamen to 5,000. However, two fundamental requests were controversial: the choice of which site to fortify and the financial contribution of the nobility to construction costs.⁷ In May negotiations turned to the ambassadors' disadvantage, the Senate not granting the *università* the right to impose new taxes in order to strengthen its resources.⁸

The impasse that arose in spring 1559 dragged on for nearly three years, despite the

given by Zane, even though it shows a different organization of the distribution of military spending: BNM, *ms. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, ff. 185^r–186^r. 5 Knapton, 'Guerra e finanza (1381–1508)', pp. 275–286, and 'Tra dominante e dominio (1517–1630)', pp. 412–419; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 108–109.

6 The chronology of these embassies is unclear, as there is no precisely dated evidence, documents being spread amongst: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 129^r–131^v; ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 100^v–102^r, 164^r–169^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 1 [Capitoli della magnifica Università]*. The names of the ambassadors who went on the second mission are listed: Tutio Costanzo (*università* procurator), Zufre Babin (vice-procurator), Hieronimo Attar (vice-proveditor), Hieronimo Bustron, Ugo Flatro, Piero Hierusalem and Hieronymo Zappe. 7 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 129^v–131^v. 8 ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 164^v–165^r [*Capitoli di Cipro*]; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 129^r–132^r, 133^r–135^v.

increasingly pressing Ottoman threat; the Senate decided to prioritize the project to renovate the Bergamo fortress, investing money which, of course, could no longer be accorded to Cyprus.⁹ Moreover, the choice of Cerines as the site for the future fortress did not meet with consensus amongst Venetian leaders, who consequently decided to send an engineer to the island to explore the different possibilities. Even amongst the Cypriot aristocracy there was no unanimity regarding the fortification of Cerines, as the project ruled out the possibility of protecting Nicosia. It should be recalled that, in July 1558, Girolamo Martinengo had accepted the idea of giving the capital a modern enceinte (doc. 4); in Martinengo's wake, Agostino Clusone, first on 3 July 1559 then again in 1560, declared himself in favour of fortifying the city, proof that the idea of security for Nicosia's palaces and houses beguiled the nobility, making it more eager to finance the project.¹⁰

The idea of fortifying Nicosia was, nevertheless, not the order of the day in spring 1559, and the absence of any clear explanation between the Venetian authorities and the *università* lasted right up until spring 1562, when the Senate took the initiative by deciding to fortify Cerines on 11 March, basing its decision on the favourable opinions of Agostino Clusone, Ercole Martinengo, Sforza Pallavicino and other officers.¹¹ The senators decreed that the financing of the project, which would cost an estimated 144,000 ducats, be split between three financial backers: the *camera del Regno* was ordered to provide 10 carats of the total expenses (42%), the Cypriot Latin clergy was ordered to give 6 carats (25%), and the *Regno's* laymen 8 carats (33%). To secure the support of the Cypriot nobility, the Senate accepted two concessions: it gave the *università* the freedom to divide up individual contributions and to impose new taxes.¹² With this unilateral decision, the *Signoria* revived the application of its defensive strategy in Cyprus, at the risk of aggravating the Nicosian aristocracy; as usual, the

9 Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 108–111. 10 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili I*, report dated 13 July 1559; BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 256^v–257^r: "Et quando si fortificasse nel modo ch'è il disegno, vi sono le muraglie vecchie, delle quali si potria prevaler, vi sono bonissimi tuffi et in abbondantia per far muraglie, si fariano calcine con facilità, per che quei gentilhuomini et cavalieri dell'isola le fariano far alle sue ville per esser desiderosi d'esser fortificati. Si trovano bonissimi terreni per far plitte, che sariano perfette per far le muraglie di dette plitte, et poi farli la sua camisa di muro, et vi sono buoni terreni per far spalti. Vi è bellissimo sito, com(e) appar nel disegno, se vi trova ancora bellissimo per fare un castello da metter vi dentro monitioni, arteglia et la fantaria italiana, et vi sono acque bonissime per uso d'ogni quantità grande di persone, oltre alli bestiami, che vi fossero. [§] Et perciò starebbe bene fortificata tanto più per esser città regia, habitata da tutti li gentilhuomeni grandi dell'isola con un popolo di 30 000 persone in circa. La qual ha di circuito miglia sej et due terzi, facendosi com'è il disegno, dove si potrebbero salvare i villani, formenti, vini, orzj, olij, bestiami et paglie dell'isola, le qual tutte cose si potrebbero facilmente nella detta fortezza ridurle, essendovi tutti li gentilhuomini dell'isola, et si fortifichera con poca spesa del pubblico, perciò che quei gentihuomeni con il popolo, che è in numero da 18 000 in circa, et li parici da 50 000 computati però li regij, quali tutti in tempo d'ogni minimo sospetto di guerra si trovano in grandissima fuga, et fastidio, per non haver fortezza alcuna da salvarsi, et perciò farebbono ogni lor potere per esser posti sicuri in fortezza, havendo quivi le lor case et palazzi, per molti migliaia di scudi, et dove hanno bellissimi monasterij con li sepulcri de suoi defonti passati, per le quelle tutte cose non si potria dar maggior contento alli predetti suoi fidelissimi sudditi, li quali essendoli fideli maggiormente ponendoli in questa sicurtà li resteriano schiavi fidelissimi et affetionati". 11 Sforza Pallavicino wrote a special report on Cyprus, on 26 January 1562: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, s.f. 12 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 20^v–21^r, 63^v–64^r; id., *Senato Mar*, filza 26.

università responded by sending three procurators to the Senate, Eugenio Singlitico, Andrea di San Zuane and Scipio Podocataro, all charged with renewing discussions regarding the contributions to the fortification of Cerines.¹³ This was the context in which Giulio Savorgnan was sent to Cyprus, tasked with, on one hand, giving his opinion on both the work being done in Famagusta and on possible complementary projects to be undertaken at the harbour, and on the other hand coming up with a new plan for Cerines, since Agostino Clusone and Ercole Martinengo's proposals were not consistent, and had not convinced the Venetian authorities.¹⁴

The wrangling surrounding the financing of the Cerines fortification did not escalate into an open crisis between the *Signoria* and the Cypriot aristocracy, for quite clear political reasons; Nicosia's nobility was in a position of total military dependence on Venice, whether to uphold the island's feudal order or to repel an Ottoman attack. The *università*'s discontent with the Senate's orders was thus expressed by a resistance to the application of a schedule for the fortification work, prolonging negotiations over the amounts to be contributed. This attitude most definitely displeased the Venetian authorities, but the *università* was also wise enough to take measures which displayed its full adhesion to the Venetian patriciate's values; on 24 February 1561, by its own authority, it gave Cyprus a sumptuary law modelled on the one in place in Venice, to emphasize the common ethical principles and codified laws linking the Nicosia *università* to the Venetian Senate.¹⁵

The Cypriot aristocracy gave further clear signs of its attachment to the *Signoria*'s military policies by joining the feudal cavalry, another means by which the nobility assumed a major role in the organization of the island's defences. The discipline that the cavalry demanded of its men proved decisive during this period, as this prestigious corps was founded upon a hierarchy of services, established under the Lusignans, corresponding to the size of the fiefs and incomes granted to the men;¹⁶ for a long time Cypriot aristocrats resisted fulfilling their military duties, and used their mastery of administrative and fiscal procedures to evade their obligation to serve. This attitude changed dramatically, however, at the beginning of the 1560s, as evidenced by the *mostra generale* of the feudal cavalry organized by Proveditor-General Andrea Duodo on 28 April 1560: 77 lords (out of 97 summoned) and 182 horses (more than the 177 expected) were present. The success of this review illustrates the nobility's acceptance of the *Signoria*'s military policies, and reveals a clear change in their attitude, as at the *mostra* held three years earlier, in 1557, they had not been at all keen to assume their duty, with 69 absences out of 111 feudatories summoned,

13 ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2, a dispatch dated 20 August 1562; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 63^v–64^r. 14 Id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 20^v–21^r; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 113–115; see also infra, docs 7–12. 15 G. Grivaud, 'Les enjeux d'une loi somptuaire promulguée à Chypre en 1561', in Ch. Maltezou / A. Tzavara / D. Vlassi (eds), *I Greci durante la venetocrazia. Uomini, spazi, idee (XIII–XVIII sec.)*, Venice 2009, pp. 351–371. 16 There were fundamentally three types of service: that of the knight (*servitio di cavalier*), that of the man of arms (*servitio di uomo d'arme*) and that of the turcopole (*servitio di turcopuliero*); for knights, four horses had to be provided, for men of arms two horses, and for turcopoles one horse, as Florio Bustron recalls, *Historia overo Commentarii di Cipro*, pp. 465–468.

and only 115 horses being presented; at the May 1559 *mostra* there were even less horses present, just 103.¹⁷ Reports on the feudal cavalry written by Venetian officers show the degree to which, in 1560, the Cypriot nobility changed its behaviour towards Venice's military policies, even if the financing of the Cerines project was a stumbling block between these two partners who had been forced to get along.

The discord between the *Signoria* and the Nicosia *università* went no further than the question of the new fortress; aside from this, evidence shows that they fully agreed on what was required militarily. The desire for an increase in troop numbers expressed by the Senate in July 1558, then by the *università* embassy in January 1559, was reflected in a series of measures which progressively transformed the organization of the island's defences. Regarding the *stradioti* cavalry, the reform of the corps did not follow the proposals Giulio Savorgnan made in 1558 (doc. 2), nor the arrangements decreed by the Senate on 16 July 1558. In May 1559 Antonio Zane bemoaned, as had other officers before him, the feeble incomes accorded to the cavaliers, a salary of 18 ducats per year and 30 *mozzade* of land; with such little money, the *stradioti* were forced to work their land to survive, and at harvest time they became peasants. The passing on of a *stradioti*'s duties after his death raised further problems, and, to avoid lengthy recruitment processes, a systematic transfer of the post to the father's eldest son was hoped for. It was hoped too that the number of *stradioti* on the island would be increased to 1,000 cavaliers, but other officers spoke of twice this number.¹⁸ Though the boost was not so sizeable, since such an increase would have necessitated a complete reworking of the cavaliers' mode of payment, the number of *stradioti* was augmented, going from 400 in 1559 to 732 in 1561.¹⁹ The attention being paid to the *stradioti*'s training was also reflected in the choice of an experienced officer as the cavalry governor, Alexandro Lascari Megaduca, who had to be persuaded to come to Cyprus, but was eventually appointed in September 1560.²⁰

Amongst the other sections of Cypriot society called upon to contribute to the military effort were the *francomati* peasants, who had already been sought to compose the first mounted arquebusier companies, as per the Senate's decision of 22 July 1558.²¹ Being recruited to the militia (*cernide*) was seen as a form of public service, bringing exemption

17 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Antonio Zane (1559), f. 8^v, report from Captain Domenico Trevisan (1560), f. 2^v; Grivaud/Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', pp. 176–178, 189–199. 18 ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 161^v–162^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberationi (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 55^r–56^r; Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 616–618. 19 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Antonio Zane, f. 2^v; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, report from Domenigo Trevisan, f. 3^r. See also infra, doc. 14. 20 It was Proveditor-General Andrea Duodo who named Alexandro Lascari Megaduca cavalry governor: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2, dispatch from Andrea Duodo dated 20 September 1560, and dispatches from Vice-Luocotenente Bernardo Bellegno and Proveditor-General Zuan Matteo Bembo dated 15 April 1562; Megaduca remained in this post until his death in August 1563, and was succeeded by the cavalier Tomaso Musachi: *ibid.*, b. 4, dispatch dated 13 August 1563; from 1575 until 1583, Tomaso Musachi was governor of the *stratiote* cavalry in Corfu and in Cephalonia: Pagratis, *Οι εθέσεις των βενετών βαίλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 172, 246; Tsiknakis, *Οι εθέσεις των βενετών προνοητών της Κεφαλονιάς*, pp. 63, 71. 21 Cf. supra, p. 88.

from other requisitions required of the peasantry (working on fortification projects, working on the salt flats, tending ovens, carting materials, guarding the coasts), and the upkeep of the *militia* was paid for by a tax of one bezant imposed on all adult males (from fifteen to sixty years old); in late January 1559 the Senate took the decision to raise the number of militiamen from 3,000 to 5,000, and approximately 1,000 of these men were to be recruited in Nicosia.²² The Cypriot *cernide* were put in place progressively, as problems arose; there were cases of fraud in the payment of the *cernide* tax, and difficulties recruiting soldiers from peasant households due to the relative scarceness of able men; moreover, the *francomati* who were enlisted wanted their exemptions from public service to continue after their demobilization. Despite this resistance, linked to the *francomati* peasantry's need for economic and social emancipation, the *cernide* troops were formed and trained by Venetian officers, regardless of Proveditor-General Zuan Matteo Bembo's doubts about their loyalty to San Marco and their ability to fight against hardened, professional armies.²³

The involvement of Nicosia's population in the defence of their city unquestionably signalled a symbolic turning point in the military history of the Venetian colony. In the Lusignan era and under the reign of Catherine Cornaro, Nicosians defended the enceinte built by Henry II and Peter I, alongside real soldiers, but this practice disappeared once Venice took power, without any official explanation being given; most probably, now that the enceinte no longer had a protective function, it no longer needed guarding and defending, which made the conscription of civilians pointless.²⁴ Consequently, the forces stationed in the *Regno* capital were a mere 60 *provisionnati* in the surrounding area of the *luocotenente's* palace, and the city gates were left to tax officials or the viscount's agents, the people in charge of collecting excises.²⁵ The Senate's January 1559 decision to entrust the defence of Nicosia to a corps of 1,000 militiamen was thus a reviving of medieval tradition; split into four companies, the *cernide* were put under the command of Greek captains tasked with organizing their contingents "in piazza da basso al curiazo et al monastero del Bibi". As with the peasant militia, the creation of this corps was not devoid of problems, and Proveditor-General Andrea Duodo bemoaned how little success he had in trying to hold inspections, each Sunday, of poor men and merchants who shirked their duty, were badly equipped and had no discipline; Duodo's authority over these troops was, moreover, disputed by the Nicosia viscount, the Senate not having thought about the institutional consequences of creating urban militia.²⁶ Despite these pitfalls, the militia were successfully organized, both in

22 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 96^v, 100^v–101^v. 23 Id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Captain Domenico Trevisan (1560), f. 4^{r-v}; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2, dispatch from Zuan Matteo Bembo dated 20 April 1562, b. 5, dispatches from Andrea Duodo dated 2 April 1560 and 24 October 1560.

24 Concerning the participation of Nicosians in the defence of their city under the Lusignans: G. Grivaud, *Grecs et Francs dans le royaume de Chypre (1191–1474). Les voies de l'acculturation*, 'Habilitation à diriger des recherches' thesis, Université de Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne, December 2001, pp. 271–273; id., 'Un règne sans fastes. Catherine Cornaro à travers les sources produites à Chypre', in C. Syndikus/S. Rogge (eds), *Caterina Cornaro: Last Queen of Cyprus and Daughter of Venice / Ultima regina di Cipro e figlia di Venezia*, Münster 2013, pp. 242–244. 25 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, f. 68^r; id., *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 153, f. 198^v. 26 ASV, *Senato*

Nicosia and the countryside; in 1561, Domenico Trevisan stated that the fifteen companies of Cypriot *cernide* contained, in the end, 4,620 men, mostly *francomati*; coming after three years of laborious efforts, this was no mean feat.²⁷

The enhancement of military training went hand in hand with the strengthening of Famagusta's fortress, where the construction of the San Marco bastion was continuing unabated; in August 1559 a direct injunction from the Council of Ten ordered the Cypriot *camera* to give a further 300 ducats towards all the work being done on the town's fortress, to bring the funding of the Famagusta project up to 1,000 ducats per month, over the course of four years. The size of this investment illustrates the priority the *Signoria* was now according to the project, as well as the urgency with which she wanted to finish the new bastion. In December 1559 Ercole Martinengo boasted a workforce of 300 to 400 *francomati* labourers, plus the galley sailors who had been demobilized during the winter season.²⁸ The death of Martinengo, in late December 1560, did not interrupt construction, even though his technical skill was clearly not matched by his immediate replacement, his son Zuan Maria, the interim leader pending the arrival of a new army governor.²⁹ It was now the *regimento's* duty to provide the financial and military resources required to keep the work going, as Vice-*Luocotenente* Bernardo Bellegno stated in April 1562.³⁰ Nevertheless, a top-level military and technical expert was needed to properly organize the work if the modernization of Famagusta's enceinte was to be successful, as the reports from Venetian officers returning from the island did not contain enough concrete detail for Venice to make a decision.

In these circumstances, the sending of Giulio Savorgnan to Cyprus met exactly the needs of the Venetian authorities, who were at an impasse in their efforts to decide upon the nature of the work to be done in Famagusta and upon the plan for, or dimensions of, the Cerines fortification project. Thus, when Giulio left the *Terraferma* for Crete, where he was appointed fortress governor on 11 March 1562, Venice first sent him to Cyprus, so that he could provide the Senate with the information it needed to settle matters that had been left unresolved for three years.³¹ To this end, Giulio was accompanied by Giovanni Magagnato from Rethymno, who was to make the plans, drawings and models to be sent to Venice in order that decisions may be made.³² Giulio was also helped by his brother Ascanio, who roamed the island examining the suitability of each of the potential fortification sites, whilst Giulio stayed within the radius of Salina–Famagusta–Nicosia–Cerines. It should be noted

Mar, filza 21, letter from *Luocotenente* Giovanni Renier dated 8 June 1559; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 1, dispatch dated 8 May 1559, b. 5, dispatch from Andrea Duodo and Lorenzo Bembo dated 15 April 1559, dispatch from Andrea Duodo dated 14 May 1560; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti comuni, filza 76, c. 198/I.

²⁷ CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 215, f. 3^{r-v}. ²⁸ ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 102b; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 5, dispatch from Andrea Duodo dated 1 December 1559. ²⁹ Id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2, dispatch from Zacharia Barbaro, Andrea Duodo and Domenico Trevisan dated 25 January 1561. ³⁰ Ibid., dispatch dated 15 April 1562. ³¹ In Manno's opinion, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 108–111, the amount of time it took Venice to decide to build a new fortress in Cyprus was most probably linked to the priority the Senate accorded to the Bergamo project.

³² ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 171^v; infra, docs 5, 7, 12; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 113–115.

that the sharing of expert tasks between the two brothers corresponds exactly to the Savorgnan *fraterna*'s principles of working together, although there is no documentary evidence to prove that Giulio brought his younger brother with him by his own authority. Further members of Giulio's retinue were his aides-de-camp, men he trusted, amongst whom figured Orazio Governa, who from 1558 onwards followed his master uninterruptedly on all of his missions; Ascanio too was probably part of Giulio's company, at the behest of his elder brother, just for the Cyprus mission, since Ascanio did not stay in Crete after September 1562, as will be seen later.

The analysis of letters and reports that Giulio Savorgnan sent from Cyprus in summer 1562 clearly shows his capacity to fulfil as precisely as possible the series of duties he had been given (doc. 6). Giulio met Venice's expectations, providing exact measurements of the enceintes and moats, and giving detailed reflections on the nature of the ground and the coastline. Seeing the Cypriot terrain for himself did not cause him to go back on the ideas he had expressed in 1557 and 1558; on 12 January 1562, before his mission had been decided or organized, Giulio reiterated his opinion that Famagusta could not be protected without a long and costly construction project; the Saint Catherine rocks had to be incorporated into the enceinte, which would lead to building a colossal fortress equipped with eight modern bastions, a solution which was clearly inconceivable in view of the sums required.³³ Giulio repeated his Famagusta argument in more detail, to show the Venetian authorities that building an enceinte would be a bottomless money pit, and that it was difficult to tell how long such a project would last; Savorgnan seems to have thus discredited Ercole Martinengo's initiatives, without proposing any real alternative, leaving it to Venice to make a more judicious decision (doc. 7). Giulio was undoubtedly disappointed with his discovery of the real state of affairs in Cyprus, as he told Sforza Pallavicino; he had arrived in a country whose reputation of wealth was inflated, where an Italian's health was threatened, and where Venetian rules of military life were ill-adapted to local conditions (doc. 8).

After spending two weeks in Famagusta, from 22 July to 9 August, Giulio went on to Cerines, where on 15 August he dictated three letters, all concerning the Cerines fortification project (docs 9, 10, 11); although they were addressed to three different authorities – the doge, Sforza Pallavicino and the *provveditori alle fortezze* – the letters complement each other, and the level of detail increases in precision and technicality depending on whom Giulio is writing to. At the end of his analyses, Giulio admits that the walls of the Cerines castle could be used to build a new enceinte with a rectangular perimeter, around 4 km long, and equipped with six bastions. He does not forget his role as expert, however, and is relatively hypocritical regarding the cost of his proposed project, only giving an estimate of the cost of digging moats for the section that would be easy to excavate (50,000 to 60,000 ducats); implicitly, Giulio infers that, due to the nature of the ground, this new fortress will be very costly, without ever expressly stating that the project will be difficult to carry out from a financial point of view.

³³ Cf. *infra*, doc. 5; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 112.

The proposal to fortify Cerines met with no great enthusiasm from the Cypriot nobility, if Giulio's last letter sent from Nicosia, on 13 September, is to be believed; therein he reveals that a rival proposal had been made, to fortify Paphos (doc. 12).³⁴ This idea, doubtless advanced in order to neutralize the Cerines project, actually led to two plans being drawn up, one of which gave the site an enceinte equipped with several bastions.³⁵ Giulio's time on the island clearly caused controversy, and his expertise did not result in the expected resolution of the question of building a new enceinte. When he resumed his analysis in 1566, after the four-year interruption represented by his time in Crete, Giulio did not hesitate to rebuff the Paphos project and revive his plan to fortify Cerines (doc. 15). In other words, Giulio's first mission in Cyprus did not lead to problems being solved or tensions being calmed.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 115; it seems that Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier already asked for works in Paphos' harbour in 1557: Tenenti, *Cristoforo da Canal. La marine vénitienne*, p. 130. ³⁵ P. Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane, 1580–1797*, Milan 1984, p. 203: “Pianta di BAFFO di detto Regno, con alcuni progetti, con bastioni, conché rendere più diffensibile quel recinto, con scala, e bussola, d'auttore anonimo ... Altra pianta di detto, pure con progetto di bastioni reali, d'auttore anonimo, con scala, e bussola, ed alcuni annotazioni”; a drawing of Paphos by Marcello Alessandri, in 1620, seems to revive these plans, cf. fig. 51. The Paphos project still went on in March 1567, at the request of Zuan Mattheo Bembo: ASV, *Senato, Deliberazioni (Secreta)*, reg. 75, f. 28^r.

5 *G.S.'s opinions regarding the defence of Famagusta, Venice, 12 January 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 23^v-24^r.

In response to a request from the Signoria for his opinion on the defence of Cyprus, and in particular that of Famagusta, G.S. explains that he is basing his opinion on a map, as he has never set foot on the island. Famagusta is undoubtedly the main fortress, but, apart from the recently installed bastion, it has old-style walls. The town's fortifications must be reinforced with five additional bastions, and in order for them to face each other the moat must be enlarged considerably.

Unfortunately, the moat must be dug out of rock, which entails excessive costs, as shown by the expenses incurred installing the bastion. G.S. remarks, moreover, that galleys cannot really provide relief to Famagusta in the summertime, but can in winter, when the Ottoman fleet cannot station itself at sea; however, a concern is that in the event of a siege the Ottomans will seize the main rock situated at the entrance to the harbour, and will thus be able to control the whole line of rocks closing off the old harbour, rendering access to the town impossible.

All things considered, the town can hardly be defended at all, rendering the situation quite hopeless. The rocks, especially the biggest one, should therefore be secured, in accordance with the drawing that G.S. has enclosed with his report.

If the rock and the whole harbour are to be incorporated into the fortification, an eight-bastion enceinte should be installed, taking care to include therein the higher areas to the south; this plan would also allow the spring that supplies the town's water to be brought into the fortress, heightening the latter's capacity.

If the rock is not incorporated into the fortification, the enceinte will have six bastions, including the one already built. It would be up to the Signoria in this case to make a decision in accordance with available funds, but G.S. thinks the eight-bastion solution is best.

Regarding other ways of defending the island, G.S. refers the Signoria to one of his previous reports, wherein he maintained that large Mediterranean islands cannot be defended by a single fortified town or city, as shown in the cases of Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, which can, on the other hand, be easily relieved from neighbouring countries. A single fortress for Cyprus is not enough, especially considering the former's numerous shortcomings.

CIPRO

] 1562 alli 12 zenaro.

] Consulto sopra Famagosta.

Serenissime Principe, Illustrissimi e Eccellentissimi Signori,

Come obediente servitor de Vostra Serenità, respondendo io Giulio Savorgnano alla proposta fattami da Lei sopra la materia del'isola de Cipro, et particolarmente della città di Famagosta et suo porto, fondandomi sopra il disegno propostomi inanzi, non essendo io mai stato in quel locho, dico che la prima consideratione si ha da havere che Vostra Serenità non ha in quel Regno se non Famagosta per fortezza principale, et Cerines per tanto quanto è locho picholo. La qualità veramente di Famagosta, con grandissima spesa de Vostra Serenità,

è bene assettata di bone muraglie e fossa, ma però alla anticha senza beluardi¹ moderni forse più grandi di quel uno che Vostra Serenità li ha fatto fare da cinque anni in qua,² et non solamente a Vostra Serenità va la spesa di far li beluardi, ma di necessità bisogna far le fosse largissime, acioché un beluardo possa veder l'altro, et defendersi con l'artegliaria, altramente non sarebbe fortezza, et facendosi tali beluardi venga tutti a cadere nella fossa vecchia, di modo che bisogna cavarli fossa nova più in fori, et ciò sarebbe poca cosa alle Illustrissime Signorie Vostre, sì per la spesa come per il tempo, quando tal fosse si havessero a cavare in terreno.

Ma per qual che intendo da diversi, tutta la fossa di Famagosta si convien cavar nel sasso che loro la chiamano rocha con grandissima difficoltà e spesa. Havendo Vostra Serenità fatta isperienza in quel uno beluardo fatto a Famagosta ultimamente, La potria da quello far li Soi calcholi, quanta spesa li andarà a far li altri cinque che manchano et medesimamente in quanto tempo si potranno far tutti. Et un solo di essi beluardi che manchasse farà esser tutta la fortezza diffettiva et non forte. Io admitto che Vostra Serenità l'abbia ridotta a questa perfectione detta di sopra. Mi resta un dubio per le informationi che ho haute da diversi pratici di quell'isola, in che modo che quella fortezza si dovrebbe soccorrere in tempo che da Turchi fusse assediata, in tempo di estate da tutti li pratici da mare mi vien fatta gran difficoltà et quasi impossibile a soccorerla con naviglij da remo. Ma tutti concoreno in opinione chel'inverno con navi armate, o con galee grosse più facilmente si potrebbe soccorrere, essendo che l'armata turchescha de inverno non potrebbe star sul mare come farebbe la estate. Se prosupone adonque che navi li potranno andare, ma qui nasce una difficoltà importante al mio parere, in che modo che queste navi potessero disarcicare le gienti, monitioni et vituaglie in la fortezza, essendo che se l'essercito nemico assediassse detta fortezza, è da credere che fussero patroni delle rive del mare più vicine, che potessero alle mure de Famagosta con bona quantità d'artegliaria che a loro non manca, et che la notte cerchariano de inpatronirse de quel magior scoglio che sta a Famagosta per levante, qual scoglio / [24^r] se è in essere come mi dimonstrano doi disegni, che ho havuti da Vostra Serenità circonda circha 700 passa,³ et fattose patroni li nemici di questo schoglio grande con trincee portando il terreno in più notte, ovvero con sacchi de coton, in modo tale che fussero coperti dal artegliaria di Famagosta qual li è lontana 300 passi. Mediante questo schoglio se inpatronirebbono ancho di quelli altri scogli et secche qual fanno il porto vecchio, et metendo del artegliaria in essi, per quel iuditio che si pò fare con disegni et modelli, et per le parole d'altri, iudicarei che navi de Vostra Serenità non potrebono soccorrere detta fortezza, rispetto a certe secche et che li bisognano più venti, et intra-

1 *a di modo che a volerla nominar fortezza moderna bisogna farli cinque beluardi* added in the left-hand margin, with signe-de-renvoi. 2 This is the San Marco bastion, which was later named the Martinengo bastion after Count Hercole Martinengo's death; cf. infra, doc. 6 n. 12. 3 These rocks close off the Famagusta harbour, and on Leonida Attar's map they are named *Il Bo* and *Santa Caterina*: Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 137 and fig. 24b. They are sometimes mentioned in sixteenth-century portolans and *Isolarii*: A. Delatte, *Les portulans grecs*, Liège / Paris 1957, vol. 1, p. 126 ("τὸ νησὶν τῶν Βοδέων καὶ τὴν Ἀγίαν Αἰκατερίνην"); A. Stylianos / J. A. Stylianos, *The History of the Cartography of Cyprus*, Nicosia 1980, p. 193 fig. 21 (Benedetto Bordone), p. 201 fig. 28 (Battista Agnese), p. 207 fig. 33 (Anonymous), p. 210 fig. 36 (Giovanni Francesco Camocio); G. Toliás, *Τα ησολόγια. Η μοναξιά και η συντροφιὰ των ησιῶν*, Athens 2002, p. 113 (Battista Agnese).

venendoli ogni pichol spatio di tempo, l'artiglieria nemica batterebbe a fondi ogni sorte di naviglij per la vicinità et quantità d'artegliaria da più bande tirata dal nemico.

Dico adonque che ogni fortezza che resti priva et senza speranza de soccorer da niuna sorte di tempo sta in evidentissimo pericolo, et si deve havere per cura disperata. Onde altro remedio come soldato et servitor suo non saperei che dire, senon che Vostra Serenità lei se inpatronischa di quel scoglio grande che per consequentia sarebbe ancho patrona de quelli scoglij picholi, et questo sarebbe il modo che naviglij grossi di inverno con fortuna potrebbono soccorrere Famagosta mediante l'abrazar questo scoglio maggiore, come Vostra Serenità potrà vedere per il disegno che lei mi ha fatto dare, sopra il quale ho dissignato il modo che, per mia opinione, si dovrebbe fare quanto ho detto di sopra.⁴

Nel qual modo li andarebbono in tutto et per tutto otto beluardi, pigliando il scoglio detto, et tutto il porto dentro. Oltra di ciò si vien a inpatronirsi di quella certa altura, qual sta per ostro a Famagosta, dallaqual si discoprirà con un cavallero di terra una certa grandissima bassura, qual mi vien detto che sarebbe un comodo alloggio alli nemici, il che è ponto d'importanza. Più oltra con questa forma di otto belluardi in tutto si vien ad avvanzar, et tirar dentro della fortezza quella fontana, qual è per sirocho che è laudata per miglio acqua che sia in Famagosta et di bona quantità, et questa cosa è ancho digna di consideratione. Et la fortezza restarà capace assai più di quello, che la è al presente, nella qual capacità potranno venir ad habitar et saluarsi gran quantità di quelli del'isola che haverano il modo de portar da viver per loro et per altri.

Concludo adonque che a voler fortificar Famagosta / [24^v] nel modo che la è al presente, senza haver il beneficio del soccorso da mare, in tutto li vanno sei beluardi, metendo quello che è gia fatto, ma pigliando il scoglio et porto et grandendo la terra, abrazzando anchora la fontana et levando il logiamento al nemico, li andarebbe in tutto otto belluardi per liquali quatro beneficij et avvantagij porta la spesa di fare li doi belluardi di più. Ma Vostra Serenità parendoli si potrà far calcular con diligentia il tempo, et la spesa che andarebbe a far li sei belluardi per la fortezza vecchia, et se ella si risolvera de farli tutti sei, con ogni debita reverentia direi che si facessero più presto li otto per le ragioni dette di sopra.

Quanto veramente ad altre sorte di difese di quel Regno mi riporto a una mia scrittura qual diedi a Vostra Serenità già quatro anni,⁵ in conformità della quale dico di più, che dopoi si è verificata la mia opinione essendo che l'isola de Corsicha è stata conservata da Gienoesi contra Francesi, per haver havuto loro Gienovesi cinque fortezze in detta isola, cioè Bonifatio, San Fiorenzo, Calvi, Aiazzio et la Bastia, dove che se ne havessero havuta una sola, come ne persero due, non l'haverebbono potuta conservare.⁶ Et per questo esempio, il Re Filippo in

4 The drawing G.S. is referring to would appear to match the one in the AST, as the latter also shows eight bastions and places the harbour inside the enceinte; cf. fig. 31. 5 This is a reference both to the 1557 report on Famagusta, cf. supra, doc. 1, and to the report co-signed by Savorgnan, cf. supra, doc. 4. 6 The Genoese did indeed resist France's 1553–1556 Corsica expedition, thanks to the fortresses of Bonifacio, Calvi, Ajaccio, Bastia and San Fiorenzo / Saint-Florent. However, it was the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis on 3 April 1559 that definitively returned Corsica to Genoa: R. Emmanuelli, 'Le temps de Sampiero', in P. Arrighi / A. Olivesi (eds), *Histoire de la Corse*, Toulouse 1990, pp. 221–227.

Sardegna havendo solamente la fortezza de Cagliari, questo anno del 61 ha mandato in detta isola de Sardegna il signor Sigismondo Boschetto a fortificar tre altri lochi, non li parendo che una fortezza basti a conservar quel isola.⁷ Et se la Sardegna non ha da esser sicura con una fortezza sola, essendo quel isola tanto vicina alla Cicilia, alla Corsicha, alla Italia, e alla Spagna da cadauna dalle qual parti può esser soccorsa facilmente, tanto mancho il Regno di Cipro lontano da soccorsi deve restar sicuro con una fortezza sola della qualità imperfetta detta di sopra. Et del tutto mi riporto a miglior pareri e a maior remedij, restando servitor de Vostra Serenità mi racomando in sua bona gratia.

Data in Venetia alli 12 zenaro del 62.

Di Vostra Serenità fidel servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



6 *Letter from the doge, Girolami Priuli, concerning G.S.'s mission to Cyprus, Venice, 16 April 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 27^v–28^v.

The doge informs Luocotenente Pietro Navagiero, captain of Famagusta Pandolpho Guaro and Proveditor-General Giovanni Matteo Bembo that on the 14th of last March the Senate decided to send G.S. to Cyprus, before his passage onwards to Crete. Having already delivered his report on the defence of Cyprus, he will go and examine Famagusta's fortifications, in particular the harbour around the rocks, and decide if the latter should be incorporated into the enceinte.

G.S. will set sail on the Quirina, which will also be taking the luocotenente to Cyprus. Once there, the two officers are to meet with the captain, the proveditor-general and the Famagusta governor, Nadal da Crema, and examine in particular the rocks at the harbour; a scale model of the site with exact measurements is to be produced, and all topographical and technical information to be brought together, particularly information concerning the different depths of the harbour. Each officer is to give a detailed assessment of the work to be undertaken, of the curtains that are to link the rocks, of the cost and duration of the work, and of the harbour's capacity, which will vary depending on the types of ship it is holding. The information gathered and the individual reports delivered by the officers will enable a decision on what kind of work is needed to make the fortress secure.

Afterwards, G.S. will go to Cerines accompanied by the captain, the proveditor-general and the governor; they will be tasked with producing one or more (depending on how many ideas are put forward) scale models of the new fortress, again with all necessary measurements. They will take into consideration the two designs already proposed for the Cerines fortress by

⁷ The architect Sigismondo Boschetto is unknown in the history of Spanish Sardinian fortifications; the architect who led the reinforcements of Sardinia's defences for Charles V was Rocco Cappellino from Cremona, who worked on the island from 1552 to 1572, aided by Giorgio Palearo: S. Casu / A. Dessì / R. Turtas, 'La difesa del regno: le fortificazioni', in F. Manconi (ed.), *La società sarda in età spagnola*, Cagliari 1992, vol. 1, pp. 64–73.

Ercole Martinengo and Agostino Clusone, from which more scale models will be produced.

After accomplishing his mission in Cyprus, G.S. will go to Crete; Pandolpho Guaro and the captain of the Cypriot maritime guard will have the job of getting him there. It will be the responsibility of the captain and the proveditor-general to apply the decisions taken in the Senate concerning the digging of the moat and the completion of the unfinished bastion, in accordance with the recently approved scale model.

] 1562 alli 16 aprile.

Hieronimus Priolus¹ Dei Gratia Dux Veneti etc. Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Petro Navagerio² de suo mandato locumtenenti proficiscenti, Pandulpho Gauro capitano,³ Joanni Mattheo Bembo provisorii generali et syndico⁴ et consiliarijs Regni Cipri,⁵ et successoribus suis

1 Girolamo Priuli (c. 1486–1567) replaced his brother Lorenzo as doge on 1 November 1559; his mandate was a period of peace and relative prosperity. He died of a stroke on 4 November 1567: A. Da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia nella vita pubblica e privata*, Milan 1960, pp. 268–270. 2 Pietro Navagiero, *di Bernardo*, was born in 1520 and was captain of Famagusta from June 1557 to June 1559; on 14 December 1561 he was chosen as *luocotenente* of Cyprus for a period of two years beginning in April 1562, but he had yet to leave at the start of May: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni in Maggior consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 174^v–175^f, reg. 4, ff. 182^v–183^f; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 7, f. 78^{r-v}; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. V, p. 469. 3 Pandolfo Gauro, *di Giusto*, was a proveditor on prisoner galleys from January 1559 to January 1560, then was made a galley governor in March 1560. On 19 January 1561 he was elected captain of Famagusta, and occupied this biennial post starting in September 1561. He once again became a galley governor in March 1564, then, upon the death of David Trevisan, was appointed *luocotenente* of Cyprus on 27 January 1566, to take office in May, taking over from the stand-in councillor Giacomo Ghisi. He died soon after in Nicosia on 3 September 1566: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, ff. 37^r, 87^r, 103^r; id., *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 174^v–175^f, reg. 4, ff. 182^v–183^f; id., *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 76^f; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, f. 62^v; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (letter from Giacomo Ghisi dated 3 September 1566). 4 Giovanni Matteo Bembo, *di Alvise*, went down in history for finding the tomb of Venus in Cyprus. Born around 1491, he was the nephew of Cardinal Pietro Bembo; Giovanni Matteo was a senator and a member of the Quarantia, and then a candidate for the dogeship in 1559. Bembo was sent two times to Cyprus: in 1546 he was elected Captain of Famagusta; then on 24 July 1561 he became both a syndic and proveditor-general in Cyprus; having fallen ill, he asked to return to Venice in the autumn of 1562. He was later elected duke of Crete in April 1564, but the Great Council excused him from this office; he died in January 1570. It should be noted that before leaving for Cyprus, for the second time in 1561, Bembo asked to be accompanied by the engineer Zuan Battista de' Zanchi, the author of an essay on fortifications that appeared in Venice in 1554. Finally, in March 1567 he asked Proveditor Francesco Barbaro to think about fortifying Paphos: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 92^v; id., *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 177^v–178^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 116^v, reg. 36, f. 24^f; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, ff. 95^f–97^r (*commissio*), reg. 75, f. 28^f; S. Secchi, 'Giovanni Matteo Bembo', *DBI*, vol. 8, pp. 124–125. Concerning his 'discovery' of Aphrodite's tomb and his decisive intervention in Famagusta's urbanism, see L. Calvelli, *Cipro e la memoria dell'antico fra Medioevo e Rinascimento. La percezione del passato romano dell'isola nel mondo occidentale*, Venice 2009, pp. 143–146, and 'Archaeology in the service of the Dominante. Giovanni Matteo Bembo and the Antiquities of Cyprus', in B. Arbel / E. Chayes / H. Hendrix (eds), *Cyprus and the Renaissance (1450–1650)*, Turnhout 2012, pp. 19–66; T. Papacostas, 'Echoes of the Renaissance in the eastern confines of the Stato da Mar: Architectural evidence from Venetian Cyprus', *Acta Byzantina Fennica* 3 (2010), pp. 159–164; V. Lucchese, 'Famagusta from a Latin perspective: Venetian heraldic shields and other fragmentary remains', in M. J. K. Walsh / P. W. Edbury / N. S. H. Coureas (eds), *Medieval and Renaissance Famagusta*, Farnham 2012, pp. 170–175. 5 The councillors of the Cyprus

fidelibus dilectis salutem, et dilectionis perfectum. Vi significamo come, alli XIIIJ de marzo prossimamente passato, nel Senato nostro è stata presa la parte del tenor infrascritto,⁶ alla quale in quello, che a voi s'appartiene darete la conveniente esecuzione, cioè essendo a proposito hora che si ha buona commodità di passaggio per Cipro / [28^r] chel magnifico domino Giulio Savorgnano Duttur⁷ nostro, prima che se ne vadi in Candia, debba come quello è intervenuto medesimamente nelle consulte fatte sopra le cose di quel Regno, et che è ben instrutto del parer dell'Illustrissimo Governator General,⁸ et altri capitani nostri in queste materie, è ben intendente del fortificare, andar a veder la fortezza nostra di Famagosta, et il sito delli scogli che vien ricordato doversi abbracciar per ridurla in buona sicortà, accioche si possa poi con la informazione sua far buone risoluzione in quello sia espediente.

L'andera parte chel sopradetto Magnifico Duttur nostro debba con la nave Quirina, che si dee partir col primo tempo, e che dee medesimamente condurre il nobile nostro ser Piero Navigiero, designato luogotenente in quel Regno, esser mandato a veder la fortezza di Famagosta e con quel Capitano Proveditor General in quella isola, e Domino Nadal da Crema Governor,⁹ particolarmente considerar tutte le cose degne di consideratione sopra essa fortezza, et il scoglio del Bo et altri scoglieti contigui,¹⁰ e sopra l'opera che vien ricordato doversi fare per abbracciarli, e sia commesso alli detti Capitano e Proveditor che gionto che sia de li esso Domino Giulio, così habbiamo diligentemente e senza dilatione a far eseguire, facendo far un modello di rilievo con le sue misure, e mandarlo de qui, con aviso particolar in scrittura della opinione di ciascuno di loro sopra tal fortificatione, e con vera e chiara informazione del sito di essi scogli, distanze, altezze, profondità dell'acqua, dove si havesse da fondar la cortina che traversa della terra al scoglio, e dall'un scoglio all'altro, facilità o difficoltà del fondarla, e del lavorar e fabricar, spesa e tempo che potria andar in tal opera, che fondo si ritrovi, nel mare appresso li scogli sopradetti, e quanto vi si potrà approssimare con qualche navilio, e con qual sorte di navilio se vi è li appresso, o poco discosto buon sorgitor per navi o altri legni, e quanto lontano e se li navilij che andassero a condurre soccorso potriano fatta che fusse questa fabrica sopra li scogli prefati, star coperti, e sicuri di non esser offesi dalla banda di terra, e se giudicarano esser buono farvi un porto, e che spesa potrebbe andar nel farlo, et in conclusione, se questa opera di abbracciare li scogli sopradetti sarà per

regimento were Bernardo Belegno, *di Benedetto* (elected on 3 November 1560, to take up the biennial office in March 1561), and Girolamo Malipiero, *di Vincenzo* (elected on 12 March 1561, to take office in August 1561): ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, ff. 173^v–174^r. 6 The Senate's decision was indeed adopted on 14 March 1562, in terms very similar to those of the doge's letter. G.S.'s mission was confirmed ten days later: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 21^r–22^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 168^v. 7 Cf. latin *ductor*: one who leads, rules, commands. 8 Sforza Pallavicino, governor-general of the Venetian army; cf. *supra*, p. 56 n. 127. 9 The governor of Candia, Nadal da Crema, was sent to Famagusta to replace Ercole Martinengo at the end of 1561. Renowned for being "voloroso, & di esperientia, & havendo quella intelligentia che ha di fortificationi", he received an annual salary of 480 ducats. He stayed in office in Famagusta until September 1566; he was promoted to governor of Capodistria in June 1566, then army governor in Zara in June 1568, transferring to Corfu in October of the same year: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 72, ff. 77^v–78^r, reg. 73, f. 140^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 119^r, 180^v–181^r, reg. 37, ff. 84^{r-v}, 202^v, 228^r, reg. 38, ff. 134^{r-v}, 174^{r-v}. 10 Concerning these rocks, see *supra*, doc. 5 n. 3.

giudition loro veramente utile e necessaria alla sicurtà di quella fortezza, e di più se si potrà tagliar e spianar il sopradetto scoglio del Bo fino un piede sotto acqua, e che spesa e tempo andrebbe in questo, e se per opinione loro havuta consideratione alla spesa et al tempo che potrà andar in abbracciar e fortificar essi scogli fusse meglio, o spianarli come di sopra o far qualche altro rimedio alla sicurtà della sopradetta fortezza, et assicurarla per altra via di poter esser soccorsa in tempo di guerra con quelle altre particolarità, che giudicarano a proposito farne sapere in questa materia per compita informatione nostra.

Et ispedito il prefato Magnifico Duttur nostro da questa essecutione, debba con li predetti Capitano di Famagosta in luogo del quale habbi a restar della fortezza un consigliere nostro di Nicosia Proveditor General e Governator andar a Cerines, ove tutti insieme con diligentia debbano veder il sitto della nuova fortezza, che è stato deliberato di fare, et havute le debite considerationi far fare con le sue misure un modello di rilievo, o più secondo la diversità delle opinioni che potessero haver, ilqual o liquali siano parimente mandati di qui con dechiaratione in scrittura della opinione di ciascuno di loro, egli siano date per maggior instruttione sua le scritture e disegni, che parerano al collegio nostro, e specialmente li dui disegni della sopradetta fortezza di Cerines fatti già sopra il / [28^v] luogo, uno dal Magnifico Capitano nostro sopra l'artiglieria¹¹ e l'altro dal Conte Hercule Martinengo,¹² li signati numero cinque e sei, sopra liquali l'habbia parimente a far fare, e mandar de qui duo modelli di rilievo, nel modo precise che sono essi disegni.

Il qual Magnifico Duttur nostro eseguito tutto ciò con quella diligentia e prestezza, che gli

11 The artillery captain in Cyprus was Agostino Clusone, a *condottiere* and servant of Venice. He was appointed *ordinanze* governor in Friuli in April 1549, and was later sent to Cyprus to replace Count Ercole Martinengo in charge of a company of 200 soldiers, gaining the title *governator general di tutta la fantaria dell'isola nostra di Cipro* and an annual salary of 1,000 ducats. He reached Famagusta on 13 March 1558, and initiated construction work on the Famagusta walls and the castle of Cerines. He fell severely ill at the beginning of the summer, but three months later he had regained his health and set off on a tour of the island's defences with Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier; he continued reinforcing the island's defensive system until his departure. In accordance with the Senate's decision on 28 January 1559, his post returned to Ercole Martinengo: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 20^v–22^r, 49^v–50^r, 227^v, and *passim*; ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 27, f. 27^v; *id.*, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 82^{r-v}, reg. 35, ff. 48^v–49^r. He left several reports detailing his activities on the island: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, s.f. (three letters, two of which were written in Venice on 13 July 1559). Even when he returned to Italy, his expert opinion on the defence of Cyprus continued to be sought between 1560 and 1562: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 255^v–258^v (*Discorso circa le cose di Cypri, Candia, Cerigo et Corfù...*), ff. 264^v–270^v (*Altri discorsi di Cipro presentati adi xxvj di genaro 1562 nell'Eccellentissimo Collegio*); ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, f. 125^{r-v}.

12 Count Ercole Martinengo, from Brescia, was first sent to Cyprus in June 1556, then again – to Famagusta – in April 1558, as *governator general della fanteria*. He was specifically in charge of the San Marco bastion in Famagusta, which was named after him upon his death in late December 1560. He was replaced by his son Zuan Maria, designated vice-governor; his other sons, the captains Mario and Horatio, continued to command soldiers in Famagusta: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (letter dated 25 January 1561), b. 4 (letter dated 15 April 1558); *id.*, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 22^r, 60^v, 61^v, 76^v, 95^v; *id.*, *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 95^{r-v}, filza 15 (27 June 1556); *id.*, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, s.f. (an undated report from Ercole Martinengo, and a letter written in Famagusta on 18 August 1559); Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 858–860; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 100–104.

sarà possibile debba venir in Candia per eseguir in quella isola, quanto gli è stato commesso da questo consiglio, e sia imposto al Capitano nostro di Famagosta et al Capitano di quella guardia,¹³ che debbano farlo condur in Candia con quelle galee che loro parerà, sì che l'habbia a venir sicurramente, e sia replicato et imposto al Capitano nostro di Famagosta e Proveditor General in Cipro che debbano tutta via far continuare con ogni possibil diligentia, secondo l'ordine che fu loro dato per deliberatione di questo consiglio di XIIIJ dicembre prossimamente passato alle fabriche di quella fortezza,¹⁴ e specialmente a far cavar la fossa e finir il beluardo principiato, et a quelle altre cose, che sono più necessarie giusta il modello che ultimamente fu fatto et approvato, delqual ordine sia loro mandata copia col presente spazzo.

Datae in nostro Ducale Palatio die XVI aprilis indictionis quinta M.D.LXII.

Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Petro Navagerio Locumtenenti proficissenti Pandolpho Gauro Capitano Mattheo Bembo provisorii generali, et Syndico, et consiliarijs Regni Cipri ac eorum successoribus.

Replicatae die 13 mensis junij M.D.L.XII per navim Quirinam.



7 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Famagusta, 7 July 1562

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 28^v–30^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 1669*, pp. 1–10; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 1–7.

G.S. arrived in Famagusta on 22 June and immediately charged the engineer accompanying him from Venice with drawing a layout of the town's fortress and harbour in order to prepare a precise plan to be sent to Sforza Pallavicino. Captain Pandolpho Guaro and the governor are assisting him in this task, as is the captain of the maritime guard, currently sounding the harbour.

In establishing his report, Giulio Savorgnan stresses three points:

- *The perimeter of Famagusta's fortress measures 2,000 Venetian passa [3,477 m], 600 passa [1,043 m] of which are the seaward wall; this perimeter includes 12 round towers, plus the new bastion. The counterscarp is very high compared to the moat, and its wall is so thick that it protects the enemy; the latter also benefits from the moat's excessive width (18*

¹³ The captain of the Cypriot maritime guard was Alvise Bembo, *di Giovanni Matteo*; on 10 August 1559 he was elected captain of the triremes in the Cypriot guard. His successor was Girolamo Contarini, *di Marc'Antonio*, who was elected on 26 July 1562: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, f. 190^f; his *commissio* as captain in id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 58^v–60^f. ¹⁴ This decision was taken on 30 December 1561: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 140^{f-v}: “Perché la città di Famagosta è di quella grande importantia al Stato Nostro, che ad ogn'uno è noto, è necessario al presente proveder che sia atteso alla sua fortificatione con più diligentia, et con più opere di quello che fino ad hora è stato fatto, accioche sia ridotta con prestezza in quella maggior securtà che possibil sia”.

- to 25 passa [31 to 43 m]). If the moat is seized, the city will fall; it will take six bastions equipped with orillons to defend it. In the enclosed drawing, Pallavicino will recognize the new bastion and the terrepleins. The terrain of the fortress is poor, as fine as sand. The inner city abounds in empty spaces and abandoned churches; if taller houses were built, 40,000 people could be provided with homes. The new bastion has two gates to allow sorties to be made, but their position is not very strategic; around ten access points would be needed to control the immense moat, and, to make the fortress impregnable, six new bastions. Four curtains can be preserved, however one new one is necessary. The arsenal curtain, meanwhile, could be transformed to make a new bastion free of cost; this option would reduce spending, as each bastion demands 50,000 ducats and five years of work.*
- *Regarding seaborne relief, it is now certain that the fortress will be able to protect large ships; to enlarge the harbour, the Gambello rock should be removed, making space for 60 galleys. If the harbour were deepened, it could hold a powerful fleet. All the details of the harbour's morphology feature in the drawings and models that G.S. has sent to Pallavicino.*
 - *As for the duration and cost of construction, overall spending can – using the figures given by the captain – be estimated at 300,000 ducats over a period of thirty years. Such an amount of time is due to the fact that there is no rock in the lower areas of the city, so earth and stone must be brought from elsewhere; in the higher areas, however, the earth used is the earth dug up on site, as was the case with the new bastion.*

Ideally, the whole project would be finished in a year; but it could just as well take fifty years, and cost up to 600,000 ducats, if animals, manpower and lime are found wanting. This being the case, G.S. is not sure of the order in which the work should be done: would it be better to remove the rock to secure aid, or rather to begin the new bastion? G.S. leaves the decision to the doge.

In the event of a threat of an enemy landing, large numbers of soldiers would need to be sent to Cyprus, as in Saint-Quentin and Metz, where fortresses were provided with contingents of at least 4,000 men. It should not be forgotten that for each shipload of 800 soldiers, half will fall ill during the journey. Cyprus's dryness is making it something of a desert, so the rettori are seeking supplies from Turkey.

LETTERA SCRITTA DA FAMAGOSTA AL SERENISSIMO PRINCIPE,
IL SIGNOR HIERONIMO PRIOLI, DEL 1562 ADI 7 LUGLIO DA ME JULIO SAVORGNANO

Serenissimo Principe,

Alli 22 di Giugno io arrivai in Famagosta, et subito feci che l'ingegnere venuto da Venetia con me¹ si mettesse a formar in dissegno il sito particolarissimo di questa fortezza,

¹ Most probably Zuanne Magagnati, who made two drawings in 1562, one of a bastion in Famagusta, another of a fortress for Cerines in accordance with G.S.'s plan: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, pp. 202–203; Grivaud, 'The drawings, plans and models of Venetian military engineers on Cyprus', pp. 121–122.

delli scogli / [29^f] del porto, del fondi del mar vicino a terra delle alture, et d'ogni cosa per poter poi far il modello iustificatissimo, accioché Vostra Serenità possa deliberare quanto li parerà, et quando che ella farà vedere all'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza suo generale,² La si potrà accertare che questi disegni, fondi et alture sono iustissime, perché con li miei occhi proprij voglio veder operar il tutto, cioè dell'esser del sito et fortezza, et per farlo più veridico, et per mia più satisfatione, il Clarissimo Signor Capitano³ di questo Regno, insieme con il Magnifico Governator,⁴ ogni giorno sono affaticandosi per far tal disegno iustissimo, et medesimamente il Clarissimo Signor Capitano della Guardia,⁵ con tutti questi Signori sopracomiti con li suoi copani loro medemi ne aiutano a scandagliar ogni cosa particolarmente, sì che a me fare impossibile che non sia per riuscire iustissimo disegno et particolarissimo come Vostra Serenità vederà.

Mi pare di doverli dire 3 capi principali per far sapere quello che più importa a Vostra Serenità.

Il primo sarà in qual esser si attrova tutta questa fortezza, oltre a quello che si può vedere per disegni et modelli, et come dovrebbe essere a star bene per mio parere.

Il secondo se si può assicurar la strada per il soccorso in tempo di guerra.

Il terzo le difficoltà, incommodità, spesa et tempo che si pò fare iuditio, che li anderà a far le sopraditte cose.

La fortezza di Famagosta circonda tutta al cordon circa 2 millia passa venetiani di 5 piedi l'uno, et è capace di dentro di campi n° 213, a rason di 840 taole per campo di 5 piedi per tavola.

Seicento passa di essa è bagnata dal mare et mille quatro cento da terra, difesa questa parte da terra da 12 torrionzini tondi, oltre il bellovarado nuovo senza piazze da grossi pezzi, et con spalle la maggior parte di esse di 20 piedi et uno de 25, et qualche uno di 9 piedi solamente, et questo dico al cordon, et sotto di esse piazze le sono le sue case matte, quale sono da esser istimate tanto quanto Vostra Serenità potrà intender dal Suo Illustrissimo Generale, da poi che li nemici si cacciasseno nella contrascarpa, il che in assai luochi ho per facile da fare qui, per la estrema altezza della contrescarpa, in assai luochi aiutata et alzata da terra eguale al cordon, o poco manco, qual contrascarpa ha di altezza fino al fondi della fossa 30 e 35 piedi, et più in alcuni luochi, ma il suo terreno di fuori va tutto pendente che l'homo se li può cacciar sotto, et facilmente coprirsi dalla fortezza, qual tutta non ha di altezza sopra il cordon un piede, 2 o 3 al più, et quello che anco non è buono, che la muraglia di detta controsarpa è fatta tanto grossa che la metà di essa bastarebbe a un balloardo moderno, il che torna a utile et sicurtà de nemici.

La fossa communemente è larga dalli 18 fino alli 25 passa, qual effetto di larghezza aiuta anco a facilitar il coprirsi nella contrascarpa di fuori via, in fine a me pare che chi sarà patron della fossa, sarà anco patron della terra. Se questa muraglia et fossa, che è in essere, fossero 6

2 This is clearly Sforza Pallavicino. 3 Pandolfo Guoro, captain of Famagusta; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 3. 4 Nadal da Crema, the city's governor; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 9. 5 Alvise Bembo, captain of the Cypriot maritime guard; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 12.

balloardi legittimi, detti belloardi sempre sarebbero atti a mantenersi con li suoi fianchi, con li suoi orecchioni et con le sue sortite, patroni della fossa. Ma senza questi, Vostre Signorie Illustrissime sono sapientissime et potranno far loro quel giudicio che le parerà.

Quanto al balloardo novo, li mando il disegno particolare et tale che con il compasso, Sua Eccellenza potrà medesimamente chiarirsi di tutte le sue qualità.

Mi resta dirli che di terrapieni⁶ si può medesimamente veder sopra il disegno le sue larghezze di dentro via, / [29^v] et che parte hanno dismantata piana di dentrovia et parte muraglia dritta, et il terreno di questa fortezza è tanto tristo, et simile al sabion del Lio⁷ brusatissimo dal sole, che è come polvere, inutilissimo da repezarsi et da far ripari.

Sono tanti siti voti et grandissima quantità di chiese vode abbandonate, et le case che sono di dentro sono tanto basse che alzandole commodamente li potrebbe star 3 volte tanto popolo quanto è al presente, et haverebbero acqua buona per 40 millia anime dentro della fortezza da bere, da cosinare, e da lavare pozzi infiniti.

Non vi è una sortita in tutta la fossa se non le due al balloardo novo, qual sono fatte trà le 2 cannoniere a mezo il merlon,⁸ in luoco che io son certissimo che non piacerano all'Illustrissimo Signor Suo Governator essendo che sono vedute della contrascarpa et in una tanta quantità di fossa doverebbero essere almanco una dozana di sortite, et per finirla dirò che questa sua fortezza importantissima non finirà mai di star bene, fino che non li siano fatti in tutto 6 legittimi belloardi, delli quali uno solo che mancherà a far, detta fortezza resterà diffettiva, et se tutti 6 saranno fatti come ditto di sopra, si proterà dir con certezza che sarà forte et inespugnabile quanto possa fare l'humana natura alli tempi presenti, essendo che questa fossa di profondità et larghezza per la forma che è bellissima et meravigliosa, et sopra tutto la muraglia et cortine che hanno da restare tra questi 6 belloardi, qual cortine restaranno n° 4 fra li 6 belloardi che si hanno a far, una si ha da fare da novo, ben è vero, che io cavo un belloardo di grande importanza della cortina vecchia propria dell'arsenale, qual faccio diventare un belloardo senza spesa, il che son certissimo, che piacerà a Sua Eccellenza, sì per lo avanzar tempo come anco per avanzar miglior forma et belloardo manco acuto et grandissimo, non dico della utilità di ducati 50 millia che tanti sarebbero andati in 5 anni per farlo, sì che delli 6 belloardi che vanno in tutto questo sarà uno manco, et conzar il novo fatto, restaranno a far in tutto n° 4 a ducati 50 millia l'uno, il conto è buono da fare et il tempo di 5 anni l'uno facendosi li calcoli sopra questo ultimo fatto.

Mi resta dirli intorno al secondo capo che è quanto al soccorer questa fortezza. Dico che il sito comporta benissimo che navilij grossi con fortuna potranno venire a sorzer in luoco securissimo vicino da poter metter ogni sorte di soccorso in questa fortezza, mediante l'abbracciare il scoglio maggiore nominato il Gambello,⁹ qual fa il porto di Famagosta come si

6 In Renaissance military architecture, a terreplein was a mass of raised earth, generally quite thick, streamlined and compact; its function was to support the walls, or more often to reinforce them with a platform on which cannon batteries could be placed, see fig. 67b. 7 The Venice Lido. 8 A *merlon* was the part of the parapet situated between two cannon embrasures. 9 The name of this rock is given in *Isolarii* of the 1480s: Stylianou / Stylianou, *History of the Cartography of Cyprus*, pp. 13, 183; Tolia, *Τα νησολόγια*, p. 113; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud,

potrà vedere dal disegno et modello, et per il fondi del mare et per il poter star in bono sorzitore sicuro dall'artiglieria nemica qual fusse in terra da tutte 2 le bande sopra il mare, et Vostra Serenità vederà che si potrà quasi in tutto far et abbrazzar il detto scoglio, come sta nel disegno, qual Vostra Serenità ultimamente al mio partire da Venetia fu fatto dall'Illustrissimo Signor Governatore Generale, et medesimamente Sua Eccellenza con più certezza potrà dar che forma li parerà nel abbracciar questo scoglio, essendo che tanto quanto è disegnato sicuramente su esso si pò fabricare, della qual fabrica havendosi a unire con la fortezza presente, si avanza che si assicurerà tutto il sito del porto, nel qual al presente senza cavarli più fondi di quello è potranno star senza rami da 60 galere, ma cavandoli il fondo si potrà far maggior, quanto Vostra Serenità vorrà capace per ogni grossissima armata, sì che il sito comporta il soccorso bonissimo et medesimamente il porto capacissimo, et da potersi fondare in ogni luoco che si vorà / [30'] muraglie da detto scoglio fino alla fortezza presente, et qui ho finito di dire quanto alla seconda parte del soccorso, essendo che tal effetto si dimostra meglio con il disegno et fondi dell'acqua del mare, qual è dissignato su li disegni et modelli, che mi riporto a quelli scandagli notati particolarmente.

Mi resta la terza parte quel è, et importa il tutto, cioè la spesa et il tempo, qual tempo reputo più importante che la propria spesa, rispetto al grande utile et danno che se ne potrebbe havere. Ma essendo io stato mandato da Vostra Serenità a questo effetto proprio in questo viaggio, a fine che habbia ad advertire tutti questi Clarissimi Rettori della mente et animo di Vostra Serenità ho voluto farlo et considerar particolarmente, iustificandome del tutto al meglio ch' io ho saputo con tutti questi Signori Clarissimi, et con cadauna persona da chi io ho potuto trazer information vera. Et trovo che a voler abbracciar il scoglio legittimamente et tenerli guarda, et chel sia unito con la terra, si potrà avanzar poco o niente manco di quello che la Eccellenza dell'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza ha disegnato su quello suo disegno, il che a venir su li calcoli iusti, governandomi dietro a questo ultimo belloardo fatto in 5 anni, computando dui pezzi di cortina attaccati a esso. Il tutto costa a Vostra Serenità per quello, che questo Clarissimo Signor Capitano mi ha fatto riferire dalli scrivani de camera circa ducati 50 millia. Più ritrovo per li miei conti, che per il manco a voler unir questa città con il scoglio al modo del disegno di Sua Eccellenza, qual come li ho detto non saperei in che modo sminuire se non poco o niente.

Dico che tal fabrica et quantità di spesa et di tempo sarebbe 6 volte tanto quanto è stata questa, sì che ascenderà alla summa di 300 millia scudi et medesimamente in proportion di 30 anni di tempo, et sappia Vostra Serenità che qui sul fatto non dubitamo se, in questa fabrica che si ha da far, anderà tanta spesa quanto è andata in questo, ma dubitamo quasi che habbia ad andar maggior spesa rispetto alla conduttura, essendo che cavandose la fossa per il belloardo novo con la istessa rocca lì su il fatto si faceva la muraglia, et con li rottami della terra si impiva le piazze del belloardo et dietro alle cortine, ma immediate che si comincia questa fabrica nova, discostandosi dalla città fino a traverso del porto, et per tutto il scoglio et secche, bisognerà

Cyprus 1542, pp. 72, 77, 137. Italian sailors knew its name: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 248^v; but not Greek sailors, Delatte, *Les portulans grecs*, vol. 1, p. 126, vol. II, p. 20.

sempre andar da lontano a trovar roccha da murare, et terra da impire tutta la fabrica per esser in sito basso, et per coprirse dalle alture sopra le vigne,¹⁰ sì che havendosi a condurre 6 volte tanta materia, quanta è stata questa in 5 anni de 50 millia scudi, crederò che per rata la fabrica habbia da costare più delli 300 millia scudi, et li 30 anni di certezza di tempo.

Non voglio restar di dirli un dubio qual mi va per la mente, et è cosa che Vostra Serenità metterà in qualche consideratione, il dubio è questo, che a far che questa città si possi dir perfetta fortezza, li vorà come è detto di sopra li 6 belloardi quali costerano loro ancora 250 millia scudi a star bene, et forse più. Dubio alcun non è, che se fusse possibile in un'anno di far li 6 belovardi, et in un'altro anno abbracciar il scoglio per haver il soccorso sicuro et porto, che al mio iuditio per la importanza d'un tanto regno porterebbe la spesa a spender questi cinque o seicento millia scudi, qual effetto per mancamento di calcine, huomini et animali non si farà in 50 anni, se bene li dinari fossero pronti qui in Famagosta. Si dimanda rispetto alla longhezza del tempo, a qual di queste dui / [30^v] imprese si doverebbe attender prima, o a fare li cinque belloardi prima, ovvero di assicurarsi di haver il soccorso, che vale il soccorso a cosa debole, et quanto vale cosa forte senza speranza di soccorso, et questo è il dubio, et quello che è peggio, che è in l'uno ovvero in l'altro li vanno 25 o 30 anni di tempo, come tante volte ho detto di sopra, sì che a voler parlar liberamente quello che si vede, et sarà confermato da tanti Clarissimi Signori Suoi ministri, ho voluto dirli et rapresentarli il tutto al mio iuditio, acciò Vostra Serenità con la Sua prudenza faccia quanto li parerà.

In questo mezo Vostra Serenità non potrà far meglio che quando ella sentirà qualche sospetto da queste bande di mandarli per il manco grossissimo numero di soldati, et sapia Vostra Serenità che se una simil fortezza fusse alla volta di San Quintino o di Terouana o di Mez, in quella guerra di quelli principi eguali in campagna,¹¹ non mandarebbero dentro di tal fortezza manco di 4 millia fanti con qualche banda di gente d'arme. Però si ha da avvertire, che quando si mettono 800 fanti, et più su una nave, quando arrivano qui sono mezi inffettati et amalati. Però bisogna pensar alla sanità, et pascoli delle pecore per tenerle vive et sane, per cavarne da loro la lana et la latte, et medesimamente dar causa che possano venir in questi paesi buoni soldati, et mantenerli sani, et che possano viver per poter combatter alli bisogni. Al presente, questo Regno di Cipro per la carestia che vi è di ogni cosa, mi ha più forma di paese deserto che di Regno tanto abbondante, come era depinto et si ha fatica a viver, et vedo che tutti questi Clarissimi Signori Rettori non pensano ad altro che a cercar di far venir formenti et biave di Turchia per la penuria che vi è di ogni cosa,¹² però ho voluto dir questo che forsi non

¹⁰ Leonida Attar gives the location of these vineyards as being to the south of the fortress: Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 137 and fig. 24b. The vineyards are mentioned frequently in accounts of the 1570 / 1571 siege of Famagusta, and are most often confused with the place name *Pomo d'Adamo*: Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 105, 111. ¹¹ This further reference to the Habsburg-Valois wars between 1552 and 1556, then again between 1557 and 1559, alludes to the Battle of Saint-Quentin on 10 August 1557, which (as mentioned supra, doc. 4) the French lost; to the French capture of Metz in April 1522; and to the destruction of Théroouanne (a diocese of Arras) ordered by Charles V in April 1533. It seems likely that G.S. knew of all this via his brother Ascanio, who served in Henry II's armies and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner after the defeat at Saint-Quentin; cf. supra, p. 40. ¹² 1562 was indeed a dry year, part of a long period of drought running from 1561 to 1566: ASV,

tocca a me, a fine solamente che essendosi ridotti in questi termini con l'ardir di capitani et forza di gente buona et sana, si possa supplire quello che manca come è detto di sopra, riportandomi sempre al parere dell'Illustrissimo Signor Governator Generale et a quello che sarà deliberato da Vostra Serenità, in buona guardia della quale sempre mi raccomando.

Di Famagosta alli 7 luglio 1562.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



8 Letter from G.S. to Sforza Pallavicino, Famagusta, 7 July 1562

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 30^v–32^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 11–20; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 8–14.

After a 46-day journey from Venice to Salina, G.S. went to Nicosia to greet the rettori. It is almost pointless to contemplate fortifying Nicosia as, excepting one side where a hill could be used and where there is favourable, water-rich terrain, the city is situated amid countryside, far from the sea. G.S. went on to Famagusta, where he wrote to the doge with several questions, to answer which the doge will undoubtedly consult Pallavicino.

In Venice, Cyprus is spoken of as a fertile country with a population of 200,000, probably able to provide 4,000 men to build a fortress in six months; a country where all the nobles wish to fortify Cerines or some other site to keep their families secure. The reality is rather different, in fact: there are shortages of wheat, wine and meat significantly worse than those in Venice, and provisions are very difficult to obtain. Workers are exempt from many jobs, and as they are unaccustomed to the job at hand, they will make slower progress than Italian workers. The nobility complicates everything, refusing to go to Famagusta due to its poor air.

In Famagusta, the soldiers are poorly cared for, unlike in Lombardy or Corfu. They are paid eight times a year, but are given neither blankets nor mattresses to sleep on. When they step off the boats they are all ill, as were G.S.'s own soldiers, or exhausted by the harsh journey. Bed-ridden men barely able to afford the bread and wine they need are little use to captains. Last April, the price of bread in Famagusta rose even higher than in Venice.

G.S. has brought supplies to Famagusta for the soldiers, and Pallavicino will learn upon reading his previous letter his opinions on the fortifications and on seaborne relief. The estimated cost he gives is based on the example of the new bastion, which took five years to

Collegio, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Bernardo Belegno; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 7, f. 78^{r-v}, reg. 8, ff. 9^v–10^r, 70^{r-v}, 71^v, 73^v; id., *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 172; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, b. 3 (dispatches from David Trevisan, dated 25 October 1564, and Piero Navagier dated 14 May 1564), b. 4 (dispatch from Giacomo Ghisi dated 10 April and 23 October 1566, and from Pandolfo Gauro, 18 May 1566); Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 025–026; G. Grivaud, *Villages désertés à Chypre (fin XII^e – fin XIX^e siècle)*, Nicosia 1998, pp. 320, 435–436.

build and cost 60,000 ducats. G.S. leaves the doge and Pallavicino to decide which site to prioritize.

G.S. has sent Pallavicino some drawings showing the fortification plans, namely six bastions, one of which will reuse the arsenal curtain; he assures Pallavicino that he is heeding his advice on the distances to be kept between bastions to give optimal firing conditions.

As the curtains can easily be mined, the moats must be unassailable, and bastions equipped with orillons must be installed. Venice is claiming that the round towers can be preserved, whilst in Cyprus some say that just four bastions will suffice: the new [Martinengo] bastion, one at the Limassol Gate, one at the arsenal and one at the Occa Tower overlooking the sea (the bastion at the San Zorzi spring and the one positioned between the Limassol Gate and the new [Martinengo] bastion would thus be abandoned). G.S. asks Pallavicino for detailed advice, especially given that the artillery general has disagreed with him over the hill referred to as the Jewish Cemetery, which should be incorporated into the bastion. Regarding the water from the San Zorzi spring, Famagusta's inhabitants could dig wells, but instead use the spring because it is easier; however, the distribution of this water is erratic, so wells often do become necessary, even if the water is, in G.S.'s opinion, of poorer quality than in Nicosia or Cerines.

One third of Famagusta's surface area is empty, and could accommodate many people, especially if its perimeter can be enlarged with new bastions. If a bastion is installed near to the San Zorzi fountain, the sandy earth close to the gardens can be used to fill the bastion piazze; good amounts of earth can be found elsewhere on the south side of the island, between the Limassol Gate and the harbour; this would reduce costs as no earth would need to be carted.

G.S. ends his letter with an explanation of the drawings of the enceinte that have just been produced or are already in Pallavicino's possession.

] 1562 alli 7 luio.

] Lettera scritta al Signor Sforza sopra Famagosta.

All' Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor Governator Generale, il Signor Sforza Pallavicino.

Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor,

Dal mio partir di Venetia fino al dismontar in terra, a Saline principal sorditor di questa isola, son stato 46 giorni di tempo, me ne andai a Nicosia per far riverentia alli Clarissimi Rettori,¹ della qual Nicosia non mi accade a farne molta mentione, non essendo vicina al mare, et da 3 parti di essa è più in campagna netta / [31¹] che non è Udine; dalla quarta parte ha un poco di altura, qual non sarebbe causa di farla non fortificabile, quando si havesse tal animo, essendo buon terreno et acqua perfettissima ma, come è detto, non essendo alla marina è un gettar via tempo a parlar di lei; me ne andai a Famagosta dellaqual ho scritto all' Illustrissimo Dominio diverse cose,² qual credo che Vostra Eccellenza le haverà a giudicare et non il Malacrea né manco Lorelogio,³ però voglio che ella sappia che queste mie lettere

1 The three Nicosia rectors were *Luocotenente* Piero Navagier, Councillor Bernardo Bellegno and Councillor Girolamo Malipiero; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 2 and 5. 2 In the letter sent to the doge, cf. supra, doc. 7. 3 G.S. affirms with this allusion that in fortification matters, decision-making power rested with political authorities and

mando aperte a Vostra Eccellenza, in le lettere di Sua Serenità, et la causa è questa, che se io volesse scriver tante particolarità a Sua Serenità dubitarei di esser troppo lungo et di venirli in fastidio, ma scrivendo io a Vostra Eccellenza alcuni particolari circa le cose di Famagosta et de quella isola, son certo che Vostra Eccellenza haverà buon patientia di legerle.

Quella sa che sempre in Venetia si parla di questo Regno tanto fertile et di 200 millia anime, si pensava di poter cavare a un bisogno 4 millia huomini guastatori da far nascer una fortezza in buon terreno in 6 mesi, et de prima se iudicava anco che tutti questi gentilhuomini (come per raggion naturale dovrebbe essere) dovessino desiderare con tutto il cuore fortificatione o di Cerines o di un'altra fortezza per star secure le sue persone et famiglie per ogni occorrentia di guerra, ma tutte 3 le cose rispondeno molto diversamente, perché quanto alla fertilità è una carestia incredibile di pane, vino et carne, et di ogni altra cosa peggio di Vinetia assai, un terzo di più di ogni cosa, et non si trova la robba per li danari, se non con gran fatica et rumori accompagnati con cento mille maledittioni.⁴

Quanto agli huomini per lavorar hanno tante sue esention⁵ et sono tanto mal usati, che

soldiers, not with architect-engineers concerned with the technical side of things. Francesco Malacreda was an architect in the permanent employment of the *provveditori alle fortezze* who, on 30 September 1561, delivered a report on the fortification of Bergamo, and who worked at numerous construction sites, including the site led by Sforza Pallavicino in Zara in 1567: ASV, *Archivio Proprio Pinelli*, b. 2, no. 16; Hale, 'The first fifty years of a Venetian magistracy: the *provveditori alle fortezze*', p. 183; G. Conforti, 'Francesco Malacreda', in P. Brugnoli / A. Sandrini (eds), *L'architettura a Verona nell'età della Serenissima*, Verona 1988, vol. 2, pp. 205–206. 'Loreloglio' should read 'Orologi', the name of the cavalier Francesco Orologi, a Vicentine architect; he too contributed to discussions over the fortification of Bergamo in 1561, and also wrote a report dated 8 November 1561: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 35. Concerning the differing opinions on the work done in Bergamo from 1561 onwards, see Colmuto Zanella, 'La fortezza cinquecentesca di Bergamo', pp. 110–124; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 106–111. It should be noted that *kavalier* Orologgi drew a map of Famagusta, which was still in the *provveditori alle fortezze*'s archives in 1759: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, p. 202. Concerning G.S.'s viewpoints in the debate over the design of the fortress and the overseeing of construction, see Concina's conclusion, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 77–80; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria a Venezia', pp. 228–231. ⁴ Concerning this drought, see supra, doc. 7 n. 10. ⁵ This reference to the exemptions granted to different types of free peasants, commonly known as *francomati*, illustrates the difficulties Venetian officers had in obtaining the workforce required for the upkeep of Famagusta's fortress. In 1481 it was established that *francomati* who had been subjected to "servitii rusticali" at the time of the Lusignans had to work for a given number of days at the Famagusta and Cerines enceintes, barring which the peasants would be paid by the day, at the same rate as galley slaves. In concrete terms, when male *francomati* were requisitioned, they had to serve for ten days per year, apart from those who were exempt from duty: priests and monks, village officers, children under fifteen years of age, men over sixty years of age and the sick. Men who lived too far away from Famagusta could choose to pay off their shift for five bezants. On 4 June 1515 the Council of Ten decreed that the *francomati* could pay 10 ducats to be exempt from this requisitioning; how successful this measure was is unknown. In 1516 and 1521 there were still 13,000 *francomati* requisitioned, but from 1528 onwards the number of days they were required to work was lowered to six, and the amount they had to pay to become exempt reduced to six bezants. According to *Luocotenente* Silvestre Minio, in 1529 11,000 *francomati* were supposed to work on the fortifications; in 1563, however, according to Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo, out of 47,503 men requisitioned, only 31,352 actually did the work. Evidence shows that further adjustments were made, as in 1534 and 1558 the required number of days was six, and the price to pay for exemption was three bezants: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 45, f. 143^v; id., *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, ff. 29^r–31^v; ASV, *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Marc'Antonio Trevisan, s.f.; BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VII 877*

io vedo una gran difficoltà anco in questo, oltre la sua infinita dapoccagine che 3 di loro certissimo non faranno quanto uno di Italia.

Quasi tutti li nobili aiutano a farla più difficile che poleno, perché non voleno sentir niuna fortificatione con tutto che confessano, che venendo guerra o convenirano star in preda de nemici, overo andar in Famagosta, dove che sano certo che per il suo mal aere se starano serrati 3 mesi lì dentro, che senza esser combattuti convenirano capitar male, massime la estate. A questa fortezza, non se li fa pur una minima provisione in alcun tempo per tenir vivi li poveri soldati. In Lombardia, se li da pairizzi, schiavine, et altre commodità che valeno per 6 ducati all'anno. A Corfù, quando un soldato arriva lì, oltre le 10 paghe all'anno se li da casa de bando senza pagar fitto, et a cadauno fante San Marco li fa dar una taola della monitione da poter dormir su detta taola, per non si amalar dormendo sopra la terra, ma qui a Famagosta hanno 8 paghe all'anno a quel modo che sono per le monede maggior parte di loro convengono pagarsi fitto di casa, de schiavine et pairizzi non se ne parla, né pur se li / [31^v] da la tavola da dormir sopra.

Sappia Vostra Eccellenza che quando vengono di nave si amalano quasi tutti, come ho fatto io con li miei che tutti siamo stati amalati, ma col cavarsi sangue, scapolatti et pure habbiamo portato con noi ogni commodità di stramazzi et d'ogni altra cosa, et a fatica, che siamo rihavuti. Pensa 'nco Vostra Eccellenza come si de ritrovar impacciato uno de quelli poveri capitaniij, quando si trovano la maggior parte delli suoi soldati amalati et andandoli a cercar, poi trovati li vede distesi in terra con il suo colletto sotto la testa, et che rimedio li polleno fare che la paga non li compra a pena il pane et il vino per tenerli vivi, bisogna risolversi di farli qualche provisione. Ho voluto scriver questo a Vostra Eccellenza acciò che lei ancora si cavi di quella opinione antiqua, della abondantia di questo Regno, nel qual si davano una volta 12 stara di formento venetiani per un ducato,⁶ et al presente io vedo che mangio il soldo del pane assai più piccolo di quello che io lassai a Venetia questo aprile.

(8651), ff. 325^r, 326^{r-v}; Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 51, col. 442–443; Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, p. 541; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 2, pp. 258–260 no. 138; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', p. 517. ⁶ An error has crept into this copy of the text, as 12 Venetian stara are equivalent to 1,000 l; Cypriot wheat prices generally hovered around 1 ducat for 12 *mozza* [= 384 l], the local measurement, irrespective of variations caused by the quality of harvests; sources thus display the following evolution:

- In July 1497, when harvests were good, one ducat bought 8 to 10 *mozza* of wheat, or 15 to 16 *mozza* of old wheat: ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 288, c. 280.
- In September 1509, with famine looming, prices had not risen much: one ducat bought 5 *mozza* of wheat, or 12 to 15 *mozza* of barley: *ibid.*, b. 288, c. 69.
- In 1517 the normal price of barley was one ducat per 15 *mozza*: *ibid.*, b. 288, c. 177.
- In July 1531 a *mozzo* of wheat was worth 2 bezants: *ibid.*, b. 289, c. 14.
- In April 1533, a period of shortage, a *mozzo* of wheat was worth 3 bezants: *ibid.*, b. 289, c. 38.
- In November 1533 prices of one ducat per 15 *mozza* of barley and 1.5 bezants per *mozzo* of wheat were considered too low: *ibid.*, b. 289, c. 50.
- In August 1534, a period of shortage, a *mozzo* of wheat was worth 4 to 4.5 bezants, and could rise to 7 or 8 bezants: *ibid.*, b. 289, c. 72.
- In June 1536 a *mozzo* of wheat for 1.5 bezants was considered too low: *ibid.*, b. 289, c. 131.

Ho parlato del viver delli soldati senza liquali non si può diffender le fortezze, et Famagosta alla prima occasione per parecchij anni havrà bisogno di buon numero et di valorosi soldati, et non amalati essendo che, come Vostra Eccellenza intenderà dalle mie scritte all'Illustrissima Signoria,⁷ per la grande incommodità che è in essa Famagosta di far quantità di calzine, anderà una gran quantità de anni ananti che siano fatti tutti li 5 belloardi, quali vanno a Famagosta.

Et quanto alla cosa dil porto per ricever il soccorso, dico a Vostra Eccellenza che la cosa è fattibile, ma al mio iudicio, come Vostra Eccellenza propria lo potrà misurare, ha da andare più di 6 volte tanta fabrica quanta è andata in questo ultimo belloardo, qual in 5 anni ha costato più di 50 millia ducati, et sappia Vostra Eccellenza che bisognerà con la traversa che va dalla terra al scoglio tenirsi molto alti rispetto alla altura che è alla fontana di San Zorzi,⁸ et come ho detto in la lettera della Serenissima Signoria, voglio lassar far Sue Signorie Illustrissime la ressolutione, quale di 2 imprese si deve incominciare, o di fare li belloardi tutti che vanno per finir la fortezza, ovvero attender alla cosa del soccorso, essendo che l'una senza l'altra non è, né si può chiamar perfetta, et per le infinite incommodità che sono in detta Famagosta per fabricar li anderano, come ho scritto a Sue Signorie Illustrissime 25 o 30 anni di tempo per cadauna delle due, et de denari li 300 millia scudi per cadauna, qual cose mi fanno restar stupido et non so prender altra ressolutione se non scriverlo chiaro, et Dio volesse che io me ingannasse et prendesse errore, et che la cosa fosse più fattibile, ma se sarà errore, sarà in più spesa et più tempo.

Che si deven adonca fare? Credo che Vostra Eccellenza considerando et misurando questo disegno di Famagosta nella grandezza che è al presente, che la forma delli belloardi che al mio parere doverebbono essere, per haver le gole et piazze grandi et li suoi orecchioni, che siano et non che parano, come Vostra Eccellenza vedrà su questo disegno, che il belloardo ultimamente fatto sta nel corpo di quello che doverebbe esser stato fatto, et per me ritrovo che a voler assettar bene questa fortezza, non li vole manco numero di questi 6 belloardi in tutto, assettando però la cortina del arsenale, quale è longa da 100 passa in una fronte di quel belloardo, che io haverei opinione di fare, per cavar la difesa della fronte di quello belloardo che guarda verso la fontana, con tutto ciò niuno tiro da fianco a punta di belloardo è manco di 200 passa, secondo l'opinione di Vostra Eccellenza, o li vicino, ben ne

– In April 1550 the normal price of wheat was 2.5 bezants per *mozzo*: *ibid.*, b. 290, c. 6b.

– In January 1551, a time of famine, wheat was worth 2.5 bezants per *mozzo*: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 46*, f. 46^v.

– In September 1557 wheat was worth 2.5 bezants per *mozzo*: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 153^v.

– In December 1561, a period of shortage, a *mozzo* of wheat cost 4.5 bezants, and a *mozzo* of barley cost 8.5 bezants: ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 136.

– In May 1566 normal prices were 3 bezants per *mozzo* of wheat, and 1.5 bezants per *mozzo* of barley: *ibid.*, b. 290, c. 217.

⁷ Cf. *supra*, doc. 7. ⁸ The San Zorzi fountain was installed by Captain Piero Navagier during the second semester of 1557; cf. B. Arbel, 'Supplying water to Famagusta: new evidence from the Venetian period', in A. Papageorgiou (ed.), *Πρακτικά του Τρίτου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, Nicosia 2001, pp. 651–656.

sono alli belloardi verso la torre dell'Occa 250,⁹ che non si può far di manco, a chi non facesse nascer maggior inconveniente, et Vostra Eccellenza col suo buon occhio vederà che in alcuni lochi ho servato la regola, dove che io ho possuto di cavar la difesa dal terzo della cortina, et in qualche loco alla mittà per batter in batteria, et qualche una è venuta più scarsa. Il ponto è stato che ho voluto servirmi, quanto che io ho possuto delle cortine vecchie et della fossa vecchia per avanzar la spesa, qual cortine al mio iudicio sono per conto di batteria le più ben fatte et più sicure che siano al mondo, ma niuno starebbe a perder tempo in batter simil cortine, ma con la mina, non essendo fianchi, legittimi patroni della fossa si farebbe che tal cortine andarebbono in aere et facilmente, però bisogna attender a conservarse noi patroni della fossa con le sortite, et con belloardi legittimi con li suoi orecchioni. Ancora che erano delle persone in Venetia che dicevano che con li torrioni tondi li darebbe l'animo / [32^r] di difendarla, et in escusation di quello che havea tal buon animo, dico a Vostra Eccellenza che, anco in questi paesi, ne sono che si contentarebbono in tutto di 4 belloardi, cioè il novo per uno, uno che si facesse alla porta di Limissò et 2 altri sopra le marine, cioè uno alla punta del arsenale, et l'altro verso la torre dell'Oca sul mare, et si contentarebbono di far senza quelli dui, cioè senza quello della fontana et senza quello che ha d'andare fra la porta del Limissò et il belloardo novo. Vorria che mi fusse risposto che forma di belluardo sarà quello che nascerà di fuori via della cortina del arsenale, et di dove si caverà difesa legittima. Son certo che Vostra Eccellenza in una occhiata si chiarirà delli pareri di tutti noi.

Non voglio restar di dirli quello che ho trovato contra la opinione di Vostra Eccellenza del general delle artiglieria¹⁰ et di me medemo, quando questo genaro tutti 3 con la voce, con una scrittura e tutti 3 con 3 disegni,¹¹ quasi simili havevimo opinione per le relationi, che all' hora ne erano fatte, che si dovesse con un'altro belloardo prender quella altura per scoprire un'alloggiamento del nemico, et far l'altro belloardo alla volta della fontana, et quelle altre opinioni che seguitavano. Dico a Vostra Eccellenza che quella altura, come lei vederà nel disegno che è scritta su li disegni delle sepolture degli Hebrei,¹² quando ben fusse stata presa con un belloardo, dico che poco più in là è un'altra maggior altura, sì che restarebbe un'altro

9 The Occa tower was located outside the city walls, on a hill overlooking the coastline, towards Salamis; cf. the drawings of Kartaro and Gibellino: Stylianou / Stylianou, *A history of the cartography of Cyprus*, pp. 242, 244; Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 65. In 1557 Leonardo Donà drew it in the form of a donjon: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 161^r; cf. fig. 28. According to a German traveller, it was used as a lighthouse to guide ships seeking to enter the bay: Christoph Fürer von Haimendorf, *Reisebeschreibung in Egypten, Arabien, Palästina, Syrien*, Nürnberg 1646, p. 299. The tower is sometimes mentioned in descriptions of the coastline given by galley pilots: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 246^v. 10 Agostino Clusone; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 10. 11 These three drawings, made following guidelines given by Sforza Pallavicino, Agostino Clusone and G.S., were in the *provveditori alle fortezze*'s 1759 inventory: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, p. 202. 12 Famagusta's Jewish cemetery appears on Gibellino's map as the *Colle degli Hebrei*; it was located to the south-west of the city walls, near to the Limassol Gate: Stylianou / Stylianou, *History of the Cartography of Cyprus*, p. 244; B. Arbel, 'The Jews in Cyprus: New evidence from the Venetian period', *Jewish Social Studies* XLI (1979), pp. 26–27 [reprint in B. Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th Centuries*, Aldershot 2000, study no. X]. Due to its position on a hill overlooking Famagusta's walls, it had to be moved to make the landscape lower: ASV, *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Lorenzo Bembo (1567), f. 10^r.

alloggiamento, essendo stato adonque falso quel fondamento ha da cessare quella opinione quanto alla bontà della fontana, quelli di Famagosta volontieri per manco fatica toleno di quell'acqua qual li vien commoda, senza cavarla di pozzi et per esser frequentata et rotta, dicono che è miglior et che 'l medemo sarebbe in più di 10 pozzi, quali sono dentro continui et buoni quanto questi, ma io per me, che me ne intendo d'acqua, tutte al mio parere non sono perfettissime, se ben loro le chiamano buone, pure in caso di bisogno sariano buone non a comparition di quelle di Nicossia et di queste di Cerines.

Quanto alla capacità, Famagosta ha un terzo di vodo che li starebbe un mar di gente et case di più cessando anco quest'altra ragione, et dovendosi far 2 cortine de più con le sue fosse, et 2 belloardi, tutte lequal cose vanno nel sasso vivo o per dir meglio sarebbeno andate, essendo che cavalcando de li si vede con gl'occhi il sasso, et dove Vostra Eccellenza vederà dipinti quelli giardini, sono vigne in qualche buso de 2 piedi di sabion alto, nel quale li portano del ledame et per forza de pozzi, quali sono infiniti con animali et ruode cavano delle acque et fanno una poca di verdura, ma se si haverà a far il belloardo verso la fontana si convenirà tor tutti quelli sabbioni, tali quali sono per empir le piazze in mezo, sì che stante questa carestia estrema di terreno che a fatica haveremo modo de empire li belloardi di vicino, non so quello mi debba dire de cavallieri ma se attenda pur a fare li belloardi prima come cosa più importante, che dapoi fatti secondo la commodità et tempo si farà poi all'hora, quando l'huomo se discosta 100 o 200 passa dall' belloardo de Limisò verso la isola, se trova del terreno in honesta quantità, et dalla parte verso ostro, cioè della sepoltura delli Hebrei verso il porto, et Vostra Eccellenza sa che a cavar una gran fossa de terra et portarla dentro del suo belloardo li vicino va tanta spesa che fa smarire li principi, cioè le sue borse, a voler poi andar con carri da lontano a tore terreno, et portarlo sarà troppo gran spesa et finalmente Vostra Eccellenza sarà contenta di haver avanti gli occhi per il suo principal fondamento che questo belloardo ultimo della qualità che è, ha costato 50 millia scudi et 5 anni di tempo et che io con questi pratici non se sa trovar forma, ne via di havere per l'avenire maggior vantaggio di quello che si è havuto in questo, anzi si sta in peggiorar, sì che Vostra Eccellenza faccia quello iudicio che li pare.

Con li disegni et modelli fatti iusti et particolari delli fondi del mare, et alture delli siti et le spalle et grossezze delle cortine et delli torrionzini tondi quali essendo fatti, non ho voluto far tore la pianta, ma secondo l'ordine di Vostra Eccellenza, li mando il disegno di quello che rimangono in esser al / [32°] cordon, che da buon senso se li può dir torrionzini, ma su quelli disegni che Vostra Eccellenza ha veduti a Venetia pareno giganti, et che habbiano quasi forma de fianchi ma retirati al cordon, che li Vostra Eccellenza li vole, restano quasi invisibili, come Vostra Eccellenza vederà per il disegno iustissimo, et io per me li ho tutti per niente, anzi ne è uno verso la torre dell'Ocha poco lontano dalla marina, qual sta nel angulo di quella tanaglia, che altra non ne è a Famagosta, qual torrione non potrebbe star peggio, et per me lo farei levar via immediate, essendo che fa impedimento alle piazze per lo effetto che dovrebbe far quella tenaglia, dico per adesso fino che si è fatto quello belloardo su la marina qual sel bisogna Vostra Eccellenza da sé lo può considerare, essendo che per via di quelle grotte commodamente si pò venire alla fronte del belloardo novo, o per batterla o tagliarla da pie o minarla non havendo più difesa di quanta ha.

Medesimamente quella parte dell'arsenale, e lei ancora è amalata credo per star in quel aere cattivo, et qui facendo fine a Vostra Eccellenza mi raccomando.

Data in Famagosta alli 7 luio 1562.

Di Vostra Eccellenza servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



9 *Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Cerines, 15 August 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 32^v–33^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 20–26; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 15–19.

After spending sixteen days in Famagusta in order to have a drawing made of the layout of the enceinte and the harbour, G.S. came down with fever, as did most of his company: out of 33 men, 28 were bled. They are better now, though, and have gone on to Cerines, where G.S. is staying in a village 300 passa [520 m] away from the castle. Cerines' fine air reminds him of the air in Osoppo, and the quality of the water is impeccable. Five new fountains will be installed in the new fortress; however this is still not enough for a population of 40,000. In the village of Riatico there are 44 quite shallow wells which provide excellent water and cost only six ducats each; water is easily found throughout the village, which will be entirely within the fortress walls, and in the surrounding areas too, where water to water the land and the cotton fields is brought up from wells via a system of ox-powered wheels.

Wood, to feed the fires needed to make lime, is also easily obtained at this site, as the surrounding mountains abound in loose branches; Famagusta does not boast such advantages in terms of air and water quality or availability of firewood. The Cerines mountains are north-facing and give a view of Caramania.

Concerning the harbour, G.S. thinks it a haven, and he plans to have the two seaward bastions built in such a way as to shelter ships from enemy fire. In the drawings and models he has sent, he explains that even though fierce northerly winds could toss them up onto the bank, ships will be safe, and in such a scenario cargoes could be salvaged. The galley harbour can only hold two or three vessels at present, but digging could extend it up to the castle gate, restoring the ruins and the old porporella. This work could be done cheaply and would enable the installation of a passage from the outer to the inner harbour which could hold 25 galleys.

There is good quality terrain at a height of one to two passa [1.7 to 3.4 m] along the coastline, comparable to the terrain in Peschiera or Bergamo and far superior to that of Famagusta. The Cerines plain is 1,250 passa [2.17 km] wide with a regular 3% difference in height towards the mountain; this does not endanger the fortress as there are 900 passa [1.56 km] between the bastions and the mountain's first slopes, and enemy cannons would need a further 200 passa [347 m] to not overshoot the fortress. Sforza Pallavicino will learn from his artillery general that a fortress must be built 1,100 passa [1.91 km] away from cannon fire, and that, in accordance with the rules Pallavicino applied in Bergamo, all bastions and

curtains must be angled to protect them against shots from the hills. As for the idea of increasing the distance by 300 passa [521 m], G.S. leaves it to Pallavicino to judge.

Digging a 1450-passa-long [2.5 km] moat is obviously financially problematic, and G.S. vows he will give his accounts to the rettori. Regarding the option of a fortress equipped with six cavalier-less bastions, G.S. will explain the matter in a subsequent letter he will send to Pallavicino and the provveditori alle fortezze.

CERINES

] 1562 alli 15 agosto.

] Lettera sopra Cerines.

Al Serenissimo Principe in materia di Cerines

Serenissimo Principe,

Dapoi stato 16 giorni in Famagosta per far far il disegno della fortezza et dil porto con tutte le sue misure, nel qual tempo io ancora non ho possuto scapolar di haver la mia parte di febre, come hanno havuti tutti li miei di casa, a 28 delli qualli è stato tratto sangue, di 33 che siamo in tutto, ma in 8 giorni se siamo tutti rehavuti, gionti che siamo stati qui a Cerines, dove son alloggiato in un casal 300 passa lontano dal castello et quasi tutto questo casale verrà a rimaner dentro della fortezza,¹ et de prima la bontà di quest'aere ne ha fatto ressanar tutti, di modo che mi pare di esser in Friuli in quello eccellentissimo aere et fresco di Osopo, et quanto alle acque sono anco perfettissime, ma quanto a quelle 5 fontane che nascono dentro della fortezza nuova, non sono in tanta quantità che potessino suplire a un 40 millia anime, ma sono bone et sane per quanto sono, vero è che questo è a ponto un'anno secco da conoscerle benissimo in la sua quantità, ma quello che importa più è che in questo casale nominato Riatico li sono 44 pozzi, niuno più profondo di 3 passa et mezzo fino a 4 per trovar l' / [33'] acqua perfettissima, simile a quella delle fontane al mio gusto, et dentro di tutta questa fortezza nova, non si farà casa niuna, qual non sia per haver il suo pozzo in casa, essendo che costa a cavar uno di questi pozzi un cechino il passo ma largo de 12 piedi, sì che con 6 ducatti si potrà far un pozzo, et non solamente in questo casale qual è la più alta parte di questo sito, qual ha da rimaner di dentro del forte, è così facile il trovar l'acqua, ma in tutti li altri luochi di dentro li sono infiniti pozzi di questa istessa natura con acqua viva dentro qual mai non manca, ancora che di continuo con le ruode et uno para de boi cavano le acque par adaquar li suoi cottoni et terre, sì che anco d'acqua al mio parere si starà eccellentissimamente bene.

Quanto al modo di haver commodità di legne per far foco, che è il terzo elemento, havendo detto delli 2 altri di sopra, dico che stando qui in queste montagne vicine si vedeno grandissima copia di frasche, et verdura bonissime per far gran quantità de fornasi per far delle calzine che bisognerano a una tanta fabrica, et Dio volesse che Famagosta havesse una tal

¹ In Venetian censuses this village, called *Riatico* further on, is not included in the burg of Cerines: Grivaud, *Villages désertés*, p. 466.

commodità, o per dir meglio l'aere et da far fuoco, et anco che la sua acqua fosse come questa in quantità et qualità, et il tutto procede perché questa contrada de Cerines et parte delle montagne guardano verso tramontana, et stando qui di continuo, vedemo le montagne della riviera di Caramania, così come a star a Murano si vedeno le montagne del Trivisano et del Friuli.

Mi resta dirli circa al porto et del mare, che si haverà una bona quantità di sito et de fondi per sorzer nave con bon sorzidor, et mi ho sforzato di far andar le ponte de quelli 2 belloardi quali vano al mare, in modo tale che in senno della fortezza in bon fondi possano star secure le navi dall'artiglieria nemica, qual fusse posta su la riviera da tutte 2 le bande, et questo si pò vedere sopra li disegni et modelli, che de ciò ne ho fatto far quelle linee et segni per veder tal chosa chiaramente, dove che dette navi possano star secure, ma da venti et fortune di tramontana et borre soleno esser terribili in questo cannale, in quel caso, cioè da uno assedio venendo dette navi in terra nel porto che è, si potrebbe salvar la maggior parte della robba, per quello che dicono questi che se intendeno di mare.

Quanto al porto de galee al presente è per 2 o 3 solamente, ma se Vostra Serenità vorrà con non molto spesa si potrà cavare et conzar questo fino sotto la porta che è al presente del castello, conzandoli però li moli et porporelle vecchie, il che si farà con poca spesa non havendosi a lavorare sotto acqua per conto de conzarli, anzi dall'altra parte del castello è quasi un'altro porto fatto da sé, come questo che è verso ponente et la porporella² qual sta, per mezzo al castello è 24 passa lontana con fondi in alcun loco de un passo e mezzo et doi, sì che con il tempo si accomoderà che da uno da questi porti all'altro si anderà con le galere dentro via de questa porporella, et è tanto facile et commodità delle pietre da tagliar et da condurre qual sono li sul fatto che meglio non si potrebbe desiderare, et questi 2 porti uniti haverebbono doi bocche, et ciò si farà con tempo et quando si vorrà per 25 galee.

Ho lassato di parlar del quarto elemento qual è della terra, et delle montagne³ per le sue alture et per conto del sasso, per la spesa di cavar le fosse, et la cosa di questo elemento la dividerò anco lei in 3 parti.

Dico che questo terreno per tutti questi campi delle montagne fino al mare di sopra via per un passo et più, et in alcuni lochi doi, è terreno così buono quanto quello di Peschera et quello di Bergamo, et lo provo per questi busi che zapando si fa fare sotto terra, et concludo che questo terreno negro appresso le muraglie et alli parapetti sarà bono come quello de Italia, Dio volesse che a Famagosta ne fusse di tale, questo riuscirà bene perché è negro et non brusato, et frutta benissimo ogni cosa, et questo primo capo è finito.

Quanto al secondo, dico che dal castello di Cerines, overo della marina fino alla più vicina montagna è una pianura larga passa 1250, qual pianura va quasi egualmente ascen-

2 A *porporella* is a protective edifice built in the sea to defend a fortress; see, by way of comparison, the excavations carried out in Nafplio around the Bourtzi islet: A. Pariente, 'Chronique des fouilles faites en Grèce en 1991', *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique* 116/2 (1992), p. 856. Leonardo Donà designed a *porporella* in the Famagusta harbour, cf. fig. 28. Other *porporelle* were present around the Corfu harbour: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βασιλέων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 63, 79, 115, 179, 265. 3 *fino al mare* crossed out after *montagne*.

dendo a rason de 3 per cento, ovvero un poco manco di montada, qual effetto non è nocivo essendo 3 per cento poca cosa, et poi il sito della fortezza / [33^v] dove ha a venire, è lui ancora pendente, et sarà largo 350 passa dal mare, sì che dal più vicino belloardo fino al pie del monte, dove che comincia ascender in foza di montagna rata sono passa 900 et a voler montar sopra un piano di questa montagna bisogna allontanarsi ancora 200 passa. Vostra Serenità dall'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza, Suo Generale potrà intender che conto che una fortezza deve far di tiri di arteglierie lontani 1100 passa, né anco di 900 et tanto più, che tutti li belloardi et cortine doverano esser fatti pendenti per coprirsi dalle alture, come a Bergamo Sua Eccellenza ha fatto fare in diversi luoghi,⁴ sì che quanto a questa oppositione di esser battuta dalla montagna, io per me non la stimo, anzi se fusse accaduto andar più sotto alla montagna ancora 300 passa de più, per me non restarei di consigliar che là si facesse tutta via, me riporto al parer di Sua Eccellenza, qual farà conoscer la verità a Vostra Signoria Illustrissima.

Resta la terza et ultima, qual sarà più difficile et fastidiosa di tutte le altre, et che ogni huomo è atto a prender in ciò de grandissimi errori quanto al cavar de un 1450 passa de fossa longa che li anderà, mi sforzarò in ciò con gli scandagli fatti, et per tanti pozzi che sono in questo sito, di prender manco error che sarà possibile in la quantità della spesa, qual tutti conti prima saranno da me mostrati a questi Clarissimi Signori Rettori di Vostra Serenità et, se Sue Signorie Clarissime in ciò prenderano qualche error, io ancora mi contento di esser come le altri, ma si manda a Vostra Signoria il conto istesso come le facemo noi, acciò Vostra Serenità faccia quanto li pare.

Quanto alla forma et rason, perché io desiderarei che la fortezza stesse in questo modo di 6 belloardi soli senza cavallieri per non attediar più Vostra Serenità con questa mia particolarmente, ho scritta la inclusa all'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza, qual littera mando aperta a Sua Eccellenza, acciò li Signori sopra le fortezze prima la possano vedere, et mandarla a Sua Eccellenza quando a loro Clarissime Signorie parerà, et alla buona gratia di Vostra Serenità sempre mi raccomando.

Data in Cerines alli 15 di agosto 1562

Di Vostra Serenità fidel servitor
Giulio Savorgnano



⁴ Sforza Pallavicino supervised construction in Bergamo from 1561 until his death: Colmuto Zanella, 'La fortezza cinquecentesca di Bergamo', pp. 111–113; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 106–111.

10 *Letter from G.S. to Sforza Pallavicino, Cerines, 15 August 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 33^v–34^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 26–30; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 19–22.

Complementing the letter concerning Cerines that he sent to the doge, G.S. here discusses Clusone's drawing, which shows a fortress containing four bastions, three platforms and seven cavaliers, with a perimeter of 18,000 passa [3.1 km], 700 [1.2 km] of which are along the coast. Ercole Martinengo's drawing, of which a scale model should by now have been produced in Venice, shows seven bastions with five cavaliers, and a total perimeter of 1,850 passa [3.2 km], 600 [1 km] of which are along the coast. Even though digging an earthen moat will be expensive, the fortress in Martinengo's drawing holds around 30% more people than the one in Clusone's plans.

G.S. proposes a fortress with six bastions – cavalier-less, but endowed with large piazze – and a larger surface area than the other two projects. To make the curtains and bastions perfect, G.S. plans to follow Sforza Pallavicino's recommended dimensions and order the digging of a moat 1,450 passa [3.9 km] in length, to which will be added a further 800 passa [1.4 km] along the coast, taking the fortress perimeter to 2,260 passa [3.9 km]. This plan is a response to the deliberations in the Senate over how to build a fortress that will protect the people and the nobility and incorporate squares, churches and soldiers' homes, with wide roads around the walls.

This fortress will be protected on its seaward side by the rocks mentioned in previous letters, which will dissuade any enemy fleet from landing; and the coastal bastions are designed to protect ships stationed in the harbour. The Madonna della Cava church will have to be incorporated into the fortress, due to its elevated location. The earth dug up from the moats will be used to reinforce the bastions, curtains and piazze. The six bastions could be equipped with the same number of arquebusiers as the seven proposed by Ercole Martinengo, and the number of sentinels and soldiers could be reduced; but G.S. gives the decision to Pallavicino, and urges him to provide any information he sees fit to the provveditori alle fortezze.

LETTERA ALL'ILLUSTRISSIMO SIGNOR SFORZA PALLAVICINO

] 1562 alli 15 d'agosto.

] Lettera sopra Cerines al Signor Sforza.

Illustrissimo Signor,

Questa mia seconda littera sarà in materia di Cerines, et per supplire a quello che non ho possuto scriver in la littera della Illustrissima Signoria, per non venerli in fastidio. Dico a Vostra Eccellenza che il disegno del Clusone¹ ha 4 belloardi et 3 piate forme et 7 cavallieri di

¹ Agostino Clusone; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 10. Although there was no drawing of Cerines by Clusone in the *provveditori alle fortezze's* 1759 inventory, there was a map that he drew of Famagusta: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, pp. 202–203.

muraglia, circonda in tutto passa n° 1800, cioè dalla parte di terra ha di fossa passa n° 1100 dalla parte di mare, al dritto passa n° 700 et secondo il dette disegno del Cluson, questa fortezza sarà capace in sé di campi n° 120, a rason però di tavole 840 per campo, ma le tavole di cinque piedi l'una per quadro delli passi, che si suole parlar in le fortification.

Per il disegno del Conte Hercule Martinengo² qual anco Vostra Eccellenza ha veduto, et fino quest'ora ne deve esser fatto il modello in Venetia sono belloardi n° 7, con cinque cavallieri di muraglia della parte di terra et uno dalla parte di mare, et tutta la sua circonferentia sarebbe di passa n° 1850, et dalla parte di terra ha di fossa passa n° 1250, et dalla parte di mare passa n° 600, faccio questa distintione da mare a terra perché va più spesa in un passo dalla parte di terra che in 15 della parte di mare, essendo che da terra bisogna cavar fossa et terrapieni, onde che da mare per haver quasi tutte le rive alte ogni minima muraglia sup- / [34^f] plixrà, havendo la riva molto bassa et il mare per fossa, et il sito dentro alto per terrapieno. Però Vostra Eccellenza, come Ella sa meglio di me, non haverà quasi niente in consideratione che di noi tre abbrazza più sul mare, che sarò io per la ragione detta di sopra, ma bisogna haver rispetto alla capacità del sito di tutta la fortezza, et il ponto principal sta nel cavar la quantità della fossa, in questo disegno del Martinengo Vostra Eccellenza potrà far misurare che haverà di fossa a mesurerla per il mezo di longhezza passa n° 1250, nella qual fortezza resterà capacità di campi alla misura sopradetta n° 180, che sarà un terzo più capace de quello del Clusone.

Et per il disegno, che io haverei animo che si facesse, non li vorrei più in tutto di 6 belloardi senza cavallieri, ma detti belloardi con le sue grande piazze et fronte vengono ad abbrazzare più sito che niuno delli altri 2 soprascritti disegni, tutta via Vostra Eccellenza vederà che io ho osservato tutti li pareri suoi al mio creder, havendo fatto le 5 cortine de terra de passa 120 l'una, come sono anco le 6 del Martinengo, et 80 passa le fronte di ciascuno belloardo, sì che da fianco a punta del belloardo non passano li 200 passa et le fronti sono battute in batteria al modo di Vostra Eccellenza, li fianchi de 25 passa l'uno per far le spalle et orecchioni perfetti, tutta la fossa sarà di longhezza di passa n° 1450, cioè 200 passa più dil Martinengo, ma in capacità dentro della fossa in questa saranno campi alla misura sopradetta n° 320 che in proportione, quanto alla capacità di dentro quella del Clusone è come sarebbe a dire 6 quella del Conte Hercole Martinengo 9, et la mia opinione è di 16 in capacità, qual mia della parte di mare et di 800 passa a drittura, et in tutto secondo il mio disegno circonderà passa n° 2250, con tutto ciò a considerare la causa, perché quell'Illustrissimo Senato ha deliberato di fare questa fortezza è stata a fine di conservar popoli et la nobiltà di questo Regno, et essendo Famagosta nelli termini che è al presente, et che si pò sperare di metter questa in esser in poco tempo, per queste ragion sopraditte, ogn'uno dovrebbe concorrer di far questa, ancora che habbia solamente 200 passa de più fossa, essendo quella dil Martinengo in capacità 9 solamente, et questa 16 con tutto ciò in questa mia opinione che

² Count Ercole Martinengo, cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 11, who drew a map of Cerines listed in the 1759 inventory: "Altra pianta di detto [Cerines] con grandioso progetto del Conte Ercole Martinengo, con Scala e Bussola, ma senza veruna annotazione." He also drew a map of Famagusta: *ibid.*

è la maggiore, non potranno star dentro se non 550 case a star commode et compartirle con le sue strade dritte, piazze, chiese et le sue strade ample attorno le muraglie, et che tutte le case che guardano verso la muraglia sia habitation delli soldati, quali per le vicinà delle mura sempre saranno come in guarda, et la notte li popoli non haveranno che far appresso le mura, non havendo case di fora via, né la notte li soldati haveranno a dar impazzo a quelli della terra, così come Vostra Eccellenza dissegnò di fare a Bergamo³ li alloggiamenti delli soldati tra le mura vecchie, et le nove et medesimamente qui si potrà far questo fabricandosi.

Quanto alla difesa di mare, Vostra Eccellenza stia con l'animo contente per più ragione, prima perché se galere voranno far batteria ad una fortezza fornita di artiglieria non ha dil verisimile, et poi non potranno metter in terra per dar assalto per li pessimi scoglij vivi et acuti che sono su la riva del mare, et poi tutta è fiancheggiata, et si ha atteso a darli tal forma per avanzarli più sito che si ha potuto a fine che nave possano sorzer in grembo della fortezza senza esser vedute dall'artiglieria nemica dalle rive del mare, per questa causa ho abbracciato assai sopra il mare et fattome avanti con quelle ponte per haver più mare sicuro, ancora si ha atteso ad andar in alcuni siti per avanzar una infinità di spesa tutta via non credo che Vostra Eccellenza vederà inconvenienti che non siano supportabili verso il mare. Et sappia Vostra Eccellenza che, per necessità, bisogna prender dentro quella giesia detta la Madonna della Cava⁴ per 2 cause, che senza essa si haveria potuto batter con l'artiglieria nemica, le nave fin sopra la bocca del porto, et per l'altura di quel sito sopra a quelle grotte, et per quelle grotte et sito doppio loro, è stato necessaria a far così di abbrazzar dentro tutte dette grotte, altramente non si pò far cosa bona al mio parere, ben è / [34^v] vero che per me non sento di far li cavallieri essendo che, non havrei animo di gettare fora della fossa pure una barella di terra, ma far la fossa profonda 20 piedi, et forse 25 par cavar tanto più terreno da gittare tutto dentro delle piazze delli belloardi et cortine, et havendo ad andare solamente terreno ritirato sopra il cordone, essendo li terraglij⁵ di dentro altissimi a beneplacito de quelli di dentro, in ogni loco si può alla improvisa presentar delli pezzi d'artiglieria et far delli effetti come cavallieri, Vostra Eccellenza mi haverà per iscusato se li sarò tanto molesto con queste mie longhe littere, ma a voler dir il tutto, non posso far di manco, et qui facendo fine a Vostra Eccellenza mi raccomando.

Crederò che Vostra Eccellenza sarà di parere che in questi 6 belloardi secondo la mia opinione, non accaderà metter più artiglieria di quello che si farebbe nelli 7 belloardi dil Conte Hercule, anzi secondo la mia opinione si potrebbe fare di manco per esser manco numero delli belloardi, et medesimamente li anderà manco sentinella, et manco guarda ancora che sia più capace la mia, et anco di questo mi rimetto al parer di Vostra Eccellenza

3 Sforza Pallavicino supervised construction of the Bergamo fortress from 1561 onwards; cf. supra, doc. 9 n. 4.

4 Santa Maria della Cava, otherwise known by its Greek name of Chrysocava, is a little chapel located towards the rear of the modern-day harbour dating back to the ninth century: R. Gunnis, *Historic Cyprus. A Guide to its Town, Villages, Monasteries and Castles*, London ²1956, p. 128; A. Papageorgiou, 'Λαξευτά ασκητήρια και μοναστήρια της Κύπρου', *Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου Μελετών Ιεράς Μονής Κόκκιου* 4 (1999), pp. 52–53. 5 Another term for a terreplein.

qual dechiarirà alli Illustrissimi Signori alcune cose quali pareno contra le opinione communi et pur sono vere.

Data in Cerines alli 15 di agosto 1562.

Di Vostra Eccellenza servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano



11 *Letter from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze, Cerines, 15 August 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 34^v–35^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 1669*, pp. 31–39; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 23–28.

Complementing his two previous letters concerning the fortification of Cerines, G.S. stresses that the moat to be dug on the landward side will be at most 1,500 passa [2.6 km] in length; it will be 4 passa [7 m] deep, excluding the cunette, and 20 passa [35 m] wide at the bastions; basing statistics on the soundings performed at 35 holes, this gives an overall volume of 150,000 passa cubi [788,400 cubic m]. Digging these holes revealed that water appears at a depth of 15 to 18 piedi [26 to 31 m], preventing further digging.

Digging will commence on each of the two seaward sides of the island, exploiting the land's natural slope to allow the water from the moats to run away easily. Here G.S. makes reference to the debate currently dividing soldiers over whether to leave the water in the moats or not, a determining factor in the organization of sorties and protection against mines. 44 fresh water wells have been counted in the village, so there will be no lack of water, and windmills could be built on the slope to improve supplies to the fortress.

Three quarters of the moat will be dug out of the ground, but one quarter will be cut out of rock; this rock is of three different densities, and in the end less than 10% of the moat will be cut out of the hardest rock. It is up to the proveditors to decide whether the work is to be done over a long period of time, as in Legnago or Famagusta, or quickly, as in Bergamo; the latter decision would mean enlisting 4,000 men, including 1,000 Italians, as one Italian sapper does the work of three Cypriots. The other 3,000 men can be recruited on the island from its 1,000 villages, each village providing three men a year for the fortification efforts; though villages with stronger workforces will give more than villages with weaker ones. It would be wise to introduce a payment by results system, like the ferlini method, which would be to Venice's benefit as shown in Peschiera; such a system stimulates workers and combats laziness, and does San Marco no harm.

G.S. excuses himself for going into such detail, but feels this is justified when he is so far away from Cyprus and too old to travel there often (Ercolo Martinengo has seen how arduous the journey can be). It is proving impossible to commence any project whatsoever on the island before September, as no provisions can be found; moreover, the summer is too hot, and no more than five hours of sun a day can be tolerated. Work like that done in Bergamo is thus impossible. If the site is to move forward, teams commanded by a chief should be put in charge of each bastion; but the proveditors know this already.

One of the Venetian officers has asked G.S. about the cost of the fortifications; he has answered that firstly one needs to know how much money will be misappropriated by those in charge of finances, and then one needs to determine how long the work will take. In the end the sum he has proposed for digging the moat (not including the part to be cut out of rock) for the six bastions and five curtains is 50,000 to 60,000 ducats. G.S. goes on to examine how much the walls will cost, and concludes that less money will be spent on the large enceinte in Cerines than on this little, worthless, fortress.

ALLI CLARISSIMI MIEI SIGNORI ET PATRONI OSSERVANDISSIMI,
LI SIGNORI SOPRA LE FORTEZZE¹ IN VENETIA

] 1562 alli 15 agosto.

] Lettera sopra Cerines.

Clarissimi signori miei osservandissimi,

In la materia di fortificar Cerines da novo ho scritto 2 lettere, una alla Serenissima Signoria,² et l'altra all'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza,³ et questa a Vostre Signorie Clarissime, et tal divisione ho fatto per non venire in fastidio nel legerle se io havesse messo il tutto su una littera sola. Però dico a Vostre Signorie Clarissime di più di quello ho detto in le altre 2, che la fossa da terra, come quelle potranno far misurare sopra il disegno, non arriva di longhezza a 1500 passa et andando profonda 4 passa senza la cunnetta, et larga detta fossa alle fronti delli belloardi 20 passa et tanto più nelle vele passato li orecchioni, tanto che fatto il conto va poco più di 100 passa di cavatione per ogni passo di longhezza di detta fossa, sì che tutta detta fossa essendo longa poco manco di 1500 passa, detta cavatione a 100 passa per uno sarebbe in tutto 150 millia passa cubi di cavatione, quale per il giudicio che potemo fare qui sul fatto, havendo fatto cavare più di 35 busi, cioè a tutte le ponte delli belloardi uno et 2 busi per fianco, et uno per cortina alla contrascarpa, quali buse saranno per segno di questa fortezza, se sarà fatta per Vostre Signorie Clarissime, et in alquante di loro si è andato in profondità di 15, et anco 18 piedi, tanto che in 4 o 5 di loro havemo trovata l'acqua viva in circa 15 piedi, et queste nelle quali havemo trovata l'acqua sono state quelle, nelle quali manco speravimo di trovarla, sì che di certezza in tutta la fossa si ritroverà l'acqua a questi 15 et 18 piedi; haverei fatto cavar ancora più, ma l'acqua ne impediva, non per questo al cavar che si farà la fossa et la cunnetta, qual anderà ancora 8 o 10 piedi più bassa della fossa, la qual ne haverà da dar fastidio, essendo che in questo piano della campagna dove facemo li due belloardi più verso il monte, siamo a livello più alti della superficie del mare passa 16 ancora che la fossa sarà profonda 4 passa et 2 la cunnetta, dal fondi de detta cunnetta fino al mare sarà de discaduta de 10 passa, qual discaduta sarebbe atta per un piccol canale a scolar l'acqua del Pò.

¹ The *provveditori alle fortezze* were Francesco Bernardo and Bernardo Sagredo; the latter was replaced in September 1562 by Andrea Badoer: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni Senato, reg. 3, f. 45^r. ² Cf. supra, doc. 9. ³ Cf. supra, doc. 10.

Voglio dir per questo che si comincerà a far la cavatione su tutte 2 le marine, et se anderà montando questi diece passa et tutte le muraglie, terrapieni, et il sito proprio sta così pendente verso al mare, sì che havendo tal pendentia quest'acqua in questi busi, overo pozzi tondi, quale ho fatto far larghi 12 piedi de diametro, non potemo cavarli l'acqua, / [35'] ma a quello modo, havendo la pendentia bassa, si scolerà ogni sorte di acqua et questa cosa a mio giuditio non potrebbe star meglio, et quando che tra soldati come Vostre Signorie Clarissime hanno più volte sentito a disputar se è meglio l'acqua in una fossa overo che elle sia secca, finalmente se risolvino che la fossa fosse secca per far le sortite, ma che in la cunetta fusse dell'acqua per star sicuri dalle mine, qual cosa non so fin qui in qual fortezza sia stata veduta, ma per far questo effetto Dio ha fatto questo sito molto a questo proposito, essendo che in questo casal li sono 44 pozzi di acqua viva in questa altezza, et un belloardo a punto viene a cader nel casal, sì che siamo chiari della abbondantia dell'acqua, et mediante la pendentia del sito securi da esse che non ne impediranno nel fabricare per la ragion detta, anzi non de parere che si caverà tante acque che si faranno delli molini che suppliranno a questa fortezza, et havendo tal altezza si potranno tirar dette acque et far molini securi nella fortezza, qual cosa sarà di grandissima commodità.

Mi resta a dirli che per le cavatione fatte a divider tutta questa fossa in 24 caratti et facendo li conti larghi pendenti verso il mare, cioè verso la roccha, dico che 18 caratti saranno di terra commune da cavare, e 6 caratti saranno di roccha,⁴ ma questa roccha sarà di 3 qualità, doi carratti de dura, qual a Famagosta costa bisanti n° 12 a tagliar il passo quadro, et 2 altri carratti sarà di roccha mediocre, qual costa a Famagosta bisanti 7 il passo, li altri 2 carratti sarrà et è tanto facili da tagliar che in Italia, a Pischera⁵ et a Bergamo assai più duri sono quelli terreni, et in questi paesi la pagano 4 et 5 bisanti il passo, ma questa fabrica se Vostre Signorie Clarissime se risolvono di farla ha da esser in uno delli 2 modi, overo la vorranno fare in 30 o 50 anni, come è stato fatto Legnago,⁶ overo Famagosta, l'altro modo sarebbe di voler metterli un sforzo di gente et in un anno metterla in fortezza con la sua guarda dentro, dico che se si vorrà farla con la commodità de assai anni, et longo tempo si haverà a camminare con le zampe⁷ vecchie come si fa a Famagosta et altri lochi de Italia, ma se Vostre Signorie Clarissime si risolveranno di volerla fare al modo di Bergamo et metterla in guarda in un anno, bisogna metterli 4000 huomini per finirla et sapian Vostre Signorie Clarissime che senza mille homeni Italiani non se li vederà mai il fine per la infinità tardità et ostinatione di questa gente, qual effetto ho provato benissimo queste 2 settimane passate che ne ho havuti fino a 60

⁴ *da cavare, e 6 caratti saranno di roccha* added in the left-hand margin with *signe-de-renvoi*. ⁵ Peschiera, on Lake Garda, where the Venetian defensive system was reworked in accordance with new ideas, which from 1549 onwards were the subject of debate between Michele Sanmicheli, Guidobaldo II Della Rovere and Giulio Savorgnan: Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 269–270; G. Perbellini, 'La difesa delle frontiere centro-occidentali: Orzinuovi, Legnago, Peschiera', in *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, pp. 165–168. For his part (cf. infra, doc. 38), G.S. considered it to be in Peschiera that the bastion was used for the first time in Venetian military architecture. ⁶ The Legnago fortress, transformed between 1519 and 1559; cf. Perbellini, 'La difesa delle frontiere centro-occidentali', pp. 164–165. ⁷ A round or oval stone structure fitted with a parapet, often built low down to defend higher structures.

homini alla volta per far questi busi, et senza dubio un guastator d'Italia farà per 3 de questi; li bisognarebbe almanco 200 et più scarpelini per rompere quella prima rocca dura, quali in ogni modo vorrei metter a lavorare non a giornata ma tanto del passo, et son di opinione che si avanzarebbe assaissimo rispetto a questi mercati di Famagosta, nella qual Famagosta li galleotti tagliano benissimo quella rocca dura che così la chiamano, il che è segno che non merita da esser chiamata dura, ma tutti li guastatori Italiani sarebbero atti a far questo officio, oltra de questi 1000 Italiani, li altri 3000 si dovrebbero tore in questa isola, nella quale è da 1000 casali, ne sarebbe sì gran cosa se per un anno tre huomini per casal venissero a lavorare a questa fabrica, intendendo però secondo le ratte delli casali,⁸ chel più grande supplisca al più piccolo, questa tal sorte di gente vedendo lavorar una parte delli Italiani, quali se lavorando a giornata guadagnerano 10 over 12 soldi, lavorando a ferlini li valent' huomini saranno atti a guadagnarsene 15 et anco 18 al giorno, con evidentissimo utile di San Marco, come sarà ben testimonio il Clarissimo Signor Thomaso Contarini Procurator,⁹ che io feci veder a Sua Signoria Clarissima a Peschera, che a ferlini con il pagamento di 14 opere si faceva tanto effetto quanto facevano 100 huomini a giornata, crederò che Sua Signoria Clarissima se lo ricorderà, voglio dir per questo che vorrei dar tutta la cavatione di questa fossa ad alcuni capi a tanto il passo, et che loro havessero la cura di far lavorar la gente a ferlini, essendo che un'huomo benissimo a un bagattino il zerletto si puol guadagnar 14 et 16 soldi il giorno, tollendo il terreno in ogni parte della fossa et portarlo nelle piazze delli belloardi, et un pie di terreno non pesa più de lire 120 grosse venetiane, sì che ogni putto et donna pol portare 40 lire de peso, che è il terzo del pie, et con questo modo di dar le cavationi ad altri, San Marco non sarà robato quanto è così nel far / [35^v] lavorar a giornata, come nella cosa delli ferlini, ma il particolar usa tal diligentia che la cosa va bene per lui, et a voler inviare la gente di questo Regno con parte delli Italiani che fossero qui, se invierebbe che la povertà di questa natione concorrerebbono al guadagno, sì che la sua pigrizia non farebbe danno al Principe, basta che 'l Regno ne mantegna 3000 persone per lavorare a ferlini per qualche mese fino che la cosa fosse inviata.

Sono entrato con Vostre Signorie Clarissime a parlar di tanti particolari che dubito di venirli in fastidio, ma essendo stato mandato da Vostre Signorie Clarissime a questo effetto per questa fortezza, me pareria di mancar del debito, se io non li scrivessi tutto quello che mi van per l'animo in proposito di far tal fortezza, et se il venir in Cipro fosse così facile viaggio,

8 G.S. intends to make use of the requisition laws imposed upon the peasantry which obliged the *francomati* to work on the fortification of Famagusta for several days per year, in accordance with customs dating back to the Frankish era; cf. supra, doc. 8 n. 5. 9 Tomaso Contarini (1488–1578), *di Alvise*, from the Madonna dell'Orto branch, was elected procurator of San Marco *de citra* in 1557, and was an important figure in political life. He was *podestà* of Verona in 1540–1541, and was included in the 1544 *Collegio* of Thirty convened to discuss fortresses. He was appointed *savio grande* several times between 1543 and 1571, and was elected to the Council of Ten in 1568. He also became a deputy in the fortification of Udine, in December 1566: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni in Maggior Consiglio e in Senato, registri sec. XVI (Banca Dati). Indice degli eletti lettera C., s.v.; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. III, p. 466; P. F. Grendler, 'The *tre savii sopra eresia* 1547–1605: a prosopographical study', *Studi Veneziani* n.s. III (1979), p. 323.

come il correre alla posta da Venetia a Bergamo non sarrei stato tanto lungo, ma questo viaggio è tale che bisogna che quelli che hanno la barba bianca non se usano di farlo troppo spesso, et l'esempio del Conte Hercole Martinengo è fresco,¹⁰ et di altri. Però le voglio anco dir questo, che in fino a un'altro settembre non sarebbe possibile né cominciar né far cosa bona, essendo che non si trova da viver in questo Regno, et io lo provo che per li mei denari non si trova della robba se non con fatica et charissima, et sopra questo bisognerà avanti de ogni altra cosa farne gagliardissima provisione et a tempo, et lo lavorar d'inverno e da mesi tempi sarà al proposito ma zugno, luio et agosto che io ho provati qui, non è possibile di star in tutto il giorno più di 4 o 5 hore al sole tra la mattina et sera, altramente se si vorrà far delle fatiche di Bergamo si andrebbe in mal'hora immediate, et chi non sollicita la gente, l'opera non se finisce maj, però darla sopra di loro più che si può, et lavorandosi a tutti 6 li belloardi in una volta, li bisognerebbe 6 capi, uno almanco per belloardo con delli huomini appresso di sé, perché uno da sé non può esser per tutto, et assai altre provisioni bisognerà farle a tempo che io non le starò a dir, ma Vostre Signorie Clarissime con la sua solita prudentia anti-vederanno al tutto, et con questo fine in bona gratia di Vostre Signorie Clarissime sempre mi raccomando.

Mi è stato detto da uno di questi Clarissimi Signori qui del Regno, che io doverei dir più chiaramente quanti ducati anderanno a far questa fabrica, io ho risposto a Sua Signoria Clarissima che a voler far io questo iudicio, bisogna che io sia informato de quanti ducatti che hanno deliberato de robar li soprastanti et altri che manezarano li danari, et medesimamente, se mi sarà detta la sorte de diligentia che serà usata in questa fabrica, et anco mi bisogna saper se tal fabrica sarà fatta in un'anno overo in 30, essendo che da un modo o all'altro è una grandissima defferentia, et quando mi sarà dato informatione vera di queste 3 cose, potrò con maggior fondamento andar più appresso alla verità, ma per satisfar a Sua Signoria Clarissima in parte, dico cha tal fossa, se San Marco potesse havere delli ministri fedeli, si cavarebbono 4 passa cubi al ducato, ma è meglio darla ad altri per tre passa al ducato, et anco qual cosa manco perché se le persone si hanno a faticare voleno guadagnar, et sempre a San Marco costarà 5 marcelli il passo o a giornata o ad altro modo, sì che se tutta detta fossa fusse di terra, venirebbe a costar la sua cavatione 50 o 60 millia ducati di tutti li 6 belloardi, et delle 5 cortine li va di più la spesa de quelli 2 caratti di rocca dura, qual torna in beneficio poi per far la muraglia, onde che se tutta la fossa fosse stata di terra si haverebbe convenuto andar in altri lochi a cavar la preda per far la muraglia, et spender in condutture, sì che è tornato a proposito che in tal cavatione et fossa sia stata questa portione di rocca.

Ancora che tutta la fossa da terra sia manco de 1500 passa la muraglia, rispetto a 10 fianchi et 10 orecchioni, importa in tutto quasi 2000 passa di muraglia, et andando alta 6 passa et uno di fondamenta, sì che in tutto anderanno da 14 in 15 millia passa de muraglia di grossezza de uno passo alto, et longo dalla parte di mare anderà circa cinque millia passa di

¹⁰ A reference to the death of Count Ercole Martinengo in late December 1560, cutting short his mission in Famagusta; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 11.

muraglia, con tutta ciò questa somma de muraglia e manco che non è quella, che è stata messa in la rocca de Cerines quale è più di 23 millia passa di muraglia, essendo che questo castello circonda 370 passa et ha alta la muraglia 16 passa, et grossa almanco 20 piedi et in qualche loco più, sì che il Cerines grande costarà manco a San Marco di muraglia che non ha fatto il piccolo, il qual piccolo di fortezza non vale niente, et il grande sarà della sorte che Vostre Signorie Clarissime il giudicarà, la spesa di tutta questa fortezza va principalmente nel cavar la fossa, le muraglie sutilissime con gran scarpa, tanto che a pena possano sustentare li terreni, quali sono eccellentissimi et in pochi lochi anderanno li spironi,¹¹ se non alle ponte sopra il mare, et alli orecchioni chi saperà tagliar il terreno iusto con diligentia, et la sua principal fortezza sarà nell'ordimento principal della fabrica fatto con tiri convenienti, et saper assettar 4 cannoniere per belloardo appoggiate alli orecchioni, che non siano imboccate, et li sta il ponto di tutta questa scientia, come l'Illustrissimo Signor Suo Governator Generale li saperà molto ben far intender, et a Vostre Signorie Clarissime sempre mi raccomandando.

Data in Cerines alli 15 agosto 1562.

Di Vostre Signorie Clarissime servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



12 *Fragment of a letter from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze, Nicosia, 13 September 1562*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 36^r; copy: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 39–40; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, p. 30.

G.S. stresses how good the air in Cerines is, and that if he had stayed in Nicosia or Famagusta, he and half his men would be dead by now. The Cypriots assure him that Paphos, not Cerines, should be fortified; but they would in fact prefer, regardless of whether the country was at war or not, that Venice abandon all her plans, even in Famagusta. G.S. does not agree, as documented in his six letters to the doge, Sforza Pallavicino and the provveditori alle fortezze. The models are well underway, but not yet finished, as the engineer has suffered setbacks; they will be finished in Candia, whence G.S. hopes to set sail on 1 October.

¹¹ Spur, counterfort.

COPIA DE UN CAPITOLO SCRITTO DA ME ALLI CLARISSIMI SIGNORI DELLE FORTEZZE
IN MATERIA DI CERINES

] 1562 alli 13 di settembre.

] Capitolo sopra Cerines.

Ho voluto dir questo in laude dell'eccellentissimo buon aere di Cerines, che senza dubbio quel mese ch' l' sole stette in leone, Dio ne ha aiutati che siamo stati a Cerines, ma se fussemo stati così qui a Nicosia ovvero a Famagosta, la mittà di noi non sarebbero vivi, sì che se ben quasi tutti questi Cipriotti volesseno dire che è meglio a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime a fortificar Baffo et non Cerines, ciò non dicono di buon cuore, ma non vorrebbero né Baffo né Cerines, et li rincresce anco di Famagosta ma pensano con parlar di Baffo di disturbare la fortification di Cerines, et questo è la verità, come è vero lo Evangelio, et cercano per tutte le vie et modi che si possano immaginare di far che San Marco non habbia fortezze in Cipro, il qual effetto se sarà fatta la sua intentione, così in tempo di pace, come al tempo di guerra, non sarà bene per San Marco; io mi potrebbe ingannare, ma credo così et scrivo medesimamente la opinione mia, come la sento, havendo scritto dui lettere alla Serenissima Signoria et due all' Illustrissimo Signor Sforza, et un'altra et questa a Vostre Signorie Illustrissime tutte 6 in materia di Famagosta et Cerines,¹ li modelli di relevo sono ben principati ma non finiti, et appena questo inzegnero ha fatto questi disegni,² et ha havuto ventura che mai è stato amalato, ma de Candia subito finiti li saranno mandati, altro non so che scriverli, se non pregar Vostre Signorie Illustrissime che me vogliano tenir nel numero delli suoi fideli servitori, et in sua buona gratia sempre mi raccomando.

Data in Nicosia, alli 13 di settembre 1562.

Penso partirmi al principio de ottobre per Candia.

Di Vostre Signorie Clarissime Buon Servitor.

Giulio Savorgnano



13 *Ammunition inventory for the artillery stored in Famagusta's fortress, 1562*

BNM, *cod. it. cl. XI 90* (6774), ff. 85^r–86^r.

This anonymous report¹ firstly gives an inventory of the weapons and cannonballs stored in the Famagusta fortress, then goes on to establish how many weapons will be needed to defend a fortress equipped (according to the plans submitted by G.S., cf. doc. 8) with six bastions, as well as what will be needed in terms of ammunition and tools for construction.

¹ The six letters that G.S. mentions are the documents 7 to 12 published here; the last of these, however, is an incomplete version. ² Concerning the engineer Zuanne Magagnati and his scale models, see *supra*, doc. 7 n. 1.

☞ ¹ The report can be found amongst various *miscellanea* in the Council of Ten collections, which also contain a summarized version of Ascanio Savorgnan's report on Cyprus; cf. *infra*, p. 174 n. 29.

1562

Come si trova al presente la munition' d'artegliaria di Famagosta, et insieme come devria esser.

Si trovano

Canoni da	C	n° 3 con balle	n° 1231
	L	20	6785
	XX	3	1456
Colobrine da	L	2	
	XVIII	6	3031
Sacri et aspidi da	XII	26	6714
Falconi	da VI	10	2123
Falconetti	da III	26	3497
Moschetti	da braga	12	2123
	da zogo	3	914
Perrere	da CL	1	
	L	4	
	XX	1	
Bombarde de ferro			

Item si trovano balle per pezzi che non sono

da XL	n° 142
XXX	245
XXV	195
XVI	170

Balle de pietra coperte de piombo

da L	1
XXX	38
XX	2

Balle di piombo con il dado de ferro

da passavolanti	n° 67
da sacro et da VI	n° 602
III	39
da spingarde et arcibusoni da posta	9447

Devriano esser' quando saran' finiti li 6 bellovardi, per ciascun' bellovardo un' pezzo almeno per canoniera che sarian'

Nelle due piazze da basso	Canoni da XX	n° 2	con balle mille in circa per ciascun' pezzo, et anco meno per li più grossi, vero è che tutti sono pezzi utili et Famagosta ha la lontananza et altre difficoltà de soccorsi
	Sacri da XVIII	n° 2	
Nella piazza di sopra	Canoni da L	n° 2	
	Colobrine da XX	n° 2	
	XXV	n° 2	
	Falconeti da III	n° 2	
In ciascun' cavallier'	Colobrine da C	1	Item con polvere corrispondente al numero delle balle dette
	L	1	
	XXV	1	
	Sacro da XVIII	1	

[85^v]

Devrian esser' al presente per la necessità di accomodarsi secondo le piazze delli dodeci torrioncini, sacri da XIII numero 24, et canono da XX numero 24, se ben' si dovesse andar' cambiandoli et dandosi loco l'un' a l'altro.

Et per il bellovarado novo quanti si disse di sopra.

Et così per ciascun' cavallier'.

Item letti da rispetto per ciascun' pezzo d'artegliaria et rode.

Item moschetti fra ogni ducento archibusieri numero 50 con balla da onze due.

Item staria bene munition' de più di archibusi, et di piche et di moschetti.

Item di fuoghi lavorati.

Di terreno, zape, pale, legname, ferramenta et simili occorenze. / [86^r]

Numero de soldati nelle fortezze, devrian esser' per ogni miglio dui millia fanti sin' a li 3 miglia, massimamente per li rispetti de la moltitudine de' nemici del mal aere e de la lontanaza e difficultà de' soccorsi et de le fortificationi fresche et imperfette.

Munition' de meglio devrian esser' a ragion di stara 4 per bocca, et piutosto 5.



14 *Extract of a report from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze concerning the state of the Cypriot cernide, Candia, 27 June 1565*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 45^r; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 56–57; ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 46–47.

A passage in G.S.'s report on Crete's local militia (cernide) concerns their Cypriot counterparts, recalling that they were founded in 1558. G.S. underlines that the militia formed by the working men of Nicosia received particularly good training; they displayed such great solidarity that they sometimes defended criminals in their ranks, creating an atmosphere of violence and disorder. The regimento succeeded through tact in stripping them of their weapons and settling them back into their villages, but the cernide continued to cause trouble and revolts in the areas surrounding Cerines in 1562. G.S. enjoins Venice to carefully add up how much defending Cyprus will cost, as soldiers are expensive and the numbers available on the island are still insufficient, even including the additional troops that would be enlisted in the event of a war.

[CERNIDE DI CANDIA]

Diro che già 5 o 6 anni fu deliberato et eseguito de far le cernide de Cipro,¹ et così furono fatte, et in Nicosia ne fu fatte del popolo se ben me ricordo circa 1000, lequali essercitate

¹ The decision to create units of *cernide* in Cyprus was taken in 1558. The *cernide* were peasant militia gathered from amongst *francoinati* old enough to serve as part of their territorial administrative district (*contrada*). The Senate at first planned to gather 3,000 men split into five companies of 600, to be led by Italian commanders and

secondo gli ordini diventarono eccellentissime, anzi troppo brave perché quando uno di loro faceva qualche homicidio et che la giustizia li metteva le mani adosso, et li suoi compagni vedendolo condurre et domandando lui aiuto, saltavano fora delle boteghe et case, et tumultavano per ogni minima cosa, tanto che quel Clarissimo Regimento di Cipro fecero provisione fingendo di volerli muttar quelle picche arcobusi et altre arme, et dargliene di migliori, et così recuperorono quasi tutte le arme, et mai più hanno voluto cernide in città et cassorono li capitani; sono rimaste le cernide in le ville, et al presente sono 3 anni che appresso a Cerines in una villa grossissima, tutte le cernide² de ditte ville fecero alcuni homicidij horendi et specie di solevation et rapine.³ Però bisogna guardarsi di dar il sapere a chi ha la gran forza et mal voler, et se Sua Serenità farà far ben li suo calcoli dell'utile et construtto che caverano al tempo di guerra di quelle cernide, et quanti milliara de ducatti li costano, facilmente le cose non sarebbero in questo esser, come anco di quella cavalleria qual in quel Regno al tempo di pace, et di più di quello che fa bisogno quasi la mittà, et in tempo di guerra, se ben fusse 3 volte tanta sarebbe poca, et per tornar al caso nostro di Candia [...].



15 *G.S. rectifies his ideas on the defence of Cyprus, 1566*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 36^{r-v}; copy: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, pp. 40–43.

In 1566, G.S. rectifies his ideas expressed four years previously concerning the workforce needed to build the fortresses; he had suggested sending 1,000 Italians to Cerines, but in fact 300 would be enough, as the case of Candia has shown that islanders employed on a pay by results basis become as valuable as Italians. Regarding the contingents of 3,000 sappers to be gathered in Cyprus, the best solution would be to order each village to supply just three men for a period of 12 to 18 months, rather than the Signoria's idea of offering the workers the chance to pay a sum of money instead of working.

The Cerines fortress will need a garrison of 500 soldiers; this will be a financial burden for the Signoria but G.S. proposes that money to pay the men, who, he underlines, will always be loyal to Venice, could be found by ceasing the salary accorded to the island's cavalry, relatively useless both in peacetime and in wartime. Cerines is a good site for a fortress, as the air is good, and if war comes the peasants can take refuge in the surrounding mountains.

stationed in Nicosia, Famagusta, Cerines, Limassol and Paphos. The following year (1559) the number of men rose to 5,000, split into eleven militia companies (one for each *contrada* plus two in Nicosia): ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 56^r, 76^v–77^v, 96^r; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, b. 5 (letter from Proveditor-General Andrea Duodo dated 2 April 1560); Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 100–101; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', p. 480. ² *solevation, et rapine* has been added after *cernide*, apparently a mistake on the part of the copyist. ³ Although we have no precise details concerning these troubles, we do know that whilst in charge of his company Captain Fabricio da Ravenna committed murder and caused the unrest seen in Cerines in the spring of 1564: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 139^v–140^v; in 1558–1559 Fabricio de Ravenna was captain of soldiers in Corfu: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 121.

Concerning the Paphos site, it is not at all suitable for a fortress: the air and water are bad, and the terrain is rocky.

] 1566

In queste lettere soprascritte fatte già 4 anni, dove che io scrivo alli Clarissimi Signori delle fortezze che, per inviare quelli Cipriotti a lavorar, sarebbe stato necessario di haver 1000 huomini Italiani,¹ al presente dico che basterebbono solamente 300, essendo che in Candia al principio del mio arrivar li,² quella gente mi pareva pegra, et ostinata poco / [36^v] meno delli Cipriotti, ma con il farli lavorar a ferlini diventerano immediate più gagliardi et più industriosi che se fussero stati tanti Italiani et delli buoni, voglio dir per questo che anco li Cipriotti farebbono il medemo, et così come all' hora iudicava che fusse necessario haver 1000 d'Italia per dar presto compimento alla fortezza di Cerines, al presente ricordarei che 300 basterebbono, et me ne vorrei servir di loro anco come soldati, oltre che si conducono a fine di inviar li 3 millia guastatori che dessero quelli del Regno, quali del Regno di ragione dovebbono essere più facili a dar per un'anno ovvero al più per 18 mesi, 3 huomini per casal di continuo per questi 18 mesi, cha pagar quella certa sorte di rata in danari, che Vostra Serenità li havea imposta, che era a Vostra Serenità 12 caratti della spesa, al Regno 8, et al clero 4, loro dicono che ciò li dispiace per la suspicion che hanno, che non diventi cosa perpetua, ilqual sospetto in le opere non ha del verisimile, et sono più de mille casali in quell'isola.³

] Avantaggio del far lavorare a ferlini, et non a giornata

Sarà detto che fatta che sia questa fortezza li vorrà una guarda di 500 fanti simile a quella di Famagosta et che la spesa sarà grandissima, io dico che la risposta sarà questa.

Che la cavalleria che Vostra Serenità tiene in qual Regno al tempo di guerra sarà di numero troppo poca, et al tempo di pace è quasi superflua il doppio, mi parrerebbe che 400 cavalli di manco di quelli che sono al presente per la pace suppliranno benissimo, et con le paghe di questi 400 cavalli si pagheranno le fanterie, il Signor Proveditor et Governator et tutta la spesa. Si dimanda venendo una guerra qual cosa tornerà più a proposito a conservar questo Regno con tutti li cavalli che sono al presente, overamente con una fortezza di quella sorte di più, et 400 cavalli manco, come sarebbe questo Cerines, nel quale si potrà salvare assai più gran numero di gente di quello che si farebbe in Famagosta per la bontà dell'aere, dell'acqua et per la sua capacità, oltre che essendo situato Cerines poco più d'un miglio lontano dal pie delle montagne sopra le quali sono posti Santo Ilarione, Buffalvento et altri

1 Cf. supra, doc. 11. 2 G.S. went to Crete after accomplishing his mission in Cyprus, in November 1562, according to Orazio Governa's diary; cf. infra, doc. 115. 3 This is not the correct number of villages on the island, showing that G.S. did not use the inventories compiled by the Venetian officers and administrative secretaries stationed in Cyprus: Grivaud, *Villages désertés*, pp. 70–80, 445–472. It should be noted that in his report Ascanio Savorgnan is similarly approximative with data concerning the number of villages; cf. infra, doc. 16 n. 13.

luochi in quella costiera di montagna longhissima, in la quale al tempo di guerra si potrà per rispetto del sito difficile salvar gran quantità delli popoli, quali con l'archibuseria delle cernide se vorranno esser fedeli, si potriano intratenir in ditte montagne un buon tempo, et per me vedo che il più gran utile che potrebbe far quelle cernide sarebbe questo, oltre la fama et reputation di haverle, mi stà il punto sopra quella fidelità a qual banda che volesseno impiegare la sua volontà, il qual effetto in tutti li popoli sta il più delle volte alla ventura di Dio. Dico questo per responder a quelli che fanno disegno che questi principalmente habbiano a deffender le fortezze; a me pare che in Cipro, in Candia et in ciascuna fortezza sta bene che la forza maggiore et superiorità stia in mano delli ministri di San Marco, cioè delli suoi Rettori, mediante li suoi soldati, riportandomi sempre però al miglior parere.

Non è dubbio alcuno che se Baffo fusse possibile per esser fortificato mi haverebbe piaciuto sommamente, ma il suo aere è pessimo et più tristo di quello di Famagosta et acqua cattivissima, et sottoposto a montagne di sasso. Nel sito che si doverebbe fare, si convenirà cavarli la fossa nel sasso vivo et non li è terreno né buono né tristo, il che fa riuscire il tutto impossibile al mio iudicio, et coloro che lo vorranno provar di fare, si chiarirano della spesa infinita che li anderà, et mai se li vederà il fine, et me provandolo faranno diventar profetta circa tanta impossibilità, tanto so dire a Vostra Serenità in materia di quel Regno.

PART THREE
ASCANIO SAVORGNAN IN CYPRUS
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1562

ASCANIO SAVORGNAN'S REPORT AND ITS CIRCULATION

The exact circumstances leading to the drawing up of Ascanio Savorgnan's report remain to some extent mysterious. It is not certain that the *Signoria* genuinely sought Ascanio's opinion on the strategic capacities of Cyprus; no mention of any official mission has been found in the Senate or *Collegio* archives, whereas surviving documentation does attest the duties given to Giulio. There is, however, solid proof that Ascanio discovered the island with his brother, and that they travelled together. It was most probably Giulio who took the initiative of bringing his younger brother with him on his expedition; maybe he wanted Ascanio to gain further experience in the field of fortification, or to have his sibling with him as an advisor on technical problems related to military architecture. As far as can be ascertained, the two brothers' partnership went no further than their time in Cyprus, as, beyond October 1562, Ascanio did not continue working with Giulio during the latter's mission in Crete.

What solid information there is concerning Ascanio's time in Cyprus comes from the writings he sent from the island, which were later collected into a single work entitled *Descrizione delle cose di Cipro*. The origins of this report can be retraced as follows: at first, Ascanio wrote two dispatches; the first, dated 25 June 1562 in Famagusta, concerns the state of the latter town's enceinte, while the second, dated 8 August in Cerines, deals with the castle overlooking the harbour.¹ Ascanio's analysis came a few days before that of his brother, Giulio finishing his own report concerning Famagusta on 7 July, and that concerning Cerines on 15 August.² Ascanio did not restrict himself to just these two dispatches, however, and spent the last two months of his time in Cyprus merging all his information into a more comprehensive report on the island, in Paphos, on 6 October; finally, he delivered a summarized version of this report that same day, again in Paphos.³ These last texts were thus finished a few days before his departure for Candia, which, Orazio Governa's diary tells us, was on 12 October.⁴

The copies of Ascanio's dispatches from Cyprus do not bear the name(s) of their addressee(s), which has fuelled numerous hypotheses regarding the author's intentions. In 1771 the erudite Friulian Giuseppe Liruti gained access to an autographed manuscript written by Ascanio, which revealed his plan: he wanted to produce a compendium on Cyprus

¹ The copies of these dispatches feature in miscellanea: BNM, *cod. it. cl. VI, 310 (6150)*, ff. 98–105, 154–161; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/6*, ff. 1–10, and *cod. Venier IV/2*, ff. 1^r–4^r, 5^r–8^r. ² Cf. *infra*, docs 7–11. ³ The long version appears in: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/12*, ff. 1–10, and *cod. Venier IV/2*, ff. 9^r–15^v [*Discorso del Illustrissimo Ascanio Savorgniano sopra la fortificatione et provisioni per difesa del Regno di Cipro l'anno MDLXII*]; the summarized version appears in: BNM, *cod. it. cl. VI, 310 (6150)*, ff. 79^r–95^v, and *cod. it. cl. XI, 90 (6774)*, ff. 194^r–199^v; CMC, *cod. Venier IV/2*, ff. 17^r–21^r [*Informatione del Illustrissimo Signor Ascanio Savorgniano delle provisioni necessarie per la difesa del Regno di Cipro l'anno MDLXII*, dated 8 October].

⁴ Cf. *infra*, doc. 115.

using notes gathered from various works, including Francesco Attar's memoir and an anonymous chronicle preserved in Nicosia, at Lodovico Podocataro's home.⁵ To this end, Ascanio wanted to incorporate into a historical account his own observations regarding the island's situation under Venetian rule, envisaging a synthesis of knowledge pertaining to both Cyprus's past and its present, a humanist approach not dissimilar to that of Florio Bustron's *Historia* written during the same period, in Nicosia.⁶ Ascanio intended his work to be printed, as he left a draft preface addressed to his future readers.⁷ Logically, Ascanio planned on including his dispatches on the defence of Famagusta and Cerines, in addition to the general considerations contained in the dated texts from Paphos.

For reasons unbeknownst to us, Ascanio did not persevere with his plan to publish a treatise on Cyprus, and surviving documentation indicates that he lost interest in the island after 1562; he was not part of the mission led by Giulio in 1567, and Giulio does not seem to have sent a single letter to him during his second spell in Nicosia.⁸ Moreover, Giulio did not really take Ascanio's opinions into consideration during the work he oversaw from 1567 to 1569, which makes it quite hard to understand why Ascanio accompanied his brother five years earlier. Certainly, Ascanio and Giulio shared several points of view, such as the necessity of introducing the *ferlini* system to pay the workforce on construction projects, or the crucial role of good-quality air and water in defending a fortress, but these kinds of opinion were more part of the Savorgnans' collective culture than the thoughts of any one member of the *fraterna*.

The ideas expressed by Ascanio hardly made an impression on his older brother, and no

5 According to Liruti, Ascanio wanted to write "non però come storico, ma come collettore de' particolari a questo nobilissimo Regno appartenenti, sparsi per i libri di questo, e di quello autore; e mi venne fatto, che da quei libri trovai tutti quei principi e re ch' ebbero dominio, da Nino incominciando fondator dell'imperio assirio, sino a' tempi de' Lusignani, che ultimi di tutii ne tennero l'imperio, servata la ragion della successione, e sino a di nostri; essendomi servito di un picciolo trattato, che va attorno sotto nome di M. Francesco Attar, e parte da una cronica anonima, che cola mi fu data": Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 57 (this quotation, given in italics, is copied from Ascanio's original). It is written on p. 59 of the anonymous chronicle that the text is the property of Lodovico Podocataro, and that it concerns the island's ancient history, finishing its analysis in the 1140s, with the crowning of Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem; evidence shows that other anonymous chronicles were associated with the Podocataro family: Grivaud, *Entrelacs chiprois*, pp. 252–253. Concerning Francesco Attar's memoir and its widespread circulation in Venice's historical culture: *ibid.*, pp. 235–239; C. Neerfeld, "Historia per forma di diaria". *La cronachistica veneziana contemporanea a cavallo tra il Quattro e il Cinquecento*, Venice 2006, pp. 100–101; Calvelli, *Cipro e la memoria dell'antico*, pp. 117–121. 6 Florio Bustron, *Historia ovvero Commentarii di Cipro*, pp. 257–269; concerning the man and his work: Grivaud, *Entrelacs chiprois*, pp. 257–269. 7 "Valendomi della memoria di molte cose lette appartenenti a quell'isola, e di nuovo servendomi della lettura d'alcuni pochi libri, che mi trovava appresso, ne feci un tal quale sommarietto, certo con non altro animo, che per soddisfare a me stesso; e per render conto, quando avvenisse, che ne fossi ricercato, del tempo per me in questi viaggi speso. Della qual fatica avendone dopo fatta partecipe persona, che amo ed osservo, e con cui soglio degli altri miei studi partecipar consistentemente, fui prima molte volte ricercato, dopo pregato, ed ultimamente astretto a farne parte a voi, onorati lettori, contentandomi io di esser dal mondo in questo atto tenuto per poco giudizioso più tosto, soddisfacendo che poco amorevole, denegando cosa così onesta all'amico [...]": Liruti, *Notizie delle vite*, vol. 3, p. 58. 8 In the correspondence sent by G.S. from 1567 to 1569, Ascanio is mentioned just once; cf. *infra*, doc. 63.

more attention was paid to them elsewhere, it being impossible to claim that they inspired the report written by Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo upon his return from the mission he carried out in Cyprus from April 1563 to April 1565.⁹ Sagredo concurs with Ascanio on the need to build a fort in Salina, but adopts an opposing point of view on Nicosia, supporting the idea of giving the city a new enceinte; Ascanio's views do not seem to have won over any of the other officers in charge of the island's defences, and it may be deduced that, though it was Ascanio's foremost intention to be seen as an expert in military architecture and strategy in the eyes of the *Signoria*, his opinions found no audience and did not meet with the success he was counting on. In this light, Ascanio's conclusive analysis of the defence of the entire Venetian State comes across as a heavy-handed piece of rhetoric when he claims that his reflections are a progression of the decisions taken by Francesco Maria Della Rovere after the defeat at Ghiera d'Adda in 1509, and when he boastfully recalls the fortification experience he gained during his time in France, when the Valois fought Charles V. As might be expected, he goes further, citing the examples of his father, Girolamo, and his ancestors, who organized the resistance against the Holy Roman Empire in Osoppo; Ascanio means to demonstrate that his beliefs emanate from the traditional culture of the Savorgnan lineage, but does not realize the pretentiousness of his words.

Regardless of changes possibly made by copyists during the transcription process, an analysis of Ascanio's text shows how he went about drawing up his report. No exact sources are mentioned in the introduction to his work, and it was doubtless his brother who gave him access to a few reports presented by Venetian officers to the Senate upon their return from Cyprus; apparent nevertheless is the singular lack of precision in the information regarding the island, indicating that Ascanio did not consult the archives of the offices located in Nicosia and Famagusta, nor meet with any civil officials. Ascanio was oblivious to local administration culture, which explains the absence of exact population data and his ignorance of the island's toponymy. The information Ascanio gathered on Cyprus before his departure amounted, therefore, to no more than what he had gleaned from general accounts circulating in Venice, such as Francesco Attar's memoir and Benedetto Bordone's *isolario*. There is no evidence that Ascanio took the time, as soon as his mission was confirmed, to broaden his knowledge of the island, and he is most often happy to rehash in his own words the ideas of other Venetian officials sent to Cyprus; his remarks on the intensive cultivation of cotton, for example, can be found similarly worded in reports from Colonel Agostino Clusone and Councillor Antonio Zane, while his opinions on the importance of salt to Venetian commerce reappeared three years later, in a text written by Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo. Ultimately, on issues not related to fortification, Ascanio delivers no original ideas, reflecting the mentality and beliefs of an officer who had come from the Venetian mainland solely to do the work of an expert.

⁹ A first version of this report has been published by Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 540–556, but a new version is to be quoted now: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 87–107 (from BNM, *cod. it. cl. VII 918 (8392)*, ff. 170^r–182^v); Manno finds the similarities between Ascanio and Sagredo's accounts convincing, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 117–118. Concerning Sagredo, see *infra*, doc. 65 n. 11.

Content

In his preamble, Ascanio claims to have consulted various reports on Cyprus before setting sail from Venice, and states that he will consequently aim to give nothing but information useful for the defence and maintenance of the island. He straight away states the following principle: fortifying the island is imperative given that it currently would not resist a military campaign, it hardly being reasonable to propose a joint operation from the fleet, the cavalry and the infantry of a territory located so far away from Italy and so close to enemy coasts. Consequently, Ascanio proposes fortifying two or three sites that offer favourable geomorphological conditions, are accessible from the sea, and could be built on without delay and for little cost. He then recommends stockpiling as many crops as possible at these sites, and destroying whatever cannot be transported, in addition to rendering the water reserves unusable; finally, he writes that ambushes must be planned to make it harder for the enemy to set up on the island.

Ascanio goes on to give a geographical description of the island, describing its regional environment and the physical particularities of its eleven administrative districts (*contrade*). He writes of the island's main hilly and mountainous areas, mentions its episcopal towns and the towns that are home to representatives of the Venetian State, then details the rural population, spread throughout a thousand villages. Though Cyprus has no real rivers, the use of norias compensates for the lack of rainfall. Cyprus boasts just one port, Famagusta, but there are endless beaches along the southern coast. The Cyprus air is very warm, except in Cerines, where it is usually perfect; in Cerines there are fountains, clean wells and wine as pleasant-tasting as syrup. The island produces much sugar and cotton, which are grown to the detriment of grain. The population is of 180,000, including 90,000 *francomati* and 50,000 *parici*, whom Ascanio presents as villainous slaves (*villani schiavi*).

Ascanio then considers seven potential sites, and intends to examine their respective qualities in order to decide which are best suited to a fortification project: he looks at Cerines, Famagusta, Paphos, Limassol, the Limassol Lake, Salina and Nicosia, even though the latter is not worth considering, as it is not by the sea. Regarding Cerines, Ascanio observes that the town is enclosed on a coastal plain, which the enemy could easily isolate. Due to the neighbouring mountains, accessible to the Ottoman artillery, only a small fortification is advisable for a site so defensively ill-adapted; the fine air, the trees and undergrowth, as well as the proximity to Karaman are all advantages for the enemy, while the wind makes the cramped harbour difficult for Venetian ships to access. The small castle is quadrangular, with three old-style towers and a weak bastion. Cerines has a small village centre, home to a chatelain and to a captain and his troops. In Ascanio's opinion, the Cerines site is not suited to sorties, nor to controlling the territory, but this fortification must not fall into enemy hands. To be avoided, however, is the example of Zara, where the bridge was erected hastily, resulting in the whole fortification being built incorrectly.

The arc-shaped Famagusta site is interesting; the harbour, which can hold ten galleys, is protected by rocks which obstruct ships from coming to shore, and which should thus be

kept; they could be incorporated into the town's enceinte, but this solution would require a lot of time and money. The Famagusta site abounds in obstacles: nearby noxious marshes, such as the Constanza Lake, and rock that is difficult to cut, which cannot replace the earth essential to building terrepleins; Ascanio notes that the twelve old-style towers are both offensively and defensively inept, and that there is just one modern bastion, which ought to be improved. He also observes that the town's water is neither good nor healthy enough to provide for 8,000 people, under the leadership of a captain, a governor in charge of 500 soldiers, and six captains each in charge of 50 soldiers. There is enough ammunition stockpiled in Famagusta, but it does not always meet real military needs.

Ascanio hardly comments on Nicosia, where, he writes, there is a river, and fine water and soil. The city, which surprisingly contains much empty space, is surrounded by a fortress measuring 4 *miglia* (7 km) in circumference, flanked with old-style towers. Salina is described as an excellent anchorage, the most popular on the island, with a rock-free terrain, and much soft water available. The air is healthy and the site is sparsely inhabited; it also contains the remains of Kition. The absence of hills or mountains suits the building of a citadel where the old castle used to be, overlooking a harbour. Ascanio feels Salina is the island's best haven, and essential to the trade of salt, such a profitable commodity for Venetian commerce.

Limassol also has its advantages in Ascanio's eyes: fine air, rock-free terrain and a nearby supply of wood. Carved stones could be obtained from Amathus and brought to suitable fortification sites, near to Akrotiri. The anchorage in the bay is excellent, but a harbour ought to be excavated in order to hold galleys. Ascanio also suggests building a fort behind the tip of Cape Gata to block the approach of an enemy fleet. Regarding the Limassol Lake, outwardly Ascanio sees it as, on one hand, dangerous to one's health, and on the other hand, easy to develop; nevertheless, he does not judge the site to be eligible for fortification due to its perimeter of over 12 *miglia* (20.5 km), its lack of water and the rocky terrain it contains. Immense amounts of money ought to be devoted to guarding the mouths of the lake, as the enemy could easily block access points by building forts. Finally, Paphos boasts certain advantages, having a harbour which would be easy to aid and can hold 60 galleys, but is impracticable for ships; however, this harbour could be an easy target for enemy cannon. The Paphos air is fine and there is no lack of water, but the ground is rocky; Ascanio again asks if the distance from Nicosia might not be an obstacle to financing a construction project on a local scale.

After examining the distinct characteristics of each site, Ascanio undertakes a comparison of all of them to distinguish which are the best of the lot. Although it meets all the conditions, Nicosia could not be rescued from the sea; those who wish to see it fortified, in order to protect citizens' houses, must admit that this would be a case of individual interests prevailing over the public good. Moreover, Ascanio writes of the sluggishness and laziness of the islanders, which would cause delays in construction. All things considered, Salina and Limassol are the sites that would most probably win the consent of those contributing to the funding of the project.

Next, Ascanio engages in a theoretical discussion of the ideal shape for the fortress, which, he says, is a semicircle or arc, with a diameter of 800 *passa* (1,400 m) giving a circumference of 1,200 *passa* (2 km), and six bastions placed at intervals of 200 *passa* (350 m); in total this would be 3 *miglia* (5.2 km) of construction work. The semicircular shape allows more people to be sheltered, and is perfect, as there is no space wasted by obtuse or acute angles. The seaward wall would not need to be elaborate, which would save money; finally, Ascanio stresses the importance of cavaliers, as decisive in an offensive sense as a bastion is in a defensive sense.

Ascanio looks at the specific case of Famagusta, which calls for swift action. He envisages a perfect fortification with six bastions, and further discusses the incorporation of the major rock that closes off the harbour; with 1,300 *passa* (2.2 km) of landward walls, the fortress would need a total of six bastions, and the rock must be brought into the perimeter. Structuring his narrative on a dialectical question / answer basis, Ascanio observes that the round towers, which are hollow inside, could easily be toppled as they are only 4 *passa* (7 m) thick. The unfinished Martinengo bastion has already cost 54,000 ducats, meaning that five extra bastions would cost 300,000 ducats, and take thirty years to build; the same figures, 300,000 ducats and thirty years, would apply for the rock. Ascanio accepts the possibility of an imperfect fortification made with half-measures, but advocates the option of a thirty-year project to build a perfect fortification that incorporates the rock.

Ascanio proposes another measure which he bases on the examples of Asti and Alba, where differing Spanish and French troop ratios led to a protraction of operations in the face of fortresses that were considered impregnable. He envisages installing cavaliers set quite a way back within Famagusta, making them invisible from without and preventing the town from being captured. The earth to build these cavaliers would be dug up around the *Diamante* tower and the castle, so that a site to receive a rescue fleet could be built at the same time.

Ascanio continues his diffuse series of ideas regarding Famagusta, and often repeats himself: he insists on the consequent need to supply the fortress with provisions, especially given that the town is the most remote fortress from Venice, and is threatened by the noxious air of the marshes. He advocates the use of the *ferlini* system to organize construction work, then adds a long discussion of the aforementioned noxious air, suggesting that Venice should give the Costanza marshes away as a land concession, so that they may be sanitized. Regarding the rocks that close off the harbour, he recognizes that having them incorporated into the fortress, as they should be, will cost time and money. Finally, Famagusta's excessively rocky ground is not ideal. Ascanio ends up returning to cavaliers as the defensive structure best suited to the local conditions, but claims that Cyprus should be given several fortresses, like Corsica and Sardinia, as rendering Famagusta completely and totally secure would take sixty years of work, at a cost of 600,000 ducats; a new fortress would cost less than 400,000 ducats, even without taking into account the contributions of Venice's subjects. Ascanio thinks that, in the end, this would be the best solution, giving Venice time to settle the issue of Famagusta's poor air and think about the best way to fortify the town.

Ascanio then considers the state of the *stradioti* cavalry, which contains 833 cavaliers, led

by eighteen captains and one governor; there is also a contingent of 205 Cypriot mounted arquebusiers, led by five captains. The *stradioti* receive a yearly salary of 40 ducats, plus 100 *moggia* (333 hl) of barley for their horses, while their captains are paid 80 ducats per year plus 160 *moggia* (533 hl); the arquebusiers are given 36 ducats per year and 80 *moggia* (266 hl) of barley, and their captains 60 ducats and 100 *moggia* (333 hl). As for the feudal cavalry, it is composed of 91 feudatories and 182 horses, split into four companies, of which an inventory is given.

Before bringing his account to a close, Ascanio makes a series of remarks concerning the Cypriot population, raising the question of possibly giving the islanders arms, an idea he sees as ill-advised. Ascanio argues that the Cypriots should not be armed for two reasons: he firstly underlines the problems that would arise when the time came to burn fields and supplies, as the arquebusiers and peasants would refuse to comply, preferring to flee to the mountains with their families and the harvests of their patrons, whom they detest; the *parici*, who are veritable slaves and seek a change of status, would not be allowed to enter the fortresses if they did not bring any supplies, and the *francomati* would do the same, as the peasants are related to each other; ultimately, the harvests would be taken to the mountains and end up falling into enemy hands. Secondly, the *stradioti* are not very effective soldiers, and should be better disciplined, in addition to being led by non-Cypriot captains experienced in warfare. The *stradioti* should also be better equipped, with longer lances and suitable plate shields; any armour that slows them down must be abandoned, however, and adding an arquebus to their armour should be considered. Regarding their horses, no small-sized breeds should be accepted, and the *stradioti* must not be allowed to keep horses that they cannot take care of, as this ends up costing Venice. The discipline brought to the *cernide* corps could be applied to the cavalry, and captains ought to be authorized to crush any disobedience. Finally, Ascanio argues it is wrong to believe that a cavalry can prevent an enemy landing; consequently, it is a better idea to invest money into paying the troops guarding fortresses.

Due to its singular strategic location, Cyprus needs, more than any other region, to know the enemy's intentions, as this determines the urgency with which supplies should be brought into fortresses; it is thus essential to send out spies disguised as merchants to monitor the enemy's preparations. On this subject, Ascanio bemoans the fact that news concerning State affairs is not kept secret.

In his conclusion, Ascanio recapitulates his analysis. He revisits the different notions of warfare discussed, such as those of Bartholomeo d'Alviano at the defeat of Ghiera d'Ada, Francesco Maria Della Rovere at the Cussano fort, and the French high constable who defended Provence from Charles V by retreating into a fortress; Ascanio himself saw in Picardy how a sortie from a fort put the whole kingdom in peril. He again mentions the case of Osoppo, where the town resisted the Holy Roman Empire while Venice's armies were beaten in Vicenza; his great-grandfather sheltered inside another fortress against Sigismund, when the latter came to reinstate the lords of Padua as rulers of Osoppo. Thus is it illustrated that a single fortress can keep a State from defeat, and this is why all the *Terraferma* has been fortified.

Circulation

Ascanio's argumentation, especially in the later sections of his analysis, betrays his intentions: to be considered an expert in military strategy and, more specifically, defensive architecture, in the hope of obtaining missions worthy of his abilities and his social status. For reasons unbeknownst to us, this hope did not materialize, and Ascanio was no more successful than his elder brother Mario in occupying a position of major responsibility befitting the aspirations of a member of the Savorgnan *fraterna*.¹⁰ Was it, then, out of spite that he planned to use the information he had gathered to compose the work outlined in the manuscript discovered by Giuseppe Liruti? The question cannot be properly answered, and Ascanio's role in the composition of the report entitled *Descrittione delle cose di Cipro*, which began to circulate in spring 1564, is unsure.

The final version of Ascanio's report came when the three letters he sent from Famagusta, Cerines and Paphos were blended into a single, more coherent account, reproduced below. The first known copy was finished in Venice, on 16 May 1564, by Giovanni Rossi / Rosso, whose level of interference in the text during the transcription process is unknown, but who dedicated the copy to Giudobaldo II Della Rovere, one of the *Signoria's* leading military chiefs, and son of the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria, who is mentioned in the report's conclusion.¹¹ This self-serving dedication points to Ascanio being behind this version, but there is no real evidence of this. Three weeks later, on 8 June, Rossi transcribed a second copy of the text, this time dedicated to Gabriele Capodilista *del cavalier Francesco*, who came from a family which was high up in the Paduan aristocracy.¹² Finally, on 25 July of that same year, another copy of the report was circulating, this time addressed to the grand duke of Tuscany, Francesco de' Medici, but signed by another copyist, Francesco Marcaldi, who makes no changes to the body of the text.¹³ Here again, though it cannot be proven, this distinguished dedication hints at craftiness on the part of Ascanio, keen to beguile a prince who might bring him to his court. As debatable as the evidence may be, it suggests that Ascanio attempted to make a profit from his mission in Cyprus in the two years following his return to Italy; it thus seems hard to believe that he was unaware of the circulation of a report he had purportedly written.

After the copies made in summer 1564, no new manuscript version of Ascanio's report came into circulation until the War of Cyprus; it was the news of the 1570 / 1571 hostilities that prompted Francesco Marcaldi to make further copies, and between October 1569 and March 1576 he signed at least forty or so of them. Marcaldi remains a mysterious character, despite the near two hundred texts that he transcribed in the last thirty years of the sixteenth century. Reproducing the work of others, most often anonymous authors, was Marcaldi's main activity; this enabled him to reach a specific audience, chosen amongst the Italian

10 Cf. supra, p. 44. 11 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *cod. Urb. lat. 833*, ff. 1–39, entitled *Copiosa descrittione delle cose di Cipro*. 12 Padua, Biblioteca civica, *cod. C. M. 495*. 13 Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, *cod. Med. Palat. 215*; this manuscript was itself used to make many other copies; cf. infra, p. 177, Table 3.

aristocracy, from whom he requested remuneration for his copies, sending with each manuscript a stock dedicatory letter.¹⁴ In an era marked by the increased dissemination of printed works, Marcaldi favoured a traditional form of circulation, aimed at satisfying a clientele of Italian noblemen eager to obtain for their libraries and family archives texts that would provide them with up-to-date, edifying knowledge.¹⁵ Marcaldi seems to have moved around regularly and built up an extensive address book, as his copies were mainly signed in Venice, but also in Ferrara, Rome, Naples, Bari, Milan, Bologna, Mantua, Cremona, Florence etc., making it impossible to know what family ties he had, or what professional or official functions he may have performed.

Marcaldi thus specialized in successive transcriptions of reports written on topical matters: between 1569 and 1576 the War of Cyprus prompted him to copy Ascanio Savorgnan's report over forty times (see Table 1, pp. 175–176), which he followed up with other select subjects, no doubt chosen for the interest they held for the public; from 1579 to 1587 he made at least forty or so copies of an account of the life of Mary Stuart.¹⁶ Other more general reports followed regarding the situation of a given State, of which there were most often a small number of copies made (four to ten for each work); thus were transcribed a *Narrazione dello stato della repubblica di Genova* (in 1588–1589),¹⁷ a *Narrazione dell'imperio e stato della casa ottomana* (between 1588 and 1590),¹⁸ a *Narrazione delle cose di Spagna* (between 1589 and 1594),¹⁹ a *Narrazione delle cose più importanti del regno di Napoli* (between 1589 and 1596), a *Narrazione delle cose più importanti del gran duca di Toscana* (between 1593 and 1595), and finally a *Narrazione delle cose più importanti del duca di Ferrara* (in 1597).²⁰

This inventory of the copies executed by Francesco Marcaldi will have made it clear that the latter held no particular link with Cyprus, and he is not known to have had any relations with members of the Cypriot aristocracy exiled in Italy, or with the Savorgnans. Marcaldi does not state that he knew Ascanio personally, and the report on Cyprus came to him via a third party, if the dedicatory letter he addressed to his clients is to be believed. Cyprus represented little more than an opportunity for Marcaldi, who made his profits from the

14 P. Ferrato, *Due narrazioni politiche del secolo XVI di Francesco Marcaldi*, Mantua 1876, pp. 7–9; A. Avetta, 'Per Francesco Marcaldi, *Archivio storico lombardo*, serie seconda 17 (1890), pp. 159–166; B. Richardson, 'A scribal publisher of political information: Francesco Marcaldi', *Italian studies* 64 / 2 (2009), pp. 296–313. 15 D. Raines, 'L'arte di ben informarsi. Carriera politica e pratiche documentarie nell'archivio familiare di patrizi veneziani. I Molin di San Pantalon', in L. Casella / R. Navarini (eds), *Archivi nobiliari e domestici. Conservazione, metodologie di riordino e prospettive di ricerca storica*, Udine 2000, pp. 187–210; Richardson, 'A scribal publisher of political information', pp. 297–309. 16 *Narrazione del stato della regina di Scozia*, twice published by P. Ferrato, *Due narrazioni storiche del Regno di Scozia ai tempi della regina Maria Stuarda scritte da due contemporanei*, Florence 1876, pp. 3–16, and by E. Giglio-Tos, *La prima storia di Maria Stuarda, da un manoscritto italiano del secolo esistente nella Biblioteca Nazionale di Parigi*, Turin 1907. 17 Published by I. G. Isola, *Narrazione dello stato della Repubblica di Genova del secolo XVI*, Genoa 1881. 18 Published by Ferrato, *Due narrazioni politiche del secolo XVI*, pp. 21–28 (quoted above). 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 11–19. 20 A fairly rich, though fragmentary, inventory of the copies executed by Marcaldi has been made by Richardson, 'A scribal publisher of political information', pp. 310–313 (concerning the copies of Ascanio Savorgnan's report on Cyprus, pp. 310–311).

public's hunger for information; this is clearly seen in the number of copies he made in the months following the signature of the peace agreement between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (on 7 March 1573), Marcaldi executing at least thirteen copies of Ascanio's report between 23 September and 28 November. In these hurried conditions, his faithfulness to the initial text was, one suspects, erratic, and the copies assume a truncated form; Marcaldi often trims one or several paragraphs, depending on how attentive he was feeling, or simply on a whim.

For reasons of a purely personal nature, Marcaldi circulated most probably over fifty copies of Ascanio Savorgnan's report throughout Italy, at the exact moment that Cyprus was slipping from the grasp of Venice and the Latin West. Ascanio's report therefore constitutes one of the last complete accounts written about the island, containing crucial information for a reader seeking to assess the military and strategic dimension of a territory that mobilized the chancelleries and armies of the entire Mediterranean between 1569 and 1573. It is hard to judge why Marcaldi next chose to concern himself with the life of Mary Stuart; maybe a waning of public interest is to be suspected. Whatever the case, the impetus that Marcaldi gave to Ascanio's report proved decisive, as the probable fifty or so copies that he made went on to spark an even greater number of copies executed anonymously. Of the text sent to Francesco de' Medici, grand duke of Tuscany, for example, twelve manuscripts have survived, held, unsurprisingly, in Florence, and in other great Italian and European collections (see p. 177, Table 3). The success of Ascanio's report is further seen in 27 copies made between the end of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth century, now held in libraries scattered around Europe and the United States (see p. 177, Table 4). In total, ninety copies of Ascanio's report can be identified, meaning that over a hundred copies of the text were circulated in Europe after 1564. It remains to this day the most widely disseminated manuscript on Cyprus in history, boasting a much higher circulation than Francesco Attar's memoir, for example.

The success of Ascanio's report is consolidated by the number of printed versions made; three were released, plus two translations. Johann Paul Reinhard (1722–1779) was behind the first printed version, which figures amongst the supporting documents of his work on the kingdom of Cyprus, published in 1768.²¹ A century went by before the next edition, included by the historian of architecture Carlo Promis (1808–1873) in his monumental essay on Italian military architects, and copied from a manuscript kept in the Biblioteca Marciana.²² Promis's version appears again, with no comments or additions, in a monograph

21 J. P. Reinhard, *Vollständige Geschichte des Königreichs Cypren*, Erlangen/Leipzig 1768, vol. 2, pp. 33–53, entitled: *Copiosa descrizione delle cose di Cipro con le ragioni in favor, o contra diverse opinioni, e delle provisioni necessarie per quel Regno*. Savorgnan's report does not, however, figure in the reissue of Reinhard's work printed in Erlangen in 1799. It is not known which original Reinhard used; all he says on the matter is: "Testo a penna esistente nella libreria delli Illustrissimi Signori Gianantonio e Gaetano fratelli Volpi, in Padova". 22 C. Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri militari italiani*, pp. 466–497, entitled: *Descrizione delle cose di Cipro con le ragioni in favore o contra diverse opinioni, e delle provisioni che erano necessarie per quel regno. Fatto per lo signor Ascanio Savorgnano gentiluomo veneziano, che fu eletto dall'Illustrissima Signoria di Venezia come uomo sufficientissimo, e mandato*

on the Savorgnan family released by the Friulian officer Emilio Salaris, in 1913.²³ Sir Harry Luke (1884–1969), a British officer who served in Cyprus (1911–1912, 1918–1920) was the author of the only study of the manuscript tradition of Ascanio’s report, plus an English translation, made from a copy kept in the Valletta public library, Luke also publishing Marcaldi’s dedicatory letter; this work was released in 1932.²⁴ Finally, in 1936, eager to disseminate the contents of the report amongst Greek readers, the scholar Nikos Kyriazis translated Ascanio’s text into Greek, from a version copied by Don Michele Cirilli, which in turn was from an original of unknown provenance.²⁵ Consequently, Ascanio’s report on Cyprus was well-known amongst historians studying the history of Cyprus during the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance.²⁶

The publication of Ascanio Savorgnan’s report

The copy of the report owned by the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, catalogue number *B-197*, is one of the series of copies Francesco Marcaldi executed during the autumn of 1573, in this case on 20 November. The dedicatory letter is addressed to Cosmo Cini, an unknown figure, from a family of wool merchants living in Pisa. Cosmo was the son of Giovan Battista Cini, a man of letters who was part of the entourage of Cosimo de’ Medici; however, whilst information regarding Giovan Battista is plentiful, little is known about his son.²⁷ The subsequent history of the manuscript is difficult to trace; Leonardo Bracci’s signature on the first folio hints that the text resided in Tuscany, but also became part of a Florentine collection sometime during the eighteenth century. At an unknown date, it entered into the possession of Sir Thomas Phillips, in whose library it bore the reference number *ms 9150*. The manuscript was later put up for public auction in London, and was acquired by Dr Homer Habibis; upon the latter’s death, the text entered the library of Sylvia Ioannou, who donated it to the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation in March 1995.

The manuscript is written on paper, in octavo (185 x 130 mm), has 56 leaves (out of 57; the final leaf is missing), and is written in brown ink in a regular hand. There is a calf binding, with gilded and blind-tooled side panels, a central decoration and fleurons in each corner, gilt edges, but missing ties.²⁸ Its easily transportable format, its simple, elegant binding and the

nel regno di Cipro per aver la sottoscritta informazione, innanti la guerra di esso regno; according to a note in the BNM catalogue, Promis used BNM, *cod. it. cl. VI, 310 (6150)*, ff. 79^r–95^v. ²³ Salaris, *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 125–147. ²⁴ *Discrittione delle cose di Cipro, con le ragioni in favore, ò contra diverse openioni, et delle provisioni, che erano necessarie per quel Regno*, Translated, with an Introduction and Notes from the 1574 copy of the Manuscript of ASACANIO [sic] SAVORGNANO in the Malta Public Library, by H. C. Luke, C.M.G., B. Litt., M.A., Malta, [The Institute of Historical Research Malta, Bulletin no. 5, Government Printing Office] 1932, 36 p. ²⁵ ‘Ἐπιθεσις περὶ Κύπρου’, tr. by N. G. Kyriazis, *Κυπριακά Χρονικά* IB’ (1936), pp. 85–101; the copy used by Cirilli was transcribed in Rome on the 25th of March 1575 by Francesco Marcaldi and addressed to Antonio Milesio; it is not known, however, where the reference manuscript was kept (Rome?). ²⁶ Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, p. 315; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 765–766. ²⁷ M. Feo, ‘Giovan Battista Cini’, *DBI*, vol. 25, pp. 608–612. ²⁸ According to the description made by L. Navari, *Manuscripts and Rare Books, 15th–18th century. From the Collections of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation*, Nicosia 2010,

hand in which it is written make this manuscript similar to the majority of Marcaldi's other copies of the report; *BCCF B-197* is another of Marcaldi's stock productions, and, like many of his copies, this version contains omissions.

Marcaldi's regular hand is of the *bastarda italiana* style, common in texts transcribed in the last third of the sixteenth century; the text is presented on pages each containing fifteen perfectly measured out lines, and indents are rare. The dense and congested text is broken up for the reader by a few section titles, written in smaller letters in the side margins. The origin of these titles is uncertain, but as they figure in the first copies of the manuscript transcribed by Giovanni Rossi / Rosso (see p. 177, Table 2), they may be attributed to Ascanio himself. In support of this hypothesis, the first page of a dispatch Ascanio sent from Paphos, on 7 October 1562, contains a list of these same titles which then appeared in the report.²⁹

BCCF B-197 contains several omissions, like most of the copies Marcaldi transcribed in the autumn of 1573. Considering the report's obscure origins, it is difficult to know which version to use as a reference; two copies appear more complete, BNM, *cod. it. cl. VI, 310 (6150)*, ff. 79^r–95^v, and CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/12*; the first of these two texts is characterized by language that is more polished and elegant than in the second, which might be reason to confirm the second as closer to the prototype. We have therefore used *cod. Cicogna 3596/12* to complete omissions in *BCCF B-197*; certainly, this choice is not entirely satisfactory, as it gives a mediocre image of Ascanio's style, which, in his 1566 / 1567 report on Friuli, displays genuine literary skill.³⁰ The incertitude regarding the quality of the original style of the text is also a problem in establishing the report's exact title, as several were used. Marcaldi had a clear preference for *Descrittione delle cose di Cipro*, but he also used other forms: *Copiosa discriittione delle cose di Cipro*, *Relazione di Cipro*, *Relazione del Regno di Cipro*.

The *BCCF B-197* variant of the report is published with maximum respect for the manuscript's original spelling, grammar and syntax, the only changes being the insertion of certain accents which are nowadays essential; the punctuation, often problematic, has been altered to make the sense more accessible to the contemporary reader, as have the rare abbreviations of titles. However, the original text's frequent apocopes have been preserved, as has the division into paragraphs, with the titles in the side margins preceded by a closing bracket. The CMC's *cod. Cicogna 3596/12* has provided the necessary notes to mend the omissions, which appear in the text in italics; when there are minor variations between the two manuscripts, the *cod. Cicogna 3596/12* variant is given in a footnote.

pp. 158–159. ²⁹ BNM, *cod. ital. cl. XI, 90 (6774)*, f. 194^v; this manuscript, from the collections of the Council of Ten, is the only document that suggests a link between Ascanio Savorgnan's report and any Venetian political authority. ³⁰ Luke, *Descrittione delle cose di Cipro*, pp. 5–6, stressed Ascanio's feeble literary qualities, without, however, taking into account Marcaldi's possible interferences during the transcription process: "Ascanio Savorgnano was no doubt an excellent engineer and military expert and critic, but he was no stylist. His style is vague and diffuse, he frequently repeats himself, his punctuation is bad even for the period (there is, for example, not a single full stop in the whole M.S.), and his sense is frequently obscure". Concerning the report on Friuli, see *supra*, p. 40.

*Table 1: Francesco Marcaldi's copies*³¹

<i>City</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Dedicatee</i>	<i>Manuscript [Source]</i>
Venice	25 July 1564	Francesco de' Medici	Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, <i>Med. Palat.</i> 215
Venice	18 August 1564	Fabio Piepolo	Athens, Gennadius Library, <i>ms</i> 87
Venice	22 October 1569	Cardinal Ippolito da Este	Volterra, Biblioteca Guarnacci, <i>ms XLVIII.2.10</i>
Venice	26 May 1571	Adriano Baglione	Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Library, <i>DS 54 A 2 S 27</i> [online catalogue]
Venice	28 February 1572	Iacomo Maria d'Avanzo	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, <i>cod. II-31</i>
Ferrara	9 March 1572	Scipione Bonleo	University of Vermont Library, http://cdi.uvm.edu/collections/item/mrmc004
Venice	12 March 1572	Filippo Cospo	BNM, <i>cod. lat. cl. XIV, 52 (4327)</i> , f. 10 ^v .
Venice	18 April 1572	[Fulvio Grati?]	Austin, Univ. of Texas, Harry Ransom Humanities, Ranuzzi Coll., <i>Phill 12932</i> [Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> V, p. 211a]
Venice	30 July 1572	Baron Sfondrati	London, British Library, <i>Add.</i> 8632
Venice	6 August 1572	Giovanni Paolo Visconti	Milan, Biblioteca Trivulziana, <i>cod. N 1192</i>
Venice	12 December 1572	Giovanni Battista d'Oria	Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale, <i>cod. N.VII.74</i> [Peyron, <i>Codices italicici</i> , pp. 275–276]
Venice	30 January 1573	Francesco Percimbelli	Turin, Bibl. Nazionale, <i>cod. N.VII.75</i> [Peyron, <i>Codices italicici</i> , p. 276]
Ferrara	8 April 1573	Alberto Cortesi	BNM, <i>cod. ital. cl. VII, 530 (7938)</i>
Ferrara	9 April 1573	Hippolito [Ro]cca	BNF, <i>ms ital.</i> 831
Ferrara	20 April 1573	Giovanni Battista Pio	University of Philadelphia, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, <i>ms codex 327</i> [Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> V, p. 376b]
Venice	23 September 1573	Domitio Lonardi	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Ottob. Lat. 2604</i> , ff. 55–88; copy: London, British Library, <i>Add.</i> 48148, ff. 63–82
Venice	28 September 1573	Luffo Nomaggi	Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale, <i>Magl. XXIV, 156</i>
Venice	10 October 1573	Roberto de' Rizzi	London, British Library, <i>Egg.</i> 2859
Venice	25 October 1573	Giorgio Manzoli	BNM, <i>cod. ital. cl. VI, 178 (6349)</i>
Venice	26 October 1573	Latantio Latantio, governor of Bologna	Cited in BCJ, <i>cod. Joppi 689 a</i>
Venice	31 October 1573	Antonio Martelli	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, <i>Magl. XXV, 666</i>
Venice	1 November 1573	Antonio Salviati	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, <i>nuovi acquisti 1162</i> , ff. 35–98
Venice	4 November 1573	Troilo Orsini	BCJ, <i>cod. Joppi 699</i>
Venice	5 November 1573	Antonio Serguidi	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, <i>Magl. XXX, 200</i>

³¹ Bibliographical references are given for those manuscripts which it has not been possible to consult.

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<i>City</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Dedicatee</i>	<i>Manuscript [Source]</i>
Venice	7 November 1573	Raffael de Medici	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, <i>Magl. XXX, 201</i>
Venice	20 November 1573	Cosmo Ciní	Nicosia, Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, <i>B-197</i>
Venice	25 November 1573	Alessandro Bonvisi	Athens, Gennadius Library, <i>ms 87.1</i>
Venice	28 November 1573	Emilio Panellini	BNF, <i>ms ital. 831</i>
Rome	8 January 1574	Giulio Cesare Collona	Vatican, Pontifica Università Gregoriana, Archivum, <i>cod. 852</i>
Rome	21 January 1574	Giovanni Mateo Palavicino	BNF, <i>ms ital. 1500</i>
Rome	8 February 1574	Cardinal Filippo Boncompagni	BNM, <i>cod. lat. cl. XIV, 52 (4327)</i> , f. 10 ^v
Rome	20 February 1574	Francesco Ridolfi	Malta, Public Library, <i>ms 1195</i>
Rome	10 March 1574	Vincentio Parenzi	Vatican, Pontifica Università Gregoriana, Archivum, <i>cod. 202</i>
Ferrara	10 November 1574	Lodovico Caccialupi	BNF, <i>ms ital. 837</i>
Ferrara	24 January 1575	Giovanni Maria Brognolla, Perugia <i>luocotenente</i>	CMC, <i>cod. Cicogna 1140/2</i>
Ferrara	25 January 1575	Persio Nitoni	Perugia, Biblioteca comunale, <i>ms I.29</i> [Richardson, 'A Scribal Publisher', p. 311]
Rome	10 March 1575	Alvise Ferreri	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Barb. Lat. 5094</i>
Rome	25 March 1575	Antonio Milesio	[Kyriazis, 'Ἐκθέσις περὶ Κύπρου', pp. 85–86: copied by Cirilli]
Rome	14 April 1575	Alessandro Manini	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Vat. Lat. 11776</i>
Rome	16 April 1575	Mgr Le[]nelini	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Barb. Lat. 5090</i>
Rome	2 May 1575	Cardinal Lomellini	Oxford, Bodleian Library, <i>ms ital.e.11</i>
Rome	5 May 1575	Francesco Perenoti	Perugia, Biblioteca Augustea [Salaris, <i>Una famiglia di militari italiani</i> , p. 124]
Naples	8 November 1575	Don Ferrante Carrafa	Athens, Gennadius Library, <i>ms 87.2</i>
Naples	10 Novembre 1575	Jacomo Mandola	Florence, Seminario archivescovile, <i>C VI 9</i> [Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum V</i> , p. 619b]
Bari	11 March 1576	Cesare Beltramo	Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, <i>cod. X.C.37</i> , ff. 216–245 [copy: Nicosia, Cyprus Museum Library, <i>ms V.IX.5</i> , pp. 61–91].
?	?	?	Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale, <i>cod. N.VII.76</i> [Peyron, <i>Codices italici</i> , p. 277]

Table 2: *Giovanni Rossi / Rosso's dedicatees*

Venice	16 May 1564	Guidobaldo II Della Rovere	Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Urb. lat. 833</i> , ff. 1–39 (copy); Pesaro, Biblioteca Oliveriana, fondo Mamiani [Promis, <i>Biografia di ingegneri</i> , p. 465; Salaris, <i>Una famiglia di militari italiani</i> , p. 123]
Venice	8 June 1564	Gabriele Capodilista	Padua, Biblioteca civica, <i>C.M. 495</i>
Verona	17 January 1579	Giovanni Paolo di Mei	Verona, Biblioteca Capitolare, <i>ms CCCLXXXIX (333)</i>
Padua	29 April 1579	Giovanni Iacomo Diedo copied by Francesco Rossi	CMC, <i>cod. P. D. 1</i>
Venice	26 April 1571	Cardinal d'Urbino	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, <i>Urb. lat. 936</i>

Table 3: *The copies of the treatise addressed to Francesco de' Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany*

El Escorial, Real Biblioteca di San Lorenzo	<i>X.III.5</i>	16th century [Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> IV, p. 501b]
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>Gino Capponi, cod. VIII</i> , ff. 125–173	After 1570
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>Magl. II, III, 382</i> , ff. 164–207	After 1570
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>Magl. II, IV, 441</i> , ff. 34–75	17th century
London, British Library	<i>Add. 8591</i> , ff. 77–102	16th–18th century
London, British Library	<i>Add. 8633</i> , ff. 1 ^r –32 ^v	c. 1570
Paris, BNF	<i>ms ital. 340</i> , ff. 44 ^r –82 ^v	Late 16th century
Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale	<i>ms Vitt. Em. 1079</i> , ff. 1 ^r –42 ^v	16th century [Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> II, p. 173]
Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale	<i>fondo gesuitico, ms 393</i> , ff. 366 ^r –378 ^r	
Turin, Biblioteca Reale	<i>cod. st. it. 2¹</i>	Late 16th century
Vatican, Archivio Segreto	<i>Misc. Arm. II. 26 (26)</i> , ff. 373 ^r –422 ^v	Early 18th century
Venice, BNM	<i>cod. lat. cl. XIV, 52 (4327)</i> , ff. 9–57	

Table 4: *Copies of Ascanio Savorgnan's report with neither author nor dedicatee*

Library	Catalogue Number	Date of Copy	Comments [Sources]
Bergamo, Biblioteca di S. Alessandro in Colonna	<i>cod. no. 27</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> V, p. 491b]
Brussels, Bibliothèque royale	<i>ms no. 7106</i> , ff. 171–189	16th century	[Library Catalogue]
Carpentras, Bibliothèque municipale	<i>ms. 589 (L 564)</i> , ff. 277–321	Late 16th century	[Library Catalogue]
El Escorial, Real Biblioteca di San Lorenzo	<i>X.III.5</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> IV, p. 501b]
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>II, II, 219</i> , pp. 133–174	17th century	
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>II, III, 334</i> , pp. 1–38	After 1570	

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<i>Library</i>	<i>Catalogue Number</i>	<i>Date of Copy</i>	<i>Comments [Sources]</i>
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>Magl. II, IV, 441</i> , ff. 34–75	17th century	
Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale	<i>Magl. XXV, 780</i> , ff. 96–148	17th century	Title page missing
Harvard, Houghton Library	<i>ms Riant 102</i>	1571	[Online catalogue]
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional	<i>ms 807</i> , ff. 92–140	17th century	[Library Catalogue]
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional	<i>ms. 7576</i> , ff. 66–105	16th–17th century	[Library Catalogue]
Milan, Biblioteca Trivulziana	<i>cod. 1464/6</i>	20 January 1574	Incomplete
Milan, Biblioteca Trivulziana	<i>cod. N 1193</i>		A Marcaldi copy?
New York, Hispanic Society of America	<i>HC 397/273</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> V, p. 318a]
Oxford, Bodleian Library	<i>ms 36621</i> , ff. 75–128		[Library Catalogue]
Paris, BNF	<i>ms ital. 1424</i> , ff. 267–287	Late 16th century	
Paris, BNF	<i>ms ital. 50</i> , ff. 294–309	16th century	
Paris, BNF	<i>ms ital. 254</i> , ff. 135–187	17th century	Incomplete, with interpolations
Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Franklin Library	<i>ms codex 327</i>	1573	[Online catalogue]
Toledo, Biblioteca del Cabildo	<i>ms 89, 16</i>	17th century	[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> , IV, p. 637a]
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana	<i>Barb. lat. 5090 (L VI 4)</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> II, p. 154]
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana	<i>Barb. lat. 5094</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> V, p. 491b]
Vatican, Pontifica Università Gregoriana	<i>cod. 202</i>		[Kristeller, <i>Iter Italicum</i> II, p. 135]
Venice, CMC	<i>cod. Cicogna 3596/12</i>		
Venice, BNM	<i>cod. it. cl. VI, 310 (6150)</i> , ff. 79 ^f –95 ^v		
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek	<i>cod. 5846</i> , ff. 307 ^a –348 ^b	16th century	[Library Catalogue]
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek	<i>cod. Ser. n. 2880</i> [from BNM, <i>ms ital. cl. VI 178</i>]	c. 1890	[Library Catalogue]

16a. THE ORIGINAL REPORT

[1^r] Di Prospero Cini Pisano

[1^v] [blank]

[2^r] Discrittione delle cose di Cipro con le ragioni in favore o contra diverse opinioni, et delle provisioni che erano necessarie per quel regno. Fatta per lo Signor Ascanio Savorgnano gentilhuomo vinitiano, che fu eletto dall'Illustrissima Signoria di Venetia come huomo sufficientissimo, e mandato nel Regno di Cipro per haver la sottoscritta informatione innanti la guerra di esso Regno di Cipro.¹

[2^v] [blank]

[3^r] Al molto Illustre Signore il Signor Cosmo Cini² Signor mio sempre osservandissimo.

Non sono ancora molti giorni, Illustre Signore, che per il mezzo d'un mio caro amico e Signore, mi pervenne nelle mani la presente discrittione del Signor Ascanio Savorgnano nobile vinitiano, laquale sommariamente contiene vari e diversi modi di difender gli stati, e specialmente il Regno di Cipro accommodandolo al suo prencipe, e così dello stato di tutto il Regno. Oltre a ciò come si trovavano e come dovevano esser tutti i / [3^v] luochi più considerabili di quell'isola con le ragioni non meno dell'una che dell'altra parte, e finalmente nella guisa che si trovavano, e come dovevano esser le genti di Cipro. Il che parendomi soggetto grande et degno, ho giudicato convenevole di farne dono a Vostra Signoria Illustrissima a cui mi rendo certo che piacerà, come a quella, che sempre si è diletтата di cose degne et grandi. Onde io riverentemente la prego che si degni di ricevere questo mio humile e picciol dono, con quel benigno e grato animo che alla humanità sua si / [4^r] richiede e che merita la divotione conche io glie lo offerisco, annoverandomi tra i fedeli et affettionati servitori che ella habbia. La cui vita Iddio nostro Signore conservi et prosperi in quella facilità che lei stessa desidera.

Di Venetia a XX di Novembre MDLXXIII.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustre Humil servo.

Francesco Marcaldi

¹ As no official trace of this mission has been found, it is doubtful whether the Senate really asked Ascanio Savorgnan to deliver the report; preliminary versions of the text confirm this doubt. This title has in all likelihood been embellished by the copyist, Giovanni Rossi / Rosso, who probably sought to give the text greater political and military authority in the eyes of its readers. ² Prospero Cini, to whom this copy of the text is dedicated, probably came from the same Pisan family of wool merchants as Giovan Battista Cini (1528–1586), a writer of plays and songs who also organized feasts at the court of the Medici: M. Feo, 'Giovan Battista Cini', *DBI*, vol. 25, pp. 608–612.

[4^v] [blank]

[5^r] In altre *mie a bastanza* è stato esposto in quai termini et esser si trova *al presente* il Regno di Cipro, non solo quanto a gli apparecchi per la guerra, ma anco della qualità, nobiltà et utilità di esso Regno.³ Nella presente non occorre dir' *altro*, se non *si* è necessario aggiungerli o mutarli alcuna provisione per miglior' difesa et conservatione di questa isola.

] Diversi modi di difender gli stati

Et prima è cosa manifesta che chi non può resister alla campagna, deve per necessità fortificarsi et tratenersi nelle terre, et come un buon giudice tra ambe / [5^v] le parti, et non una sola, così *un buon soldato* deve misurare, non solo le forze del suo Principe, ma anco quelle de nemici o vicini sospetti, liquali si preveranno di cavalleria, devrà schivar le campagne, adoperandosi la cavalleria in quelle; et devrà per necessità fondarsi più nella fanteria, laqual si adopera ne' colli, fra arbori, nelle città, et anco ne' piani, ma contra più potenti con imboscate et improvvisi assalti. Ma chi non sa che gli apparecchi di armata per il mare, di / [6^r] cavalleria per le campagne, et di fanteria per monti e per piani farian meglio tutti insieme in gran' copia, che una cosa sola più abbondante delle altre? Ma, s'è impossibile pareggiarsi al nemico di cavalleria, et di altre cose difficile, è da schivar di venir' seco alle mani, perché spesse volte il minor' numero et la minor' forza ha temporeggiato, sì che la maggior' è disciolta per diversi accidenti, causati o dall'industria propria, o da disordini de' nemici, o dalle revolution' / [6^v] del mondo, et principalmente dal voler del Signor Dio. Per queste ragioni adunque si convien concluder esser' necessario di fortificar' in questo Regno dui o tre lochi almeno, ne' siti più opportuni, et se non aiutati dalla natura almen' non disfavoriti, et tali che con facilità si possa⁴ tratenersi in isola sì lontana da Italia e sì vicina alli sospetti, almen' sin' a gli apparecchi delle debite provisioni o de' soccorsi, o di diversioni.

] Come volevano difender Cipro⁵

E perché secondo la maniera del / [7^r] guerreggiare, et secondo il fine proposto et eletto per migliore, bisogna anco resolver et indrizzar a quello gli suoi più debiti mezi, dico che non

3 There were not many reports on the *Regno* of Cyprus circulating in 1562, apart from that written by Francesco Attar, of which there exist numerous manuscript copies; and at this time Florio Bustron's *Historia* does not seem to have become widely read yet: Grivaud, *Entrelacs chiprois*, pp. 219–223, 235–239, 248–269; Calvelli, *Cipro e la memoria dell'antico*, pp. 117–121. Ascanio Savorgnan is more probably referring to the reports that Venetian officers submitted to the Senate or the *Collegio* upon returning home after their missions, which he may have known about via his brother; most of these reports are available in the ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 61 and b. 82. Some of them have been partially published, such as those given by *Luocotenente* Silvestre Minio (1529), by Syndic Cosmo Da Mosto (1542), by Councillor Antonio Zane (1559): respectively, Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 51, col. 442–449; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, pp. 118–120; Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 563–564, 616–618, 622–630. 4 In the Cicogna ms, *trattenersi* after *opportuni: et per poter*. 5 In the Cicogna ms: *Modo di diffendere Cipro accommodato al suo Principe*.

potendosi guerreggiare in campagna, et convenendo fortificarsi in terre, bisogna prima far elettione de siti più opportuni, et se non aiutati dalla natura, almen' non disfavoriti, et tali che con facilità non possano esser serrati fuori et separati dal possesso del paese, et oltre di questo si deve haver l'occhio all'opportunità de soccorsi li più sicuri, / [7^v] massimamente per navi, per le ragioni che poi si diranno, sì come medesimamente si dè haverlo non solo alli commodi proprii, ma anco a gl'incomodi dell'accampar dell'inimico,⁶ et così ad altri rispetti di maggior prestezza, in finir la fortificatione, et con minor' spesa, et a molti altri. Più oltre è da proveder, dopo l'haver' retritate in sicuro quelle più vettovaglie et frutti che sarà possibile di haver' chi con prestezza possa e voglia dar' il guasto et corromper' il res- / [8^r] tante de' frutti che non potessero esser' posti in sicuro, et le acque et ogni altra cosa che fusse per tornar' a commodo de gli nemici. Et ancora è da proveder di haver' chi con imboscate et improvvisi assalti potessero inquietar' et far' diversi danni a gli nemici,⁷ non lasciandoli goder' il paese in pace, o manco che fusse possibile. Hor per questa tal maniera di guerreggiare è da vedere se si trovan' *al presente* nel regno di Cipro le sue debite provisioni. Però, è prima da dire in quai / [8^v] termini et esser' si trovano tutti li siti di questa isola più considerabili, acciò si possa far' la comparatione fra loro et la elettione di quelli che saranno più a proposito, et per meglio far questo, non sarà forse male principiar' a dir' alcuna cosa di tutto il Regno, et così poi⁸ venire a dar' fine al rimanente delle cose proposte.

] Stato di tutto il Regno

Dico adunque che l'isola di Cipro è di forma oblonga, distendendosi miglia ducento et dieci, et nella sua larghezza maggiore / [9^r] miglia sessantacinque con circuito di miglia cinquecento e cinquanta,⁹ et la parte che guarda verso tramontana è lontana dalla Caramania miglia sessanta, da quella verso levante è distante la Soria manco di miglia cento, che si fanno in una notte, et la parte che guarda verso mezo dì è lontana dall'Egitto et Alessandria tre in quattro giornate d'armate, et altrettante et manco dall'altra parte Rhodi.¹⁰ Questa isola tutta, è divisa in undeci parti chiamate contrade, / [9^v] con questi nomi et cominciando da ponente quella di Baffo, Audimo, Limissò, Masotò, Saline, Messarea lequali sono verso mezzo dì accanto il

6 In the Cicogna ms: *a gli incomodi delle campagne del nemico*. 7 *a gli nemici* repeated in the manuscript.

8 In the Cicogna ms: *per*. 9 In the Cicogna ms there is a note written sideways in the margin, absent in the other mss, which reads: *Di circuito altri dicono ch'è di miglia 427*; this observation actually comes from Bordone's *Isolari*, cf. following note. 10 Ascanio did not calculate these distances relative to Cyprus' location in the Mediterranean basin himself; they were probably taken from maps or copies of *Isolarii* made in Venice, such as that of Benedetto Bordone (*Libro di Benedetto Brodone nel quale si ragiona de tutte l'Isole del mondo*, Vinegia: N. Zoppino, 1528, republished three times between 1528 and 1547). This passage seems more similar to the *Isolario* of Tomaso Porcacchi, published ten years later in Venice in 1572; but it should be remembered that Porcacchi frequented Osoppo, where he died in 1576. Concerning the cartographical context of *Isolarii*, see Tolias, *Τα νησολόγια*, pp. 34–36. An English translation of Bordone's and Porcacchi's chapters on Cyprus appears in C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus*, Cambridge 1908, pp. 61–62, 162–170. Despite his borrowed information, Ascanio is more precise than G.S., who was less keen on accurate geographical details; cf. supra, doc. 3.

mare, et sono divise con una longa linea de monti dalle altre contrade, lequali sono di Crusocò, Pendagia, Cerines, Carpasso che guardano verso tramontana. Resta poi quella di Viscontà, laqual è posta tra quelle di Saline e di Cerines.¹¹ Questa di Cerines è anco divisa da un'altra schiera di monti, distanti dalla riva / [10^v] del mare verso tramontana un' miglio e mezo, liquali monti se fussen' posti dalle altre parti dell'isola in quella medesima forma, havria forse questo Regno minor' bisogno di molte provisioni. Vi sono di gran' pianure, ma anco di colline è piena tutta l'isola.¹² Gli lochi principali di questa isola sono Nicosia, ov' è arcivescovado, in Famagosta, Baffo, Limissò sono vescovadi; seguono altri lochi Saline, Cerines ove vengono reggimenti da Venetia. Sono anco circa mille / [10^v] ville, chiamati qui casali.¹³ M'incresce¹⁴ non esservi che dire de fiumi, perché vi sono più tosto torrenti, et in alcuni pochi lochi si tirano serriole da fontane, et si fanno cave nella terra, elevando l'acque con ingegno di ruote, et quando vengono piogge grandi, par che riempino gli vasi nelli monti, liquali mantengono buon' tempo maggior' quantità d'acqua, et se non ritornan' le piogge, lequali in questo paese sono molto rare, si vede che va in diversi lochi molto mancando et / [11^r] diminuendosi.¹⁵ De porti, veramente niun' altro è in esser' o di momento, se non quello di Famagosta. Ma di sorzadori tutta la costa verso mezodi è molto opportuna, si com' è al contrario quella verso tramontana per le due cause di detto vento e del sito, volteggiando le navi più volentieri in lochi più larghi di quel che ha quella costa di

11 The system of eleven regional administrative districts, known as *contrade*, was inherited from the Lusignan kingdom, and remained unchanged under Venetian rule, despite the Italianization of French names. Concerning Lusignan *contrées* and Venetian *contrade*: Mas Latrie, *L'île de Chypre*, pp. 148–152; Richard, 'Οι πολιτικοί και κοινωνικοί θεσμοί του μεσαιωνικού βασιλείου', in Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. 4, pp. 345–346; Grivaud, *Villages désertés à Chypre*, pp. 26–29. 12 Here it can be seen that Ascanio Savorgnan did not know the names of the island's main geomorphological entities; the name *Troodos*, for example, appears in Florio Bustron's *Historia overo Commentarii de Cipro*, pp. 28, 30 ("Triodos"). In all fairness to Ascanio, however, Cypriot toponymy was not fixed; Leonardo Donà called the massif "montagna di Pendaglia": CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 171^v. Nevertheless, in 1562 Agostino Clusone wrote in Venice about the "Penedactilos" mountain: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 267^v. 13 This information concerning how the island was populated is strikingly commonplace. Ascanio mentions the four episcopal sees and the two burghs in which Venetian officers had settled (Salina and Cerines). The mention of the mythical number of one thousand villages shows that Ascanio did not take into consideration the figures that Cypriot secretaries had given; the copy of a register of the villages made by Francesco Bustron on 14 December 1533 as well as Leonida Attar's map (1542) establish that there were between 400 and 656 localities on the island: Grivaud, *Villages désertés à Chypre*, pp. 71–73; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, pp. 135–145. For their part, Venetian officers mention in their reports between 800 and 913 localities: Arbel, 'Cypriot population under Venetian rule', pp. 203–204 and table V. It should be noted that G.S.'s knowledge of the island's habitats was no more precise; he too says that Cyprus has a thousand villages; cf. supra, doc. 11. 14 In the Cicogna ms: *Mi rincresse*. 15 Conserving water in large vats was not common in medieval times, and would have been unlikely in a mountainous area; Ascanio is easier to believe when he writes of norias, the use of which was better described by other witnesses, such as Alessandro Magno, *Voyages 1557–1565*, W. Naar (ed.), Fasano / Paris 2002, p. 582. On the other hand, it may be argued that the chains of underground springs certain people saw prove the existence of networks of *qanats*. Whereas Ascanio does not go beyond general details of water resources and irrigation, Leonida Attar and Florio Bustron, writing around the same time, were more precise in their description of the island's hydrographic system: Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 45; Florio Bustron, *Historia overo Commentarii de Cipro*, pp. 28–29.

tramontana.¹⁶ Nella intemperie dell'aere di questa isola basteria a dire ch' è posta a gradi trentacinque in circa, ove il sole la percuote più al / [11^v] dritto, ma anco li venti scovano la terra tanto riscaldata, che diventano caldissimi, e per li monti l'aere è acutissimo, contro il quale gli bisogna gran' riparo, massimamente al petto, cosa difficile di tenersi serrati in si eccessivi caldi,¹⁷ ma solamente nella costa di Cerines l'aere è perfettissimo per causa del sito, venendoli la tramontana addosso subito dal mare, senza aver spatio di scovar la terra riscaldata, et è poi anco difesa dall'ostro dalla predetta / [12^r] schiera di monti, dalli quali¹⁸ essendosi si vicini riceve et fresco et acque eccellentissime,¹⁹ ma nelle altre parti dell'isola l'aere è molto diverso, sì com' è sopradetto, et mal si faria se non fusseno le saluberrime acque di fontane et pozzi che vi sono, nelle qual acque si suol poner come il violepo pochissimo vino, essendo li vini di questa isola sanissimi sopramodo et stomacali, ma tanto grandi che se ne prende tampoco com' è detto del violepo.²⁰ Di tal bontà adunque di vini, non cede ad altri paesi questo, né di fertilità / [12^v] de campi, di zuccari et di quello che si semina, perché quando si attende a empirli di cottoni, lasciando li formenti et biave, ne risulta abundantia di cotone et carestia di biave, *si come è al presente* rendendo molto più li cottoni,²¹ oltre che se vi fusseno più huomini et manco inerti, et più industria a guadagnarsi acque, saria molto maggior fertilità di più sorte di cose, perché di numero d'anime non cede²² tutto questo Regno cento e ottantamila in questo modo da novantamila di francomati, che tanto / [13^r] è a dir' villani liberi, et circa cinquantamila di parici, che significan' villani schiavi, et il restante è

16 Ascanio does not give a detailed examination of the best sites for mooring boats, and is surprisingly general in comparison with other contemporary descriptions of the Cypriot coastline given by ship pilots. Nor did he know anything of an anonymous report on the defensive capacities of the Cypriot coastline to be found in a volume containing several documents concerning Cyprus written in 1562: BNM, *cod. it. cl. XI 90 (6774)*, f. 84^{r-v}; also, BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 246^v–248^v. G.S. had studied, in Venice, the maps at greater length, to weigh up the pros and cons of each coastline site; cf. supra, doc. 3. 17 Excessive heat is mentioned again and again in Venetian officers' travel writings and reports, as G.S.'s remarks confirm: supra, doc. 11. 18 The phrase between *subito dal mare* and *essendosi si vicini* is absent in the Cicogna ms. 19 G.S. confirms how good the air and water were in Cerines in the letter he wrote on 15 July 1562; cf. supra, doc. 9. 20 Like most people who visited Cyprus, Ascanio sings the praises of the island's wines, which were so strong and sugary that many people watered them down. Other travellers of the period expressed the same high opinion: Oldřich Préfat [1546], in P. Flourentzos (ed.), *Τα τσεχικά οδοιπορικά της Αναγέννησης και η Κύπρος*, Nicosia 1977, p. 19; Johann Hellfricht [1565], in S. Feyerabend (ed.), *Reysbuch dess heyligen Lands, das ist ein grundtliche Beschreibung aller und jeder Meer- und Bilgerfahrten zum heyligen Lande*, Frankfurt-am-Mayn 1584, f. 376^v. On the wines of medieval and Venetian Cyprus, see W. W. Weaver, 'The medieval origins of commandaria', *Petits propos culinaires* 86 (2008), pp. 15–62. 21 Other Venetian officers frequently made the same remark concerning the problems and imbalances caused when grain fields were turned into sugarcane and cotton plantations between 1550 and 1560; this speculative crop-growing left the island's markets with depleted grain stocks; cf. the reports from Agostino Clusone: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 257^v–258^v, 269^f; the report from Antonio Zane (1559) published in Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 626–628; ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 7, f. 78^{r-v}; id., *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 132; id., *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Panulphio Guaro (1563), f. 10^r, report from Lorenzo Bembo (1567) f. 4^r; M. Aymard, *Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé pendant la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle*, Paris 1966, p. 143; concerning the economic and social consequences of the fields being transformed, see Grivaud, *Villages désertés à Chypre*, p. 375. 22 In the Cicogna ms: *accede*.

nelle città, et terre.²³ Ma tempo è homai di rappresentar' in quai termini et esser' si trovan' tutti li siti di questo Regno li più considerabili, et de quali sin' hora non si ha notitia di migliori, et questi in numero non sono più che sette, per non lasciarne indietro alcuno, liquali sono di Cerines, Famagosta, Baffo, Limissò, lago di Limissò, Saline et Nicosia, perché delli lochi che non / [13^v] sono sul mare, ne atti a esser' soccorsi, overo che non habbian già molti edifitij, come ha Nicosia, credo che non accaschi parlare.

] Come si trova Cerines

Di Cerines adunque essendo per dire alcune cose non dette per meglio ciò fare, mi è necessario prima replicare e toccare anchora alcune delle già dette, onde dico che si trova adunque il sito di Cerines haver' una lingua di monti discosta dal mare verso tramontana circa un miglio e mezo, laqual va continuando et mantenendo quasi quel medesimo stretto di campagna d'un miglio e mezo per assai lungo tratto, ma viene però a esser' una minima parte dell'isola et viene a serrar' di fuori del resto / [14^r] dell'isola,²⁴ et viene a serrar di fuori dal resto del Regno quel sito di Cerines, essendovi pochissimi passi in quei monti et difficili, anzi un' solo da carri, atti a esser' impediti, massimamente da quelli che fusseno padroni della campagna, sì che le forze da terra et la fortezza istessa con poca fatica dell' inimico diventariano inutili. A questo s'aggiunge, che potendo tirror' le colobrine più di tre miglia, come per esperianza è chiaro, et tanto più quell' un' miglio e mezo, / [14^v] et essendovi molti alti opportunissimi da piantar' et incrosar' gran' quantità d'artiglieria, ne segue che si potrà veder' et bressagliar' sin' la prima man' delle case, non che tutte le altre ancora come occultamente si vede, perché si va trovando alti et più, et manco come meglio si potesse desiderar dall'inimico, con ampie et bellissime piazze da piantar' sicuramente ogni gran' quantità d'artiglieria, et se ben per spatio di mille e ducento passa in circa, l'ascesa non / [15^r] va montando se non passa tre per ogni cento passa, nondimeno dalli impoi la salita diventa rata, et con spatio di passa trecento in circa, che tutti insieme fanno il miglio un' e mezo sopradetto, si perviene in un'alta piazza et ampia, dietro laquale ne sono subito anco molte altre più alte et spatiose, talche con le misure in mano parlando dell'ascesa²⁵ rata, la più bassa piazza viene a esser più alta di Cerines circa passa sessanta, ch' è un' campaniel di San Marco, et non è più / [15^v] discosta dal mare che un' miglio e mezo, come anco il disegno di Giovan' Girolamo²⁶ trovato

23 Ascanio follows official estimations which held the overall population in the 1560s to be 180,000 and the number of *francomati* to be 90,000. However, he underestimates the number of *parici*, which was generally held to be over 70,000; see Arbel, 'Cypriot population under Venetian rule', pp.203–211, tables V–VII. The figure of 50,000 *parici* may have been taken from Agostino Clusone's 1558 report: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 256^v. G.S., it should be noted, is no better informed on the island's true demographics than his younger brother; cf. supra, doc. 8. 24 *et viene a serrar' di fuori del resto dell'isola* absent in the Cicogna ms. 25 In the Cicogna ms: *alla scesa*. 26 Giangirolamo Sanmicheli (Verona 1513 – Famagusta 1559), the nephew/cousin of the architect Michele Sanmicheli, produced four maps of Cerines which were still in the *provveditori alle fortezze* archives in 1759: Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, pp.202–203; Grivaud, 'The drawings, maps and models of the Venetian engineers in Cyprus', p. 121. Giangirolamo was sent to Cyprus between spring and autumn 1548 to visit and supervise construction at the Famagusta fortress and the Cerines castle. He was sent to the island for the last time in

giustissimo²⁷ *lo dimostra*, il qual non passa col suo disegno questa prima piazza, ma le altre piazze che gli sono subito dietro, gli sono più alte di due campanieli di San Marco et più, ma quel che importa si va trovando alti et più et manco d'un campaniel di San Marco, di mezo, di / [16^r] un' e mezo, di dui et più come meglio potesse tornar' all'inimico, di maniera che se si farà fortezza grande, s'avvicinerà tanto più alli predetti alti, et sarà esposta a quelli, com' è detto, et dato che non si potesse offender' ove staran' gli soldati sotto li ripari, et accosto alli terrapieni della città, né espugnarla non dimeno mal s'inescarà questa gente a bastanza per sé stessa difficile a muoversi dal suo nido a venir a fabricar dalle fundamenta nuovi pallazzi, / [16^v] per dover' esser' distrutti dall'artiglieria et star' in pericolo d'esservi sepulti dentro, con le lor mogli, figliuoli et cose più care, et se non altro star' in continuo spavento che la gli possa toccare. Se veramente si volesse far' fortezza piccola in quel sito, non può riuscir' forte, non havendo alcun' aiuto da natura in quel loco, anzi disfavore; et poiche²⁸ le fortezze sono difese da gli huomini e dall'artiglieria, nelle piccole non posson' cascar' / [17^r] molti bellovardi, acciò da più parti gli nemici possan' esser' offesi et arresposti²⁹ di contrabatteria, né vi è poi spatio per capir grossi corpi di gente né per far' sortite, né per far' retire. Appresso per esser' quella costa di Cerines di miglior' aere di tutta l'isola, può accamparsi l'inimico senza pericolo d'incomodo, come saria certo in qualunque altro loco dell'isola di dover' morir' in breve tempo, sì che più tosto si de legger lochi di aere tale che all'inimico accampato et non ac- / [17^v] casato, come quelli della città, né così assuefatti a quello, laqual assuefattion' importa assai, possa dico esser' nocivo a gli nemici et non di danno a quelli della città per le cause dette, ma nella costa di Cerines, il campo de nemici havrian' anco molte altre commodità di arbori et di boschi da far' legna, cosa che non è in altri lochi. Lascierò di dire della vicinità della Caramania a questa parte dell'isola, che in sei hore si potria portar refres- / [18^r] camenti all'inimico accampato.³⁰ Lasciarò anco di dire che le navi, che fussen' mandate da Venetia con soccorsi, volteggiarian' in ogni altra costa più volentieri che in questa di Cerines, per le due³¹ cause del vento di tramontana ch' è da quella parte, et del sito forse non così largo, come in tempi d'inverno et con tramontane bisognaria. Si potria forse anco aggiungere per la natura di questa gente esser cosa degna di qualche consideratione che si procurasse di / [18^v] haver

August 1558 to make plans and scale models of existing and potential fortresses; a report of this activity written in 1558 / 1559 has survived and concerns the Akrotiri peninsula: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti Comuni, reg. 14, ff. 115^v–116^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 29, f. 157^v, reg. 33, f. 118^{r-v}; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, ff. 62^r, 100^v–101^r, 102^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 1* (letter from Sanmicheli concerning the Saint Nicholas of the Cats site, letter from Marc'Antonio Minio, *castellan* of Cerines, dated 8 October 1558); id., *Materie Miste Notabili 7*, f. 19^r; BAM, *cod. A 48 inf.*, ff. 246^{r-v}, 254^r, 256^v; Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1 / 2, pp. 319–322; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 859–860; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 297–298; Dimacopoulos, 'Sanmicheli nei territori veneziani del Mediterraneo orientale', pp. 215–216; S. Pepper, 'Artisans, architects and aristocrats: professionalism and Renaissance military engineering', in C. J. B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, Leiden / Boston 2003, p. 125; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, pp. 28, 131–132; Giangirolamo Sanmicheli's passage to Paphos is again mentioned *infra*, n. 66. See further bibliography on Giangirolamo *supra*, p. 89 n. 44. 27 In the Cicogna ms: *conforme al medesimo* after *giustissimo*. 28 In the Cicogna ms: *perchè*. 29 In the Cicogna ms: *corresposti*. 30 This argument also appears in G.S.'s 1558 report; cf. *supra*, doc. 3. 31 *Due* absent in the Cicogna ms.

sito più opportuno di questo di Cerines, perché li potesse cascare se così paresse più a proposito da farvi una cittadella, per dominar' quelli che volessero recalcitrar'. Quanto a Cerines *presente* è situato accanto il mare et la sua imperfettion' è manifesta, et basta a dire ch' è un' castelletto picciolissimo et difettivo de fianchi et terrapieni. Ha un' porto piccolissimo et imperfetto. La forma di esso castelletto è quasi a mandola o quadrangula, / [19^f] in tre anguli vi sono tre torrioni all'antica, vacui, debili et piccioli, nel quarto angulo è un bellovario mal inteso et debile. Ha fossa larga detto Cerines passa vintiuno e circonda trecento et settanta passa. Ha muraglia grossa passa quattro et nelle fondamenta sei, et alta per il più passa sedici, talche tutta quella tal muraglia havria supplito alla moderna a una città grandissima, dove non va tanto alta né così grossa, facendosi fondamento in questi tempi più in ter- / [19^v] rapieni, che in grossezza et altezza di muraglia. Ha un' borgo picciolo et di poco momento.³² Ha oltre il Magnifico Castellan', un capitano con cinquanta fanti per quella custodia, et della munition' d'artiglieria che si trova havere,³³ si traria molto maggior' costruito che da tutto quel castello, il quale per ragion' delle sue qualità sopradette, meriteria più tosto esser' trasportato, overo in quel loco ove disegnava farvi un' forte il Clarissimo Signor / [20^f] Sebastian' Venier,³⁴ o altrove per guardar' quel passo de carri di quella schiera di monti,³⁵ acciò da quella parte fusse impedito a gli nemici il condur vettovaglia, perché *al presente* in quel sito ch' è esso Cerines, non è buon né di far questo né di vietar dismantate, né di conservar territorij, over popoli, anzi stando in questo modo saria di danno, che cascheria in man' de nemici, insieme con l'artiglieria et con quel porto, qual ch' egli si sia innanzi che fusse stato guasto, / [20^v] acciò l'inimico non se ne servisse, et se a posta di quel castelletto si volesse fabricar' alcuna cosa, ne risulteria quel poco frutto, o per dir' meglio danno ch' è riuscito del ponton' di Zara, il qual ponton' fu fatto per un' subito bisogno per di et per hore, et non dimeno a posta di quella spesa fatta in esso pontone si è continuata una fortification' molto mal intesa, et di spesa maggiore di quel che havria importato il far poco conto della spesa di detto / [21^f] pontone.³⁶

32 This description of the castle and burg of Cerines may be compared to the one Leonardo Donà gave in 1557: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 145^v–146^r; but it should above all be compared to the information given in the three letters G.S. wrote in Cerines on 15 August 1562; cf. *supra*, docs 9–11. 33 The Cerines castle was normally defended by a chatelain (*castellano*) and a garrison of around fifty soldiers: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 51, col. 444 (report from *Luocotenente* Silvestre Minio, 1529); ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Antonio Zane, f. 2^v (1559); id., *Senato*, Secreta, reg. 73, ff. 139^v–140^v (8 September 1564). The annual salary of the captain of Cerines in 1559 was 240 ducats: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 183^r. After the reinforcements, the number of soldiers was increased to 100: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 249^r; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (letter from Astore Baglioni dated 28 August 1569). 34 Concerning Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier, see *supra*, doc. 3 n. 12. 35 The idea of possibly building a fort on the pass across the Pentadakylos was Ascanio's, and does not appear in the letters G.S. wrote about defending Cerines; cf. *supra*, docs 9–11. 36 Did Ascanio actually see the site first-hand before making this criticism of the Zara *pontone*? It seems possible that he is merely repeating his elder brother's opinion; between October 1539 and September 1545, when he was governor-general of Dalmatia and fortress *sopraintendente*, G.S. observed one of the phases of the fortification of Zara, surveying construction of the great five-angled bastion known as the *pontone* and of the *Terraferma* Gate, both designed by Michele Sanmicheli. There was no open criticism in G.S.'s 1547 report on the work to be done in Zara, which kept to purely technical advice; the tone of Ascanio's

] Come si trova Famagosta

Quanto veramente alla città di Famagosta, laqual' è nella contrada della Messarea, dico ch' è posta quasi all'estrema parte dell'isola a levante accanto il mare, con forma quasi di semi-circolo o di arco, facendo la corda di esso la parte da mare, per la terza parte di tutto il suo circuito, il qual' è di miglia due in circa. Ha un porto *al presente* per galee dieci in circa, ma è circondato d'alcuni scogli et alture non più lontani che passa trecento in circa,³⁷ li- / [21^v] quali scogli se si volesse spianare s'atterraria il porto, come anco per esperienza s'è veduto, et se si vorrà abbracciarli et congiungerli con la città gli andarà grandissimo tempo et spesa per causa della rocca et di altri incomodi di questo paese, et abbracciandoli in parte senza congiungerli con la città, non si può far' cosa perfetta né forte, che con facilità non potesse poi esser' sforzata da gli nemici, ovvero esserli discoperta.³⁸ Dalla parte / [22^r] di terra di Famagosta gli è causata intemperie d'aere d'alcuni alvei vicini, ove le acque si scolano da lungo tratto di paese, li quali alvei sono più bassi del livello del mare, ovvero sono difficili da tenersi in conzo per la mala sorte del terreno non tenace per li soli ardenti dirupandosi di continuo, et tra gli altri è quello detto lago di Costanza,³⁹ il qual fa si gran' torto a Famagosta, non meno di quello che li fa il terreno, essendovi sasso chiamato qui roca, il che / [22^v] causa più mali effetti, cioè più longhezza di tempo a fortificarla, spesa maggiore et più difficoltà d'haver' terreno per li terrapieni, ilqual terreno è il vero riparo contro l'artiglieria.⁴⁰ Quanto poi alla sua fortezza, per industria, non ha Famagosta altri fianchi *al presente* se non dodici torrioncini tondi all'antica, grossi passa quattro con piazza di passa cinque, sì che non sono buoni né per resister' alle armi offensive né per capir le difensive.⁴¹ Ha / [23^r] un' solo bellovardo, quel nuovo fatto alla moderna,⁴² il qual potria esser' più grande più sodo et meglio inteso di quel ch' è essendo povero di terreno, et ricco di attilatura di muraglia et di vacui, et mal posto, non

criticism, however, is reminiscent of certain negative opinions G.S. expressed concerning Sanmicheli's work, which he saw as too expensive and too ostentatious; ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 3^v-4^v. Concerning Zara's fortifications: A. Deanovic, 'Il contributo dei Sanmicheli alla fortificazione della Dalmazia', *Castellum* 7 (1968), pp. 37-56; L. Puppi, *Michele Sanmicheli architetto. Opera completa*, Viterbo 1986, pp. 78-79; Prijatelj, 'Sanmicheli e la Dalmazia', pp. 222-224. ³⁷ The measurements of the enceinte's perimeter are less precise than those given by G.S.; cf. supra, doc. 7. ³⁸ The question of whether or not to include the rocks in Famagosta's defence system is not explicitly raised in G.S.'s 1558 report; cf. supra, doc. 4; it was, however, one of the subjects on which he and other experts had to give a decision in January 1562; cf. supra, doc. 5. That same year Agostino Clusone estimated the cost of including the rocks in the fortification at 50,000 ducats: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 270^r. Already in 1500, the idea of building a fort on the Boidon islet was under consideration: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 2, col. 839. ³⁹ Ascanio's observations on the Constantia marshes and the malaria that emanated from them seem to be linked to a general awareness of the need to drain these expanses of brackish water; his opinions are partly reproduced in an undated (1563 or 1564) dispatch from Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo, found in ASV, *Senato Mar.*, filza 34. Ascanio resumes and develops this argument infra, cf. n. 98. ⁴⁰ The opinion that the terrain was not well-suited to work on Famagosta's walls and moat is shared by G.S.; cf. supra, docs 5, 7. ⁴¹ Ascanio expresses a quite radical opinion, possibly a result of his experiences in France, Flanders or Italy, where he visited various fortresses; this judgement is not very different, however, from that given by his brother G.S. in January 1562; cf. supra, doc. 5. ⁴² In 1561 the San Marco bastion changed its name to the Martinengo bastion; cf. supra, doc. 5 n. 2.

potendo far' l'offitio suo di difender la muraglia et cortina, della qual gli è fatto scudo, et è coperto, essendo troppo indentro, et questa è cosa manifesta che sta in fatto. La muraglia della cortina è grossa passa quattro, et alta dal pian' del fosso passa sette in circa. / [23^v] De terrapieni veramente potria esser' maggior' abondantia. La fossa poi è larga passa vinti, et più et manco. La controscarpa potria esser' meglio intesa, et gli sono alcuni alti di terreno che servirian' et copririan' gli nemici che si accostasseno.⁴³ Hor venendo a parlar' delle acque di Famagosta è notissimo che non sono buone né sane, se ben' ne fusse abondantia.⁴⁴ La città è assai bella di fabriche, strade et piazze. Può aver anime [24^r] ottomila in circa, ma non molti di qualità et nobilità.⁴⁵ Ha oltre il Clarissimo Capitano, un' soldato governor' di cinquecento soldati, con sei capitani di cinquanta soldati l'uno per la custodia di quella città.⁴⁶ La sua munition' è assai bella ma mal intesa, non essendo par' il numero delle palle alla polvere, et essendo più palle per li pezzi grossi che di rado si tirano, che per li men' grossi.

] Come si trova Nicosia

Segue a dire della città di Nicosia, com' è posta nella parte medi- / [24^v] terranea del Regno, quasi al mezo d'esso nella contrada del Viscontà, in una pianura forse non dissimile da quella della città di Fiorenza, havendo monti et vicini et lontani, ma non ha altro fiume se non un' torrente, ma ha fontane et pozzi di acque eccellentissime.⁴⁷ Ha anco buon' terreno, et quando fusse ritirata verso li monti più discosti, né quelli né questi che hora gli sono vicini gli potrian far' nocumento. Il suo circuito è piu di miglia quattro in for- / [25^r] ma quasi rotonda con

⁴³ The dimensions that Ascanio gives for the town's enceinte and moats are significantly less precise than those given by G.S.; cf. supra, doc. 7. ⁴⁴ Here again, Ascanio's judgement seems strikingly hasty. The situation was more complex, and he does not take into account the San Zorzi fountain or the variable quality of the water from the wells; in 1560 the captain of Famagusta, Domenico Trevisan, listed 107 wells offering good-quality water (37 public wells and 70 private ones), 124 where the water was mediocre, 620 where the water was bad, then 127 privately owned cisterns and 22 cisterns in disrepair and no longer containing water: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from D. Trevisan, f. 9^v; also: Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 124 n. 289; Arbel, 'Supplying water to Famagusta', pp. 651–656; G.S.'s opinion is significantly more nuanced; cf. supra, doc. 8. ⁴⁵ Famagusta's population was indeed estimated at 8,000: Arbel, 'Cypriot population under Venetian rule', table I. ⁴⁶ Defending Famagusta was the responsibility of the captain of the town, appointed by the Great Council for a period of two years, as was the *castellano* who assisted him, more specifically charged with defending the castle. In 1529, 726 soldiers in seven companies were stationed in the town. In the 1540s the number of soldiers was brought to 500 men, then modified depending on the urgency of the military situation; thus in March 1558 the numbers reached 800 men, then were lowered again. Finally in August 1569 the garrison contained 650 soldiers: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 51, col. 444 (report from *Luocotenente* Silvestre Minio, 1529); ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 61, reg. 2, f. 68^f (1547 report from the captain of Famagusta, Andrea Dandolo), b. 84, report from Councillor Antonio Zane, f. 2^v (1559); id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, ff. 24^v, 101^v; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (letter from Astore Baglioni, 28 August 1569); CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 70^f. ⁴⁷ This opinion is similar to others expressed at that time regarding the quality of the town's water reserves; G.S. gave the same point of view in July 1562, cf. supra doc. 8; concerning Nicosia's water resources, see Grivaud / Schabel, 'La ville de Nicosie', in J.-B. De Vaire / Ph. Planieux (eds), *L'art gothique en Chypre*, Paris 2006, p. 90; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin. Société, économie et espace urbain, 1192–1474*, doctoral thesis, University of Rouen, 2009, vol. 1, pp. 106–109; N. Coureas / G. Grivaud / C. Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia 1191–1570', in D. Michaelidis (ed.), *Historic Nicosia*, Nicosia 2012, pp. 117–118.

torrioncini tondi all'antica,⁴⁸ ma è detta città piena di vacui, per li molti giardini che vi sono. Le habitationi potriano esser migliori et più ornate, et così le piazze et le strade pienissime di polvere, dando più tosto vista d'una città incomposta et molto scarsa d'attilatura.⁴⁹

] Come si trova Saline

Hor venendo a parlar' del sito di Saline. Questo è accanto il mare dalla parte di mezo di dell'isola. Ha sorzador eccellentissimo et maggior concorso de navi che alcun' altro / [25^v] *luogo* dell'isola,⁵⁰ et vi è terreno senza roca, come mostran' diversi pozzi fatti, et è anco tale che cavandosi poco sotto subito si trova acqua, il che faria difficile ai nemici il trinccare et il far' mine. Quanto poi all'aere, si vedeno gli habitatori sani, et miglior anco si faria quando vi fusseno li fuoghi d'una città, et in somma è tale che al nemico accampato, et non accasato, come quelli della città né così assuefatto a quello, saria nocivo dico a gli nemici, che / [26^r] non faria danno a quelli della città per le cause dette. Delle acque veramente si vede per tutto accanto la marina, ove si cavan' pozzi, trovasi acque, et tali, che gli habitatori se ne laudano et contentano,⁵¹ et antiquamente vi fu una città chiamata Citium, le qui vestigie si vedeno chiaramente.⁵² A questo loco non vi è alto alcuno che dia nocumento, anzi giovamento, ove si potria far' una cittadella, che dominaria, et con poca più spesa, perché si potria far' una parte de bellovardi⁵³ della città, sin' al qual alto, / [26^v] ove antiquamente fu un' castello, si vede un' alveo, che dimostra esservi stato un' porto, onde ricavandosi il medesimo alveo poco più, si potria far' un' porto securissimo, et perché a Saline è il più sicuro stare per armate, o per dir' meglio il men' pericoloso, che in ciascun' altro loco di tutta l'isola, fortificandosi si verria a levar tal commodità al nemico. È distante Saline da Nicosia circa miglia trenta. Non è da lasciar' di dir' di questo loco, che vi è un' lago grande et bello, nel quale alcuni torren- / [27^r] ti mettono l'inverno, et per la natura del terreno l'estate si congela tutto in sale bianchissimo et fortissimo; la salina ove vien' l'acqua ha di circuito miglia dodeci, ma il circuito di quel loco ove si fa il sale grosso è solamente di miglia due e mezo in circa, et quel sal ch' è minuto et

48 This description of Frankish walls, however brief, offers some interesting information; concerning the walls of the Frankish kingdom's capital, see Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, pp. 167–175; Grivaud / Schabel, 'La ville de Nicosie', pp. 93–95; Coureas / Grivaud / Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia', pp. 137–139; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 1, pp. 368–372; Petre, *Crusader Castles of Cyprus*, pp. 299–312. 49 Ascanio's opinion on the layout of Nicosia illustrates the shock many Westerners visiting Cyprus had upon seeing its unique spatial organisation, a mixture of gardens, unpaved streets and buildings that made little architectural sense. Concerning the town planning of medieval Nicosia, see Grivaud / Schabel, 'La ville de Nicosie', pp. 102–103; Coureas / Grivaud / Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia', pp. 143–151; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. I, pp. 356–396. 50 This point of view concerning the Salina roadstead is quite original, as Famagusta's sea roads were generally believed to hold more vessels than those of Salina, where, apart from a pontoon (as Leonida Attar's map tells us), nothing had been installed to receive ships: Florio Bustron, *Historia over Commentarii de Cipro*, p. 17; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, pp. 89 fig. 23d, 99 fig. 34. 51 Ascanio appears to be the first military expert to have considered the defensive capabilities of the Salina site, and to have appreciated the quality of its air and its water resources. 52 The ancient site of Kition is also mentioned by Florio Bustron, *Historia over Commentarii de Cipro*, p. 17. 53 In the Cicogna ms: *perché si potria servirsi di parte de i bellovardi*.

leggiero si chiama de qui il sal della Regina.⁵⁴ La quantità de sali è tanta che può dar tratenimento a settanta navi ogn' anno⁵⁵ portando una nave mozzetti vinticinquemile, che fanno stara venitiani quattromile ottocento e cinquanta, della condut- / [27^v] tura de' quali guadagna una nave circa ducati mille e ottocento.⁵⁶

] Come si trova Limissò

Segue a dire del loco di Limissò, il qual è posto accanto il mare, anco dalla parte dell'isola di mezzo di, et ha buono l'aere et acqua et terreno senza roca, et legna non molto incommoda per esser' su'l mare et per la vicinità de monti, vero è che si potria poner' miglior' ordini et compartite di quel ch' è *al presente* nelli tagli de boschi. La pietra shavria da Limissò Vecchia, posta su'l mare,⁵⁷ et anco da altri lochi vicini. Ha più additi nell' / [28^r] isola et accanto la marina, et per le colline, lequali se paresse che potessen' far' qualche poco di danno, si può facilmente schivarle con retirar la fortification' un' poco più al verso del lago di Limissò, ove le colline si allargano. Ha sorzador eccellentissimo et vicino a terra è gran' fondi. Non ha porto, ma essendo terreno senza roca chi volesse poi con tempo far' una cavation' si potria sempre farla per conto di sicurezza di galee, perché per navi non accasca far' altro né a Limissò né a Saline, essendo li / [28^v] sorzadori eccellentissimi, com' è detto.⁵⁸ Viene a esser' posto Limissò quasi al mezo della longhezza⁵⁹ dell'isola, et è distante da Saline lungo la riva del mare circa miglia quaranta, et da Nicosia per altra strada da miglia sessanta, men' del doppio ch' è da Nicosia a Famagosta. Non è forse da lasciar' di dire che non noceria far' un' forte dietro la punta del capo delle Gatte da tenervi qualche pezzo d'artiglieria per non lasciar' alloggiarvi armate de nemici, et per levarli anco quella commodi- / [29^r] tà che vi fusse di quel loco, et così in altri lochi dell'isola massimamente essendo pochissimi ridotti d'armate in tutta questa isola, et in questo forse consiste la maggior fortezza di questa isola, non havendo le armate dove potersi assicurare in quella. Nel medesimo loco di Limissò dalla parte delle colline con l'archibuseria saria molta opportunità di far' belle fattioni contra gli nemici che campeggiasseno fra la città et le colline.

54 The San Lazzaro salt lakes produced salt of differing qualities; some of them were renowned for their delicacy and whiteness. Ascanio writes of an appellation used to denote superior quality, not mentioned anywhere else. Concerning this salt production: Oberhummer, *Die Insel Cypern*, pp. 111–118; J.-C. Hocquet, *Le sel et la fortune de Venise. Production et monopole*, Lille ²1982, vol. 1, pp. 140–141. 55 *ogni anno* absent in the Cicogna ms.

56 Ascanio's estimations concerning the production and marketing of salt are hard to verify, but evidence shows that in 1562 at least twenty-four ships took Cypriot salt to Venice: J.-C. Hocquet, 'Il libro "Creditorum conducentium sale Cypro" dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia', *Archivio veneto* 143 (1977), pp. 70–71. It should be noted that G.S. put forward the same argument concerning the importance of profits made from this salt trade in justifying the island's defence spending; cf. infra, doc. 68; see also Bernardo Sagredo, who writes of a level of salt production sufficient to fill sixty ships: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', p. 91. 57 In the sources, *limisso vecchia* is a name commonly used for Amathus: Florio Bustron, *Historia over Commentarii de Cipro*, p. 16; Delatte, *Les portulans grecs*, vol. 1, p. 123; U. Tucci, *Lettres d'un marchand vénitien, Andrea Berengo (1553–1556)*, Paris 1957, p. 322; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 142. 58 As with Salina, Ascanio is the only expert to have considered, in 1562, Limassol's suitability as a harbour, as well as its general defensive capabilities. G.S. took up these ideas later on, when the Nicosia fortress was nearing completion, arguing that a third fortress in Limassol would complete the island's defensive system; cf. infra, docs 77, 78. 59 In the Cicogna ms: *largezza*.

] Come si trova il loco accanto il lago di Limissò

Quanto al loco accanto il lago di Limis- / [29^v] sò, per la prima, dalla parte di terra verso l'isola essendovi per paludi l'aere pessimo et così l'acqua non è da farvi fortezza. Poi dalla parte dell'isolotto, cioè che facilmente diventaria isola se con un' taglio dall'altro capo si facesse entrar' il mare nel lago, non è ne anco da tal parte di farvi fortezza, per causa del mancamento di acqua buona, et perché se si volesse abbracciar' tutto l'isolotto, il quale ha di circuito più di miglia dodeci, gli bisognaria eccessiva guarda et / [30^r] infinita vettovaglia, perché pochi non basterian' a guardar' si gran' circuito, massimamente che anco in lochi inaccessibili senza alcun' scontro si entra.⁶⁰ Se veramente si volesse abbracciar' solamente parte di tale isolotto, vi saria poi il contrario della roca che abonda in tutto quel loco; è anco un' altro contrario a tutto questo sito, la difficoltà⁶¹ di guardar' le bocche del lago et la spesa di più di una fortezza in un' sito solo se si volesse guardarle, et non potendosi guardar' bene esse bocche sen- / [30^v] za tal gran' spesa se venisse dette bocche in poter' de nemici, si potrian' essi ancora servirsi del porto del lago, essendo di circuito di miglia dodeci esso lago. Oltre di questo con dui forti soli, che facesser' gli nemici alle due bocche del lago, la fortezza verria a esser' esclusa et serrata di fuori dal resto dell'isola, sì che se forse in apparenzia paresse bello quel sito, quando poi si viene a' particolari et fondamenti della verità si trova che non è tal loco opportuno da / [31^r] farvi fortezza per le predette⁶² ragioni.⁶³

] Come si trova Baffo

Quanto al loco di Baffo è posto appresso il mare nella medesima costa di mezodi, quasi al capo dell'isola verso⁶⁴ ponente, et è in sito molto opportuno da esser' soccorso, et di più ha porto, *non già in esser al presente ma* qual si potria facilmente accomodar' per sessanta galee et dapoì anco grandir' per più⁶⁵ di ducento, massimamente non essendo roca accanto il porto, come per pozzi *fatti da Zuan Hieronimo* se ne vede l'esperienza,⁶⁶ ma a navi sarà impossibile di venir mai in ditto porto / [31^v] ne più vicine a esso che per passa sessanta, per causa del spreo, sassi et secche, non essendo fondi più che di piedi undeci da detti passa sessanta sin' alla bocca del porto della natura detta sassosa et di secche, per lequali et per esser' quel loco discoperto, non è buon' sorzer' per le navi, se non a un' loco chiamato li scogli, lontano da Baffo circa miglia dui, et tanto vicino a terra che l'artiglieria nemica potria danneggiare.⁶⁷ Quanto all'aere, si vede che gli habitatori la passano / [32^r] et per più fuoghi

60 These observations on the Limassol lake are amongst the most precious geomorphological information available for the Akrotiri peninsula in the mid-sixteenth century, and clarify the remarks made by Sforza Pallavicino, Girolamo Martinengo, Astore Baglioni and G.S. in July 1558 (cf. supra, doc. 4), which were based on information from maps such as that drawn by Leonida Attar: Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 45 and fig. 25. 61 In the Cicogna ms: *distantia*. 62 In the Cicogna ms: *dette*. 63 The idea of possibly building a fort on the Akrotiri peninsula, near to the Saint Nicholas of the Cats monastery, had already been expressed in the 1558 report; cf. supra, doc. 4; Ascanio's opinion thus appears to be a direct response to the views given in the latter report. 64 In the Cicogna ms: *nel*. 65 *più* absent in the Cicogna ms. 66 An allusion to the soundings apparently carried out by Giangiolamo Sanmicheli during his stays on the island; cf. supra, n. 26. 67 Ascanio's

miglior' anco si faria. Le acque poi non li mancano et è bagnato dal mare da dui lati, mettendo dalla parte del mare et dui dalla parte di terra, volendo accommodarsi a quanto porta quel sito, nel qual sito si vede ch'è grande abbondantia di roca,⁶⁸ et in tal fortificatione bisognaria anco haver l'occhio che alcuni alti et massimamente quel di Santo Teodoro⁶⁹ havessero a danneggiar' manco che fusse possibile. Appresso, per esser Baffo discosto da Nicosia / [32^v] circa miglia cento, non so se contribuiriano a tal fortificatione.⁷⁰

Questi adunque sono li sette⁷¹ siti più considerabili di tutto il Regno di Cipro. Et poi ch'è stato esposto in quai termini et esser' ciascun' d'essi si ritrova, è facile la comparatione fra loro, et la elettione de' migliori.

] Come doveva esser' Nicosia

Et prima quanto a Nicosia, perché la non è su'la riva del mare né in loco di poterla soccorrere, se ben' avesse tutte le altre buone conditioni, giudicarei che non [33^r] facesse per questo Serinissimo Dominio il fortificarla, et per altri convenienti rispetti che sono poi di stato, che a me non aspetta di parlarne, ne so con quanto pesato giuditio alcuni corrono a eshortar' questa fortificatione senza ribattere l'opposition' dell'impossibilità di soccorrerla, et quella⁷² ancora del sparagno d'un' terzo della città, che si facesse su'l mare et per altri rispetti, et se bene l'intendersi di stato è diverso dall'intendersi⁷³ della guerra, poi che / [33^v] quello consiste in contrapesar gli humori⁷⁴ et forze de' Principi et de sudditi ancora, et questo più tosto consiste in vincer' più alla scoperta o con forza o con ingegno. Nondimeno è offitio di buon' soldato di non schivar' di penetrar' quanto più può per non far' danno, ma giovamento maggiore al suo Principe. Dall'altra parte, che difende questa fortificatione non sa elegger' altro che la fabrica già fatta delle case de particolari, et le difficoltà di fabricare / [34^r] in questo paese con molta tardità, non solo per la poca abbondantia delle materie ma anco per la inertia, pigrizia et poca industria di questi uomini. A questo si risponde che il soldato de' antiponer' il ben' publico del suo Principe a quelli di particolari, delli quali è anco maggior bene la maggior sicurezza, mediante l'habilità de soccorsi de altri lochi, et che la paura et la necessità, laqual se l'imponesse con buona occasione per levar' le commodità a gli nemici sono dui / [34^v] gran' stimoli di far vincer' quelle molte difficoltà.

poor opinion of the defensive capabilities of the Paphos harbour is similar to that of Leonardo Donà, who had visited the town five years earlier: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 149^v. ⁶⁸ Whereas Ascanio weighs up the advantages and disadvantages of the Paphos site, his brother, G.S., is far more critical in his 1566 report, which was based on what he remembered from the summer of 1562; cf. *supra*, doc. 15. ⁶⁹ The San Theodoro hill is today the centre of the modern town of Ktima, overlooking Old Paphos; a small church dedicated to Saint Theodore was built there at the end of the eighteenth century, near to the present-day see: Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, p. 406. ⁷⁰ This remark indicates that discussions concerning the cost of a new fortress had begun, and that the Senate was keeping some of the funding for the Nicosia *università*; cf. *supra*, p. 115–116. Ascanio rightly raises the question of whether or not Nicosia's citizens would be willing to finance a project that would not benefit them directly. ⁷¹ *sette* absent in the Cicogna ms. ⁷² The Cicogna ms gives *perché* instead of *quella*. ⁷³ *di stato è diverso dall'intendersi* absent in the Cicogna ms. ⁷⁴ In the Cicogna ms: *huomini*.

] Come dovevan' esser' Saline, Limissò et Baffo

Hor venendo a ragionar' de altri lochi, come di Saline, Limissò e Baffo, ancora che per le predette loro conditioni si può comprender' chiaro che tutti sariano opportuni da esser' fortificati. Nondimeno, poi che per hora si ha da elegger' un' sito solo da fortificarsi, dico che si denno⁷⁵ antiponer a tutti gli altri lochi dell'isola, gli lochi di Saline et di Limissò, et di questi dui quello che / [35^r] fusse di più satisfatione a gli sudditi dell'isola, che havriano a contribuire alla fortificatione,⁷⁶ et le ragioni perché si denno antiponer a gli altri lochi sono perché prima non patiscono le oppositioni dette degli alti, dapoi perché⁷⁷ hanno tutte quelle opportune conditioni sopradette, et quanto alla forma di una fortezza devria esser' di semicircolo o di arco, cioè come la corda di esso la riva del mare, laqual si estende passa ottocento, se si / [35^v] volesse far soli sei bellovardi, et questo per la ragione del diametro alla circonferentia, laqual vien' a esser tre volte più del suo diametro, et anco una settima d'esso, sì che 'l semicircolo del diametro di ottocento passa, saria circa passa mille e ducento, liquali ricercan' numero di bellovardi per il meno sei, dovendo esservi spatio di passa ducento tra l'uno et l'altro bellovardo per ragion' delli tiri a livello dell'artiglieria, sì che tutto il circuito d'una tal for- / [36^r] tezza, computando li passa ottocento della corda di detto arco et insieme tutti⁷⁸ gli spatii che prendono di più li bellovardi sei, verria a esser circa miglia tre, ma quel che importa saria capacissima per rispetto della forma circolare, laqual' è molto più capace di qualunque altra sorte di forma, per che altre forme posson' ben' abbracciar più angoli, et più tortuosa et longa circonferentia, et nondimeno non possono abbracciar' tanto spatio et piazza, quanto abbraccia la forma circo- / [36^v] lare, non essendoli occupato alcun' spatio da angoli, ma se 'l sito commandasse di prender' maggior' circuito, allora anco si potria grandire il suo diametro. Poniam' caso sin' a un' miglio, et per consequentia poi bisognaria aggionger' un' bellovardo di più.⁷⁹ Quanto alla perfettion' della detta forma è molto buona, riuscendoli gli angoli in niun' modo acuti o debili ma sodi, obtusi et ampli, che li cavallieri si possono situar' tanto innanzi a guardar' et difender' anco le fronti / [37^r] delli bellovardi, et questo perché tali angoli prendono qualità dalle forme di tutto il circolo integro, cavandone il buono di un' si gran' circuito di angoli dodeci, o fusseno quattordici, et lasciando il male et gran' spesa che saria a fortificarlo tutto, et questo per la causa della riva del mare, laqual non ha bisogno di molta fortificatione, et per consequentia fa guadagnar il sparagno d'un' terzo della fortificatione et spesa, et più ha in sé la commodità d'esser' soccor- / [37^v] sa, et quella ancora della maggior capacità, come di sopra fu detto. Resta solo a toccar' una parola dell' utilità de cavallieri di terreno solamente, et che non si de lasciare di farli massimamente contra Turchi, per oppo- nersi et non lasciarsi soperchiare dalle lor montagne che con la moltitudine posson' et soglino fare, essendo l'offender' il proprio delli cavallieri, sì come il difendersi è delli bello- vardi, et per far' bene tutti dui tali effetti, una cosa sola / [38^r] non riesce, perché li tirri

75 In the Cicogna ms: *deve*. 76 Ascanio again speaks of the island's nobility helping to finance construction work, in Salina and in Limassol; cf. supra, n. 70. 77 *perché* absent in the Cicogna ms. 78 *tutti* absent in the Cicogna ms. 79 This passage shows that Ascanio really followed the debates over the best shape to give to an enceinte; he favoured a circular form, as did, notably, Giovambattista Zanchi, *Del modo di fortificar le città*, pp. 24–28.

detti⁸⁰ delli bellovardi se sono troppo in alto non possono si ben' scovar' et far' gli suoi tirri a livello con maggior' danno de' nemici. Per altro ancora sono utili gli cavallieri, che ne' bisogni di retirete si posson' far' diventar' bellovardi, oltre che quando siano ben' posti, cioè nell' angulo et gola delli bellovardi una tal fortezza vien' come ad haver doppi bellovardi et fianchi, et può un' cavallier' in detto sito esser' utilissimo a difendere il / [38^v] suo bellovardo, et ribatterne gli nemici, anco quando fusseno entrati nel bellovardo, et queste et molte altre sono le ragioni a favor' delli cavallieri, insieme con le autorità della maggior' parte, contra li quali non vedo che altro si dica, se non che volendosi far' li bellovardi di gran larghezza, cioè di gola amplissima, li cavallieri o non potranno arrivare, et accommodarsi bene per scoprir' la fossa, o volendo arrivarvi bisognaria farne due cavallieri per ogni / [39^r] bellovardo, overo farne uno sì grande che arrivasse così dall' una come dall' altra parte del bellovardo, verso le sue canoniere. A tutti questi inconvenienti si risponde con una sola parola, che non accasca far' le gole delli bellovardi di sì smisurata larghezza a questo verso, ma ben' all' altro verso sta ben' ogni gran' grandezza⁸¹ delli bellovardi, cioè il fianco et spala ch'è dalla canoniera vicina alla cortina, sin' alla fronte del bellovardo, nella qual fronte per esser' par- [39^v] te la più discoperta, più tosto si suol far' tutta la furia di batteria, et però sta bene ogni gran' spatio et piazza dietro tal fronte per poter' far' delle retirete bisognando, ma all'⁸² altro verso non gli vedo tal necessità, pur che sia di conveniente grandezza, et bastante per il fine a che si fa, il qual non è altro che per muraglia, contramina, terrapieno, reculate o piazze per l'artiglieria, parapetti et strade, et anco acciò non sia il bellovardo sì angusto et stretto / [40^r] nella gola, che si possa tagliare et separare con l'artiglieria nemica dal capo della fortezza. Queste cose tutte facendosi, et non volendosi sì smisurato spatio di più, potria utilmente cascare il cavaliere in una tal gola di grandezza non superflua, perliche non essendo di danno il restringerla a quanto basti per tutti li detti rispetti et aggiogendosi la utilità delli cavallieri, a me pare doversi antiporre il non danno et quelle tante utilità a una superflua grandez- / [40^v] za, massimamente privandosi per quella di tanti benefitij del cavaliere. Oltre ch'essendo di tutte le parti d'una fortezza *quella di tanti benefitij dal cavaliere, oltre che essendo di tutte le parte d'una fortezza* quella più sicura, ch' è in mezzo fra un' bellovardo et l'altro, per esser' da dui bellovardi difesa, non è alcun' profitto di levar' senza grandissima causa, alcuna parte del detto loco sicuro, per dover' poi collocarla nella fronte del bellovardo molto meno difesa, che alcun' altra parte d'una fortezza, sì per esser' guardata da un' solo bellovardo et / [41^r] non da dui, come per esser' la più lontana dalle difese. Questo dico per che facendosi più curta la cortina, vien' poi a farsi la fronte del bellovardo più larga, mettendosi quello che devria andar' nella cortina, loco più sicuro nella fronte, ch'è meno sicura, come è detto. Et di ciò tanto basti, *perché nel resto mi riporto alli desegni.*⁸³

80 *detti* absent in the Cicogna ms. 81 *larghezza* in the Cicogna ms. 82 *dal* in the Cicogna ms. 83 These drawings are not mentioned anywhere in the public collections; Ascanio must therefore have sent along with his letters a series of plans, which Francesco Marcaldi evidently does not mention.

] Come doveva esser' Famagosta

Quanto a Famagosta per le sue conditioni dette di sopra, non è dubbio che ha bisogno de diversi rimedij perché anco essa ha diverse infirmità, l'una è che gli va tempo nella fortification' perfetta forse / [41^v] più lungo non di quello che noi si saperiamo eleggere, ma di quello che li vicini sospetti forse ci vorranno concedere; l'altra sorte della sua infirmità è che per far' fortification' imperfetta, cioè con manco numero di buoni fianchi di quel che porta tutto il suo circuito, et li debiti tirri et difese dell'artiglieria, et con debile provisione per farla habile di haver' soccorsi sicuri, questo saria un' perder' l'opera, il tempo et la spesa. Perilche dopo l'haver' / [42^r] più volte circondata et riveduta la detta città di Famagosta, così di fuori come di dentro, et similmente riconosciuto il debile et il forte, l'offese et le difese, che vi si posson' fare, le difficoltà de lochi, materie, huomini, condutture, il tempo, la spesa nel fortificare, ingenuamente lo confesso dopo longa ambiguità dell'animo mio, non senza voler' Divino, dal quale il tutto dipende, mi cascò nell'animo quel rimedio che di sotto si dirà, ma prima per ragionar' della forti- / [42^v] fication' perfetta, concludo esser' quella, et la migliore, laqual ha bellovardi sei, et che ha la congiontion' del scoglio maggiore con la città, *come nel desegno finalmente si potrà comprendere*, et le ragioni di tal parere sono queste, ch'essendo il circuito di Famagosta dalla parte di terra passa circa mille e trecento, non gli possono cascar' né meno né più di sei bellovardi, per la ragion' de tirri dell'artiglieria⁸⁴ così offensivi come di difensivi, che sono di ponteria circa passa ducento per ogni tirro, onde si può comprender' [43^r] chiaro il conto di detto numero di sei bellovardi.⁸⁵

Quanto poi alla congiontion dello scoglio con la città, dico che è necessario per più cause et per non essere discoperti da diverse parti, che senza esse si scopririano, et per meglio dar mano et corrispondentia della debita difesa alla fortification del scoglio senza la qual corrispondentia essa diventaria poi overo un corpo senza braccia, overo con li bracci et fianchi sicurrti che l'artiglieria nemica gli potria facilmente imboccare et levarli le difese. Quanto veramente in far fortificazioni perfetta in Famagosta, per ribatter a forza mi basteriano le ditte raggioni a favor della perfetta, pur soggiungerò anchora altre riposte, che non mancheranno alle cose che dice, che è fautore di detta fortificatione imperfetta, et prima vien detto che li torrioni tondi supleriano, et per poter frequentar più spesso e maggior numero di tiri dell'archibuseria, et artiglieria. Allega ancora la longezza di tempo et spesa maggiore della fortificatione perfetta, et così della congiontion dello scoglio con la città, perilche senza tal congiontion vorian fare un certo ponton sullo scoglio. Rispondendo, dico per prima, che bisogna anco far conto con gli nemici se essi potranno o non, come di certo potranno per ragione et esperienza delle passate distributioni⁸⁶ che suol fare l'artiglieria, potranno dico fracassar e distrugere quelli torrioni tondi, per esser vacui di dentro, per non esser grossi si non passa quatro, per esser di muraglia, et per non esser capaci per la lor

⁸⁴ *di tutta l'artiglieria* in the Cicogna ms. ⁸⁵ Around the same time, G.S. proposed eight bastions for Famagusta's enceinte, but accepted the possibility of only building six; cf. supra, docs 7 and 8. ⁸⁶ Probably *distruzioni*, as Salaris proposes.

picciolezza di terra pieno, il quale solo, et non alcuna muraglia fatta da gli uomini, può resistere all'artiglieria, onde quando sarà destrutto un solo torrione come vi si potrà adoperar l'archibuseria? Et se ben questa sola raggion basteria, rispondo ancora a quella maggior frequentia di tiri dell'artegliaria che quando le fosse senza acqua, come ha Famagosta, siano empiti di molti sassi, come essa non gli ha et doverebbe havergli, da questo si può causare non minor numero di danni a gli nemici, tirandosi l'artegliaria in detti sassi, che poi saltano in diverse parti, ma di più l'artegliaria, cosa che non può far l'archibuseria, spezza e fracassa travatte, traverse ed ogni gagliardo ostaculo et impedimento opposto a gli nemici.

Quanto alla longhezza di⁸⁷ tempo et spesa maggiore che in quella vadi, et nella congiotion' del scoglio com' è sopraddetto. A me basta che quanto a esser' cosa più forte della sua imperfetta per sé stesso con questo si convince,⁸⁸ et per le predette ragioni allegate a favor delle fortification' perfetta, laqual poi ha anco la sua infirmità del tempo, forse più longo di quello che li vicini ci volesseno comportare, andando li spa- / [43^v] tio di anni trenta secondo la regola del bellovarado di Famagosta fatto da novo et spesa di ducati trecentomila essendo costato detto bellovarado cinquantaquattromila ducati, et non è finito ancora;⁸⁹ similmente nella fattura del scoglio per conto di soccorso sicuro, secondo la detta regola, essendo stato il tutto compassato appresso poco non gli andarà manco di altri trenta anni per la carestia di huomini, et difficultà de lochi ove si fabrica de mate- / [44^r] rie condutture et di ciò che bisogna, et poi di spesa non gli andarà manco di altri trecentomila ducati. Medesimamente quella fortification' imperfetta per haver tre bellovardi, cioè dui appresso il fatto, et per voler farne et fondar in mare, ha anco la sua parte di tempo di anni forse quindici, massimamente per quel fondar' in mare, che poi arrivaranno alli vinti anni, con la fattura del scoglio, quantunque imperfetta di modo che non solo ha / [44^v] il difetto sopraddetto che con facilità et breve tempo, di poche canonate se gli può distrugger' uno di quelli torrioni tondi et levarli le difese, ma ha ancora difetto del spatium di una ventena d'anni, et di spesa di più di trecentomila ducati. Queste adunque sono le due principali opinioni che corrono per aiutar et difender' Famagosta, et se ben' di quella della fortification' imperfetta non gli so vedere alcuna ragione, se non apparente et poco fondata, et / [45^r] che solo potria forse applauder più all'appetito di quelli che fussen' già satij delle matte spese de ingegneri, che non videro mai guerra, più dico potria piacere all'appetito che alla vera ragione, et perciò in niun' modo forse può esser buona tal opinione, per le ragioni dette di sopra. Per lequali volendosi accomodar' de⁹⁰ diverse necessità del sito, et di diverse cose già fatte con gran tempo et spesa, mi par buona l'opinione della perfetta fortification' con bellovardi sei et con / [45^v] la congiotion' del scoglio con la città per conto de habilità de soccorsi più sicuri, et però forse si devria principiar' a essequirla né restar' di sempre continuarla sin' al suo compimento, ma insieme ancora per il detto pericolo della sua longhezza di tempo, a me pariera che si dovesse

87 *et* in the Cicogna ms. 88 *convieni* in the Cicogna ms. 89 This line of reasoning is expressed in a similar way by G.S. when he uses the example of the Martinengo bastion to estimate the cost and duration of the new fortification work to be done in Famagusta; cf. supra, doc. 7. 90 *a* in the Cicogna ms.

aggiungerli un' altra sorte di provisione, laquale non può nocere, ma giovare sommamente⁹¹ a detta fortification' perfetta, et all'imperfetta ancora, et di più per un' altro ris- / [46^r] petto che poi si dirà; et questa è cosa che ha molte ragioni et esempi a suo favore, et quel che forse più importa ha la ragione della necessità per le cause dette, et insieme ancora quella della possibilità; et prima, venendo agli esempi nelle città di Asti, et di Alba in Piemonte,⁹² paese pieno di singular' esempi delli modi di temporeggiare per conservar' gli stati, volendo rimediar' a simil angustie di tempo, tutti quelli grandissimi capitani, così dalla parte di Spagna nella / [46^v] città di Asti, come anco dalla parte di Francia nella città di Alba, insieme tutti concorseno in un' medesimo parere, come più espediente et più necessario, et tale che dopo esser stato da essi capitani dell' una et l'altra parte molto ben' riconosciuto il tutto, fu giudicata cosa o inespugnabile o almeno di gran' tempo e sangue, et questo non è altro se non saper ben' ordinar' et reppozzar' una ritirata dentro di una città, laqual cascherà benis- / [47^r] simo in Famagosta per la sua capacità et per esser vacua, havendo anco molte case et ediftij vacui et le ragioni della fortezza delle ritirate sono che li fianchi ritirati dentro della prima cinta di muraglia non sono esposti né possono esser' scoperti dall'artiglieria nemica, senza gran' tempo et sangue, perché per prima non dovendosi restar' di difender' la prima cinta di muraglia, ch' è *al presente* più che mai sia possibile, avranno gli nemici da perder quel tempo. Dapoi succede / [47^v] un' altra seconda fattura a essi nemici di levarsi dinanzi quelle ruine di muraglie et terrapieni della prima cinta di muraglia,⁹³ facendo questo gran' scudo alla ritirata, et impossibilità di piantarli batteria, et anco ciò vorrà tempo. Finalmente gli bisognerà combatter' la ritirata che medesimamente vorrà il suo tempo, tanto⁹⁴ importante nel mal aere di Famagosta et sarà anco difficile tal ritirata da espugnarsi, quando sia fatta con fianchi ben' intesi et [48^r] con buon' terreno, *il quale si potria transportar dentro con facilità di fuori dalla città, che dissi di sopra esser nocivo, et anco con naviglij, ove ne fosse quando il bisogno lo ricercasse, e così tenerlo almen preparato per li bisogni, quando pur al presente ne mai si volesse far tal ritirata, perché per altro anchora, per cavaglieri et terrapieni della fortification perfetta, sarà sempre buono anzi necessario, insieme con legnami et cose necessarie per le ritirate. Similmente si potria aver terreno, se si volesse fare una cavatione non nociva né di gran spesa, ma utilissima, et per servirsi di terreno et per conto del habitarsi il soccorso, et tal cavatione forse in niun altro luogo casca meglio, che fra il Castello di Famagosta et il torrione chiamato il Diamante, oltre che in quel luogo è buon terreno, et non rocca, et per essere il debito fondo tutto molto ben misurato, le navi di soccorso non haveriano altro contrario se non che il passaggio di passa circa 400, l'arteglieria nemica li potria tirare, il che su le guerre non si stima tanto, come forse in apparentia, et è chiaro che*

91 *solamente* in the Cicogna ms. 92 By using these examples of the Piedmontese fortifications of Asti and Alba, Ascanio is clearly seeking to further establish himself as an expert on military architecture; in Promis's opinion, Ascanio's use of these two examples is fallacious, based not on a real knowledge of the two enceintes but rather on what he had read in books: C. Promis, 'Vita di Girolamo Maggi d'Anghiari, ingegnere militare, poeta, filologo, archeologo, giurisperito del secolo XVI', *Miscellanea di storia italiana* 1 (1862), pp. 122–123. 93 *di muraglia* absent in the Cicogna ms. 94 *tanto* absent in the Cicogna ms.

per artiglieria non restano di passarli apresso, bisognando, et passano felicemente le compagnie di cavalleria che sono manco veloci delle navi, le quali potrian diminuire molto il predetto contrario con l'aspettar su le volte suo vento sforzevole, et poi si ridurriano a discagar nella presente cavatione, se ben si dovessero rompere, a che non si deve riguardar ne casi di gran bisogni, massimamente essendo più necessario il soccorso in Famagosta che in luogo del mondo, per il mal aere causato dalla Costanza, per il qual in luoco delli soldati che ne moriranno al sicuro, bisogneria poterne rinfrescar di novi.

A questo s'aggiunge poiche oltre la forza per assedij ancora e mancamento di vettovaglia si conquistano le città, che poco valerian' tante spese di fortification', se non vi s'aggiunga qualche poco di munitione, non dirò d'anni ma almen' di mesi, et che dette munition' non si potesse levar' né cambiar' senza saputa o licentia di alcuno degli Illustrissimi Consigli, et tanto più è ciò d'importanza a Famagosta per esser' di tutte le altre fortezze essa la / [48^v] più lontana da Venetia, essendo poi ancora questo di grandissimo giovamento in particolare a Famagosta, poiche per il molto mal aere suo l'haver il modo di tratenersi saria la destruttion' de' nemici, et certa vittoria nostra, senza colpo di spada. È anco degna di qualche consideratione, sopra li modi di far' lavorar' et fabricar', overo sopra di sé a ferlini overo a giornata, cioè a ferlini in questo modo, che per ogni corso et camino d'un carro di ter- / [49^r] reno o di sassi, se gli dà una moneta chiamata ferlino, per segnale, sì chè se sono pegri et fanno pochi corsi guadagnano anco poco, ma a lavorar' a giornata, ho avvertito, che tanto guadagna il pegro quanto il più sollicito, per il che presto tutti diventano pegri, il che causa la tardità et poca opera con molta spesa, et per esperienza si è provata differentia di spesa da un' modo all'altro da quattordici a cento oltre il beneficio della maggior' prestezza.⁹⁵ Ma in materia dell' / [49^v] aere di Famagosta non sarà forse male toccar' una parola a fine di qualche rimedio che non passasse li termini, come fa essendo nocivo non solo a gli nemici, ma anco agli amici, poco giovando contra tal aere l'assuefattion' dell'habitare, laquale in tutti gli altri lochi dell'isola si vede giovare, eccettuato solo il loco di Famagosta,⁹⁶ perché nelli altri luochi non sono come a Famagosta quelli alvei et massimamente della Costanza, ov' è quello stagno et lago sì pesti- / [50^r] fero, dal qual o sia più basso del livello del mare, o pur ne sia causa la mala sorte del terreno non tenace per li soli ardenti, dirupandosi facilmente et riempiendo sempre da nuovo gli alvei, secondo che si vanno cavando, causando poi spesa infinita et immortale, nondimeno per la speranza di grandissimo premio et guadagno, si trovò già chi accettò⁹⁷ tal impresa, con questo che gli fusse donato quel spatium d'alveo che riempisse et bonificasse, abbracciando / [50^v] detto alveo grandissima quantità di terreno; et perché gli fu tagliata tal concessione a Venetia, se di là non fusse concessa con tutto questo non sarà poco di trovar' più alcuno a prender' questa impresa né peggio si può far che non far' nulla.⁹⁸ Questi adunque sono li rimedij alle male qualità di Famagosta, lequali

95 Echoing his brother's theories, Ascanio supports the idea of a pay-by-results method of remunerating the workforce, using the *ferlini* (tokens) system that his brother had already seen employed in Peschiera in 1549/1550, and which he proposed for the work in Cyprus in his 1566 report; cf. supra, doc. 15: Manno, 'Il governo del cantiere', p. 1088. 96 *et questo* before *perché* in the Cicogna ms. 97 *già chi accettò* absent in the Cicogna ms. 98 With this remark Ascanio infers that an attempt to drain the Costanza marshes failed for administrative and

invero sono grandi, dall'aere nocivo non solo a gli nemici, ma anco a gli amici *della difficoltà di soccorrerla sicuramente per causa di quelli scogli, che volendoli spianare si atterra il porto et li fondi, come per esperienza s'è viduto, e per abbracciarli poco senza congiurgerli con la città, non può uscir né cosa né forte, né ben coperta come ricerca il bisogno, et poi in abbracciarli come si de, congiungendola con la città per esservi rocca et molte altre incomodità di questo paese, gli va tempo di una età et spesa infinita. Segue poi la terza mala qualità di Famagosta, della difficoltà di fortificarla, non solo perché non ha terreno ma anco perché ha rocca, sicche in nisun modo è favorita essa Famagosta dalla natura, et meno si trova al presente aiutata dall'arte essendovi diffetti di fianchi et terrapieni, ne quai con tutte gli va poi tempo infinito et eccessiva spesa. Il che si può forse dire che sia la quarta sua mala qualità* alle quai cose tutte essendovi de più sorte rimedij, come di / [51^r] sopra si disse, niuna sorte forse ci è poi a quelle infinite longhezze, di tempo et spese, se non quanto è sopradetto, col fondamento di quelli esempi et ragioni, et massimamente per la ragion' della necessità, laquale terra anco seco quella d'un' altra utilità, che con la ritirata convenendosi restringer' Famagosta, per li urgenti et prudenti rispetti, si guadagnerà di⁹⁹ poter dar' una giusta risposta alla iscusca che forse potriano addur' quelli dell'isola di non voler contribuir' alle spese di una nuova fortezza, et qu- / [51^v] esto perché Famagosta è tanto capace et vacua, che essa sola a loro può bastare; ma la verità è che al Principe, come un' occhio solo non basta una sol fortezza in una sì spatiosa, grande et sì lontana isola, secondo anco gli esempi di Corsica, che saria perduta se avesse havuto una fortezza sola, et della Sardegna ancora.¹⁰⁰ Perilche et per le male qualità di Famagosta, et per il vantaggio di una contribution' di quelli del paese, saria da elegger di far' una nuova fortezza, et repezzar solamen- / [52^r] te Famagosta, continuando però anco quel che si de fare più tosto che fortificar' di quel modo Famagosta sola, andandoli poi tempo et spesa, et manco perfettion' che in una nuova fortezza, perché nella sua perfetta fortification' se gli va tempo di anni sessanta. Nella nuova fortezza per le diverse qualità senza roca et con abundantia di terreno, non gli andarà forse dui a tirarla in fortezza sufficiente, et manco secondo l'ordine predetto. Et se in Famagosta gli andarà spesa di ducati seicento- / [52^v] mila a San Marco, non contribuendo in quella gli sudditi, nella nuova fortezza gli andarà molto meno delli dui terzi, massimamente se gli sudditi contribuiranno per conto de' loro interessi,¹⁰¹ poiche per li detti necessari et ragionevoli rispetti Famagosta non li potrà più capire, et così poi si venirà anco ad haver di più l'intento del benefitio publico, di non aver un' sol occhio, cioè una sol fortezza in una sì ampia et sì lontana isola, et dappoi quando si vederà riuscito il ri- / [53^r] medio al mal aere

political reasons. A series of letters dating from 1563 to 1566 explain that the salt flats engineer, Felice Brunello, proposed a project to channel the rivers feeding the marshes, also calling for mills to be built 'al modo italiano' in order to make Famagusta more independent with regard to grain (dispatch dated 9 August 1563); this plan was notably supported by Bernardo Sagredo and the captain of the naval guard, Alvise Bembo. The proposition ended in the Senate ruling on 30 March 1566 that Brunello would be accorded the tithes of all the land he managed to drain: ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 34. **99** *a* in the Cicogna ms. **100** This argument concerning the defence systems of Corsica and Sardinia echoes the argument given, more precisely, by G.S. in supra, doc. 5. **101** The figures given by Ascanio are for G.S. the highest possible numbers; cf. supra, doc. 7. It should be noted that, for Ascanio, Cypriot financial contributions were not a certainty.

di Famagosta, con più satisfattione et commodità si potria entrar' con maggior sforzo nella grande et lunga spesa della perfetta fortification' di essa Famagosta. Resta con poche parole a dir' delle altre principal cose proposte, per quella tal maniera di guerreggiare sopradetta.

] Come si trovano le genti¹⁰² di Cipro

Si trovano *al presente* in questo Regno cavalli stradiotti ottocento e trentatre computadi suoi capitani al numero di disdotto et il suo Governatore; similmente Ciprioti archi- / [53^v] busieri a cavallo ducento e cinque con gli suoi capitani numero cinque. Ha di soldo ciascuno stradioto ducati quaranta all'anno, et moza cento d'orzo, et gli lor capitani hanno ducati ottanta et moza cento e sessanta d'orzo;¹⁰³ l'archibusier' a cavallo ha ducati trentasei et moza d'orzo ottanta et gli lor capitani hanno ducati sessanta et moza cento d'orzo.¹⁰⁴ Gli Feudatarij sono nonantauno obligati con cavalli cento e ottantadui. Gli provisionati sono nonanta, essendo divisi / [54^r] detti feudatarii et provisionati in quattro compagnie; una si chiama del Clarissimo Proveditor'; la seconda ha suo capitano il signor Eugenio Sincriticò gran' siniscalco, figliuolo del Conte di Rocas; la terza è sotto il conte Giacomo di Nores, figliuolo del Conte di Tripoli; la quarta è sotto il signor Tutio Costanzo.¹⁰⁵ Sono poi quattromila et cinquecento fanti di cernede Ciprioti, sotto quindeci capitani.¹⁰⁶

] Come dovevano¹⁰⁷ esser' le genti di Cipro

Hor per due effetti che resta a dire, non sarà mai a proposito il metter' le arme in mano de Ciprioti / [54^v] et per la prima quando si vorrà mandar' a dar' il guasto alle vettovaglie, come si disse di sopra, li ducento cavalli Ciprioti archibusieri che sono tutti villani insieme con gli suoi capitani, oltre che non vorran' obedire, attenderan' a salvarsi ne' monti con le lor mogli, figliuoli, et con le vettovaglie ancora de suoi padroni da loro molto odiati, et le cernede medesimamente havran' imparato a farsi forti contra li stradioti non parenti, essendone molti stradioti parentati de qui, et massimamente / [55^r] li capitani, perché oltre che la turba de villani non è accettata nelle fortezze non portando seco vettovaglia, sariano certi che quando anco¹⁰⁸ fusseno accettati non potriano col poco lor haver longo tempo nutrir' se et gli suoi, et oltre di questo tutti desiderano mutation' di quella dura conditione, non solo li parici per

102 *Come si trova al presente la gente* in the Cicogna ms. **103** This information concerning the *stradioti* shows that reform of this auxiliary corps had been implemented; it notably led to numbers being doubled to 800 men in total; cf. supra, doc. 3 n. 1. **104** The auxiliary corps of mounted arquebusiers was created in 1558; Agostino Clusone listed 130 men split into four companies, one in each of the four *contrade* of Cerines, Crussoco, Carpasso and Salina. Their numbers rose in 1561 to 200 men, now split into five companies, with a yearly pay of 30 ducats plus 80 *mozza* of barley: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 250^v; ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 71, f. 55^v; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, f. 3^{r-v}; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 774; see also supra, pp. 117–118. **105** The 28 April 1560 *mostra generale* gives the precise numbers of the Cypriot feudal cavalry; the *mostra* included the four companies led by the officers Ascanio mentions, made up of 97 feudatories with 182 horses to present: Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', pp. 177, 189–199. **106** Ascanio's description of the *cernide*'s composition does not match the numbers originally planned for this corps in 1559; cf. supra, doc. 14 n. 1. **107** *deveriano* in the Cicogna ms. **108** *anco* absent in the Cicogna ms.

esser' schiavi, ma anco li liberi per esser' parenti delli schiavi et per molte angarie.¹⁰⁹ Perilche è manifesto che poi al fine quelle vettovaglie ridutte ne' monti / [55^v] insieme con loro caschierian' in man' del nemico. Et quanto all'altro effetto ancora d'inquietar et danneggiar gli nemici, potria esser ogni cosa, ma questi villani Ciprioti a cavallo non mostrano gran' garbo di saperlo fare. Ma essendone li di passati morto un' di questi capitani Ciprioti, il Clarissimo Providitore gli ha prudentemente sustituito un' altro capitano che non è Ciprioto.¹¹⁰ *Quanto alli cavalli stradiotti, potriano essere meglio armati, disciplinati et capitaniati, poi che dalla sufficienza de capitani dipende ancho quella dei soldati, però saria molto più utile, manco numero di capitani, ma che fessero sperimentati su le guerre, che è il maggior numero dei capitani giovani o inesperti, li quali perciò non solo non possono saper et conoscer li modi et vantaggi del viver, ma ne ancho il modo dell'amaestrar gli altri, havendo bisogno loro di esser amaestrati, di modo che ne loro sono buoni, et manco possono far gli altri, ma quando li capitani hanno di esperienza, li pochi sanno et possono far buoni et utili i molti sottoposti a loro, che poi sariano inutili senza quella tal guida, ovvero mancando del essercitarsi all'obbedienza, et all'ordine, senza le quai cose non sarà mai da confidar molto nelle predette compagnie, le quali doveriano ancho haver le lanciae più longe, havendole cortissime,¹¹¹ et non secondo il proprio di quella milizia né come si ricercaria contra quelle de vicini, li quali per questo potriasi giongere et non esser gionti, et le targhe sono molto mal fatte, mal nervate et deboli, essendo longo disotto, che il soldato non potendola accomodar sul collo del cavallo, viene ad esser armato solamente nella scena, perilche alcuni si sono messi a portar più tosto corsaletti, anzi molti vorriano introdurli, il che saria un transformar la natura et proprietà di stradiotti, dove che anco bisogna star sul saldo in quella maniera di guerreggiar appropriata a questo Stato Illustrissimo. Sì che di corsaletti sariano più tosto per far fatti d'arme et per quel altra maniera di guerreggiar in campagna, et più tardavano la velocità di quelle expedite fattioni molto più utili, secondo l'invenzione proposta. Sì che li stradiotti vorrei che andasseno armati da stradiotti, et se pur si dovesse adgionger qualche cosa, si potria far portar un archibusetto et questo quanto all'arme. Delli cavalli veramente, se ben nelli principij è stato necessario a serrar gli occhi a molte cose, pure a poco a poco si doveria, come si ha fatto, non admetter cavalli troppo piccioli et anco avertir al' poco di cervello di alcuni poverazi stradiotti, o per dir meglio alla sagacità di diversi del isola, che li stravendono li cavalli con diverse malitie, et promission di favori, per il che di gran parte del soldo vengono ad ingannati, et defraudati con danno del Principe, non havendo poi il modo di mantener né se né il cavalli, come si ricercaria al bisogno, et al beneficio del pubblico,¹¹² et perché nel disciplinar' le cernede molti di quelli ordini sono*

109 All the Venetian officers split the Cypriot peasantry into two main groups according to their legal status of either *francomati* or *parici*; here, however, Ascanio sheds precious light on the solidarity between the different categories of peasants. As early as 1539 the syndic Francesco Boldu adopted a series of measures designed to restrict marriages between the different categories, and even to limit the *parici*'s access to monasteries: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 45, ff. 20^v–21^r. **110** In 1567 G.S. seems to echo this argument concerning the captains' ethnicity; cf. *infra*, doc. 29 n. 10. **111** Here Ascanio echoes G.S., who wanted the *stradiotti* to be equipped with *alla corvatta* lances; cf. *supra*, doc. 2. **112** Other officers shared Ascanio's opinion on the degeneration of Cypriot horse breeds:

utilissimi, si potria introdurne anco nella ca- / [56^r] valleria di ritrovarsi insieme et esercitarsi con quella pene, overo maggiori alli disobedienti, per laqual obedienza che il tutto importa, saria necessario, non che utile, dar' autorità alli capitani di cassar' quelli che non gli sono obedienti, quando però li capitani siano¹¹³ sperimentati su le guerre et huomini d'honore, perché¹¹⁴ tali saperiano far' elettione di quelli che volesseno farli honore. Et per poter' haver' de tali capitani saria più benefitio spender' un poco di più, cioè che'l soldo delli / [56^v] capitani fusse sin' a ducati ducento oltre li moza cento et sessanta d'orzo, et un' ragazzo, et che ciascun' di detti capitani havesse cento cavalli, et anco paga morta per diece cavalli di più,¹¹⁵ in man' del Clarissimo Proveditor' da esser' dispensati di comun' parere a certi mezi capitani et huomini da bene, che danno l'anima alle compagnie, et anco a chi si portasse meglio alla giornata, perché se chi governa ha in mano premio et pena, fa diventar' più / [57^r] utili al Principe quelli che gli obediscono. Ma sì¹¹⁶ come si cresce questa buona spesa, si potria diminuir quella inutil spesa di tanti capitani et delli ducento cavalli Ciprioti, massimamente che quanto al numero delli cavalli sono pur troppi, per quel tal modo di guerreggiare sopradetto *et fu già opinione d'alcuni, che le dismantate si potessero prohibere et diffendere, et che per questo effetto ci bisognasse buon numero di cavalli, ma se detta opinione non è vera, come è falsissima, non potendo essere sì veloce la cavalleria come le vele del armata, l'arteglieria della quali si guadagna l'habilità delle dismantate, seguita che remossa quella causa, sì de rimover anco l'effetto di tanto numero di cavalli, non dire più che ne siano non sia meglio, ma di due spese, et da lasciar la manco utile, et è da eleger la migliore, come saria ancho quella di crescere il soldo alli fanti delle fortezze di Cipro, acciò non sia furniti di tali che sono morti di fame inanzi la vista de nemici, et che possa esser concorto de migliori soldati.* Non è forse anco da lasciare che se alcun' loco ha bisogno di presenter gli andamenti de' vicini sospetti; è l'isola di Cipro per haver tempo di retirar le vettovaglie et privarne gli nemici, [57^v] come si è detto di sopra, et per saper tali andamenti gli modi sono facili de chi sotto pretesto di mercatanti¹¹⁷ si trovasseno presenti, et vedesseno ogni lor' proceder', massimamente potendo finger' imprese contra il Soffi,¹¹⁸ et poi voltarle verso

according to Agostino Clusone, in 1559 there were 1,861 horses on the island for 1,101 mules; that same year Councillor Antonio Zane gave an even bleaker assessment, writing that, as horses cost 300 ducats, all that people rode on the island were mules. Consequently, they said, anybody riding a mule needed to be forced to ride a horse instead, as previously. These differing views on the number of horses available were doubtless due to differing perceptions of 'pure breeds'; in 1557 Leonardo Donà claimed that the only good breeds were in Messarea, and *Luocotenente* Salvador Michiel voiced an even more radical opinion in December 1550, declaring that pure breeds had nearly all gone: BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 251^v; ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Antonio Zane (1559), f. 8^v; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 166^v, 171^v; Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 616, 624; see also supra, doc. 3 n. 5. 113 *hanno* in the Cicogna ms. 114 *perché* absent in the Cicogna ms. 115 Ascanio advocates a payrise for the *stradioti* captains; in 1558 G.S. called for a pay rise for all *stradioti*, not just their captains; cf. supra, doc. 2. 116 *si* absent in the Cicogna ms. 117 *mercanti* in the Cicogna ms. 118 *Sofi* was the name commonly used to refer to the Shah of Iran, with whom Venice had tried several times to form an alliance against the Turks, using Cyprus as a relay for letters and messengers; cf. B. Arbel, 'Venetian Cyprus and the Muslim Levant, 1473–1570', in N. Coureas / J. Riley-Smith (eds), *Cyprus and the Crusades*, Nicosia 1995, pp. 166–167 [reprint in B. Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th Centuries*, Aldershot 2000, study no. XII].

Cipro, la dove tal spie potranno scoprir la verità a tempo meglio che gli avisi più lontani. Ancora a me par che non stia bene che alcuno del paese intervenga alli secreti di stato, vedendo lettere in tal *materia, o zifere, che vengono da Constantinopoli o di altri luogi, et questo perché subito li principali del paese vengono a saper tutti li secreti*,¹¹⁹ et quello è quanto mi occorre di dir al presente del modo di diffendere il Regno di Cipro, havendo detto primo diversi modi di diffenderi gli stati, de quello di diffendere Cipro accommodato al suo Principe, dello stato di tutto il Regno, come si trovano et come doveriano esser tutti i luogi più considerabili di questa isola, colle ragione così dall'una come dall'altra parte, et finalmente come si trovano, et come doveriano essere le genti di Cipro, et se mai venirà tempo che habbia forze maggiori, et che 'l nemico habbia minori manco danari, o più imperfetta disciplina et unione, all'hora si dirà forse del altra maniera, detta guerra campale, et quanto et dove col mezzo et scala di questa isola, li potria intrare ad impresa di gran merito et gloriose. Perché oltre la raggion di tanto disavvantaggio, sono infiniti essempij a favor della proposta maniera di guerreggare, del Signor Bartholomeo Alviano nella rotta di Gieradada et del Duca Francesco Maria d'Urbino, che col trattenersi nel forte di Cassano senza alcun rischio conservò il stato,¹²⁰ così del grand Contestabile di Franza, che in Provenza contro Carlo V, trattandosi nel forte, conservò quel Regno, et da poi in Piccardia io vido che per uscir del suo forte misso in una punta di aco tutto quel Regno per dir le parole proprie, che udi dire dal Re Hendrico così l'Ongaria s'è perduta et il Piamonte conservati tanto importa un modo di guerreggiare più che l'altro.¹²¹ Et se fosse licito boccar alcuna cosa delli suoi, mio padre col trattenersi nella fortezza di Osopo fu causa come è ben nota della per generatione¹²² non solo di quel paese già tutto perduto ma di altri ancora molto indeboliti, all'hora per la rotta di Vicenza, così anchora poco più di cento anni inanzi di mio padre il bisaulo mio si trattene in altra fortezza contra un altro essercito imperiale di Sigismondo Imperatore, che veniva per remetter in stato li Signori di Padua.¹²³ Sì che spetialmente questo inclito Stato se ha sempre conservati meglio con l'haver a

119 G.S. nurtured this opinion in a 1568 letter; cf. *infra*, doc. 60. 120 Here, mentioning the strategies of two Venetian commanders, Ascanio recalls a perilous chapter in Venice's history, the years 1509–1530: Bartolomeo d'Alviano escaped defeat at the hands of the League of Cambrai's armies at Agnadello in the Ghiara d'Adda on 14 May 1509; and the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, army governor-general from 7 September 1523 onwards, took part in the reconquest of the *Terraferma* from the Milanese (notably recapturing Lodi in 1526), and used the Cassano fort as his base of operations. These two cases are explained in greater detail by Mario Savorgnan, *Arte militare terrestre e maritime*, pp. 92, 209–211 (with a plan of the battle of the Ghiara d'Adda), who readily compares the duke of Urbino's military leadership qualities to those of Caesar. 121 This knowledge of the military turnrounds won by the Valois against the Holy Roman Empire, in Picardy and Provence as well as in the Italian wars, is doubtless a result of Ascanio's time at the French court from 1556–1557; cf. *supra*, p. 40. 122 The copyist probably should have written *preservazione*. 123 Here Ascanio boasts about two major military exploits of his ancestors that bestowed glory upon the Savorgnan *fraterna*; first the resistance against the Holy Roman Empire's troops, led by his father Girolamo at Osoppo from 17 February to 30 March 1514 (cf. *supra*, pp. 30–31), then the tenacity of the Savorgnans, led by Tristano Savorgnan, in the fight against Sigismund of Hungary from 1413 to 1418. Ascanio's father, Girolamo, boasts of the same exploits in a 1519 memoir: Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 46–48, 290–292.

tempo preparatosi il modo di poter temporeggiar, et con li capitani che hanno tenuti tal modi, et più simili al Duca Francesco Maria d'Urbino che al Signor Bartholomeo Alviano, il quale poi, che dimostrò al mondo che una fortezza sola poteva torre tutto un stato, si è già fortificato in modo quello di Terra Ferma,¹²⁴ che quando ben si perdesse uno essercito non restaria però ogni cosa in preda dalli nemici, il che è ancho il maggior fondamento di preservar questo inclito Stato, poi che di qualità di capitani et quantità di forze inferior ad altri, sì come anco io ho udito a dire da grandissimi capitani che la sola reputatione di questo fù meno resoluti li Principi ad assalire et tentar questo Illustrissimo Stato, come non restariano di tentarlo se credassero ogni cosa più piana, et con manco impedimenti da farli perder gran tempo et danari quasi di più valuta, che esso stato.¹²⁵

[58^r] [blank]

[58^v] Del Signor Prospero Cini Pisano

124 Ascanio lays emphasis on Venice's strategy reversal after the defeat at Agnadello, decided on by its two main military commanders, the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria I Della Rovere, and Bartolomeo d'Alviano; having seen the weakness of Venice's defensive system, they implemented a policy of reinforcing fortification structures around cities and other strategic sites belonging to San Marco, in order to structure the resistance to invasions: Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 23–31; Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 5–23 and passim; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 91–94; Concina / Molteni, 'La fabbrica della fortezza', pp. 86–92 and passim. 125 In the Cicogna ms, the report ends with: *Data in Bapho alli VI di ottobre MDLXII.*

16b. ENGLISH TRANSLATION¹

[1^r] Prospero Cini, from Pisa

[1^v] [blank]

[2^r] Description of the affairs of Cyprus and of the measures the island requires, with arguments for and against various opinions. Prepared by Sir Ascanio Savorgnano, a Venetian gentleman who was sent to the Kingdom of Cyprus by the *Serenissima*, who judged him fit for the task because he held the following information prior to the war on the island.

[2^v] [blank]

[3^r] To the most illustrious lord Signor Cosmo Cini, ever my honourable master.

My illustrious lord, not many days ago a dear friend and master of mine gave me the present treatise written by the Venetian gentlemen Signor Ascanio Savorgnano, which in short discusses various ways of defending and securing the Venetian Empire, particularly the Kingdom of Cyprus. A description is given of this island's current state, then of / [3^v] its most important locations and how to improve them, along with the different opinions of various experts; followed by a presentation of the Cypriot population and what ought to be done with it. Judging the report to be of special importance, I have seen fit to present it to Your Illustrious Lordship, and am certain that it will please you, since you always enjoy pursuing things of special importance. I thus reverently beseech you to accept this humble and small gift of mine with all your customary kindness and grace [4^r], matched only by the devotion with which I make my offering, happily considering myself one of your faithful and affectionate servants. May our Lord God give you a long life with all the comfort you could desire.

Venice, 20 November 1573.

Your Illustrious Lordship's humble servant
Francesco Marcaldi

[4^v] [blank]

[5^r] Other treatises *of mine* have *sufficiently* explained the *current* state of the Kingdom of

¹ Translated from the sixteenth-century Venetian original to English by Evangelia Skoufari and Joseph Cunningham.

Cyprus, not only as regards its readiness for war, but also the quality, dignity and utility of the island. There is no need for the present treatise to expand *too much* thereupon, but it shall study additions or changes needed for a better defence system and for the preservation of Venetian rule on the island.

The various ways of defending the Kingdom of Cyprus

Firstly, it is obvious that if one cannot hold out against the enemy in the countryside, by necessity one must remain in and fortify one's cities; and, like a good judge who takes into consideration / [5^v] the arguments of both parties, not of just one alone, *a good soldier* must measure not only the strength of his own side, but also that of the enemy or suspected enemy; so if the enemy has a superior cavalry, he will avoid war on the plains where cavalry will be employed, and will, by necessity, rely mostly on infantry. This infantry will be employed in the hills, among the trees and in the towns; it can also be employed in the plains, but with ambushes and sudden assaults when confronted with a more powerful enemy. No one can deny, though, that, instead of one of the three units being larger than the others, it would be better to have an equally large naval fleet, for sea battles, / [6^r] cavalry, for war in the plains, and infantry, for the hills and countryside. If, however, it is impossible to match the enemy's cavalry, and difficult to match his other units, it would be wiser to avoid confronting him altogether; on various past occasions sides with inferior numbers and inferior forces have delayed battles, resulting in the enemy, although more powerful, being vanquished due to incidents caused either by the inferior side's intelligence, by disorder in the enemy camp, by upheaval / [6^v] among the enemy's population, or, most commonly, by the will of our Lord God.

For all these reasons, then, we should conclude that at least two or three areas in the Kingdom of Cyprus need to be fortified, at the most appropriate sites; and if the terrain is not the most favourable, it should at least be not unfavourable, and permit us to comfortably maintain possession of an island so far from Italy and so near to the suspected enemy, at least until we can send the necessary provisions and relief or cause diversions.

The planned defence of Cyprus

If a side is using a certain method of warfare, / [7^r] and has a determined aim, it is also necessary to determine the best way to achieve such an aim. I say that if it is not possible to fight in the countryside, and more convenient to erect fortifications in the plains, first the most appropriate sites must be selected; and if the terrain there is not the most favourable, it should at least be not too unfavourable, and be such that the fortification cannot be easily cut off and separated from the rest of the country. Furthermore, care must be taken to ensure a safe method of obtaining reinforcements, / [7^v] particularly by sea, for reasons I shall explain later; attention must likewise be paid to what is most convenient for our forces, to making it difficult for the enemy to set up camp, and to other aspects of major importance, such as

completing the fortification on time and at a reasonable cost; and also to many other factors. Furthermore, after gathering and storing as many provisions and as much fruit as possible, care must be taken to damage and destroy in good time all the remaining / [8^r] provisions that have not been stored, in addition to sabotaging water and anything else that may prove helpful to the enemy. Another important task is to disturb and harm the enemy with ambushes and sudden assaults, not leaving them to enjoy the country in peace, or at least granting them as little tranquillity as possible.

It now needs to be established whether or not the Kingdom of Cyprus in its *present* state is able to conduct this sort of warfare; but first an analysis must be made of / [8^v] the current condition of the island's most important sites, in order to compare them and decide which are most appropriate. To do so, maybe it would be a good idea to begin by describing the island as a whole, before concluding with the rest of the subjects mentioned.

The Kingdom's current state

The island of Cyprus is shaped like an oblong, extending for 210 miles in length, and 65 miles in width at its widest / [9^r], with a circumference of 550 miles; its northernmost point is 60 miles away from Caramania, while its easternmost point is less than 100 miles from Syria, reachable in one night; its southernmost point is three to four days sailing from Egypt and Alexandria, and its westernmost point is the same distance or even less from Rhodes. The island is divided into eleven districts called *contrade*, / [9^v] named as follows, from west to east: Baffo, Avdimo, Limissò, Masotò, Saline, Messarea, all to the south near to the coast, and separated by a long mountain range from the other districts, which are Crusocò, Pendagia, Cerines and Carpasso, all to the north. Finally there is the Viscounty, situated between Saline and Cerines. Cerines is also separated by another range of mountains, one and a half miles from the coast / [10^r] to the north; were these mountains on the other side of the island and the same shape, perhaps this kingdom's defences would require less improvements. There are some large plains, but the island is also full of hills. The most important places are Nicosia, which is the seat of the Archbishopric, then Famagusta, Baffo and Limissò, all Bishoprics. Then there are places like Saline and Cerines, administered by regiments sent from Venice. Additionally there are almost 1,000 / [10^v] villages, which here are called *casali*.

There are regretfully no rivers to speak of, the island having mostly just streams. In some parts people make rivulets from the springs, and dig holes in the ground, and use wheels to draw water up; and when heavy rains arrive this seems to fill the ducts in the mountains, where great quantities of water are preserved for a long time; and if the rains, which in this country are in fact mostly very scarce, do not come back, in many places the waters dry up and / [11^r] run out.

At the time being the only harbour of note is that of Famagusta; however the whole south coast is very convenient for anchorage, contrary to the north, which has two drawbacks, the Tramontane wind and the coastal geomorphology, both of which see ships choose to anchor elsewhere. Regarding the island's weather, peak temperatures are around thirty-five

degrees / [11^v], and winds become extremely hot after coming into contact with the warm soil. The air up in the mountains is so sharp that precautions are necessary, especially for the chest, although it is difficult to stay covered up when the heat is so intense. Only on the coast of Cerines can fine air be found, since the north wind blows straight in from the sea, not having the chance to touch the warm soil. Cerines is protected from the southerly wind by the aforementioned / [12^r] nearby mountain range, which offers the town fresh air and excellent water; but elsewhere on the island the air is very different, as mentioned, and life would be difficult were it not for the extremely healthy water offered by the springs and wells. People often use this water to dilute a small quantity of wine; the island's wines are very healthy and very digestible, but so strong that only a small quantity is consumed, as with a julep. This country is second to none for the quality of its wines, for the fertility / [12^v] of its fields, for its sugars, and for the crops it sows; when the fields are sown with cotton, wheat and oats being abandoned, the result is an abundance of cotton and a dearth of cereals, as is the case presently, since cotton gives far greater yields. In addition, if there were more workers and less idlers, and more eagerness in looking for water, the island would be more fertile and would have a greater diversity of crops. The island's population is only around 180,000, divided up as follows: 90,000 *francomati*, / [13^r] meaning free peasants, around 50,000 *parici*, meaning serfs, and the remaining 40,000 or so souls dwelling in the towns and the countryside.

But now is the time to present the current condition of all of the island's most important sites, seven in total: Cerines, Famagusta, Baffo, Limissò, the lake of Limissò, Saline and Nicosia. To my current knowledge there are no other sites worthy of note, for I feel it is not necessary to discuss places that are not / [13^v] by the sea, nor able to receive relief, or that do not have many buildings, like Nicosia does.

Cerines

*To better illustrate certain aspects of Cerines which have not yet been mentioned, I must first repeat some of the points already made; firstly, in Cerines there is a mountain range about one and a half miles from the northern coast, which continues for a fairly long stretch of, again, almost one and a half miles. This creates a very small, narrow strip of land separated from the rest / [14^r] of the island, since routes across the mountains are few and treacherous; in fact there is only one track for carriages, which can easily be blocked, especially by an enemy in control of the countryside, who could thus easily render land troops and the fortress itself useless. It should be added that the enemy's culverins can shoot over three miles, as I have seen first-hand, and most definitely further than one and a half miles; / [14^v] and there are many high hills all around the area with wide and convenient platforms for safely positioning, out of sight, great numbers of artillery and crossfire, which could hit the first row of houses and the rows behind. And, although for nearly 1,200 *passa* the gradient does not / [15^r] rise more than three *passa* for every hundred, from there onwards the gradient does become steeper; and after almost three hundred more *passa* – altogether making the afore-*

mentioned mile and a half – one reaches a high, wide platform, just behind which are many more, higher and wider still. So the lowest of these platforms is, taking into account the steep ascent, almost sixty *passa* higher than Cerines, that is to say as high as San Marco's bell tower; and no more than one and a half miles / [15^v] from the coast, as confirmed by Giovan Girolamo's sketch, which I found to be very accurate, but missing the first terrace. The other, higher platforms directly behind are twice the height of San Marco's bell tower. Some of the terraces are higher than the bell tower, others half its height, / [16^r] others one and a half times its height, or twice, or even more; in short, any height the enemy may desire.

If a large fortress were to be built, it would have to be close to these hills, and thus more exposed; and even if this stronghold were impregnable, and provided safe shelter for the soldiers under the ramparts and next to the embankments, it would still be difficult to convince the locals – who already have great trouble venturing from their homes – to come and build entirely new houses, necessary / [16^v] since their existing homes could be destroyed by the artillery, burying the men, women and children inside, along with all their belongings, or at least causing the inhabitants to live in a state of constant panic and fear of harm. If one were determined to build a small fortress at that site, it could never be of any great strength, since the terrain is not very advantageous. This fortification, just like any other, would need to be defended by soldiers and artillery, but such a small fortress could not have / [17^r] many bastions, essential if one wants to attack the enemy from all sides and expose him to counter-batteries; nor would there be sufficient space to shelter retreats or contain the large numbers of soldiers required to carry out sorties. Moreover, since the Cerines coast enjoys the best climate on the whole island, the enemy could set up camp there free from danger or any kind of hindrance, unlike elsewhere on the island, where they might quickly perish; it is thus better to choose sites where the climate poses a threat to the enemy, who would have to live in tents, and not the locals / [17^v] or anyone else accustomed to the climate of the area. The Cerines coast would also offer the enemy many other comforts, such as forests full of trees for timber, not found elsewhere on the island. Another problem is the proximity of Caramania to this part of the island; / [18^r] the encamped enemy could receive provisions in just six hours. Also, for any ships sent from Venice with reinforcements, Cerines would be the least preferable coast to sail to, for two reasons: the Tramontane wind that blows along it, and perhaps the fact that the site is not as wide as would be required in wintertime or in the event of strong northerly winds. In addition, the character of the Cerines inhabitants may need to be taken into consideration; / [18^v] to control eventual rebellions, Cerines could be given a citadel, and the fortress project could be taken to a more appropriate site.

Regarding Cerines' current fortress, it is situated next to the sea and its flaws are evident. It is a very small castle, and lacks both flanks and ramparts; it also has a very small and insufficient harbour. It is almost almond-shaped, or quadrangular, / [19^r] and in each of the three angles there are three old-style towers, hollow, weak and small, while in the fourth angle there is a poorly-built, weak bastion. The Cerines castle has a moat twenty-one *passa* wide, and a circumference of 370 *passa*. The walls are four *passa* thick at the top and six *passa* at the base, and sixteen *passa* tall at most; they could have served a very large town had they been

built to modern standards, according to which such tall or thick walls are unnecessary, nowadays more importance being given to / [19^v] ramparts than to the thickness or height of the walls.

Cerines has a small and insignificant population. Apart from the Magnificent Castellan, the castle's garrison is composed of a captain and fifty infantrymen; their ammunition could provide far more safety than the castle itself, which due to the aforementioned flaws would be much better relocated elsewhere, to either the site the illustrious Lord / [20^r] Sebastian Venier chose to construct a fortress on, or a site enabling one to control the passage of carriages over the mountains, preventing the enemies from transporting provisions. In its present location, the Cerines castle cannot control such passages, nor prevent enemy landings, nor hold the territory or control the locals. Keeping it where it is could even prove harmful, if it were to fall into enemy hands along with the artillery and the harbour; it should therefore be destroyed, / [20^v] in order to avoid the enemy taking hold of it. And if, instead of that small castle, a different structure were built, this too would undoubtedly be of little use, and could even do more harm than good, as was the case of the Zara bastion, constructed unexpectedly and very hastily; the structure was badly designed and, to make matters worse, it proved much more expensive than it would have been had they simply calculated the expenses / [21^r] before building.

Famagusta

As for Famagusta, in the district of Messarea, it is situated almost at the eastern tip of the island, by the sea; it is almost semicircular in shape, like a bow, with the coastline as the chord making up one third of the total circumference, which is almost two miles. *At present* it has a port big enough to contain almost ten galleys, but is surrounded by rocks and crags for a distance of about three hundred *passa* / [21^v]. The question of how to deal with this is difficult to answer: levelling them would fill the port with earth and thus ruin it, as experience has shown; walling them up and connecting them to the town, however, would be time-consuming and expensive, due to the nature of the fortress and to several more of Famagusta's inconveniences; and walling them up partially without connecting them to the town would give a flawed, weak construction that could easily be occupied by the enemy, or exposed to him.

Inland, / [22^r] the Famagusta air is unhealthy due to nearby channels where the waters flow for a long distance through the countryside; these channels are below sea-level, which makes upkeep difficult, and the erosion of the poor soil by the constant heat of the sun causes them to overflow continuously. Additionally, the Costanza lake is also very detrimental: the rocky soil, called *roca*, / [22^v] creates further problems because it makes building fortifications longer, more expensive and more difficult in terms of finding enough earth for the ramparts, which are the real defence against artillery.

As far as the fortress of Famagusta is concerned, it *currently* has just twelve small, old-style circular towers, four *passa* thick, with platforms five *passa* wide; these are not suitable for resisting attacking weapons, nor for holding defensive ones. The fortress / [23^r] has just

one bulwark, recently-built and modern, but which could have been bigger, more imposing and more well-built. Its walls are richly decorated but shoddy, with many cavities. It is also badly positioned: it was supposed to shield the curtain wall, but does not since it is placed too far behind it, and is in fact covered by it. The curtain wall is four *passa* thick and about seven *passa* tall measured from the bottom of the moat. / [23^v] More ramparts should have been built. The moat itself is approximately twenty *passa* wide. The counterscarp could have been better designed, as some of the site's higher points may shield the enemy approaching the fortress.

Famagusta's waters are abundant but unhealthy. The town has quite pretty buildings, streets and squares; and the population is / [24^r] around 8,000 souls, but not many of dignity and nobility. Apart from the Illustrious Captain, the town's garrison is composed of a commander with men, under whom there are six captains in charge of fifty soldiers each. Their ammunition is fairly considerable but badly organized, as there seems to be more gun powder than cannon balls; furthermore, there are more cannon balls for the heavy pieces, which are rarely fired, than for the smaller ones.

Nicosia

The town of Nicosia is located to the south / [24^v] of the kingdom's centre, in the district of the Viscounty, in a plain perhaps similar to that of Florence, there being mountains both near and far. There is no river, only a torrent, but it does have springs and wells with excellent waters. It also has good soil, and neither the distant nor the nearby mountains pose a threat to the town. Its circumference is over four miles, / [25^r] almost circular in shape, with small, old-style round towers; but the town is full of open spaces, due to the many gardens. The houses could be prettier and better decorated, however, and the dusty squares and streets similarly give the impression of a rather neglected and ugly town.

Saline

Saline is by the sea to the south of the island. It has excellent anchorage and more ships arrive there than anywhere else / [25^v] on the island. Its soil is rock-free, and not much digging is needed to find water, as the various wells show. The terrain would make it difficult for the enemy to build trenches and install mines.

As for the climate, the population appears to be healthy, though it would benefit from more households, as in a bigger town. In any case, the inhabitants' houses mean the climate is not a problem for them; but it could be for the unaccustomed enemy, living in tents and not in buildings. / [26^r]

Regarding the water, a well dug anywhere along the coastline will give water of such quality that the inhabitants pride themselves on it. In ancient times there was a town on this site called Citium, the remains of which are clearly visible. There are no hills that might pose a threat; on the contrary, it would be a good idea to construct a citadel overlooking the site.

This would not be very costly, as some of the town's bastions could be used along the route up the hill / [26^v], at a spot where there used to be a castle. The channel one can see is evidence that there used to be a port, and if the channel could be dredged a little more, a very safe harbour could most probably be created. And since Saline provides the safest anchorage for a fleet, or at least less dangerous than anywhere else on the island, fortifying it would deprive the enemy of this advantage.

Saline is about thirty miles from Nicosia. It has a large and beautiful lake, to which various torrents / [27^r] bring water during the winter; and the nature of the soil is such that in the summer the water evaporates, resulting in a very white, thick salt. The salt flat where the water converges has a circumference of twelve miles, but the circumference of the part where the thick salt is found is only about two and a half miles; the other fine, light salt is called here "the Queen's salt". So much salt is produced that it can fill up to seventy ships a year, each ship carrying 25,000 *mozzetti*, equivalent to 4,850 Venetian *stara*, / [27^v] and earning about 1,800 ducats from transporting the product.

Limissò

Limissò is next to the sea and also to the south of the island, and boasts good air and water, rock-free soil, and woods which are not as inconvenient as they could be, seeing as the town is both by the sea and near the mountains; for the cutting back of these woods, however, better orders and dispositions are needed than those *currently* in place. Rock can be found in Old Limissò, by the sea, as well as other nearby places. The town can be accessed via various routes, / [28^r] from the sea and through the hills; any risk to the town posed by the latter could easily be avoided by positioning the fortress more towards the Limissò lake, where the hills get wider. The waters near the coast are very deep, and offer excellent anchorage. The town has no harbour, but the soil is free of rocks, meaning excavation would be simple; a harbour would keep the galleys safe. No harbour is needed for ships alone, though, neither in Limissò nor in Saline, since, to repeat, the / [28^v] anchorage is excellent.

Longitudinally Limissò is located almost at the centre of the island, and is about forty miles from Saline along the coast, and sixty miles from Nicosia in the other direction, so around twice the distance between Nicosia and Famagusta. It would be a good idea to build a fortress behind the tip of the Cape of the Cats, where some artillery pieces could be positioned to prevent enemy warships taking shelter there, and deprive them of any convenience / [29^r] the location may offer; the same should be done elsewhere on the island, since there are very few coves anywhere on the island where the enemy fleet could take shelter. Here lies perhaps the island's major asset, that enemy warships have nowhere to anchor safely. Coming back to Limissò, the enemy would have to set up camp between the town and the hills, and easy and effective arquebusier attacks against him could be launched from the latter.

The site adjacent to Limissò Lake

Concerning the site adjacent to Limissò Lake, / [29^v] firstly it would not be wise to build a fortress at the landward end of the lake, since the air and water is very bad there due to swamps; and the small islet – which could easily become an island, if a channel were cut to allow the seawater into the lake from the other end –, would also be a bad place to build a fortress, due to the lack of good water and also to the fact that if it were ever necessary to wall up the islet – which has a circumference of over twelve miles –, an excessively large garrison and / [30^f] endless provisions would be required to guard it, especially given that even the most inaccessible sites can be conquered without any resistance at all. And even if only a part of the islet were to be walled up, another problem would be the rocks that cover the whole area. Yet another drawback is the difficulty of protecting the mouths of the lake; to protect them would mean building more than one fortress at a single site, a very costly operation. / [30^v] If the enemy came to control the mouths, they could also use the harbour created by the lake. Additionally, given that the enemy could only position himself at the two mouths of the lake, a fortress could come to be separated from the rest of the island. So, although the site seems convenient at first, a more detailed analysis shows it to be not such an ideal place for a fortress. / [31^r]

Baffo

Baffo is also by the sea on the southern coast, but almost at the western tip of the island, very favourably located to receive reinforcements. It has a harbour *that is currently disused*, but which could easily contain sixty galleys, and could be expanded to hold over 200, given that there are no rocks around the edges, as shown by the wells *dug by Zuan Hieronimo*. However, no ships could ever enter the harbour, / [31^v] or even come within sixty *passa*, due to the waves, rocks (within the harbour itself) and shallows, the depth being just eleven feet for sixty *passa* starting from the entrance to the port. Such a rocky, shallow and exposed harbour is not considered safe anchorage for ships, excepting a place called “the rocks”, about two miles from Baffo; but even this site is close enough to land for the enemy artillery to damage it.

As for the quality of the air, the inhabitants seem to get by, / [32^r] and would do even better if there were more households for them. There is no lack of water, with the sea on two sides of the town (if we consider Baffo as having four sides, two seaward and two landward). If a fortification were ever built there, there is no shortage of rocks; however, there are several potentially risky nearby hills which would need to be taken into consideration, especially that of Saint Theodore. Furthermore, since Baffo is about a hundred miles from Nicosia, / [32^v] I am not sure that the capital’s inhabitants would contribute to construction efforts.

So these are the seven most important sites of the Kingdom of Cyprus. Having described the current condition of each one, we can now compare them and choose the best.

Suggestions for Nicosia

Though in all other aspects Nicosia is a suitable site for a fortification, the fact that it is not by the sea, and generally poorly located to receive provisions, makes me advise / [33^r] *La Serenissima* against fortifying it; there are further reasons against fortifying Nicosia, but these would be matters of State, whereof I am not authorized to speak. Furthermore, I am not sure that those in favour of fortifying Nicosia have sufficiently reflected upon their ideas; they seem to ignore the difficulty of receiving reinforcements, and the fact that building a fortification by the sea would cut costs by a third, and also the other arguments I have presented. State politics and military know-how are two different things; the former consists in weighing the temperament and strength of States and their subjects, / [33^v] and the latter consists rather in direct conquest, either through power or acumen. Nevertheless, it is a good soldier's duty to advance as much as he can, as long as it is to the benefit and not the detriment of his leaders. The only argument put forward by those in favour of fortifying Nicosia, however, are the private houses already existing there, and the difficulty and delays involved in building elsewhere on the island, / [34^r] due not only to the scarcity of materials but also to the inertia, laziness and lack of industry of the men. To this the answer comes that a soldier must put the public good of his State above the good of private individuals, who in any case may benefit from a safer country able to receive reinforcements from overseas. These fears and necessities are great incentives / [34^v] to overcome the many difficulties involved; and if the enemy is faced with these same difficulties, they will be greatly disadvantaged.

Suggestions for Saline, Limissò and Baffo

Saline, Limissò and Baffo, as explained above, are all appropriate sites for a fortification. However, since at present only one site can be fortified, I hold that either Saline or Limissò should be favoured, since they present all of the advantages and none of the disadvantages of the other sites discussed; the choice between the two / [35^r] should be made by the island's subjects, who will have to contribute to the fortification's construction. The fortress should be semicircular or bow-shaped, with the coast as its chord, extending for 800 *passa*, if only six bastions are / [35^v] intended. This is because the circumference would be 3.14 times larger than the diameter; the diameter would be 800 *passa* and the semicircle around 1,200 *passa*. This would mean the number of bastions would be at least six, since they must be 200 *passa* apart to enable direct artillery fire. The total circumference of such a fortress / [36^r], then, including the 800 *passa* of the bow's chord plus all six bastions, would add up to around three miles; more importantly, its circular shape, wasting no space with angles, could hold many people / [36^v], far more than any other shape, the latter likely to involve angles and long, winding circumferences. And the circumference could be enlarged if desired, giving a greater diameter; if the latter reached one mile, however, another bastion would have to be added. The proposed circular shape of the fortress is almost perfect: solid, blunt and wide, with no sharp or weak angles, and allowing a more outwardly-positioned entrenchment to protect and defend

the front / [37^r] of the bastions. It is the overall shape of the whole fortress that makes these angles ideal, giving all the advantages of a large circumference with twelve to fourteen corners, and none of the disadvantages or great expense involved in fortifying the whole site, since the coastline does not require much fortification. This fact would see construction time and expenses drop by a third, and the coastline would also give the fortress the advantage of being able to receive provisions easily, / [37^v] as well as giving a greater capacity, as mentioned.

Earthen cavaliers would also need to be built, in particular to oppose the Turks and the siege towers they usually build with their superior numbers. Cavaliers and bastions must both be built, the former for attacking purposes and the latter for defensive purposes / [38^f]; firing from bastions is not as effective as firing from cavaliers, which have greater height, thus bringing greater damage to the enemy. Another advantage of cavaliers is that in the event of a retreat they can perform the function of bastions; if well-positioned, at the corner and the gorge of a bastion, the fortress suddenly appears to have double the number of bastions and flanks, greatly enhancing its defences / [38^v] and opposing the enemy even if he has already entered the real bastion. For this reason and many others, then, including their endorsement amongst the large majority of experts, cavaliers should be built; I see no plausible counter-arguments, excepting maybe the opinion that if very wide bastions were built, that is, bastions with very wide gorges, cavaliers would not be able to cover the moat, and two retrenchments would be needed for each / [39^f] bastion, or possibly just one, but large enough to cover both ends of the bastion. The logical response to this is that building such wide gorges is not a good idea; width should rather be given to that side of the flank and scarp running from the crenel next to the curtain wall, up to the front of the bastion / [39^v], which is often the most attacked side of the bastion, since it is the most exposed. That said, it is often a good idea to install a good amount of space and a platform behind the front of the bastion, in order to allow retreats if necessary. However, a cavalier has various functions, serving as defence against mines, as a rampart, as space for retreats and / or the passage of soldiers, as a platform for the artillery, as a parapet, and finally as a means of avoiding the bastion being so cramped and tight / [40^r] at the gorge that it risks being cut off from the head of the fortress by enemy artillery. *Provided the cavalier sufficiently fulfils all these functions, and provided it is wide enough*, I do not think leaving space and building the platform would really be necessary, and the cavalier would be an effective part of the gorge of a reasonably-sized bastion. For all of these reasons, then, the bastions need not be any wider than strictly necessary; all the various advantages of reasonably-sized bastions and of cavaliers easily outweigh the arguments in favour of wider bastions. / [40^v]

Moreover, since the walls between two bastions are the safest and most protected (by both bastions) part of any fortress, there is no sense in removing any part of these sections without very good reason; doing so, by shortening the curtain wall, for example, would mean elongating the front of the bastion, which is the least protected part of the fortress since it has no other bastion to protect it / [41^r], and is furthest away from the defences.

And that is, for now, all I shall say regarding Saline, Limissò and Baffo; other relevant points are addressed *in the accompanying sketches*.

Suggestions for Famagusta

In view of the current state of Famagusta, described earlier, there is no doubt that the town requires a lot of work. Its fortress has various flaws, to the extent that improving and perfecting it would take a lot of time; maybe we / [41^v] would be prepared to give up this time, but would our enemy allow us to? If, however, we rushed the necessary work, building fewer flanks than the circumference of the fortress requires, installing fewer towers and posts for the artillery, and skimping on measures to ensure the fortress can safely receive reinforcements; if we did this, it would be a waste of labour, time and expenses. Having / [42^r] inspected Famagusta many times, from the outside and the inside, noting all its strengths and weaknesses, all the damage that the enemy could do to it, all the defensive improvements that could be made, the difficulties presented by the site, the materials available, the townspeople, the time restrictions, the expense involved; having taken all this into consideration, I came, after much deliberation, and with God's help, on which everything depends, to a conclusion I shall soon present. First, though, reflecting on the aforementioned 'perfect' fortification, / [42^v], I believe the best design for the town would be a six-bastion fortress joining the largest rock to the town, *as shown in the sketch at the end of this treatise*; Famagusta's circumference being around 1,300 *passa*, six is the number obtained by leaving two hundred *passa* between each bastion to allow space for artillery fire / [43^r] (both offensive and defensive).

*Joining the rock to the town is necessary to avoid exposing Famagusta in several places, and to improve the fortification's defences; without such a conjunction, the fortress would be a body without arms, or at least with arms and sides so short that the enemy artillery would have no trouble entering the fortress and obliterating its defences. I feel that this alone sufficiently explains and justifies my argument in favour of improving and perfecting Famagusta's fortress; however, I will address the counter-arguments frequently given by those against doing so much work. Firstly, these people claim that the current fortification's circular towers are good in that they allow greater and more frequent arquebusier and artillery fire. They also point to the amount of time and expense required to make such improvements to the fortification and to join the rock to the town, preferring the idea of building a pontoon next to the rock. In response, I would firstly say we must ask ourselves if the enemy might be able to destroy the circular towers; and both logic and past experience indicates that they most certainly would. They are hollow, no more than four *passa* wide, made of brick, have small ramparts and have no man-made walls capable of resisting artillery fire. The destruction of just one of the towers would render the arquebusiers useless. Though this reason alone is decisive enough, I will also respond to the argument that the circular towers allow more frequent artillery fire: a better way to make use of the artillery would be to fill Famagusta's empty moat with rocks, since artillery fire hitting the rocks would rebound at various angles, and could cause great harm to the enemy, smashing beams, traverses and many other obstacles in the enemy's path. Arquebusiers cannot do any of this.*

Concerning the time and expense required to build such a perfect fortress, and to join the rock to the town as mentioned, some say that instead of a perfect fortress which would

take a lot of time, it would suffice simply to make the existing fortification considerably stronger than it is, without being necessarily perfect. There is some sense in this, as perfecting the fortress definitely would take a lot of time: if we base our estimate on Famagusta's bastion, started from scratch and yet to be completed (and so far having cost 54,000 ducats), a perfect fortress for Famagusta would require thirty years / [43^v] (and around 300,000 ducats), which the enemy may not grant us. Similarly, joining the rock to the town, which would, as said, enable the safe reception of reinforcements, would also take thirty years (and also cost around 300,000 ducats), due to the lack of manpower and the difficulty of obtaining and transporting / [44^r] the necessary materials. On the other hand, building a three-bastion fortification, that is, the existing bastion plus two new ones, would take around fifteen years, plus five more to set the foundations of the two new bastions in the sea, plus the time needed to join the rock to the town. However, this shorter duration, is outweighed by a similar probable cost of over 300,000 ducats, plus the additional disadvantage / [44^v] that, as mentioned, the circular towers could be destroyed quickly and easily with just a few cannonballs, eliminating the fortification's defences.

These, then, are the two main opposing opinions regarding how to improve and defend Famagusta. I cannot see any reason to pursue the imperfect fortress argument excepting maybe that / [45^r] it would satisfy people fed up of lavish spending by engineers who have never seen a war; but this is quite a superficial reason, and as such, bearing in mind the aforementioned arguments, the perfect fortress plan should be adopted. With enough help to meet the site's various needs, a six-bastion fortification can be achieved, and / [45^v] joining the rock to the town will ensure it can safely receive reinforcements. Given the risk of the project taking too long, work should begin as soon as possible, and should not stop until completion, instead of being left half-finished as often happens. Another precaution that I feel should be taken to greatly improve both the perfect and the imperfect fortress projects / [46^r] is the construction of a retrenchment inside the town. Both reason and past experience support this measure, which is both essential and simple to execute. Past experience in this case would be the towns of Asti and Alba in Piedmont, an area which has seen many unique examples of time-saving measures in defence projects with similar time restrictions. All the great captains in these two towns, from Spain in the case of / [46^v] Asti, and from France in the case of Alba, reached the same conclusion, that having a well-built retrenchment inside a town, and knowing how to properly use and repair it, will render a fortress impregnable, or at least extremely difficult to conquer. Famagusta is well-suited to this measure / [47^r], in view of its capacity and its many empty houses and buildings. A retrenchment would prevent the flanks withdrawn inside the first row of walls from being exposed to the enemy and his artillery; the latter would have to spend a great deal of time and blood to fully breach the fortress if, thanks to the retrenchment, the defenders no longer had to stay and defend the first row of walls, as they currently most definitely would have to. The ruins left after the enemy destroyed the first row of walls and its ramparts would be a strong shield for the retrenchment; the enemy would have to surmount them / [47^v], and would have great difficulty establishing a battery there. Fighting against the retrenchment, moreover, would also be long and difficult, especially

given Famagusta's bad air, and especially if the retrenchment is given well-designed and well-built flanks / [48^r] made with good soil, *which could be easily brought in from outside of the town, and by ships if necessary. The latter could bring wood and other necessary materials for the retrenchment, as well as for the cavaliers and the ramparts of a perfect fortification, generally keeping the fortress ready for any situation. A channel could, if necessary, be built to aid the transporting of earth and the receiving of relief; this would cost little and be very useful. A good location for the channel would be between Famagusta's castle and the Diamante tower, as the soil is good and rock-free, and the seabed has been well-measured. Ships bringing relief would face little difficulty, except for a stretch around 400-passa-long exposed to enemy artillery fire; care must be taken here, since the enemy would need only to approach when the ships were near to have a clear shot. Cavalry companies, slower than the ships, could also pass easily, and could help the ships through the aforementioned stretch by waiting on the vaults for strong winds, then retreating to unload in the channel. Ideally they would retire, but this would not be an option in times of great need, especially since relief would be more important in Famagusta than it would be anywhere else, due to the bad air caused by Lake Costanza. The air here is so bad that soldiers would surely die from it, and thus more soldiers would need to be brought in to replace them.*

It must also be underlined that, since the town may need to resist a siege for a large amount of time, it would be unwise to spend so much time and expense on building the fortress without also supplying it with additional ammunition, enough to resist for several months. No one should have any control over this supply without the knowledge and permission of the *Serenissima's* Illustrious Councils; this is especially important in a place as far from Venice as Famagusta / [48^v]. Another reason the ability to resist for a long time is so important to Famagusta is that the aforementioned bad air could, if the enemy were forced to deal with it for long enough, bring us victory without a sword being thrust. Another matter which must be taken into consideration is how best to remunerate the work of fortifying Famagusta, by *ferlini* or by the day. By *ferlini* would mean giving a *ferlino* coin in exchange for every completed carriage journey transporting earth or rocks, / [49^r] as an incentive to avoid laziness; by day would mean paying everybody, from the laziest men to the most industrious, the same each day. This soon results in everybody becoming lazy, causing delayed and poor results at great cost. Experience has shown that paying by *ferlini* is 14% cheaper than paying by the day, along with the added benefit of the work being completed sooner.

Coming back to Famagusta's bad air, / [49^v] however, it would perhaps be wise to seek a not too time-consuming remedy to the problem, since it is harmful not just to the enemy but to us also, and it is not at all healthy to become accustomed to this air by living in the town for a long time. No other place on the island seems to suffer from this problem, not having waterways like Famagusta's; especially problematic is that of Costanza, where the stagnant swamp and lake are extremely pestilent, / [50^r] either due to being below sea-level, or to the bad soil which does not resist the hot sun, eroding easily and refilling channels created by the flowing water, all of which cause endless problems and expense. There is someone, however,

who has taken on the task of filling and draining the area through which the channel passes, hoping to be rewarded with ownership of the surrounding area of land; / [50^v] Venice has not agreed to this, however, and without a change of heart on the *Serenissima*'s part, it will not be easy to find someone else for the job. Simply doing nothing is the worst possible option.

These, then, are the solutions to Famagusta's considerable drawbacks, from the poor air that threatens us as well as the enemy, *to the difficulty of safely receiving reinforcements due to the rocks in the port. The latter is something of a quandary: levelling the rocks would fill the port and seabed with earth (as experience has shown); walling them up only partly, without joining them to the town, would not give the port the required protection; walling them up properly and joining them to the town would take an age and cost a fortune. A further drawback is the difficulty of building a fortress in Famagusta; nature has not been generous to the town, and the soil is bad and rocky. Yet another drawback is that the existing fortification is shoddily built, with flawed flanks and ramparts; fixing and perfecting the fortress would require huge amounts of time and expense.* As mentioned, though, there are various solutions to these problems / [51^r]; but maybe none suited to the time and cost required. All we should do is look to the aforementioned arguments, and understand the necessity and utility of the fortification, the urgency of building retrenchments, and the fact that the new fortress / [51^v] would give shelter to all of Famagusta's inhabitants, which would hopefully persuade them to contribute to the cost and construction of the new fortress. All in all, however, my final conclusion is that, as the *Serenissima* needs more than one eye to keep watch over its empire, such a large and distant island as Cyprus needs more than one fortress to properly defend itself; this was the case with Corsica, which might have been lost had it had only one fortress, and also with Sardinia.

So, given Famagusta's drawbacks, along with the fact that the locals ought to contribute to construction efforts, a new fortress should be built in addition to repairing / [52^r] the existing walls, all of this work lasting around sixty years. Only repairing the existing fortress would mean spending similar amounts of time and expense but for inferior results. If built on a convenient site with rock-free soil, the new fortress ought to be operational after only two years, maybe less. And whereas repairing the existing fortress would cost San Marco 600,000 ducats / [52^v], since the inhabitants would not help with the work, the new fortress would cost less than two thirds of this, especially if the inhabitants contributed, which they ought to given that having more than one fortress on this large, distant island is in the public interest, enabling all of them to be given shelter, something the existing fortress alone cannot do. Looking beyond these two years, if a solution could be found to the problem of Famagusta's poor air, / [53^r] work could quickly proceed on the great and costly task of perfecting the fortification.

I shall now say a few words on the subject of which methods of warfare should be adopted.

The Cypriots

There are *at present* in this Kingdom 833 mounted *stradioti*, including 18 captains and a

governor; and 205 mounted arquebusiers / [53^v], including five captains. Each *stradioto* is paid 40 ducats per year plus 100 *mozza* of barley, and their captains 80 ducats per year plus 160 *mozza* of barley. Mounted arquebusiers get 36 ducats per year plus 80 *mozza* of barley, and their captains 60 ducats and 100 *mozza*. There are 91 feudatories, with 182 horses; and 90 pensioners. The feudatories and pensioners are / [54^r] divided into four companies: one led by the *Provveditore*; another captained by Lord Eugenio Singlitico, the great seneschal and son of the Count of Rocas; another by Count Giacomo di Nores, son of the Count of Tripoli; and the fourth by Lord Tutio Costanzo. Then there are 4,500 infantrymen patrolling the island, with 15 captains.

Suggestions for the Cypriots

For two reasons I shall now explain, it is not and will never be a good idea to arm the Cypriots / [54^v]. The 200 mounted arquebusiers, for example, if asked to go and sabotage the island's remaining provisions so the enemy could not use them (as explained above), would refuse to obey and prefer to run away into the mountains with their wives and children and steal the provisions of their lords, whom they hate deeply. The same would no doubt occur with the peasant infantrymen, who have learned to stand up to the *stradioti*, to whom they are not related; many of the *stradioti* are relatives of locals, and especially of / [55^r] captains. Although the peasantry would not be allowed inside the fortress, since they would have no provisions to contribute, it is certain that if they were allowed in they would not be able to sustain themselves for long. All of them, both the *parici*, who are slaves, and the free peasants, who are related to the slaves and also suffer great oppression, seek a better life than the hardship they have now; they too would not hesitate to steal provisions and take off to the hills, where they / [55^v] would certainly fall into the hands of the enemy. As for if the peasants could be employed to hassle and cause harm to the enemy, as good an idea as this is, it is doubtful that the Cypriot mounted peasants would be skilled enough to do it. When recently, however, one of these Cypriot captains died, the illustrious *Provveditore* prudently replaced him with a non-Cypriot.

Regarding the mounted stradioti, they ought to be better armed, better disciplined and also under better command, since the quality of the soldiers depends on the quality of their captains. It would be far better, however, to have a small number of experienced and well-trained captains; the current captains are mostly young and inexperienced, lacking the wisdom of age and the ability to train others (they often need training themselves). The resulting situation is poor captains leading poor soldiers. A small number of experienced captains, on the contrary, can effectively train a large number of otherwise useless, disobedient and undisciplined men. Without such training these men should not be relied upon. There is also a problem with their spears, which need to be much longer; at their current length, only eighteen feet, they are unsuitable for a militia and inferior to the enemy's spears, which could easily do damage to us (especially since the Cypriots' armour is very weak and badly made), but not the reverse. Unable to settle their spears on their horses' necks, the

soldiers end up appearing to be armed, but are not actually. For this reason, some of them prefer to wear chest armour, and want it to be introduced into the ranks of the stradioti; but the methods of the Serenissima's soldiers must be uniform across its illustrious empire. Besides, chest armour would be more useful for sudden assaults, and warfare in rural areas; but for the stradioti's regular purposes it would be a hindrance. So I would like the stradioti's armour to stay as it is, and if something must be added, let it be a small arquebus, and nothing more.

Regarding the soldiers' horses, whilst earlier on various factors meant it was a necessity to compromise, now that the situation is slowly improving, horses that are too small should no longer be allowed. Another concern is the dimwittedness of some stradioti, or rather the shrewdness of many islanders, perhaps, which sees the former often deceived by the latter out of large amounts for troublesome horses, all of which does damage to the Serenissima, as the result is that the soldiers have neither the means to take care of themselves nor of their horses. On a more positive note, the infantrymen are very well organized, and the cavalry / [56^r] too should adopt their habits of meeting together and exercising, with the same (or worse) punishments for any disobedient souls who do not participate. To obtain these levels of obedience, which is essential, captains, provided they are experienced and honourable enough to judge which soldiers will be loyal and useful, ought to be authorized to dismiss anyone who disobeys them. In order to have such captains, expense should not be spared; their pay / [56^v] should be raised to 200 ducats, in addition to 160 *mozza* of barley, a servant, and the command of 100 horses. The illustrious *Provveditore* should also pay for forage for a further ten horses, to be accorded by common consensus to certain half-captains and men of honour, who put heart and soul into their companies and display increasingly good conduct; for if the governor rewards good conduct as well as punishing bad conduct, this will motivate those who obey him to be greater assets / [57^r] to Venice. While costs are to be raised in this area, they should most definitely be cut in the matter of the island's excessive numbers of captains and horses. The 200 Cypriot horses are more than is necessary for the kind of warfare to be expected. *Some say that the reason so many horses are required is because dismounting should be prohibited; but this is not at all correct. The cavalry are not as fast as warships, so it follows that if the artillery is removed, so should the excessive number of horses be removed. This would represent two costs, one to get rid of the excess and another to select the best of what remains; plus the cost of better pay for the infantrymen defending the fortresses, who will not provide much defence if they are starving.*

It should also be underlined that if there is any place that needs to pay close attention to the activities of its suspected enemies nearby, in order to, as mentioned, have enough time to gather provisions into a safe place and deprive the enemy of what remains; / [57^v] if there is any place where this must be done, it is the island of Cyprus. Obtaining information on enemy activities is easily done via merchants who travel to neighbouring shores and can spy on the enemy's every move; this is a far quicker and more reliable way to get information than notifications from afar, especially given the deception often involved in the latter, for example when the enemy feigns to prepare operations against the Sofi but then turns them against

Cyprus. Furthermore, it seems to me unwise to have Cypriots party to State secrets by reading letters or encoded messages from Constantinople or elsewhere, as in Cyprus talk spreads quickly and the secrets would soon be known by all the important people on the island.

And that is all I have to say, for now, concerning how best to defend the Kingdom of Cyprus and keep it under Venetian rule, concerning the island and its people's current state, and concerning how best to improve these, with arguments for and against various opinions. If the island had greater forces, and the enemy had less funds, discipline and unity, we could maybe contemplate other methods of warfare, such as field war, which in combination with the island's qualities and resources could bring great success and glory.

For, though it does have certain drawbacks, there are infinite examples in support of the proposed method of warfare: Lord Bartholomeo Alviano in the Giera d'Adda; Duke Francesco Maria d'Urbino who consummately defended Cassano from within its fortress, keeping it under the rule of the great Constable of France; and when Charles V defended Provence in the same way. When the latter did leave his fortress in Picardy, he put, in the exact words I heard King Henry say, his whole kingdom on the tip of a needle. Elsewhere, though Piedmont was conserved, Hungary was lost when the fortress was abandoned. All this must be considered when choosing which method of warfare to adopt.

And if I may mention my own family, it is well known that my father's decision to remain within the fortress of Osoppo saved not only that place from what had seemed certain defeat, but also other places between Osoppo and Vicenza. And, just over a hundred years earlier, my great grandfather used the same method to defend Venice against another imperial army, that of Emperor Sigismund aiming to hand power back to the lords of Padua. All of this illustrates, then, how this illustrious State, more than any other, has been better defended by preparing early in order to gain time, with excellent captains leading operations; a great example would be not Lord Bartholomeo Alviano's captain, but that of Duke Francesco Maria d'Urbino, who showed the world that a single fortress, when built according to the Terraferma's standards, can save a whole State, and that even if an army is defeated, the enemy can still be prevented from taking everything. This history is fundamental to defending Cyprus and compensating for the lack of quantity and quality amongst its forces compared to its potential enemies; I myself have heard great captains, who would never have wavered for a second had they thought everything would be easy, say that the mere reputation of the island's fortresses made them hesitate to attack Cyprus, as they foresaw more obstacles and greater loss of time and money than the island was worth.


[58^r] [blank]

[58^v] By Lord Prospero Cini Pisano


16c. THE BCCF B-197 FACSIMILE



Cover




1^r




1^r

2^r



2^v

3^r



3^v

4^r

Al Molto Ill^{re} Sig^{ro} il Sig^{ro} Cosimo
 Coni Sig^{ro} mio sempre
 Osservandiss^{imo}

Non sono ancora molti giorni Ill^{re} Sig^{ro}
 che per il mezzo d'un mio caro amico
 e Signore, mi pervenute nelle mani
 la presente descrizione del Sig^{ro} Asca-
 nio Savorgnano Nobile Vnitiano;
 laquale sommarimente contiene ua-
 ri e diversi modi di difender gli
 Stati; e spetialmente il Regno di
 Cipro accomonandolo al suo Prin-
 cipe: e con dello Stato de tutto il
 Regno: oltre a ciò come si troua-
 uano, e come douerano esser tutti i

no. 1


luochi più considerabili di quell'isola,
 con le ragioni non meno dell'una che
 dell'altra parte; e finalmente nel-
 la guida che si trouauano, a come do-
 ueuano esser le genti di Cipro, che
 fareuano soggetto grande et degno,
 ho giudicato conueniente di farne
 honor a Vostra Sig^{ra} Ill^{re}. A cui mi
 uendo certo, che piacere come a
 quella che sempre si è diletata di
 cose degne et preziose. Onde io rice-
 uentemente la prego, che si degni
 di ricevere questo mio humile e
 picciol dono, con quel benigno e gene-
 roso animo che alla bontate sua si

richiede e che merita la situazione, con
 che io glie lo offerisco, annouerandoli
 nomi tra i fedeli, et affezionati
 seruitori, che ella habbia. In cui
 uita l'ill^{re} Vostra Signore conser-
 ui, et prosperi in quella felicità
 che lei stessa desidera.
 Di Venetia il xx di novembre M. d. lxxiiij

Di Vostra Sig^{ra} Ill^{re}


Humil seruo.

Franco Marcelli.




4

5



5

6




del mondo, et principalmente del
 ules del sig. tis: Per quelle
 ragioni auunque si conuen
 eluor esser necessarii di forti
 ficar in questo d'ogni lui, o tre
 lochi almeno ne siti piu opportuni,
 et se non actati dalla natura al
 ma non disfavoriti, et tali che
 con facilità si possa costrarsi in
 Isola si lontana dall'isola, et si
 uicina alli sospetti, almen con
 a gli apparecchi delle debite pro
 uisioni, o de soccorsi, o de diuer
 sioni:
 Et parbe secondo la maniera del
 guer:

Coma uelenano
 l'isola
 Cipro.

quorogione, et secondo il fine pro
 posto, et eletto per migliore, biso
 gna xxxi ricular, et abrizzar
 a quello gli uoi piu debite metti
 tira, che non potendosi guerreg
 giare di campagna, et conuenendo
 fortificarsi in terra, bisogna pri
 ma far electione de siti piu oppor
 tuni, et se non actati dalla natu
 ra, almen non disfavoriti, et tali
 che con facilità non possano esser
 serrati fuori, et separati dal pos
 sesso del paese, et oltre di questo
 si deue hauer l'occhio all' oppor
 tunità de socorsi, o li piu sicure,

6°

7°




massimamente per uoi, per la uigia
 ni, che poi si uicinas, si come me
 deramente si de haue lo non se
 lo alle comodità propri, ma uero
 a gli incomodi dell' accampar
 dell' inimico, et così ad altri uo
 petti di maggior prestanza, in
 finir la fortificatione, et con mi
 nor spesa, et a molti altri: Più
 oltre è da prouider di haue l'ha
 uer uicinato in sicuro quelle
 piu uicinate, et fructi, che ta
 ni possibile di haue: Si con
 prestanza para, et uoglio dar
 il guarda, et conserper il ves
 tate

tanto de uicini, che non potessero esser
 posti in sicuro, et la uigia et ogni
 altra cosa, che fusse per tornar
 a comodo de gli nemici: et in
 con è da prouider di haue l'ha
 con imboscate, et improvvisi assal
 ti potessero in quieto, et per di
 uersi uicini a gli nemici a gli
 nemici, non lasciandoli godere il
 paese in pace, o moro che fusse
 possibile: Per per quella cui
 maniera di guerreggiare è da ue
 dere se si troua nel d'ogni di
 cipro le sue debite provisioni:
 Però è prima da haue in que

7°

8°



termini, et esser si trouano tutte
 le città di questa isola più consi-
 derabili, accio si possa far la con-
 federazione fra loro, et la elezione
 di quelli, che saranno più si pro-
 posito, et per meglio far questo
 non sarà forse male, principiar
 a dir' alcuna cosa di tutto il de-
 gno, et così poi uenire a dar
 fine al rimando delle cose pro-
 poste.


Substituto
 il degno.

buca aduague, che l'isola di cipro
 è di forma oblonga, ha' circonferen-
 zia miglia duecento, e dieci, et
 nella sua larghezza maggiore

miglia sessantacinque con circuito
 di miglia cinquecento, e cinquar-
 ta, et la parte, che guarda uerso
 Tramontana, è lontana dalla ca-
 pitana miglia sessanta, ha gu-
 cila uerso Levante, è distante
 la somma mara di miglia cento,
 che si fanno in una notte, et la
 parte, che guarda uerso mezzo
 di, è lontana dall' Egitto, et Ale-
 scandia tre in quattro giornate
 d'ornate, et altre tante, et man-
 co dall' altra parte di Rodi: que-
 sta isola tutta è diuisa in uer-
 dieci parti. Siuimate contrade

8°

9°






con questi nomi, et cominciando da
 Ponente, quella di Baffo, Andime,
 Limisso, Masoto, Saline, Masareca
 le quali sono uerso mezzo di accanto
 al mare, et sono liuse con una lon-
 ga linea le monti dalla altre
 contrade, le quali sono di corso
 io, Pentagui, Cerines, cas-
 passu, che guardano uerso Tra-
 montana: A' altra poi quella di
 Viscontà, laqual è posta fra
 quelle di Saline, et di Ceri-
 nes: questa di Cerines è
 aco diuisa da un' altra schiera
 di monti, distanti dalla riva
 del

del mare uerso Tramontana un mi-
 gliò e mezzo. liquali monti se fus-
 sen posti dalle altre parti nell'
 isola con quella medesima forma,
 laonde forse questo degno uir-
 noi bisogno di molte provisioni:
 Vi sono di grana piùuano, ma poco
 le colline è piena tutta l'isola:
 gli lochi principali di questa
 isola sono Xicoria, ou' è Arcives-
 couado in Famagosta, Baffo,
 Limisso sono vescouadi: Segue-
 no altri lochi: Saline, Cerines,
 oue uogono d'aggiamenti da Ve-
 netia: Sono uero circa mille

9°


10°

10^v11^r11^v12^r





12^v


13^r



13^v

14^r

14^v15^r15^v16^r




16^v

17^r

per dover esser di strada dall'ar-
 chidaria, et dar in pericolo
 l'esseri seguiti dentro con
 le lor mogli, figliuoli et esse
 qui care, et se non altro dar
 in continuo spouento, se la
 gli fosse tacere; se ueramen-
 te si uollesse far fortissima pi-
 uola in quel sito non può ri-
 uscir forte, non hauerà alcun
 aiuto da natura in quel loco,
 anzi di sfauore, et poi che le
 fortissime sono difesa da gli
 huomini, et dall'architettura,
 nelle picciole non possono esser
 molti

molti bellouardi accia ha più far-
 ti gli nemici possono esser offesi,
 et corrisposti di contrabatterie,
 né uel e poi spatio per capir gro-
 si corpi di gente, né per far ser-
 tite, né per far roturate; Ape-
 pressa per esser quella costa di
 Corinas di migliori aere di tutta
 l'isola, può accamparsi di uenire
 senza pericolo l'acampato, come
 sarà certo in qualunque altro lo-
 co dell'isola di douer morir in
 breue tempo, uel se più tosto si
 de eleggeri lochi di uero tale che
 all'inimico accampato, et non ac-




17^v

18^r


campato, come quelli della città, né ca-
 si assuefatti a quello, la qual as-
 suefettion importa assai, possa
 dar assai noia a gli nemici,
 et non di danno a quelli della
 città, per le cause dette, ma nel
 la costa di Corinas, il campo de
 nemici hauerà anco molte al-
 tre comodità di alberi, et
 di boschi de far legna, uel
 che non è in altri lochi; Lasci-
 uari di dire della utilità
 della Caranania a quella
 parte dell'isola, che in ser-
 uore si potrà portar uolges-
 ca

campato all'inimico accampato;
 Lasciuro anco di dire, che le na-
 ui, che fossero mandate da uene-
 tia con soccorsi, uoltegiaruan
 in ogni altra costa più uolun-
 taria, che in questa di Corinas,
 per le due cause del uento di tra-
 montana, uel di da quella parte,
 et del sito forse non esser largo,
 come in tempi d'incorno, et
 con tramontana bisognaria; Si
 potera forse anco agguarsi per
 la natura di quella gente es-
 ser cosa degna di qualche con-
 sideratione, che si procurasse di



Sauer sito più opportuno di que-
 sto di Carinas, perché si potesse
 cascare, se così paresse più a
 proposito la farui una cittadella
 la per dominar quelli, che in-
 lessexe recalcitrar. Quanto a
 Carinas è situato accanto il
 mare, et la sua imperfectione
 è manifesta, et basta a dire
 ch'è un Castellotto piccolissi-
 mo, et difensiva de parabi-
 et turcopiani; Ha un porto
 piccolissimo, et imperfetto. La
 forma di esso Castellotto è qua-
 si di mandala, o quadrangola,


di tre angoli, ed sono tre torrioni
 all'extrema uscia labili, et piccio-
 li, nel quarto angolo è un ballo-
 uscio mal inteso, et debil; Ha
 fossa larga detto Carinas passa
 vintuna, et videria trecento, et
 settanta passi; Ha muraglia per
 un passu quattro, et nelle fonda-
 menta dei, et alta per il più pas-
 sa sedici, solo tutto quella del
 muraglia ha una raffata alla
 montana di una città piccolis-
 sima, dove non ha tanto alta né
 così grossa, facendosi fondamen-
 to in questi tempi più di tre-

18^v19^r

rapioni, che in grossezza, et al-
 tezza di muraglia; Ha un balo-
 uscio picciolo, et di poco momento;
 Ha oltre il Mar Castellata un
 capo con cinquanta fanti per
 nella custodia, et della munici-
 palian d'artiglieria, che si troua
 bauere in troua molto mag-
 giori in troua. Se da tutto
 quel castello, il qual per ve-
 rita d'alta sua qualità sopra-
 tutto, munitoria più tosto es-
 sen trasportato, messo in
 quel loco, oue si troua in
 un forte il Clarius sig.
 Se

Sebastiani Venier, si troua per
 questo, quel passo de camo di
 quella sebbene ha molti, acci
 da quella parte può impedito
 a gli nemici il condur uirtua-
 gli, porbe in quel sito, ch'è
 esso Carinas, non è buon né
 di far questo, né di uolere di-
 montate, né di conservar Termi-
 tory, ouer Popoli, anzi stando
 in questo modo sarai di danno,
 che cascherà in man de nemici
 insieme con l'artiglieria, et in
 quel porto, quali ab'coli si sia
 innanzi, che fusse sta questo

19^v20^r




arca l'ordine non se ne serui-
 se, et se a porta di quel Castel-
 letto si uollesse fabricar alcuna
 cosa, non risultaria quel poco
 frutto, o per dir meglio d'ar-
 chi e munito del portone di
 mare, il qual per ora fu fatto
 per una subito bisogno, per di
 et per bere, et nondimeno a
 poca di quella spesa fatta in
 cosa portone se e continuata
 una fortificatione molto mal co-
 tata, et di spesa maggiore di
 quel che hauro impostato il
 far poco conto della spesa di detto
 por-

portone.
 Questo accrescente alla città di Fa-
 magosta, la qual e nella contra-
 da della Messara, cioè ab' i po-
 sta quasi all' estrema parte dell'
 isola a levante accanto al mare,
 con forma quasi di semicircolo
 di terra, facendo la corda di esso
 la parte de mare, per la terza
 parte di tutto il suo circuito, il-
 qual e di miglia due in circa,
 sta un' porta per quale dieci in
 circa, ma e circondato d'alcuni
 scogli, et alcuni non più lontani
 che passa trecento in circa, li-

20^o

21^r





quali scogli se si uollesse spianare,
 s'attorcere il porto, come auca
 per esperienza s'e ueluto, et
 se si uorra abbracciarli, et con-
 giungerli con la città gli uolrà
 un grandissimo tempo, et spesa
 per causa della roca, et di al-
 tri incomodi di questa paese,
 et abbracciarli in parte sen-
 za congiungerli con la città,
 non si può far non perfetta,
 né forte, che con facilità non
 potesse poi esser sforzata da
 gli nemici, ouero esserli dis-
 aperta: dalla parte di terra
 li


la terra di Famagosta, gli causa
 un' intemperie d'acque d'alcuni
 alui vicini, oue le acque si so-
 lano da lungo tratto di paese, lo
 quali alcuni sono più bassi del
 livello del mare, ouero son dif-
 ficili da tenerli in corso per la
 mala sorte del tempo non taxa-
 ce per li soli orienti, abrupendi-
 se di continuo, et tra gli altri
 e quello detto il lago di Colba-
 za, il qual fa se gran torto a
 Famagosta, non meno di quello
 che li fa il terreno, essendovi
 sasso, et bitume qui roca, et de

21^o

22^r


22^v23^r23^v24^r

237




24^o

25^o




25^o

26^o



me anticamente fu un castello,
 simile un alaco, che dimora et
 sono. Sono un porto onde ricorrono
 loro il mercato alio poco più, si
 poteva far un porto sicuro, et
 porre a Saline è il più sicuro
 fare per armate, e per altri me-
 glia il mare pericola, che in cas-
 una altra loro di tutta l'isola, for-
 tificandosi si vorrà a leuar tal
 comodità al nemico; e di Sal-
 te Saline de Naxos una miglia
 trenta, non è la lancia di altri di
 quella loro, che ni è un lago por-
 te, et bello, nel qual alcuni torren-

ti mettono l'acqua, et per la riva
 del terreno, l'ebete si coglia sotto
 in sale bianchissimo, et fortissimo; la
 selina, che vien l'acqua, ha di circon-
 to circa miglia. nonci, ma il circuito
 di quel loro, merita il sal grosso è
 solamente di miglia due, e mezza
 di circa, et quel sal, che è minuto, et
 leggero, si abiana da poi il sal della
 Regina; la quantità de sal è ter-
 ta, che può far trattamento a se-
 tante navi ogni anno, portando una
 nave mo^o otto uentimilaquattro, che
 fanno Doga Venetiana, quattromila
 ottocento, e cinquante, della condotta


26^r27^r

cura de quali guardano una nave, cin-
 ca lucate mille, e ottocento.
 Segue a dire del loro di Lemisso, il
 qual è fatto accanto il mare, circa
 dalla parte dell'isola di mezzo di,
 et ha buona l'aere, et acqua et ter-
 rena senza roca, et legna non molto
 comoda per esser sul mare, et
 per la vicinità de monti, uovo è
 che si poteva poner migliori ordi-
 ni, et comodità di quel, uo è
 nella tagli de boschi; La pectora
 buona de Lemisso necessaria por-
 ta sul mare, et sono de altri lo-
 chi vicini. Ha più additi nell'
 Isola,

27^v


Isola, et accanto la marina, et per
 le colline, legnali se possono, che
 possono far qualche cosa di grano,
 si può facilmente recicarle con ve-
 ticore la forte d'istria, un poco più
 al uesso del lago di Lemisso, que-
 le colline si allargano: Ha portu-
 dor' cui^o et vicino a terra è buon
 fondo; Non ha porto, ma essendo
 terreno senza roca, chi volesse
 por' con tempo far una caualera,
 si potrebbe sempre farla per co-
 sta di ricorre^o de galee, perche
 per nave non arasta far altro, né
 a Lemisso, né a Saline, essendo li

28^r



28^o



29^o




29^o

30^o


*Coma si trova
il lago presso
to il lago di
Limassol.*

30^v31^r31^v32^r




32^v

33^r



33^v


34^r



con i mura
esser Saline,
Lemisso, et
Zaffo.


gran Stamok di far vince quelle
molte difficoltà.
Sto venendo a ragionare de altri
lochi, come di Saline, Lemisso,
et Zaffo, ancora che per le
prebete loro condizioni si può
comprender chiaro, che tutti
sarebbono oppositi da esser for-
tificati; nondimeno, perche
per loro si ha da elegger un
sito solo da fortificarsi dico,
che si debba anteporre a tutti
gli altri lochi dell' Isola, gli
lochi di Saline, et di Lemisso,
et di Zaffo di quello, che
fuss

fuss di piu satisfazione a gli suditi
dell' Isola, che haurono a centri-
nare alla fortificatione, et le re-
gioni, che haurono a contribuire
alla fortificatione, et le ragioni
perche si debba anteporre a gli
altri lochi, sono perche prima non
fatta sono le opposizioni dette delli
alti lochi perche hanno tutte su-
lle oppositive condizioni sopra-
te, et quanto alla forma di una for-
tezza de qua esser di semicircolo
lo si di aver, cioè come la corda
di esso la linea del mare, la qual
si stende passa ottocento, se si




volasse far soli sei bellouardi et
questo per la ragione del diamet-
ro alla circonferenza, la qual
area si esser tre volte piu del
suo diametro, et esso una set-
tima d'esso, si il semicircolo
del diametro di ottocento faria
area circa passa mille, e du-
cento, la qual area non ha
di bellouardi per il more sei do-
uando esserui spatio di passa du-
cento, tra l'uno, et l'altro bel-
louardo, per ragion delli tirri
a livello dell' artiglieria si che
tutto il circuito d'una tal for-
tezza

tezza computando li passa otto-
cento della corda di detto arco,
et insieme tutti gli spatio, che
prendono di piu li bellouardi
sei uorria a esser circa miglia
tre, ma quel che importa seria
capacissima per rispetto della for-
ma circolare, la qual e molto piu
capace di qualunque altra sorta di
forma, perche altre forme posson
ben abbracciar piu angoli, et piu
toritura, et loro circonferenza,
et nondimeno non possono abra-
cciar tanto spatio, et piazza qu-
anto abbraccia la forma circou-





36^v


37^r



37^v


38^r

38^v39^r39^v40^r





40^v


41^r



41^v


42^r

42^v43^r43^v44^r





44^v


45^r



45^v

46^r

46^r47^r47^v48^r




più l'ortosa de Venetia essendo
 poi essere questo di grandissimo
 giuocamento in particolare a Pa-
 magosta, poiche per il male mal
 avere sua l'hauea il modo di con-
 tenera senza la destructione de
 nemici et certa vittoria nos-
 tra, senza colpo di spada, e
 aca de qua di qualche conside-
 ratione sopra li modi di far
 lauorari et fabricar, ouero so-
 pra di se a forlivi ouero a
 giornata oue a forlivi in qu-
 esto modo, che per ogni corso
 et camino di un carro si tar-
 reo

uero i di sassi se gli da una ma-
 neta, obianeta forliva per secole,
 se che se sono peoni et fanno
 pochi corsi guadagnano essi po-
 ca, ma a lauorari a giornata, he
 accentato, che tanto guadagna il
 giorno quanto il piu salutato, per-
 che he presto tutto deuocano pe-
 gori, che causa la tardata, et
 poca opera con molta spesa, et
 per esperienza se e prouata
 l'effeuentia di spesa da un modo
 all'altro de matto dieci e cento
 oltre il beneficio della maggior
 fretta. Ma in materia dell'

48v

49r




uero di Famag^{ta} non sara forse ma-
 le toccar una parola a fine di
 qualche minaccia, che non passasse
 li termini, come fa essendo no-
 uice non solo a gli nemici, ma
 aca a gli amici poco giouano
 contra al uero l'assogattion
 dell'habitare laqual in tutti
 gli altri luochi dell'isola si
 uole giuare, eccettuato solo il
 loco di Famagosta, perche nelli
 altri luochi non sono, come a Pa-
 magosta, quelli aluci et massi
 nemici della costanza ou
 e quel luogo et lago si peltri-
 fero,

ferro del qual o sia piu basso del
 livello del mare, o suo no sia
 causa la mala sorte del terreno
 non tanto, per li soli ardenti,
 disingandosi facilmente, et vi
 impedia sempre da uno gli di-
 uer secondo, che si uera causa
 ha, causando poi spesa infinita,
 et dannosa, nondimeno per
 la speranza di grandissimo pro-
 fito, et guadagno, si troua gia
 chi accetta tal impresa, con qu-
 esto, che gli fusse donato quel
 spazio d'alcuni, che riempiesse,
 et bonifiasse, abbracciando


49v

50r




50^v

51^r




51^v

52^r




52^v

53^r




53^v

54^r




54^v

55^r




55^v

56^r



56^r

57^r



57^v

58^r

B-177



58*

PART FOUR
GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S GREAT WORK
(1567–1570)

NICOSIA: A CITY TO FORTIFY

After completing his first Cyprus mission, Giulio Savorgnan set sail for Salina on 12 October 1562, leaving behind him his reflections concerning projects not under his supervision. His long spell in Crete, from October 1562 to May 1566, distanced him from Cypriot affairs; surviving correspondence contains no proof that Giulio maintained contact with any officials or noblemen he may have met in Nicosia, Famagusta or Cerines. He was too busy with the construction projects in Candia and Chania to follow the progress of Cypriot fortresses, particularly that of Cerines, which had been in abeyance since 1559.¹

During Giulio's time in Crete, the defence of Cyprus was reinforced in accordance with previously defined general principles. The numbers of *stradioti* and arquebusiers were modestly increased, still split into several regional companies, and in 1563 the *stradioti* stationed in Larnaca were given better quarters, in the form of fifty houses spread around a "bel cortile", with stables and wells. At the same time, the Kiti tower was built in order to assist the *stradioti* in their task of guarding the coastline.² Efforts to improve training of the armed forces, which had been ongoing for some time, continued, and the proveditor-generals carried on working as tenaciously as ever, if the letters and reports sent by Bernardo Sagredo between May 1563 and April 1565 are to be believed.³ Following to the letter the orders given to him in his 6 March 1563 *commissio*, Sagredo supervised the progress and the cost of the Famagusta construction project, and inspected the feudal cavalry with two *mostra generali*, as well as inspecting the rest of the island's troops; Sagredo thus continued, with the help of Colonel Scipio Piacenza, the consolidation of discipline amongst the Cypriot armed forces, and this enabled him to witness the consequent improvements made to the latter's physical condition, as well as the shoddy arming of the *stradioti*, which he deplored.⁴

The strengthening of Venice's grip on the island's military affairs and the undeniable successes observed by Venetian officers were part of Venice's more systematic policy of exploiting its colonies, which illustrated the *Signoria*'s desire to gain a tighter control of the island's principal resources.⁵ In the mid-1560s several initiatives were introduced to enhance the productive capabilities of rural areas, whether to supply the island's towns, cities and garrisons or to improve fiscal receipts and land incomes. An example of this was the work

1 Concerning G.S.'s work in Crete: Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. I / 2, pp. 329–332; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 231–232; Steriotou, *Τα βενετικά τείχη του Χάνδακα*, pp. 22–29. 2 ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Bernardo Bellegno dated 16 September 1563, ff. 5^v–6^r; id., *Senato mar*, reg. 37, f. 52^r. 3 Concerning Bernardo Sagredo, see the short biography infra, doc. 65 n. 11. 4 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 65^r–67^r; further improvements in 1567: *ibid.*, reg. 75, ff. 53^{r-v}, 56^v–57^v. 5 Id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Bernardo Bellegno dated 16 September 1563, f. 1^v; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 520–524; G. Grivaud, 'Sur quelques contradictions de l'administration vénitienne à Chypre (1473–1570)', *Thesaurismata* 20 (1990), pp. 197–199.

done in the hope of regulating the island's hydrographic system in order to increase the amount of land being farmed; in spring 1566 the engineer Brunello was tasked with draining the insalubrious parts of the Costanza Lake; Brunello had already made a name for himself by draining the San Lazzaro salt flats after they had been ruined by the catastrophic floods of winter 1560, a feat already attempted by Marino Gradenigo in 1564; around the same time Francesco Patrizi had dams built to channel rivers that ran through the properties owned by the count of Jaffa, Giorgio Contarini, in Kalopsida and Maroni.⁶ To a similar end, millet began to be grown as a substitute for wheat, and techniques allowing for longer preservation of grain stocks began to be assessed, by Giovanni Sozomeno, for example; in such a way, Venice extended to Cyprus the grain policies it applied in *Terraferma* and elsewhere in the *Stato da Mar*.⁷

Venice's desire to increase yields and enhance the incomes it drew from Cyprus nevertheless caused imbalances which became more concrete in the 1560s, and which were amplified by the severe wheat crisis that lasted from autumn 1564 to late summer 1567.⁸ Although unrelated to Cyprus' military institutions, these economic and political factors did affect the organization of the island's defences, weakening social cohesion and generating considerable tension, the calming of which directly conditioned the future of the soon-to-be fortress. Indeed, during the carnival of 1566, while the project to fortify Cerines was floundering, as it had been since 1559, a hunger riot broke out in Nicosia, changing the entire situation on the island.

Partly at the origin of this unrest was the food shortage that hit Cyprus, notably affecting the storehouses of the capital city; in anticipation of the coming festivities, the *rettori* supplied the city with grain, but these precautionary measures did not halt rumours of wheat being loaded onto the *Veniera* in Salina, to be sent to Venice, which would threaten supplies for Nicosia's marketplace. This concern saw Venice's colonial policies directly called into question, and it was upon hearing the vague, unconfirmed news that a mob gathered, on 26 February 1566, at the hour of the *Ave Maria*, before the *palazzi* of Vice-Luocotenente Giacomo Ghisi and Proveditor-General Antonio Bragadin. Abuse and then stones were hurled at the doors and balconies of the two buildings, before the pressure mounted when

⁶ ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 141^v, and filza 34; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2, dispatches dated 15 January 1561, 12 October 1562, 5 June 1563, 13 and 20 January 1564; Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 90–91; Francesco Patrizi, *Lettere e opuscoli inediti*, ed. by D. Aguzzi-Barbagli, Florence 1975, p. 49. ⁷ ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, f. 125^v; id., *Senato Mar*, filza 34 (dispatch from Luocotenente Mattheo Michiel dated 31 January 1564); id., *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 258; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 10^f; Étienne de Lusignan, *Chorographia et brevis historia universale dell'isola de Cipro principando al tempo di Noè per in sino al 1572*, Bologna, A. Benaccio, 1573, f. 86^f; F. Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris ⁴1979, vol. 1, pp. 521, 538–540.

⁸ ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Bernardo Bellegno dated 16 September 1563, f. 1^v, report from the captain of Famagusta, Panulphin Gauro, dated 29 September 1563, f. 10^f, report from the captain of Famagusta, Lorenzo Bembo, dated 21 September 1567, f. 3^v; Grivaud, 'Sur quelques contradictions de l'administration vénitienne à Chypre', pp. 199–200.

another rumour began to circulate claiming that one or two rioters were being held prisoner at the vice-*luocotenente's* house. The tensions were eased by the intervention of Viscount Zuffre Corner and several Cypriot nobles, who used their oratorical skills to calm the mob after several hours of negotiation; one after the other, Tuzio Costanzo, Giacomo de Nores, Ugo and Filippo Flatro, Francesco da Milano, Gualtier Sozomeno, Antonio Davila and Livio Podocataro reassured their listeners that the amount of bread available on the marketplace would be increased, that no grain would be sent to Venice, and that no rioters had been imprisoned. The following day these points were restated publicly on the *piazza*, and carob stocks began to enter the city.⁹

This bout of popular anger, violent and unexpected, shook the island's social and political stability, Venetian authority never having been so radically questioned in the *Regno* capital. The opportune intervention of the Cypriot aristocracy, lead by the viscount and the members of the *università*, succeeded in avoiding any excessive outbreak of violence; above all, it bolstered the aristocracy's position as a mediator essential to the proper upkeep of the internal balances of Cypriot society. Nevertheless, a climate of suspicion settled in Nicosia in spring 1566, and tensions subsisted. Venice expected an exemplary punishment for the perpetrators of the riot, as social cohesion had to be consolidated in support of the island's defence plans. The inquest entrusted to the *regimento* led to the execution, one year later, of three leaders of the violence: a Greek priest, a fencing master and a saddler, all sentenced to hanging on 13 April 1567. These sentences re-established order, and satisfied all those involved in the previous year's ruined carnival: the Venetian officers, who symbolically reinstated the *Signorià's* absolute authority; the Cypriot nobility, who at once tempered Venice's ardour for repression and used it to halt the populace's attempts to gain freedom; and the Nicosian plebs, whose demands regarding supplies for their city were acknowledged

9 ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 217 (letter from Giacomo Ghisi and some councillors); the statements of the various officials involved in the affair appear in the file opened by the chancellery secretary Zuan Francesco Stella, which can be found in the ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 5. Knowledge of the event comes above all from the brief account given by Étienne de Lusignan in *Description de toute l'isle de Chypre*, Paris 1580, f. 211^{r-v}, which is relatively faithful to archive sources. Lusignan gives 1565 as the year of the riot, but it actually occurred in February 1565 *more veneto*, i.e. February 1566; two months later, a German traveller passing through Nicosia wrote of the unrest, which left a deep impression in the minds of all concerned: Christoph Fürer von Haimendorff, *Reisebeschreibung*, p. 307. Historians know about the carnival 1566 riot, but in general do not put it into context, either transforming it into a political revolt launched as an assertion of identity, or reducing it to an insignificant epiphenomenon: Ph. Zannetos, *Ιστορία της νήσου Κύπρου: από της αγγλικής κατοχής μέχρι σήμερα*, Larnaca 1910–1912, vol. 1, p. 969 [reprint Nicosia, Epiphaneiou, 1997]; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, p. 816; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', p. 528; id., 'Résistance ou collaboration? Les Chypriotes sous la domination vénitienne', in M. Balard (ed.), *État et colonisation au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, Lyon 1989, p. 136; id., 'Entre mythe et histoire. La légende noire de la domination vénitienne à Chypre', *Études balkaniques – Cahier Pierre Belon* 5 (1998), p. 101 [reprint in: id., *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th centuries*, Aldershot, 2000, study no. XIV]; A. Aristidou, 'Άγνωστες απόπειρες για οργάνωση στάσεων ή εξεγέρσεων κατά τη διάρκεια της Βενετοκρατίας', in A. Papageorgiou (ed.), *Πρακτικά του Τρίτου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, Nicosia 2001, vol. 2, p. 582; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, p. 56.

as fair, even though they had to sacrifice three of their people in order to regain their status as a legitimate voice in the island's social dialogue.¹⁰

The shadow of the 1566 carnival's aborted revolt was still hovering over Nicosia when discussions began regarding the fortification of the city, which coincided with Giulio's arrival in Cerines to begin his second mission, on 6 May 1567. The succession of notable dates during the spring of 1567 leaves little doubt as to the tense atmosphere enveloping the city; the decision to build a new enceinte and demolish 1,800 popular houses in the process was taken in the month following the execution of the three riot leaders, and in this light the mass destruction may be considered an extra punishment inflicted upon the *popolo*, guilty of having fuelled the revolt, as ephemeral as it may have been. With a certain naivety, Savorgnan expressed his amazement at how submissive Nicosia's inhabitants were in the face of the enormous destruction they suffered, not understanding the political background specific to the local context (doc. 53). The fragility of the *Regno* capital's social stability explains the haste with which the authorities organized the great, solemn procession of Sunday 1 June 1567, in which all of the capital's constitutional bodies participated, in ceremonial dress (doc. 85); construction work could not yet be commenced at this date, as not enough tools were available, but, six weeks after the official repression of the 1566 carnival riot, this ostentatious piece of theatre reconciled Nicosia's principal social groups around a collective project based on defending the public good.

Attributing the fortification of Nicosia solely to Nicosian society's internal tensions does not explain the complexity of the various interests connected to Giulio Savorgnan's second mission. In the context of the *Stato da Mar*, the reinforcement of the island's defensive system, which had been underway since 1557 / 1558, unquestionably produced improvements in the organization of the armed forces, as was examined earlier. Despite everything, the main stumbling block concerned the new fortress which needed to be built to support Famagusta; the choice of Cerines, a decision made in 1559, generated more resistance than support, turning the Cypriot aristocracy into a veritable arbitrator due to its position as the project's main financial backer. Paradoxically, the fear of an Ottoman attack, which justified all of the island's mid-century initiatives, faded, the *Serenissima* being convinced that Suleiman the Magnificent would not choose to break the peaceful relations between the two states. However, the death of the sultan, on 7 September 1566, toppled this stability, and it was suspected that Selim II wanted to inaugurate his reign with a resounding conquest of Cyprus.¹¹

The urgency created by Selim II's accession to the throne revived deliberations over the

¹⁰ ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 236, 238, 240, 241 (dispatches from *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini, dated 16 and 26 April 1567); id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, ff. 69^r–70^v; see also infra, doc. 83. ¹¹ Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, vol. 6, pp. 262–266; Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 026–034; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 878–883; Cozzi, 'Venezia nello scenario europeo', pp. 52–54; Panciera, 'Défendre Chypre. La construction de la forteresse de Nicosie (1567–1570)', in A. Brogini / M. Ghazali (eds), *Des marges aux frontières. Les puissances et les îles en Méditerranée à l'époque moderne*, Paris 2010, pp. 84–87; G. Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', in Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. 6, pp. 143–145.

second fortress Cyprus needed, and it would seem that the decision to end the stalemate surrounding Cerines should properly be attributed to Sforza Pallavicino, commander-in-chief of Venice's armies. In the letter he wrote on 4 March 1567 (doc. 17), he restates in particularly diplomatic terms that the work to reinforce Famagusta's walls must be pursued, and that the Cerines castle ought to be transformed in accordance with the proposals made by Giulio Savorgnan five years earlier, in summer 1562. Finally, conscious of the Cypriot aristocracy's reticence to finance a project which would bring them no direct benefit, and with the February 1566 riot in mind, Pallavicino proposed the idea of building a citadel in Nicosia, also stating that a coastal site would need to be fortified in the future in order to secure the possibility of seaborne aid sent from Italy.

The idea of endowing Nicosia with a new defensive structure thus established itself as a concrete plan in spring 1567; it had been an arduous journey from the first discussions on the subject in July 1558 (cf. doc. 4), when only Girolamo Martinengo supported the idea of securing the *Regno* capital, against the judgement of Sforza Pallavicino, Astore Baglioni and Giulio Savorgnan, who all questioned the strategic value of a site that could not be accessed from the sea. Pallavicino's attitude changed in March 1567 thanks to the gnawing worry brought by the unrest of the 1566 carnival, but the idea of giving Nicosia a modern fortress had been under discussion for several years. With a population of over 21,000 inhabitants, the Cypriot capital was one of the most important cities of the Greek-speaking world; the amount of noble houses there made it a centre of the luxury product market, and the city remained the main market for the island's produce, needed to meet the everyday requirements of a populace largely employed in artisanal professions and in the transformation of raw materials.¹² Making the island's riches safe was an aspect of the precaution observed for both economic reasons and for social, political and strategic ones, as Martinengo had stated. After Martinengo, Agostino Clusone argued the case for fortifying the capital on several occasions, on 13 July 1559, then in 1560.¹³ In summer 1562 Ascanio and Giulio Savorgnan both considered the matter and, even though they did not accept the idea, their contributions confirmed the importance of the debate.¹⁴ Finally, in his end-of-mandate report, Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo also advocated fortifying Nicosia, stating that the *Regno* capital ought to be protected, especially given that the city's material conditions lent themselves to rapid construction. The project would only take around seven months, he wrote, thanks to the sections of the old enceinte which were in good enough condition to be reused; Sagredo also confirmed that in the discussions regarding the dimensions of the future enceinte he did not share the opinion of Colonel Scipio Piacenza, who was in favour of a very large perimeter which would include the neighbouring hills.¹⁵ The modernization of Nicosia's walls had gradually become a topic of public discussion.

12 Arbel, 'Cypriot population', pp. 196–202; Coureas / Grivaud / Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia 1191–1570', pp. 119–120. 13 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, report from Agostino Clusone; BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, ff. 256^v–257^r. 14 Cf. supra, doc. 16; both G.S. and Ascanio followed Ercole Martinengo, who was against a new fortification in Nicosia: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, report from Famagusta, dated 18 August 1559. 15 Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 103–104; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 126–129; Panciera,

Other men took part, directly or indirectly, in the discussions, for example, a few military engineers who were in Cyprus during these years, including two experts in the domain of bastioned fortifications who held preeminent positions in the field at that time. Giacomo Lanteri, a Brescian mathematician who knew Girolamo Martinengo well, visited Cyprus as part of a huge tour of Mediterranean countries, during which he spied on Ottoman fortresses along the North-African coastline on behalf of Philip II, possibly in the early 1560s.¹⁶ Though Lanteri tells nothing of his activities in Cyprus, in 1557 he published, in Venice, two dialogues in which he debated geometric rules used in fortification outlines;¹⁷ later on, in 1559, still in Venice, Lanteri produced a technical treatise concerning construction methods for earthen walls, wherein he examined the various possibilities open to architects tasked with building a modern enceinte, and insisted upon the defensive and offensive qualities of terrepleins.¹⁸ Though there is no direct proof that Lanteri personally got involved in the discussions regarding the fortification of Nicosia, the two works he published saw his opinions circulate amongst both Cyprus' aristocratic circles and the *Terraferma's* great military architects, such as Girolamo Martinengo and Giulio Savorgnan. It is beyond doubt that Savorgnan was familiar with Lanteri's ideas, several of which appear to have directly inspired him (figs 67, 68), even though it should also be stressed that the two men evidently shared the same intellectual environment: both based their work on a systematic use of mathematics and paid special attention to the manuscript treatise that had been the foundation of fortification science in Venetian territory, composed in 1553 by Giangiacomo Leonardi, while he was the Venetian ambassador of the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo II Della Rovere.¹⁹

Another military engineer in Cyprus during autumn 1561 and the year 1562 was Giovanni Battista Zanchi, on the island to accompany Provveditor-General Zuan Matteo Bembo, who wanted at his side a technician "che sia pratico nelle cose de fortificar".²⁰ From

'Défendre Chypre', p. 90. ¹⁶ Concerning Lanteri: C. Promis, *Della vita e delle opere degli Italiani scrittori di artiglieria, architettura e meccanica militare da Egidio Colonna a Francesco Marchi, 1285–1560*, Turin 1841, vol. 2, pp. 110–112; G. Barbieri, 'Il trattato "Della economia" di Giacomo Lanteri, letterato e architetto bresciano nel secolo XVI', *Saggi di economia aziendale e sociale in memoria di Gino Zappa*, Milan 1967, vol. 1, pp. 151–166; G. Vivenza, 'Giacomo Lanteri da Paratico e il problema delle fortificazioni nel secolo XVI', *Economia e storia. Rivista italiana di storia economica e sociale* XXII/3 (1975), pp. 503–538; G. Benzoni, 'Girolamo Martinengo', *DBI*, vol. 71, pp. 155–156; P. Procaccioli, '«Cipri non vi dee torre de la mente questa città». Quesiti e ipotesi sugli anni ciprioti di Francesco Marcolini', Arbel / Chayes / Hendrix (eds), *Cyprus and the Renaissance*, pp. 115–116.

¹⁷ Giacomo Lanteri, *Due dialoghi di M. Jacomo de Lanteri, ... ne i quali s'introduce Messer Girolamo Catanio, ... e Messer Francesco Trevisi, ... a ragionare del modo di designare le piante delle fortezze secondo Euclide...*, Venetia: appresso V. Valgrisi e B. Costantini, 1557; Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 274–275, 286.

¹⁸ Giacomo Lanteri, *Duo libri di M. Giacomo Lanteri, ... del modo di fare le fortificationi di terra intorno alle città e alle castella per fortificarle...*, In Vinegia: appresso B. Zaltieri, 1559. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 72, and *infra*, doc. 66.

²⁰ ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 72, ff. 95^r–97^r (*commissio* dated 21 August 1561); *id.*, *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 116^v; A. Manno, 'Giovannibattista Bonadio de' Zanchi', in *Venezia e la difesa del Levante*, pp. 150–151, scheda no. 223; A. Fara, *Il sistema e la città. Architettura fortificata dell'Europa moderna dai trattati alle realizzazioni 1464–1794*, Genoa 1989, p. 45.

Pesaro, where he was born in 1515, Zanchi boasted great experience as a soldier, having led troops under Ottavio Farnese and Marcantonio Colonna during the Italian wars. After coming into the service of Venice, Zanchi reached Cyprus, but it remains difficult to say whether or not he was involved in the discussions surrounding the island's future fortress; here again, however, Zanchi's ideas were widely circulated thanks to the success with which his treatise on fortification methods had met, a good while before his departure for Cyprus. Published in Venice in 1554, the work was twice reprinted, again in Venice, in 1556 and in 1560, and a French translation was released in Lyons in 1556.²¹ In this short, 64-page book, Zanchi's pedagogical bent is seen in an abundant display of his practical principles; several plates show maps and outlines quite similar to those used by Giulio Savorgnan for Nicosia (figs 64–66), and for both Zanchi and Savorgnan the modules and measures of a fortress are determined by the trajectories and distances of firearms, as Antonio Manno has already underlined.²²

Though nothing is known in detail of exactly what the two men did in Cyprus, Giovanni Battista Zanchi and Giacomo Lanteri's spells on the island prove that Nicosia's aristocratic elite was aware of the progresses being made in the design of fortified enceintes. These were people well up to date with technical knowledge, and were able critics of fortification projects; furthermore, their frequent trips to Venice allowed them to easily obtain those publications, which in the sixteenth century became a Venetian speciality.²³ Their frequenting of Venetian political and military circles in both Italy and Cyprus brought together into a shared intellectual community brains concerned with building defensive structures in line with modern requirements. Though Nicosia's bastioned enceinte was effectively the work of Giulio Savorgnan, the plan he pursued was the result of a convergence of ideas expounded by Nicolò Tartaglia, Giangiacomo Leonardi, Giacomo Lanteri, Giovanbattista Zanchi and Bernardo Sagredo, but also Daniele Barbaro, who inserted a section on fortifications into his Italian edition of Vitruvius in 1556 (fig. 69),²⁴ and Girolamo Maggi, the author of a practical treatise on fortifications published in Venice in 1564 (figs 68a–d).²⁵ In spring 1567, in Nicosia, Giulio Savorgnan solidified principles formulated over the course of a long process of mathematical and military reflection undertaken by the Venetian elite, and which had its origins in the work of Francesco Maria Della Rovere.²⁶ Nevertheless, this

21 Giovanbattista Bonadio de' Zanchi, *Del modo di fortificar le città*, In Venetia: per P. Pietrasanta, 1554; Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 253, 274, 285–286. 22 Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', p. 235. 23 Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 245–246, 274–275. 24 Daniele Barbaro, *I Dieci libri dell'Architettura di M. Vitruvio...*, Vinegia: F. Marcolini, 1556; 2nd ed., Venetia: appresso Francesco de' Franceschi senese & Gioanni Chrieger alemano compagni, 1567 [reprint, Milan 1987, with introduction by M. Tafuri]. 25 Girolamo Maggi, *Della Fortificatione delle città*, Venetia: R. Borgominiero, 1564 (a work which includes the posthumous treatise on the same subject written by Giacomo Castriotto); Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 250, 273, 287; G. E. Ferrari, 'Le edizioni venete di architettura militare del Maggi e Castriotto', in *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, pp. 179–194. 26 For a more precise look at the intellectual relations between the mathematicians, architects and men concerned with mechanical sciences in Venetian circles, see Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 227–245.

reflection did not evolve independently from progress made in other Italian states, as shown by the projects undertaken in Tuscany by Giovanni Battista Belluzzi and Pietro Cataneo; the latter led projects, in 1554 then in 1567, which also bore witness to a community of ideas, in their modernization of old enceintes, for example figs 70a–d).²⁷ In the 1540–1570 period, the phenomenon of Venetian publishers becoming specialists in fortification treatises reinforced the circulation of ideas regarding issues common to the whole Italian peninsula.²⁸

Given this intellectual and scientific environment, Giulio Savorgnan can hardly be considered the genial inventor of a perfect urban enceinte for Nicosia designed *ex nihilo*; the Friulian noble synthesized mathematical ideas and principles passed down by a long erudite and practical tradition, but he doubtless viewed this tradition detachedly, being a man who favoured empiricism over theorizing. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that without Sforza Pallavicino's express order and without the financial pressure of the Cypriot nobility, Savorgnan would never have made Nicosia secure. Faithful to the argument he gave in 1558, and reiterated in 1562, Giulio rejected the idea of fortifying the capital, without ever showing the least interest in the soundness of his opponents' arguments. In spring 1567 the officer's sense of discipline and duty to the state obliged him to betray his convictions; it would, of course, be fanciful to expect even the slightest comment on this reversal of attitude, Giulio being as proud a character as he was conservative.²⁹

In Nicosia, Giulio Savorgnan confirmed himself mainly as a shrewd commander, capable of controlling the local context's specific circumstances in order to utilize his skills as a hands-on man of action, and lead a construction project of unprecedented proportions. His qualities as a soldier and his title of army commander-in-chief conferred upon him an unquestioned authority, which he used prudently and intelligently during the twenty-six months of his stay on the island; however, his talents as a military architect were not the result of any in-depth study of the rules of scholarly architecture, as set out by Daniele Barbaro, for example. Though it is unknown exactly how the eleven-bastion enceinte was designed, it can be said for sure that Savorgnan worked step-by-step. In the letter he wrote to Sforza Pallavicino on 27 May (cf. doc. 26), Giulio states that his decision to fortify the city was taken on

27 Pietro Cataneo, *I quattro primi libri di architettura...*, Vinegia: Aldo, 1554; id., *L'architettura di Pietro Cataneo, ... alla quale, oltre all' essere stati dall' istesso autore rivisti, meglio ordinati e di diversi disegni e discorsi arricchiti i primi quattro libri per l'adietro stampati, sono aggiunti di più il quinto, sesto, settimo e ottavo libro...*, Venetia: Aldo, 1567; E. Bassi / S. Benedetti / R. Bonelli et al. (eds), *Trattati, con l'aggiunta degli scritti di architettura di Pietro Cataneo, Giacomo Barozzi da Vignola, Alvise Cornaro, Francesco Giorgi, Claudio Tolomei, Giangiorgio Trissino, Giorgio Vasari*, Milan 1985. More generally, concerning the evolution of treatises on military architecture in an Italian context: H. de la Croix, 'The literature on fortification in Renaissance Italy', *Technology and Culture* 4/1 (Winter 1963), pp. 39–45. 28 Hale, 'Industria del libro e cultura militare', pp. 245–246.

29 Not only did G.S. never justify this change of attitude towards the fortification of Nicosia, but also, later on, though he advocated building an earthen enceinte, he allowed the walls to be clad with carved stone, without explaining this new about-turn. In the latter case, it may be hypothesized that the Cypriot nobility adopted the argument put forward by Giacomo Lanteri, *Duo libri di M. Giacomo Lanteri*, pp. 72–75.

the ground between 10 and 19 May; during the earliest stages, the possibility of building a citadel was studied, as Pallavicino had recommended, but this plan was dismissed due to geomorphological constraints. At this point Savorgnan proposed the alternative solution of a bastioned enceinte, immediately accepted by the Nicosia *università* in its assembly held on 20 May (cf. doc. 83). The definitive plan for the enceinte, as we know it today via the copy made by Germanico Savorgnan, preserved in the Archivio di Stato of Turin (fig. 39), shows the rigour of an architect who established a perfect geometric outline and pasted it onto the old face of the Cypriot capital. The principal merit of Giulio's plan was that it both satisfied Pallavicino's orders and answered the concerns of the Cypriot nobility; it was only after its construction that the enceinte would be considered a deliberate statement of revolutionary architecture.³⁰ Though Savorgnan was aware of the innovative aspects of his project, he feared the final opinion of Pallavicino and the Senate, which he awaited for over six months.³¹ Furthermore, the architect's flair for innovation was quickly exhausted when he attempted to intervene in the organization of Nicosia's *intra muros* urban planning; if the drawing preserved in the Venice Archivio di Stato was indeed drawn by him (fig. 39), it reveals a

³⁰ In the literature concerning Nicosia's fortress, there is a definite distinction between studies which use G.S.'s correspondence and / or available historical material, and studies which give paraphrastic or impressionistic appreciations of the enceinte. In the first category can be found: Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, vol. 6, p. 266; G. Jeffery, 'Venetian remains in Cyprus', *The Builder* LXXIX / 2998 (21 July 1900), pp. 47–48, 58–59; id., 'The XVIth-century fortress of Nicosia', *ibid.* XCII / 3337 (19 January 1907), pp. 51–55; id., *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, pp. 26–30 (containing errors regarding the reports written by Ascanio and G.S., and a precocious identification of drawings of a Nicosia bastion held in the BAM; in his diaries, Jeffery mentions discussions regarding G.S. without saying whether or not he has researched them or had them researched in Italian libraries: D. Pilides, *George Jeffery: His Diaries and the Ancient Monuments of Cyprus*, Nicosia 2009, vol. 2, p. 557); Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 844–849 (based on a painstaking consultation of the literature concerning the War of Cyprus); Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 126–129; Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, pp. 315–321; id., 'Projecting Utopia: the refortification of Nicosia, 1567–1570', in A. Pérez-Gómez / S. Parcell (eds), *Chora Five: Intervals in the Philosophy of Architecture*, Montreal 2007, pp. 227–258; Panciera, 'Défendre Chypre', pp. 81–101; id., 'Giulio Savorgnan e la costruzione della fortezza di Nicosia', pp. 131–142; Marangou, *Πόλη Αμμοχώστου... / Famagusta Gate: Its Long History and its Thirty-year Presence in Modern Civilisation*, Nicosia 2011, pp. 49–60; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 185–186; the author's own studies: Grivaud, 'Aux confins de l'empire colonial vénitien. Nicosie et ses fortifications (1567–1568)', *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 19 (1992), pp. 269–279; id., 'Nicosie remodelée (1567). Contribution à la topographie de la ville médiévale', *ibid.*, pp. 281–306; id., 'Le chantier insolite des murs vénitiens de Nicosie (1567–1570)', in Pileidou / Alfa (eds), *Όχρωμαμένες πόλεις*, pp. 191–207; Coureas / Grivaud / Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia', pp. 204–208. Into the second category go: G. Perbellini, 'Le fortificazioni di Cipro dal X al XVI secolo', *Castellum* 17 / 1 (1973), pp. 52–58; id., *The Fortress of Nicosia: Prototype of European Renaissance Military Architecture*, Nicosia 1994; J. N. Coldstream, *Nicosia – Gothic City to Venetian Fortress*, Nicosia 1993; Ch. Tzobanaki, *Ενετικές οχυρώσεις στην Κρήτη και στην Κύπρο. Ομοιότητες των μνημείων του πολέμου*, Nicosia 1998; M.-L. von Wartburg, 'Venetian buildings in Cyprus: Impact and feed back', in Ch. Maltezos (ed.), *Κύπρος–Βενετία, κοινές ιστορικές τόχες*, Venice 2002, pp. 40–42 (= 'Vestigia leonis: Art and architecture in Cyprus under Venetian rule', in *Cyprus Jewel in the Crown of Venice*, exhibition catalogue, Nicosia 2003, pp. 70–71). ³¹ Cf. the letters to the *regimento* and Francesco Barbaro dated 11 October 1567: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 66^v–67^r.

schematic knowledge of the layout of the city's buildings and roads, not supported by any precise topographical data.

The process that led to the adoption of this plan for Nicosia's fortress was in the end the result of a series of factors that disprove the notion of a project developed overseas and over a long period of time. Giulio Savorgnan's correspondence leaves no doubt as to the fortuitous nature of the proposal he made to Venice's senior officers and the Nicosia *università* in mid-May 1567, which was the product of a lucid analysis of official and local contingencies. Giulio enjoyed significant room for manoeuvre, holding the trust of Sforza Pallavicino and the *Signoria*; he acted quickly, as he was in familiar territory, and this enabled him to immediately calculate the political and economic benefits of the transformation of Nicosia into a modern fortress. His relations with the nobility, and his connections with the collateral-general, Eugenio Singlitico, offered him an alliance with Nicosia's elite, whose financial aid was essential to the project's completion, a fact made clear by the failure of the project to fortify Cerines. Whilst the Senate's decisions, decreed in Venice without prior consultation of the *università*, had failed, Savorgnan showed himself to be a master of negotiation, securing in around ten days the support of Venice's most important officers and of the Cypriot nobility. Giulio managed very shrewdly to win the trust of the *università* by offering to seven major aristocratic families the opportunity of having bastions named after them if they took charge of the construction work; this gave Giulio the support of the Singlitico family (the count of Rochas), the de Nores family (the count of Tripoli), the Podocataros, the Davilas, the Costanzos, the Caraffas and the Flatros (doc. 28).

This being the case, Giulio seems very much to have been a man in control of the situation, managing to unite around a coherent plan the convergent interests of Venice, the local aristocracy and even Nicosia's citizens. This political success was accompanied by Savorgnan's fascinating ability to oversee a huge construction project – in reality eleven parallel projects –, of a size never before seen in the history of fortifications in Venetian-controlled countries.³² As a general rule, the medieval enceintes of *Terraferma* cities were partially renovated and given modern bastions, and some demolition of housing was necessary to clear the glacis of the modernized enceintes.³³ Giulio saw for himself each one of these projects, in Peschiera, in Zara, in Bergamo and in Corfu; he oversaw in person, for over three years, the work done on Candia's fortification, but, again, this was the partial modernization of an old enceinte. In Nicosia, Giulio's task moved up in scale, and he synthesized all of these projects, assimilating the work done on each one to produce a brand new, global project which propelled the new fortress to the forefront of the era's military architecture. Giulio was all the more successful in this endeavour for the fact that he met the challenge set by Sforza Pallavicino, namely that the fortress be built very quickly – in less than a year, in fact – as

³² Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 106–111, 121–131; Concina / Molteni, "La fabbrica della fortezza", pp. 103–107, 158–162. ³³ For the Italian context, see Lamberini, 'La politica del guasto. L'impatto del fronte bastionato sulle pressistenze urbane', in Cresti / Fara / Lamberini (eds), *Architettura militare nell'Europa del XVI secolo*, pp. 219–240.

Nicosia needed to be able to resist an Ottoman attack from spring 1568 onwards. Savorgnan showed that in practice six months were enough to make a large city secure, which was clearly an impressive feat, and also unprecedented in the history of Renaissance fortifications. Giulio often took pleasure in comparing the results of his work, 11 bastions built in nine months for 90,000 ducats, to those of Ercole Martinengo's efforts, a single bastion built in Famagusta at a cost of 125,000 ducats over nine years.³⁴

For Savorgnan, Nicosia was unquestionably an opportunity that he grasped with exceptional tactical acumen, in order to meet the target set by Pallavicino and the *Signoria*. Via the intermediary of Eugenio Singlitico, Giulio was supported by all of Cyprus's great aristocratic households, and he ceaselessly defended the collective image of the island's nobility in letters to his Venetian correspondents; the portrait he gave of these nobles, while he was overseeing the construction of the seven bastions entrusted to them, bears witness to a harmonious understanding between the two parties, based on common goals.³⁵ In the Venetian camp, Giulio met with more difficulty; he won the support of Venetian officers, such as his compatriot Leonardo Roncone, Antonio del Berettino, Chieregatto and Virgilio Alberghetto, the cannon founder, but more often he lamented being surrounded by incompetent captains.³⁶ With Venice's senior officers, Giulio enjoyed only mixed success; though in theory all of the said officers should have contributed to the project's success, only *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini was fully committed to helping him. Querini's sudden death, on 20 July 1567, thus left a void which was never filled, Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro proving incapable of imposing his own authority.³⁷ Giulio thus found himself faced with those tensions he so feared, feeling like a prisoner of tussling Venetian factions, the famous *broglio* he decried on several occasions. In Nicosia, these rivalries were reflected in complications which delayed construction of the four bastions being supervised by leading Venetian officers (Barbaro, Querini, Loredan, da Mulla); paradoxically, the difficulties came from divisions within the Venetian camp, not from relations with the Cypriot aristocracy. In this respect, it should be noted that Giulio was evasive when it came to discussing the exact responsibilities of different individuals, preferring to avoid *ad nominem* accusations, except when he complained of the slowness with which Nicosia's fortress was given supplies, which was the job of the *rettori*.³⁸

Far from being supported by the Venetian officers stationed in Nicosia, as part of some kind of 'mainland solidarity', Savorgnan had, on the contrary, to circumvent a series of obstacles related to both the failings of colonial administration and the intrusion of private interests into a project undertaken for the public good. The daily sabotage Giulio describes caused delays in construction, but, conversely, the *Signoria* unflinchingly maintained her trust in her extraordinary envoy during the two years of his mission: all the requests Giulio made for wood, tools, soldiers, cannons and ammunition were met in reasonable time, as he desired.³⁹

34 Cf. doc. 77. 35 Cf. doc. 28. 36 Cf. docs 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 55, 62, 65, 70, 71, 74. 37 Cf. docs 30, 53. 38 Cf. docs 52, 53, 57, 58, 60. 39 Cf. docs 23, 33, 37, 49, 51, and ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 45^v, 63^v–64^v, 83^v–84^v, filza 39 (4 March 1568), filza 40 (27 January 1568 m.v.); id., *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 56^v–57^v, 79^v.

It seems that, as a result, the continuity in the project came from the profound understanding between Savorgnan and Sforza Pallavicino, wherein Sforza abstractly gave the outline of a project that Giulio then made concrete; the relationship between the two military leaders consolidated the series of decisions that led to the transformation of Nicosia into a fortress, from the letter Sforza wrote in Giudecca on 4 March 1567, to Giulio's return to Venice in summer 1569. Viewed from this angle, the Cyprus project may be considered the outcome of the close bond the two men formed, which was consolidated over many years, and which probably dated back to their shared time in Bergamo in 1561.⁴⁰ Pallavicino's trust, loyalty and protection formed the foundation on which Savorgnan based his actions.

Giulio Savorgnan's immense worth thus resided in his ability to catalyse to his advantage several situations, all offering him the chance to realize his greatest dream, that of building a prototype fortress which could then be reproduced in Italy. Savorgnan never hoped for anything other than to be entrusted in the future with the design and construction of the fortress that would make Friuli safe from Ottoman attack. Everything else was, he claimed, of little importance to him; and in case he did not get to carry out this plan, he instilled the desire into his nephew Germanico, in order that the family should carry on the initiative in the future.

In this light, Giulio achieved an astounding feat, rationalizing the old circular 7-km-long enceinte left by the Lusignans, and reducing its circumference by a third; by opting for a regular outline 5.5 km in length, with eleven bastions at 400 m intervals, Giulio respected the pre-existing outline of the city, and situated the three gates at the openings of the main traffic roads. However, giving the fortress such an outline led to one of the most drastic renovations of modern Mediterranean urban planning: 1,800 houses, 11 *palazzi*, 3 monasteries and 80 churches were condemned to demolition; this meant 10,000 people, nearly half of the city's population, were expropriated, losing their homes and having to content themselves with salvaging beams, joists and other rare materials in order to rebuild their houses on the plots of land they were granted *intra muros*. Finally, the transformation of the city was made definitive with the derivation of the Pedaios, which crossed the city from west to east; after being channelled, the river's new course went around the enceinte via the north, while the old riverbed was turned into a new traffic route – today's Ermou Street –, where the old bridges lost their functions.⁴¹

Savorgnan was not fundamentally concerned by the rearrangement of the city, even though he considered the re-housing of expelled citizens into new plots of land, which never become a reality, due to the inevitable property speculation which grew from autumn 1567 onwards.⁴² Giulio certainly reconsidered the question of the flow of soldiers within the new enceinte, as ease of access to the bastions was a decisive factor when it came to moving and sending troops and cannons from one bastion to another. The granting of a central *piazza*

⁴⁰ Cf. docs 10, 11; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 106–111; id., 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 228–229, 234–235. ⁴¹ P. Leventis, 'Bridges across the void: Medieval memories from Nicosia's Green Line', *Hellenic Studies / Études helléniques* 12 / 2 (2004), pp. 59–72; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 1, pp. 375–376. ⁴² Cf. doc. 53.

from the archbishop prompted Giulio to envisage an ideal layout, in which eleven streets branched out towards the bastion *piazze* (fig. 39), but there is no evidence that he thought for an instant of making this idea a reality. Finally, Giulio's discipline and sense of morals, which held that public money must not be wasted, saw him dismiss any ostentatious decoration of the city's gate; the Rochas bastion gate, today's Paphos Gate, and Barbaro bastion gate, today's Keryneia Gate, were consequently strikingly functional in appearance (figs 77, 78). Only the Caraffa bastion gate, today's Famagusta Gate, was decorated more grandiosely, and even then only in very modest proportions (fig. 79). The similarities between this gate and the Saint George Gate in Candia, designed around 1565 by Captain Paolo Zorzi, while Giulio was overseeing construction of the town's enceinte, illustrate the austerity implemented by Savorgnan in the face of the excessive spending caused by Michele Sanmicheli's monumental embellishments, as in Zara (figs 54–55).⁴³ Venetian documentation from before 1570 does not prove that the three gates were given names; at the very most, the facade of the Famagusta Gate was decorated with the coats of arms of the six great Venetian officers who served in Nicosia between 1567 and 1570. The names that Étienne de Lusignan gives to the enceinte gates, *porta Giulia over di sotti* (Famagusta Gate), *porta di S. Domenico* (Paphos Gate) and *porta dell' proveditor over di sopra* (Keryneia Gate), are not found in Giulio's correspondence, and may be simply an invention of the Dominican historian (fig. 45).⁴⁴

The lack of importance Savorgnan accorded to the aesthetics of public urban planning shows how, in his eyes, the military aspect of a defensive structure was exclusive of all other aspects. On several occasions in his correspondence, Giulio defines himself as a soldier and only gives worth to the strictly technical side of his projects. In spring 1568, for example, when the fortress walls were up and the enceinte was essentially finished, Savorgnan was so uninterested in the cladding work on the earthen walls that he asked to be repatriated to Italy; the finishing touches to the fortress posed no material challenge, and his military leader responsibilities only came into play when he insisted that supplies be brought to the fortress and that the *Signoria* send as quickly as possible the troops who were to defend the enceinte. His observations on the matter show that to his officer-architect's mind, the project's fundamental success was the construction, in nine months and for little cost, of an earthen enceinte able to protect 100,000 people. Giulio knew that this was an astounding achievement; all that mattered to him afterwards were the benefits he could draw from this achievement when back in Italy.

Giulio Savorgnan's principal success in Nicosia lay unquestionably in his ability to catalyse people and contexts at the right moment, and to keep everything in balance during the first eight months of construction, from July 1567 to April 1568. Thanks to his experience on a construction site and his 1562 visit to Cyprus, he was able to anticipate the requirements of the project, requesting pickaxes and other tools from Corfu even though

⁴³ Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. I/2, fig. 206; Tzobanaki, *Ενετικές οχυρώσεις στην Κρήτη και στην Κύπρο*, p. 23; Marangou, *Πύλη Αμμοχώστου / Famagusta Gate*, pp. 130–131. ⁴⁴ Étienne de Lusignan, *Chorograffia*, f. 16^r; Marangou, *Πύλη Αμμοχώστου / Famagusta Gate*, pp. 102–105. On the other names given to the three gates, see *infra*, p. 379 n. 2.

he did not yet know the objective of his new mission; Giulio oversaw every part of the work, from the demolition of the old walls to the installing of cannons; he had Lombard-style baskets made to move excavated earth, and demanded carts suited to each different haulage operation.⁴⁵ His ability to foresee a project's requirements was also seen with regard to the workforce; Giulio knew that the fortification project was reliant on the number of peasants the Cypriot nobles and Venetian officers could provide him with, and by setting the requested figure at 500 men per bastion and then entrusting their masters with recruitment, Giulio was guaranteed to have enough men whenever he wanted.

Giulio's sense of duty, public good and thrift were seen in his establishment of an efficient system of remunerating workers, using the famous *ferlini* (tokens) he had discovered in Peschiera in 1549, and used himself in Candia in 1565–1566. In this system, a token was given to any worker, man, woman or child, who excavated and moved a basketful of earth; over the course of a day's work, zealous workers would earn more tokens, and their pay would increase the more they worked during their two-week stint (fig. 73). Savorgnan had understood that this pay-by-results method of remuneration would motivate the Cypriot workers, whom he had observed in 1562, and who had left an awful impression on both him and Ascanio.⁴⁶ Thanks to this payment system, Giulio knew that the work of excavating and earth-moving would be done quickly. Savorgnan also thought about how the workers' pay should be handed over, not wanting them to suffer at the hands of ill-intentioned secretaries or cashiers, more interested in embezzling public money than upholding Venice's honour; Giulio stated that on certain sites, such as in Corfu, nearly a fifth of the money apportioned to paying the workers was misappropriated via various fraudulent tactics.⁴⁷ Giulio thus paid particular attention, as part of his responsibilities as leader of the project, to the feeling of trust that needed to bind the workers to their masters and to San Marco; the precautions taken in organizing the material side of the project are an illustration of this, bandaging the wounds of the 1566 carnival revolt and turning the enceinte into the symbol of a re-established concord. There is no doubt that Giulio's organizational skills, along with his moral discipline, played a major role in the project's success.

The impetus provided by Savorgnan had its effects on the ground, creating an unexpected working atmosphere on the eleven small sites he was coordinating. Since the project commenced during the hottest part of summer, immense shelters protected by canes and able to hold up to 500 people were installed at each bastion; the workers came there to eat, drink, rest and collect their *ferlini*. These rest areas were made even more pleasant by cheerful music, played by small groups of instrumentalists who invited the workers to dance. This relaxed environment helped work progress more smoothly, and Giulio acknowledged the pleasure he took in visiting the shelters twice a day to follow the progress being made at the bastions, without fear of the heat, dust, fatigue and unhealthy air.⁴⁸

The active phase of construction began four weeks after the solemn inauguration on

45 Cf. doc. 43; for other tools required in the building of an enceinte, see figs 71d–e, 72a–d. 46 Cf. docs 11, 15, 16, 21, 23, 28, 38. 47 Cf. docs 28, 34, 39, 40, 46. 48 Cf. doc. 28.

Sunday 1 June; the first month of work was actually spent making 1,200 pickaxes and demolishing the houses and other buildings standing in the way of the new enceinte. This demolition took seven weeks in total, at a cost of 3,000 ducats, even though in reality the job of clearing and cleaning the glacis dragged on until summer 1570.⁴⁹ In early July attention turned to organizing work at the four bastions entrusted to Venetian officers (Querini, Loredan, Barbaro, da Mulla); the latter were to set an example and encourage the Cypriot nobles in charge of leading work at the other seven bastions to do the same. However, the premature death of *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini, on 20 July, turned the initial situation on its head, as Savorgnan lost his main aide on the ground; it was, in the end, at the four bastions attributed to the Venetian officers where the greatest number of problems and delays were met, as mentioned earlier.

Querini's death did not slow down construction work right across the project, as, at the beginning of August, Savorgnan observed that the bastions were half-complete and the curtains were one-third complete.⁵⁰ The effectiveness of Giulio's work methods gave immediate results, Nicosia being made secure after just three months, in late September, and potentially ready to be defended three months later, in late December. As a result, Giulio pressured the *provveditori alle fortezze* to see to the sending of troops to guard the new fortress, hoping for, at each bastion, 300 Italian soldiers led by a captain, and 300 regular local troops (*ordinanze*) to whom could be added 400 irregular Cypriot troops from the local militia (*cernide*).⁵¹ Thus, 1,000 men needed to be sent to defend each bastion, and this body of 11,000 soldiers would make the fortress impregnable. Savorgnan also requested artillery, gunpowder, ammunition and bombers to be sent to Nicosia; finally, aware that the fortress should not depend entirely on reinforcements and resources sent from the mainland, Giulio asked for a cannon foundry and a bombardier school to be created.⁵²

Even though the pace of construction grew too abated for Savorgnan's liking, the 22 orillons were completed at the end of November, enabling platforms, upon which cannons would be placed, to be installed. For the former, Giulio employed traditional construction techniques favouring adobe bricks (*plite*, cf. *πλιθάρι*), which were particularly suited to the climate and were shock-resistant; for each orillon, 40,000 adobe bricks were made, which required much anticipation in order to have the materials at hand when needed. By using local artisans, Savorgnan also saved considerable amounts of money, reducing the cost of building one bastion to 5,000 ducats, which demonstrated that it was possible to build an entire fortress for the sum of 55,000 ducats. Saving the public coffers from excessive spending, this of course represented a personal victory for Savorgnan; in Famagusta, the San Marco / Martinengo bastion alone swallowed up 125,000 ducats in nine years! For Savorgnan, the cost and time he saved on construction became the manifest proof of his successful designs and methods, even though he omits to underline that the working conditions in Nicosia and those in Famagusta could not be compared equally; the former's brown earth

49 Concerning the incomplete state of the fortress, see *infra*, pp. 542–543. 50 Cf. doc. 36. 51 Cf. doc. 29. 52 Cf. doc. 33.

could be easily dug up and transported, whereas the hard rock of the latter's ditches was a battle for the worker's pickaxes.⁵³

The arrival of the cold season slowed down construction; the peasant-labourers could not work during the rains of November and December, and returned home to work their land. At this time, the *Pediaios* had already been successfully diverted; the job was finished two months prior to the first downpours, again for a modest sum, just 800 ducats being spent.⁵⁴ However, the winter plunged the project into lethargy, only twenty men on average working at each bastion, which was a source of constant complaint for Savorgnan. He deplored in turn the financial carelessness that had reigned since the death of Querini and was draining the project's coffers, then the moral laziness of the Venetian officers, who were convinced that the Ottoman threat was less urgent in winter; he worried in particular about the difficulties being met in securing provisions for the city, as 100,000 people needed to be able to survive a siege lasting several months.⁵⁵

After several months of intense labour over the summer, work on the fortress fell into a phase of inactivity and gloom; the only achievements came at the Podocataro bastion, where the parapets began to be erected in January. Over the following weeks, work began on the parapets of the other bastions and the curtains, although it would be a long time before they were finished; in mid-June 1568 half of the bastion parapets were yet to be completed. These delays did not prevent the installation of the artillery pieces Savorgnan had requested six months earlier, which made Nicosia a functioning fortress by the end of February, complete with troops, artillerymen and the ammunition required for a defence effort. Other soldier contingents arrived in spring 1568, proof that Venice provided the required military support, scrupulously respecting Savorgnan's requests.⁵⁶ Thanks to these combined initiatives, Cyprus rose to a level of security comparable to Crete, in record time; Savorgnan was thus not wrong when he stated, without fear of flattering himself, that no Christian prince had ever realized such a powerful and rapid military project as that overseen by the *Signoria* with the building of the Nicosia fortress in 1567–1568.⁵⁷

After being made secure in spring 1568, Nicosia no longer truly interested Savorgnan, who had achieved his goal; from late November 1567 onwards he knew that the Senate and Venice's military authorities endorsed his decisions and recognized his talent;⁵⁸ planning on quickly reaping the benefits of his exile, Giulio asked to be repatriated to Italy in June 1568, in the hope of returning as quickly as possible to his estates in Friuli. The Senate's answer, a yes, came on 21 August, and the letter officially ending his mission in Nicosia was signed by the doge, Pietro Loredan, on 26 August;⁵⁹ therein, Giulio was solemnly saluted for all his services rendered to the *Signoria*, and replaced by the light-cavalry general, Astore Baglioni, who was consulted on the defence of Cyprus in August 1558.⁶⁰ Already possessing theoretical knowledge of the island's specific strategic problems, Baglioni was entrusted with finishing off

53 Cf. doc. 7. 54 Cf. doc. 44. 55 Cf. docs 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57. 56 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 79^r, 80^v–81^r, 88^r–89^v, 91^r, 110^v. 57 Cf. doc. 49. 58 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 56^v–57^r, 67^v, 79^v. 59 *Ibid.*, ff. 111^{r-v}, and doc. 104. 60 Cf. doc. 4.

construction, in Famagusta and Cerines as well as in Nicosia, and oversee the defence of the island with Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier.⁶¹ Unfortunately for Giulio, Baglioni arrived in Cyprus late, only in April 1569; whether or not this delay was the deliberate intention of the *Signoria* is impossible to determine.⁶²

From this point onwards, the last year of Giulio's stay in Nicosia became a period of transition, during which Giulio had to learn to be patient. His work on the island was mainly focused on two areas: firstly, he oversaw the cladding of the bastions and curtains carried out by, on average, 100 to 200 labourers during the winter of 1568 / 1569. The work of bonding the enceinte with carved stone began in summer 1568 at the Caraffa bastion, and was not finished until September, at a fairly high cost of 2,600 ducats. In December part of the cladding of the curtain linking the Rochas and Tripoli bastions was begun in order to protect the wall from the flow of the Pedaios, at the point where the river had previously penetrated the Lusignan enceinte, and where a narrow gate, today's Paphos Gate, was to be opened (fig. 78). All of this work, not of any real technical worth, and carried out slowly, left Giulio greatly discouraged.

However, Savorgnan gave himself over to designing complementary, functional buildings, intended to heighten the coherence of his model fortress. He designed and oversaw the construction of a foundry, in which artillery pieces and cannonballs would be made; this measure, decided upon after the creation of a bomber school, strengthened the autonomy of the fortress; it could now produce its own cannons and projectiles, without having to depend on the will of the *Signoria* or the speed of seaborne communication.⁶³ Giulio also drew great satisfaction from building storehouses spread around a large courtyard, intended to hold the fortress's weapons and ammunition in a central, easily controllable location; this idea seems to have directly influenced the later design of the warehouses in Casal Monferrato, designed by Germanico Savorgnan twenty years later, as well as those reproduced by Buonaiuto Lorini in his end-of-century works (figs 57, 71c).⁶⁴ Savorgnan's last work in Nicosia was the gate installed at the Caraffa bastion, today's Famagusta Gate, which the architect designed during the last month of his stay, in April 1569, and which may be considered a veritable manifesto from Savorgnan in support of sober and rational military architecture (fig. 79).⁶⁵

For Giulio Savorgnan, the arrival of Astore Baglioni heralded his liberation, finally allowing the Friulian to leave Nicosia after a stay which in the end had lasted two whole years. His departure from the city prompted a ceremony of which there remains no description whatsoever, but which seems to have gathered together a large part of the Nicosian population. Three eulogies were dedicated to him, by Giovanni Podocataro, Paolo Flatro and the Carmelite friar Nicolò Robusto, all of whom expressed the public recognition of the

61 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 111^r, 132^v–133^r; concerning Astore Baglioni, see the short biography given in doc. 4 n. 3. 62 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 132^v–133^r (15 February 1569). 63 Cf. doc. 74. 64 Concerning the buildings erected inside the Casal Montferrato fortress, see Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan (1554–1597)*, ch. 4.6 (“Il granaio”). 65 Marangou, *Πύλη Αμμοχώστου / Famagusta Gate*, pp. 82–105.

università and the clergy.⁶⁶ Giulio was also given the symbolic present of the city's standard, which he kept until the day he died. The effort made to celebrate his departure unquestionably marked an important step in the process of Nicosia's population becoming aware of the modern city's new identity; these citizens were now reunited in the need to close ranks and resist the Ottoman threat. Giulio also took away from the island the pavilion which had sheltered him on site, and the circular work table on which the plan of the fortress, along with its eleven bastions, was engraved; Giulio took all of these souvenirs with him to Osoppo, and eventually bequeathed them, in his will, to his loyal aide-de-camp, Orazio Governa.⁶⁷

No one knew when observing the pomp and splendour of early May 1569 that these were in fact false goodbyes. Savorgnan's return journey to Italy was more like an odyssey than a peaceful trip back to his homeland; Giulio first set sail from Salina on 9 May, but after a halt in Limassol on the 22, the ship ran aground on rocks near to the *Capo delle Gatte*, on 30 May. After managing to get free of the rocks and avoid any breaches in the hold, the captain resumed the ship's journey, heading for Paphos, under the threat of the Ottoman naval guard in Alexandria. After a few days spent waiting in the Paphos harbour, the ship got back onto the Candia route, but found itself quickly attacked by five galleys from the Ottoman naval guard in Rhodes. Faced with such imminent danger, the ship returned to Cyprus and Giulio eventually disembarked in Limassol, on 26 July. The announcement of his return, when the Ottoman threat was growing, saw him recalled to Nicosia by the island's Venetian officers, eager to decide upon an appropriate strategy; it was here that, on 2 August, Giulio offered to stay on the island and resume serving Venice there, actively contributing to the defence of the city he had just made secure. His proposal was not accepted, however, and Giulio ended up going back to Limassol one week later. A lack of wind and the scarceness of maritime transport during the summer season saw him forced to wait until the end of the month for a ship that could take him home; Giulio eventually set sail for Venice on 2 September, leaving behind him a pioneering work of architecture in its design and construction, even though it was not fully finished.⁶⁸

The challenge set by Sforza Pallavicino and the *Signoria* had thus been met, and all Giulio Savorgnan was left to do was to reap the glory of his work. With the many observations and skills accumulated throughout his career, Giulio confirmed in Nicosia the excellence of his methods, demonstrating his ability to go beyond debates on the supremacy of theory over practice.⁶⁹ In Nicosia, the *governator general della milizia del Regno di Cipro* proved he could produce a masterful synthesis of both.

⁶⁶ Cf. *infra*, pp. 609–638, texts edited and presented by Evangelia Skoufari. ⁶⁷ BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 150^v. ⁶⁸ Concerning how the return journey to Venice went, see *infra*, doc. 115; concerning the incomplete state of the fortress, see *infra*, pp. 542–543. ⁶⁹ G.S.'s place in the period's scientific movements and the specific importance of the fortification of Nicosia in his body of work have been clearly analysed by Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 230–231.

A. THE OFFICIAL CONTEXT

17 *Letter from Sforza Pallavicino to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Giudecca (Venice), 4 March 1567*

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 1/d^{r-v}; copies: id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 72^r-73^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 16, ff. 43^r-44^v; id., *Annali 1566-1570*, ff. 7^r-8^v.

At the doge's request, Sforza Pallavicino gives his thoughts on the Cypriot defences (which he has still never seen), taking into consideration the conclusions he had reached with other military leaders in a 1558 report. The distance of Cyprus from Venice and its proximity to the Turks, who could easily reach the island, necessitate an impregnable fortress capable of fending off the enemy until the arrival of seaborne relief. At this point in time, Venice has three sites to meet this need: Famagusta, Nicosia and Cerines. In Famagusta, the new bastion ought to be completed by reinforcing the flanks and digging the moats. It will not be possible to fortify Nicosia quickly, as the city is too large; and as the enemy might use the capital as a base, a citadel capable of controlling the city and saving the Regno's nobility needs to be built there, in a location with easy access to water. The luocotenente [Nicolò Querini] and the governatore [G.S.] will choose the site best suited to Venice's interests, and will take care to provide the citadel with adequate supplies. Cerines is too small to be a real point d'appui, but to abandon it would be a show of weakness; G.S. has proposed fortifying it in the modern style, a good solution. These undertakings should hold back the enemy, and if the latter launch a campaign, they will have to face not only the island's poor air but also difficulties in finding provisions there. A sizeable number of decent soldiers ought, however, to be sent to make up for the weaknesses of the fortresses; and after reinforcing Famagusta, Nicosia and Cerines, a coastline site should also be securely fortified to receive seaborne relief.

Serenissimo Principe,

Anchor ch' io possa malamente discorrere sopra la difesa del Regno di Cypro, sì come dalla Serenità Vostra mi è stato imposto, non havendo maj veduto né considerato quel Regno, né meno havutane informazione conforme da quelli che vi sono stati.¹ Nondimeno per ubidirla in ogni cosa (come è il mio debito), mi sforzarò di dirvi sopra il parer mio, al meglio che potrò, redendomi certo che s'io haverò mancato in cosa alcuna, ne restarò iscusato appresso la benignità di lei, et di quelli Eccellentissimi Signori, li quali si degnerono di accettare, se non il mio parere, almeno il mio buon animo.

Dico adunque che considerato il gran potere del Principe, del quale s'ha da temere la vicinità de suoi Regni per la commodità ch' da di traghettare ogni corpo di gente che volesse sopra quell'isola et li molti luochi ove può sbarcare, all'incontro la gran lontananza che è da

¹ In fact Sforza Pallavicino had some knowledge of the problems linked with the defence of Cyprus as he wrote a report on this subject on 21 January 1562: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, s.f.

quel Regno al resto delle forze di questo Serenissimo Dominio, dalle quali nascono tante difficoltà, lequali per non esser longo lasciarò da parte, il mio parer saria che la intentione della Serenità Vostra havesse ad'essere solo fermare il piede in quel Regno, con il mezo di qualche fortezze fortificate et munite, di sorte che fusseno sicure di non essere espuguate, et che potessero essere soccorse per la via del mare, et a levare ogni commodità al nemico di allogiamento nel quale si possi stabilire, et d'ogni sorte di cosa, della quale si havesse a nutrire, attento che a far città di nuovo in terra d'inimici, et massime a Turchi non è così facile, né meno il condurre ogni sorte di nutrimento da lontano. L'exeguire questa intentione s'haveria a fare per mio giudizio in quel modo, ch' io già dissi in una mia scrittura del 1558, credo di luglio insieme con quelli altri Signori che furono chiamati sopra questo negotio,² quando però si fosse certi d'haver tempo a bastanza. Ma perché li tempi che corrono non ricercano questa longhezza ma rimedij, se non s'è perfetti al meno molto più presto.

Ricorderò reverentemente alla Serenità Vostra che non havendo altra terra di conto in quel Regno, che Famagosta, Nicossia et il castello di Cerines, voglio almeno per il presente assicurarsi di quelle in questo modo, ciò è a Famagosta far rassettar quel baloardo nuovo,³ con ingrossarli le spalle, sì che la punta dell'orecchione sia almeno X passa, rassettar quella forbice secondo il disegno del Signor Giulio Savorgnano, cavar fianchi bassi nelle fosse come è dove potranno cavarsi, perché se ben non saranno perfetti daranno pur maggior difficoltà al nemico, et far terrapienar per tutto dove mancasse il terrapieno, facendoli ancor di più delli montagnoli di terra nei luoghi opportuni, si sarà possibile, et racconciar per di fuori il sito di maniera che il nemico non possi accostarsi senza esser scoperto.

A Nicosia laquale, non vi provvedendo, sarebbe la vera sede del nemico, et che per la grandezza sua non si può fortificare se non con gran tempo, essendovi sito al proposito, farli una grande et gagliarda cittadella, laquale possi battere tutta la città et salvar la nobiltà di quel Regno, procurando nella elettione dil sito quella commodità d'acqua et di buon terreno che sarà possibile, la quale fortezza tra l'altre bisognerà che sia tenuta molto ben provvista di vettovaglia, rispetto alla difficoltà di poterla vettoagliare in tempo di guerra. Nel resto il Clarissimo Signor Luogotenente et quel Signor Governatore che sarà per tempo potranno pigliar il partito, che conoscerano convenirsi più al servitio di questo Serenissimo Dominio. / [1/d']

Quanto a Cerines non è dubio che essendo nel termine ch'è al presente, per la piccolezza sua non vi si può fare fondamento di difesa sopra, di maniera che restando così, non è altro che un invitare il nemico, al quale è commodissimo a pigliarlo et tenerlo, ruinandolo non saria altro che mostrarli un segno dove potessi e smontare et fermar il piede in quel Regno, fortificandolo (come io ho per necessarissimo) et secondo il disegno del Signor Giulio,⁴ il quale a me piace assai, potendolo però havere in difesa per tutto questo inverno che viene come son certo che si potrà, volendolo fare la Serenità Vostra, et essendovi quel buon terreno per cavare et lavorare che mi vien detto, crederò che sarà un gran fondamento per questo Serenissimo Dominio in quel Regno, et un gran scudo a Famagosta, et a Nicossia percioche il

2 Cf. supra, doc. 4. 3 The bastion built by Ercole Martinengo; cf. supra, p. 119. 4 Cf. supra, doc. 10.

nemico darà prima di testa in quella fortezza, che in niuna delle altre per essere la più vicina et la più commoda per il mantenimento del suo essercito, et anco di ragione doverà essere la più diffensibile, essendo fortificata alla moderna et essendo senza obbligo alcuno.

Quando in quel Regno siano fatte tutte quelle provisioni et levate tutte queste commodità, ove il nemico potesse fermarsi al coperto, io crederò che penserà un pezzo inanzi che si metti a questa impresa, et mettendosi non resterà con quel honore che forse s'imagina, rispetto all'aere et al mancamento delle cose necessarie che haveria, presuponendo che tra tanto Vostra Serenità procurerìa par la via della diversione, et per ogni altra di tenerlo travagliato continuamente. Mi resta solo a dirli che il molto numero delli soldati supplisse alla debolezza delle fortezze, dalli quali quando saranno buoni se ne potrà sperare ogni buon servizio, et quando saranno come quelli ch' io vego che di continuo gli sono mandati, io per me non crederò che se ne habbia la Serenità Vostra ad'assicurare in modo alcuno per haverli buoni, è necessario che siano ben trattati, è che buoni capi et conosciuti fra soldati li conduchino.⁵ Quanto alla sufficienza delli governatori et particolari, è generale, non mi diffunderò, essendo certo che la Serenità Vostra sa molto bene di quanta importanza sia questo. Non restarò anchor di dirli che per queste provisioni non si deverà restare, che doppoi havendo tempo commodo non si finisca di fortificare Famagosta realmente, rassetando anchor Cerines et il castel di Nicossia, di sorte che quella fortificatione sia durabile et far anchora una buona piazza alla marina, che possi ricevere con facilità il soccorso in quel sito, che haverà quelle buone qualità che se li convengono, il qual non posso specificare per non haverne più che tanta notitia. Questo è quanto ho possuto dire sopra questo negocio, il che ho fatto per ubidire alla Serenità Vostra, et non per che io non sappia di non poter interamente soddisfare al bisogno, non potendo parlare se non per relationi d'altri, et ancor non molto conformi, del che confido come ho detto di sopra essere iscusato dalle benignità della Serenità Vostra alla qual humilissimamente baccio le mani.

Dalla Giudecca li 4 marzo 1567.

Humilissimo servitor.
Sforza Pallavicino

Scrittura del Signor Sforza. 1567 4 marzo.



⁵ This argument reflects both the opinions expressed by Giulio Savorgnan in 1558 (cf. supra, doc. 2) and those of Ascanio Savorgnan in his report (cf. supra, doc. 16).

18 *Letter from the doge, Girolamo Priuli, entrusting G.S. with his mission in Cyprus, Venice, 7 March 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 3^{r-v}; copies: id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 71^v-72^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 16, ff. 44^v-46^r.

The doge, Girolamo Priuli, informs the captain of Famagusta, Lorenzo Bembo, and Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro that he is naming Giulio Savorgnan – currently governor of Corfu – governor-general of the Cypriot army, as he is already acquainted with the affairs of the island.

To support him in his mission, he will bring with him the 100 soldiers and 10 lanze spezzate granted to him in Corfu. Whilst he will answer only to Barbaro in affairs concerning the rest of the island, in matters regarding Famagusta G.S. will be under the command of both Barbaro and Bembo. Notably needing to be finished there is the work started on the Martiengo bastion.

In Famagusta, Cerines and Nicosia G.S. will, in accordance with the Senate's decision, implement the recommendations of Sforza Pallavicino, which shall be sent to him along with copies of the drawings of the work to be done.

If difficulties arise on the ground in Famagusta, the three men in charge will be given the freedom to choose the best possible solution, whereas everywhere else Barbaro and G.S. are to seek further opinions before taking action.

The provveditori alle fortezze will send 50,000 ducats in order for the work to commence without delay; 20,000 will be delivered by the two galleys taking G.S. to Cyprus, and 30,000 will arrive at a later date. The money is to be used for no other purpose than this work, and if it proves insufficient more money will be taken from the reale's fortune, after duly notifying the rettori.

The work begun in Cerines and Nicosia is to be finished by March [1568]; work in Famagusta will go on longer, to make the fortress fully secure. In order for work to start immediately, 2000 shovels, 1000 pickaxes, 300 large mallets, 10 barrels of nails and 2000 wooden boards for making wheelbarrows will all be sent; followed later on by 300 sappers.

G.S. and his men will be taken to Cyprus by the sopracomiti Angelo Surian and Vincenzo Maria Priuli, who are then to remain on the island at the service of Bembo and Barbaro; the Nicosia regimento will be notified of these plans and the sopracomiti will be given the same biscotto rations as the Cypriot maritime guard.

Hieronimus Priolus Dei gratia Dux Venetiarum etc. Nobilibus et Sapientibus Viris Laurentio Bembo¹ de suo mandato Capitano Amacuste, et Francesco Barbaro² Provisori Generali Cypri fidelibus dilectis salutem et dilectionis affectum. Noi havemo molto a core quel Regno nostro, et però non volendo mancar da ogni opportuna et conveniente provisione per la sicurtà et buona custodia soa, havemo deliberato chel Magnifico Conte Julio Savorgnano, che al presente si attrova Governator in Corphu, vegni de lì per Governator general de quella

1 Lorenzo Bembo was the son of Zuan Matheo, who was provveditor-general in Cyprus in 1561; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 4. Lorenzo was born on 10 February 1520, and a highlight of his career was the office of *provveditor sopra le camera* which he held from February 1555 to June 1556. He accomplished his first mission in Cyprus in 1559 accompanying Provveditor-General Duodo; then in 1561 he was provveditor of the prisoner galleys, a post he came back to in 1568. He was elected captain of Famagusta on 14 January 1565; he took up the biennial office in August of that year, and ended it with a report he read before the Senate a few months later, on 21 November. He was elected provveditor-general in Cyprus on 20 August 1568, and received his *commissio* on 25 February 1569, with a monthly salary of 200 ducats. He reached the island on 26 April 1569, and died during a tour of inspection at the end of that year: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 37^r; id., *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 3, ff. 19^v–20^r, reg. 4, ff. 184^v–185^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 156^r, 184^{r-v}; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 5 (dispatch dated 15 April 1559); id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84 (report on his mandate as captain of Famagusta); id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 130^r–131^r (a *commissio* text dated 15 February 1569), reg. 76, f. 128^v; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. 1, p. 137; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 99 n. 34 and passim.

2 Francesco Barbaro, *d'Alvise*, was born in 1495, and held several offices in the *Stato da Mar* before going to Cyprus. He was *camerlengo* in Crete in 1521, then was sent to Constantinople in 1530, before being made the *podestà* of Castelfranco from 1532 to 1533. He was provveditor-general of the cavalry in Dalmatia from 1537 to 1538, then bailo and provveditor in Nafplio in 1539; while in this office he was forced to hand the city over to the Turks in 1540. Further landmarks in his career were the positions of *savio di Terraferma* in 1541, provveditor in Zakynthos in 1552, provveditor-general in Corfu from 1565 to 1566 and *savio del Consiglio* in 1567. He was appointed provveditor-general in Cyprus in December 1565, but demanded that the votes be recast; in the end it was Antonio Bragadin who was given the position, but relinquished it prematurely when he passed away on 5 July 1565 in Cyprus. Barbaro, who left Corfu on 6 September 1566, was named Bragadin's replacement by the Council of Ten in November 1566, then was elected unanimously by the Senate on 20 January 1567 for a period of two years, with a monthly salary of 200 ducats, and was obliged to take with him a chancery secretary, nine servants and ten horses. Barbaro was then relieved of his *syndico* responsibilities, it being established that “nelle cose della militia sia superiore a tutti li altri ministri nostri che sono et serano in essa [Cyprus]”; he did, however, have to provisionally fill the post of *luocotenente* pending the arrival of Pandolfo Guaro's replacement. Complaining that he could not bear the island's climate (“Dalle lettere del diletissimo nobel nostro Francesco Barbaro Provveditor General in Cipro lette a questo Consiglio, si è intesa l'indispositione della persona sua, causata della qualità di quell'aere che molto l'offende...”), Barbaro was allowed to return to Venice; there, he made an unsuccessful attempt to become procurator of San Marco *de citra* in March 1569, but was appointed provveditor-general in Dalmatia and Albania. In Albania he was supposed to meet G.S., but Barbaro died before setting sail, on 20 March 1570: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 60^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, ff. 33^v, 249^v (citation), reg. 38, f. 155^v (citation), reg. 39, f. 173^v; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, ff. 67^v–68^r, 69^r–70^v, and Parti secrete, filza 12; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, ff. 23^r–24^v and 76^r–77^r (*commissio* of the provveditor-general in Corfu, 14 March 1565 and 11 March 1566), 117^r–118^v (*commissio* of the provveditor-general in Cyprus, 31 January 1567); id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (dispatch dated 15 July 1566); id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, ff. 23^r–24^v, 76^r–77^r (*commissio* of the provveditor-general in Corfu, 11 and 14 March 1565); Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, pp. 029–030; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 133, 134, 141, 142; G. Benzoni, ‘Francesco Barbaro’, *DBI*, vol. 6, pp. 103–104 (dates sometimes confused).

militia, essendo certi che con l'autorità et esperientia soa, et per che è novamente venuto da quel Regno, et però è benissimo informato dell'esser et qualità de quella isola et delli suoi bisogni, farà quel utile et fruttuoso servitio che si richiede, et havemo ordinato che meni seco li cento fanti chel condusse de lì, et le diece lance spezzate che li havemo concesso con doppia paga per poter con loro far de quelli effetti³ che saranno necessarij, così attorno quelle fabbriche come per la buona custodia del Regno, lo havemo destinato per Governator general de tutta la militia del Regno, et volemo che nelle cose pertinenti a Famagosta debbe star a obedientia di voi doi, et in quelle pertinenti al resto dell'isola all'obedientia di voi Proveditor solo secondo la vostra commissione, et havendovi dato ordine per altre nostre delli precedenti giorni le replicate delle quali saranno con queste, che dobbiate attender a finir il baloardo principiato a Famagosta,⁴ et far alcune altre cose contenute nella scrittura presentata dal detto Conte Julio, che vi mandassemo inserta in esse nostre.

Vi commetteremo con il Senato che così dobbiate essequir ma, in medesimo tempo, attenderete al restante delle cose di Famagosta, de Cerines, et di Nicosia, di quel modo che si contiene nella scrittura, che ora vi mandassimo qui occlusa dell'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza Palavicino, nostro Governator general, et per maggior vostra instruzione vi mandamo anche copia de diversi disegni da potervene servir secondo l'occasione, et se sul fatto nascesse qualche dubbio che impedisse che Famagosta non si potesse exequir la continentia di detta scrittura, volemo che tolto che haverete il parer di quelli che a voi parerà, dobbiate resolver quello che insieme con el detto Conte Julio giudicarete esser il meglio. Se veramente il dubbio nascesse altrove che in Famagosta, voi Proveditor general tolto il parer de chi vi parerà, bene risolverete insieme con il detto Conte Julio quello che giudicarete bene, essequendo poi con diligentia quello che sarà risoluto, il che, acciò che non s'habbia a ritardare per manchamento de danari, havemo deliberato de mandar de li ducati cinquanta mille, cioè vinti mille per le doi gallie, che conducono el Conte Julio, et li trenta mille per li altri passazzi, liquali danari saranno mandati per li proveditori sopra le fortezze, et volemo che siano posti in camera, ne possano esser spesi in altro che nelle cose che si farano in Cerines, et Nicosia, per che quanto a Famagosta la limitatione delli mille ducati, che quella real deve mandar ogni mese per conto di quella fortificatione,⁵ pare esser a bastanza, massime che a qualche tempo che non si è speso molto danaro in fabbriche, et però detta limitatione sarà tagliarda et potrà supplire al bisogno di Famagosta, ma

³ These 100 soldiers were indeed in G.S.'s 12 March 1562 *condotta*: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 28^r.

⁴ The Martinengo bastion, cf. *supra*, p. 119. ⁵ Once the island fell under Venetian rule, the *reale* (the former royal estate of the Lusignans) had to contribute a certain amount of money each year to the construction of Famagosta's fortress. The sum varied according to the type of work being done at that particular time; here are the figures we know of: 3,600 ducats in 1499: Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 3, col. 839 ~ 1,200 ducats in 1506: *ibid.*, vol. 6, col. 288 ~ 2,400 ducats in 1534: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from *Luocotenente* Marc'Antonio Trevisan ~ 3,600 ducats in 1559: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 186^r. However, for the same year the figure of 12,100 is found in: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Antonio Zane, f. 2^v (this figure also includes money given for work in Cerines). A stark decrease occurred in 1567, when it was decided that the *reale* should make a monthly payment of 1,000 ducats, which could be increased if necessary: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, *Secreta*, reg. 8, f. 80^r, and *Parti segrete*, filza 12; more generally, see also Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 850–852; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 472–473.

in evento che la non satisfacesse, vi servirete d'ogni sorte di danari de quella real, per che così scrivemo a quel rezimento che debbi fare, et ne darete aviso per che faremo acconciar le scritte come sarà bisogno, per che volemo che de lì se tenga conto destinto et particular di tutto quello si spenderà / [3^v] per conto di fortificatione, darete ordine che così sia exequito, facendo tener separato quello delli 50 mille ducati che mandamo de qui, per Cerines et Nicosia, da quello delli danari de quella real spesi in Famagosta, et il tutto fare che sij mandato de qui alli proveditori sopra le fortezze, giudicando superfluo advertirvi a farli spender con ogni vantaggio et sparagno del publico, per che conoscendovi diligenti et prudenti ministri nostri, volemo esser certi che metterete ogni opera et cura possibile, bene, et utilmente spesi.

Ben volemo dirvi che conoscendo per prudentia vostra quanto importi el far questa executione con presto, et in tempo dobbiate attendervi con ogni diligentia possibile, et sopra tutto che quello che si ha a far a Cerines et Nicosia, che va fatto di terreno sia del tutto finito et al ordine per tutto il mese di marzo dell'anno venturo alla più longa, per poter esser in tempo per ogni bisogno, non lassando però quello che si deve fare in Famagosta, sì che a un tempo medesimo anche questa fortezza sia riduta in quella maggior sicurtà che si possa con libertà d'alterare et acconciare quello che vi paresse, rispetto al tempo che haveste et all'occasioni che venisseno, lequali noi non potemo vedere, et però si remettemo a voi che sete sopra il fatto, et per che siano de lì delli instrumenti necessarij per li sopradetti effetti vi mandaremo badili 2 mille, zaponi 1000 et 300 magipichi,⁶ 2 mille tavole d'albero per far caruole et altri servitij, et diese barili di chiodi, et con li primi passazi mandaremo anche 300 vastatori. Li nobili huomeni ser Anzolo Surian⁷ et ser Vincenzo Maria di Priuli⁸ sopracomiti de libertà conducono de lì de nostro ordine il sopradetto Conte Julio et soi fanti, et deveno fermarsi de lì fino a nuovo aviso, et stare all'obedienza de voi doi, però ve ne servirete di loro di quel modo vi parerà bene, comunicarete le presenti nostre con il rezimento di Nicosia, per che così li scrivemo che farete et perché vi mandino il denaro per la fortificatione de Famagusta, et per che paghino et provedino di biscotto alli sopracomiti sopraditi, secondo che è stato fatto con le galee che sono state altre volte a quella guardia, et per vostro aviso li havemo fatto dar de qui quatro paghe per cadauno in groppo.⁹

Datae in nostro Ducali Palatio die septimo martij, indictione decima MDLVIJ.

a tergo. Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Laurentio Bembo Capitanio Amaguste, et Francisco Barbaro Proveditori Generali Cypri. Del Serenissimo Priuli. 1577 7 marzo.

⁶ Large mallets; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. *magio*. ⁷ Anzolo Surian, *d'Augustin*, was named galley *sopracomito* on 19 March 1562: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior consiglio, reg. 3, f. 193^r.

⁸ Vincenzo Maria Priuli, *di Marc'Antonio*, was named galley *sopracomito* on 14 February 1562: *ibid.* ⁹ This text reappears in the official documents of the Senate, with the same date and an additional paragraph: "Et damo sia preso che delli danari della Signoria nostra siano posti in cassa delle fortezze da mare ducati 50 milla, per mandar in Cipro, ciò è 20 milla par le galee spedite et 30 milla per quelli passaggi che parerà al Collegio nostro, et siano comprati delli istessi danari le sopraditte robbe per mandar in Cipro, et mandar anco li 300 guastatori sopradetti per quelli passaggi che parerà al ditto Collegio. De litteris 190. De non 1. Non sinceri 9": ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 26^r–27^r.

19 *Letter from the doge, Girolamo Priuli, to Lorenzo Bernardo, the Corfu bailo, concerning G.S.'s mission, Venice, 10 March 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 68^r.

The doge informs the bailo that G.S. will return to Cyprus as governor-general of the army on a second mission, taking with him the 100 men and 10 lanze spezzate granted to him previously, to help with the construction he is to oversee and to defend the island. The captain of Famagusta and Proveditor-General Barbaro have been informed. In order for him to arrive and take up his new post as soon as possible, the two sopracomiti, Anzolo Suriano and Vincenzo Maria Priuli, have been sent to Istria to take Paolo Orsini to Corfu, where he will serve as governor-general of the army with 100 men and 10 lanze spezzate; they will then take G.S. and his men to Cyprus. The bailo is asked to notify G.S. of this decision, and to arrange for his men the standard pay accorded to soldiers going to Cyprus.

La soprascritta lettera fu divide in due, cioè una a Sua Serenità et l'altra alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze come qui sotto si contiene.

Hieronymus Priolus, Dei gratia Dux Venetiarum etc. Nobili et sapienti viro Laurentio Bernardo de suo mandato bajlo et provisorio generali Corcyrae¹ fideli dilecto salutem et dilectionis affectum. Non vedendo noi mancar da ogni opportuna et conveniente provisione per la sicurtà et buona custodia del Regno di Cipro, havemo deliberato con il Senato chel Magnifico Conte Julio Savorgnano, che è ultimamente ritornato da quel Regno, et però è benissimo informato delli esser et qualità di quell'isola, et delli sui bisogni, oltra che è di auctorità et esperienza, sì che da lui siamo certi di ricever ogni honorato et fruttuoso servitio, vada per governor general di tutta la militia di quel Regno, et chel conduchi seco li cento fanti che l'ha con lui, et le diese lanze spezzate che li concedesemo con il Senato, per poter con quelli far di quelli effetti che occorreranno, così a torno quelle fabriche come per la buona custodia et sicurtà di quell'isola, secondo che scrivemo al Capitano di Famagosta et al proveditor general Barbaro che è in Cipro, et semo certi che essendo lui financo andato con ogni prontezza dove ne è parso d'adoperarlo, così farà anche al presente in questo così fatto nostro bisogno, et accioché el vada quanto più presto sia possibile al detto governo, et con ogni sua commodità havemo fatto venir in Histria ser Anzolo Suriano et ser Vincenzo Maria di Friuli sopracomiti di libertà per levar il signor Paulo Orsino,² quale havemo destinato per Go-

1 In April 1566 Lorenzo Bernardo, *di Piero*, was made *bailo* and proveditor-general of Corfu for a period of two years: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 172^v–173^r. 2 Paolo Orsini came from a dynasty of Roman *condottieri* which between 1509 and 1617 gave eight great officers to Venice's armies. The son of the *condottiere* Camillo, Paolo (born 1539), fought alongside his father in the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1538–1540. He then fought in the French armies for Henry II in the War of Siena, and in Pope Paul IV's armies in Rome, before leading the troops of the Duke of Ferrara. He went back to serving Venice in February 1566, with an annual salary of 2,000 ducats and 6 *lanze spezzate* to help him. He was infantry governor in Verona, then was appointed

vernator General della militia di quell'isola, con fanti cento et diese lanze spezzate in luogo suo, come vederete per altre mano di lettere nostre, con ordine che subito sbarcato detto signor Paolo, et fanti debbano levar sopra le loro galee el detto conte Giulio, fanti et lanze spezzate, et condurle in Cipro.

Tutto questo farete intender in nostro nome al detto Magnifico conte Giulio, acciò chel sappia la volontà nostra et si metti a camino con quella maggior prestezza che sia possibile, sì come desideramo chel facci, et siamo anche certi che farà con ogni prestezza, come ha fatto sempre con molta nostra satisfatione. Et perché havemo deliberato con il detto Senato che alli sopradetti cento fanti et diese lanze spezzate chel condurà con luj, voi dobbiate dar una paga per cadauno in dono, secondo il consueto delli fanti che si mandano in quel Regno.³ Vi commetteremo con l'auttorità del detto Senato che prima che li detti fanti cento et diese lanze spezzate partano per Cipro, debbiare far dar detta paga per cadauno di loro, come è sopra-detto.

Datae in nostro Ducali Palatio Die X Martij Indictione decima M.D.LXVIJ.

military governor in Corfu in March 1567. In October 1568 he handed this post to Nadal da Crema, and then became governor of Verona, in place of Alfonso Palazzo who was sent to Cerines in July 1569. On 22 May 1571 he rose to the rank of army captain, and played a central role in military command, notably in the Battle of Lepanto; he then fought in the 1573 assault on Tunisia under the command of Don Giovanni of Austria. He never succeeded in gaining the title of *Capetano generale* that he craved for, and was eventually removed from his position of supreme command in 1585: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 117^{r-v}, 174^r, reg. 39, f. 84^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 70^v, reg. 75, f. 25^v; P. Litta, *Famiglie celebri di Italia*, Milan 1819–1884, *Orsini di Roma*, table XXVI; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 120, 124–125, 128–129, 134–135, 243–244. C. Argegni, *Condottieri, capitani, tribuni*, Milan 1937, vol. 2, p. 371; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέροννας*, pp. 138–139; Orsini is frequently criticized by G.S.; cf. infra, docs 31, 43. ³ As an incentive for soldiers to come to Cyprus, they were paid two extra sums, one when they left and the other when they returned; cf. supra, doc. 8.

B. GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S CORRESPONDANCE

20 *G.S.'s opinion regarding the defence of Cyprus, Venice, 17 February 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 66^v; copies: CMC, *cod. Cicogna* 1669, ff. 97^r–98^r;

ABS, b. 52, fasc. *Libro primo dei discorsi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*, pp. 102–104.

To make Famagusta more secure, finishing, and perfecting, the Martinengo bastion should be made first priority; the supervision of this work could be entrusted to Roncone, the ordinanze governor and an experienced man with a keener judgement than the engineers. The earth dug up from the moat, which was supposed to have been put inside the bastion, has been left on the counterscarp in the middle of the bastion, a catastrophic error. If the earth has not already been moved, it should be used wherever it is needed, notably at the sea tower.

Concerning the defence of the whole island, in addition to the reports he delivered in 1558 and 1562, upon his return from Cyprus G.S. has submitted another to the provveditori alle fortezze, and he has nothing further to add to what he has already established. He does point out, however, that one of the forts could be built in Nicosia, incorporating the spring so that it does not fall into enemy hands if the city is taken. The spring would be helpful in digging the moats and would ensure the safety and wellbeing of the people taking refuge in the fort.

Di Famagosta

Serenissimo Principe, Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori,

Per soddisfare a quanto Vostra Sublimità m'ha commesso ch' io dica dove che per adesso bisogna attendere a fabricar in Famagosta, et quello che bisognerà far per mia opinione per ridurla in quella maggior securtà che si può, dicho di far finir il belloardo nuovo già cominciato fino alla sua perfettione, et se si contiuarà come è stato principiato, et secondo gli ordini dati, non si potrà fare alcun' errore ma, se nel fatto occoresse qualche difficoltà, Vostra Sublimità farà tuore il parer del governor delle ordinanze Roncon,¹ perché è huomo

¹ Leonardo Roncone was held in high esteem by G.S. and Francesco Barbaro, and played a fundamental role in the business of reorganizing the island's defences. Leonardo came from a military family which gave Venice several other officers, including Lodovico, who served in Friuli – possibly under the command of G.S. –, and Filippo, who led a company in Corfu in 1558/1559, then in Bergamo in 1564; Leonardo seems to have known G.S. since the early 1550s. Before going to Cyprus, Leonardo was made governor of Cattaro in March 1558, and before that was governor of the Orzi Novi fortress (until November 1564), as well as governor of Marano (for a pay of 30 ducats). He was appointed *ordinanze* governor in Cyprus in December 1565 (with a yearly pay increased to 400 ducats), and arrived on the island at the beginning of July 1566. During the construction of Nicosia's fortress, G.S. and Francesco Barbaro regularly applauded Roncone's technical skill and military discipline, which made him an indispensable member of the project and fit for the post of governor of the Nicosia fortress. He then took an active role in the preparations for the war of 1570. Having been given the task of organizing the defence of Nicosia by Astore Baglioni, he died in the assault of 9 September: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, f. 23^r, reg. 37, f. 148^v, reg. 39, f. 131^v; id., *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, ff. 28^r, 48^r; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (letter dated 8 July 1566); Pietro

intendente di fortificazione et non lascierà far errori, et per mia opinione è assai meglio che alcun ingegnere, perché oltre la pratica et intelligientia di fortificatione, è anche huomo di buon giudicio; et perché il terreno della fossa del detto belloardo che devea esser portato dentro la terra è stato posto di fori su la contrascarpa per mezo detto balloardo, et non potria star peggio, però in caso chel non fosse stato portato via, Vostra Serenità ordinarà di farlo levare, portandolo dentro la terra o fori dove sarà giudicato meglio fra lo ditto belloardo nuovo et un torion tondo che è alla marina; vi è una tanaglia² nell'angullo dellaqual vi è una meza luna,³ questa meza luna impedisse che la tanaglia sopradetta non può fare il suo effetto per la fossa, così verso il torion tondo alla marina come dall'altra parte alla volta d'un torioncino tondo, alla volta et vicino al detto belloardo novo. Però per mio parere saria ben fatto levar via detta meza luna, riducendo le muraglie delle cortine insieme unite per fare ch'el angulo potesse difendere da tutte 2 le bande, come si vede in un dissegnetto che io farò presentar alla Serenità Vostra. Nell' resto della fortezza di dentro non mi pare che si possa far altro per adesso, ma in evento di bisogno diria che si facesse portar dentro essa fortezza quella maggior quantità di terreno che fosse possibile, ponendolo nei luochi dove fosse giudicato maggior bisogno.

Quanto alla difesa dell'isola, altre volte et fu del 1558 et 62,⁴ se ben io non era stato de li, disse quello che mi occorreva in due mie scritte, che sono nell'ufficio delle fortezze, hora havendo aggiunto quel di più che ho giudicato a proposito in un'altra mia scrittura presentata dopo il mio ritorno di quel Regno,⁵ non saprei che aggiunger che riportarmi a quello che in dette scritte si contiene. Ben direi che uno delli forti che si havesse a far saria ben fatto a farlo sopra l'acqua di Nicossia, a fine solamente che dett'acqua giovasse a quei del forte et non lasciarla alla città di Nichossia, dellaqual città se gli nemici havessero la commodità di quest'acqua sarebbe commodissimo alloggiamiento, il che non sarà se l'acqua sarà nostra, laqual si farebbe perder nelle fosse del forte che si facesse, et porta la spesa a far detto forte in questo luogo, se ben non è vicino alla marina per levare questo commodissimo alloggiamiento all'inimicho oltre la conservatione di tante anime, et alla Vostra Serenità humilmente mi raccomando.

Di Venetia, li 17 febraro 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano



Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 120 n. 243 and passim; A. Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δοκίμια φύλλα (1570–1572). Ο Πόλεμος της Κύπρου*, Nicosia 2004, p. 106; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βασιλίων και προνοητών της Κύπρου*, p. 121. 2 *tanaglia*: a structure composed of two small flanks creating a re-entrant angle facing outwards, the function of which was to cover a curtain. 3 *meza luna*: a structure in fortification that was originally circular, and used to cover the fortress's curtain and bastions; in the second half of the sixteenth century it was often replaced with a ravelin. 4 Cf. supra, docs 3 and 5. 5 Cf. supra, docs 7 to 12.

21 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Corfu, 12 April 1567*

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 11^r-13^v.

G.S. has been in Corfu for forty days but has not yet managed to make any headway with the two northerly bastions, even though he could have proceeded as in Zara, where in July 1566 the walls were restored for less than 2,000 ducats using the ferlini system. If G.S. had adopted this system and spent 200 ducats on each bastion, both could have been finished. Proveditor-General Barbaro asked some time ago that the nineteen proposals for Corfu that G.S. submitted in June 1566 be put into effect; it was Colonel Zuan Beccari's job to do so, but nothing has been done, even though March and April are the best months for working. G.S. informed the rettori of the plans he was submitting to the provveditori alle fortezze; he assured them that 1,000 ducats had been allocated to the work on the millet tower, but the letter that he was carrying did not testify to this promise, and he lost all credibility. This is what led to G.S.'s forty days of idleness, something that he has never experienced before and that he is not enjoying at all in view of the time he has wasted on Corfu's fortress, which offers favourable physical and material conditions and which, due to its cost, is considered the greatest in the world.

When the news came from Zakynthos, G.S. learnt that he had been posted to Cyprus, that Paolo Orsini was coming to replace him in Corfu, and that Girolamo Martinengo had been sent to Candia. G.S. knows not in what capacity he is going to Cyprus, but he is adamant that neither the forty days of idleness nor women have affected his desire to serve; he prays to God that he will come back from Cyprus alive, and is sad to be leaving Corfu, where he has not managed to oversee the completion of even a single bastion, a task that could really have been finished in twenty days. If in Cyprus he can find men and tools, and if Venice sends artillery and gunpowder, he will be able to build forts of a higher quality than that of Famagusta, where, as in Udine, the terrain is not suited to this kind of work. G.S. supposes that a new fortress is planned, and, not wanting to take away any of the supplies bound for Famagusta, requests ahead of time the supplies he will need: 3,000 to 4,000 pickaxes, as many cannonballs, enough artillery to fire at least 400 shots, and lots of powder, balls and lead. Finally, he stresses the urgent need for Venice to send a large number of good soldiers.

Molto Magnifico Signor mio honorato,

Son certo che Vostra Signora aspettava una lettera da me nel mio primo gionger qui, nella quale li dovesse dar conto di questa importantissima fortezza ma, per non contristarla et darli mala satisfatione nel principio, mi era risolto de indugiar tanto a scriverli che io havessi fatto con il mezo di questi Clarissimi Rettori qualche giovamento a questa fortificatione, ma la sorte mia cattiva, o per dir meglio la mala sorte della fortificatione di Corfù, ha voluto che io sia stato qui hormai quaranta giorni senza haver mai potuto impetrar gratia di poter fare un minimo servitio a questi dui belloardi della fronte di terra, quali in più lochi hanno aperta la bocca et cridano, domandando aiuto et misericordia, il che era fattibile, et così come questo

luglio passato manco di ducento ducatti movendo terreni con li ferlini, fu restaurata et riparata quella città di Zara al modo che si sa.¹

Dico a Vostra Signoria che medesimamente con ducento ducatti l'uno, et forse manco di terreni, con li ferlini si haverebbono assettati benissimo questi dui belloardi, ma quando fui gionto qui dissi quello che si voleva fare, presente il collonello Zuan Beccari,² qual sapeva l'intentione del Clarissimo Barbaro³ passato, qual era de essequire quelli 19 miei ricordi datili in tanti capitoli adesso un'anno che io era qui,⁴ la copia delli quali diedi a Sua Serenità, questo zugno passato et furono approbati tutti et parte de loro dal Clarissimo Barbaro sono stati essequiti in tutto, et parte principiati. Però io credeva che il detto collonello Zuan Beccari dovesse / [11^v] desiderar che tutti fussero essequiti, ma non so a chi dar la colpa che mai mi hanno voluto intender né ascoltar, et sappia Vostra Signoria, che mai ho fallato giorno che non l'abbia ricordato, facendo conscientia del gran peccato che è a perder tempo al presente. Il mese de marzo, aprile che in questi paesi sono li migliori dell'anno, nelli quali si trovano gente in abbondantia da lavorare, ma zugno, luglio et agosto si perde gran parte del giorno per li estremi caldi, et poi la gente attende alle campagne, per il poco numero d'huomini che vi è et poltroni, il settembre fino a febraro è tanto pluvioso che mal si pol lavorare, et per far venir voglia di lavorare l'ho scritto a Sua Serenità, et un'altra lettera alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze, qual tutte due lettere le ho fatte vedere prima a questi Clarissimi, et in le sue lettere le ho mandate duplicate, et per la verità io ancora ho per excusati questi Signori Rettori, se non mi credono, per che io li portai una lettera di Sua Serenità,⁵ qual diceva mandaremo mille ducatti, per far la torre da salvare il meglio, et li danari non comparsero altrimenti, et io li dicevo che li rasonatti a Venetia mi haveano certificato che in quelli diece mille ducatti che io havea portati da Venetia, sei mille erano per conto de formenti, tre mille per conto de soldati et mille per questo conto di far la torre del meglio, quando è stato poi aperto il groppo, non è stato vero niente, di modo che me hanno burlato per la busia che io li diceva, ancora che la lettera di Sua Serenità sia in esser et venuta, per il che havendomi trovato in busia / [12^r] in questa cosa che a me era certificata per vera a Venetia, non è gran fatto se non me voleno ascoltar, sì che in poche parole darò conto a Vostra Signoria di quello che ho fatto in questi 40 giorni, il che è niente, né mai in mia vita sono stato 40 giorno in ocio, come son stato al presente.

1 G.S. alludes to the construction work done in Zara in July 1566 at the site supervised by Sforza Pallavicino, where the *ferlini* system was used to pay the 2,000 men working there: Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan', p. 188; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 129–130; Concina / Molteni, '“La fabrica della fortezza”', p. 161. 2 Colonel Zuan Beccari was sent to Corfu as governor in the spring of 1565, and awaited the renewal of his *condotta*, which had come to its end. He was ordered to work closely with G.S. to ensure the security of Corfu's fortress, which Venice felt was threatened by French corsairs serving Raguse: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 22^r; id., *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, *Lettere di condottieri e di gente d'arme*, b. 308 (proceedings of 9 February 1566 m.v.); Pagratis, *Oi εκθέσεις των βενετών βαίλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 138. 3 Francesco Barbaro; cf. supra, doc. 18 n. 2 4 G.S. alludes here to the 19 recommendations he made to reinforce Corfu's fortress, dated 25 April 1566: ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 5^r–6^r, and *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 49^r–50^v. 5 G.S. does not mention these difficulties in the report he wrote at the end of his mission in Corfu on 10 March 1567: *ibid.*, ff. 66^v–67^v.

Et io era risolto di scorrer così fino alla risposta delle mie sopradette lettere scritte a Sua Serenità et dubitava grandamente di amalarmi da disperatione di quest'ocio, et di questo tempo che si perde, nel quale se ne potrebbe haver una grandissima carestia, et forse anco di me in questo loco per questo servizio, ma son certo che Vostra Signoria si maraviglierà et mi tratterà da pazzo a sentirme a dire che ho havuto caro grandemente di esser levato de qui, che è tenuta la prima fortezza del mondo, rispetto al costo suo, alla infinita monition di guerra, et ben fornita di formenti, senza modo di far fuoco, et di aere perfettissimo per andarmene in Cipro, qual è l'opposito in le sopradette cose, essendo venuta nova qui dal Zante per tre diverse man di lettere de particolari, per le quali si dice che Sua Serenità me manda in Cipro, et che qui viene il Signor Paolo Orsino di certezza, et anco che si ha detto ma non per cosa certa, chel Signor Hieronimo Martinengo va in Candia, ma particolarità alcuna di questi Signori né di me, non si sa se io vado in Cipro come soldato o proto de murari, overo di guastatori sia qual si voglia di questi tre me sarà cara pur ch' io non stia qui, / [12^v] per che a me quest'aere era peggio all'animo che quello al corpo vedendomi esser vecchio, fuori d'Italia, senza far servizio alli miei patroni, gran parte de quali ho opinione che credevano che io dovessi farli gran giovamento, come sarebbe stato di certezza, ma la cosa non è mia, crederò ben che al manco Vostra Signoria che mi conosce sarà certa, che il gioco non mi ha disviato, il quale a me è inimicissimo come altri l'havea nelle ossa, le donne manco me hanno disviato né spasso de niuna sorte, anzi in questi 40 giorni che io son stato qui mai ho posto il piede fuori del ponte della fortezza, accompagnando ogni giorno il Clarissimo Baijlo⁶ et tutti doi li Signori Consiglieri⁷ sera, et mattina levandoli de casa fino al ponte della fossa, et se io voleva far essercitio me ne andava in li castelli ogni giorno per caminare, sì che la mia vita è stata tale et niuno havrà causa di dir bene né male della mia fabrica ch' io habbia fatta in questo mio viaggio.

Prego Vostra Signoria che la voglia pregar Dio che di Cipro ritorni vivo, et che in Cipro habbia modo de far qualche utile alle Vostre Signorie Illustrissime, non posso negar di non haver un martel grandissimo di non haver ridotto a perfettione almanco uno di questi balloardi, il che l'havrei fatto certissimo in vinti giorni, ma patientia me rinresce che li boni portarano la pena per altri. Se in Cipro haverò chi voglia homini, zappe et pale, et che da Venetia siano mandate artiglierie, et polvere et piombi si faranno presto delli forti, più forti di Famagosta ma il lavorar a Fama-/ [13^r] gosta, et a Udene⁸ sono assai simili di pessimi siti, per consumar li thesori et per far poco honor a chi li fortificarà, et manco a chi li difenderà per che, come ben sa Vostra Signoria, la fortificatione è molto amica della polpa et del terreno, et non delle ossi né delle pietre o sabione.

6 Lorenzo Bernardo; cf. supra, doc. 19 n. 2. 7 In the spring of 1567 the Corfu *bailòs* two councillors were Andrea Diedo, *di Hieronimo*, who had been in this position since June 1566, and Zuan Francesco Contarini, *d'Alessandro*, who took office in April 1567, replacing Zuan Antonio Venier, *di Lunardo*: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 172^v–173^r; Pagratis, *Oi εκθέσεις των βενετών βαίλων και προσηγών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 143. 8 The fortification of Udine and the defence of Friuli were both issues with which G.S. concerned himself, as he gave opinions and delivered several reports concerning the two questions between December 1566 and January 1567. It should be noted that in each case he stresses that fortifying Udine is not a priority: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 56^r–66^r; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 121–123.

Se io sapesse domandar qualche servitio a Vostra Signoria lo dimandarei per la baldezza della servitù ch' io tengo seco, come fece mio padre con il Clarissimo Signor suo padre,⁹ pur non voglio restar di pregarla che in caso che fusse vero che io andasso in Cipro, mi vado immaginando che faranno far qualche forte da novo oltre a Famagosta, in questo caso supplico Vostra Signoria in mio nome a pregar li Signori delle fortezze che immediate vogliano proveder delle cinque cose sopradette in grand' abbontantia, come sarebbe a dire al manco tre o quattro mille zapponi, altre tante palle, se non ne sono in quel Regno al presente, et medesimamente artiglierie per non disornir Famagosta né di polvere né de balle, et Vostra Signoria in quel caso ricordi che non mandino pezzi d'artiglieria che non habbia da far quattro cento tiri almanco per ciascuno, così di polvere come di balle et di piombi in grandissima quantità. Non dico di gran numero de soldati et boni, per che Vostra Signoria da sé lo pò molto ben considerare quanto è necessario grossissimo numero. Et se avanti il partir di questa mia lettera se havesse qualche certificatione da Venetia più vera, non restarei di scriver qualche altra cosa, et qui facendo fine alla / [13^v] sua buona gratia sempre me raccomando.

Di Corfù alli 12 aprile 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano¹⁰

Corfù 1567 12 aprile



22 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Corfu, 16 April 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 17^{r-v}.

The Corfu bailo has shown G.S. the letter from the doge entrusting him with his mission. G.S. assures the doge that he will make his way to Cyprus as quickly and as eagerly as he has always gone anywhere the Signoria has asked him to, and he thanks the doge for not forgetting him. He vows to respect the doge's wishes and hopes to know more about his mission very soon, so that he may request tools and ammunition from the provveditori alle fortezze.

G.S. also thanks the doge for the money he has given him, which has been delivered by Paolo Orsini; he stresses how lucky he is to receive such grace. He also expresses how pleased he is with the titles accorded to Francesco Soranzo, appointed bailo in Constantinople, and Francesco

⁹ Nothing is known about the nature of the connection between Girolamo Savorgnan and Nicolò Michiel, which may have partly affected the relationship between G.S. and Francesco Michiel; it may be supposed that the connection was formed between 1500 and 1520, when Venice was forced to rethink its defence policies; cf. *infra*, doc. 30. During those years, Nicolò Michiel was linked to the *giovanni* party: R. Finlay, 'The Venetian Republic as a gerontocracy: Age and politics in the Renaissance', *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 8/2 (Fall 1978), p. 173. ¹⁰ There follows a long post-scriptum concerning the problems related to the artillery pieces then positioned in Corfu's fortress.

Barbaro, appointed provveditor-general in Cyprus; this is proof that Venice rewards its loyal servants.

Serenissimo Principe,

Il Clarissimo Baijlo¹ qui di Corfù mi ha fatto veder quella lettera per la quale la Serenità Vostra mi commanda ch' io vada in Cipro alli suoi servitij et che lei pensa ch' io anderò prontamente, et con buon animo, come ho fatto sempre in molti lochi in suo servitio, alla qual lettera rispondendo dico a Vostra Serenità che ella non se inganna de niente del mio buon animo et della prontezza nella quale sarò sempre per servirla di buon cuore, anzi la ringratio infinitamente quanto più spesso ella si degna di ricordarsi di me, et di comandarme ogni sorte di servitij che io sia buono di farli. Se io sapessi qualche particolarità della volontà sua, di ciò che si ha da fare in Cipro, domandarei al presente a Vostra Serenità per avanzar tempo diverse cose, ma non restarò di far una nota delle cose che sarebbono necessarie qual manderò alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze.

Mi resta a ringratiar la Serenità Vostra che la se habbia degnata di farmi quel presente de danari,² quali mi sono stati portati dall' Illustrissimo Signor Paolo Orsino, et voglio che la sappia che mi sono stati molto più cari che se fussero stati diece volte più, essendo che Vostra Serenità da sé stessa, è mossa a farmi questo favore, il qual appretio molto più che li proprij danari, per che li danari si spendono et il favore di esser in gratia di Vostra Serenità durerà perpetuamente, et mi è stato di grandissima consolatione haver sentito delli honori che le Signorie Vostre Illustrissime hanno dato alli doi Clarissimi Signori Soranzo³ che è a Constantinopoli, et al Clarissimo Barbaro che è in Cipro, di modo che si vede chiaramente che la benignità di Vostra Serenità si ricorda di honorare quelli che fidelmente et ben la / [17^v] serveno ancora che siano lontani, come sono quelli dui signori, per il che anco noi altri soldati, vedemo già l'effetto cominciato in noi et potemo sperare in li nostri gradi di esser anco honorati per lontani che siamo, et con questo fine sempre alla sua buona gratia me raccomando.

Di Corfù alli 16 aprile 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Corfù 1567 16 aprile



1 Lorenzo Bernardo; cf. supra, doc. 19 n. 1. 2 An allusion to the 500 ducats that the Senate gave to G.S., via Paolo Orsini, to cover the costs of his journey to Cyprus: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni, reg. 75, f. 25^{r-v}. 3 Giacomo Soranzo was elected *bailo* of Constantinople in January 1566, and took office in May: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 186^v–187^r. Concerning the office of *bailo*, see: B. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani a Costantinopoli', in *Venezia e i Turchi. Scontri e confronti di due civiltà*, Milan 1985, pp. 56–69; E. R. Dursteler, 'The bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and career in Venice's early modern diplomatics corps', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16 / 2 (2001), pp. 1–30; M. P. Pedani, *Venezia porta d'Oriente*, Bologna 2010, pp. 77–81.

23 *Letter from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze, 18 April 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 19^r–20^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 70^{r-v}.

The proveditors know that if they wish for a fortress to be built in Cyprus, they must send the necessary tools and ammunition quickly, as the island is a long way from Venice. Even if G.S. cannot know exactly what will come to be required, he feels the fortresses will need:

- thousands of pickaxes and shovels;
- enough powder and cannonballs for at least 500 shots from each cannon;
- 2,000 pikes for each fortress, as the example of Malta has shown;
- 500 cuirasses;
- 25 botte [187 hl] of pitch;
- sufficient quantities of lead, given that in the event of an attack 2,000 arquebusiers can, for their ammunition, consume up to 2 miara [30 l] of lead every day;
- arquebusiers and 200 to 300 large muskets;
- rope for the arquebusiers;
- lumber to be used in construction;
- a great many barrels of nails.

Furthermore, G.S. proposes replacing the round baskets used to move earth in the construction of fortresses throughout the Levant, and which hold a maximum of 44 pounds [21 kg], with Lombard-style zerletti, baskets that workers carry on their backs which can hold up to 90 pounds [43 kg]. If this type of basket is introduced, along with the ferlini system, work will go twice as quickly. G.S. has not found anybody who can make these baskets in Crete, but they could easily be brought from Italy, where they cost no more than half a marcello. G.S. apologizes for going into such technical detail, but justifies himself by explaining that digging the moats represents four fifths of the total outlay of a fortress, and half of these expenses could be saved. He concludes by asking for a pay-rise for the soldiers, from 8 soldi per day to 10, in order to attract good men. The island being so far away means that special measures must be taken to convince soldiers to come, as Sforza Pallavicino will confirm.

Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori¹ miei osservantissimi,

Se in Cipro Vostre Signorie Illustrissime vorranno che si fabbrichi, le sanno che de prima zappe et badili vorranno esser a migliara et direi particolarmente quanti, se io sapessi quello che si ha da fare per avanzar tempo, però non ponno esser di più in quelli lochi lontani da Venetia et per monitione sempre sono boni et necessarijssimi.

De artiglierie, polvere, et balle per fare cinque cento tiri per pezzo, è cosa troppo nota et principale.

Doi millia picche da monitione sarebbono poche in ciascuna fortezza, come sarebbe dir

¹ The two *provveditori alle fortezze* in April 1567 were Paulo Zorzi and Marco Grimani: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 45^v.

Famagosta, Candia, Canea, Corfù et Zara, et poco ha mancato che Malta non sia presa l'ultimo assalto che hebbe, per causa che tutte le sue picche li furono rotte,² et tagliate dalle archibusate et difesero quell'ultimo assalto con gran fatica con l'arme d'hasta curte, che furon labarde de monitione,³ onde mille sarebbono poche per fortezza.

Cinque cento corsaletti di monitione per fortezza, sono più presto pochi cha molti.

Vinticinque botte di pegola sono necessarijssime per fortezza.

Piombi ne potrebbe andar 2 miara a 2 mille archibusieri in un giorno, che manco non ne vole a potersi difendere, et bisogna ricordarsi che le piazze a esser forte convengano esser grande, et che se ne consumano assai in le artiglierie di bronzo, tirandone li centenara alla volta dalli fianchi alle batterie, però ducento miara per fortezza in questi paesi, che non sono edeficij coperti di piombo, saranno necessarij.

Arcobusi da monitione sono necessarij, quali si adoperano alli rispetti.

Li moschettoni grandi 200 o 300 per fortezza fanno effetti mirabili / [19^v]

Corda per archibusieri in gran quantità, perché a Malta hebbero da fare in questa materia, come Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime si dieno ricordar delli avisi.

Legnami da fabricare, cioè per fare scalle et ponti da cavar le fosse, o altre cose secondo le opere che vorranno fare, sono necessarijssimi.

Vi vanno anco barili di chiodi in gran numero.

Non voglio restar di dar anco un'altro fastidio a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime qual le parerà cosa non degna da scriverle ma è importantissima: le saperanno che in Cipro, in Candia, alla Canea, Corfù et Zara, tutte le cavatione delle fosse si fanno portando li terreni in alcune ceste tonde molto discommode da metterle da prese in spalla o sopra la testa, ancora che pesano piene fino a 44 lire. Se io fusse in Vostre Signorie Illustrissime, vorrei introdurre li zerletti, come si usano in Lombardia, nelli quali molto più comodamente si portarebe 80 et anco 90 di terra, di quella che si fanno queste 40, et fabricandosi a ferlini, overo come si voglia sarà utile il doppio, perché a questo modo la difficoltà è nel caricarsi, però per inviar la cosa, se Vostre Signorie Illustrissime ne mandassero per questa prima volta qualche miaro, o quante a loro parerà in queste sue fortezze di Levante, sarà una bona et utilissima opera, ne ho voluti far fare in Candia non hanno saputo, con li navilij per esser cosa leggiera di fora via l'un nell'altro ligati, facilmente si portarano et costanno dui per marcello, et credo anco manco, et bisognarebbe mandarli anco quelli tre legni di selgaro⁴ fatti, sopra li quali si pone il zerletto per caricarlo. Vostre Signorie Illustrissime non me habbiano a male se io li do impazzo con simil minutie ma, per mia opinione, le cavationi delle fosse è li quattro quinti della spesa di

2 This is a reference to the siege of Malta, and more specifically to Suleiman the Magnificent's attempt to take over the island from May to September 1565, which ended in an Ottoman defeat. Here again it should be underlined how much G.S. takes into consideration past conflicts with the Turks to form his ideas on strategic defence. It is not known, however, in which account G.S. found his information regarding the broken pikes, as at that time the last Ottoman attacks on Malta had rather been characterized by large-scale use of artillery: Francesco Balbi, *La verdadera relación de todo lo que el anno de M.D.LXV ha succedido en la isla de Malta*, Barcelona: en casa de Pedro Reigner, 1568, ff. 98^v–101^v. 3 This was a halberd or another type of medium-sized pole weapon. 4 This appears to be a regional variant of *salice*, 'willow'.

una fortificatione fatta in / [20^v] bon terreno per elettione, l'avanzar il mezo delli quattro quinti in una simil cosetta mi pare che sia da non tacere, sì che convengo parlare in quelle cose che siano utile al suo servitio, et voglio che le sappiano (come credo) che me conoscono che così come li propono le monitioni et fortezze reale tanto più attendo di far fare quello ch' io posso con suo grandissimo sparagno, a fine di conservare il tutto con l'aiuto di Dio.

De numero de soldati et buoni non ne parlerò, non havendo fondamento alcuno, ben li ricorderò con ogni debita riverentia che per li broglj, li capitani, li governatori suoi, et anco altri non hanno ardimento di parlare per tenir la ragione delli poveri soldati, et lassano andar l'acqua alla bassa (come si suol dire) lassando intaccare con mille artefici le paghe delli poveri soldati privati, sì che non hanno né anco li suoi 8 soldi al giorni, però Vostre Signorie Illustrissime per rimediarli doverebbono per l'avenir (volendo tenir homini boni da combattere et non generation inutile che 1000 non valerebbono contra 50) pagarli a ragion che habbiano soldi 10 al giorno per fante netti, senza niuna sorte de intacco, et Vostre Signorie Illustrissime consideranno da per sé qual sorte di contadino o altro vil artesano, che non guadagni assai più delli soldi 10 al giorno, ma che li fussero dati come ho detto otto schietti che sarebbe poi lire 15 al mese, con li quali hanno da vestirsi, armarsi et mangiare per vivere; quando fussero pagati a questo modo, ne venirebbono de boni a servirle, et son certo che vennendo il bisogno, Vostre Signorie Illustrissime li daranno anco uno da 12, ma il ponto è di non esser accolti all'improvviso con la gente trista sul fatto, non havendo né anco tempo di mandarne a cambiar de boni, et questa è la causa che mi move a parlare al presente et se io fussi a Triviso, o a Padua, o a Lignago, non aprirei la bocca, ma la lontananza del / [20^v] viaggio, et il tempo mi fa liberamente parlare dil che li chiedo perdono, et in tutte le cose suddette le supplico a voler haver il parere del suo Eccellentissimo Generale, il Signor Sforza, se io domando cose che non siano più che necessarie, anzi spero che accrescerà in numero et in qualità, per che è da creder che Sua Signoria ricorderà anco delle cose che io non le posso antivedere, non sapendo quella che si habbia a far in Cipro, et qui facendo fine, alle sue bone gratie sempre me raccomandando.

Di Corfù alli 18 aprile 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustrissime buon servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Da Corfù 1567 18 aprile



24 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Corfu, 18 April 1567*

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 21^{r-v}.

G.S. thanks Francesco Michiel for his two letters, and tells him that he has written, on 16 April, two letters in response; these will be delivered to him by his nephew, Mario, who is returning to Italy to escape the Cypriot sun.

G.S. has written to [Andrea] Badoer and expresses his delight at having been promoted, hoping that he will be capable of doing everything necessary to properly defend the Regno. He has also written to Suriano, to the doge, to the provveditori alle fortezze and to Sforza Pallavicino. G.S. asks Francesco Michiel's opinion on whether or not the letter addressed to the proveditori, written before he knew the objective of his mission, is inopportune; if it is, it should be destroyed.

G.S. tells Michiel that he will set sail the next day [19 April 1567] on a galley that will take him to Candia, whilst the soldiers will be taken on a different vessel as far as Zakynthos, where another boat will be sought to get them to Cyprus.

In the post-scriptum, G.S. assures Michiel that he is not scared of falling ill in Cyprus, or of succumbing to the temptation of Bacchus and Venus. He hopes to return to Italy in good health and to revisit the fortifications in Candia; and he is delighted with the decision to fortify Udine.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Le due lettere sue mi hanno dato tanto lume che io son sforzato a restarli sempre schiavo. Li ho scritto già dui giorni due altre mie lettere, qual li saranno portate da mio nipote il conte Mario,¹ qual ho mandato in dietro per paura del sol di Cipro, et non per altro.

Ho scritto al Clarissimo Badoer savio grande,² allegrandomi della sua maggior autorità cresciuta, et che per questo vado anco più allegramente, sappendo et sperando che non lascerà mancar di niuna di quelle cose che farà bisogno per la difesa di qual Regno tanto importante a Venetia. Ho scritto anco al cavalier Suriano,³ a Sua Serenità, et alli Signori delle

1 G.S.'s nephew Mario, the son of Marc'Antonio Savorgnan, was at this time fourteen years old; he had doubtless already been with his uncle to Dalmatia and Corfu, but, thinking of the family, G.S. here sends him back to Italy as a precaution, judging the bad Cyprus air to be a risk for him and his brother Germanico. Paradoxically, it was Germanico, the younger of the two brothers (thirteen years old), who made the journey to Cyprus. 2 Andrea Badoer, born on 2 February 1515. In 1544 he married one of Zuanne Corner's daughters and went on to pursue a career in administration and diplomacy, becoming an important political figure. He was a *rettore* in Feltre in 1552, and again in Crema in 1553; then from 1566–1567 he was *savio di Terraferma*, in charge, notably, of the *ordinanze*. He was also named ambassador extraordinary to Philip II in December 1560, then *luocotenente* in Udine in 1563. He became a member of the Council of Ten in December 1567, and had the task of discussing the demarcation of Tyrol's borders, along with Agostino Barbarigo and Sebastiano Venier. During the war in Cyprus he played a leading role in the negotiations with Spain and Rome that settled the establishment of the Holy League. He died in September 1575: 'Andrea Biagio Badoer', *DBI*, vol. 5, pp. 98–99. 3 This *cavalier* Soriano was probably Michele Soriano, a diplomat sent to England and the Netherlands from 1554 to 1557, then to Spain, France and finally Rome from 1568 to 1571. He played a direct part in the discussions leading to the establishment of the Holy League in 1570: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 4, pp. 951ss.

fortezze, come Vostra Signoria Clarissima vederà, et al Signor Sforza, ringratiando Sua Eccellenza.⁴ Prego Vostra Signoria che se li paresse che questa lettera delli signori delle fortezze inclusa fusse fuori di tempo, overo non a proposito non sapendo io quello che hanno deliberato di fare in Cipro né la causa del suspetto, però non mi voglio risigare di darla se Vostra Signoria prima non la vede, sì che mi remmetto al suo buon giuditio di presentarla o veramente tenerla in sé, et abbruciarla all'arrivar di queste in Venetia, dubito che le cose saranno forse talmente assicurate che tal lettera mia sarebbe dispiacevole et fastidiosa, et se le cose fussero più calde mediante questa lettera, le provisione sarebbeno forse più preste, et come ho detto mi riporto al suo buon giuditio et quella faccia quanto li piace.

Dimane da sera, con l'aiuto di Dio, monteremo in galera per Candia et poi per Cipro, di cento et diece che siamo in tutto,⁵ li diece mandamo sopra una nave fino al Zante, et lì poi ritroverà passaggio per Cipro, / [21^v] portando le robbe di tutti li altri soldati, con le quale non havemo voluto caricare né inbogliare le galere per buoni rispetti, sì che mi raccomando a Vostra Signoria senza fine, et dal Zante li scriverò ancora, et di Candia, et tanto che io lo scrivo, mi giova estremamente all'animo per che Dio ha inclinata la mia natura a volerli bene, et esserli servitor, però la prego a tenirmi per tale. Volendo dare la lettera alli Signori delle fortezze, la sarà contenta di darla a messer Filaretto che lui sia solo.

Di Corfù alli 18 aprile 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Non ho una paura al mondo di amalarme in Cipro, per che non ho paura né de Baccho né de Venere, con Jove sarà quello che piacerà al Signor Dio, ma sperarò bene in lui che facendo io opera giusta per la religione et per li miei patroni senza pensiero dell'utile, ma solo dell'honor et della vita, tornerò sano in Italia di certezza, però Vostra Signoria non si pigli fastidio alcuno di me, né mancarò di farli honor. La ressolutione di Udene⁶ mi serve per una ombrella contra il sole di Cipro, et poi vado anco voluntieri per rivedere Candia, cioè la sua fabrica che Dio volesse che 'l Eccellentissimo Pregadi potesse veder quella sorte di fortificatione.

Da Corfù 1567 18 aprile. Al Clarissimo messer Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michiel fu del Clarissimo Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia.



4 Of these various letters, only those addressed to the doge and to the *provveditori alle fortezze* seem to have been preserved; cf. supra, docs 22–23. 5 That is, the 100 soldiers and ten *lanze spezzate* mentioned in G.S.'s *condotta*; cf. supra, doc. 18. 6 The Senate voted for Udine to be fortified on 16 December 1566, having heard the arguments of Sforza Pallavicino, Astore Baglioni, Girolamo Martinengo and G.S.: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 115^v. This decision was not to G.S.'s liking; he did not judge Udine to be an important part of Friuli's defensive system. Cf. the reports on this matter mentioned supra, doc. 21 n. 8; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 121–123.

25 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Nicosia, 27 May 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 29^r; id., *Materie Misti Notabili* 11, f. 74^r; id., *Annali 1566–1570*, f. 9^r.

G.S. reached Nicosia on 10 May, and on 16 May the leading Venetian officers took the decision to build a fortress encircling all the fine houses of the city, taking care to maintain a good distance from the hill to the west, near the old walls. The reasons behind this decision will be explained at a later date; G.S. says he is at the officers' disposal, and sends with this letter another addressed to Sforza Pallavicino so that he may inform the provveditori alle fortezze. Regarding the deadline for the project, the coming March [1568], G.S. assures the doge that it will be met, as long as he is given 6,000 men and nobody interferes with the execution of his orders. Eight months will suffice, and the work will cost less than building a single bastion in most other places under Venetian administration.

Serenissimo Principe,

Alli 10 del presente mese di maggio son gionto qui in Nicossia, et alli 16 è stato risolto da questi Clarissimi Signori di abbracciare con uno forte tutte le buone case di Nicossia, discostandosi da quell'altura che è vicina alla muraglia vecchia verso ostro. Le cause che hanno mosso questi Clarissimi Signori a fare tal deliberatione, per lettere di loro Signorie Clarissime la Serenità Vostra sarà avisata. Io non manco di star' alla obedientia di loro Signorie Clarissime, così come Vostra Serenità ha comandato, sì in Famagosta a quel Clarissimo Capitano, come qui in Nicossia a questi Clarissimi Signori.¹ Delle particolarità di questa fortezza, mando qui inclusa una mia lettera aperta all'Eccellentia del Signor Sforza general suo, accioché li Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze, volendo possano sapere ogni particolarità. Et circa il tempo di esser messa in fortezza per tutto marzo come la Serenità Vostra ha scritto che si debba fare, quella non dubiti che il tutto sarà fatto a tempo, se però questi Clarissimi Signori me attenderanno di dar il numero delli sei mille homini a tempo, et che non me sia confuso et interrotto l'ordine del fabricare, son certissimo che molto avanti li 8 mesi saremo posti in securtà bonissima, et con manco spesa di certezza di quello che costa un belloardo solo a Vostra Serenità in questo suo Regno, overo in assai altri lochi del suo Stato, riportandomi nel resto a quanto ho detto di sopra, et in la bona gratia di Vostra Serenità sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 27 maggio 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

¹ In May 1567 the Nicosia *regimento* was made up of *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini, *di Marco* (who was elected on 17 November 1566 and took office on 16 March 1567), Councillor Nicolò Loredan, *di Hettore* (elected on 3 February 1566, took office on 16 February) and Councillor Benedetto da Mulla, *di Hieronimo* (elected on 20 October 1566, took office on 22 April 1567): ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 182^v–184^r.

26 *Letter from G.S. to Sforza Pallavicino, Nicosia, 27 May 1567*

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 33^r–37^v; copies: id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 74^r–76^v; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 8; id., *Annali 1566–1570*, ff. 9^r–12^v (extract from the section concerning G.S.'s voyage).

G.S. tells of his journey from Corfu to Cyprus which took seven days, during which the galleys managed to avoid the Turk Corsairs (on the advice of Romagas, the captain of Malta's galleys). Even though it was a deviation from the route to Famagusta, G.S. disembarked at Cerines to avoid the risk of bad air in Salina.

During the nine days he has spent in Nicosia, the rettori have taken the decision to fortify the city with eleven large bastions, and the Regno lords have agreed to give 80,000 ducats to this end. The count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] has donated 10,000 ducats, and the count's relative Antonio Davila has followed suit, giving the same amount; the università has agreed to donate 60,000. The decision has been taken not to fortify Cerines with the 50,000 ducats sent from Venice, as even with this extra sum, many soldiers would still be needed to defend the town.

Building a citadel in Nicosia incorporating both the spring and the city proved impossible for five reasons:

- *The spring is so far from the city that to incorporate it would have required a twelve-bastion enceinte, but such a fortification would not have protected any houses.*
- *The citadel would have faced the hills, from which the city needs to be protected.*
- *The terrain around the fountain is rocky.*
- *The river being so nearby, it would have been necessary to build several bastions on muddy ground, delaying construction.*
- *To build such a citadel would be to treat islanders as potential rebels, an idea that nobody accepts.*

Thus the preferred option is now an eleven-bastion enceinte, away from the hills, protecting the city's fine houses. If for each bastion G.S. is given 500 men to cart earth, the work could be finished in eight months.

This project is receiving widespread support; nobody, however, is getting behind the choice of Cerines, too small and too treacherous for boats often faced with unfavourable winds that leave them stuck in the harbour. Venice is making a double investment in this enterprise: if the enceinte is built quickly, not only will the city's reputation grow, but also the enemy will lose a potential point d'appui. Moreover, the Regno lords are prepared to show their support with actions, not just with words as was the case in Udine. The terrain is better than in Candia, and water can be found everywhere at small depths; the same is true in Udine, and this is why G.S. hopes Venice will next allow him to build a fortress in Friulian lands.

In Nicosia, two thirds of the Regno's population can be saved, and the fortification project is consistent with Sforza Pallavicino's recommendation to build a large fort in Nicosia. The main problem is getting Venice to send tools and good soldiers with the necessary artillery and ammunition. A 6-passa [10.5 m] moat needs to be built, and a bastion built from tuff with a 210-passa [365 m] perimeter could be constructed for less than 2,500 ducats; less money will be needed for each 158-passa-long [274 m] curtain. Work will commence on digging the moat,

making it deeper on the inner side and taking care to leave the flanks uncovered. From both a technical and a military point of view, G.S.'s measurements have been calculated to ensure maximal protection of each bastion. Mudbricks will be used for building, as they are highly resistant to the Cypriot climate.

The work of clearing the terrain for the curtains and bastions has begun, and all the excavated earth is being taken inside the fortress; from this raised ground an open enemy approach will be impossible to miss. If the enemy builds trenches, soldiers could make sorties and lay waste to them, maintaining control of the moat. Neither are mines a concern, as half of the perimeter is water; nor enemy cannons, as they would have to be positioned on the ground, in the line of fire of the high enceinte walls.

G.S. has reached the point of hoping war will come soon, so that he may put his theories into action; if good soldiers, decent artillery and enough arms and ammunition are all sent, he envisages a similar reputation for these walls to that of the walls in Malta, but for less expense. The rettori and the Regno lords are busying themselves to move things along quickly, all promising to respect G.S.'s orders. It will be a great feat if Nicosia can be fortified with 11 large bastions, each with a curtain, in six months and for a cost of just 60,000 ducats, compared to over ten years and 110,000 ducats for just a single bastion in Famagusta.

G.S. went to Famagusta on 24 May with Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro to supervise the repairs being made to the enceinte, and he reminded his superiors of 17 objectives that could be achieved within nine months. He thinks this would be possible using the ferlini system, as in Candia; but there are not enough capable soldiers, and the rettori must await Venice's orders.

G.S. concludes by recalling that the maximum altitude of the hills near to Nicosia's future enceinte is eight and a half passa [14.8 m]; this is near to the Podocatoro bastion, which at its own highest point is six passa [10.4 m] high. G.S. leaves it to Sforza Pallavicino to appreciate the importance of this difference in height.

Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor mio,

In sette giorni di navigazione siamo venuti da Corfù fino all'isola di Cipro, che sono mille et trecento miglia, oltre questi giorni siamo stati un giorno fermi al Zante, uno a Cerigo, quattro alla Cannea, uno in Candia et uno a Sitia per non incontrarne nella guarda de Rodi di sette galee et tre galeotte. Se io non astringeva li sopracomiti d'andar da Cerigo alla Cannea, loro volevano da Cerigo a dritta strada andar in Candia, dove all'hora era detta guarda di Rodi, il che sappessimo alla Cannea, per questa causa fermamo in quella città quattro giorni. Passamo poi in vista de Rodi et quando fossimo in veduta delle montagne di Baffo, mi venne voglia d'andar in Cipro al contrario de tutte la navigazioni, per che tutti lasciano Baffo a banda stanca et poi vano a Limissò, et poi de longo a Saline, et le galee poi al porto di Famagosta, lasciando tutta l'isola a banda stanca, qual Famagosta è dal capo dell'isola verso levante, come Vostra Eccellentia sa. Questa è la strada ordinaria et più breve alle galee, ma il smontar a Saline overo a Famagosta, con questi caldi ordinariamente noi Italiani si amalamo, per ciò mi venne voglia per esser d'estate senza pericolo di fortuna di tramontana d'andar di longo via a Cerines, lasciando l'isola a banda dritta et dismontar in quel buon aere,

et poi preso l'aere, venirmene a Nicossia, che è solamente meza giornata et così habbiamo fatto, senza amalarsi pur uno di ottanta che siamo, havendone lasciati trenta delli nostri a Corfù, quali deveno venire in la prima nave con le robbe nostre. Vero è che le galee per arrivar a Famagosta hanno da far cento miglia più per voltar la punta del Carpasso et andar a Famagosta, qual lungamento di strada è stato molto a proposito (come ho detto sopra) a fine / [33^v] della sanità per l'aere, et poi se andavimo per la strada solita nel gionger a terra alla volta di Baffo, incontravimo Ramagas, con un' altra eccellentissima galea da Malta, quale al capo Salamon di Candia haveano havuto lingua da una nostra nave, qual andava a Venetia, et inteso che a questo capo dell'isola erano due galee turchesche che facevano de gran mali come corsari. Ramagas la sera istessa smontò in terra per far acqua, et fu alle mani con li stradiotti, quali li dettero una lanzata, et lui scrive non esser ferito, ma che pregava il reggimento di Baffo che li volesse dar nova dell'esser di quelle due galee turchesche per volerle castigar', di modo che di notte di certezza se incontravimo loro harebbono creduto che noi fossimo stati quelli, et harebbono fatto il suo debito solito.¹ Noi medessimamente haressimo combatuto, et de prima una sbarata d'arteglierie per parte non harebbe mancato, et poi qual cosa di meglio avanti che se fossimo conosciuti. La sorte ha voluto che tra noi christiani non sia seguito altro, acciò che loro restando vivi possano far il suo mestiero, et che noi possiamo aiutar ad assettar questo regno del modo che si spera bene.

In nove giorni che io son stato qui in Nicossia, è stato risolto da questi Clarissimi Signori di fare undeci grandissimi belloardi, et de prima questi del Regno hanno fatto dono in tutto a Sua Serenità di ottanta mille ducatti per far questa fabrica, et il primo è stato il Signor Collaterale Conte di Rochas,² che ha dato buon principio, donando del suo diece millia

1 The incident caused by the Maltese captain Romagas is mentioned again later on; cf. *infra*, doc. 50. The knight of Romagas was a famous mid-sixteenth-century Mediterranean corsair, whose real name was Mathurin d'Aux-Lescout, part of one of the youngest branches of the Armagnac family. In December 1546, at 18 years of age, he joined the Order of Malta and took to the seas. From 1575 to 1577 he was captain-general of the Maltese galleys, and, after unsuccessfully pursuing the post of lieutenant-general of the order, he died in Rome in November 1581: S. Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo. Cristiani e musulmani fra guerra, schiavitù e commercio*, Milan 1993, pp. 54–55. His time as a corsair in Cypriot waters is mentioned in several different documents from the 1560s; he even stopped at Limassol Bay in the summer of 1569 to fill up on water: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, ff. 20^v–21^r, and *Parti Segrete*, filza 11; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 153*, f. 199^r. On Christian corsairs in Cypriot waters see Tenenti, *Cristoforo da Canal. La marine vénitienne*, pp. 153–155. 2 The Senate promoted Eugenio Singlitico to the rank of collateral-general on 28 October 1563, an exceptional distinction: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 70^r, reg. 4, f. 60^v. This promotion was unquestionably a further step in the integration of the Cypriot nobility into the Venetian political and military structure; the first benefactors of this process had been Tuzio Costanzo and Cesare Podocatoro (in 1532 the latter also pursued the post of collateral-general, but was unsuccessful): Marino Sanudo, *I diarii*, vol. 56, col. 274; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, p. 93; J. Anderson, 'Some new documents relating to Giorgione's "Castelfranco Altarpiece", and his patron Tuzio Costanzo', *Arte veneta* XXVII (1973), pp. 290–299; S. Settis, *Artisti e committenti fra Quattro et Cinquecento*, Turin 2010, pp. 133–142. Eugenio (Zegno) Singlitico was a leading figure of political life in the last decade of Venetian domination in Cyprus. Bearing the title of grand seneschal, he was one of the four commanders of the feudal cavalry in 1560. After becoming a *università procurator*, he sought to be elected viscount in February 1561, then was the *università* ambassador in Venice in February and in August 1562. When his father Giacomo (Zacho) died in

ducatti, ha portato li suoi argenti alli Clarissimi Regimenti et consegnata tanta entrata. Poi secondo suo cognato il Signor Antonio Davila³ altri diece mille ducatti, argenti, danari, et entrata, et la universalità⁴ sesanta millia in tutto li ottanti millia sopradetti. Le cause che hanno mosso questi Clarissimi a non cominciare a fortificare Cerines / [34^r] di terra, et poi fare a Nicossia una cittadella sono state più, la principal di tutte era che, se bene da Venetia haveano da venire cinquanta millia ducatti, et che ne fossero stati altri cinquanta millia, non sarebbe stato possibile a fortificar Cerines contra la volontà de tutti senza esser qui una gran forza de soldati, et con lunghezza di tempo.

Di fortificar una cittadella qui a Nicossia, pigliando dentro la fontana et tenir il piedi anco in la città, questo per più ragioni era impossibile, prima per che si havea trovato che la fontana viene di sottoterra più d'un miglio lontano dell'habitato della città, sì che era impossibile a tenir il piedi sopra la fontana et in le muraglie vecchie senza una fortezza almanco di dodeci belloardi, qual harebbe abbracciato in sé campagna et giardini et niuna casa; seconda, sarebbe venuta a cadere in sito sottoposta a quella istessa altura, dalla quale questi Clarissimi Signori si sono discostati con le undeci belloardi, gettando a terra buon numero di case et detta altura continua, approssimandosi alla fontana; terza, il fondo vicino

1563, he became the count of Rochas, and was then named collateral-general; from this point on, he went back and forth between Italy and Cyprus, where in the summer of 1567 he contributed 10,000 ducats to the fortification of Nicosia, before taking off again for Venice soon after. He was allowed to return to Cyprus, but was summoned back to Italy in February 1568. He came back to Cyprus once more in February 1570 as commander of the *stratia*; he was campmaster during the siege of Nicosia, and met his end on 9 September: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from the captain of Famagusta, Domenico Trevisan, c. 16^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 96^v, 152^v; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (Hieronimo Santa Maura's minutes of 10 February 1561, dispatches from Pietro Navagiero dated 20 August 1562 and 1 February 1564); id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta) reg. 73, ff. 63^v–64^r, reg. 75, f. 81^r; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 131^r; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 102 n. 63 and passim; Étienne de Lusignan, *Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, f. 42^v; B. Arbel, 'Greek magnates in Venetian Cyprus: The case of the Singlitico family', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995), pp. 332–333; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 193. 3 Antonio Davila, son of Alvise, was an influential member of Nicosian society, having married on 31 December 1547 the count of Rochas' sister, Fiorenza, who came with a dowry of 12,000 ducats. He owned property in the Paphos region, and was accused by his peasants of not helping them during a food shortage in the spring of 1550, despite boasting a yearly income that in 1554 was estimated at 4,000 ducats. On 4 August 1563 he leased the incomes from the hospitaller commanderies at Foinikas and Anogyra at 2,500 ducats per year. His love of literature can be seen in the fact that four books were dedicated to him by Paolo Manuzio between 1556 and 1560, and can also be seen in his friendship with Jason de Nores. He was in Italy when the war of 1570 broke out, then he went to Spain, France and back to Italy before dying in Padua in 1599: ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 6b; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (dispatch dated 22 October 1564); AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 11 no. 16; Fürer von Haimendorf, *Reisebeschreibung*, p. 306; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes apparentées au pape Clément VIII Aldobrandini (1592–1605). Flatro, Davila, Sozomenoi, Lusignan, Bustron, Nores (selon les fonds de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano et de la Biblioteca Vaticana et de l'archivio Doria-Pamphili)', *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 12 (1983), pp. 27–29; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 190; Étienne de Lusignan's information on Davila (*Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, f. 70^v) is contradicted by the surviving documentation. 4 This is what is given in the manuscript from the Contarini collection; the word has probably been confused with *università*.

alla fontana sarebbe stato di rocca come è l'altura sopradetta; quarta, per causa d'uno torrente sarebbono caduti più belloardi in un sito giaroso, qual harebbe renduta la fortificatione di molto più spesa et tempo; et la quinta ragione era che questa cittadella, tutto il Regno non la voleva sentire peggio di Cerines, dicendo che ciò si faceva trattandoli di rubelli, il che non è vero, anzi è al contrario, ma che più presto si dovesse discostar' da questa poca altura qual è vicina a questa città dalla parte d'ostro, et lasciar fuori una buona quantità di case et restringersi della grandezza della muraglia vecchia, in serrar dentro le case buone con undeci belloardi che tanti si ha giudicato / [34^v] che sia possibile di esser fatti in otto mesi et manco tempo, se mi daranno cinque cento huomini per belloardo di continuo da portar la terra.

Vedendo questi Clarissimi Signori tanta prontezza d'animo in dar fuori questa summa de danari, et considerando al contrario di non voler dar aiuto alcuno per Cerines, né manco per questa cittadella piccola, et come cose impossibili di esser fatte a tempo per quello si vedeva, et così come ogni sorte di naviglio non pò far viaggio contra un vento furioso et mare grosso, ma convien ceder, così questi Clarissimi Signori Rettori erano incontrati in un vento gagliardo et mare grossissimo che questi non volevano assentire che se principiasse (come ho detto) né Cerines né manco la cittadella. Il far niente era il peggio. Far questa spesa con li suoi danari del donativo gioverà in due cose, alla reputatione nella grandezza della gran fabrica et prestezza sua, qual darà da pensare ad altri molto bene, et poi questo alloggiamento capitando in mano d'altri potentissimi di cavallerie in paese fertilissimo sarebbe stata un'altra sorte di disputa di quello che si faceva di Udene, come Vostra Eccellentia l' ricorda, per che questi del Regno fanno la spesa in maggior parte. Quelli de Udene aiutavano solamente de parole et non de fatti.

Qui è il miglior terreno che sia al mondo, meglio anco di quello di Candia, et alli quattro, sei et sette passa in tutti li lochi si trova l'acqua et perfettissima, di modo che si vederà l'effetto qui, quanto importa l'esser in sito di buon terreno et acqua, et questa era una delle mie principal raggioni che io diceva di Udene, ma spero che con la isperientia di Nicossia, che questi Signori Ilustrissimi, avanti ch' io mora, me lascierano aiutar Vostra Eccellentia a far una fortezza in Friuli di sette overo otto belloardi in sito di buon terreno, havendo alle spalle la marina et li paludi, et poco lontano dalla porta d'Italia. / [35^r] Questa fortificatione di Nicossia, sì per la prestezza et poca spesa, come per la forma et capacità sua, nelle quale vi potranno stare li dui terzi delle anime di questo Regno, sarà utile cosa, rispetto al tempo, et per mille rispetti questi Clarissimi Signori sono stati sforzati a far così, et forse avvanzerà tempo di far anco qual ch'altra cosa, et chi ha tempo ha vita. Il render le cose difficili alli nemici con metterli lunghezza di tempo avanti gli occhij, et metterli in dubio li guadagni certi, mi pare che 'l sia a proposito del caso nostro, et poi questo fatto è in consonantia della scrittura di Vostra Eccellentia, dove la parla di Nicossia, et prudentemente la dice, s' el tempo concedesse di fare un gran forte, a Nicossia, ma la conclude almanco di fare una grande et gagliarda cittadella, il che facendosi per conto della spesa, il tutto si harebbe fatto col danaro del Principe, et come ho detto contra vento.⁵ Si ha giudicato che con manco spesa del Principe, in manco tempo et con maggior satisfattione de tutti questi del Regno sia stato il far' li undeci

5 Cf. Sforza Pallavicino's opinion supra, doc. 17.

belloardi, che haverla fatta minore fusse stata in qual loco si voglia per le rovine, et altre ragioni dette di sopra.

La più grande difficoltà che habbiamo è d'havere da Venetia li istromenti da lavorare, presupponendo che soldati buoni et artiglierie con le sue monitioni habbiano da venire conveniente quantità et a tempo. Il terreno è tanto buono, come si vede dalli centenara delli pozzi che senza farli muro atorno stanno dritti. Con una cavatione di sei passa di terreno ben tagliato a scarpa, di certezza durerà molti anni, et con manco di doi mille e cinquecento scudi si farà la camisa a uno belloardo, ancora che ciascuno de questi giri ducento e diece passa, et manco danari anderano a far la sua cortina intiera qual è di 158 passa l'una, de alcuni / [35^v] tuffi, quali si tagliano con le manare, come il gesso et basterà far dette muraglie grosse dui piedi in tuti li lochi equalmente, cominciando l'anno futuro, o come parerà a Sua Serenità, volendo mantener questo gran forte in esser.

Al presente si caverà la fossa più profonda dalla parte di dentro che dalla parte delle banchette di fora via, ma però pendente acciò che li fianchi possano vedere et scoprire il tutto. Da fianco a punta sarà 214 passa per questa causa ch' io dirò, ho accresciuto li 14 passa di lunghezza essendo che per la gran quantità delli belloardi et forma perfetta si cavano le difese delli fronti delli belloardi, non solamente dalli dui terzi della cortina ma anco dalla mittà, di modo che le archibugiate et moschettoni dalla mettà delle cortine di terra potranno vedere le fronti de tutti li belloardi, il che sarà a mio giudicio cosa che non dispiacerà a Vostra Eccellenza. Li fianchi al piano della campagna sono 30 passa, le spalle di ciascun belloardo al piano della campagna 18 passa, il diametro del tondo del orecchione 14 passa e mezzo. Tre cannonere a un paro in 12 passa del fianco, longe di tromba ciascuna 8 passa, una piazza sola per ciascun belloardo. Settanta passa in tutte le gole delli belloardi da un'angolo della cortina all'altro. Tutte le cannonere et parte delli orecchioni si fanno di plite, con la paglia dentro et li muri delli giardini in questi paesi duranno scoperti, fatti di plite [li?], centennara d'anni et anco le case, per che de inverno no vi viene giaccio et de estate non vi piove.

Sopra il piano della campagna si comincia a far' li terreni ritirati a gran scarpa, così alli belloardi come alle cortine, eccetto alli orecchioni dentro via alli quali si supplisse con plite. Li parapetti grossissimi, la fossa un'altro anno havrà d'andar bassa fino alli 30 piedi et piacendo al Signor Dio, per marzo si sarà in altezza dico di fossa et terreno vivo, almanco alli 20 piedi, et forse più per che biso- / [36^r] gna prometter poco per poter attender molto più. Batteria non potrà esser fatta che vaglia nel terreno vivo.

Si faranno un passo più profonde le fosse alle ponte delli belloardi per quest'anno, ancora che riescano ottusi, come si vede per li dessegni, et da questa maggior cavatione alle ponte nasce che più commodamente le piazze et li parapetti delli belloardi si faranno più alte che alli orecchioni per due cause, per cavallerie che fussero fatti fora da nemici, et acciò che li fianchi scoprano meglio di sopra via, tutto il piano della fronte delli belloardi. Non si getta pur una cesta di terra fori della fossa ma tutto dentro, il che fa che tutta questa fortificatione restarà molto superiore a questa bellissima et piana campagna, per la quale volendo venire nemici descoperti ha del impossibile.

Caminar con trincere sotto a gran fortezza, dove le sortite potranno esser grossissime, vi

sarà del daffare grandissimo, et poi venuti venuti che saranno vicini alla fossa, in detta fossa haranno da far conto con noi che siamo avvantaggiati delli fianchi sicurissimi, delle sortite et noi in possesso et patroni di detta fossa, nella quale il gran numero suo non si pò adoperare per offenderne con traverse. Quanto alle mine in la mittà della circonferentia della fossa si trova l'acqua, come ho detto, et in l'altra mittà con la fossa della cunnetta,⁶ si assicurerà benissimo dalle mine.

Quanto alli cavalleri⁷ noi haveremo più di sei passa di altezza di terreno sopra il piano della campagna et con la grandezza delle piazze di detti belloardi, et con la bontà et abbondantia del terreno, et il numero grossissimo di diece e vinti mille persone che saranno dentro, havendo noi l'avantaggio dell'altezza, delli sei passa del belloardo fatto più commodamente di dentro si potremo alzare, et non se lasciar far soperchieria alcuna, essendo che li dui belloardi vicini a questo combat- / [36'] tuto con li suoi cavallieri, et cortine altissime daranno travaglio infinito al nemico.

Concludo al mio parere, che se non fosse il rispetto di offender li animi delli miei Signori per altre cause, io havrei cominciato a pregar Dio che mi facesse venir occasione l'anno futuro di provar questa fortezza, se ben fusse solamente meza fatta, sperarei con manco danno assai che non è stato fatto a Malta di acquistar tanta reputatione a questi Clarissimi Signori che governano questo Regno, et per consequentia all'Illustrissimo Stato, quanto hanno fatto li Maltesi nel suo grado, rispetto al poco tempo et poca spesa che si haverà havuto qui, presupponendo a Venetia conveniente numero de soldati boni et non generatione furfanta, et la qualità delle artiglierie fornite, come ho detto di sopra. Non dico del numero delle picche, corsaletti, arcobusi, moschettoni, piombi, corda, pegola, et altre cose che farà bisogno di monitione a un tanto fatto. Il Signor Dio faccia quello sia per il meglio per questo Illustrissimo Stato, con tutto ciò bisogna, che noi homini oltre l'aiuto di Sua Maestà facciamo il debito nostro, et a tempo. Credo che questi Clarissimi Signori faranno la sua parte, essendo che non vi bisogna perder onza di tempo, et medesimamente questi Signori del Regno.

Io non manco di ben servirli et che a me sia atteso quello mi hanno promesso et che siano essequiti li ordeni, quali altre volte ho già provati et sono riusciti. Vengano pur da Venetia, le cose bisognose et a tempo et sopra 'l tutto gran quantità di polvere fina et piombi, che del resto il tutto passerà benissimo. Bella cosa sarà da sentire che in un belloardo solo in Famagusta piccolo, che dovrebbe esser due volte tanto grande, se habbia speso in farlo cento et diece mille ducatti, et più di diece anni di tempo, et che con manco scudi si habbia fortificata Nicossia di undeci belloardi grandissimi et undeci cortine in mezz'anno di tempo, et con sesanta millia ducatti incamisarla poi tutta la muraglia. / [37']

Alli 24 di maggio son stato a Famagosta con il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore per dar ordine alla reparatione di quella fortezza, qual non ha havuto mala sorte di haver havuto soldati, che l'habbia fortificata, et per farli quello si pò in 9 mesi, ho ricordato a Sue Signorie Clarissime dicisette capitoli qui inclusi, tutti di cose assai importanti et fattibile nel tempo sopradetto. A me darebbe l'animo di farle fare, se si volesse essequir' il vero ordine che io ho

⁶ *fino all'acqua* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁷ *di inimici* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

adoperato in Candia delli ferlini, ma non vi vedo esecutori atti in quel loco de soldati. Li Clarissimi Rettori non pono far alcuna sorte di cose che noi altri soldati siamo obbligati di farle, sì che staremo aspettando le provisioni gagliarde che vengano da Venetia per poter far a tempo qui in Nicossia quanto è detto di sopra, et non mancarò in conto alcuno di far' il debito mio, acciò che sotto il tempo del generalato di Vostra Eccellenza con questi Illustrissimi Signori il Suo Stato si conservi felice et sicuro, il che so che è desiderato da Vostra Eccellenza più che la sua propria vita, et qui facendo fine me raccomando alla sua buona gratia, desirandole sanità.

Non voglio restar di dire che l'altezza maggior' che è più vicina de queste alture, quali mettevano li animi de altri capitani in pensiero che non fosse possibile⁸ di fortificar Nicossia per causa sua. Le ho voluto mesurare con le mie man proprie et livellarle. Io dico che la maggior sua altezza è di otto passa et mezo sopra il più basso piano che sia in questa città et vicina alla punta del belloardo Pò da Cathero⁹ 260 passa, qual belloardo Po da Cathero¹⁰ sarà di altezza lui ancora di 6 passa, di modo che l'altura di fora li sarà superiore dui passa e mezo, che viene ad esser manco d'un passo per cento di superiorità, et tenendosi detta punta del belloardo solamente 4 piedi più alta delli suoi orecchioni, et / [37^v] medesimamente la piazza, si resterebbe copertissimi ma tanto maggiormente come ho detto di sopra, volendo tenir quasi a tutti li belloardi le ponte più alte delli orecchioni 8 piedi più dalle bande verso la campagna piana. Vostra Eccellenza pò far giudicio se queste alture di uno per cento sono de importanzia.

Di Nicossia alli 27 maggio 1567.

Di Vostra Eccellenza servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

1567 27 mazo. Al Signor Sforza. 1567 27 maggio.



27 Memoir concerning measures to be taken in Famagusta, 27 May 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 30^v–31r; copies: id., *Materie Misti Notabili* 11, ff. 73^v–74^r; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 8, s.f.

Francesco Barbaro, Lorenzo Bambo, G.S., Scipione Parenzo and Leonardo Ronchone draw up a list of 17 measures to be taken in Famagusta, where, in accordance with the recommendations made in the letter of 7 March 1567, work will be finished by March 1568.

1. Lower the piazza at the arsenal tower to protect the cannon embrasures.
2. Enlarge the moat starting from the arsenal tower and going up to the Campo Santo tower.
3. Finish the cavalier at the Martinengo bastion, covering the parapet with tuft.

⁸ *im* crossed out before *possibile*. ⁹ *Caraffa* crossed out and *pò da Cathero* added above. ¹⁰ *Caraffa* crossed out and *pò da Cathero* added above.

4. *Join the ravelin to the cavalier.*
5. *Lower the piazza at the cavalier situated above the Limassol Gate.*
6. *Finish the cavalier at the Moratto tower.*
7. *Install a cannon embrasure at the Carmelite tower.*
8. *Remove the wall from the old tower adjacent to the Carmelite bastion.*
9. *Lower the piazza at this bastion.*
10. *Build all the new curtains in such a way as to allow in barba firing.*
11. *Finish the middle cavalier.*
12. *At the curtain next to the Mozzo, towards the new bastion, cut out a very low embrasure.*
13. *At the Mastici tower, install a cavalier with a demilune.*
14. *Finish the cavalier at the Diamante tower.*
15. *Continue demolishing the tower and complete the bridge.*
16. *Lower all the counterscarps in the same way as the one recently built at the Carmelite bastion.*
17. *Tidy the rest of the moat.*

Havendo considerato in essecutione delle lettere dell'Illustrissimo Dominio il modo che si deve racconciare la fortezza di Famagusta per il presente bisogno, dovendo esser fatte le sottoscritte provisioni per tutto marzo prossimo venturo 1568, come nelle lettere di 7 marzo ne vien commesso,¹ habiamo giudicato et deliberato ut infra, tutti d'accordo, li quali si sottoscriveranno da esser osservata nell'avvenire.

Primo. Abbassar la piazza del turione del Arsenale,² tanto che li homini che staranno alla cannonera, che guarda verso il castello siano coperti dalle alture delli hebrei,³ sì che le balle delle cannonate habbiano a passarli un piedi sopra la testa, facendo la cannonera che non tiri fori dalla fossa.

2°. Tagliar il terreno et slargar la fossa fra il turrion del Arsenale et il turion del Campo Santo, et portar il terreno dentro vicino, dove fa maggior bisogno.

3°. Finir il cavallero del Martinengo al Campo Santo, non alzando la piazza più di quello che è al presente, il parapetto grosso piedi 30, facendo una camisa al detto parapetto de tuffi sottilissima più alta un pie della cortina, qual parapetto habbia ad esser doi piedi e mezo alto per tirar in barba⁴ dalla parte verso il turrion del Campo Santo, ma il parapetto di detto⁵ cavallero sul angolo che guarda verso il turrion del Andravisia alto piedi 6 per esser coperto dalle alture delli hebrei, incasimandolo di dentro di plite.

4°. Alla porta de Limissò, unir il rivellino col cavallero con un muretto tale che sustenti il

1 Cf. supra, doc. 18. 2 A tower situated at the south-east corner of the enceinte. The names of the sixteen towers built for the enceinte by the Lusignans and later reinforced first by the Genoese and then by Venice were (starting from the south-east and going clockwise): Arsenal, Campo Santo, Andruzzi, Zudecha / Santa Napa, porta Limissò / Ravelin, Minio / Diocare, Moratto / Priuli, Pulacazaro, Carmeni / San Luca, San Marco / Martinengo, Maruffi / Muzzo, Mastici, Diamante, Signoria / Diavolo, Catena and da Mar. Concerning this enceinte, see Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, pp. 105–116; Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', pp. 315–343. 3 Already mentioned supra, doc. 8 n. 12. 4 In artillery terminology, "tirar in barba" meant to fire a cannonball above the parapet, without using the cannon embrasures to aim. 5 *belloardo* crossed out after *detto*.

terreno, qual terreno dentro va alto tanto quanto la piazza del rivelino / [30^v] alla strada, et empire la fossetta tra il rivellino et il cavallero, et quelli muretti dui che si ha da fare da novo alti, tanto quanto li parapetti del rivellino, al qual parapetto bisogna stropare tutte le cannonere di sopra, che dette cannonere non tiri niente fori della fossa, infin alli ultimi turioncini.

5°. Nel cavallero sopra la porta di Limissò, far abbassare la piazza tanto che la restasse più bassa del suo parapetto 6 piedi per quelle 2 cannonere, quali poleno tirar' per la fossa da tutte 2 le bande, il resto del detto cavallero non far abbassar le piazze per poter tirare in barba di sopra via, per tutta la campagna.

6. Finir il cavallero del Morato con quel ordine dell'altro, ma li parapetti tutti bassi per trar in barba, et la sua piazza 6 piedi più alta della muraglia.

7. Cavar una cannonera al turion delli Carmini che non tiri fori della fossa, non intaccando la cortina nella riculata.

8. Levar via il muro del turion vecchio che è congiunto col belloardo verso li Carmini per farli piazza a quel fianchetto, accomodando la cannonera.

9. Abbassar la piazza de tutto il belloardo, tanto che si sia coperti di altezza di 6 piedi, lasciandoli il parapetto col muro tanto che sia 32 piedi grosso.

10. Che tutte le cortine nove possano tirar in barba et che siano fatte 2 cannonere nella gola del belloardo.

11. Il cavallero del Mozzo finirlo, come sono le altri.

12. Alla cannonera della cortina vicina al Mozzo, verso il belloardo novo, cavarla tanto bassa che ella intacchi 2 piedi nella rocca di fora via, et stropar quella di sopra fatta secondo il ricordo dell'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza.

13. Il cavallero di Mastici assettarlo, come li altri, facendo la mezza luna come nella scrittura. / [31^r]

14. Il cavallero del Diamante finirlo, come li altri.

15. Continuar di rovinar la torre et finir d'empire il ponte, come ha da stare.

16. Abbassare tutte le contrascarpe nel modo di quella che è sta fatta ultimamente per mezo li Carmini, lasciando la banchetta 10 piedi larga, et il terreno di fora via 5 piedi più alto.

17. Nettar il resto della fossa che manca.

Io Francesco Barbaro, Proveditor Generale del Regno affermo quanto di sopra.

Io Lorenzo Bembo, Capitanio del Regno affermo quanto è soprascritto.

Io Giulio Savorgnano affermo quanto è di sopra.

Io Scipione Parenzo affermo quanto di sopra.

Io Lonardo Ronchone affermo quanto di sopra.

Capitoli per rassettar Famagusta. Al Serenissimo. Provisioni per Famagosta. 1567 27 maggio.



28 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 28 July 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 39^r–45^v; copies: id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 8, s.f.
(abridged version, first two paragraphs only).

G.S. expresses his thanks to Francesco Michiel, who has always been a good source of advice to him; notably in the letter G.S. received from him in Corfu, wherein he suggested involving the Cypriot nobility in the construction work, as they would be happy to serve the Signoria.

There is no part of the island of Cyprus that is not governed by one of a small group of knights; though five years ago these eight to ten (if only the main ones are included) men were strangers to any notion of fortification, they have immediately offered to help G.S. in meeting his goals. He has asked them to supply 500 men at each bastion for eight months, and has proposed to each of them the idea of naming the bastion under their supervision after their family. This costs Venice nothing and has immediately appealed to the knights' sense of ambition; these very same knights refused to even think about fortifying Cerines five years previously. In the end they have accepted to donate 80,000 ducats, and they happily endure great exertion: waking at six o'clock in the morning, working their peasants in the moonlight, and pausing construction during the hottest hours of the day, from one pm to seven pm. They have abandoned their previous lives, where they slept until the sun rose and lived in better conditions than even Venetian nobles; they no longer sleep at night, they pay their peasants every two days, and they take their orders from G.S. twice a day. Construction is spread across eleven sites, and is being carried out in high spirits; for two weeks' work peasants earn ten to eleven soldi, one bagattino being paid for each basket of 45 pounds of earth transported. Despite his low opinion of them five years earlier, G.S. now acknowledges that the Cypriots are harder workers than the Italians and the Cretans. Seeing how well the islanders withstand the heat, he regrets having asked Venice to send 300 men; Italians fall ill, as have G.S.'s own forty men. He usually eats at a table of twenty, but on certain days he has been accompanied by just his nephew Germanico and Captain Zuan Battista. Out of his other men, only Orazio Governa has escaped fever.

G.S. has ordered the purchase of 18 horses to assist in overseeing the payment of the workers, and he is delighted that his orders thereupon have been followed: the system in place requires each receipt to be approved several times over by different secretaries and Venetian officers, G.S. himself giving the Querini or Barbaro stamp. He deplors the fact that he does not receive barley rations for his horses, which costs him one ducat per day, when all the other officers, great or small, do receive them. Count Germanico's soldiers are nearly always ill, which is problematic as they are charged with making sure the guards pay the workers fairly; dishonest guards can result in 20% of the budget assigned to the workers' pay being robbed. G.S. says he is happy that he is managing to see each bastion twice a day, visiting the cane shelters big enough to give shade to 500 men, where the handing out of the ferlini is accompanied by flutes and dancing workers; some shelters even have a small orchestra. There are around 1,500 venturieri working under nobody's command, including some women. The general atmosphere is cheerful.

The personnel at each bastion is as follows:

– *One cashier, paid one mocenigo per day, in charge of the ferlini, which are stored overnight in a chest to which a Cypriot noble also has the key.*

– One secretary and one comptroller, charged with keeping records of the tools used; they are each paid 20 soldi per day, even on Sunday.

– Four men to hand out the ferlini.

– The peasants, who, once they have shifted 24 baskets, go to the shelters to eat; there the cashier and the secretary give them two large ferlini. The small ferlini each bear a number from 1 to 11 to prevent the peasants from switching to another bastion; for each bastion there are 15,000 small ferlini and 7,500 triangular ones, then there are 15,000 large ferlini for all the bastions combined. Peasants who manage to earn 12 large ferlini in one day receive one triangular ferlino; if they earn 15 of these, they are allowed to go home. Peasants who work quicker than others will not receive more triangular ferlini, but will be paid by results; whereas slower workers may take 20 days to do the work expected of them in 15.

Due to a lack of baskets and pickaxes, the 1st of June saw work commence on only one bastion; but work on all bastions was underway by the start of July. 1,200 pickaxes have been made, and the demolition of 1,800 houses, including four worth over 10,000 ducats, has begun. More fuss was made over demolishing 50 little houses in Candia than over destroying some 80 churches here. There is consensus throughout the community from top to bottom, and, as G.S. is getting all the manpower he requested in order to keep his word, work on the Querini, Barbaro and Mulla bastions is progressing at a fine rate, in an atmosphere so cheerful that at times G.S. forgets the heat, poor air and tiredness.

G.S. began writing this letter on 7 July, but was interrupted and is resuming it on the 28; he announces the death of Luocotenente Querini eight days earlier, and despairs at his passing, Querini having provided such precious support in getting construction underway. He regularly came in person to inspect all night long the work being done on the bastion bearing his name. He was quick to understand G.S.'s intentions, especially as he was familiar with G.S.'s previous projects in Peschiera, Verona and Candia. Amongst the papers he has left behind has been found a letter meant for the Senate in which he applauds G.S.'s devotion to the common good. G.S. recalls that he has requested eight months to complete the work, 6,000 men, and 15,000 ducats per month, i.e. 90,000 ducats over the course of six months. 17,000 had been spent by 25 July, 3,000 of which went to demolishing the houses, churches and walls of the old enceinte, to timber needed for the shelters and to transporting tools; meaning that only 15,000 ducats have gone to actual construction in a month. The bastions are already two thirds of the way towards the target set for the year, and the curtains will be ready in a month. G.S. is confident that everything will go well, even if he has been ill for six days in this hellish country; he sagely advises his heirs not to serve overseas, and hopes he will get back to Italy alive. Through his obstinacy, Governor Roncone has managed to get the ordinance into good shape, and deserves to be made governor of Nicosia; the command of the ordinance could be transferred to his cousin, Captain Gregorio, whom G.S. has known for eighteen years, and who is in charge of the Querini bastion site. G.S. would be prepared to pay him 30 ducats per month, as he and Roncone would provide Nicosia with excellent government, which the city needs. Each bastion requires a captain, 300 militiamen (cernide), 300 Italian soldiers plus their sergeant, 400 Nicosiates or refugee peasants, bread, powder and cannonballs. If, as the Signoria had desired, three forts had been built, at Cerines, Nicosia and Limassol, at least 18 bastions would have

been needed, and these forts would not have protected the potential 130,000 people seeking refuge in Nicosia.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Dalla inclusa copia le sapperà assai cose del mio viaggio et di questa fortificatione, ma essendo io suo servitore per natura prima, et poi per causa della sua virtù qual mi ha giovato in assai cose, cioè li suoi prudenti ricordi et advertimenti, quali sempre tengo in la memoria, et più che posso li vio mettendo in essecutione et sempre me riescono benissimo, tra le altri la si deve ricordare che la me scrisse la seconda sua lettera, qual mi fu data a Corfù, che accadendo fabricar in Cipro; che io dovesse dar delli carichi a questi nobili cavallieri, quali per la qualità delli suoi animi farebbono gran facende in servitio dell' Illustrissima Signoria et con utile della fabrica, il che è riuscito tanto perfetta et miracolosamente che più non si può desiderare. Questo solo¹ fatto mi obbliga di esser in vita suo servitore, et se ben per il passato non havessi havuto mai da lei altri boni ricordi come ne ho havuti, et che per l'avenire medesimamente non fusse per haverne, questo solo è stato tanto grande, che non solamente io et tutta casa mia ha da restarli in perpetuo servitori, ma quella Illustrissima Republica ha causa per ciò di esser obbligata lei ancora a Vostra Signoria come lo dirò qui sotto, per il che la sentirà di quanto beneficio è stato suo ricordo.

Voglio che la sappia che già cinque anni, questi cavallieri, quali sono poi circa otto o diece principali ma non uniti, quali governano il tutto / [39^v] per le sue gran facultà et auctorità, erano quasi lontani de ciascuna sorte di fortificatione, ma immediate che io toccai una parola dicendoli che se volessero far da valorosi et nobili come sono, di darne 500 homini per uno in manco assai delli otto mesi, mi darebbe l'animo, consignandoli un belloardo per ciascuno con due meze cortine che lassarebbono una memoria perpetua di sé, havendo li detti belloardi li nomi delli proprij cavallieri, cioè delle sue famiglie; questa cosa per la ambitione naturale humana hebbe tanta forza che non ha ingannata niente di Vostra Signoria, anzi se l'ha preso errore, è stato molto più di quello che lei giudicava et antivedeva, essendo che, come ho detto di sopra, erano su quel humore come già cinque anni in la materia di Cerines, dubitandosi di far a Cerines sei belloardi di due volte tanta spesa et tempo in ciascuno quanto in quello di Famagosta, et par la verità il Principe nostro et questi signori cavallieri haveano ragione di dubitare, vedendo l'effetto vero, cattivo per loro, pur sono remmossi principalmente per honore particolare che ogn'uno desidera d'havere quella memoria del suo belloardo, per il che mi hanno prestato orecchie, et mi hanno creduto, essendo alquanti di loro anco stati in Candia, et vedute quelle opere della sorte che Vostra Signoria ha inteso da altri.²

¹ *ho* crossed out after *solo*. ² An allusion to the fortification work done in Crete, both in Chania and in Candia, where G.S. was fortress governor from October 1562 to March 1566; cf. the various reports from him preserved in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 36^v–48^r; also: Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1 / 2, pp. 329–332, 427; J. Dimacopoulos, 'Le fortificazioni e le porte di Candia', *Castellum* 16 (1973), pp. 89–106; I. Steriotou, 'Le mura di Candia nel quadro delle fortificazioni veneziane di Creta', *ibid.* 24 (1984), pp. 87–98; ead., *Τα βενετικά τείχη του Χάνδακα*, pp. 22–29.

Concludo che l' ricordo di Vostra Signoria li ha fatti dir de sì, anzi li ha fatto offerire li ottanta millia scudi et la non potrebbe mai credere come allegramente fanno le più estreme fatiche, levando a 6 hore di notte a concurrentia / [40^r] l'uno dell'altro a lume della luna, facendo lavorar' li suoi villani, quali si lasciano riposare per il gran caldo dalle 13 hore fino alle 19, et questi cavallieri lasciano stare li suoi fatti per attendere a questo, pretenno man alle sue borse per far mille servitij, solevano dormire fino 2 hore di giorno et facevano una vita più commoda et delicata assai più di Venetia. Al presente di notte non dormeno et di giorno fanno pagar' con questi caldi ogni dui giorni li soi contadini, et loro proprij hanno li ordeni di ciò che hanno a fare da me, due volte al giorno, mai fallo di star un pezzo per belloardo, ancora che se lavori in undeci lochi, sempre si sente un cridar dai questi homini in modo de allegrezza, et che fanno il servitio allegrissimamente, ogni quindici giorni si mutano li contadini, quali communemente uno per l'altro guadagnano a uno bagattino per ciascuna cesta di 45 lire di terra, diece et undeci³ soldi et communemente stanno su le undeci, ma per dir la verità sono più gagliardi a lavorar a ferlini delli Italiani, et più delli Candiotti, et questo che io dico è giusto al contrario della opinione commune vecchia delli Cipriotti, et contra la mia istessa opinione, et in le mie scritture già 5 anni dicevo a Sua Serenità che non sarebbe stato mai possibile a far bon frutto in fabriche di Cipro senza cinquecento Italiani, ma ultimamente già un'anno in Venetia, tornato ch' io fui de Candia, dissi in scrittura a Sua Serenità che speravo con 300 homini solamente guastatori de / [40^v] Italia de inviare questi Cipriotti a lavorare, al presente vedendoli tanto gagliardi et che non temeno il sole, io son pentito di haver dimandato li 300 homini a Sua Serenità per che faremo senza,⁴ et benissimo essendo che tutti li Italiani si amaleranno, come hanno fatto li miei di casa che siamo quaranta, et qualche volta de vinti che mangiano alla mia tavola mi ho trovato non havere con me sani, se non il conte Germanico⁵ et il capitano Zuan Battista,⁶ et 17 erano in letto con la febbre, et noi 3 che facciamo più fatica delli altri, il Signor Dio vole che siamo sani, delli altri 20 servitori per esserne amalati 10 alla volta è stato molto spesso, eccetto Horatio⁷ che sta sano, come me.

Et sappia Vostra Signoria che ho conprati 18 cavalli per mandarli alli belloardi a sopra-veder' a far' li pagamenti, ben che questi signori cavallieri se pur dovessero ingannar qualch'uno metterebbono 500 ducatti del suo per far reuscire il suo belloardo più presto et più bello, ma li ordeni sono stati posti con tante doppie sottoscrizione che avanti che una bolletta venga alle man mie, che le bollo con uno bollo Querini et Barbaro,⁸ et prima passano per man

3 *et fino a 12* crossed out after *undeci*. 4 This remark can be seen as proof of G.S.'s honesty and moral fortitude regarding a matter in which he was aware of his own contradictions, showing that he regularly read preceding reports made in previous years; cf. doc. 11, dated 15 August 1562, wherein he stresses the need to enlist 1,000 Italians, and doc. 15, from 1566, in which he proposes reducing this figure to 300. 5 Germanico Savorgnan, son of Marc'Antonio and G.S.'s nephew; cf. supra, pp. 17–18, 38, 41, and infra, pp. 549–551. On 4 February 1567 the Senate made him a captain, entrusting him with commanding the troop of 100 soldiers his uncle G.S. had led to Corfu; his pay was 20 ducats per *paga*: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 136^r. 6 Possibly Captain Giovanni Battista Trionfi of Ancona, sent to Cyprus in May 1567 in charge of a company of 100 soldiers: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 164^{r-v}. 7 Orazio Governa, G.S.'s faithful aide-de-camp; cf. supra, p. 18 and doc. 115. 8 This indicates that, in order to keep accurate accounts for each individual bastion, not only did the tokens (*ferlini*)

de 3 scrivani et poi sottoscritta dal cavalliero, et poi da quattro Signori Rettori et un'altro, sì che ogni bolletta per far ogni sorte di pagamento ha da passare (come ho detto) per dieci tamisi, sì che le cose del danaro passano bene, ma sono ben de quelli che bravano contra di me, quali dicono che io voglio strafare et per despetto non mi lasciano dar l'orzo per li miei cavalli col mal anno, che Dio li sia. A me questo importa solamente / [41^r] un ducatto al giorno di danno, essendo che non è persona che serva questa reale che non habbia l'orzo⁹ per quanti cavalli tengano, che è come in Italia le tansse, qual tanse in parte fanno¹⁰ le spese alli nostri cavali delli soldati in Italia. Il Governatore di Famagosta, questo delle ordinanze, quello delli stradiotti, tutti li capi de stradiotti et soldati, et capitanij delle ordinanze, scrivani della camera, zaffi, comandatori et ogni sorte di generatione ha l'orzo, eccetto me, et ho caro di haverlo per questa causa sola, per che con li miei ordeni in la materia delli danari faccio tanto giovamento a questa fabrica, come ho fatto in Candia, et più me vale la satisfattione dell'utile grandissimo che so di fare al mio Principe che ogni mio interesse particular'.

Voglio anco che la sappia che li soldati del conte Germanico sempre sono amalati la mettà, quali stanno di continuo dui per ciascuno belloardo a veder' che li dui zaffi che tengo per ciascun belloardo non faccia torto alli villani di torli il bagattino, quando la cesta di terra¹¹ sta al peso, et questi zaffi sono alcuni marioli della terra, quali troviamo a posta et senza pagamento fanno questo officio, che quando vedeno una cesta piccola overo non piena la fanno pesare et tolleno loro il ferlino al contadino, et il soldato non li lascia far torto, con tutto ciò questi zaffi guadagnano qualche volte uno mocenigo et più al giorno, prima io faceva che li soldati tolevano la cesta di bando al contadino, cioè la terra facendolo restituire al pagatore ma a longo andare / [41^v] li soldati si straccavano et si lasciavano passar li contrabandi non essendo l'interesse suo, ma li zaffi che vivono de rapina per suo interesse fanno andar le ceste di continuo molto piene, il qual fatto vol dire il sesto di tutta la raggione et forse il quinto, in cento millia scudi con questa fabula avanzarne 20 millia è un bel dir', però Vostra Signoria che sol fare nottomia particolare delle cose non haverà per male, se ben li scrivo queste cosette che pareno miserie et pur sono gran cose, et de quelli ho praticati già pochi mesi, che non potevano capire niuna mia ragione né manco, ma lasciavano operare né rimediare alli errori grossissimi in danno della Signoria di trecento per cento, sì che bisogna raccomandarsi a messer Domenedio di imbatterse in lochi che possiamo far servitio a chi siamo obbligati, et per parlar di cose piacevoli, le dirò che non è homo al mondo che vada come me vinti dui volte al giorno alla festa, essendo che sopra ogni belloardo a mezo le piazze sono state fatte frescate tanto grande, che vi stanno li 500 homini sotto coperte de canne gargane con tutte le foglie, et lì sotto si pagano et cambiano li ferlini, ciascun belloardo ha una piva sordina et di continuo vano ballando et saltando questi villani, sono de questi signori che hanno oltre la piva, tamburini, trombette, piffari, hanno tappezarie alle sue frescate armate de arme d'hasta honorate et celate, che se assomigliano a garde de soldati. Vi sono circa mille et 500 venturieri,¹² quali lavoranno senza esser sta comandati, tra quali vi sono delle donne

bear a mark specific to each bastion, but that there were also seals specific to each bastion. ⁹ *dalle* crossed out after *orzo*. ¹⁰ *alli* crossed out after *fanno*. ¹¹ *non* crossed out after *terra*. ¹² These 1,500 *venturieri* constituted a

brutte come il diavolo, sì che essendovi donne, homini, istromenti da sonare, frescate tappezzate / [42^r] vengo ad andare 22 volte al giorno alla festa et questo mi tiene credo sano, tutti li miei portano ombrelle, et tutti li pagadori delli ferlini ancora, che habbiano ombrelle et che siano del paese, se amalano molto spesso loro ancora.

Per ciascun belloardo pagamo uno mocenigo¹³ al giorno a uno cassiero, qual tiene una chiave della cassa delli ferlini la notte, et l'altra il cavalliero per rispetto delli 2 libri tenuti uno da un scrivano et l'altro da uno scontro, il qual scontro ha cura di tener il conto delli zapponi, delli badili et delle ceste, et questi 2 scrivano et scontro hanno 20 soldi al giorno per uno, benché lavorano anco la dominica. Si pagano 4 homini della terra per ciascun belloardo, quali stanno di continuo a dar via li ferlini piccoli alli villani al sole, in la polvere, che ogni giorno mangiano 3 lire di terra per ciascuno, et stanno accostati a 5 cavalletti, tra li quali li contadini hanno da passar' a uno a uno, per non metter confusione a toccar il suo ferlino et quando il contadino ha portato 24 ceste di peso va al banchetto sotto la frescata dove il cassiero et il scrivano li danno dui ferlini grandi di questa sorte che io mando a Vostra Signoria, li piccoli sono signati fino alli 11, accioche li villani d'un belloardo non possi andar all'altro a metter confusione.¹⁴ Di questi piccoli sono 15 millia per belloardo, delli grandi tondi sono anco 15 millia, et de questi triangoli sono sette mille e cinque cento per belloardo, et quando uno contadino ha servito 2 giorni et che ha guadagnato 12 ferlini grandi al giorno, se li da in segno / [42^v] di 2 giornate, 2 de questi triangoli grandi, fino alla summa di 15 giorni, poi guadagnato chel habbia 15 di questi grandi triangoli,¹⁵ se li fa il suo bollettino del servito, et se per sorte fusse tanto gagliardo che in dui giorni guadagnasse 3 da dodeci, se li da ben il danaro ma solamente dui triangoli grandi, et così al contrario se staranno 20 giorni a guadagnar li 15 da dodeci, il danno è suo del tempo più longo, ma¹⁶ è cosa meravigliosa a veder' che questi che in verità lavorando a giornata sono più deboli et più pegri homini del mondo, et a ferlini al contrario, et tutti li altri, et io habbiamo havuto ragione de ingannarsi de giudicarli tristi come sono in effetto a giornata, che non si può veder' peggio cha vederli a lavorare, me par che habbiano 2 nature in una persona, poltroni et valent' homini.

Questa lettera io la scrivo al presente che è alli 7 di luglio. Fù cominciato a lavorar' a un belloardo solo il primo dì di zugno, per che non si havea copia di ceste né de zapponi, pur al principio di luglio a tutti li belloardi si lavora. Habbiamo fatto far' mille e ducento zapponi, si ha atteso a far spianate de circa 1800 case, delle quali erano 4 che passavano 10 mille ducatti l'una, più parole furono fatte in Candia a gettar 50 cassette che non è stato qui a gettare tutte queste, circa 80 chiesie et de bellissime, li pretti, la nobiltà, li mercanti, il popolo, li signori, il

supplementary workforce seemingly composed mainly of the poor of Nicosia whose houses had been demolished. ¹³ A Venetian silver coin, weighing 6.52 gr. ¹⁴ These tokens (*ferlini*) have been found on several different occasions, cf. fig. 73, and are described by L. Michaelidou, 'Τα βενετικά νομίσματα της Συλλογής του Πολιτιστικού Ιδρύματος Τραπεζης Κύπρου', in Ch. Maltezos (ed.), *Κύπρος-Βενετία, κοινές ιστορικές τύχες*, Venice 2002, pp. 257–259, fig. 19; L. Michaelidou / E. Zapiti, *Νομίσματα της Κύπρου. Από τη Συλλογή του Πολιτιστικού Ιδρύματος Τραπεζης Κύπρου*, Nicosia 2007, p. 202, figs 16–20; A. Pitsillidis, 'Τα ferlini της Λευκωσίας', in D. Michaelides (ed.), *Epigraphy, Numismatics, Prosopography and History of Ancient Cyprus: Papers in Honour of Ino Nicolaou*, Uppsala 2013, pp. 85–93. ¹⁵ *triangoli* added above *grandi*. ¹⁶ *per la verità* crossed out after *ma*.

Clarissimo Barbaro che mi commanda hanno voluto così, et io ho detto che ubedirò et che mi basta l'animo di far tanto, se mi daranno tanta gente in tanto tempo, et hormai sono tanto chiari che quello li ho promesso è per riuscire, il vero che / [43^r] tutto il belloardo Querini, Barbaro et Mulla da un capo all'altro di ciascuno alla punta delli belloardo li terreni sono alti 10 piedi sopra il piano della campagna, alli orecchioni 7 con manco di 800 ducatti di spesa per uno, et le sue fosse cavate circa 8 piedi, et le cortine circa 5 piedi di modo che si tengano tanto bravi questi Clarissimi, et tutti che [mi ?] crederebbono ogni miracolo, per che vedeno passar le cose senza strepito ben regolate, et allegramente si fa il tutto, tanto che io credo che questo mi faccia star sano al dispetto del cattivo aere et del gran caldo et della fatica, et per che la nave che ha da portar questa lettera non partirà fino a 40 giorni in questo meggio, scriverò a Vostra Signoria delle altre particolarità, havendo io un gran spatio di tempo di 6 hore, che sono dalle 13 fino alle 19 et per adesso me raccomando alla buona gratia di Vostra Signoria. Alli 7 luio 1567.

Rettenuta fino al presente, che sono alli 28 luio, le dico che già 8 giorni¹⁷ è morto il Clarissimo Luogotenente Quirini quale era un'utilissimo Rettore da governar questi popoli, diligentissimo in far venire li homini, in preparar danari, vittoarie et tutte quelle bone parte che poteva havere un'gentilhomo, del quale da prima che io venne qui dubitava col fatto suo che me dovesse intricare il cervello, ma è stato tutto al contrario che, per havere buon intelletto diligente et sottile, in spatio di 15 giorni si havea molto ben chiarito et certificato della mia natura et animo et operationi, di modo che non si poteva satiare di predicare ogni giorno in diversi lochi, et me veniva ad orecchie da più bande, et io non son stato cinque volte a casa sua / [43^v] a costeggiarlo, ma la mattina all'alba assai volte a lume della luna me veniva a ritrovar sopra il suo belloardo et fino al levare del sole; io l'ho accompagnava,¹⁸ qual non si poteva satiar di farne carezze, honorarme, dicendo li miracoli del profitto grande che facevano tutte queste gran fabbriche et lui, che era stato altre volte a Peschera, a Verona et in Candia, havea gusto et giudicio di questo fatto. Si ha trovato doppo la sua morte una menuta di sua mano, che havea apparecchiato di scrivere al Senato molto particolare, in laude estrema di questi miei ordini miracolosi chiamati da lui. Diceva pubblicamente che tutti li gentilhuomini venetiani doverebbono tuore essemplio di me in havere buon animo et bona cura, et fatica per il bene pubblico, et il diavolo ha voluto che sia morto per far danno non solamente a me, et a casa sua, ma anco alla fabrica.¹⁹ Se io non havesse questa certa et gran scurtà et servitù, che io ho con Vostra Signoria non li scriverei questa cosa, qual ha un poco, anzi assai del spagnuolo overo avantatore, ma havrò testimonij di provare a Vostra Signoria questo che io dico della menuta, qual è capitata in mano delli altri Clarissimi Signori, non so

¹⁷ Bartholomeo Nogiero reports that Querini died on 21 July; cf. *infra*, doc. 84. Born on 14 December 1512, Nicolò Querini, *di Marco*, was proveditor in Peschiera (1553) and Salò (1555), *podestà* in Verona (1563), then *advocator comunis* in 1563 / 1564 and 1565 / 1566. He was elected *luocotenente* of Cyprus on 17 November 1566, and left Italy, in a quite impoverished state, in February 1567, arriving on the island in March: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 9^v–10^r, 182^v–183^r; *id.*, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 135^r; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. VI, p. 338. ¹⁸ This is what appears in the manuscript. ¹⁹ From this point on, G.S. incessantly lamented Nicolò Querini's death; cf. *infra*, docs 30, 31, 32, 34, 39, 40, 45.

se sapperanno overo vorranno servirsi di lei. L'effetto del fatto se a me non sarà mancato, sarà testimonianza honestamente bona.

Mi resta a dirle che io domandai de prima li 8 mesi di tempo et li sei mille huomini, cioè spesa di quindici mille ducati al mese per il fatto che è fin qui, io ho callato il mercato in 6 mesi solamente, che viene ad esser nonanta millia ducatti, et per dirlo a Vostra Signoria anco speso con li 80 millia del Regno metterne in bonissimo stato, ma loro cioè tutti Signori grandi et piccoli hanno openione che in 3 mesi o al più in 4 mesi si habbiano fatto li miracoli, et io sto ordinato con parole in / [44^r] li miei 6 mesi. Sappia Vostra Signoria che fino alli 25 luio si hanno spesi dicisette millia ducatti, come la vederà, tre mille delli quali sono andati in gettar case, chiesie, muraglie della città vecchie, legnami per far le frescate, barelle per condurre con li boij, ceste, palle, zappe carissime, per non perder tempo, travi da far ponti, sì che si²⁰ pò dire che se habbia lavorato di terreno solamente un mese rispetto a 15 mille ducatti, che circa tanti sono stati spesi in cavar terreno, et tutte le piazze delli belloardi²¹ sono alzate più delli 2 terzi che hanno d'andare per quest'anno, et parte delle cortine in buon esser con un'altro mese, spererò bene che tutti diranno le materie per allegrezza, essendo li poverazzi usi a vedere spendere li cento et diece millia ducatti in un belloardetto solo et piccolo, et 10 anni di tempo. Questo effetto tanto diverso del tempo et della spesa fa che ogn'uno dice a suo modo, se quella furfanta della invidia non mi vienne a rompere il cervello, spero che ogni cosa anderà bene ma sia più presto quella che mi havesse compassione come si suol dire.

Son stato la settimana passata 6 giorni amalato, ma heri et hoggi andato fori di casa, per la verità è un paese diabolico, et voglio consigliare li miei heredi a far capitoli come erano quelli del Migliorino, che li soi patroni lo mandasse per terra in ogni loco, et non per mare, lo giudico certissimo al presente per un savio homo, et per che dubito venir in fastidio a Vostra Signoria con questa mia letterazza longa, ancora che lei così mi habbia comandato li ponerò fine. Raccomandome alla sua bona gratia et che la cerchi di farne tornar vivo in Italia, et quelli Signori che m'hanno fatto venire qui havranno da render conto a Dio se me saranno ingrati / [44^v] di non mi far tornar presto in Italia, havendo havuto il servitio da me che ponno havere qui, et così come il capitano Andrea²² in Candia ha saputo far meglio di me, così questo Governatore Ronchone delle ordinanze è per far atorno questa fortificatione.

Queste ordinanze del Regno erano andate in mal' hora et con il suo valore, sapere et fatica le ha fatto tornare in bonissimo essere, come io ne ho vedute parte, se io fosse in Sua Serenità, lo farei Governatore di Nicossia et li lassarei il peso delle ordinanze, per che ha uno suo

²⁰ *ha* crossed out after *si*. ²¹ *et* crossed out after *belloardi*. ²² Andrea Nigrisoli, mentioned *infra*, docs 30 and 44, was the lieutenant of the 44 *leggieri* from G.S.'s company of soldiers, and was his most trusted man. He accompanied G.S. to Cyprus and Crete, and was his right-hand man during the fortification project in Candia; in view of his knowledge of this site, he became its main supervisor after G.S.'s departure. He rose to the rank of captain of the Candia guard in October 1564, and was entrusted with finishing the fortification of the city in accordance with the drawings and scale models left by G.S.: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 35, f. 171^v, reg. 36, ff. 188^v–189^r; *id.*, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 73, f. 110^v. He wrote a letter in Candia addressed to Francesco Michiel; cf. *supra*, doc. 21.

coggino de 40 anni nominato il capitan Gregorio qual²³ conosco già 18 anni²⁴ al presente in queste ordinanze intende tanto.

Io dico a Vostra Signoria qual meglio ch' io so per beneficio di questa mia fortezza, rispetto alla fortezza, però è da credere che havendosi a defendere con tre cose principali, che io ne ricordasse a Sua Serenità due cattive, per broglio o per altro, qual cose sono queste che bisognarebbono in occasione di guerra, prima un buon governatore intendente, prudente, savio et valoroso come questo è, fra tutti li soldati di Vostre Signorie Clarissime. L'altra che questi undeci belloardi hanno bisogno de 3 millia et tre cento cernede, cioè un capitano per belloardo con 300 cernede, quale da questi saranno tenute bene, li bisogna poi altre 300 fanti Italiani / [45^r] con undeci capi, che saranno sei cento de questi. Altri aiutanti della città, contadini che fugiranno qui dentro se ne caveranno sempre della terza sorte 400 per belloardo, mettesi pure dell'pane, polvere et palle, come diceva il Fausto²⁵ che le cose di questo Regno andaranno bene et sappia Vostra Signoria che, se ben si havessero fatti tre forti piccoli, uno a Cerines, uno a Nicossia et l'altro a Limissò, li voleva al manco 18 per belloardi et in tutti 3 non si sarebbe stata più gente di quello che capirebbe questa fortezza grande di Nicosia, nella quale a 4 passa quadri per ciascuna persona homo, donna et putto, li capirebbe dentro 130 mille anime comodissimamente, senza metter a conto li 11 gran belloardi nelle piazze delle quali accadendo il bisogno li voglio far combattere li stradiotti, et²⁶ che la cavalleria nostra sortisca in le fosse, me raccomando a Vostra Signoria senza fine et la prego a star sana, et tenirme nella sua gratia, et raccomandome a quelli Signori che a lei pare, che habbiano buon animo delle mie fatiche, overo al manco della mia bona intentione.

Di Nicossia alli 28 luglio 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

*Al Clarissimo Signor Francesco Michele Signor mio. 1567 28 luglio. N° 1^a.
La causa della fortificatione.*



²³ added above *conosco*. ²⁴ Captain Gregorio Pantea, from Verona, was acknowledged as “una persona di valore” in a Senate decision of October 1564, which accorded him the interim command of a company of *ordinanze*: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 41^v. He was associated with the map of Nicosia drawn by Germanico Savorgnan on 8 August 1567, which he was ordered to take to Venice, cf. fig. 40. He is also mentioned infra, doc. 29 n. 5. ²⁵ A reference to Vettor Fausto (c. 1480–1546), a Greek humanist whose love for mathematics and architecture saw him revolutionize naval architecture. He held the chair of Greek at the San Marco *scuola*, and wrote a book published posthumously by Paolo Ramusio, *Victoris Fausti ... Orationes quinque*, Venetiis: apud Aldi filios, 1551, cf. A. Tenenti, *Cristoforo da Canal et la marine vénitienne avant Lépante*, Paris 1962, pp. 21, 29 and passim; Tafuri, *Venezia e il Rinascimento*, pp. 165–166; Hale, ‘Industria del libro e cultura militare’, p. 255; Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 53–55. ²⁶ *anco* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

29 Letter from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze, Nicosia, 2 August 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 49^r-50^v; id., *Materie Misti Notabili* 11, ff. 76^v-77^r.

The fortification of Nicosia is progressing, and the platforms of the eleven bastions are now on average 12 piedi [4 m] high, although they will be twice as high when finished. The eleven curtains are 8 piedi [2.8 m] high. The terrain is so favourable to construction that the city will have already been made secure by the time this letter reaches Venice. To defend the fortress, eleven captains with 300 soldiers will need to be sent from Italy; there will be one captain in charge of each bastion, and each captain and his men will be supported by a company of 300 ordinanze soldiers, now well-disciplined thanks to Governor Roncone, plus a possible 400 additional men, in which case each bastion would be defended by 1,000 men. The fortress commander could be Roncone, whom G.S. has known for twenty years and believes to be the man for the job, endowed with brains and experience, and a fine knowledge of fortifications. Under Roncone's command is Gregorio Pantea, who for a wage of only 25 ducats is the perfect assistant. G.S. attended an inspection of the 700 stradioti, and was pleased with what he saw, despite some problems. They need a governor who is more dynamic than the old vice-governor currently serving, and G.S. proposes Captain Dionisio de' Naldi or Captain Cesare Tagliaferro, who served Sforza Pallavicino; the language barrier is not really a problem, as all the stradioti speak Italian and will respect a competent leader.

Clarissimi Signori miei osservantissimi,

Questa fortificatione di Nicossia è ridutta che in questi primi giorni d'agosto in tutti li undeci belloardi sono alzate le sue piazze dodeci piedi sopra il piano della campagna, cioè il più basso alcuni sono 14 et alcuni 16 et più. Per quest'anno, Vostre Signorie Illustrissime si pono contentare che la menor di dette piazze sia all'altezza di 16, et poi li va 8 piedi di parapetto, sì che il minore sarà di 24 piedi in tutto superiore alla campagna, et la sua profondità di fossa al presente in qualche loco è più delli 12 piedi et in pochissimo tempo se arriverà alli 16 et anco alli 20 di cavatione di fossa, sì che in tutto li sarà de montata 44 piedi, et alle ponte delli belloardi più si sarà vicini alli 50. Fino al presente giorno si siano anco alzate tutte le 11 cortine 8 piedi di altezza, et qualch'una più di 12 con altra tanta profondità di fossa. Si taglia il terreno qual è tanto bono, che è assai meglio che di muro et sta benissimo a scarpa da sua posta et non pò esser battuto, di modo che questa fortezza sarà in securtà posta avanti che Vostre Signorie Illustrissime habbiano havuto queste lettere.

Bisogna pensare¹ che quantità di gente farà bisogno per defenderla. Io dico che undeci capitani con 300 fanti per uno che vengano d'Italia et assignarli uno per belloardo, et appresso a loro metterli anco undeci di queste compagnie delle ordinanze che sono di 300 fanti l'una,² quale per quanto intendo già un'anno erano andate in grandissimo dessoridine, ma dappoi che questo Governator / [49^v] Ronchone le ha disciplinate a suo modo, per quelle che io ho vedute, credo che non si possa far meglio, sì che havendosi in ciascuno belloardo

1 *alle arteglierie* crossed out after *pensare*. 2 *che sono di 300 fanti l'una* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

300 soldati³ d'Italia et 300 di questi, et un'altra sorte di gente quale si farebbe elletta fra tanti che fussero fugiti qui dentro, gran fatto che non se arivasse a 400 in tutto si venirebbe ad esser mille homini per belloardo,⁴ et questi 400 con arme da monitione a certi tempi in alcuni lochi farebbono grandissimo giovamento, essendo che l'inimici non potranno combatter una tal fortezza in tutti li lochi in una volta, et la gente eletta si pone alli maggiori bisogni, et quest'altra sorte di gente dove non fa tanto bisogno suppliscano.

Bisogna pensare di mettervi uno governatore che oltre la fidelità et valore habbia anco cervello, et sia giudicato bono. Faccio sapere a Vostre Signorie Clarissime che io conosco quasi tutti li soi soldati,⁵ et non potrei vedere governor fatto di questa fortezza che più mi paresse a proposito di questo Ronchone, governatore delle ordinanze; io lo conosco già 20 anni et sempre ho fatto grandissimo conto di lui, et Dio ha voluto che in questi tempi si habbia trovato qui, essendo homo di cervello et d'ogni maneggio, intende così bene le cose delle fortificatione quanto altro capitano che serve Sua Serenità, è amato et stimato grandemente de tutta questa nobiltà per questo havendo da esser' le ordinanze et questa fortezza tutto un corpo, non li levarei il peso delle ordinanze, essendo che supplirà benissimo all'una et l'altra cosa come io dirò a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime. Si trova havere il detto governor Ronchone un capitano Gregorio Pantea / [50^r] veronese,⁶ qual è uno bonissimo capitano, è suo luogotenente et anco suo parente, qual capitano Gregorio tra lui et il Signor Governatore, hor' uno et hor' l'altro faranno eccellentissimamente bene il servitio di Sua Serenità, et questo con 25 ducati di pagha supplirà benissimo di certezza meglio assai di quello che hanno fatto delli altri, che toccavano li 600 ducati. Vi bisogna fatica, diligentia et desiderio d'honore, come di certezza questi faranno.

Mi resta a dirle che ho veduta una rassegna de tutti li stradiotti, quali al mio parere de homini et de cavalli le Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime si ponno contentare, ma ben intendo che quando venne qui il Clarissimo Barbaro la paga avanti haveano li cavalli molto mal all'ordine, potrebbe esser per causa della carestia che era stata grandissima,⁷ quali ad ogni bisogno farebbono utile servitio per la quantità che sono de circa 700, ma hanno ben bisogno de uno governatore più vivo di quello, che è quel vecchio vice governatore. Vorrei veder qui al suo governo il capitano Dionisio de' Naldi,⁸ o il capitano Cesare Tagliaferro, che era capitano delli cavalli leggieri dell'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza, uno di questi 2 farebbe il servitio bene per Sua Serenità, et io ho per una fabola quel dire non obbediranno uno governatore

³ *soldati* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁴ *per belloardo* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁵ A precious piece of information, showing that officers frequented various garrisons in the *Terraferma* and the *Stato da Mar*.

⁶ Gregorio Pantea, already mentioned above supra, doc. 28 n. 21. ⁷ Here G.S. refers to the long period of drought that hit the island from the summer of 1562 onwards and resulted in a permanent shortage of food; cf. supra, doc. 7 n. 12.

⁸ Dionisio dei Naldi / Dionisio Naldo, *cavalier*, led the guard of Porto Lignago (in the province of Verona) in May 1550. He went to Cyprus, with Eugenio Singlitico, after being appointed Famagusta's infantry governor on 8 February 1570, as a replacement for Colonel Scipio Piacenza; in charge of a troop of 150 soldiers, he was paid 600 ducats per year. He died during the siege of Famagusta in the winter of 1570 / 1571: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 27, f. 91^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, ff. 132^r, 141^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 103 n. 65 and passim.

italiano per che non ha la lingua, dico che quasi tutti sanno parlare italiano, tutti li capi benissimo.⁹ Non danno obedientia a questo per che non lo stimano, et tra loro capi se odiano molto, sì che¹⁰ de obedientia et de malivolentia non si pò venire a peggio di quello si è, venga pur uno che sappia commandare et che intenda il mestiero che sarà obedito con utile di Sua Serenità, et qui facendo fine a / [50^v] Vostre Signorie Clarissime sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 2 agosto 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustrissime servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Alli Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori miei osservantissimi li Signori sopra le fortezze in Venetia. Copia. 1567 2 agosto. N° 3. 300 fanti per belloardo oltre 300 cernide et 400 della terra 1000 per uno.



30 Letter from G.S. (to Francesco Michiel?), Nicosia, 2 August 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 47^r–48^v.

G.S. thanks his correspondent for the two letters he has sent him, and is grateful to him for insisting that Venice agree to adopt cavaliers. G.S. hopes Michiel will be given a position of great authority; he himself hopes to be appointed infantry general or campmaster, since he has already been performing these functions for 65 months, unpaid and unrecognized.

In G.S.'s eyes, Governor Roncone could make an excellent governor of Nicosia, and Captain Andrea Nigrisoli would be a fine choice to oversee construction in Cerines and execute the orders of Girolamo Martinengo, who G.S. hopes will soon get back to Venice. G.S. apologizes for using his correspondent as an intermediary to send letters and drawings, but stresses that this should be taken as a sign of extreme confidence; he is sending all of this due to the death of Nicolò Querini, an officer respected by all and endowed with a rare efficiency and great probity, who served Venice as best he could, helping the whole construction project by cutting back daily expenses. This rigour is now disappearing, as Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro does not possess the same authority; G.S. fears Nicosia might not receive its grain provisions in time. He hopes a new luocotenente will arrive, one capable of withstanding all the pressures of the job.

G.S. asks for this letter to be destroyed, so as to avoid any bad feeling from the camerlengos or councillors; he admits that due to intrigues and jealousy he is more worried about 4 bastions than about the other 7 combined. In order for an errorless map to be printed, G.S. has sent with the letter a drawing of Nicosia's enceinte done by Germanico Savorgnan; he hopes that one day

⁹ This remark on the language barrier seems to follow on from an argument expressed by Ascanio Savorgnan; cf. supra, doc. 16 n. 110. ¹⁰ *più* crossed out after *che*.

Germanico will undertake a fortification project of his own in Friuli. G.S. finishes by remarking that he has only been ill for six days.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Io ho havuto due sue lettere, una fatta nel principio di luglio, et anco la sorte delle artiglierie che sono state ordinate per qui. La ringrazio infinitamente et se io la potessi honorare più di quello che io faccio, lo farei molto volentieri. Sarà forza che in Senato sia detto chi è stato colui che ha scritto a Giulio l'aricordo di adoperar li cavallieri. Niuno mai dirà di esser stato lui, né potria esser tanto prosuntoso ma Vostra Signoria con la mia lettera justificarà esser stata lei quella, sì che se tal cosa dispiace a Vostra Signoria, quella non dica altro, et se anco la vole che la verità si sappia (come è detto), lei lo puol far sapere, io non voglio¹ servirme in vita mia² dell'honor d'altri et tanto manco di quello delli miei amici et patroni. In fine io la vorei veder così volentieri savio di Terra Ferma,³ quanto che se io fosse fatto della zonta de Pregadi, come già fu fatto mio padre,⁴ il che mi sarebbe più caro che se io fussi fatto generale della fanteria overo mastro di campo, quando ben questo grado fosse appresso Vostre Signorie Clarissime posto di soldo et di dignità del pari, come il generalato delle fanterie, benché questo grado, sono hormai 65 mesi che io lo essercito, et faccio tutti li effetti de mastro de campo, ma mi manca solamente il soldo et la dignità, basta bene che vi sia la spesa, la fatica et il pericolo. Quando che io havero 90 anni, di certezza mi daranno qualche dignità in arsenale.

Dalle copie delle incluse la saperà quanto me, ben la supplico a procurare per queste arteglierie, et che io / [47^v] possa venire in Italia quando il Clarissimo Barbaro.⁵ Se del 1568 habbia a venir armata grossa fora, non è da pensarvi, ma con le nave de luglio o d'agosto cioè adesso a un'anno darne la nostra libertà, per che bisognando non partiremo, et non accadendo a che preposito star più qui?

Questo governorator Ronchone sarebbe attissimo governorator qui de Nicossia, meglio che altri che conosca, et per la fabrica di Cerines il capitano Andrea Nigrisoli⁶ mi parerebbe a proposito, come è già provato essendo che in Candia Moretto Calavrese⁷ sapperà ben esse-

1 *mai* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 2 *mai* crossed out. 3 From November 1566 to June 1567 Francesco Michiel was a member of the college of the *Dieci Savi alle Decime*: ASV, *Dieci Savi alle Decime*, Terminazioni di sopraluogo e stime, b. 855, ff. 39^r, 54^v–56^v, 63^{r-v}, 72^v–73^r, 82^r–83^v, 84^v–86^v, 88^r–90^r. 4 Girolamo Savorgnan was accepted into the Senate as a supernumerary member on 1 September 1508; cf. supra, p. 30. The parallel that G.S. draws leads one to understand that his father and Nicolò Michiel became closer to one another during their time in this institution. 5 G.S. hoped, then, that his mandate in Cyprus, which had no fixed duration, would, like the post of provveditor-general, be over after two years. 6 Captain Andrea Nigrisoli, already mentioned; cf. supra, doc. 28 n. 22. 7 Colonel Moretto Calavrese was appointed governor of Cattaro in December 1563, served in Corfu until 1566, then was infantry governor in Candia in March 1567, under the command of Girolamo Martingengo, who recommended Calavrese for the continuation of the fortification project in Candia after requesting to be repatriated to Venice on 20 August 1568. Calavrese went to Corfu, between 1574 and 1576, and then was in Candia in March 1578 and April 1579: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 22^r; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, f. 119^r, reg. 38, ff. 51^v, 155^r; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1, s.f.; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 1*, s.f. (*Expositione del Colonello Moretto Calavrese circa la difesa di Candia*); id., *Materie Miste Notabili 2* (*Relazione* dated 17 May 1575); Pagratis, *Oi ἐπιδείξεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 151–153.

quire la volontà del Signor Hieronimo Martinengo per continuare le sue fabbriche, qual Signor Hieronimo vorrei che tornasse a Venetia prima di me per vedere come anderanno le cose del mondo, et se noi altri saremo pagati a giornata o a ferlini. Se io⁸ li mando questi dessegni et lettere che vanno ad altri, la prego a non me l'haver per male, per che io più baldezza et securtà con lei, che non ho con miei nipoti né con miei fratelli, et questa è la causa.

La morte di questo Quirini è stata di grandissimo danno a questa fabrica per che era stimato da tutti la sua diligentia, intelligentia, essecutor eccellentissimo, ogni giorno metteva qualche miaro de ducatti in deposito de questa reale, quale è stata molto lacerata da consiglieri, camerlenghi non solamente vici per li proprij morti, ma sono stati viciosissimi per haver 50 ducatti danno via 2 millia di San Marco, con la conscientia grossa de carità verso la Republica; questo Querini andava ogni giorno ingrossando la posta, et me ha detto senza che siano mandati danari da Venetia, se non questi 20 millia che hai portati, et voglio apparecchiare un scigno / [48^r] de 60 millia ducatti per agosto, et biave in la fortezza senza fine. Al presente ogni giorno si cavanno danari del deposito per accomodar diversi, per che non vi è né cervello né carità. Il Signor Proveditor vede mai, è tanto di natura bono che fino li suoi servitori di casa non lo stimano come tutti sono chiari, mai vol⁹ contrastar con niuno sì che non si scoderà, si spenderanno li scossi come piacerà al Signor Dio, et pane non venirà a tempo a Nicossia. Per reverentia de Dio, ne sia mandato luogotenente che non solamente sia de bona volontà ma sia vivo, et che non si scordi di cose che li vengono dette.¹⁰ Credo che questi caldi facciano far mutatione fino alle nature degli homini.

Questa lettera è da stracciare, per che non me vorrei queste inimicitie de camerlenghi, né de consiglieri. Li balloardi delli quali mi danno più daffare li suoi 4 che tutti li altri 7, et ho più che fare a repararme dalli intrichi et garbugli loro, che non ha un cavallo senza coda dalle mosche, non solamente hanno per male che li altri 7 belloardi si facciano bene, ma tutti li spiaceri che pono farli non mancano, et¹¹ vorrebbero tirare in dietro li altri 7 per andar loro avanti, sì che è da far per tutto. Bisogna tacere queste cose, abbruciare la lettera et motteggiar qualche parola solamente a un paio di savij de intelletto, acciò scrivano et facciano provisioni gagliarde che venendo armata sia del pane qui dentro, legni et molini, et sale da sallare li animali in qualche caso. Non manco di ricordarlo ma me du- / [48^v] bito di non venirle in fastidio, non solamente a loro ma anco a Vostra Signoria con tante mie parole, quale sarebbono superflue et fastidiose se fussimo securi che mai non ne venisse guerra, però faro fine dicendoli solamente chel conte Germanico se raccomanda a Vostra Signoria, et ha fatto questo dissegno iustissimo, et acciò che non ne fosse stampato qualch'uno falso io metto in libertà Vostra Signoria di farne stampare uno a questo modo circa la forma et grandezza sua,

8 *ben* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 9 *vol* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 10 Upon Nicolò Querini's death, Augustin Barbarigo, *di Zuane*, was elected as his successor on 12 October 1567; however, Barbarigo did not take office, remaining *commissario sopra i confini* as before. Nicolò Dandolo, *di Hieronimo*, was thus elected on 13 November 1567, and arrived in Nicosia the following summer: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 182^v–183^r; on Dandolo's biography, see G. Gullino, 'Nicolò Dandolo', *DBI*, vol. 32, pp. 502–504, and Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 100 n. 38; see also *infra*, p. 542 n. 7. 11 *li* crossed out after *et*.

et advertir bene a quelle cannonere.¹² Quanto a quelle lettere che sono scritte dentro, Vostra Signoria Clarissima le acconzi a suo modo, acciò non parer che io le habbia fatte far per boria, però bisogna pensarli sopra bene, ma per far dispetto a quelli de Udene alli quali Vostra Signoria ne manderà da sé un paio de dozene per farli dar l'anima al Diavolo, et che vedrano ch'el conte Germanico un giorno farà fare una fortezza in Frioli poco manco di questa, et che li dacij siano di San Marco, et che sia fatta in buon terreno. Mi raccomando a Vostra Signoria senza fine, et la prego a raccomandarme al Clarissimo Signor Misser Antonio Morosini,¹³ et a chi lei pare, tenendomi sempre per suo buon servitore, son stato amalato solamente 6 giorni.

Di Nicossia alli 2 agosto 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Ho riceputo la sua d'ultimo marzo et un'altra dentro, quella di primo luglio.

1567 2 agosto. N° 2.



31 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Nicosia, 7 August 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 51^r–54^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 77^r–78^v.

Continuing the account of his mission, G.S. reiterates that he is following Sforza Pallavicino's recommendations on the work to be done at three different sites. A list of seventeen measures to be taken in Famagusta has been drawn up; and Cerines must be fortified. As for Nicosia, the fortress needs to protect the nobility and their property, and make it impossible for the enemy to take the city. G.S. explains that priority has not been given to Cerines for several reasons: the Regno lords were not prepared to help finance the project, so the same difficulties would have arisen as in 1562; the financial burden would have fallen on Venice, and the 20,000 ducats that G.S. brought across with him would have run out quickly; finally, if Cerines had been fortified, 60,000 people could have taken refuge there, as in Famagusta, but another 100,000 would have been left to fend for themselves in the mountains.

In Nicosia, the idea originally was to build a twelve-bastion citadel that would have used water from the spring; but the latter is too far away from the city. Moreover, such a citadel would not have enclosed any houses within its perimeter; it would have been exposed to attacks from higher altitudes; construction would have been long and costly, since the citadel would have been built on rock that is difficult to cut through; and finally, in the event of imminent war, to prevent the enemy from taking the city it would have been necessary to demolish many

¹² This drawing has been preserved, and can be found at the AST, cf. fig. 40. ¹³ Antonio Morosini is also mentioned infra, doc. 63.

houses, which nobody would have agreed to. However, undertaking nothing at all would have been a show of weakness, and tantamount to surrendering 130,000 Nicosian citizens to the enemy, as getting the city's population to Famagusta would have been impossible. As a result, G.S. and his team considered at length the idea proposed previously by Sforza Pallavicino.

G.S.'s proposition was to build a new enceinte, if he could have 500 men at each bastion and pay them using the ferlini system. He promised that within eight months the city could be secured, and this promise was enthusiastically received by Provveditor Barbaro, the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] and the other lords, who promised in turn to provide all the money and manpower G.S. may need. There was much discussion over what kind of fortification should be pursued: some wished to see four forts, each with six bastions, and others preferred a fourteen-bastion enceinte; but in the end G.S. persuaded everyone that his eleven-bastion plan was the best option, as it would be far from the hills and would not destroy any more houses than the other plans. The count of Rochas immediately offered 10,000 ducats, putting forward all of his money plus some of his future incomes.

[In the insert corresponding to f. 53^r] The count of Rochas' offer of 10,000 ducats was followed by a donation from the count of Tripoli [Giacomo de Nores], although this offer, as Luocotenente Querini had already understood, turned out to be artificial, as he stipulated that the money, private incomes and jewels belonging to his wife that he promised had to be collected from his home. Antonio Davila, on the other hand, immediately honoured his offer of 10,000 ducats. All this was from May to July, and at the beginning of August Davila received a letter from the Signoria thanking him for already having come to the Cypriot camera's aid in the past with a donation of several thousand mozza of wheat and barley during the drought, whilst others were selling it to make a profit. The Signoria spoke in this letter of her intention to reimburse Davila the price of the grain he gave; this made the count of Tripoli jealous, and on 15 August he donated 5,000 mozza of wheat and as much barley, to make sure that he was the second nobleman to make a donation to the construction work. Even though he deplores such artifices, G.S. preferred to have the Signoria's letter amended to avoid tensions [end of insert].

The second donation was made by Antonio Davila, a relative of the count of Rochas, who gave 10,000 ducats in money and incomes. Others followed suit, and a total of 60,000 ducats has now been donated, plus 5,000 ducats to compensate the poor for the demolition of their houses (no equivalent compensation will be offered to the rich). G.S. assures the doge that the support of the nobility can be won through reasoned discussion, and through appeals to their vanity; he has proposed to the leading knights the idea of having the bastions under their supervision (supervision both of the construction in progress right now and, potentially, of the defence of the bastion later on in wartime) named after them. Work has therefore begun in Nicosia, but not in Cerines, which will be dealt with later. This course of action is to the satisfaction of Francesco Barbaro, Querini and all of Cyprus's officers. G.S. also informs the doge that he will write to the provveditori alle fortezze to update them on how the situation is developing.

Serenissimo Principe,

Per un'altra mia fatta questo maggio, li davo conto del mio arrivo qui in Nicossia,¹ et me riportavo del tutto alle lettere del Clarissimo Proveditore Barbaro et delli altri Clarissimi Signori.² Al presente farei il medemo, ma havendome comandato Sua Signoria Clarissima che io scriva come obediente suo servitore, le dirò qualche cosa di quello che è stato fatto, et prima alcune ragioni per che è stato fatto questo. La Serenità Vostra sa che io son venuto da Corfù in questo Regno non mi sapendo a che fare che io venisse, ma dappoi gionto in le lettere di Vostra Sublimità era una scrittura prudentissima dell'Eccellentia del Signor Sforza, qual è stata fatta da Sua Signoria Illustrissima de ordine di Vostra Serenità, fondata sopra li pareri diversi di noi altri suoi capitaniij che siamo stati altre volte in questo Regno, per la quale Sua Eccellentia ricorda tre cose principali, una delle quali harebbe fatto dui effetti.³

La prima era di rassettare così come portava il tempo breve diverse cose in Famagosta, qual effetto il Clarissimo Barbaro et quel Clarissimo Capitanio del Regno Bembo fecero bonissima rresolutione, come appare per 17 capitoli nelli quali, oltre il governor delle ordinanze Ronchone et quel governatore di Famagosta, io ancora li intraveni,⁴ sì che è stato benissimo adempito la volontà et parere di Sua Eccellentia quanto a Famagosta. Il secondo capo era di fortificare Cerines. Il terzo era di fare qualche sorte di forte qui a Nicossia a fine di fare dui effetti in una volta importantissimi, l'uno de quali era per salvare questa nobiltà et il suo havere, l'altro effetto che era forse anco maggiore per non dar commodità al nemico che se impatronisca di questa città di Nicossia, quale li sarebbe stato un commodissimo alloggiamento da fermarvi dentro il piedi, et travagliare poi tutto il resto del Regno, come ben Sua Eccellentia ponderà.

Al presente si da / [51^v] conto a Vostra Serenità, et bisogna dirle le cause quale hanno mosso questi Clarissimi Signori a cominciare più presto una che l'altra, et la causa per che non si hanno cominciate tutte dui in una volta. Se si havesse principiato da Cerines, cosa chiara era al mio giudizio che si harebbe havuto da questo Regno quelle istesse difficoltà, o poco manco, che si hebbe già cinque anni passati quando la Serenità Vostra rissolse nel Senato che Cerines fosse fortificato, per il che la mi mandò all'ora a vedere questo sito di Cerines,⁵ et la sa che questi del Regno non contribuivano voluntieri a quella spesa, era adunque da pensare che bisognava far tutta la spesa col danaro della borsa di Vostra Serenità, et qui su le galee si havea portato solamente vinti millia ducatti, quali fino al presente sarebbono stati spesi. Vero è che Cerines fatto che fosse a quel modo che Sua Eccellenza lauda, si harebbe fatto forte, et in sé si harebbono salvate tante anime quante in Famagosta, come sarebbe a dire 60 millia anime frà tutte due, in questo Regno ne sono più di 160 millia, di modo che se ben Cerines fosse stato fatto prima et a tempo, restavano più di cento millia anime a descriptione d'altri, da poter esser condotte via, et in le montagne in poco

1 Cf. supra, doc. 25. 2 Letters that do not appear to have been preserved. 3 G.S. recalls how he came to be in Cyprus, mentioning the recommendations given by Sforza Pallavicino; cf. supra, doc. 17. 4 Cf. supra, doc. 27. 5 Cf. the letters sent on 15 August 1562, supra, docs 9, 10, 11.

tempo harebbono convenuto abbandonarle. Questi sono li effetti che harebbe fatto Cerines, se fosse stato fortificato prima.

Qui a Nicossia, si havea animo⁶ di fare una cittadella come stavano li ricordi de noi altri soldati sopra li quali era fondato quel di Sua Eccellenza. Quella fontana de prima viene sopra terra immediate dentro della porta della cittadella, un buon spatio, passando per horti et giardini avanti che arrivi all'habitato delle case, poi questa fontana viene sotto terra coperta tanto da lontano che non si sapeva da tutti, come è in effetto di modo che havendosi voluto fare un forte qual havebbe abbracciato il nascimento di questa fontana, ancora che fosse stato fatto di 12 belloardi / [52^r] rimaneva tanto lontano dell'habitato delle case che non harebbe potuto dislogiare il nemico di Nicossia, et tal forte non harebbe abbracciato in sé pur una casa, peggio che era sottoposto a quell'altura, dalla quale questi signori si sono discostati gettando a terra assaissime case. Poi il fondo in quel loco era bona parte sopra la rocha difficile da tagliare, che mai se li vede il fine in le cavationi come ben sa la borsa di Vostra Serenità per causa di Famagosta, oltre di questo la giara d'un certo torrente in quel loco harebbe fatto grandissimo impedimento alla fabrica, sì per la spesa come per il tempo, et come cose impossibili ha bisognato pensare ad altri rimedij, et questi del Regno non erano tanto matti che non se avedessero che alla prima sospitione era necessaria cosa, per ragione di guerra, di spianare tutte le case di Nicossia, per impedire un tale alloggiamento al nemico, per ciò non l'assentivano in alcun modo et poco aiuto et favore, mio giudicio si harebbe havuto da loro.

Il fare niente era una mala cosa et stare a descrizione de nemici, che habbiano a venire et dimontare commodamente in diversi luochi et impatronirsi di questo alloggiamento con grandissimi guadagni, et per il manco menar fori di questo Regno 130 millia anime, che tante sono quelle che non pono capire in Famagosta, et per che in la scrittura di Sua Eccellenza sono le formal parole qual havemo studiata cento volte, et dicono:

A Nicossia alla quale non vi provvedendo sarebbe la vera sede del nemico, et che per la grandezza sua non si pò fortificare, se non con gran tempo (essendovi sito al proposito) farli una grande et gagliarda cittadella.⁷

Io sopra questo dissi che detta grande et gagliarda cittadella non la intendeva niente manco di sette belloardi, ma il / [52^v] farla alla fontana era inutile, oltre la impossibilità come è detto. Ma che se non fosse stato il rispetto di gettare giù delle case, che me havrei discostato 260 passa da quelle alture, quale sono 8 passa e mezzo d'altezza, et che se mi fossero dati 500 homini per belloardo, et che io li potessi far lavorare a mio modo a ferlini, che in otto mesi con 6 millia homini in buon terreno, mi metterebbe in securtà bonissima. Non hebbi così presto detto tal parola che il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore Barbaro mostrò un segno grandissimo d'allegrezza. Il Conte di Rochas et questi altri signori, tutti ad una voca con un'allegrezza infinita, dissero homeni et danari non mancaranno che se fortifichi tutta Nicossia, et se venirà ad empire la scrittura dell'Eccellenza del Signor Sforza per salvare questa nobiltà di Nicossia, et medesimamente si priva il nemico di questo commodissimo alloggiamento, et io

6 *animo* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 7 Cf. supra, doc. 17.

dico più che li staranno dentro le 130 millia anime de contadini più larghi et commodi in questi undeci belloardi che se fussero stati fatti quattro forti di sei belloardi l'uno, in quelli 24 belloardi divisi a quel modo in 4 forti non sarebbono stati capaci di tanta gente quanta starà in questa de 11 belloardi soli. Questi del Regno per conservare più case haveano opinione di farne 14 belloardi, et io le dissi che 11 basteranno, et che facendosi anco li 14 anderano fatte quelle istesse rovine di case, quanto in li undeci, per che a tutti doi li modi era necessario a discostarsi 260 passa da quelle alture, dalla qual parte è stato il danno delle rovine. Con questa allegrezza il Conte di Rochas devotissimo servitor' di Vostra Serenità et meritevole d'ogni honore, con una prontezza d'animo grandissimo offerse a Sue Signorie Clarissime in dono diece millia ducatti, mandando immediate tutti li soi argenti alli Clarissimi, et poi li ha consignato tanta entrata della sua /

[53^r is a half-page inserted into the register] la prima offerta fù del Conte di Rochas di 10 millia,⁸ la seconda immediate fu del Conte de Tripoli,⁹ ma fu artificiosa come diceva il Querini morto, che havea tal offerta per niente, per che diceva Signori mandate a casa mia a tor in nota miei danari, miei argenti, le gioije de mia moglie, le mie entrate, fattevene parte a vostro modo. Il Signor Davila fece la sua offerta nobile et chiara, dicendo vi dono in tutto diece millia ducatti, sborsando in camera fischal mille ducatti, mille d'argenti et 8 millia de tante entrate assignate, et già ne ha date assai lui et il Conte de Rochas. Queste offerte furono fatte tutte de mazo e passato zugno, et tutto luglio et al principio di questo d'agosto, è venuta una lettera di Sua Serenità molto amorevole et cortese verso il Signor Davila, laudandolo et ringraziandolo del presente de alquanti millia mozi di formenti et orzi al tempio della carestia,¹⁰ che lui donò alla reale liberamente et non come fece altri, che se l'ha fatto strapagare.¹¹ Sua Serenità da vero principe commanda che al presente li sia pagato tal orzo et formento, per il che il Conte de Tripoli immediate comparse alli Signori, dicendo vedo che li

8 10 millia added above with signe-de-renvoi. 9 Giacomo de Nores, who in 1565 succeeded his father Alvisè, was granted by the doge the permission to carry weapons in public on 22 September 1556. He was one of the four commanders of the feudal cavalry in 1560, and one of the island's main landowners, notably leasing the tithes of the archdiocese for 7,000 ducats a year that same year. He was a *università* procurator in February 1565 and commanded the Nicosian artillery during the siege of the city; in late August 1570 he was killed by an arrow: ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from the captain of Famagusta, Domenico Trevisan, c. 16^r; ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 1 (a *università* dispatch dated 1 February 1565), b. 3 (dispatch dated 22 October 1564); CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, ff. 202^r–203^r; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 103 n. 66; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées' p. 48; Grivaud/Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 194. Infra, doc. 82, is the letter that the count of Tripoli wrote to the *rettori* and the proveditor-general about his promise. 10 *al tempio della carestia* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 11 In a dispatch dated 23 October 1566 from Nicosia, Vice-Luocotenente Iacomo Ghisi reports the extreme food shortage that Cyprus was suffering after poor harvests in 1564, 1565 and 1566. As no wheat could be got from Syria, the *regimento* ordered Antonio Davila and Tuzio Costanzo to buy grain in the Paphos, Chrysochou and Avdimou regions; however, they only managed to obtain 11,000 *mozza* of wheat and 4,000 of barley, enough for just one month. To complement this, Davila offered 3,000 *mozza* of wheat and 2,000 of barley from his own estates, refusing to accept any money for it: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3. The Senate explicitly thanked Davila on 15 July 1567: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 49^r.

altri dui hanno fatto biade assai in la reale, et Vostre Signorie non mandano a tore niuna cosa, io ve offerisco al presente cinque millia mozi de formento et cinque millia d'orzo, 4 mozi fa un staro veneziano, per via di cancellieri da chi se lascia governar da loro fa scrivere a Sua Serenità che è stato il secondo. Ho conciata la lettera di Sua Serenità per non far nascere contraditione, queste sono cose di far dare l'anima al diavolo, sarà bella cosa da vedere che tanto sarà remunerato Paulo Orsino quanto Hieronimo Martinengo et Giulio Savorgnano di raggione haverà qualche cosa manco, et così il Conte de Tripoli con l'arteficio osella, questi uccellazzi de qua, la verita è questa così come è vero l'Evangelio, Vostra Serenità sarà contenta di strazzare questa poliza, et advertire che è tutta cosa da messer Francesco Cornaro¹² qual li scriverebbe il tutto. Li Barbarighi¹³ saperanno ben la verità loro et la torno a pregar che la voglia strazzare questa, qual è fatta il dì della Madonna d'agosto. / [54^r since 53^v is blank]

Secondo fu il Signor Antonio Davila suo cognato,¹⁴ degno lui ancora della gratia et favore di Vostra Serenità, immediate ne offerse altri 10 millia dando li soi argenti, danari, et consignando per resto tanta entrata. La universalità da questi essempij offersero¹⁵ loro ancora sesanta millia ducatti, et cinque millia di più per restaurare le case a quelli poveri miserabili che sono state rovinate. Delle case delli ricchi non se ne parla, sì che il fatto è passato a questo modo, et voglio sperare che questi del Regno daranno ogni grandissimo aiuto a Vostra Serenità et per Cerines, et per ogni altra cosa che la vorrà fare in questo Regno. Qui si pò molto ben vedere quanto importa a tore, et dimandare le cose più per una via che per l'altra, vedendo questi signori del Regno come che questi danari si spendono con intelletto, et loro mossi anco dalla gloria particolare, io le dissi se vorreti ogn'uno de voi cavallieri principali, hareti il carico di fare un belloardo per uno, quel havrà il nome della casa vostra et sarà una memoria perpetua, et in tempo di guerra ve lo deffendereti. Questo desiderio d'honore ha havuto forza di far nascere tal buon effetto, et tal invention non la voglio attribuire a me, ma (come è la verità a uno suo gentilhuomo qual me la scrisse da Venetia al mio partire de Corfù,¹⁶ sì che il signor Dio ha guidata tal cosa, et credo che queste ragioni dette, et vedute da questi Clarissimi sul fatto, saranno bastante di far conoscere a Vostra Serenità che sia stato meglio a cominciar a fortificare Nicossia cha Cerines, essendo che si anderà poi a Cerines a seconda di mare, et di vento (come si suol dire), et anco a seconda de danari. Et al contrario sarebbe intravenuto se si havesse cominciato da Cerines. La Serenità Vostra mi perdoni se li do tanta molestia, con questa lunga lettera, et l'accetti almanco il mio / [54^v] buon animo et se la Vostra Serenità restarà lei la millesima parte così soddisfatta delle mie operationi, come resta contento questo Clarissimo Barbaro. Contentissimo era il Clarissimo Querini morto

12 Most probably Francesco Cornaro, son of Fantin, mentioned *infra*, docs 88 and 93. He belonged to the *Corner della Piscopia* branch of the family, very well placed in Cypriot society since the 1360s, when Peter I of Lusignan granted the fiefdom of Episkopi to Federico Corner, in exchange for financial support; Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 814–817; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 26–27. 13 The allusion hidden in this sentence is incomprehensible, and the precise role of the Barbarigo brothers in the affairs of the island is not known. Three months later, Agostino Barbarigo, who had been elected *luocotenente* of Cyprus, was excused from taking office: ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 1 (letter from Francesco Michiel dated 25 October 1567, Venice). 14 *suo cognato* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 15 This is what appears in the manuscript. 16 The closing bracket is missing.

bona memoria. Medesimamente tutti questi altri Clarissimi et tutti questi del Regno per quello che mi mostrano Beato me. Scrivo anco alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze¹⁷ l'inclusa nelli buoni termini in che si ritrovamo al presente,¹⁸ et qui facendo fine, alla bona gratia di Vostra Serenità sempre mi raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 7 agosto 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All'Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe di Venetia, il Signor Hieronimo Prioli, mio signore sempre osservantissimo. 1567 7 agosto. N° 4.



32 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 11 August 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 56^r–58^v.

G.S. considers how well Western princes extend their authority via favourites, to whom they accord titles and offices that ensure their loyalty. After a long list of examples, G.S. comes to the case of Friuli, where the house of Savorgnan is more worthy of merit than any other; he hopes Venice will increase the allowance of 350 ducats given to his nephew Mario, and that he himself will cease to be sent to the dominio da mar, which has been his sphere of existence for fifteen years now.

Amongst the fine servants of Venice living in Cyprus are the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] and Antonio Davila, who receive no income from the Signoria whatsoever; G.S. feels this is wrong, and that Venice should re-examine its policy towards the island's nobility, who, pointing to their privileges as justification, could have refused to finance the fortification of Nicosia if G.S. had read the letter Venice addressed to them. Antonio Davila has been thanked for his donation of 4,000 to 5,000 mozza [1,280 to 1,600 hl] of grain (for which the Signoria is preparing to reimburse him) to the rettori during the 1564 famine. G.S. suggests according the count of Rochas the hereditary title of seneschal of Cyprus which the count held previously via his wife, and the office of constable to Antonio Davila. These measures would secure the two men's services, as Querini desired.

G.S. laments the shortcomings of the local administration, which is failing to supply Nicosia with adequate provisions even though the island has enough reserves to last two years; once more he mourns the premature death of Querini, and proposes that Leonardo Roncone be made the governor of Nicosia's fortress. The archbishop [Filippo Mocenigo], in Cerines since mid-June, has been amazed by the speed at which construction is progressing, and constantly

¹⁷ *Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza* crossed out and replaced above with *Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze*. ¹⁸ Cf. infra, doc. 33.

applauds how small the costs of fortifying Nicosia are proving in comparison to those of other Terraferma fortresses. G.S. hopes the archbishop will have reiterated this praise in Venice to his relative, the procurator Alvise Mocenigo.

Finally, G.S. deplors how shoddily he is treated in having to pay over 50 ducats per month for horse feed. He feels he is being badly done by compared with the other governors on the island, as well as all the soldiers and administrators who, as is the custom on the island, receive free barley for their horses. G.S. feels slightly bitter about this lack of consideration, when it is he who carries all the responsibility for the construction being done.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Io credo che se questa nave indugiasse a partire ancora un mese che io la caricarei de lettere, tanto che io venirebbe 20 volte in fastidio a Vostra Signoria Clarissima. Mi era scordato dirle di tutti li principi del mondo in ogni provincia et in ogni città cercano d'haver alcuni principali suoi favoriti et fideli, per poter havere (mediante loro) li animi delli altri, et quando qualche principe non ne ha di tal sorte, cercano di farne che dependano da loro, dandoli utile, dignità, giurisdiction et facendoli dei favori et diverse sorte di cose, acciò che tutti dicano, io ancora voglio ben operare come sarebbe a dire per Carlo Quinto nel Regno di Napoli, Marc'Antonio Colonna per le frontiere di Roma sempre vien essaltato, il marchese del Guasto et li suoi vecchi sono stati tali, il Signor Don Ferrante Gonzaga et li figliuoli medesimamente, in Franza la casa di Ghisa et quella del gran contestabile, in Spagna il duca d'Alva Don Garzia, in Genova casa Dorea per il Re Filippo, in Fiandra il Conte d'Agamont, in Bressa Vostre Signorie Clarissime hanno parte delli Martinenghi et Avogadri, sono case favorite, in Verona hanno arlevati¹ ultimamente li Pompei, in Vicenza adoperanno li Porti, in Frioli in questa parte che è del imperatore attendevano Tedeschi a far grande il Signor Francesco della Torre Guercio che è morto, qual io me ricordo poverissimo et è morto molto ricco, il Conte di Goritia, l'altro Signor Francesco della Torre de 500 scudi d'entrata che haveva, ne ha più di 18 millia al presente.² La mia casa in Frioli, et in tutto lo stato de le Signorie Vostre Clarissime non ha causa di ceder de antiqui meriti, ne de mo- / [56^v] derno a niun'altro.³ Voglio sperar' che un giorno daranno al Signor Mario qual cosa più delli 350 ducatti che ha all'anno,⁴ et a me faranno al manco privilegio et me assecureranno de non mi mandar più in mare, dove che io sarò stato circa 15 anni, quando che io sarò tornato, se potrò arrivare.

In questo Regno di Cipro, vi sono di bonissimi servitori di questo Stato quali tengano la

1 *arlevare*: to feed, to nourish; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. 2 This long series of examples from the Italian peninsula (including Friuli) and France raises the question of how monarchs maintained their authority over the most powerful aristocratic families, those who controlled regional societies. This question in turn raises the issue of Venice's political intermediaries in Cyprus; the series of examples G.S. gives confirms how much the journeys made by Mario, Germanico and Ascanio contributed to the development of their brother's thoughts on the matter. 3 *di questo illustrissimo stato* crossed out, as is *sia che se voglia* above. Concerning the Savorgnan family's relations with Venice, see especially the various studies by L. Casella. 4 Mario Savorgnan, G.S.'s nephew, commanded a company of soldiers and was paid 350 ducats per year: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 49^v.

balanza dritta in servizio di San Marco, come sono stati questo Conte di Rochas et questo Signor Davila, quali se io fussi in la Signoria mai li lascierei andar senza remuneratione, et voglio che La sappia che se veniva letta la lettera che havea fatto scriver Sua Serenità a questi del Regno, non si havea un quattrino d'aiuto, per che quel modo di domandarli pareva a loro che fosse contra li suoi privilegij, ma il Conte di Rochas prudente, conoscendo li humori, fu lui quello che advertite li Signori che nel legger della lettera alcune parole fossero tacchiate, sì che questo advertimento con il sì buon principio, facendo che suo cognato et lui offerissero li 20 millia ducatti in dono. Altri hebbero molto per male et per concorrentia sua si hanno havuti quelli 60 millia ducatti, sì che tutti li 80 si poleno reconoscer da questi dui, il che importa il tempo che Nicosia sarà fatta forte et per consequentia la conservation del Regno. Questo Signor Davila già 2 giorni sono venute lettere di Sua Serenità doppoi questo fatto, per le quali laudano et ringratiano il detto Signor Antonio de 4 millia mozzi o 5 de formento et orzo, che lui ha donati alli Clarissimi Rettori in questa carestia passata.⁵ Sua Serenità l'ha ringratiato et comandato che li sia pagato quanto va- / [57^r] leva all'hora, io dico che se io fussi in Vostra Signoria, vorrei ricordare a qualche uno di quelli Signori che senza spesa, senza danno, anzi senza pericolo per contrapesare con alcuni altri suoi concorrenti, non si potrebbe far meglio quanto assicurarsi di questa partita et mostrare gratitudine infinita con utile bono in ogni età, io vorrei dare al conte di Rochas in vita sua il titolo senza entrata de siniscalco del Regno, come havea prima⁶ tal grado per conto della moglie, la entrata è tornata a San Marco.⁷ Li vorrei dare tal grado in vita sua et se havrà figlioli che loro ancora facciano delli meriti, si potrà poi far gratia anco a loro. Medesimamente farei con questo Signor Antonio Davila, li darei il suo de contestabile⁸ in vita sua, et lo vorrei dir chiaro per li suoi meriti, li suoi figlioli è da creder che continueranno in ben operare, et a questo modo con parole solamente se teniranno li animi de questi in speranza devotissimi, et come ho detto di sopra saranno contrapesi d'altri. Il Clarissimo Quirini morto che havea cervello et era homo da stato se viveva, haverrebbe scritto al publico questo ch' io dico a Vostra Signoria, ma le astutie de alcuni altri hanno forza de ingannar il mondo, et certe bontà quali si risolvono in fummo.

Ma me dubito da disperatione et per la negligentia del mondo che non me ressolva io ancora in fummo, ben che il sole esca de leone hoggi et al dispetto del caldo, et del sole siamo vivi ma ho pensiero che moriremo da fame, per negligentia (come si suol dire) alcuni moreno da fame in un forno pieno di pane, così faremo noi che moriremo da fame in questa fortezza, et in questa isola ne è nato da viver per 2 anni a tutta l'isola, si vorrà indugiare / [57^v] tanto,

5 Cf. supra, doc. 31 n. 11. 6 *prima* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 7 Eugenio Singlitico's wife, Melisina Requesens, inherited the title of seneschal of Cyprus from her father, Onofrio, and passed it on to her husband. When she died on 20 July 1553, heirless, Venice confiscated her assets, thus depriving Singlitico of his title and his estates: E. G. Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, Paris 1869, pp. 313–314; Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, p. xix; Arbel, 'Greek magnates in Venetian Cyprus', p. 333; G. Grivaud, 'Παλαχώρι... / Palaichori: A mountain village through the ages. Historical review', S. Sophocleous (ed.), *Τὰ Παλαχώρια... / Ta Palaichoria: Centuries of Heritage*, Nicosia 2002, pp. 49–51. 8 Petro Davila was given the title of constable of the Kingdom of Cyprus by King James II, but Venice did not allow his descendants to inherit it: Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, pp. 682–683; Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, pp. 149–150 n. 3.

che veniranno li fanghi grandissimi, li carri pochi et la robba lontano, et li avisi della gran sospitione per poter disaggiazzare questi⁹ frigidì sarà tutto¹⁰ in un tempo, con la vista dell'armata, sì che tutto il mio pensiero è qui, ma s'el Clarissimo Querini viveva a tempo harebbe supplito de danari et di portar il pane a bon'hora dentro, sì come ho scritto per altre. Vostra Signoria Clarissima s'affatichi di far far' governorator' a questa fortezza il Magnifico Signor Lonardo Ronchone, per che non si può trovar meglio in tutto il Stato a mio giudicio, et questo io dico per beneficio del Stato, et sempre me raccomando alla sua bona gratia, et se la potesse vedere quello si ha fatto final presente con 23 millia ducatti, et non lavorando al presente più di 4 millia persone, la stupiria, come ha fatto heri l'arcivescovo¹¹ qual è stato in quel buon aere di Cerines circa 50 giorni, et essendo cavalcato heri mattina atorno tutta la fortezza dice, che se questi 23 millia ducatti fossero stati spesi tutti atorno un belloardo solo, essendo ciascuno di questi più grande del maggior che sia in Padoa, Lignago, Verona et maggior di quello degli Orzi, li pareria buon mercato et questa cosa non dice solamente a me, ma a quanti che sono stati¹² dapoì heri, et hoggi a trovarlo et dice non potesse tenir de non scriver tal cosa alli suoi parenti et particolarmente al Clarissimo Signor Alvise Mocenigo.¹³ De gratia, Vostra Signoria lo tiri in parole per veder' se questo Reverendissimo mi burla o dice da senno, per che non soglio creder molto alli pretti, et dubito che vedendomi le persone tanto fisso in questo humore di questa fortificatione, che per far mi impazzire del tutto mi vadano a seconda, con laudarmi in mia presentia, però la supplico a scrivermi se havrà scritto a quel Clarissimo Procurator Mocenigo. / [58^r]

In capo di 3 mesi, questi Clarissimi mi hanno mandato a casa orzo et paglia per dui

9 *fredi* crossed out. 10 *tutto* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 11 Filippo Mocenigo, *di Piero, cavalier*, from the San Samuele branch of the family, was born on 1 September 1524. He was the last archbishop of Cyprus, and was appointed on 13 March 1560 by Pius IV, with the particular task of applying the Tridentine reforms (which he had published in Cyprus in October 1564). He died in 1589 and was buried in Padua: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (dispatch dated 17 October 1564); Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. 5, p. 193; L. de Mas Latrie, 'Histoire des archevêques latins de l'île de Chypre', *Archives de l'Orient latin* II (1882), pp. 325–328; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 4, pp. 755, 758; G. Fedalto, *La Chiesa latina in Oriente*, Verona 1976, vol. 2, p. 175; E. Skoufari, 'L'Arcivescovo Filippo Mocenigo e l'applicazione della Riforma tridentina a Cipro negli ultimi anni della dominazione veneziana', in Arbel/Chayes/Hendrix (eds), *Cyprus and the Renaissance*, pp. 205–230. 12 *heri* crossed out. 13 Alvise Mocenigo, *di Tomaso*, from the San Stae branch of the family, was born on 26 October 1507. He had an impressive political career: first *savio di Terraferma*, then a member of the Council of Ten, he went on to be *podestà* in Padua, Paul IV and Pius IV's ambassador to Rome and Ferdinand II's ambassador to Vienna. Over the course of his career he was given the titles of *cavalier* and count palatine; he was elected procurator of San Marco *de ultra* in 1565, then on 11 May 1570 he obtained the highest title of all, doge. He died on 7 June 1577 and was buried in San Giovanni e Paolo: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 35^v; id., *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 85^v–86^r; Da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia*, pp. 274–283. G.S. was particularly apprehensive of the procurator, possibly because in the summer of 1560 Alvise Mocenigo, then the syndic of the *Terraferma*, dealt directly with G.S. and Ascanio over the matter of a default during a horse show: BAM, *cod. G. 273 inf.*, ff. 172^{r-v}, 174^{r-v}, 175^r. Furthermore, in August 1568, while G.S. was overseeing the fortification of Nicosia, Alvise Mocenigo imposed a truce between the different aristocratic factions in Friuli, ruling that a family was responsible for the actions of all its members: Muir, *Mad Blood Stirring*, pp. 271–272; Conzato, 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', pp. 174–175.

cavalli, et li altri governatori ne hanno per 6, et alcuni di loro toccano 400, et un'altro 600 ducatti, credo che per questo mi dano tanto poco orzo, toccando io 1600 ducatti, ma me ne va di certezza più di 50 ducatti al mese del mio, et se 'l vescovo et questi Signori ogni giorno mi dicono che se meravigliano di tanta fabrica ch' io faccio fare, mi è venuta voglia di mandarli il suo orzo in dietro, et dirle che io ancora mi meraviglio altro tanto di loro et della sua prodigalità, trattandomi a questo modo, ma ho havuto gran fatica a tenermi, et non li ho detto né ben né male, così va il mondo. Se io tenesse 40 cavalli et adoperandoli, come faccio in suo servizio, essendo così l'usanza del Regno di dar orzo a tutti fino alli zaffi, alli comandatori, conduttori de cancelleria, stradiotti, et ancò fino al proto delli murari di Famagosta, glie l'hanno dato questo anno senza licentia della Signoria quando voleno, ma io non sono homo d'andarli a far netta la veste, né esserli spione, vorrei che non mi havessero dato questo poco. Pensi Vostra Signoria ciò ch' io possa sperare che debbano scriver di me, et vorranno esser stati loro causa di tutta questa fabrica, Dio sa quanto ne hanno poca colpa, et manco fatica né con la vita né con il cervello. Bisogna che io sia fachino, et delli conti non ne sanno una parola al mondo, et del tutto si riportano a me, et per quello si vede hanno opinione che io sij un'homo da bene, come son al suo dispetto, ma per che non hanno né senso né gusto di quelle cose, delle quali piaceno tanto a me a parlar con Vostra Signoria, credo che me habbiano in odio overo in fastidio, per che non so parlar / [58^v] li né de carte né de certe altre sorte vanità, sì che son in questi termini. Ma il Querini morto, faceva così notomia delle cose, come sa Vostra Signoria, che bisogna fare cento volte sopra una cosa simile de tanta importantia. Non potendo havere il parer né il consiglio del Senato delle cose dubiose (rispetto al tempo) per la lontananza, et me raccomando a Vostra Signoria Clarissima, et mi giova a dirle quello, che mi va per la mente.

Di Nicossia alli 11 agosto 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo il signor Francesco Michiel, fu del signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1567 11 agosto. N° 5.



33 *Letter from G.S. to the provveditori alle fortezze, Nicosia, 12 August 1567*

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 60^f–61^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 78^v–79^f.

At the behest of Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro, G.S. informs the provveditori alle fortezze of Nicosia's artillery requirements. He requests: two 100-lb culverins with ammunition; 22 50-lb weapons (14 cannons and 8 culverins) with ammunition, to arm the 22 bastion flanks; 22 20-lb weapons (11 cannons and 11 culverins) with ammunition; 22 14-lb weapons with ammunition, for the cavaliers at the curtains.

Sforza Pallavicino will undoubtedly think this total of 68 artillery pieces insufficient, but G.S. prefers to be lightly armed, wishing to equip each bastion and each curtain with three falconetti long enough to fire 70 musket balls. He insists upon the sending of this light artillery, as it will not be expensive, merely half the price of the artillery supplied for most fortresses in the dominio da mar. These weapons are essential to the defence of Cyprus; the country's salt and cotton are, as everybody knows, very important to the State and its citizens.

G.S. asks for a large quantity of lead, 300 miara [141 tonnes], to supply the artillery and the arquebuses. This cost will be mostly compensated for by the fact that there is no engineer or site manager to be paid for on the construction site.

Timber must be sent to make the axletrees for the artillery pieces, and also someone to take charge of the gunners and, as is done elsewhere, set up a school for them. Fifty gunners would not be enough, but G.S. leaves the matter up to Sforza Pallavicino.

Furthermore, G.S. requests 500 muskets, 3 to 4 miara [1.4 to 1.9 tonnes] of pikes, 2,000 short pole weapons, flame-projecting cannons, fine powder, 25 botte [18.775 litres] of pitch, rope, 2000 arquebuses, and 500 cuirasses with two armourers to ensure their upkeep.

The island has enough food to last two years, and Nicosia's fortress will be able to protect the whole population providing it receives the necessary provisions in good time.

Clarissimi Signori miei osservantissimi,

Il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore Barbaro mi ha commandato che io scriva¹ a Vostre Signorie Clarissime le cose che fanno bisogno per questa fortezza di Nicosia, qui sotto saranno notate quelle che a me pareno necessariissime.

Prima. Due colobrine da 100, con 500 balle almanco per tutte due, et la polvere che lì va per tanti tiri.

] 4 / balle 500²

In undeci belloardi li sono 22 fianchi, però li vole almanco 22 pezzi da 50, compartiti in questo modo 14 cannoni et 8 colobrine, et almanco otto millia balle da 50, et la sua polvere che lì va.

] Columbrine 4 canoni 12 / 3200

22 pezzi da 20 cioè 11 colobrine et undeci cannoncini da 20, con nove millia balle che saranno da 400 tiri per uno, et la sua polvere.

] Canoni 12 / 3000

22 pezzi da 14 ma tutti longhi per adoperarli alli cavalleri sopra le cortine, et sono di poca spesa et tiranno da lontano, con diece millia balle fra tutti, et la sua polvere.

] Columbrine 10 / 2500

Questi 68 pezzi a questa gran fortezza saranno giudicati dall'Eccellenza del Suo Generale il Signor Sforza più presto pocchi cha superflui. Io son grandissimo amico dell'arteglieria minuta, come sarebbe a dire pezzi da 6 quali chiamano falconetti, ma che siano longhi et

¹ *che io scriva* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ² The quantities written in the margin of the manuscript are from another hand, and were added after the letter was received.

ricchi di metallo, nelli quali in un tiro solo se li pò tirare 70 balle di moschettone di 2 onze l'una, et queste sono al mio giudicio per defender fortezze così buone arme quante siano al mondo. Delle qual sorte ne vorrebbero esser tre per ciascuno belloardo et 3 per ciascuna cortina, in tutto di queste artiglierie minute 66 pezzetti con balle /

] 20 / 500

] 5 moschetti da ruogo con balle 2000

[60^v] et polvere da far 500 tiri per uno, più presto vorrei che ne mancasse il terzo di tutte le artiglierie grosse che queste minute, et Vostre Signorie Illustrissime diano tutte queste artiglierie allegramente, considerando con quanta poca spesa et in quanto poco tempo li sarà fatta questa importantissima fortezza, qual sarà causa di preservare tutto questo Regno sotto a questo Illustrissimo Stato, senza il quale molto ben le sanno quanto importano li sali, li gottoni et l'utile di tante nave al particolare et al publico, però havendo rispetto alle sopradette cose, ogni gran spesa presente (ma che sia presta) sarà bonissima et parerà piccola a Vostre Signorie Illustrissime. In Famagosta, in Candia, in La Canea et in Corfù, in proportione li sono due volte tante artiglierie quante sono queste, sì che non si domandano cose dishoneste.

] polvere miara 350

] fina miara 8

Di piombo, per riverentia di Dio, Vostre Signorie Illustrissime ne mandino una quantità infinita per adoperalo non solamente in li archibusieri ma anco in le collubrine da 20 et da 14, in tempo delli assalti, tre cento miara non sarà superfluo, et bisogna che quelli protti del arsenale se usano loro ancora a sentire a dimandare cose che loro non sanno, et se bene Vostre Signorie Clarissime non hanno a questa sua gran fortificatione né spesa di ingegniero né de protti, pur si lavora in 11 lochi et si fa bene, senza questa sorte di generatione che intrigano il mondo il più delle volte.

] miara 45

In tutto questo Regno non si trovano legni da far assili per le rode delle artiglierie, però le Signorie Vostre Clarissime per ogni pezzo facciano mandar de rispetto 4 legni da far assili, quali / [61^r] si rompeno molto facilmente adoperandosi. In tutte le sorte delle artiglierie sopradette li bisogna una roda di rispetto per pezzo, oltre le 2 ordinarie, et anco delli letti per dette artiglierie da rispetto.

Uno capo de bombardieri per governarle che sia conosciuto et provato in qualche loco per galant' huomo, con ordine di Sua Serenità di levar una scuola de bombardieri qui a Nicossia, come si fa nelli altri lochi suoi, ma per quest'anno non si potrà cavar construtto de scollari, però 50 bombardieri saranno pochi al mio giudicio, et me riporto a quanto che consiglierà l'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza.³

500 moschettoni si richiedeno a tanti belloardi.

] mandati

3 o 4 miara de picche parte de frassino, parte d'albedo.

Doi millia arme d'hasta curte.

³ G.S.'s opinion was shared by the Senate: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75. ff. 56^v-57^r.

Trombe di foco, et altri fochi lavorati, per esser il tempo breve siano mandati fatti.
 Di polvere fina non si havrà tempo di farne, se non se ne manda fatta in quantità bona,
 tirare archibusate con la trista è tanto quanto ingannar noi medemi voluntariamente.

] miara 8

25 botte di pegole per brusare legnami et far diversi effetti de notte.

Corde da tirar le artiglierie almanco cento pezzi per mutarle da loco a loco.

] mandate

Corda per archibusieri da brusare et per le arteglierie quantità proporcionata.

Doi mille arcobusi da monitione, et 500 corsaletti con dui armazoli⁴ da tenirli netti et governati. / [61^v]

Da mangiare nell'isola ne è quasi per 2 anni, se sarà condotto a tempo in questa fortezza. Vostre Signorie Illustrissime salveranno la fortezza, et tutte le anime del Regno, ma sel mangiare non sarà portato dentro, per me non si lascerà venir dentro la gente per attender a conservar la fortezza tanto più lungo tempo. Il Signor Dio et Vostre Signorie Clarissime in questo mezzo ne aiuteranno, alle qualli per adesso non dico altro se non che me raccomando sempre alla sua bona gratia.

Di Nicossia alli 12 agosto 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustrissime servitore.

Giulio Savorgnano

monitionj. Alli Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori miei osservantissimi, li Signori sopra le fortezze in Venetia. Copia. monitionj arteglierie. 1567 12 agosto. N° 6.



34 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 23 August 1567

ASV, *Archivo Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 62^{r-v}.

G.S. reports that work is going very well, apart from the three bastions being supervised by Venetian officers, where the latter's jealousy towards the eight other bastions is causing complications. This exasperating situation reminds G.S. of a similar experience he had in Corfu, where Captain Schillino was an outright thief; there, however, the intervention of Schillino's brother, a Venetian doctor, prevented the captain from being dragged before a court. In Nicosia, the same captain is now undermining Barbaro's authority, wantonly and repeatedly thieving from, tricking and slandering others. G.S. contemplates punishing him to put an end to the complaints, and to the stolen money.

⁴ Armourer; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v.

Clarissimo Signor mio honoratissimo,

Dovendo partir in questo giorno le mie lettere con li dessegni, le faccio sapere che tutte le cose della fabrica vanno benissimo, ma quelli 4 belloardi che furono eletti dalli Clarissimi tre de loro me dano tanto daffare che me faranno voltar il cervello, per che l'ambitione è tale che tutti li dispiaceri, incomodità che poleno far, lo fanno par invidia alli patroni delli altri otto belloardi, et se hanno invidia che facciano bene alla sua patria et al suo Principe dovrebbero cercar loro ancora di far così, ma cercano solamente de tirar in dietro et impedir chi guida gli altri 8 belloardi. Pensi Vostra Signoria in che termine io me ritrovo, peggio è che ho fastidio de alcuni de questi tre che siano fatte delle giottonarie, le quali ho trovate et fatto vedere chiare, ma non è il più gran orto né più gran sordo al mondo, quanto quello che non vol vedere né intender, sì che prego il Signor Dio che me dia buona patientia, che non ne castighi un giorno uno da buon scenno qual sarà forse un capitano Schillino, ladro publico, et a Corfù è stato formato un processo contra de lui de mille robbarie et poltronerie, ma non è stato ispedito, et mandato a monte per favor di quel medico Schillino, suo fratello in Venetia.¹

Vostra Signoria farebbe un'opera di misericordia se ella havesse uno avogador suo amico, et far scriver a Corfù et mandar a tor quel suo processo credo fatto al tempo dal Sanuto Barbosso, dal quale Vostra Signoria ne havrà qual informatione. Questo tristo è causa chel Clarissimo / [62^v] Barbaro perde il credito in questo paese, supportando le tristitie et poltronarie de costui, oltre il robbar della fabrica; alli suoi soldati ha fatto una infinità de robbarie, lamentationi di chiavamenti sono assai copiosi, sì che oltre queste 3 virtù, et poi la più pessima lingua et inganna questo povero gentilhuomo, qual per la sua età et bontà crede ogni cosa, et li fa (come ho detto) grandissimo danno alla reputatione. Finalmente sarà forza che io li dia un castigo come merita, essendo che ho più daffar' con lui et con il suo belloardo che non ho quasi con tutti gli altri, per le lamentationi et robbarie. Il Clarissimo Querini morto conosceva benissimo il gran tristo che è, et a Vostra Signoria sempre me raccomandando.

Di Nicossia alli 23 agosto 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il signor Francesco Michiel fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. Schilini. 1567 23 agosto. N° 7.



¹ G.S. mentions several times the case of Captain Schillino and his brother; cf. infra, doc. 40. Captain Nicolò Schillino, who had been in Corfu, was recruited by Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro to serve in Cyprus; on 22 January 1567 Barbaro gave him fifty men, appointed to the Nicosia guard: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 251^r; id., *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 74, f. 118^v.

35 *Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Nicosia, 10 September 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 79^{r-v}.

Over the past three months, work on the eleven bastions and eleven curtains has progressed satisfactorily, at a cost of 12,000 ducats per month, and G.S. assures the doge that, providing the work continues to be financed at the same rate and is given adequate supplies, the city will be secure. The bastion piazze are now 16 piedi [5.5 m] high from the ground. There is an orillon at each bastion, and they will be finished by the end of the week; the other eleven orillons will be completed in a month. Work is commencing on the parapets at each bastion; when they are finished they will be 40 piedi [14 m] high from the moat, whilst the curtains are 20 piedi [7.5 m] high.

The Constantinople bailo and others too have hinted that the Ottoman fleet may attack Cyprus in the coming year, which prompts G.S. to clarify what exactly is needed in material terms for the defence of the island. He proposes six measures essential to the security of Cyprus, two to be followed by Venice, two by the rettori and two by himself. He asks Venice to send, in good time, enough troops to defend the eleven bastions, and also to send the missing artillery (only 24 pieces have arrived thus far). G.S. has no doubts that Venice will honour its responsibilities as hastily as possible, but is worried that the boats bringing across troops and ammunition may be attacked by enemy galleys. G.S. hopes that the Constantinople bailo will have informed the Signoria of his fears, and that Venice will have anticipated the need for soldiers and material.

It is the rettori's duty to procure supplies for Nicosia so that the fortress may resist a siege; the harvests must not fall into enemy hands. Provisions must be sought very early on, not merely when war is at hand, as there are not enough animals and carts to transport them quickly. Moreover, the rettori must provide construction workers for the three coming months just as they have done in the three past months; G.S. underlines that he has reduced the requirements, now asking for men who can work for just six months rather than eight, and planning to spend less than the 15,000 ducats per month previously requested.

It will be G.S.'s task to have Nicosia turned into a fortress for Christmas time; this will definitely be achieved if the required workforce is forthcoming. He will also take charge of defending the fortress if it is attacked, which, G.S. is sure, will be the easiest of all the six measures.

G.S. concludes by asking for lead to be sent for the arquebuses and minor artillery, which he judges to be the best weapons to defend the fortress.

Alli Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori miei osservandissimi li signori sopra le fortezze in Venetia.

Serenissimo Principe,

Per altre mie, con la nave *Dolfina* le ho scritto l'esser di questa fortificatione di Nicosia.¹

¹ Cf. supra, doc. 31. The *Dolfina* was a ship that frequently connected Venice to the Levant: Tucci, *Lettres d'un*

Al presente le faccio sapere che, con spesa di dodeci millia ducatti al mese in tre mesi, questi undeci belloardi et undeci cortine sono redutte in tali termini, che con altra tanta spesa di quanta è stata fatta fino al presente, noi si ritrovaremo a esser in securtà buonissima da potersi defender da ogni forza per tanto tempo quanto ne dureranno le vettovaglie et le monitioni. Tutte le piazze delli belloardi sono alzate al suo segno di 16 piedi sopra il piano della campagna, et di fossa communemente un belloardo, per l'altro quasi tanto di cavatione per mezo alle fronti delli belloardi. A cadauno belloardo li è stato fatto un orecchione quali in una settimana saranno finiti. Medesimamente li altri 11 orecchioni in un mese saranno fatti. Le cannonere alli fianchi similmente sono in bonissimo esser. Si attende al presente con diligentia a fare li parapetti de tutte le fronte delli belloardi. La reuscita del tutto di questa fabrica la Serenità Vostra intenderà da altri, et finiti che habbiamo li parapetti li vorrà 40 piedi di scalla dalla fossa fino alla summità delli parapetti, quali non pono ricever batteria. Alle cortine communemente habbiamo 20 piedi di altezza tra fossa et terrapieno. Se li faranno anco li suoi parapetti di terra.

Per li avisi che si hanno havuti da Constantinopoli dal Clarissimo Baijlo,² et per diverse altre vie, et da queste galee turchesche della guarda rissona che l'anno futuro si potrebbe haver da travagliare in questo suo Regno, et io mi movo per il carico, che io ho dalla Serenità Vostra a fare questo officio, per mio discarico, intravenga poi quello si voglia, udendo questa voce che va a torno, però con quella debita riverentia che si conviene a un suo / [79^v] buon servitore, non voglio restar da ricordarle sei cose principali per poter far haver buon fine in ogni occasione che possa intravenire, delle quali sei cose, due d'esse sono necessarie de esser fatte da Vostra Serenità et due altre da questi Clarissimi Signori suoi Rettori, et le altre due hanno da esser fatte da noi soldati. Quelle di Vostra Serenità sono de mandarci a tempo tanta fanteria et bona quanta si conviene a 11 belloardi, et per poter tener in officio et obedientia questi popoli. L'altra che la Serenità Vostra supplisca di mandar qui a tempo il restante delle artiglierie che si convengono a questa fortezza oltre questi vinti quatro pezzi primi, che lei ha mandati. Io son certissimo che la Serenità Vostra non mancherà di far queste due cose con diligentia per l'importantia sua, ma dubito del tempo che de marzo una banda de galee non facesse impedimento alle nave che conducessero le fanterie, artiglierie et monitioni, et questo è un mio grandissimo fastidio, dubitandomi di non haver a tempo le due cose sopradette. Dall'altro conto, io sto con speranza chel Clarissimo Baijlo havrà dato a Vostra Serenità li medemi avisi come ha fatto qui, per ilche la Serenità Vostra havrà forsi fin' hora anticipando il tempo presa ressolutione di supplire di mandar qui per tempo il restante delle monitioni, et quello che fa di bisogno, havendo per quella strada di Constantinopoli medesimamente havuto l'aviso della qualche di questa fortificatione, che questi suoi Clarissimi Signori Rettori hanno risolto che si faccia, et che al presente è più di mezza fatta.

Le due cose quali toccano da esser fatte da questi Clarissimi Signori suoi Rettori, l'una è

marchand vénitien, nos. 6, 12, 14 and passim. 2 On 7 August 1567 the Senate was informed, via letters from the *bailo*, of naval preparations in Constantinople, and decided to forward the news immediately to Cyprus: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 51^r.

che a tempo Sue Signorie Clarissime habbiano provisto di far venire in questa fortezza quella quantità di formento, orzi et altre vettovaglie chel Signor Dio ha fatto nascere in questo Regno, accioché dette vettovaglie tenghino tanto maggior tempo vivi noi in questa fortezza, et non che restassero fori con nostro danno et con commodità delli inimici, et questo si dice perché li interessati et patroni delle robbe difficilmente credeno quello che potrebbe intravenire, et poi quando sono chiari del male, che a loro ha venire adesso, non hanno poi tempo di condur le vettovaglie in la fortezza per la gran penuria che vi è qui di carri et animali per condurle, et questa cosa è da farvi consideratione grandissima. Io non manco di ricordarlo ogn'altro giorno, anzi dubito più presto di venir in fastidio a Sue Signorie Clarissime. L'altro secondo effetto qual tocca a Sue Signorie Clarissime di fare è che non me sia mancato per 3 mesi ancora di darne tanta gente che si possi far opera, quanta è stata fatta in questi 3 mesi passati, et se non mi fossero dati, io me iscusò con la Serenità Vostra, essendo che de prima, io dissi a Sue Signorie Clarissime questo maggio, ananti che si facesse la resolutione, che volevo otto mesi di tempo et quindici millia ducatti al mese, sì che me contento di dui mesi manco delli 8 et anco manco delli quindici millia ducatti al mese, senza li quali huomini io non potro attender a quanto che ho promeso a Vostra Serenità et a Sue Signorie Clarissime.

L'altre due cose che toccano a esser fatte da noi suoi soldati, sono queste, haverli posta in fortezza bona per Natale questa sua città di 11 belloardi et 11 cortine, il che sarà fatto di certezza se mi saranno dati li huomini da lavorare, et l'ultima parte che tocca a noi soldati, è il defenderli fidelmente et valorosamente questa sua fortezza fatta in sei mesi da ogni gran forza, che la volesse offendere, laqual ultima parte, io l'ho per la più facile et più sicura da esser fatta da noi cha ciascuna delle altre cinque sopradette, né questa si potrà fare mancandone una delle altre soprascritte.

Non voglio restar di dirle ancora, che io l'habbia scritto più volte in le mie lettere passate alla Serenità Vostra et alli Signori sopra le fortezze, che ne siano mandati piombi in grandissima quantità per adoperarli non solamente nelli archibuggieri, man anco in le artiglierie minute, liquali io stimo più che ogni altra cosa per la difesa di questa fortezza. Et qui facendo fine alla bona gran di Vostra Serenità sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 10 settembre 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano



36 Minute of a letter from G.S. to the doge, Nicosia, 5 October 1567

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 66^r–68^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 80^{r-v}.

Back from Famagusta, G.S. gives an account of the work that has been going on there for four months. The slow progress in Famagusta is distressing him more than construction in Nicosia, as the nature of the terrain and the urgency of the situation are a worry. Captain Lorenzo Bembo has begun having the chain tower lowered in order to install a platform that will dominate the two sides of the harbour; G.S. recalls that during his mission in 1562 he proposed reinforcing this platform with a retaining wall as shown in a drawing he had sent.

At the arsenal tower, work on the counterscarp is progressing; it has been lowered by 6 piedi [2 m], allowing the earth excavated during construction to be brought back into the city. This undertaking should be repeated all around the fortress walls, using the ferlini system to gain time.

Lorenzo Bembo has carried several jobs to completion, but the city has no real site manager; the proto, who had complained of insufficient wages, was on his deathbed at the end of September, and Captain Antonio del Beretino is also ill. The infantrymen spend their money fecklessly and G.S. proposes dismissing 100 or 200 of them, a decision that Francesco Barbaro and Marco Michiel support; G.S. hopes the two officers will write to Venice to this end.

It is unquestionable that, whether in peacetime or in wartime, the fortress must be provided with high-quality soldiers, and especially captains, as Sforza Pallavicino has said. Rettore Marco Michiel, as effective as he may be, is no substitute for the manual work offered by a proto.

In Nicosia work has been underway for four months, and, even though a month has been lost, the city is already halfway to becoming a fortress; it would thus be rather surprising if over the six months to come three months' work could not be done to render the city impregnable within the specified time limit.

The doge can be proud of the conduct of his officers at the Nicosia construction sites, and G.S. applauds Governor Roncone, who is not only overseeing work on the Querini bastion but also helping G.S. on his twice-daily inspections of the 22 orillons, which are currently two thirds of the way towards completion. At each bastion there is a company of 300 ordinanze soldiers with their banners and drums, and their captains obey Roncone perfectly. Whereas two years earlier they were undisciplined, these ordinanze now look better than their Italian counterparts; proof of just how much a good leader can transform troops and a city's fate, regardless of whether the city is fortified or not.

G.S. ends his letter by recalling that five years previously he stated that in the event of war a great number of soldiers commanded by a governor ought to be sent to Famagusta to defend the town; despite the threat of attack currently looming, troops and captains fit for combat have yet to be sent.

Serenissimo Principe,

Io son tornato heri da Famagusta qui a Nichossia, nella quale Famagosta son stato tre giorni per vedere quello che hanno fatto in li quattro mesi passati, et per poner quelli ordeni che si può in beneficio di quella sua fortezza, qual per la verità mi da più travaglio all'animo di quello che si pò havere di questa nuova fortezza de Nicossia, per che qui havemo terreni et siti

larghi a nostro modo, et li a Famagosta siamo restretti in quelle grossissime muraglie senza terreni et quel poco che vi è, è tutto sabia che bagnandolo con l'acqua non fa corpo, per il che difficilissimamente si può far cosa bona di terreno. Far gran cose de muraglie, il tempo non lo concede. Quando che io li fui nelli ultimi giorni di maggio, il Clarissimo Capitano Bembo havea già cominciato a far abbassar quella torre alla cathena della bocca del porto,¹ et li è fatta una buona piazza terrapienata de quelli terreni simili al sabione, qual piazza fa bonissimo effetto a tutte due le parte così fuori del porto, come dentro et era cosa necessaria, et se Vostra Serenità farà vedere sopra li miei desegni ch' io li mandai già sono 5 anni passati,² La troverà che li andava una muraglia atorno a scarpa, sì per grandir la piazza come per securarla, che li terreni non gettano giù le muraglie vecchie³ terrapienate, et fatte senza scarpa et maculate a basso dal mare, il che per adesso non se li pol far altro, ma ben ricordarei che un'altr'anno se li facesse le sue muraglie per assicurarla dalle rovine che soleno⁴ nascer per⁵ causa deli terreni tristi.

Si hanno acconciate quelle cannonere al turion del Arsenale et la contrascarpa di fora è stata dricciata in bona parte li all'incontro del Arsenale, portando quel terreno tal qual è dentro, dove / [66^v] faceva gran bisogno, et al presente si continua a farli la banchetta atorno la contrascarpa abbassandola 6 piedi et quel terreno superfluo si porta dentro della fortezza, et se anderà continuando a far detta banchetta a torno il resto della città, qual cosa si fa molto presto, volendosi lavorar con li ferlini et non lavorar a giornata, il che è un gettar via il danaro et il tempo. Si lavora al presente a ferlini et sperano vederli presto il fine.

Il Clarissimo Bembo fece anco fare li parapetti al cavallere Martinengo et assettar alcune cannonere al cavallero⁶ di Limissò, et anco fece far parte del cavallier nominato il Morato.⁷ Ha fatto far anco una cannonera che serve quanto la puole per difesa del belloardo nuovo. Si farebbono delle cose assai ma lascierò andar da banda il broglio, et vorrei che tutti li ministri di Vostra Serenità li scrivessero liberamente quello che sentono in suo servitio, acciò che quella potesse proveder alli bisogni importantissimi di questa sua fortezza, della qual (come ho detto di sopra) ne sento un grandissimo pensiero et fastidio, non per altro se non per che in detta fortezza non li vedo persona atta a chi io habbia potuto dirli fareti la tal cosa, essendo che quel proto che vi era assai sufficiente, venne qui già 15 giorni a lamentarsi a questi Signori che moriva da fame, per che non poteva viver con 80 ducatti di soldo, havendo da notrir forse 15 bocche et che li era stato levato più de altro tanto soldo a Venetia, sì che questi Signori Clarissimi non li potero far altro, si amalò imediate qui a Nicossia, si fece portar a Famagosta et l'ultimo di settembre dicevano che stava per morire. Il capitan Antonio del Berettino,⁸ qual

1 Construction work at the harbour chain tower thus began in late summer 1567; but the results of this work are difficult to identify on what is left of the tower today: Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', p. 343. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 7. 3 *vecchie* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 4 *spinger* crossed out after *soleno*. 5 *per* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 6 *belloardo* crossed out and *cavallero* added above. 7 G.S. here confirms how extensive the work done on the circumference of Famagusta's walls was, and dates the work done at the Martinengo bastion, the Limassol Gate and the Moratto tower; cf. Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', pp. 349–350. 8 Captain Antonio del Berettino / Beretin, who had served in the San Giorgio Gate guard in Verona, was made a captain on 4 January 1567, and given the task of levying 100 soldiers to take to Cyprus: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 165^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, ff. 249^r, 253^r.

ha ingegno, lui ancora ho trovato amalato di mala sorte. Quel governatore lui ancora sempre è pezzo, che amalato / [67^r] in questa materia de fortificatione tra quelle fanterie vi sono un bon numero di furfanti quali mangiano la paga, fori di preposito, non ho mancato de ricordarlo a questo Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro de cassarne 100 o 200 de quelli soldati inutili. Sua Signoria Clarissima mi ha commesso che io lo dica al Clarissimo Signor Marco Michiel Capitanio del Regno,⁹ quale ha detto di volerlo fare, et credo lo farà, et Sua Signoria Clarissima se ne avede molto bene come si ritrova ad essere senza un inzegniere da poterli comandar un servitio lì in Famagosta¹⁰ con il proto amalato, li capitani loro ancora et il governatore nell'esser sopradetto, sì che io dico questo chiaro a Vostra Serenità come l'ho detto al Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro, et anco l'ho detto al Clarissimo Capitanio Michel, quali tutti dui me l'hanno più che confermato et dolutosi meco di tal cosa. Non so se Sue Signorie Clarissime lo scriveranno a Vostra Serenità. Io voglio far il debito mio per scarico mio, se ben tal peso me fusse lasciato da altri tutto sopra di me.

Io sto con speranza che crescendo il sospetto, Vostra Serenità habbia da mandar qui buon numero di gente et fanterie bone, et capi proporcionati come dice la scrittura dell'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza, qual Vostra Serenità ha mandata qui et particolarmente dice che li capi et governatori vogliono esser de qualità da poter reuscire al tempo di guerra, per che¹¹ al tempo di pace quasi tutti¹² sono boni et¹³ nelli bisogni le cose andarebbono poi¹⁴ a un'altro modo. Il Clarissimo Michel fa tutto quello che pò far un rettore diligentissimo, ma non potrà mai fare quelle cose che tocca a fare a un proto con le sue mani. Sua Signoria Clarissima anco fa tagliare in le / [67^v] fosse atorno il belloardo novo certa quantità di rocca qual faceva impedimento alli fianchi, quali non potevano scoprire tutte 2 le fronti.

Qui a Nicossia dal primo di giugno fino all'ultimo di settembre che sono 4 mesi giusti, mi sono state date tante opere quante me furono permesse di dare in 3 mesi,¹⁵ et questo haver dato un mese le opere de manco è stato per che, se intese chel sospetto, non augmentava et altre cause, però sappia Vostra Serenità che siamo assai più de mezi posti in fortezza, et gran cosa sarebbe che in ottobre, novembre, decembre, zenaro, febraro et marzo che sono 6 mesi, che in questi 6 mesi non ne possiamo lavorar 3, et tre siano di cattivi tempi, et come ho detto di sopra, io sto con l'animo contento che Nicossia sarà fatta a tempo inespugnabile, come si vede chiaramente che è fin qui, son certo che la Serenità Vostra non mancherà di mandar a tempo quello che tocca a lei. Questi Clarissimi da me sono stati sollecitati a ricordarsi delle vettovaglie et che non me manchano delli homeni, promettono farlo.

Et io de quello che tocca a me, mediante le cose sopradette, non manco al presente et se Vostra Serenità sapesse le fatiche¹⁶ / [68^r] et bone operationi che vengano fatte di continuo da

9 Marco Michiel, *di Tomaso*, succeeded Lorenzo Bembo as captain of Famagusta; he was elected on 2 February 1567 and took office on 14 September 1567: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 184^v–185^r. 10 *lì in Famagosta* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 11 *al tempo di guerra per che* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 12 *li governatori* crossed out after *tutti*. 13 *ma* crossed out and *et* added above. 14 *sarebbono* crossed out and *andarebbono poi* added above, with signe-de-renvoi. 15 *giusti* crossed out after *mesi*. 16 *le fatiche* added on the line above; then the following has been crossed out: *qua che si fa, certissimo la restarebbe satisfatta, et occorrendo il bisogno con assai manco fatica, la sarà difesa et conservata sotto l'ombra di Vostra*

questi consiglieri del Regno, quali attendano alli belloardi con grandissima diligentia, et tutti loro sono fatti¹⁷ eccellentissimi protti et ingegneri, certissimo la restarebbe satisfatta.¹⁸ Il Magnifico Governor Ronchone delle ordinanze oltre il suo belloardo Querini, del quale ha spetial cura di continuo, è con me a rivedere tutti li 22 orecchioni 2 volte al giorno,¹⁹ quali si fabricano in una volta, quali orecchioni sono stati fatti più delli 2 terzi et assai di loro finiti. Al presente in ciascun belloardo vi è una compagnia di 300 soldati delle ordinanze venuti con le sue insegne, tamburi, vettovaglie che è stato un' piacere a vederli a venire et lavorar tanto allegramente, et tutti questi capitani sono tanto obediendi al detto Magnifico Governor Ronchone che meglio non si pò desiderare, et lui non manca de accarezzar li boni, et prender quelli che mancassero del debito suo, et per la verità tutte queste ordinanze senza comparatione hanno miglior chiera et meglio vestiti delle ordinanze d'Italia, et disciplinati molto bene al mio giuditio, et intendo di certezza che già 2 anni erano state lasciate andar in rovina, sì che la sufficientia d'un governatore è atta di fare diventare boni li migliaia degli homini, et medesimamente un governatore inepto et negligente è atto a far perder una fortezza a Vostra Serenità malamente, et all'incontro un governor diligente è atto di defender una villa aperta, et in poco tempo farla diventar in gran stima.

Et in conclusione di questa mia lettera, non voglio restar di replicarle quello che io le scrissi già 5 anni sono passati, che in caso di guerra la sua fortezza di Famagosta havea bisogno d'un grossissi-/ [68^v] mo numero di valorosi soldati, et deffenderla per forza di valorosi soldati come del governatore...²⁰

Così come l'Eccellenza del Signor Sforza in quella sua scrittura fatta di marzo dice l'istesso,²¹ et l'aricorda a Vostra Serenità, staremo aspettando che, crescendo il sospetto, la Signoria²² mandi qui bon numero de soldati, et capitani che siano vivi et intendenti delle cose di guerra, et Vostra Serenità sia certa che non mancarò di fare tutti quelli boni effetti che ella²³ ha sperato d'havere da me, essendo che io le sono devotissimo servitore, et sommamente desidero de immittar et superare li miei vecchij, quali sono stati fidellissimi²⁴ et boni²⁵ servitori di Vostra Signoria, et²⁶ alla²⁷ bona gratia della quale²⁸ me raccomando.

Al Serenissimo. copia. 1567 5 ottobre. N° 8.



Serenità alla bona gratia della quale sempre me raccomando. Questo Magnifico Governor Ronchone con undeci delle sue compagnie delle ordinanze fa lavorare in questi belloardi, le quali ordinanze ogni giorno ne piaciono più et sono eccellentissime, disciplinate tanto per la virtù d'un buon governatore, et così accaderebbe in ogni sorte d'occasione, et dalli capi dipende il tutto. 17 si fano crossed out and sono fatti added above. 18 certissimo la restarebbe satisfatta added above with signe-de-renvoi. 19 2 volte al giorno added above with signe-de-renvoi. 20 Crossed out: Mi pare che mi si convenga defender con la mia persona Nicossia, qual non era in alcuna consideratione e... 21 fatta di marzo dice l'istesso added above with signe-de-renvoi. 22 Sublimità crossed out and replaced by Signoria. 23 Serenità crossed out after ella. 24 amorevolissimi crossed out and fidellissimi added above. 25 ssimi crossed out after boni. 26 sempre crossed out after et. 27 Sua crossed out after alla. 28 della quale added above with signe-de-renvoi.

37 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 5 October 1567

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, f. 70^{r-v}.

G.S. reveals that he has written to the doge so that the latter can inform the provveditori alle fortezze of very considerable delays. He summarizes what he wrote in his previous letters, explaining in detail how the six duties he has specified are to be divided:

- *It is Venice's duty to send infantry to defend Famagusta and Cerines, and to send 300 soldiers for each of the bastions of the Nicosia fortress; and the Signoria still needs to send the artillery for the bastions already requested.*
- *It is the Nicosia rettori's duty to ensure that the city receives adequate provisions and to supply 500 men at each bastion to work there for three months, not four as they did last time from June to September.*
- *It is G.S.'s duty to get the Nicosia fortress in perfect condition, which should not be a problem as work is progressing according to plan. G.S. also thinks he should take charge of defending the city.*

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Io ho scritto una lettera a Sua Serenità, qual io la feci a posta per advertire questi Clarissimi Signori de alcune sue tardità de grandissima importantia, et leggendo io questa mia lettera a Sue Magnificentie Clarissime me dissero che la volevano fare scriver in ziffera, et io fui contento, et acciò che Vostra Signoria Clarissima sappia la sustantia sua, qual se restringe in sei capi principali da esser fatti a tempo, dui da Sua Serenità, doi altri da Sue Signorie Clarissime et doi altri da noi soldati. Quelli di Sua Serenità sono di mandarci a tempo quella quantità de fanteria bona, et capi proporcionati qual habbia a supplire a Famagosta, a Cerines, et qui. Domando solamente una compagnia di 300 fanti per ciascuno de questi 11 belloardi et la guarda della piazza, et questa è una de quelle che ha da esser fatta da Sua Serenità. L'altra è de mandarne il resto dell'arteglieria qual si conviene a 11 belloardi, come ho scritto per altre mie.¹

Le due qual toccano a questi Clarissimi per farli ressentire, perché questo mese di settembre erano mezi rafredati nel darne li homini da lavorare. Dico che l'officio suo è di proveder che le vettovaglie per viver chel Signor Dio ha fatto nascer in questo Regno siano condotte a tempo in questa fortezza, et non lasciarle fora a beneficio de inimici. L'altra sua operatione e di darne li 500 homini per belloardo per 3 mesi ancora, essendo che tra zugno, luglio, agosto et settembre che sono 4 mesi me hanno dato solamente tanta gente, quanta mi haveano permes- / [70^v] sa di dar in 3 mesi, questa è la seconda parte che tocca a fare a Sue Signorie Clarissime.

Le due altre cose qual toccano a me, una è di fare che in 3 mesi di lavoriero ancora sia redutta questa fortezza a perfettione, il che sarà di certezza, perché habbiamo passato più della

¹ Cf. supra, doc. 33.

mettà della fortificatione et siamo in benissimo termini, et ogn'uno che la vede fanno ancora le suoi giuditij più larghi. Lo sesto effetto, qual medesimamente tocca a me, sarebbe il saper fidelmente et valorosamente combatter, et defender questa terra, come si conviene a soldati buoni, il che ho per più facile assai di far questa sesta partita che non è stato il fortificarla, con tanti rispetti contra² le robbarie, che senza dubio alcuno il defenderla sarebbe la minima de tutte, pur che precedano ananti quelle due di Sua Serenità, et quelle delli Clarissimi senza le quale Vostra Signoria Clarissima pò far giudicio ciò ch' sarebbe, et tanto li dico per la presente, ma ha ben da sapere che non è possibile a veder 22 oreccchioni tutti a un modo eccellentissimamente fatti come questi³ alcuni finiti, et altri⁴ prestissimo saranno in ordine, dil che il Signo Dio ne sia ringraziato, et mi pare che la cosa sia fatta se non mi viene mancato della gente, et qui facendo fine a Vostra Signoria Clarissima sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 5 ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo signor mio osservantissimo, il signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1567 5 ottobre. n° 9. 300 fanti per bellovarado et la guarda della piazza.



38 Letter from G.S. to Sforza Pallavicino, Nicosia, 7 October 1567

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, ff. 72^r-74^r.

Work on the 22 orillons is going excellently, and G.S. is eager for Pallavicino to see it for himself. The three cannon embrasures have been installed more successfully than in Candia, and are very close to the orillons; to bear the weight of the cannons and their movements, these parts of the walls have been built not from earth but from plite – mudbricks with straw mixed into them (a traditional adobe technique) – to better withstand rain and the dryness caused by the sun.

The earth excavated from the moats has been left at the centre of the bastions and curtains. Work on the orillons has begun, and G.S. explains the method used to raise bastions, and gives the exact heights by which they were raised, from the moat to the top of the walls. G.S. is very satisfied with the work on the orillons as they are already as high as the bastion piazza, and only 8 piedi [2.8 m] away from being as high as the parapets. Therefore, before the year is over the fortress walls will be over 40 piedi [13.9 m] high. G.S. believes the whole fortress could be finished in a few months and for not very much money.

Construction has been progressing steadily for four months, but in June there was a

2 *oltra* crossed out and *contra* added above. 3 *come questi* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 4 *altri* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

shortage of tools and materials. Work continued as normal in July and August, with 500 men at each bastion, but in September the rettori lost their ardour when they learnt of the peace treaty signed with the sultan, at the same time as they were trying to deal with raging heat waves. Total spending is currently at 45,000 ducats, and construction is already half-finished, meaning that the work will cost 30,000 ducats less than the budget predicted; this is all thanks to the ferlini system, via which the Cypriot labourers work more efficiently than those in Italy or Crete.

G.S. incessantly praises how imposing the demi-curtains and the façades of the bastions look, and exalts the perfect shape of the enceinte, after seeing to it that obtuse angles were used for the bastions. He could go on forever about decisions made regarding measurements, and he generally eulogizes his dear fortress (he calls it his daughter). He also thanks Sforza Pallavicino for his advice.

In 1561 Sforza Pallavicino entrusted G.S. with the task of installing orillons at all of the bastions in Chania, however impossible it may have seemed; G.S. succeeded in installing two, one at the harbour chain tower and one at the Michele bastion, next to the rock. G.S. has always been in favour of orillons; Clusone and Girolamo Martinengo have not, but G.S. managed to convince Pallavicino.

A Chania rector has pointed out that Girolamo Martinengo has begun work on the orillons of a bastion facing the plain, but G.S. feels this is a waste of time. Re-examining the measurements, G.S. tries to convince Pallavicino that he is right, highlighting the error inherent in accentuating the orillon arcades, which renders the bastions ineffective, as happened in Corfu. Mistakes are made when building fortresses, G.S. says; plans and then actual construction must be closely scrutinized to avoid them.

Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Questi 22 orecchioni riescono tanto bene che non è possibile a dir meglio, et pagarei qualche anno della mia vita che Vostra Eccellenza li potesse vedere. Le tre cannonere riescono benissimo, essendo che quella che se accosta molto all'orecchione, et quel merlone vicino viene di fora via 20 piedi largo, et ha cinque piedi di dritto di modo che 20 largo et 5 alto pare nano et sodo, poi se ritira sopra li 5 piedi alla mia scarpa del terreno ritirato, quale in questi paesi lo facemo meglio che in Candia. Questi terreni sono tutti creda qual se impasta, come quella con la quale si fanno li coppì, ma per il sole buttarebbe infinite fisure, hanno qui il rimedio che li impastano dentro bona quantità di paglia, della quale ne è infinita abbondantia per la fertilità qual è stata quest'anno, et questa per il sole et per la diligentia che vi metteno, diventa tanto menuta et rotta che la convengono sempre portare nelli sacchi, et quando la danno a mangiare alli cavalli, prima la convengono crivellare come si fa la biada. Questa tal sorte di paglia menuta et mista col fango di creda, non la lascia aprire per il sole, et con questa materia fanno le plite quale si conservano alla pioggia. Con questa mestura facemo tutti li terreni ritirati. Un braccio grosso il terreno di fora è misto con questa paglia; dui passa più in dentro è impastato senza paglia; dui altri passa più in dentro bagnato ma non tanto impastato. Diventa una materia tanto soda et appropriata all'arteglieria, cioè per farli resistentia, che meglio non si pò desiderare. Questo terreno ritirato in ogni 5 piedi d'altezza, ne ha 4 di scarpa.

Habbiamo atteso nel principio a cavare la fossa et portar li terreni in la parte dentro in li belloardi, et medesimamente alle cortine 25 passa in dentro habbiamo cominciate. A tutti li orecchioni / [72^v] et li fianchi, habbiamo atteso con diligentia, et alzati detti orecchioni a 20 de loro non manca alzarli a chi un piede, a chi dui. Tutti questi orecchioni al piano della campagna, il suo diametro del tondo è 15 passa manco un piede, ma comincio alla fine della fronte dove che comincia il tondo dell'orecchione a montare ogni passo un pie con il dritto del orecchione, tanto che quando sia fatto tutta la circonferentia tonda fino al capo delli 8 passa del dritto, si è montato fino all'altezza della piazza del orecchione et 2 piedi più. Nasce un bellissimo effetto a questi orecchioni che standosi a meza cortina si vedeno le fronte, quale in li terreni ritirati non sono coperte dal dritto del orecchione, qual orecchione di fora via mostra quella gran scarpa impossibile a esser battuta, et dentro via quasi dritto per coprire meglio la cannonera. Questi dritti delli orecchioni sono fatti di 2 plite, quale tutte 2 importanno 3 piedi e un quarto, ma tutti li orecchioni sono fatti di quella mestura con la paglia. Tutti li merloni sono fatti di 2 ma di plite atorno, ma dentro empiti di quella mestura, qual diventa tutto un corpo sodo. Siamo tanto alti hormai et havemo atteso ultimamente a far questi terreni ritirati a tutte le fronte, quale vano montando sopra li orecchioni. In assai lochi questi terreni impastati sono alzati fino al piano delle piazze delli belloardi et più, sì che con la cavatione della fossa li vole 30 piedi di scalla, 8 piedi ancora ho animo di fare li parapetti, con la cavatione della fossa alli belloardi li vorrà quest'anno più de 40 piedi. Et già che questi terreni se impastano tanto bene che è una cosa meravigliosa, crederò di finire questa fortezza (rispetto alla sua grandezza) in pochi mesi et con pochi danari.

In li quattro mesi passati, zugno et settembre, è stato lavorato in questi dui solamente per un mese, il primo non si haveano li istromenti da lavorare, né ceste né legnami, né ferri. Luglio et agosto è stato fatto il debito che io hebbi 500 homeni per belloardo. Questo settembre, questi Signori / [73^r] se aggiacciorono in questi caldi, o per dir meglio, deventarono stitici nel principio di settembre, quando intesero la sottoscrizione della pace pur quest'ottobre,¹ che è venuto fresco, loro si sono un poco rescaldati, et io li ho fatto il partito un poco più largo, di haver permesso con 120 millia scudi in 8 mesi di metterci in bonissima sicurtà, ma vedendo io la gagliardezza delli homini, quali a ferlini superano li Candiotti et li Italiani, li ho scansati dui mesi di tempo et 30 millia scudi di manco spesa, et di certezza con 45 millia ducatti che si hanno spesi, si vede la fabrica assai più di meza fatta, sì che Vostra Eccellenza stia di bona voglia, et me allegro con lei che farò honore alla opinione che ella ha di me et anco appresso li nostri Signori, ella non haverà vergogna delle laude che si hà degnato di darne.

Vostra Eccellenza non potrebbe mai credere che effetto mirabile che fanno le meze

¹ On 25 June 1567, soon after his accession, Selim II made further capitulations to the Venetian ambassador Marino Cavalli, and reinstated peace; this saw the *bailo*, Giacomo Soranzo, pay Cyprus's tribute for the years 1565–1567 (16,000 ducats), on 29 June and 2 July: M. P. Pedani Fabris, *I "documenti turchi" dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, Rome 1994, pp. 198–199, nos 793–797. Peace was confirmed in the Senate on 26 July 1567, and the news was immediately sent on to the Cyprus *rettori*: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 50^v.

cortine quali serveno per fianco. Le fronte proprie delli belloardi metteno paura a chi se appresenta alla fronte dell'altro, restandoli quello quasi per schena, et il tutto dipende da quella sua ressolutione che ella prese di far battere in batteria dalli dui terzi. La grandezza di questa fortezza e perfetta forma mi ha concesso che li belloardi vengono tanto ottusi con 30 passa di fianco, et cavare la difesa dalla mittà della cortina. Non voglio più infastidire Vostra Eccellenza, ma harebbe da scriverle 2 giorni continui. Dubito non esser incorso in quelli errori che il più delli padri che hanno un figliolo solo sogliono incorrere, dicendo a qualche suo amico molte laude di quello suo figliolo, trasportato dall'amore grande che li porta et li pare miracolose, et quello che l'ascolta che non è interessato se ne ride della passione del padre. Direi che Vostra Eccellenza facilmente si burlerà che io laudo questa fabrica mia figliola. Dall'altro canto pensando che quello che ho fatto non è tutta fattura di me solo, ma li fondamenti principali in maggior parte dependono da Vostra Eccellenza, sì che essendo anco lei interessata, io sto con speranza con ella l'intenderà con satisfattione sua. Ho detto tanto / [73^v] bene con verità che io son stracco, et per destraccarme voglio dire anco, con la verità, un poco di male.

Quella sa che la mi commise già 6 anni, quando andai alla Cannea, che io dovessi far li orecchioni a tutti quelli belloardi, quali fino a quell'ora erano fatti tre e mezo, ma per li dessegni che Vostra Eccellenza havea veduti, la giudicava fino all'ora tal cosa impossibile. Quando io fui alla Cannea, come l'Eccellenza Vostra potrà vedere con li dessegni, se io me inganno o non che non è possibile a far li orecchioni a quelli sette fianchi, che io trovai fatti. Io feci fare 2 belloardi: in quello del porto della cathena, dalla parte del mare, non poteva cader orecchione, in quell'altro nominato il Michele appresso al scoglio li ho ordinato il suo orecchione come necessarijssimo,² et Vostra Eccellenza sa che io fui sempre amico delli orecchioni, et nella prima consulta che Vostra Eccellenza fece ananti Sua Serenità, la si deve ricordare che tutti li ingegneri, il Clusone, et il Signor Hieronimo Martinengo non li volevano sentire, et finalmente Sua Serenità con il parere di Vostra Eccellenza rissolse a favore della mia opinione, sì che lei è stata causa et primo a farli fare in questo stato, ciò è in Lombardia.³

Al presente per quello mi ha scritto un Clarissimo Rettore della Cannea,⁴ il Signor Hieronimo Martinengo ha ordinato et cominciato a far fare li orecchioni a quello belloardo

² G.S. oversaw the reinforcement of Chania's walls during his time as fortress governor in Crete from November 1562 to March 1566; according to Orazio Governa's diary, he visited Chania at least three times; cf. *infra*, doc. 115. In particular he ordered orillons to be built, a bastion (the Sabbionara bastion) to be turned into a tenaille to better control the harbour, and the moat around the enceinte to be enlarged. As he lived in Candia at this time, G.S. left various written orders for the city's *rettore*, Luca Michiel, concerning the work to be done in 1565: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 3, f. 115^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 41^r; Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1, pp. 426–427; P. Morachiello, 'Candia. I baluardi del Regno', in *Venezia e la difesa del Levante*, p. 135. ³ An allusion to the lengthy debate surrounding the construction of Bergamo's new walls in 1561: Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 106–111. ⁴ Benedetto Londo, *di Giacomo*, was elected *rettore* of Chania on 24 November 1566, and took office on 29 January 1567, going on to serve for two years: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 181^v–182^r.

di mezo verso terra, nominato la piatta forma. Qui se tratta di non lasciar gettare via il danaro del Principe nostro, et questi che voleno far parer me cieco che non l'habbia veduto, voglio farlo parere appresso Vostra Eccellenza non intendente di quest'arte. Vostra Eccellenza sopra il dessegno in una occhiata sola se chiarirà se la sua o la mia opinione sarà stata una simplicità, o per dir meglio una ignorantia crassa. Dico che quella piatta forma al cordon, et anco quelli altri belloardi, tutti 7 detti fianchi sono manco di 17 passa l'uno, per il che col consiglio di Vostra Eccellenza detti fianchi erano di due cannonere per uno alle piazze⁵ da basso, et haveano solamente trenta piedi di spalla, per il che io le ho fatte ritirare per avanzar spalla a basso in una / [74^f] sola cannonera, et due alla piazza di sopra, et 2 altre al loco dove suol esser l'orecchione sopra la spalla, et come cosa fori di proposito non li ho voluto far fare orecchioni, essendo che tutti quelli belloardi furono fatti con quella intentione di cavare le sue difese dalli cavalleri a mezo le cortine, come già 25 anni se usavano, per il che da quella cannonera sola che ho fatta fare, qual dovendo esser sola vole avere un gran dente et esser molto discosta dalla cortina, et volendo lei fare il suo officio alle fronte delli altri belloardi, le cui ponte saltano molto in fora, et li belloardi sono accuti fora di modo.

Volendosi cavar dal fianco otto passa di dritto, dico che per la intersecatione che farà la linea della fronte, qual va a refferire a manco della mittà della cortina, per il che in capo delli 8 passa del dritto, volendosi tondeggiare l'orecchione, dico chel scemediametro⁶ al cordone a pena venirà a esser di 4 passa, sì che tutto sarà di 8, il che mai sarebbe fatto da me, né anco di 10, et a pena consentirei de 11 in loco che patisse batteria. Quello che io ho fatto alla Cannea non può esser battuto in la fronte, ma è solamente battuto nella mittà del circolo d'esso orecchione, cioè per la longhezza sua, sì che il mio può stare et è supportabile per la raggione sopradetta, come sarebbe anco quel'orecchione che si dovrebbe fare a Corfù alla versuada, qual conviene esser longo et dritto per fare ben l'effetto suo, ma si può supportare che sia più debole di spalla per causa del mare. Questi 2 sono in un caso istesso supportabili et per necessità fatti così, ma sopra il dessegno l'Eccellenza Vostra in una occhiata, con il compasso in mano, si chiarirà di questo falso lattino che fa gettando via il danaro del Principe per l'ambitione di voler parere più intendenti delli altri.

È di necessità che cada in uno di doi inconvenienti di fare il dritto del orecchione solamente 3 o 4 passa longo per grandire et ingrossare il tondo del orecchione. Io dico che questi suoi orecchioni havendo così poco dritto deventeranno simili et inutili, come erano quelli di Corfù quali Vostra Eccellenza face accommodare, facendoli più longo il dritto ecco uno / [74^v] inconveniente. L'altro che volendo lasciarli 8 passa di dritto detto orecchione viene tanto acuto che, se in lui sarà fatta batteria 4 passa di certezza, ne potrà cadere in quella muraglia alta 38 piedi, et che tutta si può battere, sì che ne rovinerà in dentro almanco 4 passa, altri 4 bisogna che rimanga di terreno per parapetto da potervi star dietro coperti dalle cannonate. Dico dove vorranno star 8 file de soldati per defender detta batteria, essendo che tutto l'orecchione a suo modo è grosso solamente 8 passa, 4 va in la batteria et 4 di parapetto, adunque è inutile, et per questo Vostra Eccellenza li vole almanco 12 passa grossi, et io li ho fatti in Candia

5 *alle piazze* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 6 *dal tondo* crossed out after *scemediametro*.

tutti di 13, et qui a Nicosia questi 22 orecchioni de 15 passa, manco un piede, sì che Vostra Eccellenza intende, come vano le cose di questo mondo, et lei come generale di questo Illustrissimo Stato delle opere bone fatte nel suo tempo da tutti noi altri suoi soldati, lei ne partecipa la sua parte, et delli errori quando che ella li sappia, mi pare che la sia obligata a non lasciarli andar più ananti, et son certissimo che Vostra Eccellenza comparirà ananti la Serenissima Signoria, et se la sentirà qualche errore in le mie fabbriche la mi advertirà, acciò che io mi sappia emendare. Il medemo lei è tenuta a fare delli altri, che per troppo sapientia vogliono far danno alli nostri Signori Illustrissimi, et qui facendo fine me raccomando sempre alla sua bona gratia.

Di Nicosia alli 7 ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Eccellenza servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza. 1567 7 ottobre.



39 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 10 October 1567

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 76^r–78^v.

G.S. laments the passing of Luocotenente Querini, which is having a particular impact on Nicosia's grain provisions; the wheat that was supposed to be delivered in August and September came late. Late penalties have not been applied; these fines do not concern Proveditor-General Barbaro, who, all in all, has no authority in the matter.

Carob production has been so abundant this year that it could have fed the peasantry for six months, but the rettori have granted export licences to Alexandria and other ports; as the merchants who take the produce to Turkey make such large profits (200%), obtaining the necessary authorization is easy.

When the rettori are asked, for purely economic reasons, if they would keep the carob on the island to prevent the need to import millet from Venetian lands, they reply that Venetian laws apply to grain, not to carob. The argument that millet is less nutritious than carob does not change their opinion at all. G.S. is prepared to take full responsibility for this decision, but the proveditor does not wish to cause tension. This situation is only deepening G.S.'s sadness at the death of Querini, to whom the public good was so vital.

The proveditor ordered the ordinanze soldiers to work on construction for two weeks starting from 1 October, it being understood that they are to be paid using the ferlini system. Consequently the ordinanze have arrived from all over the island with their banners and drums, and are displaying great bravery. At the Rochas bastion a company commander has been found who was banished from Nicosia for three years for having got involved in a brawl; but the proveditor and G.S. feel he should receive his wages, as he has done the work that Venice has asked of him. G.S. visits the Rochas bastion twice a day, and the 300 soldiers working there continually ask him for his help. G.S. laments the problems that are eroding Venice's authority,

and, seeing the extent to which justice is flouted, he has reached the point of wishing he were deaf and blind so that he would never have to deal with humanity again.

At all the bastions the peasants are complaining that they are being unfairly paid; the camera fiscale pays wages half in carzi (each worth 3 bagattini), half in tornesi (each worth 1 bagattini), which are legal tender only in Zakynthos, Corfu and Candia; this results in a 200% profit for the camera, at the workers' expense. The latter are supposed to earn 10 soldi per day, but are swindled by the Venetian officials who pocket the difference. One poor fellow came to complain to G.S. that the 12 ducats given to him were not genuine; G.S. sent him to the rettori, who proved incapable of resolving the matter. G.S. is fully aware of the embezzlement going on and does not know how to protect Venice's honour, as the proveditor does not desire to get into a dispute with the rettori. G.S. says he is in despair, but the sight of the bastions under construction lifts his spirits.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Io son sforciato di dirle, contra la mia volontà, li mali effetti quali ogni giorno intravengano per la morte del Clarissimo Luogotenente Querini. Questa camera reale è stata molto mal trattata in le morte de tanti Clarissimi Luogotenenti, per il che si ha da scodere infinita quantità de ducatti overo di biade, qual tutte se ispediscono con facilità et si fanno in danari. Et il mese di agosto et settembre si haverebbe scossa una gran quantità di danari, et robba se questi Signori havessero voluto, ma tutto quello che si scode in camera, fino all'ultimo giorno di settembre, vien pagato in la camera fiscale senza pena alcuna et per gola di guadagnar cinque per cento, mai è stato possibile che questi Clarissimi abbiano voluto sollecitare questi dui mesi che biade siano condotte in la fortezza.¹ L'utile de questa pena de cinque per cento si divide in tre parte: una va alli scrivani rasonatti della reale, quali insegnano li tratti alli Clarissimi vicelogotenenti, viceconsiglieri, et camarlenghi, alli quali cinque vanno li 2 terzi de queste pene, et al Signor Proveditore niente di utile va in sua borsa, et fa quanto puole, ma quelli non lo stimano et Sua Signoria per quanto dice non ha autorità, il che in questo tempi sta malissimo. Per questa ragione sopradetta de haver perso dui mesi di tempo di condur gran quantità di biade per gola de quelle pene, et per non haver il Signor Proveditor maggior autorità.

In questo proposito, li voglio dire chel Signor Dio ha fatto na- / [76^v] scere tante carobbe

¹ G.S. points out here how the dysfunctional *camera reale* complicated the question of supplying the fortresses with grain; in this instance, he deplors the fact that Venice's officers did not have feudatories deliver yields at the beginning of the summer, just after the harvests, so as to provide for the months in between harvests, rather than waiting till the end of September, when the harvests were usually shared out between the different areas (*partison delle biave*). As a result of their system, supplies for August and September had to be bought at market price, which led to various forms of speculation. In his 1565 report, Bernardo Sagredo denounced other cases of fraud connected to the *camera reale*: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 100–102. Concerning agricultural rhythms: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Giovanni Francesco Mella (1566); CMC, *cod. PD C 2669/4A*, f. 35^{r-v}; G. Grivaud, 'Ordine della Secreta di Cipro. Florio Bustron et les institutions franco-byzantines afférentes au régime agraire de Chypre à l'époque vénitienne', *Μελέται και Υπομνήματα* 2 (1992), pp. 580–581, 588.

in questo Regno que quest'anno, che harebbero supplito a tener vivi 6 mesi li contadini del Regno, quali si havessero salvati in questo grande et sicuro nito fatto da novo, ma Sue Magnificentie (ancora che siano stati advertiti più volte), a preghere de scrivani et altri suoi di casa, hanno concesse diverse licentie de condurne in Alessandria et in diversi lochi gran quantità,² essendo che li mercanti, portandole in Turchia, guadagnano 200 per cento in manco d'un mese, per il che li mercanti tengono certe sorte con diversi mezi che ottengono la licentia, et se l'hanno per 500 cantari de carobbe è tanto che darla per 50 millia, per che a tutte le scalle ogni ministro vol menar le mani, et li mercanti per il gran guadagno fanno far li miracoli a tutti questi ministri cipriotti, et anco a qualch'un'altro.³

Quando se li dice Clarissimi Signori non lasciate andar via le carobbe che sono qui per domandar meglij alla Serenissima Signoria,⁴ essendo che le carobbe sono condotte et li meglij si hanno da condurre, queste costano poco et quelli costaranno assai danari al Dominio, rispondeno che le leggi della Signoria se intendeno solamente in li formenti et in li orzi et non in carobbe, tal risposta hanno data al Signor Proveditore, et poi li è stato anco detto che bisogna haver la fatica de far il meglio in farina, et poi li bisognano legni da cocer il pane, et mal si pol viver con il meglio solo se non è accompagnato con formaggi, salati o carne, salata, ma con le carobbe schiette et acqua si pò vivere, veda Vostra Signoria se questo è errore grandissimo, io dico al Signor Pro- / [77^r] veditore che me lo commandi a me che lo farò fare, segua poi quello si voglia, è tanto bono et rispettoso per non venir a rumore, che scorre via le cose et fa benissimo se non venisse occasione, ma se la venirà et che si perda il tutto per queste negligentie, che colpa ne haverà Giulio Savorgnano se questi sono così poco amorevoli alla sua patria. Il Clarissimo Querini morto me andava per la fantasia infinitamente, perché era amorevole al publico senza un rispetto al mondo, et mai ho conosciuto homo che avesse più conosciuto il mio buon animo, et la mia natura et Dio l'ha voluto tore per far danno a questo regno, et anco dispiacere a me.

2 *gran quantità* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 3 The carob trade is poorly documented; it was not a part of the big trade monopolized by Venice, and functioned mostly via small ships between Cyprus and the Levant. Leonardo Donà reported annual production to be as high as 15,000 cantars (about 65,000 hl), around half of which were exported from Limassol to Syria and Damietta: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 149^r. Carob production is mentioned in the statistical inventories of the island made throughout the period of Venetian rule, for example those published by Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, p. 498, republished by Aristidou, *Ανεύδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 3, p. 277 (it should be noted that Aristidou gives, without any explanation, a date of 1523 for this document, whilst Mas Latrie, also without any explanation, prefers an earlier date; the reality is that these statistical documents were regularly updated. Several different manuscript versions exist, yet to be analyzed codicologically). 4 To combat food shortages, Venice tried several times to develop millet-growing on the island, as millet can be preserved better than other grains. Growing millet was thus tested in 1564 in Morfou on land belonging to the count of Rochas, Eugenio Singlitico; however, it quickly became apparent that millet needs as much water as cotton, and that it impoverishes the soil. As a result, the *reale* feudatories balked at planting millet, and in January 1567 *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini was sent to Cyprus with 6,000 *stara* of the grain, to be stored in Famagusta or sewn in the fields: ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 34 (letter from Matthio Michiel dated 31 January 1564); id., *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 72, f. 125^v; id., *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, f. 73^v; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 108^{r-v}; Grivaud, 'Ordine della Secreta di Cipro', pp. 570–571.

È forza che io glie ne dica un'altra che hanno fatto heri. Havendo deliberato il Signor Proveditor' con tutto il regimento che le ordinanze delle *cernide*, qual hanno le sue esentione dal Senato che non estate questo, per questa volta tutte esse ordinanze debbano venire il primo di questo mese d'ottobre a lavorare per 15 giorni alli *ferlini* a portar il terreno, per il che fù ordinato che tutte le ordinanze venissero, et furonno scritte le lettere a tutti li capitani per le contrate che dovessero venire con le sue insegne, tamburi, arme d'hasta curte, et ciascuno sotto la sua insegna, vengano alegremente, et fanno li miracoli di gagliardezza.⁵ La notte passata, il cavalliero del vicelogotenente hebbe per spia che un capo di cento fanti al belloardo del Conte di Rochas era bandito per tre anni,⁶ per una semplice rissa de Nicossia, con taglia chi lo prendeva de 20 ducatti et che dovesse servir in galea 18 mesi. Il Signor Proveditor dice che quest'homo è stato comandato et fatto venire sotto la fede publica, è venuto sotto la sua insegna, / [77^v] ha lavorato nel belloardo et dormiva in lo istesso belloardo senza un pensiero al mondo. Il Signor Proveditore dice voler scriver di questo a Sua Serenità, il ponto sta chel cavalliero vole la taglia, io la darò del mio per far conoscer l'animo mio a questi homini, quali me hanno ad aiutar a difender questa fortezza.

Consideri Vostra Signoria che tempi che sono questi ogni volta, che io vado sopra quello belloardo 2 volte al giorno, sempre se mi appresentano quelli 300 di quella compagnia, et tutti si gettano con li genocchi per terra et mi domandano aiuto et misericordia, et sanno il mio bon animo, et se io non forse in isola mi venirebbe voglia di farlo andar a lavorar sopra il suo belloardo, al dispetto de chi non vol bene alla Signoria di Venetia, et che cercano con la sua avaritia de metter a fondi questo Stato, et per la verità non vengano castigati li tristi come si doverebbe, essendo che li broglj impediscono il più delle volte la giustitia, per il che niente me rincresce a deventar vecchio et perder l'udire, et il vedere per non saper le male cose che vengano fatte, et questa sola che li voglio dir' ultima, qual li basterà per 7 settimane et se ella non se ressentirà nel animo di questa, non vorrò creder che ella sia nata di gentilhomo venetiano ma di qualche Turcho, o di qualche Arabo nemico dell'humanità.

Il caso è questo che heri et hoggi, quando vado su li belloardi tutti li contadini ad una voce cridano che certa moneta qual si domandano carzi, quali voleno 3 bagattini l'uno, et la camera fiscale li ha dato a tutti li contadini la mettà de questi carzi, et l'altra mittà messedati de tornesi, quali se spendono al Zante, a Cor- / [78^r] fù et in Candia, et li valeno un bagattino l'uno, et se dice che in questa terra, che ne sono stati de quelli che ne hanno fatto venire le botte per far questa mercantia, essendo che di grandezza et poca differentia dal tornese al carzi, hanno guadagnato 200 per 100, non dico San Marco ma questi ministri;⁷ me riporto al

5 It was indeed exceptional that the *cernide* soldiers took part in the fortification project, as the *francomati* amongst them were usually exempt from such work; the proveditor-general's decision to call them up was, however, justified, as the need for manpower and the use of the *ferlini* system of payment meant that all members of the local population got involved. 6 *per tre anni* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 7 Here G.S. observes the speculation made on the coins in circulation amongst the construction workers; *carzie* were bronze divisional coins minted unsystematically on the island under James II, then between 1518 and 1570: N. Papadopoli Aldobrandini, *Le monete di Venezia*, Venice 1893, vol. 2, pp. 233–234, 246, 275, 482–486; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 803, 876–877; M. Bompaire / C. Morisson, 'Η νομισματοκοπία στο μεσαιωνικό βασίλειο', in Th. Papadopoulos

fatto et alla verità che tutti li contadini me cridano 22 volte al giorno di questa cosa, che mi fanno venir li sudori della morte che in 15 giornate di soldi diece l'una, debbano haver di danno 50 soldi cioè 5 giornate. Queste sono pur cose che la forca a quelli sarebbe poca punitione, se brusano li monetari, per che ingannano qualch'uno, ma questi venendo dalla camera reale ingannano troppo evidentemente li poveretti, et alienano troppo li animi delli sudditi. In ogni tempo sarebbe cosa mala ma in questi è pessima, ne voglio dir una più chiara che uno pover' homo havea toccato in quell' hora 12 ducatti della camera, et diceva che non erano boni, vene da me, lo mandai immediate dalli Signori, et dicono che non sanno che fare, per questo io piango la morte del Querini, et sel fosse vivo niuna de queste cose sarebbono.

Pensi Vostra Signoria di che animo io mi trovo, havendo questi conscientia così grossa et così poco a caro l'honor suo; et il Signor Proveditore non havendo più cha tanta autorità va scorrendo per quanto Sua Signoria dice al meglio chel può, et dice non voler combattere con li rettori et San Marco torà de mezo, et non so che peggio dirle. Io sarei disperato del tutto ma mi conforto a vedere come questi belloardi riescano in grandezza et bellezza meravigliosi a me medemo, et molto più alli altri. Et con questa bona bocca farò fine, raccomandandoli la sua patria, et se fosse possibile / [78^v] farli qualche rimedio, et a Vostra Signoria me raccomandando.

Di Nicossia alli 10 ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michiel, del Signor Nicolò. Venetia. 1567 10 ottobre. carzi et carobe et pene. N° X.



(ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. V: *Μεσαιωνικό βασίλειο, Ενετοκρατία Β'*, Nicosia 1996, p. 1478; Michaelidou / Zapiti, *Νομίσματα της Κύπρου*, pp. 196, 200–201. G.S. put their value in October 1567 at three *bagattini* (12 *bagattini* being worth one *soldo*), which Florio Bustron confirms: *Historia overo Commentarii de Cipro*, p. 462: “ogni quattro carcie vagliano un soldo veneziano”. As for *tornesi*, these were bronze coins used on the Ionian islands and in Crete, in circulation in Cyprus due to the island's lack of divisional coins, which hindered day-to-day trade. The recurring problem of coins in Cyprus, noted by Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, p. 876, was present throughout the period of Venetian rule; in September 1531 the syndics reiterated a ban on using any billon coins other than *carzie*: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 149^v. Later on, reduced quantities of *carzie* were minted on the island, but, in an 18 October 1555 dispatch, *Luocotenente* Marco Grimani deplored the fact that out of a promised 2,000 ducats-worth of *carzie* only 300 had been sent. Things had not got any better a few years later; on 8 October 1558, Proveditor-General Sebastiano Venier was still remarking that a lack of bronze coins meant that correct change could not be given for gold and silver coins. He thus called on Venice to “mandare delle altre carcie et di quelli da doi soldi stampati ultimamente li quali daranno utile alla cecha sua”: ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori a altre cariche, b. 190, c. 40; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 5.

40 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 15 October 1567

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 80^r–82^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 79^r–v.

It is mid-October and work has been underway for 105 days, or three and a half months, at a spending rate of 15,000 ducats per month. A month has been lost, however, as, even though work began on 1 June, there was a shortage of tools; and then in September the rettori stopped working when news arrived of the peace treaty signed with the sultan. G.S. gives detailed accounts of the events, firstly out of loyal service to Venice, and secondly so that his correspondent can analyze the situation and they can exchange opinions.

G.S. proposed fortifying Nicosia in eight months, with 11 bastions, 11 curtains and 22 orillons of greater dimensions than the towers in Crema, Treviso, Padua and Famagusta. 20 orillons are finished; six bastions along with their curtains are three-fifths complete and the five others are half-complete. In total this represents 75 days' work. G.S. requested eight months to finish construction and a budget of 120,000 ducats, but he now assures Michiel that six months and 90,000 ducats will suffice, even though the rettori have not supplied the men they were supposed to; this has delayed work and makes the passing of Luocotenente Querini even more painful. G.S. does, however, praise the securing of grain provisions for Nicosia.

G.S. expresses concern for his health, as, aside from the journey from Venice, he visits twice a day all of the 22 construction sites situated at the orillons of each bastion; he closely supervises the work being done, the measurements and the installation of cannon embrasures.

Innumerable complications are arising at each bastion, as the camerlingos do not pay the workers on time, and when they do pay, it is in tornesi, which bakers refuse. These injustices anger G.S. as they are happening at the three bastions under the supervision of Venetian officers, which have ended up causing more problems than the eight bastions entrusted to Cypriot nobles.

G.S. highlights the case of a Brescia captain, Schillino, the brother of the established Venetian doctor, who stole 120 bezants; he steals the soldiers' pay, gambles with it, and when he loses sets himself up again with the Signoria's money at the expense of the poor peasants; doing great harm to the public good. G.S. is eager for revenge, as these actions, by delaying construction, are an affront to his reputation; but Schillino manages each time to escape punishment.

Expenses that should not be part of the construction budget are nevertheless included, such as the cost of transporting the 24 artillery pieces to the fortress, which cost over 600 ducats; of building quarters for the soldiers of Schillino's company; and of building the two towers used to store powder, which cost over 100 ducats each. All the demolition of the old walls and churches situated outside the enceinte is also included in the general budget, representing a sum of 10,000 ducats.

If the enemy threat becomes more concrete, G.S. hopes Venice will send companies of soldiers in sufficient number, as well as a commander to replace the Famagusta governor. G.S. is awaiting 50 bombardiers, and more should be sent to Famagusta. If the threat is not corroborated, he fears that the difficulties concerning Nicosia's supplies will worsen; meanwhile, merchant ships are continuing to take carob to Syria, which amounts to supporting the enemy's peasantry. If the tension between the island and the Ottomans disappears, G.S. plans on requesting leave in February [1568], which would see him back in Venice in a year.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Per tutte due le nave Dolfine, ho scritto particolarmente delle operationi che si fanno qui a Vostra Signoria. Al presente che siamo a mezo il mese d'ottobre, le faccio sapere che si ha lavorato atorno questa fabrica al conto del danaro solamente 105 giornate, che sono tre mesi e mezo, a raggione de 15 millia ducatti al mese, se ben fu cominciato il primo di giugno, che sono 4 mesi e mezo, ma questi Clarissimi di settembre se infrigidirono, tanto quando che intesero della sottoscrizione della pace,¹ che tra il mese di settembre et quel di zugno, nel quale per non haver li istromenti da lavorare, tra questi 2 mesi fu lavorato per un solo. Faccio questi conti a Vostra Signoria come a quello che è a mio giudicio tanto eccellente notomista delle cose humane, cioè dell'operatione et delle parole delli homini quanto delli fatti. Io tengo Vostra Signoria tanto eccellente in questo, quanto erano eccellenti l'avocatto Ottonello² in considerar li processi civili et criminali, et quanto il Faloppia medico et dottore era eccellente ciroico,³ et in quella sua arte della notomia. Però, havendo io Vostra Signoria per tale, le voglio dar conto del tempo et del fatto, acciò che io me possa mantenere in la sua gratia et in quella bona opinione che io credo che ella habbia di me, essendo che io son certo che ella crede che io sia un'utile et fidel servitore della Signoria di Venetia et che, oltre l'amorevolezza, li sia anco quella parte che vol havere li homini da capo de non se ingannare in li giuditij, essendo che tutte le cose in questa professione dependeno dallo antivedere, et questo antivedere non sta solamente in le diverse spetie delle cose ma in le quantità et sopra il tutto, non se ingannare del tempo et questo del tempo / [80^v] è de grandissima importantia alli agricoltori, alli marinari, alli studenti ma molto più alli soldati, non solamente nel fatto de combatter, ma anco nel condurre li eserciti a far le imprese un giorno più, et un'houra manco manda in rovina et da la vittoria al capitano.

Così voglio dire che il permetter saldamente, come ho fatto io a questi Signori Clarissimi, che Nicossia in 8 mesi sarebbe stata da me posta in fortezza, et sopra questa mia parola è stato fatto questo fondamento di far questi undeci belloardi et undeci cortine et 22 orechioni, ciascuno assai maggiore delli qual si voglia turrion tondo, che habbia Crema, Treviso, Padoa, overo a Famagosta, et pur sono fatti et finiti 20 de loro fino a quest'houra presente, et in 6 belloardi di certezza habbiamo passato li 3 quinti, mettendo anco le sue cortine appresso, perché li belloardi sono fatti li 4 quinti, ma per le sue cortine che lasciamo le ultime a finire. Le dico che habbiamo in tutti questi 6 passato li 3 quinti, et alli altri 5 belloardi assai più della mittà del tutto sono fatti, sì che a parlar più chiaro de tutta la summa in 75 giorni io l'ho per finitissima et 105 sono stati fatti, in tutto saranno questi 6 mesi, se bene io ne domanda alla prima⁴ 8 di tempo, quali importavano 120 millia ducatti di spesa, della quale me contento di 30 millia ducatti manco, cioè dui mesi manco, certamente mi pare

1 ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 50^v–51^r. 2 The lawyer Ottonello Pasino / Pasini, also mentioned infra, doc. 65, was a Paduan jurist and professor of canonical law who served Pope Adrian IV in Rome, then the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere. He ended up settling in Venice in the 1540s, but later returned to Padua, where he died in the early 1580s: *Nuovo dizionario storico ovvero Storia in compendio*, Bassano 1796, vol. 14, p. 176. 3 *fisigo* crossed out and *ciroico* added above. 4 *alla prima* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

che habbiano un gran torto a non me mantenere quello che mi hanno permesso, essendo loro chiarissimi che io li attendo molto più della promessa. In questo proposito voglio che la sappia che, sel luogotenente Querini fosse vivo, qual era vivo da senno, io non havrei da scriver a Vostra Signoria che mi mancasse se non 45 giorni, come al presente dico di 75, et fino a quest' hora sarebbeno stati / [81^r] portati più formenti et più orzi in questa città di Nicossia, di quello che saranno portati fin l'ultimo giorno di genaro, et in questo non me inganno, sì come dico a Vostra Signoria che non me ho ingannato della quantità del danaro né del tempo che è andato fin' qui, et che anderà in questa fortificatione, et spero certissimo ogni giorno di acquistarme più credito appresso Vostra Signoria, più con le opere fatte a tempo che con le parole.

Per questo, dico le cause per le quali altri impediscono li miei desegni, et se Vostra Signoria sapesse le patientie et li disturbi, et le inresolutione che mi vengano date et fatte in una materia tale come questa, certo l'harebbe compassione al caso mio, et la si darebbe meraviglia come è possibile che io sia vivo, non dico solamente per il viaggio et star al sole nel rivedere due volte al giorno li 22 orecchioni, nelli quali mai è stato mesurato cosa alcuna che non sia stato di mia mano,⁵ né tirato corda né posto palo né fondati muri che ne sono⁶ fatti assaissimi dentro via delle cannonere, in parte che non ponno esser veduti di fora con li suoi sboradori⁷ de muro per le piogge, et 4 cannonere per fianco, qual cannonere voleno tanto artificio a metterle che le fanno perdere il cervello alli homini.

Le querele che vengano sopra ciascun belloardo che li manca il pane, alle volte il daffar è infinito, che li camerlenghi voleno andar a solazzo fori della città a trovar le acque fresche, et non dano li danari a tempo et tutti li cinque millia guastatori sono atorno di me. Dio me aiuta che delli 11 belloardi, 7 sono di questi cavallieri quali suppliscono col suo danaro, ma sel Querini fosse vivo li camerlenghi starebbono in cervello et non darebbono tornesi / [81^v] dal Zante, che valeno un bagattin l'uno in cambio de carzi che qui valeno 4 bagattini l'uno, et qualche volta ne hanno dati in li pagamenti a questi poveretti il terzo et la mittà, et mi sono atorno me, che non poleno spender quella moneta, et li fornari non la voleno;⁸ tale ingiustitie così evidente, così contra a quelli che le fanno come a quelli che per broglio il sopportanno, mi fanno tanta colera et tanto dispiacere alla mia vita, che Vostra Signoria mai lo potrebbe credere; et per tornare alli belloardi le dico che mai fu fatto il più grande errore in questa fabrica di quello che è stato, a non lasciar che tutti li 11 belloardi fussero stati comandati et guidati da questi cavallieri cipriotti, io antevidi questa cosa, ma l'ambitione di metterli nome il belloardo Mulla, Loredano, et li altri dui ha fatto che questi Signori Clarissimi attendeno solamente a un certo modo alli suoi 4 particolari, et non tengono un conto al mondo del resto della fabrica, et Dio che è giusto fa che quasi tutti li altri belloardi li sono ananti a questi del fatto, et per dirlo chiaro a Vostra Signoria in 3 de questi 4 ho più da fare, che non ho in tutti li altri 8 dal poco governo, che li sta sopra per che alcuni delli patroni stanno un mese a vederli.

⁵ *che non sia stato di mia mano* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁶ *habbia* crossed out and *sono* added above. ⁷ Small diversion canal; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. ⁸ These wrongdoings have already been denounced supra, doc. 39.

Li suoi sustituti in parte de loro sono stati tali che volevano giocar in queste presse con le ongie, et pur li ho trovati in fallo, talche robbavano li danari et li ho fatti tornar in dietro una volta che erano stati posti da banda 120 bisanti da uno capitano Schillino Bressano, quale è un gran mariolo et è fratello di quel medico Schillino⁹ che sta in Venetia, che ha tante amicitie con gentilhomini. Questo Schillino è stato raccomandato al Signor Proveditore, quale non vol veder cose tanto per sottile contra di questo pur l'ha levato di quel maneggio, ma lo doveva far impiccare et io volevo / [82^r] esser il boija, ma non è ancora fora che io non l'habbia a castigar in qualche modo. Robba le paghe alli soldati et poi giocarà li 80 et 100 ducatti in una sentata, et poi si vol reffare con li danari della fabrica a spesa di San Marco, overo a danno delli poveri contadini, in pregiudicio del honor mio di quello che ho promesso del tempo et della spesa, ma se io havesse creduto che non dovesse esser castigato, se non così poco li permetto la fede mia, che io l'amazzava o almanco li dava qualche strania cortellata. Questo furfante sta in questa terra, ma non ardisce mai a venir dove io sia, perché sa che io lo voglio castigare.

Torno a dire che se Vostra Signoria sapesse il daffare che io ho, non dico della fabrica del far officij, quali toccheranno da esser fatti da 11 protij per il manco et da 4 o 6 ingegneri, che a Bergamo non erano manco, ma siamo privi de bombardieri et de capo, et nel condurre questi 24 pezzi d'artiglieria da Saline fin' qui, si ha havuto una fatica molto grande. Sappia Vostra Signoria che il condur di quest'arteglieria et monitione costa più di 600 ducatti, et questo vien posto a conto della fabrica in pregiudicio del mio honore. Sono state fatte parecchie case per questo capitano Schillino et per li suoi soldati, de muro et de plite, con li danari della mia fabrica, si fanno al presente due torre per mettervi dentro la polvere che stiano secure, quale costeranno più di 100 ducatti l'una, pur col danaro della mia fabrica. Tutte le muraglie vecchie della città se deffanno con questi danari, monasterij et chiese alte che restavano di fora immediate delle fosse, tutto si fa con questo danaro di modo che queste spese straordinarie fin qui importano poco manco di 10 millia ducatti, tanto che la mia fortificatione verrà a costare se non 80 millia ducatti. Tanto li / [82^v] so dire al presente. Li voglio dire quello che io spero per l'avenire, et quello di che mi dubito.

Se, da Constantinopoli li a Venetia, sarà cresciuto il sospetto, spero che ne saranno mandate le compagnie delle fanterie in buon numero, bone et a tempo, et fra quelle qualche buon capo per poter supplire a Famagosta, a quel governatore qual non è in molto buon esser; medesimamente aspetto per qui almanco 50 bombardieri, et a Famagosta ne vorrebbe anco un buon numero, perché quelli che sono li sono stati fatti in maggior parte per broglj, quali al tempo di pace valeno qualche cosa. Se il rumore non crescerà, qui la provisione di far venir le biade qua dentro si farà ancora più frigidamente, et li navitij delle carobbe anderanno per Soria a centennara, come vanno al presente a desene, essendo quelle che harrebbero tenuti vivi li contadini, et queste sono le disperationi che fanno fastidio alli homini del mondo et particolarmente a me. Io non manco di dirlo particolarmente tanto che io credo haverme ingenerato odio grandissimo da alcuni che non vorrebbero, che io havesse né occhij né lingua. Non li posso far altro, et non ho paura che niuno dica di me né tristitia alcuna né ignorantia de

⁹ The Schillino brothers are mentioned supra, doc. 34.

pigritia, perché non le faccio. Per questo io dico liberamente quello ch' io sento de altri et non ho paura del broglio, essendo che finalmente la verità starà di sopra, et con questo fine me raccomando alla bona gratia di Vostra Signoria. Et se le cose turchesche saranno fredde, io scriverò per la mia licentia questo febraro per potermi partire fino a 11 mesi di quest'isola, et esser adesso a un'anno appresso a Vostra Signoria con animo de attendere a viver per l'avenire, et non me star a struppiare il cervello come faccio al presente per causa d'altri.

Di Nicossia alli 15 ottobre¹⁰ 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel del Signor Nicolò, Venetia. 1567 15 ottobre. carobe. N° XI.




41 *Letter from G.S. (to Francesco Michiel?), Nicosia, 15 October 1567*

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, f. 90^{r-v}.

If upon receiving these letters the fears of an Ottoman attack have subsided, G.S. authorizes his correspondent to deliver the letter he wrote to the doge, as the senior officers in Famagusta are not doing well; if the threat persists, G.S. gives his correspondent permission either to deliver the letter or to burn it.

On the morning of 15 October, G.S. measured six bastions and found them to be 35 piedi [12 m] tall, 5 or 10 piedi [from 1.7 m to 3.5 m] taller than the five others. This disparity is down to the fact that the 10,000 peasants who could have been ordered to work on the fortress were not put to use, even though the men were (apparently) paid. In Famagusta there is no shortage of manpower: 300 men from the galleys, 200 soldiers and 200 peasant volunteers are at work. This is so many workers that no one knows what to do with the 700 remaining peasants, who would, however, be most welcome in Nicosia; this explains the delays at certain bastions. Nevertheless, if the requisite number of workers is provided, construction will be finished in 75 days. G.S. takes no pleasure in relating the negative aspects of the situation, but it is best to intervene before it is too late.

Se al ricever di queste mie, paresse a Vostra Signoria che il sospetto dell'armata de Constantinopoli si rissolvesse in niente,¹ Vostra Signoria in quel caso faccia quello li pare di

¹⁰ The copyist has written *febraro*, but the word has been crossed out and corrected, most probably by the recipient of the letter, to *otto*.  1 A 12 October 1567 dispatch from Vice-Luocotenente Benedetto da Mula and Provveditor-General Francesco Barbaro in Nicosia reports that, following a letter from the Constantinople *bailo*, a spy was sent to Caramania to see if Ottoman forces were preparing for war; however, as nothing was discovered,

presentar questa lettera che va a Sua Serenità essendo che, come lei vede a Famagosta, quelli capitani et governatore non stanno bene, et se non sarà bisogno, non vorrei dar impaccio a Sua Serenità, ma sel sospetto sarà, per mio descario Vostra Signoria faccia quanto li pare, o darla o abbruciarla, ma non conciarla, la copia della quale è qui inclusa, et anco vi è una copia de una mia scritta all'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza.²

Questa mattina, che sono alli 15, ho mesurato 6 belloardi, quali alle sue fronte al presente li vole 35 piedi di scalla, li altri cinque sono alcuni de loro 5 piedi manco et alcuni 10. Questa differentia è stata perché l'angaria è stata posta et compartita in tutta l'isola, ma non hanno voluto lasciar venire 10 millia homini del territorio di Famagosta, et hanno havuto il torto perché questa angaria straordinaria et li homini sono pagati;³ per Famagosta ne hanno de più, havendo 300 galeotti, 200 soldati et 200 contadini voluntarij, non sanno neanche che fare di questi 700, sì che fanno male a questa fortezza senza utile di quella, et (come ho detto) non si pò metter angaria a questi contadini, et da qui è nata la parte della differentia di esser questi sei belloardi più fatti, ma come ho detto in 75 giorni di lavoriero il tutto sarà finito, se però daranno li homini. Mi convien bravare et scriver lettere a Sua Serenità, dolendomi de chi non me da li homini per negligentia sua, et poi mi permettono di darli, et mi fanno stracciare le lettere. Pensi Vostra Signoria che broglio al contrario è questo che io convengo fare per non restar intricato, io penso che debbano scriver le belle cose di me, se havessero qualche attacco di farlo, se io taccio la fabrica non si farà a tempo per / [90^v] transcuragine del mondo. Se sarà guerra et bisogno, meglio sarà haver cridato et haver fatta l'opera, se sarà pace, meglio sarebbe haver fatto vista di non vedere, il Signor Dio faccia quello sia per il meglio; chi dirà adunque bene delle mi operationi, niuno se non li Cipriotti alli quali ho ordinato il carico. Altri non lo vorranno dire, io al manco lo dirò a Vostra Signoria, et quella l'intenderà anco per altre strade, perché così gran machina, non potrà star ascosta alle orecchie di Vostra Signoria.⁴

1567 15 ottobre.



another spy was going to be sent: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 4. 2 Probably the 7 October 1567 letter; cf. supra, doc. 38. 3 On 12 September 1506 the Council of Ten set the requisition imposed on the *francomati* at ten days per year, but also stipulated that the men could pay a fee of half a ducat (5 bezants) instead of working. Ten years later, in March 1516, it was estimated that 13,000 *francomati* from 15 to 60 years of age were being made to work exclusively on fortifying Famagusta and Cerines. The peasants did not like this, as construction was incessantly extended; however, it was agreed that peasants from the Paphos region should no longer be forced to make the journey to Famagusta. In 1528 the requisition was reduced to 6 days per year (or 3 bezants): CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 46, ff. 29^r–31^v; BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VII 877 (8651)*, f. 326^{r-v}; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 804–805; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', p. 517. 4 This letter was probably addressed to Francesco Michiel; although it bears neither address nor subscription, it comes from the same quire.

42 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 21 October 1567

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 84^r–86^v.

At the present date 5,000 ducats have been spent on each bastion and the accompanying curtains, giving a total of 55,000 ducats. Earlier in the day it rained for the first time since G.S.'s arrival; he saw how the Cypriot nobles thought nothing of getting wet and continued overseeing the work, wishing to set an example for their men. This is proof that honour can change people; formerly the most elegant noblemen of the Venetian State, now these men barely sleep at night and work all day in the blazing sun without a break. Every day at around 8 pm, fierce gusts of wind whip up clouds of dust, and G.S. guesses that it is the dust getting into their ears, eyes, throat and intestines that gives such an olive tint to the islanders' skin. The nobles bear this dust as determinedly as they do the rain, never abandoning their posts, a resolve that G.S. is delighted to report. He returns, however, to the bastions, which will cost 3,000 ducats each, along with the demi-curtains which cost 1,000 each.

G.S. is sad that Francesco Michiel, Sforza Pallavicino and all the Collegio cannot see for themselves the methods being used to build the bastions; if they could see the earth piled up 35 piedi [12 m] high, they would think the bastions were costing 10,000 ducats each. G.S. assures Michiel that the orillons and curtains will keep the moat protected with their cannons and arquebuses, and he stresses that several reinforcing walls have been built between the cannon embrasures and the orillons.

The rettori, Proveditor Barbaro, the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico], the leading lords, Governor Roncone and G.S. all meet up frequently to watch the construction work, and all are amazed at how much has been achieved in such a short amount of time. In 110 days, 70 days less than the six months initially scheduled, 11 miracles have been worked, at a cost of 500 ducats per day; the money spent has been the 80,000 ducats donated by the nobility and the 10,000 ducats granted by Venice. The enemy will need 45-piedi-high [15.6 m] ladders if they are to scale the bastions; nobody will find any fault in G.S.'s work, however the Ottoman threat may develop.

Over 40,000 plite are required for each orillon and the accompanying cannon embrasures; G.S. ordered the plite to be made in June, to take advantage of the blazing summer sun. When the peace treaty with the sultan was signed, a certain negligence set in, and now 200 miara [94 tonnes] of plite are lacking; another technique has thus had to be chosen, which G.S. explains in minute detail.

Still on this topic, he gives exact measurements and concludes by reiterating that he will always do his best to please Venice by saving money and enabling the Signoria to spend it elsewhere. Finally he mentions that the last news he received from Venice was brought by Captain Marco Michiel, on 1 August.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

In questo giorno, che ne havemo 21 del mese d'ottobre, si ha speso cinque millia ducatti per ciascun belloardo con la sua cortina, in tutto cinquantacinque millia ducatti da cinque mocenighi l'uno, et in questo giorno è venuta una pioggia, qual è stata la prima che habbia

veduta un Cipro, essendo che l'altra volta ch' io fui in Cipro, ancora che io steti in questo Regno da cinque mesi, et al presente quasi 6, questa è stata la prima pioggia ch' io habbia veduta, et cavalcando mentre che pioveva considerano che questi gentilhuomini patroni delli belloardi per il desiderio del honore stavano a bagnarsi, per dar buon essemplio et non lasciar partire li suoi homeni, tanta è la forza di questo furfante honore che fa muttar natura alli homini, et questi erano come li ho scritto altre volte li più delicati gentilhuomeni del stato di Vostra Signoria, et al presente non dormeno la notte, levano a far lavorare a lume della luna, stanno nel sole terribilmente, et quello che è peggio, ogni giorno alle 20 hore si levano alcuni venti terribilissimi, con tanta polvere per l'aere che non si potemo vedere l'un l'altro, et questo è una delle male cose che sia in questo Regno, per il che credo che il colore olivastro che tira al verde che hano quasi tutti li homini, donne et putti di questo Regno, credo che proceda da questa polvere quale li va in gola, et li questa li intestini, et noi altri Italiani li lasciamo la pelle del tutto. Non dico il fastidio che si sente di detta polvere nelle orecchie, et in li ochij infiniti diventano orbi in questo Regno credo per questa causa, qual polvere va a trovare anco li homini serrati in casa. Questi gentilhomini supportano questa polvere et, come ho detto cavalcando in questo giorno di fora via delle fosse che pioveva molto bene, non ho trovato pur uno di questi signori che habbia abbandonato la sua fabrica, / [84^v] per il che mi è venuta voglia di scriver questa mia a Vostra Signoria in sua laude, ma non ardisco di scriverle quello che è stato fatto con tre millia ducatti che tanto costa ciascuno belloardo,¹ et le due mezo cortine vicine al suo belloardo mille ducatti l'una.

Così provendo, essendo su l'oro² della fossa, per mezo alle ponte delli belloardi, me augurava che Vostra Signoria o il Signor Sforza, o l'Eccellentissimo Colleggio fussero a guardare quanta machina, che è uno de questi belloardi, et se è buon mercato l'haver fatto una si gran montagna di terra per 3 millia ducatti l'una. Io faccio questo giudicio che certissimo Vostra Signoria, Sua Eccellentia del Signor Sforza et anco li Clarissimi Signori sopradetti farebbono giudicio che tanta fossa, et tanta altezza di terra che al presente li vole di scalla 35 piedi, almanco costassero diece millia scudi l'uno delli belloardi. Et se la vedesse come tali belloardi pareno aperti in le spalle, per la obtusità dell'angulo della sua punta, non è possibile a immaginare quello che è, et stando in la fossa per mezo la punta de detti belloardi si vede quelle defese delli fianchi, con quelle 3 cannonere basse. Li orecchioni et le 2 meze cortine, quale tutte due commodamente tiranno le archibusate et cannonate per quella fossa; in fine, è impossibile a immaginarsi quanti muri che habbiamo fatti dentro via delli orecchioni, cioè della cannonera vicina all'orecchione, qual havemo fatto per adesso de pietre delle rovine, quale ne serveno benissimo per sustentar li terreni dentro via, et per farli condutti da portar fora le acque delle piogge, senza rovinarne le plite né li terreni.

Non voglio restar di dirle che assai volte si trovamo a esser li Clarissimi Signori Rettori, il Signor Proveditore, il conte de Rochas, tutti questi principali cavallieri del Regno, il governor Ronchone et io, et concludemo che dubitamo grandemente che tutti li Clarissimi Signori che governano quella città, non è possibile che possano / [85^r] creder che si habbia

1 *belloardo* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 2 *oro* instead of *orlo*.

fatto la quanta parte di quello che è stato fatto, et dubitamo tutti di esser tenuti da Vostre Signorie Clarissime per homini passionati, et che se lasciamo trasportare dallo desiderio, come persone interessate. Facciamo questo giudicio, perché quelli che vengano da Cerines, da Famagosta et d'altri lochi di questo Regno, dicono che credevano fussero fatte gran cose come è la fama, ma che l'effetto è quattro volte più, così pensamo che faranno Vostre Signorie. In 110 giorni havemo fatto queste undeci miracoli, a cinque cento ducatti al giorno. Mi mancano 70 giorni di lavoriero per arrivare alli 6 mesi, se ben ne domandai otto alla prima, et con li 80 millia ducatti del regno, et 10 millia di Sua Serenità haveremo fatto li undeci belloardi, quali vorranno più di 45 piedi di scalla a montarli sopra, et le cortine saranno anco secure da scalle, sì che mi parerà che quelli Signori che mi harranno fatto venir in questo Regno per fortificarlo, non haveranno (al mio creder) havuta vergogna dell'effetto delle mie operationi, ma il ponto è, che se nell'arrivare delle prime lettere che questi Clarissimi scrissero, per la prima nave di questa fortificatione, se a Venetia sarà stato sospettochel Turcho armi quest'anno grossamente, le fatiche nostre saranno accettate per bone, ma se 'l sospetto non sarà, non mancaranno de quelli che diranno al contrario, ma noi che erimo qui mandati per questo, se habbiamo governati sul fatto, come il Signor Dio ha inspirato a questi Clarissimi, a obedientia delli quali convengo stare.

Le voglio dire un'altra cosa che ne va più de 40 millia plite per ciascun' orecchione et le cannonere, cominciai di zugno a domandar et sollecitar queste plite che fussero fatte, mentre che il sole le poteva in un giorno seccare, et / [85^v] per la verità s'harebbono potuto fare, ma è stata usata un poco di negligentia per un mese, quando si hebbe a dire che la pace era sottoscritta, per il che ne mancano da 200 miara de plite per fare parte delle cannonere, et come cosa impossibile a esser fatta, non scaldando più il sole, la necessità ne ha fatto diventare industriosi di modo che le facemo senza plite, et saranno di certezza più bone, et Vostra Signoria intenda il modo, in mezzo delle 3 cannonere del fianco basse vanno 2 merloni, quali merloni facciamo nascer di getto come se buttano de bronzo le artiglierie o le campane, noi conzamo tutto il piano del fianco con quella pendentia come hanno da star le cannonere, et dove che va il voto della cannonera lo fabricamo di pietre quadre, ma però di muro secco senza calzina per poterlo diffare senza fatica in un'hora, uno di questi vaccui di cannonera nella parte di fora via di questo merlone li mettemo doppie plite, et dentro via medesimamente doppie plite, dalla parte dentro dove stanno le artiglierie.

Ecco che questo merlone è stampato dalle due reste de plite et dalli dui fianchi da queste due muraglie secche qual sono, come ho detto, il voto della cannonera. Dentro di questa cassa, qual è longa 8 passa et larga 4 e mezzo, gettamo della creda impastata con la paglia menuta, et empimo questo merlone qual vien alto 10, et in alcuni lochi 12 piedi, tutto di questo pillo et fra 5 mesi o 6 si seccarà talmente che si farà tutta una plita soda, et quando sarà il bisogno deffaremo quella muraglia qual al presente occupa il voto della cannonera, così come si mette quel ferro con la coperta di creda, quale fa nascere l'anima o, per dir meglio, il voto delle artiglierie che resta poi quel metallo buso, così restarano le cannonere vode tra li doi merloni / [86^r] fatti de pillo tirato che haveremo via questo marzo il muro secco di piede, sì che in tutte dette cannonere non li restarà pur una sola pietra, ma questo terreno così ben

composto tutto in una massa, grosso 8 passa recettacolo da migliara de balle nemiche, ecco che la necessità ne fa gettar in stampa le cannonere o, per dir meglio, li merloni, anzi voglio dire che se habbian gettato in stampa li belloardi, et non è gran fatto se la Signoria di Venetia haverà fatto gettare (come si suol dire) in stampa una fortezza come questa de 11 belloardi, se quest'anno passato il suo arsenale in 3 notte mandò fora una armata tanto grossa come la fece, et se vorranno, hanno modo di far anco di meglio. Bisogna darli animo che facciano, son certo che Vostra Signoria non mancherà, né io per la mia parte manco de affaticarme, con la vità et con l'intelletto, con farli sparagnar il danaro più che posso in queste a fine di spenderlo in altri bisogni utili, et per la conservatione perpetua di questo stato, et per non venirle in fastidio farò fine, facendoli sapere che li ultimi avisi che habbiamo delle cose del mondo sono quelli che ne portò il Clarissimo Signor Marco Michel, Capitanio di questo Regno,³ qual partite di Venetia al principio d'agosto, sì che sono da 3 mesi che siamo sordi d'intender nove, et alla buona gratia di Vostra Signoria sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 21 ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signore Francesco Michel fu del signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1567 21 ottobre. le canoniere de plite. N° 12. manca una parte della lettera.



43 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 29 October 1567

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, ff. 88^r–89^v.

Nicolò Dolfino, who will be stopping in Cyprus on his way from Alexandria to Venice, will be able to report the progress of work on the fortress. At the moment it is sowing season and only 3,000 men are working. 58,000 ducats have been spent, and one sixth of this has been on extraordinary expenses, despite G.S.'s vigilant surveillance of the use of public funds.

Provisions are not being acquired for Nicosia with any great haste or enthusiasm, and the 24 artillery pieces that left Salina on 1 September have still not arrived. People are convinced that the threat of conflict is fading, and the workers' ardour is decreasing; however, it can safely be said that the next five months will produce at least two months' work and the fortress will be made secure. G.S. has learnt that in Candia, where construction is not very far along, Girolamo Martinengo is being paid 200 ducats more than he, and Martinengo's friends in Venice will probably see to it that he gets a pay-rise twice as large as that given to G.S., even though the latter has done eleven times as much work.

³ Cf. supra, doc. 36.

G.S. then sings the praises of Giovanni Sozomeno, who is an excellent mathematician, and such a good assistant to G.S. on the ground that at times he replaces him. He is also in charge of demolishing the churches and old walls (which would have been perfect if better aligned), as well as taking measurements, thus replacing the proto, for whom a successor has never been found. The proveditor has written to the doge commending Sozomeno, which G.S. seconds, assuring Michiel that Sozomeno is a willing servant; he could produce scale models for the rettori, and, having shown his talent for making wheels used in transporting artillery, he could be the country's engineer. He took, at his own expense, the initiative of diverting the soft water that was flooding the salt flats, and was rewarded with a monthly allowance of 10 ducats. He is currently seeking to acquire some uncultivated land belonging to Venice, and G.S. is supporting his request.

G.S. asks Francesco Michiel that he too show his support for Sozomeno, who is a servant of Venice motivated, like a simple joiner, solely by a desire to serve honourably. G.S. concludes by assuring Michiel that rain has only set construction back by half a day.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Dal presente portatore che sarà il Magnifico Signor Nicolò Dolfino qual viene d'Alessandria, Vostra Signoria se potrà informare in che termine che sono li undeci belloardi di questa fortezza et le sue cortine, ancora che al presente per il seminar della terra non lavorano più de tre millia homini, et per tutto questo mese che siamo al presente non havemo arrivato alli cinquanta otto millia ducatti in tutto, et per tutto il sesto delli quali danari vanno in spese straordinarie, ma mi defendo più che posso, acciò che io habbia a fare il servizio delli miei patroni con manco spesa che sia possibile, et in questa materia son il più fastidioso homo che sia al mondo et voglio esser così, et voglio far questo broglio alla roversa ancora che ne siano delli altri, quali sono molto cortesi nel danaro de San Marco per far piacere alli suoi amici, quali li fanno havere delli utili particolari. Questo mondo è fatto a questo modo et mi giova a lamentarme con¹ Vostra Signoria in simil cose, et me confido tanto in la giustitia de Dio et del mio ben operare con buon animo, et con la ragione ananti li occhij, che finalmente haverò honore delle mie fatiche, per quelle due parte qual toccanno a me.

Facciano pur li altri le sue parte² questi Signori, in materia di far venir vettoarie qui in Nicossia, se ne vanno molto fredamente et se stano a guardar l'un l'altro, et dal principio di settembre fino per tutto questo mese d'ottobre non hanno finito de condur le monicioni de quelli 24 pezzi d'artegliaria da Saline fino qui a Nicossia, la causa è perché il manco pensiero che s'hanno tutti e che potesse venir una guerra questo aprile. Ogni minima lettera o aviso de schiavo che venga li mette in speranza certissima che non habbia da esser guerra immediate, tutte le provisioni del fabricare se abbandonano, et all'incontro ogni voce cattiva che venga siamo su le furie et sul voler far facende, ma in 24 hore le cose diventano frede, sì che mi vien qualche volta fastidio grandissimo di questo / [88^v] modo di proceder, ma Dio me aiuta che ho tempo in mano, cioè novembre, decembre, zenaro, febraro et marzo, che sono cinque

1 *pensi* crossed out and *con* added above. 2 *le sue parte* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

mesi, gran fatto che non se ne lavoriano dui quali ne metteranno in securtà benissimo. Questo è il mio conforto, et di certezza al presente habbiamo fatto li 2 terzi del tutto et della spesa. Altro non mi resta dirle, se non che intendo per via d'Alessandria che in Candia se fanno de molte poche facende, ancora che il Signor Hieronimo tocca 200 ducatti più soldo di me senza sua colpa all'anno,³ et che quando veniremo a Venetia li suoi amici li faranno havere doppio aumento di quello che haverò io, che havrò fatto undeci volte quanto il Signor Hieronimo, et 60 più del Signor Paolo Orsino. Mi vien fastidio a immaginarne queste cose che saranno vere come io le dico.

Mi resta a fare un'officio con Vostra Signoria in raccomandatione d'un gentilhommo di questa città, nominato messer Zuane Susomino,⁴ de dui millia ducatti d'entrata, et tre millia d'entrata ne aspetta da suo socero qual non li pò mancare; questo gentilhommo ha bonissimo ingegno et è mattematico eccellente, et fa una fatica grandissima, tutto il giorno è sempre con me, et in assai lochi che non posso esser mando hora lui, et alle volte il Magnifico governor Ronchone. Questo Susomino ha buon ingegno naturale et ogni cosa che io li mostro la capisse benissimo et la sa essequire, et come dico fa una fatica grandissima, tra le altre cose nel fare gettar giù case chiese, le muraglie vecchie della terra che sono molto⁵ difficile da desfare ma muraglie perfettissime, ma tanto mal lineate che si può dire peggio di quelle di Udene, ma quelle de Udene sono state fatte con mal giudicio et de trista materia, et de manco bontade, queste come dico de eccellentissima materia ma mal lineate, fatte a ventura molto straniamente.⁶ Le facemo desfare dette muraglie a tanto il passo, et questo messer Zuane Susomino ha cura d'andarli a mesurare officia che toccherebbe / [89^r] da esser fatto da un rasonatto et da un proto, et qui non ve ne sono. Questo gentilhommo essendo nobile et ricco, la povertà non lo indurà a far cosa cattiva. Il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore per sue lettere l'ha raccomandato a Sua Serenità et io lo raccomando a Vostra Signoria, pregandola che in nome mio la lo voglia raccomandare a quelli Clarissimi Signori di Collegio in farli qualche bene, per essemplio d'altri, et come dico lo faccio fare fatiche da non credere il tutto fa voluntieri. Il Signor Proveditore l'adoperà, li Clarissimi Regimenti in far far modelli, è lo ingegniero di questo paese; nel condur quest'arteglieria le rode delli pezzi

3 *all'anno* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 4 Giovanni Sozomeno (not to be confused with two or three other men of the same name), son of Guido, came from a Greek family. He served in the feudal cavalry as a knight, and his estimated income in 1554 was 1,000 ducats; in 1556 he obtained the fiefdom of Kritou Marottou, and he dabbled in the system of leasing public assets when he leased Famagusta's great *gabella* in January 1566. He became a leading member of the Nicosia *università* after being a procurator in February 1564, then again in March 1565 and June 1566. He displayed his skills as a mathematician and an engineer during the work done at the San Lazzaro salt flats in the 1560s, then during the fortification of Nicosia, which G.S. confirms. He took an active role in the war of summer 1570; he was taken prisoner on 9 September, but managed to buy his freedom. He must have gone quickly back to Italy, as he published his *Narratione de la guerra di Cipro* in February 1571. For further biographical details: Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 120–121 n. 244; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', pp. 33–35; id., 'Les "custodi" de la Marciana Giovanni Sozomenos et Giovanni Matteo Bustron', *Miscellanea Marciana* V (1990), pp. 18–20; P. M. Kitromilidis, *Κυπριακή λογιόσση 1571–1878*, Nicosia 2002, p. 256. 5 *più* crossed out and *molto* added above. 6 These remarks on the Nicosian walls built by the Lusignans are reminiscent of Ascanio's summer 1562 observations; cf. supra, doc. 16.

da 100 andorono in fasso per gratia de quelli maestri del arsenale che non le sanno fare, et questo messer Zuan Susomino andò, et immediate repezzò dette rode, et condusse l'artiglieria da galant'homo, et in tempo di guerra et di pace è buono. Fù quello che fece già alquanti anni a sue spese quel edificio con il quale furono cavate le acque dolce fora delle saline, quando si guastorono tanti sali, et per remuneratione della sua spesa fatta del suo danaro et della sua fatica, li fu notata una parte a Venetia di darli 10 ducatti al mese di provisione, vedendo lui così piccola cosa monto in nave, et se ne venne qui in Cipro senza farli altro.⁷ Al presente intendo che vol dimandare alcune terre greze che mai furono lavorate, et sono della Signoria. Credo che sarà ben fatto a dargliele, pagando qualche livello alla reale, et tanto sarà avanzato et con la sua industria, spesa et fatica, con quelle terre darà da vivere a qualche numero di persone.

Prego Vostra Signoria ad haverlo per raccomandato et farli qualche favore appresso a quelli Clarissimi di Collegio con chi Vostra Signoria Clarissima ha baldezza, et dirli anco che io giudico che sia ben fatto per le cose di Sua Serenità di accarezzare quest'homo ingenioso, nobile, riccho, et che li facemo / [89^v] fare ogni sorte di fatica, come se fusse un semplice muraro o marangone, et il tutto fa con tanta prontezza et desiderio di ben servire per honore, che io li son infinitamente obbligato et è un utilissimo homo, et per non venir in fastidio a Vostra Signoria farò fine, raccomando me medemo alla sua bona gratia, et voglio che la sappia ancora che la pioggia non ne ha fatto restar de lavorar se non meza giornata, doppo che si fabrica.

Di Nicossia alli 29 ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1567 27 ottobre. N° 13.



⁷ Venice's officers took great care of the San Lazzaro salt flats following the floods of winter 1555 / 1556, which damaged salt production for the next two years. The years that followed saw unceasing efforts to divert the torrents, which took up all of the officers' time and attention (Antonio Zane worked on this in 1557, and Andrea Duodo in 1559): ASV, *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, ff. 10^r–11^v; id, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, b. 1 (dispatch from Giovanni Battista Donà dated 13 September 1557), b. 5 (dispatches from Andrea Duodo dated 3 August and 3 November 1559); Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 90–91.

44 *Letter from G.S. to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, Nicosia, 15 November 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 91^r–93^r, and a copy, written in another hand, on ff. 95^r–96^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 82^r–83^r.

Over the course of October all of the orillons have been completed, except for one at the Caraffa bastion, which has been left out in order to see whether or not the water from the river can be diverted, as the rettori stipulated in their plan (a plan which has cost 800 ducats). It rained heavily at the start of November, which should result in good harvests next year. The river has followed its specified course without any trouble, meaning that work can begin on the orillon at the Caraffa bastion, situated exactly at the old mouth of the course once followed by the Pediaios. In eight days the terreplein at this bastion has already been raised to a height of 7 passa [12 m], an incredible feat which is owed to the fact that the workers are paid using the ferlini system.

By the end of October 60,000 ducats had been spent; this is just half of what had initially been forecast, yet work is two thirds complete, and was actually mostly done in four months. G.S. predicts another two months of construction (at a cost of 15,000 ducats per month) before Nicosia will be as secure as the other cities of the Venetian State. The façades of the Rochas bastion are 40 piedi [13.9 m] high, and those at the other bastion are between 35 and 40 piedi [12 and 13.9 m] high; they will all be raised by 9 to 10 piedi [3 to 3.5 m], and will end up being around 10 passa [17.3 m] high. The curtains are 25 passa [43.4 m] thick, similar to those of the terrepleins in Treviso, Padua, Crema and Brescia; as for the bastions, their total width is 60 passa [104 m].

The walls are as perfect as if they had been made of stone, and, thanks to the installation of diversion channels, have not been damaged by the heavy rains. The doge will be pleased to know that each bastion has cost 4,000 ducats, and each curtain 3,000 ducats, which makes 77,000 ducats in total; to this there must be added 13,000 ducats of extraordinary expenses, which G.S. breaks down and explains in detail.

A maximum of 5,000 ducats will be spent in November, and, as men are lacking, little will be done between now and Christmas. The rettori have learnt from a Greek who has come to Cyprus from Caramania that there are no Ottoman plans for war next year, news which has prompted men to stop working; in the end, therefore, the enceinte will not be finished in six months as G.S. had hoped. Construction will be finished after Christmas, and G.S. is sad that he will not boast the honour of having a fortress of this kind built in a far-off country in just six months. The proveditor is conducting inspections across the island, and in a month will go to the Paphos region.

By the time this letter reaches Venice, G.S. will have spent thirteen years of his life serving Venice, in Dalmatia, Corfu, Crete and Cyprus. If next year the Ottoman fleet launches an attack, G.S. will be happy to go on serving Venice, even if he is not paid and even if the island is under no military command; but if not, he would happily resign and go back to Venice in February or March [1568]; in this case he would leave instructions as to how the work should be finished, as he did in Candia where he gave Captain Andrea Nigrisoli the duty of continuing construction for another year.

Serenissimo Principe,

Partendosi questa nave Barbara qual sarà l'ultima di questa muda, non ho voluto lasciarla partire senza questa mia, nella quale le dico che per tutto il mese d'ottobre sono fatti et finiti vinti uno orecchioni, et uno solo manca del belloardo Caraffa, qual si fa al presente et questo è stato lasciato di fare per vedere l'effetto che facevano le acque del torrente, che¹ passava per Nicossia, qual è stato da questi Clarissimi Signori divertito con spesa di otto cento ducatti, che va benissimo fori della città, et con queste piogge qual sono state questi primi giorni di novembre in tanta quantità che per conto de mancamento d'acque non si dubita che l'anno futuro habbia a esser se non fertilissimo di biade. Il torrente è venuto et siamo securi di lui, et si attende con diligentia a fare quest'ultimo orecchione qual è venuto a cadere iusto nel alveo vecchio del torrente, ma² ancora che il terra pieno et parte di quel belloardo vadi diece passa alto et longo più di 70, et larghissimo in³ tempo di otto giorni,⁴ li è stata posta terra et giara alta sette passa, cosa incredibile, et noi medemi che la facemo condurre non la potemo creder, et pur è fatto il tutto procede dal lavorare a ferlini nel quale li va l'interesse proprio delli lavorati.

Sappia Vostra Serenità che per tutto ottobre non è stato speso sesanta milla ducatti, il qual danaro non è la mittà di quello che io domandai a questi Clarissimi Signori, ma è ben fatto di certezza li dui terzi dell'opera, et se bene sono passati cinque mesi di tempo,⁵ non si ha però havute opere et spesa del danaro se non per quattro mesi. Dico che se si lavorerà dui mesi ancora con 15⁶ millia ducatti di spesa al mese,⁷ si sarà in eccellentissima securtà quando ciascun'altra fortezza che Vostra Serenità habbia in li / [91^v] suoi Stati da mare et da Terra Ferma, et non bisogna che tal cosa li para strannia et incredibile, ma per la verità è così. Le fronte del belloardo Rochas voleno al presente quaranta piedi di scalla, tutte le altre di ciascun belloardo sono d'altezza che a loro ancora vole scalla tra li 35 piedi et li 40. Tutti saranno augmentati diece piedi più, sì che sarà di montata nove et diece passa. Se io non me ho ingannato di pronosticare da principio che in 4 mesi si sarebbe venuti di altezza a questi sette e otto passa che siamo al presente, e da crederme anco che io non prenderò errore di alzarne dui passa in dui mesi per l'avenire, con li trenta millia ducatti di spesa. Non creda Vostra Serenità che queste altezze siano sottile, debile o mal fatte. Quanto alla grossezza sua, tutte le cortine sono de 25 passa grosse di modo che li terragli di Treviso, Crema, Bressa, et anco quelli de Padoa, non sono meglio di questi tutti li belloardi fatti prima le sue parte di dentro, large piedi 60 passa⁸ fino alle fronte,⁹ et ultimamente li¹⁰ è stata fatta la parte sopra l'oro della fossa, sì che non sono in appentia fatti ma sodi quanto hanno d'andare.

Circa l'esser ben operato, se fussero stati fatti de muro con pietre cotte non potrebbeno esser fatti né più iusti né più ben tirati, et le piogge che sono state grandissime non li hanno

1 *qual* crossed out and *che* added above. 2 *in otto giorni* crossed out after *ma*. 3 *questo* crossed out after *in*. 4 *di otto giorni* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 5 *di tempo* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 6 *trenta* crossed out and *15* added above. 7 *in tutti doi* crossed out and *al mese* added above. 8 *quanto li terragli* crossed out and *large più di 60 passa* added above. 9 *fino alla fronte* added above, *et ultimamente, et più assai* crossed out after. 10 *facciamo* crossed out after *li*.

fatto un nocumento al mondo, perché con l'antivedere si ha provisto di far correre tutte le acque delle piogge in dentro, verso le piazze delli belloardi, dove non ponno far mal alcuno. Le cannonere medesimamente fatte, con tutte le cerimonie maggior che si ponno fare, et come ho detto di sopra, mi pare che Vostra Serenità non si habbia a discontentare che questi Clarissimi Signori Suoi Rettori li habbiano fatti undeci belloardi grandissimi et inespugnabili con quattro millia / [92^r] ducatti l'uno, che più non li costeranno per quest'anno di terra et undeci cortine grossissime et altissime, queste li costeranno tre millia ducatti l'una, queste summe ascendevano a settantasette millia ducatti. Li altri tredici millia che mancano fino alla summa de nonanta saranno andati et anderanno¹¹ in spese straordinarie, credo che quattro millia ducatti et più anderanno a buttar giù le muraglie vecchie, ferramenti, legnami per far ponti, torrette da salvar le polvere, casette de soldati, far spianate di tante case et chiese, divertire il torrente detto et condur l'arteglieria della marina, fin qui con le sue monicioni, il tutto si fa con il danaro et si fanno molto ben pagar, et il tutto va a conto della fabrica, fino la monicione delli sali, che si conducano qui. Ho voluto dire a Vostra Serenità nelli termini che si ritrova questa sua nova fortezza.

Questo mese di novembre, non credo che si spenderà cinque millia ducatti et forse manco, perché non vi è gente, et fino a Natale non si farà molte facende, essendo che questi Clarissimi per un Greco che è venuto di Caramania, qual li ha detto che non sarà garbuglio l'anno che viene, perciò se la tengano quasi per sicura, et si pensa di altro, et me rincresce chel sospetto non habbia continuato, acciò che tal fabrica si havesse finita di poner in securtà in li sei mesi primi che se si havesse voluto, per tutto il presente mese di novembre si harrebbe vedutto la cosa a fine, et questo terzo della fabrica¹² che manca, sarebbe stato finito l'ultimo giorno di novembre, dove che adesso bisogna star ad aspettar di farlo (per quanto si dice) doppo Natale, et manco spesa era haverlo fatto prima, et più sicura cosa et più honorevole da sentire che Vostra Serenità in sei mesi in paesi lontani et descomodi¹³ habbia fatto una tal fortezza, della sorte che è questa, / [92^v] la Serenità Vostra sarà contenta di perdonarme, se io le do fastidio¹⁴ con questa mia lettera ma, come ho detto di sopra, havendo a star quattro mesi senza scriverle, mi pareva maggior errore a non li dar conto di quello è fatto fin' al presente, ancora che da altri.¹⁵ Vostra Serenità sarà avisata più particolarmente.

Il Clarissimo Signor Proveditor è stato alla volta per il Regno da 15 giorni, et al presente è ritornato, et starà fora circa un mese dalla parte verso Baffo.

Mi resta de ricordar alla Serenità Vostra che al arrivar di questa mia in Venetia sarà l'anno finito, nel quale la Serenità Vostra mi promise, mandandome a Corfù, di non me voler tener più in Levante di questo solo anno, sapendo Vostra Serenità che io l'havea servita più de 12 anni tra Schiavonia, Corfù, Candia et Cipro, et andavo per li 13 anni, al presente ho cominciato a entrar nelli 14 de servitù in Levante. Io dico alla Serenità Vostra che se quest'anno

11 *et anderanno* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 12 *della fabrica* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 13 *et descomodi* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 14 *in convenir star ad ascoltar* crossed out after *fastidio*.

15 G.S. seems here to be speaking more rhetorically than truthfully, as in the four months prior to this letter he had written to the doge at least twice; cf. supra, docs 31 and 35.

uscirà armata turchescha, che la voglio servire in ogni modo se dovesse starvi per privato fante a piedi, et anco senza soldo, ma se armata non uscirà grossa, mi parerebbe honesta cosa che questo marzo, o febraro, la Serenità Vostra mi mandasse la mia licentia, et se pure doppo che io havrò havuto la licentia, questo marzo la volesse o vero li paresse che io aiutasse questi Clarissimi a fare di muraglia uno de questi belloardi, et una de queste cortine per poter lasciare una stampa del modo del fabricarli di muro come anco della poca spesa che vi anderà a fare un belloardo et una cortina, così come al mio partir de Candia, già venti mesi sono,¹⁶ ch' io lasciai sopra quelle fabriche in mio loco de commission di Vostra Serenità il capitan Andrea Nigrisoli quale, come sa il Clarissimo Signor Daniel Veniero,¹⁷ continuo per un anno a far passar quella fabrica, con tanto diligentia / [93^r] et sparagno del danaro di Vostra Serenità, come se io li fusse stato in persona, così credo che intravenirebbe qui delli 10 belloardi et 10 cortine, se si ne facesse de prima la esperientia in uno qual sarebbe fatto questo estate futuro, di modo che non mo potrei partire di questo Regno se non al settembre futuro, mal per starmene qui senza far cosa alcuna in servizio di Vostra Serenità non mi pare bona stantia per me, come ho detto di sopra se armata turchescha uscirà non domando altramente licentia, et se non sarà armata la domando per questo marzo o vero per settembre, se la Vostra Serenità vole che si faccia un belloardo di muro prima. Son certo che la non mi negerà questa licentia essendo iusta, et da lei promesso di tenerme poco tempo fora, et alla sua bona gratia sempre me raccomandando.

Di Nicossia 15 novembre 1567.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

copia. Al Serenissimo. 1567 15 novembre. licenza condotta. N° 14.



45 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 15 November 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 97^r–98^v.

The damage done by the cruel parting of Luocotenente Querini is more tangible each day; he would never have let work get delayed by a month and a half, and the enceinte would have been completed by now. He would also have seen to it that money was coming into the camera's coffers, not going out of it as has been the case; a lot of credit has been granted, against Venice's best interests. Paradoxically, the lords prefer to contribute to extraordinary expenses than pay their regular taxes. G.S. hopes that a new luocotenente will be sent to Cyprus soon, and reiterates his desire to return to Italy.

¹⁶ If Orazio Governà's diary is to be believed, G.S. left Candia on 10 March 1566; cf. *infra*, doc. 115. ¹⁷ Daniel Venier, *di Marc'Antonio*, cavalier, was appointed captain of Crete on 13 May 1565, and held the post from October 1565 to October 1567: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 178^v–179^r.

The city is no better stocked in grain than any other year; the delivery of salt began, but stopped abruptly. As for the artillery, though powder was brought from Salina without delay, some of the cannonballs have still not been sent, which Querini would never have tolerated. War is no longer in people's minds; G.S. feels that there is now nothing to do and that he can return to Italy. He loathes this idleness and loathes the company of weak-willed people who are unaware of the danger present and lack respect for Venice's interests.

G.S. has served Venice for 42 years now, 14 of which have been in the Stato da Mar, and he hopes to die in Italy. In Nicosia, Count Germanico's soldiers still have no quarters after seven months; working all day long and sleeping outside has seen a third of them fall ill. People only pay attention to G.S. when they need to, otherwise nobody respects public authority, or even God.

Twenty men are working at each bastion, excepting the Caraffa bastion, where there are more workers in order to bring it up to speed with the others. The island's peasants are the most obedient in the world, and Nicosia's citizens are easy to govern compared to those of Candia, Chania, Famagusta, Corfu and Zara. The people of Nicosia endure the demolition of their houses and gardens with a level of patience that, when observing with his own eyes men cut down people's fruit trees and destroy their houses and churches, G.S. finds astounding. Whatever the raison d'État, G.S. considers his job cruel and inhumane, and remarks how an unforeseen threat forces people to consider the question of provisions well in advance, and necessitates measures that are at times excessive. In Nicosia, demolishing houses to clean the areas approaching the enceinte will finish in February, but the bigger buildings will be more difficult to remove.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Ogni giorno siamo più chiari che la morte del luogotenente Querini è stata di grandissimo danno al bisogno di questo Regno; senza dubbio, se fosse vivo non harebbe perso un mese et mezo di tempo, come è stato fatto fino al presente giorno che siamo alla mittà de novembre. Per tutto il qual mese sarebbe finita la fabrica et li sarebbe in la camera reale tanti scudi, che senza dar impazzo a Venetia se harebbe fatta de muro tutta questa fortificatione. Li crediti di questa camera sono infiniti per causa della morte di tanti regimenti, essendo che li vici fanno per broglij et per preghere, et sotto mano le cose vano in foggia di mercantia, et si scorre in nembo in nembo a spese del povero San Marco, il quale è peggio trattato che non fu una volta Pasquino a Roma.¹ Se Vostra Signoria sapesse come si procede in questi paesi, la si meravigliarebbe che se ben hanno il modo di pagare, come certamente hanno quest'anno, voleno più presto contribuire con qualche straordinario che pagare, menando la cosa in longo et così va il mondo. Parlo de infiniti crediti da persone che hano il modo et non ponno tacere che non sue lo dicano, dicendomi questo appresso che quando conoscono rettori che portano da sé danari o altro in camera, ma vedendo il mondo governato da questi fano

¹ An allusion to the satirical poems the Romans stuck to the base of Pasquini's statue; this was a literary genre which was given a new lease of life in mid-sixteenth-century Italy; cf. V. Marucci / A. Marzio / A. Romano (eds), *Pasquinate romane del Cinquecento*, Rome 1983, 2 vols.

quanto è detto di sopra. Prego il Signor Dio che sia mandato, per beneficio di questo Regno uno luogotenente qual vaglia et voglia.²

Già che sarà la pace d'Ottaviano, io ancora domando licentia a Sua Serenità, condizionatamente se armata turchescha non uscirà grossa.³

Non è stato condotto niente più biade in questa città / [97^v] di quello si farebbe un'anno ordinario, che non fosse de alcuno sospetto; fu cominciato a condur il sale, ricordarto da me, con una gran furia immediate cesso et non è stato condotto delle quindici parte una. Le monicioni delle artiglierie, non dico la polvere qual fu condotto immediate, ma le balle ancora sono una parte a Saline, et più che io lo ricordo faccio peggio, ma sel Querini fosse vivo, sarebbe come ho detto di sopra.⁴ Non si pensano di guerra in conto alcuno, et io me ho pensato di non star più in questi paesi per far niente, però supplico Vostra Signoria Clarissima a darmi favore et far conscientia a quelli che mi hanno fatto venire qui in Cipro, essendo che mi fu permesso di non me tener più d'un anno fori d'Italia, et non bisognando cioè non uscendo armata, et ch' io habbia da star qui in ocio, certamente son homo da morire da disperatione, però supplico Vostra Signoria Clarissima ad aiutarme et liberarme da questa gente di questa sorte, che senza un fondamento al mondo si metteranno in fuga per niente, et il giorno dietro per manco cosa non si pensano più né hanno sospetto alcuno, et tengono tanto conto della robba di San Marco come se fusse de Giudei, et se io non facesse delli fatti d'arme anche con loro per interesse di San Marco, le cose andarebbono assai male.

Faccio quanto io posso et mai me pentirò per haver mancato, et non vedo l'hora di esser appresso Vostra Signoria, et voglio attender per l'avenire a vivere già chel mondo è tale. Ho fatto la mia parte di servire 42 anni, et 14 correno adesso, che io servo in li Stati da mare; vorrei se io potessi venir a morire / [98^r] in Italia. Prego Vostra Signoria ad aiutarmi come son certo che la farà, et in Italia potrei esser bono per fare ancora qualche servizio, se ben son vecchio et entrato in li 58 anni, et ananti che questa lettera arrivi a Venetia, et che torni la risposta qui, et che io venga de là sarò tanto vicino alli 60 anni che sarà mal per me. Prego Vostra Signoria a liberarmi che io non prattichi più con persone tale. Ancora non mi hanno dato alloggiamento per li fanti del Conte Germanico, et è debito sette mesi che son qui. Per dormire all'aere et star tutto il giorno sopra le fabriche, sempre ne è un terzo de amorbati. Se viene qualche nove cattiva, mi fanno certe carezze finte come quelle delle puttane quando voleno cavare li danari alli homini. Il giorno sequente che non hanno sospetto, non tengano neanche conto del Pregadi né del Consiglio di Diece, né de Domenedio. Altro non le so dir da novo, et me raccomando a Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Si lavora alli belloardi con 20 homini per belloardo, eccetto al Caraffa, che vi è bon numero di gente per aggiungliarlo alli altri.

2 Nicolò Dandolo went to Cyprus at the beginning of summer 1568; cf. supra, doc. 30 n. 10. 3 Peace between Venice and the Ottoman Empire was officially declared on 26 July 1567; cf. supra, doc. 38 n. 1. 4 In February 1580 Filippo Pigafetta still recalled the catastrophic transporting of the cannons to Nicosia: BAM, *cod. R 125 sup.*, fasc. "Cose raccolte in Osoppo da raggionamenti col Signor Giulio Savorgnano", f. 11^r.

Li gentilhuomini di questo Regno si disperano di questa negligentia. Li contadini sono li più obediendi homini del mondo; il popolo di questa città: mercanti et cittadini, chi non li fa iniustitia, et si governa con ragione, si lasciano governare con la maggior facilità del mondo, et mai da loro ho sentito pur una cattiva parola. Candia, la Canea, Famagosta, Corfù et Zara tutti sono più fastidiosi da governare de questi, quali sopportanno le rovine delle loro case, giardini, con tanta / [98^v] patientia, che maggior non si pò desiderare, dalla qual patientia mi viene tanto dolore et compassione che è una cosa incredibile in vederli a tagliare li suoi fruttari, spianar le case et le chiese, il che non si pò far de manco per raggion di guerra, et questo mio mestiero è molto furfante et crudele, empio et inhumano, et non è possibile a menar la cosa più a longo, perché le guerre da mare conducano le esserciti molto da lontani paesi all'improvviso. Il che non aviene tanto alle guerre da terra, et pare che una città pol star senza spianata atorno, io dico de no perché all'improvviso si hanno da fare tanti altri servicij di condur vettovaglie dentro delle fortezze, che non avanzarebbe tempo di tagliare tenti arbori quanti ne bisognano tagliar qui, et spianar tante case come bisogna far la spianata, qual è cominciata et fatta in quelle fabriche grande, et difficili da desfare, si scorrerà de desfar le facile fino a febraro, et me raccomando a Vostra Signoria Clarissima, per non venirle più in fastidio.

De Nicossia alli 15 novembre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor Francesco Michele. 1567 15 novembre. N° 15.



46 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 23 November 1567

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 99^r–100^r.

Letters have arrived from Constantinople announcing the election of Girolamo Zane as ambassador to the sultan, as well as the preparation of the fleet and the Turks' friendly attitude towards Venice; the bailo nevertheless applauds the fortification of Nicosia, as the Turks know from experience that a strong fortress cannot be conquered without losing a great many men, as happened to them in Szeged and Malta.

Only two bastions are currently being worked on, Caraffa and Podocataro, where there had been a reduced workforce. G.S. is not pleased with the Venetian officers' decision to patronize four bastions, as they do not know how to prevent intrigues and theft such as those committed by Captain Schillino, who is now habitually gambling away up to 100 ducats; G.S. still has not managed to have him punished by the proveditor, and the captain has ended up being transferred to Famagusta.

News has arrived from Constantinople that no provisions are being allowed out of Otto-

man lands, and that three vessels were to leave Venice to transport 2,000 soldiers, artillery and ammunition to Cyprus. This is the last news that the island has received (via Aleppo), as no letters have come from Italy since the start of August. G.S. does not know when he will ever leave Cyprus; being here is a waste of his time and causes him to waste his money, as he has to keep up with men who spend money like water. Since Venice no longer needs him, he hopes to be granted leave soon, like Girolamo Martinengo who, furthermore, is paid four times as much as G.S.

Proveditor Barbaro has been out of the city for fifteen days seeing the stradioti displays, and he will be gone for twenty days more. G.S. is anxious to know whether or not Venice will be satisfied with the fortress, and if his efforts will earn the praise of his superiors. He has followed Sforza Pallavicino's advice, as his previous letters have shown.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Non essendo ancora partita la nave Barbara et essendo venute lettere di Constantinopoli, per le quali se ha inteso qui della creatione del Clarissimo Signor Hieronimo Zanne¹ ambasciatore al Signor Turco, et che già il Clarissimo Bajilo havea acquietata quella difficultà delli hebrei,² et che le galee turchesche in arsenale erano state messe all'ordine, et che Turchi dicevano di voler esser grandi amici con Vostre Signorie Illustrissime, ma che il detto Signor Bajilo laudava molto la diligentia che era stata fatta in fortificare Nicossia, et che di marzo la sarebbe a perfettione, et che questa è la vera et sicura strada di mantenere la pace con Turchi, con l'haver oltre a Famagosta anco Nicossia inespugnabile et capacissima, et che ne vorrebbe vedere anco delle altre fortezze in questo Regno, per la difficultà che è stata a combattere Ziget et Malta,³ qual costanno a Turchi tanto quanto si sa per la morte di così gran numero de loro che sono mancati, et per ciò Sua Signoria Clarissima come intendente de cose de stati lauda le nostre operationi fatte, et ne da animo di farne delle altre maggiori, et io son disperato a sentire queste lettere et vedermi nove belloardi, alli quali si perde tempo et non li lavora al presente pur un' homo.

1 Girolamo Zane, *di Bernardo*, from the San Polo branch of the family, was born in May 1515. He was a Council *savio* and a *cavalier*, then the Constantinople *bailo* from 1542 to 1544; he was elected procurator of San Marco *de citra* on 7 May 1568. Finally, he was appointed captain-general *da mar* in July 1566 and on 20 June 1568; it was in this capacity that he was held responsible for the failed rescue of Cyprus in the war of summer 1570. He was tried, and fell into disgrace before dying in October 1571: Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. 7, p. 324; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 131–132; U. Tucci, 'Il processo a Girolamo Zane, mancato difensore di Cipro', in G. Benzoni (ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence 1974, pp. 409–433. Zane was elected ambassador to the Ottoman Empire on 13 September 1567: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 72^r, 150^v; id., Consiglio dei Dieci, *Secreta*, reg. 8, ff. 96^r–97^r. 2 Probably an allusion to the affair of Jewish merchants trading alum belonging to the sultan between Italy and Constantinople, which obliged the *bailo*, Soranzo, to intervene: B. Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, Leiden / New York / Köln 1995, pp. 120–128. 3 Both in Malta in 1565 and in Szigetvár (Hungary) in 1566, Ottoman forces were overcome by the resistance of troops fighting from within fortresses. However, whilst the Hospitallers and their Christian allies managed to repel the Ottoman troops, the resistance efforts in Szigetvár were ultimately unsuccessful, and the town fell on 8 September 1566. The landmark event of this Hungary expedition was the death of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent during the night of 5 to 6 September 1566, whilst leading the aforementioned siege of Szigetvár: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 4, pp. 846, 890.

A dui soli faccio lavorare, Caraffa et Podacathero, alli quali era sta dato manco huomini delli altri perché Dio vole così, et sappia Vostra Signoria che io hebbi per una mala nova quando che io vidi che li consiglieri et li altri de magistrato volsero tuore per loro 4 belloardi. Loro non vi sanno attender, et per star di sopra alli altri intrigano le opere delli altri belloardi per invidia, et peggio che ho havuto più daffare / [99^v] a defenderme dalle robbarie de un capitan Schillino,⁴ qual più volte ho trovato in fallo, ma il Signor Proveditore è tanto buono che se ben glie lo faccio vedere chiaro, non lo vole creder di modo che mi fa perdere la patientia, tanto che io lo voglio castigar di mia mano. Dica poi la Signoria ciò che la voglia, et per che sapevano che io non glie la volevo scappolare, l'hanno mandato a star a Famagosta in sua mal'hora et, per la verità, è un gran giotto et un gran tristo. Vol giocare alle carte li 80 et 100 scudi alla volta, et poi robbar San Marco in giuditio dell'honor mio, et mai non lo comportarò fino ch' io haverò man.

Da Constantinopoli è anco scritto che non si lasciano andar vettoarie fori del Regno, et che a sette di settembre la nave Contarina era sopra porto con arteglierie et monicione per venir qui, et due altre nave con doi millia fanti sel sospetto andava ananti. Queste sono le più fresche nove che habbiamo del mondo de là, venute de Aleppo qui, et loro le hanno havute da Constantinopoli. Le ultime nove che habbiamo d'Italia ananti queste furon nel principio d'agosto, che hormai sono passati quattro mesi. Et non essendo venute nave fino al presente, potressimo star ancora tre⁵ altri mesi fino per tutto febraro senza nova d'Italia. Consideri Vostra Signoria che spassi sono questi, quali sono simili all'esser morti. Se quelli Signori Clarissimi saranno così infrigiditi, come questi Clarissimi Rettori qui, non vedo l'hora di partirme da questo paese, perché non mi piace star senza sospetto o speranza di far qualche bene. Perdo il tempo, devento vecchio et povero, perché mi conviene far grandissima spesa qui, essendo che questi gentilhomini ne spendeno 3 volte più di quello che hanno, et pur sono ricchi et la mia natura è facile / [100^f] a fare le spese come loro; sì che non essendo sospetto, né bisogno di me più in quest'isola, la supplico ad esser contenta a favorirme et farmi dar licentia. Crederò ch'el Signor Hieronimo Martinengo la deve haver havuta fino al presente, et in Venetia sarà remunerato 4 volte più di me rispetto alle operationi nostre, et Vostra Signoria tenga a mente questo che sarà così.

Il Signor Clarissimo Proveditore già 15 giorni è fori della città a fare le mostre alli stradiotti, et non tornerà qui fino a 20 giorni. Altra nova non li so dire, se non che io sto con grandissimo fastidio, et pensiero già 6 mesi passati di sapere se questa fortificatione in questa forma sarà di satisfatione di Sua Serenità, et Vostra Signoria Clarissima consideri se io ho causa di prendermi fastidio di affitticarmi con tanta discommodità, et non sapere sel servitio et fatica che si fa sia grato al suo patrone, et dal principio di zugno in qua siamo in questo fastidio, et si potrebbe star anco 3 mesi ad haverne nova. Mi confido in due cose principale, una che la raggione vole così come è stato fatto, l'altra che la scrittura dell'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza è stata essequita da noi, come Vostra Signoria haverà veduto dalle lettere che li

⁴ Already mentioned supra, doc. 34. ⁵ *dui* crossed out and *tre* added above.

ho mandato per altre nave, et per non venirle in fastidio farò fine, raccomandome sempre alla sua bona gratia.

Di Nicossia alli 23 novembre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo il Signor Francesco Michele fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1567 23 novembre. Nave Barbara. N° 16.



47 *Letter from G.S. (to Francesco Michiel?), Nicosia, 30 November 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 101^r–102^r.

Even if their chiefs do not care much for the Cypriot lords, G.S. tells of how happy he is to see the ordinanze being well governed and well prepared to defend the fortress under their leader's command.

G.S. has had the idea of building a citadel to guard against a popular uprising; it would be made up of the Querini bastion and its two curtains, the Bemba Gate and the proveditor's quarters, and could be built for little cost as it would be meant merely for repelling street battles, not for resisting bombardments. G.S. has received letters from his correspondent but none of them were in answer to the letters G.S. had sent to him. He learnt in a letter from Giulio Contarini dated 10 October that the Senate was pleased to hear of Nicosia being fortified, which is a relief to G.S.; however, he fears he will be reproached for the two months of work lost, even though this is not his fault. Too often here people take no interest in Venice's affairs and flagrantly fritter their money away.

G.S. has decided to never again leave Friuli and Venice, and he again complains that he is not as well treated as Girolamo Martinengo, who knows how to turn a blind eye to dishonourable behaviour. He feels old and is fed up of being far from home, as he does not gamble and does not have a pretty whore with whom to pass the time. Venice did grant the two requests G.S. made to her, but not as he had hoped. Firstly, he asked not to be stationed in Corfu for a long time; he only stayed there for eight days, but was immediately transferred to Cyprus. Secondly, he asked the Signoria to send skilled troops and captains; she did so, but the three captains who came to the island are devoid of honour and know nothing about warfare. G.S. explains how disgusted he is to see public affairs going from bad to worse, and asks his correspondent to burn this letter.

G.S. is said to have a bad temper, and, at the sight of Venice being desecrated by negligence and greed, he most certainly does. He hopes he will be pardoned for revealing how the public good is being abused, two months' work having been lost and thieves having been left unpunished. Everyone knows who is and who is not worthy in this kingdom. G.S. asks once more to return to Friuli, assuring Francesco Michiel that being granted leave would be the best payment he could receive.

[...] ¹ di notte et di giorno, et il marescalco ha sempre che fare o medicar cavalli overo ferrarli.

Circa le ordinanze, el presente che sono ben governate et che havemo fortezza capace da salvarvi dentro loro et le sue fameglie, me piace che siano perché in le fortezze sempre dependeranno dalli suoi capi et dalli Clarissimi rettori per consequentia, et per quello io ho veduto qui nel lavorar loro, non amano molto questi gentilhomini del Regno, sì che concludo che porta la spesa a tenerli.

Quanto al fare una cittadella nella quale li vorrei tenir tutte le monicioni, ma non la vorrei far forte inespugnabile ma solamente per battaglia di mano contra sollevatione de popoli; la farrei pigliando dentro il belloardo Querini et fino alla porta Bemba ² che è meza la cortina verso il Querini, et altro tanto ³ fino a meza cortina verso il belloardo Mulla, et vorrei serrar dentro la casa del Clarissimo Proveditore, la qual cittadella si potrà fare quando si vorrà, con pochissima spesa se si harrà persona che sappia o voglia farla, sì come sta questo dessegno, et la faccio forte dentro via per battaglia di mano et non contra arteglieria. Et per adesso non so che scriverle altro se non ringratiarla infinitamente che la si ricorda di me, et ho havuto le sue lettere con la nave Contarina ma non ho havuto risposta de tante mie scritte a Vostra Signoria quando io li mandai li desegni. ⁴ Ho ben havuto una lettera del Clarissimo Signor Julio Contarini procurator fatta di 10 ottobre, ⁵ qual mi scrive che è stato udito in Senato con molta satisfatione de tutti la ressolutione di far undeci belloardi a Nicossia, et che si debba menar le mani a finirla. Basta che io ho questa lume che nell'Eccellentissimo Senato non hanno havuto a male la ressolutione presa di farsi qui Nicossia forte a questo modo, ma penso bene che havranno tanto più per male a sentire delli 2 mesi persi, senza mia colpa et con / [101^v] mia grandissima desperatione, vedendo che si attende a giocare alle carte, per dirla chiara, 10 hore al giorno per il manco et qualche volta 12, et non si ha un pensiero né una cura al mondo delle cose di San Marco, et voleno buttar via li danari in poltronarie, ma crido tanto che si fa manco male et se mi vorranno male, patientia.

Ho dissegnato di non volere più partirme de Frioli né di Venetia, perché son impatiente a veder a far ribalderie per miseria, ma il Signor Hieronimo Martinengo sel vederà robbar 10 millia scudi sapperà tacere, et se io trovo un ladro et che lo dia in le mani, non lo voleno castigare. Però essendo vecchio, Vostra Signoria me aiuti a tornare in Frioli, perché finalmente mi harrò affaticato di bando, et bisogna esser giocatore, o veramente haver qualche moglier bella et putana. È stato una bella man de capitanij questi 3 primi che sono gionti sopra questa

1 This letter is truncated, with a folio missing. 2 The name G.S. gives to the modern-day Cerines Gate suggests that several Venetian officers had their names associated with the new enceinte; indeed, aside from the *regimento* members whose names were given to three bastions (*Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini and councillors Nicolò Loredan and Benedetto da Mula), it would appear that the names of Proveditor-General Lorenzo Bembo and the army governor, G.S., were given to two of the city's gates, which Étienne de Lusignan confirms, *Chorograffia*, f. 16^f, and fig. 45. But the question remains unresolved: Pietro Valderio (*La guerra di Cipro*, p. 80) mentions the Bemba Gate and the Caraffa Gate, and Zuan Falier (*Relationi della presa di Nicosia*, f. 14^{r-v}), the Tracona Gate (for the Bemba Gate) and the Salina Gate (for the Savorgnan / Caraffa Gate). The modern-day Paphos Gate does not seem to have been given the name of any individual person, as G.S. calls it *porta Caraffa*; cf. infra, docs 53, 63. 3 *verso* crossed out after *tanto*. 4 This allusion to a regular correspondence is a good hint that Francesco Michiel was the recipient of this letter. 5 *fatta di 10 ottobre* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*; the letter appears infra, cf. doc. 90.

nave Contarina, il capitano Marascotto, il Poeta et il Carrer,⁶ quali tutti 3 hanno 3 moglie tanto brogliesche, tutte tre a un modo che meglio non si può desiderare. Certo Sua Serenità mi ha esaudito benissimo in due cose che io li ho domandato, la prima fu al mio partir di Venetia, io supplicai Sua Serenità che non mi lasciasse molto tempo a Corfù, et così fu fatto che 8 giorni dappoi la mia partita di Venetia, fu messa la parte di levarmi da Corfù ma de mandarme in Cipro. Io ho scritto a Sua Serenità che mandando fanterie qui, debbano mandar bona gente et capitaniij vivi, come Vostra Signoria havrà veduta la copia che io li ho mandato. Mi hanno servito anco di questo come di quella di Corfù, che tutti 3 questi capitaniij beccano, il qual beccare a li ucelli è segno et inditio che sono vivi. Ecco che mi hanno esaudito in mandarmi capitaniij vivi, sì che Vostra Signoria et io procuramo più che potemo di fare, che non se faccia guerra per che non si sapperà farla, havendoli a far maneggiar arme, et stati a persone che non sano ciò che sia honore, et Vostra Signoria / [102^r] sarà contenta di abbrucchiare questa lettera, perché vedendo le cose del publico ad andare male mi vien voglia di dire, et dico poi la verità.

Dicano poi altri di me ciò che vogliono. Diranno che son collerico, è più che vero che mi vien collora a veder ad assassinare la Signoria di Venetia per negligentia, per transcuragine et per avaritia, et per non venirle in fastidio, me raccomando alla sua bona gratia et la prego che la me perdoni se io la faccio partecipe delli miei travaglij per conto del publico, et malamente posso supportare l'haver perso questi 2 mesi di tempo, di non veler castigar li ladri et anco dirme, havemo scritto per via de Constantinopoli et espedito il messo, non te havemo voluto disviare della fabrica, perché tu li attendi tanto di bon cuore, quando saremo a Venetia diremo gran ben di te alla Signoria, et infinite simplicità simile. In questo Regno, siamo molto ben conosciuti tutti, chi vale et chi non vale. Vostra Signoria mi faccia pur venir in Frioli, et mi contento che per mia remunerazione sia la licentia, qual a me basta, appresso alla lettera del Clarissimo Signor Julio Contarini. La moglie di questo capitano Carrero è bastarda sorella del Signor Zuan Alvise Bragadino,⁷ però sia abbrucchiata la lettera.

Di Nicossia allo ultimo novembre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

1567 *ultimo novembre. Discorso del Regno. N^o 17.*



⁶ These three captains were not serving anywhere when the Senate decided to send them to Cyprus in late August 1567. Earlier on, Filippo Marascotto had served in Verona and then, on 3 March 1565, was enlisted in the guard of Corfu, where he led a company of 100 soldiers; Alessandro Poeta had served in Corfu as captain when G.S. was also in the island, in 1551–1553; then he was under G.S.'s command in Dalmatia in June 1556, in charge of another company of 100 soldiers; it is not known where Girolamo Carrero served before coming to Cyprus: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 81^r, reg. 36, ff. 78^r, 199^v; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κύπρου*, pp. 74, 77. ⁷ Zuan Alvise Bragadino was a very active figure in the leasing of estates and incomes in Cyprus in the 1560s, in partnership with his uterine brother Zuan Philippo Milano; they leased the *casali* of the Latin archdiocese, and the incomes from both the Great Commandery and the Limassol Latin diocese: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (dispatch dated 22 October 1564).

48 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 17 January 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 106^r–107^r.

G.S. forwards to his correspondent a letter from Polo Michiel written in Cerines, and is also shipping some medicinal oil to him on the next boat to Venice.

In Nicosia, little construction work has been done in November, December and part of January, supposedly because funds are lacking and the Ottoman fleet is no longer a threat. To date, total spending is at 77,000 ducats; in the 77 days between November and 17 January only 7,000 ducats were spent, the standard outlay for half a month. The sight of only seven bastions being worked on, by less than 500 men at each, fills G.S. with despair.

The arrival of the two ships Barbaretta and Nana has stirred the rettori, and, if they grant 500 men for each bastion, G.S. thinks it will be possible to finish all the scheduled work by March, working on the assumption that his six previously established tasks will be carried out.

The rettori seem more determined than usual, maybe because they have received a letter, or maybe because the Ottoman threat is back in people's minds. G.S. has never failed to remind them of their duties in providing men for construction, on which the completion of the work depends.

As if Michiel were his patron, G.S.'s mind is not at rest until he has reported everything to him; he apologizes, however, for involving Michiel in all of his far-off problems. G.S. is doing the best he can within the confines of his duties, and puts himself at the mercy of God.

Clarissimo mio Signore osservantissimo,

Dalle due lettere incluse Vostra Signoria Clarissima vederà, quanto mi scrive il Magnifico Signor Polo Michel¹ da Cerines. Li mando anco l'oglio da medicina² per il presente portatore con questa nave che sarà la prima a partire di questa muda, et al presente non li dirò altro se non ch' io li son fidellissimo servitore, et sempre me le raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli xvii genaro 1568.

Circa le nostre fabbriche, la vederà da questa poliza che in tutto novembre et decembre et parte di genaro non si ha lavorato, se non a un belloardo et poco a un'altro. Si diceva per mancamento de danari per non usare diligentia a scoderli, et perché non haveano più sospetto; fino al presente si ha speso in tutto sesanta sette millia ducatti, sette millia ducatti tra novembre, decembre et fino alli 17 genaro, li quali 7 millia ducatti sono la mittà d'un mese in 77 giorni. Pensi Vostra Signoria se mi debbo trovar disperato, pur in questo giorno che è il dì de Sant' Antonio alli 17 genaro³ si lavora con poco manco di cinque cento homini per belloardo, ciò è in sette belloardi solamente.

¹ Polo Michiel, *di Salvador*, succeeded his brother Zuan as *castellan* of Cerines; he was elected by the Grand Council on 17 January 1566, and served for two years starting from February 1566: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 185^v–186^r. ² It is written on the other side of the letter that this is a small jar (*pitaretto*). ³ 17 January was indeed the feast day of Saint Anthony.

La venuta qui della nave Barbaretta et della nave Nana hanno messo pensiero a questi Clarissimi di lavorar et se me daranno tutti undeci li belloardi forniti di 500 homini per ciascuno, per tutto marzo attenderò a quanto ho promesso alli miei Signori Illustrissimi, quali Signori Illustrissimi hanno fatto tanto bene le sue due parte de qualle 6 cose, che già io scrissi a Sua Serenità,⁴ che toccava a loro Signore Eccellentissime di fare qual erano il numero delli soldati et boni, quanto al numero credo che saranno. / [106^v] Circa la monitione d'ogni sorte sono state le provisioni meravigliose et da grandissimi et veri senatori, sì delle artiglierie, quantità et qualità, et fornimenti et altre numerose et regie provisioni, per il che cresce l'animo alli boni suoi servitori di far più di quello si può, se fosse possibile.

Questi Clarissimi hoggi mi ha parso di vederli più vivi del solito in voler operar bene, o sia la causa di qualche lettera havuta, overo che li sij tornato il sospetto et maggiore, havendo vedute queste provision così grosse da un tanto Senato, il che non è indicio di bonazza. Non ho mai mancato di ricordarli in ogni proposito che di certezza Sua Serenità farebbe gagliardamente et a tempo le sue due porzioni, et che io ancora farò le mie, ma una de loro dipende dal volere de Sue Signorie Clarissime, et però che se ricordassero di far, sì che le sue non fussero per far impedimento alle altre tutte, et che senza havere li homini a tempo, le altre sarebbero state superflue, anzi il tutto sarebbe ressolto in niente.

Voglio dir tutte queste cose a Vostra Signoria come a mio singolare patrone, et così come in ogni cosa et in ogni occasione, quando l'homo ha la sua conscientia netta li fa un gran giovamento, così a me è di grandissimo contento a far sapere tutti li miei fatti et affanni a Vostra Signoria Clarissima, alle quale desidero quel medemo bene et honore che io desidero per me medemo, però la prego a perdonarmi se io le faccio sentire anco li miei fastidij et travagli, et ne ho grandissima sollevatione a ragionarne almanco con lettere con Vostra Signoria, non li potendo parlar per la lontananza. Dio sa, come ho detto, che se per cridar et far ogni gran bene et ogni gran male giovasse a far beneficio alle cose di Sua Serenità, io non restarei di farlo, ma faccio ciò che son et posso come son obbligato di fare, et / [107^r] mai attendo ad altro, et li miei pensieri non sono volti né a piaceri né a utili, né a commodità, faccia il Signor Dio quello li piace. Avanti che partano le nave le scriverò ancora. Al presente la ringratio infinitamente che la si degni di ricordarsi di me, come la fa per sue lettere, qual me sono sommamente carissime, et me raccomando infinitamente alli Clarissimi Signori suoi compagni, miei Patroni et Signori, et a lei stessa, pregandole sanità.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.

Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michele che fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. con un pitaretto da oglio da medicina. 1568 17 zener.
] Replicate a 2 mazo con la nave Querina. N° 19.

⁴ Cf. supra, doc. 35.

The letter is accompanied by a note showing two records, presented as tables. On one side are the amounts of money that have been spent on construction, on the other, the number of days that the work has taken; for increased readability, the two tables are here combined into one.

1568 adi 17 zener

	summa	ducati	bisanti	carcie	
<i>balloardo</i>		<i>ducati</i>	<i>bisanti</i>	<i>carcie</i>	<i>zornadattoli</i>
Querini		6,443	7	19 ½	30
Barbaro		5,750	8	3	48
Loredan		5,737	2	13 ½	40
Flatro		6,722	5	15 ½	9
Carafa		7,410	5	11	48
Podocataro		6,507	8	8 ½	44
Costanzo		5,903	3	2	70
Davila		5,968	8	1 ½	34
Conte Tripoli		6,338	5	1 ½	17
Conte de Rochas		5,506	5	6 ½	22
Mula		5,219	2	14 ½	14
<i>Summa</i>		67,508	3	4	376



49 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 21 February 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 108^r–110^r.

No work was done over November, December and most of January because the rettori thought war was unlikely; but a hint of a threat arose halfway through January and now work has been going on for nearly a month. The parapets of the bastions are finished and it can safely be said that if war comes, the fortress will be secure, even at the Podocataro bastion, which is 260 passa [452 m] away from the nearest hills. Everybody is very impressed by the fortress, and G.S. would give two years of his life for Francesco Michiel to be able to come and walk around the enceinte three times, and understand the effect it will have on the enemy.

G.S. hopes his loyal service to Venice will be appreciated, despite certain spiteful souls, and he is determined to see his virtues acknowledged like those of the rest of the State's servants and soldiers; thanks to him Nicosia has been transformed into a fortress for only 70,000 ducats, when the original schedule was for the work to be finished in eight months for 120,000 ducats (later amended to six months and 90,000 ducats). The current total outlay is at 77,000 ducats; the additional 7,000 have been extraordinary expenses, so the bastions have indeed been built for 70,000 ducats. Moreover, builders have been working for two months on bonding the

Caraffa bastion, but this work is not to be paid for out of the overall budget, of which there remain 20,000 ducats. There are still 40 days until the end of March; construction will progress as quickly or as slowly as the rettori want it to. The latter have received heated dispatches from Venice, but God alone knows what they are doing about it. For his part, G.S. has kept his five-month promise, without exceeding the scheduled budget.

The parapets at the bastions, albeit not totally finished, are battle-ready. All of the curtains have been raised and are just awaiting their parapets; these will be built with the earth from the moats, which are currently being tidied and levelled. By 1 April, there will be ten sites needing work, and the tasks shall be done one site at a time, starting with the bastion already in the process of being equipped [Caraffa]; G.S. hopes to leave Cyprus in August after finishing two bastions, a curtain and a gate. He reiterates that he has never erred from the mission entrusted to him, and that even though he has not received all the manpower he was promised, his fortress has gained a considerable reputation throughout Turkish lands; no more, he feels, could have been expected.

The provveditori alle fortezze have sent the requested artillery on time, along with lots of ammunition, and G.S. thinks that no sultan or emperor can ever have equipped a fortress so mightily in one stroke; he views this haste as a reward to him personally.

Venice's other duty was to send troops, which they have done quickly. The quality of the soldiers and captains, however, is not the best: one third of the troops have proved useless, and many of the captains thieve from and murder their soldiers. G.S. has demanded that 21 ducats recently stolen be returned; the soldiers in question ought to have been punished, but here in Cyprus, so far from Venice, the case will never be pursued.

It was the rettori's duty to provide G.S. the manpower required to finish the work in March. If they had wanted, work could have been finished at Christmas; but, likewise if they so wish, the 90,000 ducats could be gone by March, leaving a fortress not only built of earth, but also equipped with walls. Concerning supplies, only a third of the 700,000 stara [783,170 l] of grain initially predicted can be procured for the city, despite the Senate's injunctions. It is thanks to the intervention of the count of Rochas that the ammunition and artillery has arrived from Salina, and that the reale grain has been stockpiled. G.S. laments the way the situation has developed, and once more begs his correspondent to get him out of Cyprus the soonest possible, as idleness is ruining him and will lead him to a bad end.

Clarissimo Signore mio osservantissimo,

Ancora che il mese di novembre et decembre, et maggior parte di genaro si habbiano fatte poche facende interno a questa fabrica, la causa era perché questi Clarissimi non pensavano che mai più si dovesse haver sospetto di guerra in questo Regno, pur ha piaciuto a Dio di far venir a mezo genaro un poco di sospetto per il che si ha lavorato quasi un mese, nel qual tempo questi belloardi in le sue ultime parte di esserli finiti li parapetti sono in tal esser che ho fatto veder chiaramente a tutti, che potemo star securissimi in battaglia in tutta la piazza del belloardo Po da Cathero, qual è il più vicino che sia di tutti li altri al monte, qual li è solamente lontano 260 passa di modo che ogn'uno che vede quella piazza et quelli parapetti tanti securi, et che fa bellissimo vedere, considerando l'utile del suo effetto, restano tanto

satisfatti che io non lo potrei mai scrivere a Vostra Signoria Clarissima, pagarei dui anni del tempo che ho da viver che Vostra Signoria Clarissima senza suo discommodo potesse cavalcare 3 volte atorno Nicosia, una dentro via per li terragli, la seconda circondarla in la fossa propria, et la terza di fora via della fossa per considerare l'effetto che pol fare il nemico.

Certissimo ancora che Vostra Signoria Clarissima me voglia bene et me habbia per buon servitor di San Marco, in quel caso la mi vorrebbe due volte meglio, et la sarebbe chiarissima che Dio me ha fatto nascer per un buon servitor di questo Illustrissimo Dominio, se ben non son stato conosciuto, se non da poco tempo in qua per causa della malignità de alcuni particolari che sano far de simil facende, et al suo dispetto non me hanno potuto tener che non habbia fatto la mia parte de bene alla mia patria et alli miei Signori, quanto cadaun altro servitore o soldato che la servono; in fine il caso è questo, che Nicosia è in fortezza con settanta millia ducatti solamente, da poter esser difesa et pretendo di esser / [108^v] uscito del debito havendo ateso benissimo alla promessa, et di più perché la prima promessa mia fu di otto mesi et cento e vinti millia ducatti, non parlo de questa grande ma mi contentai poi di nonanta millia scudi in sei mesi, a raggion de quindici millia ducatti al mese, et mi contentava di venir con li nonanta millia ducatti al segno che siamo venuti al presente, che è alli 21 di febraro con settanta sette millia ducatti, delli quali sette millia et più sono andati in altre cose straordinarie, ma in li belloardi non è speso più di settanta millia ducatti anzi manco, è da considerar un'altra cosa, che sono più de doi mesi che si lavora al belloardo Caraffa di muro di calzina facendoli le sue camise con parecchij murari, et questo incamisar di muraglie perfettamente, non si dovrebbe metter a conto delli miei nonanta millia ducatti, delli quali me ne mancano a spender vinti millia. Et fino per tutto marzo sono ancora poco manco di 40 giorni et secondo che sarà la volontà di questi Clarissimi si lavorerà,¹ quali si moveno a esser più diligenti et manco secondo che a caso li vengano portati li avisi, et se ben da Venetia li è stato scritto lettere piene di foco, messer Domenedio li ha fatti tali che né quelle lettere né manco il mio dire, move punto li animi de questi, ma bisogna raccomandarsi a Dio del tutto. Io ho pagato il debito mio, già che in manco de cinque mesi a raggion del danaro, ho atteso alla promessa.

Li parapetti de tutti li belloardi sono in difesa, assai de loro finiti. Tutte le cortine ingrossate et alzate, si attende a farli li suoi parapetti, con il finire di nettare et equalizare li piani delle fosse, con quel istesso terreno si finiscono li parapetti et le cortine, sì che, dal primo di d'aprile in là, si restarà di lavorare in diece lochi, et si anderà fabricando in un loco solo alla volta, facendo le camise et muraglie a questo belloardo cominciato per poter par- / [109^r] tirme questo agosto da quest'isola, lasciando fatto forsi un paro di belloardi di muro, et una cortina et una porta, come hanno d'andare et queste saranno le stampe et modelli delli altri, et la esperientia della spesa. Et sappia Vostra Signoria Clarissima che non ho mancato di attender a questa mia prima parte che toccava a me, se ben non ho havuto tutti li homini, cortissimo tutti in questo Regno credeno, et in Turchia è una fama tanto grande di questa fortezza che maggiore non è possibile a desiderare, et l'effetto non l'asconde, se avesse

¹ *si lavorerà* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

accaduto il bisogno havrei fatto anco la seconda parte, ma la colpa non è mia di non haver potuto provarla.

Quelli Signori Illustrissimi de Venetia hanno fatto così regal provisione di mandar per tempo la infinita monitione et la bellissima in quantità et qualità de arteglieria, il qual fatto è stato tanto grande, che io credo che né il Turco né li imperatori passati, mai in alcun tempo in una volta habbiano mandato in una fortezza tanta arteglieria né tante balle né tanta polvere, né tanti moschettoni, né tante picche quante sono state portare qui, però questa provisione così gagliarda fatta da Sue Signorie Illustrissime io l'accetto per la mittà del premio de tutte le mie fatiche, per il che è inditio chiaro che le operation fatte qui li sono di contento.

Quanto alla seconda parte che toccava a fare (come io scrissi) a Sua Serenità, qual era di mandarci le fanterie a tempo, anco in questo Sua Serenità è stata molto presta.²

Quanto alla qualità alle fanterie, è accaduto quello che io mi pronosticava che fussero mandate bone fanterie et capitaniij proportionati; la verità è stata che un terzo della fanteria è stata inutile, et li capitaniij secondo dice la mia lettera sono stati bona parte de loro proportionati alle fanterie sue. Io intendevo et desideravo che li fanti fossero stati boni, et li capitaniij proportionati a quelli et non proportionati a questi fanti. Li poveri Signori Illustrissimi sono ingan- / [109^v] nati et assassinati per li broglij, ma li capitaniij cioè bona parte de loro sono gran ladroni et assassini delli poveri soldati, del suo honore se ne havessero, et del suo Principe et a qualch'uno di loro, in una volta sola, li ho fatto restituire fino a vinti uno ducatto³ malamente tolti a sette fanti, certissimo meritava de esser appiccato, ma in questo paese, qual è tanto lontano da Venetia, non se appicca, se non le luganighe, et ho a caso di esser tanto vecchio, che non sarò più bono di far altro viaggio che da Venetia in Frioli, per non vedere più tante robarie et furfanterie impuniti, et io non posso far più di quello ch' io faccio se ben trovo li ladri, et li do in mano, mai vengano castigati perché Dio vole così.

Quanto alle due parte che toccavano a questi Signori Clarissimi, l'una era di darne li homini a tempo per finir questa fabrica per tutto marzo. Se havessero voluto la fabrica era finita per Natale, ma se vorranno ancora per tutto marzo saranno quasi spesi li nonanta millia ducatti, et la fabrica non solamente in fortezza di terra ma anco di muraglia fatto assaissimo. Quanto al condur più di sette cento millia stara venetiani,⁴ che si ha opinione che siano in tutto il Regno tra orzi et formenti, al mio creder non harebbono condotto dentro ne anco la

2 The troops did indeed arrive in Cyprus at the beginning of January 1568; cf. supra, doc. 48. 3 *in una volta* crossed out after *ducatto*. 4 *venetiani* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. G.S.'s estimate of the requirements for the fortresses (700,000 Venetian *stara* of wheat and barley) is markedly higher than that which Eugenio Singlitico had given in a letter one month earlier, assuring his reader that 200,000 *stara* would be enough to supply Nicosia's fortress for a year, and 100,000 for that of Famagusta: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 303. In Cypriot measures, 700,000 *stara* represented around 1,750,000 local *mozza*; cf. Nicolò Dandolo's conversion: *ibid.*, c. 251. A normal harvest brought from two to two and a half million *mozza* of grain, as in 1553 (1,000,000 *mozza* of wheat and 1,500,000 of barley): ASV, *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Alvise da Ponte, f. 2^r. See also the five-yearly inventory of the grain harvests published in Grivaud, *Villages désertés à Chypre*, p. 481.

terza parte, perché non credeno né mai lo crederanno se non quando vorrano poi fare la provisione, et non potranno. Et da me mai è mancato di farli rileggere mille volte le lettere del Senato che li comanda espressamente questo fatto. La diligentia et fatica del conte di Rochas qual si despera de queste cose ha pur fatto tanto, che ha fatto condurre le monicioni da Saline et l'arteglieria, et alcune biade della reale. Il mondo è fatto a questo modo et non giova a ricordare et vano in colora, et fanno peggio, et me rincresce di esser vivo, et con questo fine me raccomando a Vostra Signoria Clarissima qual prego, che non essendo sospetto, mi voglia dar favore che mi parta / [110^f] da questo Regno nel quale stando così otioso, senza dubio farò mal fine. La prego a sollicitar la mia partita.

Di Nicossia alli 21 febraro 1568.

Scrisserò anco avanti che le nave partano.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.

Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 21 febraro. Replicate a 2 mazo con la Contarina. N° 20.



50 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 23 February 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 112^{r-v}.

Thus far only 70,000 ducats have been spent, representing four months and twenty days' work at 15,000 ducats per month; if Querini had still been alive, construction would have already reached this stage last November. Concerning provisions, G.S. notes with despair that if the Ottoman fleet had launched an attack at the start of April, only one fifth of stocks would have been available. The enemy threat having waned, G.S. has been told to stop worrying and concern himself with his bastions, as provisions are the proveditor-general's responsibility; however, the proveditor-general says that he can only assume authority in wartime, and in peacetime can do nothing. The amount of provisions in the city is currently no more than ordinary. G.S. prays God to free him from this office in which he is surrounded by people with no sense.

G.S. explains that the man carrying this letter is a stradioto who injured Captain Romagas when the latter came to stock up on water in Cyprus; the man merely followed the order he had been given to allow no Maltese knights onto the island, and thus deserves to be rewarded.

Clarissimo mio Signore osservantissimo,

Ho scritto più man di lettere mie a Vostra Signoria Clarissima circa la fortificatione che stiamo bene, havendovi speso solamente settanta millia ducatti, che vol dire quattro mesi et vinti giorni a raggion de quindici millia al mese, et se 'l Querini era vivo, del mese di

novembre si sarebbe stati nel esser che siamo adesso a circa alle vettoaglie, perché non credeno le cose si rissolveno in niente, et senza dubio alcuno se l'armata veniva al principio d'aprile, non si portava dentro la quinta parte delle biade. Al presente che sono cessati tutti li sospetti, tanto manco ne sarebbe condotta, mi rispondono che debba attendere alli miei belloardi, et lasciar governar a chi ha da fare. Li Clarissimi si iscusano che tocca al Signor Proveditore, il qual Signor Proveditore dice che in caso di guerra lui farebbe, ma per pace non ha autorità, et da magnare non ne è in la città niente o poco di straordinario. Prego il Signor Dio a liberarmi da questi travagli. Ho da far con persone che non hanno senso.

Il presente portatore, messer Zorzi Maures, è quello che capitano Ramagas¹ scrisse, che lui li havea dato una lanciata che non havea male. Questo fu sforzato a far così havendo prima pregato Ramagas che per cortesia non volesse far acqua, et lui li rispose la farò al tuo dispetto, il stradiotto all'hora li dete la lanciata, fece bene, et se non l'havesse fatto meritava castigo, havendolo fatto è degno di laude, et de qualche remuneratione.² Turchi che vengano in quest'isola lo vano a vedere per la gran fama di Ramagas, et vedendolo mal in ordine de drappi, non mi par che sia honore della Signoria. Farne de boni il soldo non lo concede, si dovrebbe aiutarlo per essemplio d'altri, quali lasciarebbero andar (come si suol dire) l'acqua / [122^v] alla bassa, o per dir meglio li Maltesi all'acqua, et me raccomando infinitamente a Vostra Signoria Clarissima pregandola che la mi faccia levar di questo paese più presto che la puole.

Di Nicossia alli 23 febraro 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 23 febraro. Replicate a 4 di maggio con la nave Querina. N° 21.



1 Mentioned supra, doc. 26. 2 To briefly explain the context of this altercation between the Maltese corsairs and the *stradioti* charged with defending the Cypriot coasts, the corsairs were using Cyprus as a rear base to stock up on water, wood and even food for their conflict with Ottoman ships; Venice refused to tolerate this any longer, not wanting to run the risk of having the island's coasts under the surveillance of Turkish fleets (the Alexandria and Rhodes guards), which they feared would lead to a direct attack. Wishing to preserve good commercial relations with the Ottomans, from 1518 onwards Venice strictly forbade the corsairs from the Cypriot coasts; in the *commissio* delivered to her officers, the *Signoria* insisted that no supplies be given to the Maltese men, and that the *stradioti* repel anyone not respecting these rules. More concretely, this latent war between the Maltese and the Ottomans continued throughout the 1560s and was the reason behind the sultan's demand for the island to be ceded to Venice in March 1570: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, ff. 20^v–21^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 58^v–60^r (*commissio* of Girolamo Contarini, captain of the Cypriot maritime guard, 4 January 1563), 65^r–67^r (*commissio* of Bernardo Sagredo, proveditor-general and syndic, 6 March 1563), 152^v–153^v (*commissio* of Antonio Bragadin, proveditor and syndic, 24 February 1565); CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, ff. 193^r–194^r.

51 *Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 26 February 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 116^{r-v}; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 84^v–85^f;
id., *Annali 1556–1570*, f. 26^{r-v}.

G.S. promised to turn the city into a fortress in six months and for 90,000 ducats; up to now 70,000 have been spent, representing four months and twenty days' work. He has thus kept his word, and between now and the end of March he will use the remaining 20,000 ducats (representing forty days' work) to go beyond what he promised, providing he is given the required manpower.

At present the curtain parapets are being installed; the curtains are very high and 25 passa [43.5 m] wide. The bastions are in perfect condition, and the only problem continues to be the matter of provisions: this year the island has produced 60,000 stara [500,000 l] of grain, and this must, G.S. repeats, be used to supply the fortress; if not, the city's population will go hungry in the event of a war. The grain has not been brought to the city because no one feels this to be necessary; the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] has taken the initiative of bringing in grain from the reale, but this is not enough. Finally, G.S. applauds Venice for sending good artillery and massive amounts of cannonballs, powder and ammunition; proof that they can achieve what no prince in the world has ever achieved before.

G.S. acknowledges that Venice has sent troops in time. Work is currently focused on the Caraffa bastion, and by September the fortress will be fully equipped. G.S. has never wavered in the performance of his duty, and, having served in the Levant for fourteen years, he hopes he will be allowed to die in Italy.

Serenissimo Principe,¹

La mia ultima promessa a questi Signori Clarissimi fu de darli questa città in fortezza, con nonanta millia ducatti in sei mesi di tempo. Al presente li faccio sapere che sono stati spesi in questa fortificatione solamente settanta millia ducatti, che vol dire quattro mesi et vinti giorni di tempo, et nel esser che siamo al presente vengo ad haver atteso alla promessa che io ho fatta anco a Vostra Serenità, con tutto che mi mancano opere per l'amontare de quaranta giorni, cioè vinti millia ducatti, che sono dalli settanta fino alli nonanta millia. Siamo alli ultimi giorni di febraro et habbiamo in mano (circa il tempo) tutto il mese di marzo, sì che se mi saranno dati li homini si fabricarà anco tanto, che sarà di più di quello che è stato promesso.

Si attende al presente ad assettare li parapetti delle cortine, qual cortine sono altissime et larghe vinti cinque passa di terraglio; con lo equalizare delle fosse se li finisce li suoi parapetti.

¹ Girolamo Priuli's successor, Pietro Loredano, was elected doge on 26 November 1567; he overcame the competition after two weeks of tension between the four candidates, amongst whom figured Alvise Mocenigo. Born around 1482, Pietro Loredano devoted himself to trade and played little part in Venetian political life; however, he later became *podestà* in Verona, then the doge's councillor, then vice-doge, and finally doge. He died on 5 May 1570: Da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia*, pp. 270–274; R. Zago, 'Loredan, Pietro', *DBI*, vol. 65, pp. 779–781.

Li belloardi che è stato il più, sono in tanto buon esser quanto si pò desiderare. Non ho altro fastidio se non che accadendo li bisogni, mai sarà portato dentro la quarta parte delle vettovaglia che è o sarà in questo Regno fino che non se li faccia altra provisione, et me ne son chiarito quest'anno a li, è in questo Regno al presente (per quello è giudicato) più di sei cento millia stara venetiani di robba tra orzi et formenti, et non conducendosi dentro delle fortezze non si potrebbero salvare le anime del Regno, et persi che fossero li popoli, difficil cosa sarebbe a farne venire de alti paesi. Non vengano condotte queste biade dentro delle fortezze perché niuno non si vol discomodare, non credendo che habbia ad esser il bisogno. Delle biade che sono della reale, il conte di Rochas, ve- / [116^v] dendo che le cose non andavano bene, si ha tolto il carico et ne ha fatto, et tutta via fa venirne assai, ma (rispetto alli particular) sono poche et il tempo sarebbe tanto breve che, accadendo il bisogno d'aprile, sarebbe anco peggio di quello ho detto di sopra, et forse non si sarebbero condotte dentro la quinta parte del tutto. Con la sua solita prudentia anco a questo la Serenità Vostra troverà rimedio. Quella ha fatto il più che è haver fatta la fortezza. Medesimamente a tempo l'ha mandato qui tanta quantità di belle et bone artiglierie, le migliori del mondo con tanta abbondante quantità de balle, polvere, et altre sorte de infinite monicioni, che son certissimo che niuno altro principe del mondo habbia in una volta sola monita mai alcuna altra fortezza con tanta real spesa, come è stata questa che ha fatta Vostra Serenità.

Similmente per lei è stata fatta la provisione di mandar bona parte delli fanti a tempo, et se li sospetti qui fossero continuati, ananti Natale questa sua fortezza sarebbe stata assicurata, come è² al presente. Si lavora³ di muraglie al belloardo Caraffa et anco per farli la sua parte, et la sua cortina di muro acciò che la Serenità Vostra questo settembre possa sapere quanto li anderà ad incamisare tutta questa sua fortezza; in questo mezo, non mancarò di fare il debito mio in servitio suo, come son obbligato, et starò aspettando che la si degni (non essendo maggior sospetto) di lasciarme venir a morire in Italia, havendola io servita in Levante in più volte più delli quattordecim anni, et al presente vado per le quindeci, et sempre me raccomando alla sua bona gratia.

Di Nicossia alli 26 febraro 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità bon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe di Venetia, il Signor Pietro Loredano, mio Signore sempre osservantissimo. 1568 26 febraro. Replicate a 2 di maggio con la nave Contarina. N° 23.



² *stata* crossed out after *è*. ³ *al presente* crossed out after *lavora*; *adesso* crossed out above.

52 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 26 February 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 114^{r-v}.

G.S. is observing with despair that finishing the construction of the fortress and securing provisions are becoming minor concerns, and that the proveditor can do nothing about it as no state of war has been declared. G.S. shudders at the thought of a surprise enemy attack, as the grain currently coming into the city is only enough to meet daily needs; he supposes that the harvests of individual citizens will be sold, and the reale harvests will be left to rot. G.S. will always put the public good first, even if people find this irritating; he has accomplished the mission he was given to fortify Nicosia, and if it had been necessary he would have defended the city too. By the end of March the rettori will owe him 10 days' work.

Concerning the newly arrived troops, G.S. thinks they are of poor quality and not up to the task; apart from two who seem to be satisfactory, most of the captains have tried to deceive him, and God knows that bad sailors put good ships in danger. The bad captains leave their units in the hands of fanfarons who do not know how to command troops. The captains also steal nine out of every ten ducats (for example through selling pikes to soldiers for twice the price they paid for them), and elsewhere the arquebusiers load the ships with casks of wine; the army has become a usurious form of commerce. G.S. has revealed these malpractices, and has managed to have the stolen money returned, but the thieves have not been punished. Once he is back in Venice, G.S. will be sure to propose measures to put a stop to these crimes, but he hopes others will take action before this. He feels old, and asks his correspondent to grant him the favour of being able to die in Italy.

Clarissimo mio Signor osservantissimo,

La vederà ciò che io scrivo a Sua Serenità,¹ quella come mio Signore confidentissimo faccia quanto li pare. Ben li dico che io son il più disperato homo del mondo, perché le cose qui per ogni minima cosa si abbandonano tutte le provisioni di fabrica et vettoaglie, et non ardisco scriver il tutto a Sua Serenità, ma è peggio assai di quello li ho scritto. Il Clarissimo Proveditor dice se fosse guerra io farei fare delle facende, ma per pace non ho autorità; in questo modo passano li negotij, se venisse un'occasione straordinaria Vostra Signoria pò pensare come sta il mio animo. A pena vengono condotte tante biade in la città che suppliscono al viver ordinario, et questo credo li basti sapere, et li pronostico che se lasceranno vender quelle de particolari, et quelle della reale se lasceranno marcire da qui avanti. Non ho mancato, ne mancarò mai, di ricordare il ben publico, se ben son certo de esser tenuto da alcuni fastidioso, la verità finalmente ha gran forza.

Io ho atteso alla mia permessa di haver fatta la fortezza a tempo, et havrei atteso anco alla seconda mia permessa di defenderla. Questi Clarissimi quanto alle sue due parte, la pò intendere che delle opere mi hanno mancato, et l'ultimo giorno di marzo mi saranno debitori diece giorni. Tutta via per gratia del Signor Dio, stiamo bene come ho scritto. Delle vettoaglie, il mio pronostico fatto di settembre è stato più che vero, et sarà.

¹ Cf. supra, doc. 51.

Che Sua Serenità ne dovesse mandar arteglierie, monitione et soldati a tempo, sempre ho giudicato de sì, ma della mala qualità et dapocagine, poco intelletto et avaritia, de maggior parte delli capitani, quali non me hanno ingannato / [114^v] niente, a pena fin' qui ne ho trovati dui soli boni, però il Signor Dio sa ciò che fa, non facendo venir guerra a Vostre Signorie Illustrissime, perché li tristi marinari fano pericolare anco le bone navi. Li tristi capitani affittano tutte le squadre a forfanti che non sanno commandare, et menano seco fanteria più furfanta de loro. Li capi soldi de ogni diece ducatti nove sono robbati dalli capitani, del vender le picche alli soldati per nove lire et a loro costano quattro et meza; li arcobusi voleno guadagnar un ducatto dell'uno, portano botte de vino in nave, et guadagnano de un tre et finalmente questa nostra militia è diventata una mercantia hebraica, che si assomiglia più alle usure che alla mercantia. Io ho dechiarito molto bene tutte queste poltronarie a chi debbo, li rincresce, si dole ne ho fatto restituire, ma non se appicano li ladri, et io non posso più. Quando venirò a Venetia, non mancarò di mostrar la strada per remediare a questi desordini. Se però quelli Signori Illustrissimi voranno farlo, essendo che per li broglij il mondo si va intrigando ogni giorno più, et beato me ch' io son vecchio che tanto manco passione né sentirò de queste cose nel mio animo, et in questo poco che mi resta de vita sempre sono buon servitore di Vostra Signoria Clarissima, alla quale sempre me raccomando, et liberamente le scrivo il mio animo, et la prego a favorirme che io posso venir a morire in Italia.

Di Nicossia alli 26 febraro 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo mio Signore osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 26 febraro. Replicate a 2 mazo con la Contarina. N° 22.



53 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 4 March 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 118^r–121^r.

G.S. is aware that he is venting to Francesco Michiel all the woes that he should be venting to his brothers, but explains that the latter are undoubtedly busy with other matters; G.S. values Michiel's opinion highly and trusts him in public affairs, expressing opinions to him that he cannot voice to his relatives or the Senate. G.S. knows that via Michiel four or five Collegio members are kept informed of his concerns with the greatest discretion.

G.S. has already alerted people of the need to supply the fortresses. Proveditor Barbaro has been ill for several months and is very weak, incapable of dealing with such matters. The rettori are busy with daily administration, and asking for their help would be a waste of time; their attempt to have the artillery transported amounted to handing the job over to Captain Regolino, an incompetent old man living in Famagusta with 50 men under his command.

When the rettori do decide to act, they take inappropriate measures and disregard their duty, no matter how often they are reminded of it.

It is 6 March, and thus far out of the 20,000 stara [16,600 l] of salt to be brought to Nicosia as promised last June, only 1,000 [831 l] have appeared. G.S. has had the windows of a church bricked up so that 50,000 mozza [166,630 l] may be stored safely. This salt will be used to preserve the meat from the animals to be brought into the fortress, thus providing enough food to endure a siege of at least three months. Herds of animals must not be left to the enemy, as happened in Malta when the arrival of the Ottoman fleet caught the island unprepared.

To avoid a re-occurrence of Malta's predicament, G.S. wants the city to be supplied in salt, grain, oil, wine and timber; but each time he reminds people of how urgent a need this is, he is once more told to worry about his bastions and nothing more. The Cypriot lords are even more aware of the matter's urgency than G.S., and are not to blame for the inaction. G.S. laments the proveditor's illness, which is causing many problems for everybody. The fortress not only needs to be finished, it needs to be supplied in good time.

G.S. raises a further two aspects of the work being done that bother him greatly and make him want to go as soon as possible back to Italy to die. The università accorded 5,000 ducats to those peasants whose houses have been destroyed, and Venice approved a similar handout three months earlier. Last January G.S. reminded the rettori that if work was solid over the coming two months, his promise to Venice that construction would be finished in March [1568] would be kept. As G.S. sees it, he has had four priorities: build eleven bastions, which he has now done; build eleven curtains, which he has nearly done; dig the moat; after knocking down the old walls, tidy up the areas surrounding the moat and the enceinte, home to 10,000 people. 11,000 citizens, mainly rich families, have stayed in the city; Nicosia has a population of 22,000, including 1,000 soldiers.

The work of destroying the houses of the poor has been underway for ten days, and G.S., portrayed by the rettori as an executioner, is shaken by the suffering of these people, who do not know what to do with the beams and stones of their demolished homes. The old and weak and the sobbing women whom G.S. listens to and then sends to the rettori would tug at the heartstrings of the Devil himself. The peasants all know that 10,000 ducats have been allocated to them and that half of this has already been delivered by Venice. It is sinful to brutally uproot these people without providing them somewhere to rebuild their houses, especially given that the city disposes of sufficient plots of land to build 6,000 homes, with the barley or wheat fields providing gardens. Land which before the fortification of the city cost under 100 ducats now costs 16,000. At the end of July the rettori forbade any unauthorized construction projects in order to protect the empty plots of land, but this ban had little effect, as Nicosia's rich bought plots to build on and make a profit. Moneylenders are ruthless here, worse than anywhere else when it comes to feeding off both the poor and the rich.

Seeing how bad things were getting, G.S. tried to convince the rettori to give 15 perteghe [31 m] of land, the equivalent of 6 ducats, to every one of Nicosia's poor, representing 10,000 ducats in total; he also requested the imposition of a maximum price per campo padoano [36 ares] of 336 ducats, and that plots of land be shared out to the poor by himself and four lords: Giacomo de Nores (the count of Tripoli), Antonio Davila, Ugo Flatro and Giovanni Sozo-

meno. He also proposed making two roads, cutting across the fields between the bastions and Saint Sophia, which is now in the middle of the enceinte. As soon as his decisions began to be put into action, the wealthy owners of the fields in question voiced their discontent, and the rettori were divided on how to proceed. In the end, the poor have been given no land, and are devastated to see the rich acquiring great plots of land for themselves, against the wishes of both God and the Senate.

Archbishop Mocenigo has offered the courtyard in front of his palazzo for the building of a great piazza in between Saint Sophia and his palace; G.S. feels this is necessary, as a square should always be patrolled to protect against any popular uprising. The rettori's abode is currently situated towards the Querini and Mulla bastions, and 700 passa [1,217 m] away from the piazza near to the Caraffa Gate. The new square is thus needed, and the process, meant to be organized and coherent, of building the new roads across the fields is in the end proving incoherent and illegal. The proveditor is in despair at the situation, and the poor are begging for mercy. G.S. feels like he is in purgatory, or even in hell itself, and wants to put his fingers in his ears to shut out the lamentations. During inspection tours with the count of Rochas [Eugenio Sinclitico], Governor Roncone and other lords, he only looks at the walls and the moat, covering his eyes when they reach the new constructions.

G.S. has been hounded by many people insisting that the new houses be built in an orderly fashion, but he has told them that this is now impossible. He ends his letter asking to be freed from this land and to return to Italy, where he plans to spend his days in Venice and Osoppo. Querini's death has truly been a disaster for this fortress.

Clarissimo mio Signore osservantissimo,

Io convengo dar a Vostra Signoria tutti li fastidij che doverebbono esser dei miei fratelli overo delli miei parenti, ma perché credo che siano occupati in altro maggior cose non scrivo altramente a loro, ma tutti li miei fastidij li voglio partecipare con Vostra Signoria Clarissima, come con mio Signore, nel quale ho grandissima opinione che li brogli mai lo faccia restar de dir liberamente quello che torna a beneficio di questo Illustrissimo Dominio, et non solamente li scriverò quello che non ardisco scriver alli miei parenti, ma anco li dirò cose che non ardisco a scriverle al Senato proprio, et se io credesse far bene de scrivere queste cose in le lettere publiche, lo farei ma dubito di far peggio. Ho presa questa rresolutione de avisar Vostra Signoria Clarissima, quale con la sua solita prudentia farà sapere questi miei fastidij a quattro o cinque di quelli Signori Eccellentissimi di Collegio,¹ acciò che Sue Signore Illustrissime con la sua solita prudentia (sappendolo) possano provvedere senza far rumore.

¹ The *Collegio* brought together several different governmental bodies, each of which had their own powers but also acted together. It was made up of three groups of *savi*: the six *savi* of the Council of Pregadi (or *savi grandi*), who dealt with matters concerning the Senate; the five *savi di Terraferma*, who dealt with city and *Stato da terra* matters; the five *savi agli ordini*, who took care of maritime matters (merchant and military fleets and the *dominio da mar*). Together or separately, these bodies had the power to instruct or demand to be consulted on matters set to be examined in the Senate or the Grand Council; cf. A. Da Mosto, *L'Archivio di Stato di Venezia. Indice generale, storico, descrittivo ed analitico*, Rome 1937–1940, vol. 1, pp. 21–22; G. Cozzi, 'Politica, società, istituzioni', in G. Cozzi / M. Knapton (eds), *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla guerra di Chioggia alla riconquista della*

Per un'altra mia, li ho scritto et anco a Sua Serenità, che bisogna far provisione de fornir a tempo questa sua fortezza de vettovaglie.² Il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore è stato amalato parecchij mesi, et per la verità Sua Signoria Clarissima dice sentirsi molto decaduto per la forza di questo male, di modo che non ardimo a darli fastidio, né a parlarli de una infinità de cose che bisognarebbono. Questo Clarissimo Regimento è tanto occupato in le sue cose ordinarie che il parlar con loro Signorie è un gettar via le parole, di modo che mi trovo molto disperato. Per ogni minimo aviso si metteno in fuga, et volevano de prima mandar a tor le artiglierie delle nave, et harebbono havuto 25 balle per pezzo a pena senza rode da terra. Mandarono a tore un certo capitano Regolino³ casso a Famagosta, con 50 fanti, homo vecchio, impotente, con una panza grandissima, / [118^v] atto a far tutti li mestieri del mondo eccetto che di soldato. Queste et simil altre provisione mi furono dette che facevano, per il che io dissi che simil cose farebbono perdere la reputatione alla summa della cosa. Pur restarono di tor l'artiglieria et il soccorso di quest'homo; quando li vien voglia, fanno alcune provisione da se improprie al caso, et quelle che bisognano lasciano star di fare, se ben li è ricordato a tempo.

Siamo alli 6 di marzo et ancora de vinti millia stara di sale (dico stara Venetiani) che mi haveano promesso fin questo luglio et cominciato a condurne in questa fortezza da Saline, non ne è stato portato fino al presente mille stara, et questo non accade danari a comprarlo, perché ne è in abbondantia. Li ho fatto conzar et preparar una chiesa dishabitata fatta a volto, qual era in un giardino abbandonata,⁴ et fattoli fare le sue porte et murate le fenestre per farli questa monicione de 50 millia moza, dove mai si pò guastare, et se la cosa importa lo lascio considerare a Vostra Signoria Clarissima perché con detto sale, li bestiami et animali del Regno si condurebbono qui in Nicossia et salando le sue carne si farebbe durare un'assedio dui o 3 mesi di più, che sarebbe la conservatione del Regno. Onde che procedendosi così frigidamente, senza pensiero alcuno de altre⁵ infinite cose tali carnazzi restarebbono nell'isola fori della fortezza a beneficio et commodità de inimici, come è accaduto a Malta, non credendo Maltesi che l'armata venisse così presto a loro danni. Vostra Signoria Clarissima si deve ricordare che erano scritti all' hora in le nove, et se quelle erano miserie de quantità, et si dovevano infinitamente della discomodità de haverli persi per negligentia,⁶ et haverle lasciate a beneficio del inemico.

In quest'isola tal errore sarebbe mille volte peggiore per la quantità; da me non manca per inadvertentia et non mi giova a cruciarme se non si fa provisione del sale, delli formenti, delli orzi, mancosi fa de oglij, non de vini, non de condurre li legnami che Sua Serenità /

Terraferma, Turin 1986, pp. 109–110; P. F. Grendler, 'The leaders of the Venetian State, 1540–1609: A prosopographical analysis', *Studi Veneziani* n.s. XIX (1990), pp. 37–39. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 51. 3 Captain Lunardo Regolino was sent to Cyprus at the beginning of 1565, in charge of a troop of 125 soldiers stationed in Famagusta. He asked to return to Venice in spring 1567 when one of his daughters died; the Senate allowed him to do so on 15 May, and replaced him with Captain Giovanni Battista Triomphi, who took office nearly a year later; cf. infra, doc. 106: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 164^{r-v}; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 211^v–212^r. 4 Might this be a reference to the building situated near the Paphos Gate, known today as Castelliotissa? Cf. Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, pp. 176–177. 5 *darle* crossed out and *altre* added above. 6 *per negligentia* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

[119^r] ha mandati con tanta prontezza et spesa fino a Saline. Non manco ogni giorno di ricordarlo, mi rispondeno che attenda pur a fare li miei belloardi. Li ho risposto che sarebbero finiti ananti Natale se mi havessero dati li homini, il deffetto per la verità non viene dalli gentilhomini del Regno, quali si cruciano più de queste negligentie di quello che faccio io, et come ho detto la indispositione del Clarissimo Signor Proveditore fa gran danno a tutti questi negotij. Non basta haver la fabrica redotta in quel buon termine che la è al presente con settanta millia ducatti, ma li vole anco le altre provisioni a tempo.

Son sforzato a scriverli anco con mio dispiacere de dui errori che daranno perturbatione all'animo di Vostra Signoria come fa a me, non li dico per farli rimedio che il tempo non lo comportarà più, ma acciò che Vostra Signoria sia tanto più diligente a farmi levare di questo Regno, acciò che possa venir a morir in Italia, et che io non veda le cose cattive che io vedo qui tra le altre; la sa che la universalità⁷ di questo Regno, per restaurare li poveri miserabili a chi sono stata gettate giù le case, dettero cinque millia ducatti,⁸ et che da Venetia già tre mesi per benignità di quelli Signori Clarissimi furono mandati cinque millia ducatti per far quest'effetto proprio de restaurar li poveretti,⁹ mai si ha fatto una ressolutione al mondo. Questo genaro passato, io comparse ananti Sue Signorie Clarissime et li dissi che ne mancavano dui mesi di tempo per attender alla promessa fatta a Sua Serenità di haver posta Nicossia in fortezza per tutto marzo, et che a me per conto della fortificatione conveniva far 4 effetti, l'uno era di far li undeci belloardi, quali fino all'ora erano in bonissimo essere, mi conveniva far le undeci cortine, quale si facevano all'ora con la cavatione della fossa, che era il terzo effetto. Il quarto era che havendo gettate giù tutte le muraglie della città vecchie, era necessaria cosa a far la spianata de gettar giù le case qual sono immediate sul oro della fossa nova fino delle muraglie vecchie, nelle qual case, computate quelle che sono / [119^v] state rovinate in la fossa nova et sotto alli belloardi et terrapieni, in tutto vi habitavano diece millia anime et dentro della città fortificata sono rimaste undeci millia anime, ma la maggior parte delle bone case ricche. In tutta Nicossia sono al presente vinti doi millia anime, computati li soldati, sì che a diece millia sono andate et vanno giù le case.

Da diece giorni in qua convongo attender a far le spianate, di gettar giù tante case che non è altra infelicità al mondo quando vedere la miseria di questi poveretti, quali tutti vengano mandati da me, et tutti li Clarissimi voleno che io sia il boia, et io li dico che tutti li animi di questi poveretti sarebbero quietati se sapessero dove portar li suoi travi, li soi sassi et legnami delle sue case desfatte, et le sue povere masaritie di casa; mi vengono ananti gli occhij vecchi impotenti, donne et numero de fantolini a far esclamatione con tante lacrime che farebbono contaminare il gran diavolo, et se vi fosse poste da correre come si va de Fiandra a Roma, credo certo che io me havrei risigato di correr de qui in Cipro¹⁰ fino a Venetia, se ben havessi creduto di perder la vita, ma per venir al caso, io li mando alli Clarissimi Rettori, tanto che (come si sol dire) sono mandati da Rodes a Pillato.¹¹ Li poveretti

7 Should probably read *università*. 8 *detero cinque millia ducati* added above with signe-de-renvoi; cf. infra, doc. 83. 9 ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 68^r. 10 *de qui in Cipro* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 11 *From Herod to Pontius Pilate*, a tendentious religious reference, illustrating the distance G.S. kept

tutti sanno che diece millia scudi siano per questo conto et che Sua Serenità ne ha mandati cinque millia già alquanti mesi. Io dissi a Sue Signorie Clarissime che era una impietà a cacciarli fori di casa senza assignarli loco dove andare, et che dentro della città nova erano siti da far sei millia case, et più de giardini, non dico de gentilhomini ma possessioni arrate de orzo et formento seminate. Qualche pezzo di terra che ananti la fortificatione non si poteva vender cento ducatti, al presente ne trovano mille et sei cento. Li Signori Clarissimi fino de luglio fecero cride che niuno dovesse fabricare da novo senza sua licentia per voler compartire li siti vodi anco alli poveretti. L'effetto mai è stato fatto, ma li ricchi tutti hanno fabricato et comprati siti infiniti, non solamente per fabricar loro ma per farne mercantia / [120^f] et usure. Et sappia Vostra Signoria che li usurari in questo paese sono horrendi, quali mangiano la povertà et li gentilhomini ricchi molto straniamente, ben che tal cosa sia per tutto il mondo pur qui è forse peggio delli altri lochi.

Vedendo io le cose andar per mala strada, dissi a questi Signori Clarissimi che io era sforzato a far la spianata et che dovevano dispensare equalmente li diece millia ducatti in dar 15 perteghe di terra per ciascun' poveretto, ciò è un sito longo 5 passa di 6 piedi l'uno et largo 3 passa, che sarebbero stati più che contenti et harebbe costato un tal sito sesanta marcelli d'argento, cioè 6 ducatti per poveretto. Ricordai che fusse messa una limitatione, che un campo padoano di terra non fosse venduto niente più di 336 ducatti il campo, che prima non si vendeva 30 ducatti il campo, et che mi offeriva dando me Sue Signorie Clarissime quattro de questi Signori per compagni di compartire questi siti in 8 giorni alli poveretti et far fare le strade drette. Mi diedero per compagni 4 signori honoratissimi, il conte de Tripoli, il Signor Antonio Davila, il Signor Visconte¹² et il Signor Zuane Susomino. Fù dato principio a far due strade a traverso quelli gran campi, cominciando dalle gole delli belloardi tendendo alla volta del centro, cioè alla chiesa de Santa Sophia qual è restata giusta nel centro della fortezza nova.¹³ Cominciarono immediate li particolari che non erano miserabili alli broglij et li ricchi

between himself and the Church. ¹² Ugo Flatro came from a Greek family (some of whom were of Greek faith, some Latin) which became increasingly influential throughout the sixteenth century. Ugo went to the *mostra generale* of the feudal cavalry in April 1560, as a knight, and presented three horses, indicating a considerable income; furthermore, he leased estates, including that of the Corner brothers. He lost the election for viscount of Nicosia in February 1561, but was a *università* procurator on 17 June 1566, and finally became viscount on 26 January 1567, going on to serve from 1 July 1567 to the end of June 1569, when Thomaso Singlitico replaced him. He unconditionally supported the Nicosia fortification project, and gave much more money than could have been expected, as his assets were sequestrated by the *camera*, to whom he ended up in debt in November 1569. Ugo was Giovanni Sozomeno's father-in-law. He died on 9 September 1570 during the Ottoman assault: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 218; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (dispatch dated 12 February 1561), b. 5, separate fascicle, ff. 2^v–3^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, f. 53^v; MCC, *cod. P.D. C 2669/4A*, ff. 22^v, 35^v, 48^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 118–119 n. 233; Tucci, *Lettres d'un marchand vénitien*, no. 284; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', pp. 15–16; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 190; G. Grivaud, 'Les testaments parallèles des cousins Flatro (1523, 1538)', Ch. Maltezos / G. Varzelioti (eds), *Oltre la morte. Testamenti di Greci e Veneziani redatti a Venezia o in territorio greco-veneziano nei sec. XIV–XVIII*, Venice 2008, pp. 221–241. ¹³ Despite what G.S. says here, the Saint Sophia cathedral was not situated at the centre of the new enceinte. A drawing preserved in the ASV appears to

de chi erano li campi adoperarono le sue arte tanto che nacque sisma nel regimento proprio. Io per interesse di far presto la spianata sollecitava Sue Signorie Clarissime, et mai havemo potuto far tanto noi cinque che fino per tutto febraro sia stato dato ancora un sito alli poveretti et tutti cridano, et sono in estrema desperatione, il che è contra la volontà de Dio, contra la volontà del Senato, et li ricchi hanno comprati siti grandi et di loro si tace, si lavora a caso senza / [120^v] una regola al mondo, che non potrà caminar un cocchio per questa città, né manco 3 fanti o dui a un paro.

Monsignor Reverendissimo Arcivescovo ha fatto un gran presente che ha donato tutta la sua corte ananti il suo pallazzo per far una grandissima piazza tra Santa Sophia et la sua habitatione, qual cosa è necessaria, che alla piazza per li soccorsi et per li tumulti si tenghi sempre una guarda de soldati,¹⁴ il che qui non si pò fare. Li Clarissimi stanno da una parte della città, appresso alli belloardi Querini et Mulla, et la piazza rimane appresso alla Porta Caraffa, 700 passa lontano da Sue Signorie Clarissime,¹⁵ voglio dir che quella piazza non pol star lì dove che è al presente, perché sarà incommoda alle diece millia persone qual fabricano da novo, et questa piazza del'arcivescovo è necessaria ad esser fatta. Piazza senza strade non sta bene, volevimo noi cinque, in li siti novi lasciar le sue strade fatte con cervello. Sue Signore Clarissime ne hanno date certe risposte a tutti cinque che siamo chiariti, che voleno chel suo cavagliero faccia queste compartite, perché così il conte de Tripoli et il Signor Davila, et li altri dui hanno tanto caro il suo honore, quanto homini che siano al mondo et io son come loro, et lasciamo andar ogni cosa in mal hora, le fabriche tutte si fanno fori di regola con un dolor estremo de chi ha cervello. Se lo dicemo al Signor Proveditor, li vien fatte certe risposte tanto stranie chel povero Signore se amala da desperatione, et quello che è peggio li poveri cridano misericordia, et noi non li potemo far altro. Mi par esser al purgatorio, o per dir meglio a casa del diavolo. Mi vien voglia di stroparmi le orecchie per non udire tante lamentationi, come faccio quando che cavalco ogni giorno per li terragli in compagnia di conte de Rochas et de questi altri Signori et con il Governator Ronchone, che per non veder le fabriche irregolate senza strade, che si fano dentro via delli terragli, mi convengo tenir una mano ananti a quel occhio dalla parte verso / [121^r] fabriche fatte di novo di case, et per consolarme guardo dall'altra banda verso la fossa et li belloardi.

L'altro giorno, essendoli venuta una gran furia adosso di gente, mi dissero che dovesse far fare quelle case con ordine. Io li risposi che non era più possibile a metterli regola, essendo andato la cosa tanto ananti, et non so altro che concluder a Vostra Signoria Clarissima se non pregarla quanto più posso a liberarme da questo paese, perché ho deliberato di venir a finir la mia vita in questo mondo, star 4 mesi dell'anno in Venetia d'inverno, et li altri 8 a Osopo.

back G.S. up, putting the cathedral in the middle of the city with several streets branching out from it; but this is an error; cf. fig. 39. It should be noted that Étienne de Lusignan also situates the Saint Sophia cathedral at this imagined location; cf. fig. 45. ¹⁴ *di soldati* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. ¹⁵ This precious information is a confirmation that the *rettori*'s residence, situated to the northeast of the city, probably where the buildings of the old British administration used to be, was opposite the city's main square, which was near to the modern-day Famagusta Gate, and was thus what Florio Bustron refers to as the *piazza di basso*: *Historia overo Comentarîi de Cipro*, pp. 26, 463–464; Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, pp. 95, 107.

Prego Vostra Signoria de gratia che la mi voglia con ogni suo poter liberarme da questi paesi, perché non so più bono da niente, da qui ananti starò con mia mala satisfattione, et me raccomando a Vostra Signoria Clarissima quanto più passa. La morte del Querini è stata una mala cosa per questa fortezza.

Di Nicossia alli 4 marzo 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia. 1568 6 marzo. Replicata a 8 mazzo 1568 con la nave Contarina. N° 24.



54 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 10 March 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 122^r–123^r.

Last June G.S. was worried that the water table was too high for the moat at the Podocatoro bastion to be built. He originally thought simply of diverting the water, but in the end he was able to channel a headsource towards the countryside and thus irrigate villages and property belonging to the reale; this represents extra profits for Venice, as in Cyprus one piede of water can yield 4,000 ducats per year.

G.S. thanks God for this discovery, as it will fund the garrison of 600 soldiers needed to defend the fortress. The water will also be useful for the city if people agree to use it to irrigate fields capable of producing 500,000 stara of millet per year, as well as cotton and sugar-cane fields which could generate the money needed to pay the soldiers' wages. If this plan goes ahead, G.S. will for the rest of his life be content with how good a servant he has been to Venice; if his father and his uncles were alive, they would be pleased with their son and nephew.

G.S.'s plan is different to that of Clusone, who wanted to manufacture semolina biscuits. G.S. writes to ask that Venice resist intrigues and refuse to grant water to anyone at any price, dedicating it instead to the public good. Venice has spent enormous amounts on artillery and ammunition, the Cypriot lords have donated over 100,000 ducats and G.S. has invested his life and everything he owned into the island; but God has made an offering of this water.

G.S. anticipates an objection that Michiel might have concerning the water, namely that it could allow the enemy to come within one or two miglia [1.7 to 3.4 km] of the southeastern side of the enceinte and secure reserves for its armies. G.S. answers this argument with the assurance that the water table is shallow in this region and a well could be dug in four hours; the plan should thus go ahead.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Fino del mese di zugno, nel principio di questa fortificatione de Nicossia dubitai che l'acqua viva mi dovesse fare qualche impedimento alla cavatione della fossa al belloardo Po da

Cathero, perché li pozzi in quel loco erano pochissimo profondi et abbondanti de acqua, per il che considerai che con una cavatione di 300 passa di longhezza, facendoli un fosso a bastanza profondo, si potrebbe facilmente scaricare queste acque in una bassa verso Levante, et più mi venne in fantasia fino all' hora che cavandosi tutta la cunnetta era da sperare di trovarvi un grosso capo d'acqua, qual fosse più simile al nome de una seriola che una fontana grossa, et in manco d'un miglio per la pendentia grande del paese, per quella bassa che è sopra detta (qual cavatione è stata fatta dalle acque), si potrà condurre al piano della campagna in paesi et ville della reale, quali terreni patiscono d'acqua et se li sarà condotta quest'acqua, che io me ho imaginato di condurre, sperarò non solamente di haver fortificata Nicossia alli miei Signori Illustrissimi con manco di nonanta millia ducatti, et la più bella fortezza del mondo, che direbbe Vostra Signoria Clarissima se da questa cunnetta si cavasse un'acqua corrente,¹ alta uno piede et larga cinque o 6 piedi, un pie d'acqua in Cipro, cioè alta un piede et larga un piede, rende quattro millia ducatti d'entrata.²

Che Dio havesse voluto farmi tanto favore che mi havesse prestato la sua gratia di anteverer questo, acciò che io passa far anco questo segnalato servizio alla mia patria, cioè alli miei Signori, essendo che sarà necessario a tenerli al manco 600 fanti, et non li vole manco morso a così grosso cavallo, che con questa utilità di quest'acqua Sua Serenità pagasse questa spesa della guarda. Un'altra gratia mi / [122^v] accaderà di certezza che quest'acqua, havendola trovata io sarà anco cosa honesta che la sia dispensata in utile di questa fortezza in questo modo, in far seminare ogn'anno tanti campi de meglio quanto la potrà supplire in queste bellissime campagne, bone terre et sole ardente con l'acqua detta in pochissimo tempo si faranno cinque cento millia starà di meglio, et poi si attenderà a gottoni et a zucchini per pagar li soldati, et far altra spesa. Se questa cosa riuscirà vera, non parerà a Vostra Signoria Clarissima che mi potrò contentare di viver alegro questi pochi anni che mi restano, et potrò dir con verità di non esser stato inutile servitore delli miei Signori, et se mio padre et miei avi tornassero vivi, non dubiterei che mi dovessero reprimere di non haver fatto bona servitù a Vostre Signorie Clarissime, come era sempre stato la sua intentione, et li suoi ricordi.

Questa mia cosa non si assomiglia punto a quella offerta del Clusone,³ quando voleva si

1 *corrente* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 2 Although they do not give water prices, in their dispatches the Venetian officers explain that Nicosia experienced difficulties in obtaining enough water, as the citadel spring, which belonged to the *reale*, seemed to be the only one capable of ensuring an abundant supply of water, for the city and for the land of the Our Lady of Mercy priory. The fountain built at the *piazza di sopra* in the 1530s and the upkeep of its piping was all paid for by the *reale*, and no tax was ever imposed on water consumption; the priory, on the other hand, collected rent for the irrigated gardens it rented to individuals, and did not maintain the piping that took the water to the *piazza di basso*. Venice's officers report the tensions caused by the city's water management, in the 1560s precisely: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, cc. 173, 203; id., *Senato Mar*, filza 39, letter from Benedetto da Mula dated 31 March 1568. John Locke, who visited Nicosia in 1553, wrote that the *reale* demanded one bezant for each tree irrigated in the city's gardens: Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, p. 71; more generally: Grivaud / Schabel, 'La ville de Nicosie', p. 90; Coureas / Grivaud / Schabel, 'Frankish and Venetian Nicosia', pp. 117–118; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 1, pp. 108–109. 3 This is not the artillery captain Agostino Clusone, who served in Cyprus from 1558 / 1559 and wrote several reports on defending the island, as he died on 13 September 1565; cf. supra, doc. 6 n. 11, and BAM, *cod. A 88 inf.*, f. 23^v; it is

grossa provisione per insegnare a fare li biscotti de semola. Io non domando premio a niuno, anzi non lo scrivo a Sua Serenità ma l'ho detto bene questi giorni a questi Clarissimi Signori a un certo preposito, acciò non fussero ingannati da alcuni che ddesignavano ingannar sotto altra spetie havendomi sentito a parlar di quest'acqua, per il che ho voluto advertire Sue Signorie Clarissime che non facciano concessione alcuna per non rompermi questo disegno, che Dio me ha mandato ananti gli occhij per far un tanto utile a Sua Serenità, et havendo speso quelli Signori Illustrissimi tanti danari in artiglierie et monicione mandate qui, questi del Regno più di cento millia ducatti; et io ho messo la mia fatica vita et ciò che ho havuto, Dio vole lui ancora far quest'altro bene dell'acqua per far la cosa in somma perfettione, dilche ne sia sempre ringratiata Sua Maestà.

Conosco que Vostra Signoria Clarissima subito con il suo cervello mi farà un'oppositione, et io ho apparecchiata la contra mina: Vostra Signoria / [123'] Clarissima mi dirà sedeci o vinti millia ducatti d'entrata su le porte di Nicossia et la commodità de meglio è una bona cosa, ma li nemici in caso di guerra haverano il beneficio mediante quest'acqua di poter alloggiare un miglio o dui vicino alla città dalla parte di Greco Levante. La risposta è questa che dalla parte di sopra verso garbino, dove nasce la fontana, qui sono tanta quantità di pozzi et laccati pochissimo profondi et bone acque, che se ben noi tutti di diciparemo, in 4 hore si faranno delli pozzi da novo, li migliara et in un passo di cavatione si havrà tanta acqua quanta si vorrà vicina alla fortezza, un miglio, dui, tre, et 4, da notrire quattro esserciti non che uno; si pò adunque concludere che essendo altr'acqua vicina per li inimici, per questa causa, non porta la spesa a restar di fare un tanto utile a Sua Serenità. Però sarà bona cosa et Vostra Signoria Clarissima mai si potrebbe immaginare come un'hora mi pare mille anni a vedere a caminare quest'acqua, et con questo fine me raccomando sempre alla bona gratia di Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Di Nicossia alli 10 marzo 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo mio Signor osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michele, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 10 marzo 1568. Nave Barbara. 25. della seriola. 600 fanti per guarda di Nicossia.



rather another captain of the same name, most likely a son or nephew of Agostino, who leaves Venice for Cyprus in March 1568: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 80^v; see also *infra*, doc. 65.

55 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 31 March 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 124^r–125^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 85^{r-v}.

During the last week of March the ordinanze were summoned by the rettori to work on construction, and have done so very willingly. At the same time, the four companies of soldiers on board the Gradeniga reached Cyprus; but upon arrival they were exhausted, forty of them having died during the journey. Two thirds of them may be considered no more than mediocre; their captains in Venice praise them, but in reality they pale in comparison to the ordinanze.

It is thanks to Governor Roncone's attention to discipline and training that the ordinanze are now so good. The exemptions granted to the ordinanze must be maintained as a protection against the encroachments of Greek officials, who want to rob the peasantry. G.S. would like to see their numbers increased to 5,000, and then complemented by an equivalent number of Italian soldiers. The improvements made by the ordinanze have occurred only in the last few years; they were nothing like the same men six years ago in 1562.

Regarding Nicosia, it has been ten months since construction of the fortress commenced on 1 June. It only took five months to complete the earthen fortification, and G.S. provides an account of the money spent: the walls built to support the earthen bastions cost 2,200 ducats; the revetment at the Caraffa bastion cost another 2,000 ducats; diverting the river cost another 1,000; demolishing the old walls 5,000; and 4,000 ducats went on extraordinary expenses. Construction has taken ten months instead of five, which has entailed extra costs as the secretaries, cashiers and administrative staff at each of the eleven bastions have all had to be paid for longer.

Total spending is at 85,000 ducats, but the true figure is 75,000 ducats, five months of continuous work (so 15,000 ducats per month). G.S. reiterates that it is out of a desire to serve Venice that he gives such accounts.

Once again fearing an enemy attack, the rettori have for ten days been bringing into the city as many supplies as possible. G.S. reminds the doge that he already warned of the need for provisions in previous letters, and hopes he might merit some praise.

Serenissimo Principe,

Questa ultima settimana di marzo, li Clarissimi Signori suoi Rettori hanno fatto venire un'altra volta a lavorare le ordinanze, qual vennero con tanta prestezza con le sue arme, et con tanto buon animo che io mancherei molto del debito mio se non lo scrivesse alla Serenità Vostra, et in questa settimana istessa sono gionte qui in Nicossia le quattro compagnie sopra la nave Gradeniga, quale fanterie per il lungo viaggio sono venute molto rovinate, oltre più de quaranta morti.¹ Li altri mal conditionati ma questo è un accidente straordinario, ma per dirlo liberamente a Vostra Serenità de tutte le fanterie che sono venute qui, a pena che cavandone fori un terzo di loro, li altri dui terzi si potrebbero chiamare mediocrementemente bone, et ciò dico per esser quel terzo putti mal disposti delle vite et furfantelli boni da niente,

¹ 3,000 soldiers were sent by the Senate in January 1568: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 79^f.

ma li in Venetia li soi capitanij li gomfiano con tanti calzoni et arme, che pareno grassi et bianchi come le ocche da Ognisanti che se vendeno dalli contadini in Venetia, ma a comparisone de queste ordinanze, per le vite de questi grandi et putti, pareno tanto peggio.

Ho voluto reppresentarli la verità acciò che a sappia per l'avenire farne provisione, et che la conosca meglio la virtù di questo Magnifico Governator Ronchone, la diligentia et scientia del quale è stata causa che queste ordinanze sono in così buon esser, tanto obediante et ben essercitate, che sarà ben fatto che Vostra Serenità a qualche preposito scriva che a queste ordinanze siano conservate tutte le sue esentioni, perché certa sorte di generatione di ministri greci che governano le ville sempre cercano de intaccare questi delle ordinanze, ma se defendeno meglio che pono ricorrendo dal suo Governatore, essendo quelli ministri usi a scorticare li contadini molto senestramente fino su li ossi. Il detto Signor Governatore et io ricorremo al Clarissimo Signor Proveditore, qual ne da ogni favore ma tutti / [124^v] insieme non potemo tanto che basti a defenderli; per me vorrei che fossero cinque millia in tutto et accompagnati con altri tanti Italiani, saranno meglio che se fossero tutti Italiani, mentre che saranno governati fidelmente come sono al presente. Già sei anni non erano governate a questo modo, et all' hora io non teneva molto conto di loro, come le scrissi a quel tempo.²

Mi resta a dirli di questa fortificatione di Nicossia che, se ben dal principio di giugno fino in questo giorno che è l'ultimo di marzo, sono passati diece mesi intieri di tempo con tutto ciò non si ha lavorato a conto della fortificatione di terra se non cinque mesi iusti, come si pò vedere per il conto del danaro, et lo provo in questo modo. In ciascun belloardo per sustentar li terreni et per avanzar spesa dentro via delli fianchi, dove non pò esser fatto batteria, è stato lavorato di muro con pietre lavorate come hanno da stare per avanzar anco tempo di non star a fondare nel terreno posto da novo, per ciò in ciascun fianco li è fatto più de cinquanta passa di muro, sì che ogni belloardo ha de fatto cento passa di muro come ha da stare, che vol dire questa partita in undeci belloardi a doi ducatti il passo più di doi millia e ducento ducatti. A far la camisa al belloardo Caraffa di muro più de altri doi millia ducatti. Circa mille ducatti al divertire del torrente. Fino qui sono cinque millia nel spianare de tutte le muraglie vecchie, et altre assaisime fabbriche di muro, torrette per la polvere, case per soldati, et altre spese straordinarie fano una bona summa. Ma li è anco una partita che Vostra Serenità mi doverebbe metter a conto qual importa più presto quattro millia ducatti cha tre, qual è il danno che si ha havuto a far lavorare diece mesi continui dove che si harebbe potuto fare in cinque mesi, essendo che tanta spesa va in ciascun belloardo de scrivani, scontri, cassieri, quelli che dano li ferlini, massari et altre facende simile necessarie per far passare le cose ordinariamente senza confusione, queste tal sorte / [125^r] di spese sono andate così, quando erano ducento homini per belloardo come quando ne sono stati cinque cento, et ciò è proceduto non per inadvertentia mia, ma perché li sospetti mancavano et si stava in speranza di giorno in giorno che venissero li homini. Il tempo è passato di diece mesi, il che si poteva far in cinque come è detto, et la spesa è corsa che è questa partita grossa che io dico.

In tutta la summa della spesa del danaro siamo alli ottanta cinqu millia ducatti battuti

2 Cf. supra, doc. 14.

più diece millia et più delle cose sopradette, si viene a restare in li settanta cinque millia che io dico a Vostra Serenità, che sono per l'amountare de cinque mesi de lavoriero, a raggione de quindici millia ducatti al mese come ho detto. La prego a perdonarme se li venirò in fastidio con questi miei conti, se ben io mai né nessuno delli miei soldati maneggiamo danari di Vostra Serenità in conto alcuno, ma con li occhij et con le orecchie desidero bene per honor mio, con utile di Vostra Serenità di sapere li conti più particolarmente ch' io posso. Il Clarissimo Signor Provveditore confida in me, et io li voglio esser fidel servitore et farli honore in questo suo regimento.

Quanto alle vettoaglie da diece giorni in qua, questi Clarissimi essendo cresciuto il sospetto verrebbero che tutte le vettoaglie del Regno fossero dentro della città et fano quella maggior provisione che pono al presente. Da me, mai ha mancato di antevere a tempo a tutte le cose necessarie et ricordarle non una volta ma cento, come Vostra Serenità pol esser chiara dalle mie lettere che io li ho scritte li mesi passati,³ per le quali li scrivevo che dubitava di venir in fastidio a Sue Signorie Clarissime come son certissimo (non occorrendo il bisogno) mi haveranno per tale, et bisognando la Serenità Vostra almanco non me haverà per inadvertito che io non habbia pensato et ricordato le cose a tempo, sempre la troverà che io son stato et li sarò bonissimo servitore, et che sarò degno della sua laude et bona gratia alla quale sempre / [125^v] me raccomando.

Di Nicossia l'ultimo giorno di marzo 1568.⁴

Di Vostra Serenità Buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Serenissimo. ultimo marzo 1568. Nave Barbara. Replicate a 4 zugno. Delle ordinanze.



56 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 31 March 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 126^{r-v}.

Upon learning that work had resumed, the count of Tripoli [Giacomo de Nores] immediately offered 1,000 ducats in ready money, and 2,000 ducats in silver. Even though he is ill, the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] will also help to secure funds. G.S. has received two letters from Francesco Michiel and has written back to him. As the archbishop is en route to Venice, Michiel will hear a first-hand account of how well the fortification of Nicosia is going; all the same, G.S. expresses his satisfaction with the innovative cannon embrasures protecting the cannons.

³ Cf. supra, docs 35, 44, 51. ⁴ After this there is a paragraph that has been crossed out: *Sono poste le guardie alle tre porte nove et non si pò entrare in la fortezza, se non per li ponti di legno per li quali lavorano le opere. Fino cinque giorni, questi Clarissimi fano pensiero di levar mano di lavorare in diece belloardi per mancamento de danari, ma io desiderava bene di lavorar ancora un mese, come era la mia intentione. Si attenderà a fare quello che si potrà, secondo che sarà l'occasione del tempo et del mondo.*

Dispatches from Caramania and Syria state that Ottoman forces are preparing for war against Cyprus; in Sattalia fifteen transport ships and five barges capable of transporting 2,000 horses are being built, and timber is being cut for the making of siege weapons. The situation should be clear by around the middle of April, and G.S. assures Michiel that he will do his duty. He asks his correspondent to commend him to Antonio Tiepolo in order to counter the malicious rumours spread about him by Zuane di Garzoni in Candia. G.S. is relying for his defence on the support of his relatives and of Michiel; and he once again mentions Girolamo Martinengo, who he feels is better treated than he. He refutes the idea that the source of the rumours is to be found somewhere amidst his huge family, and knows that Michiel will bear witness to how much his relatives do for him.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Per questa nave Nana scrivo a Sua Serenità come la vederà. In quest' hora il conte de Tripoli, havendo inteso che volevano levar mano di lavorare, ha portato immediate mille ducatti de contadi, et offerto altri doi millia in argento per impegnare e desfare. Il conte de Rochas è un poco amalato et li hanno tratto sangue. Lui ancora non sopporterà ad ogni suo potere di aiutar a trovar danari. Per ciò non ho scritto a Sua Serenità quello che è depennato sopra questa copia. Altro non mi resta a dirli, se non che la ringratio infinitamente delle due lettere sue, qual ho havute con la nave Gradeniga. Li ho scritto copiosamente, per il capitan Leone, qual viene con Monsignor Arcivescovo, con la nave Contarina, dal qual Monsignor Arcivescovo Vostra Signoria Clarissima potrà intendere la reuscita di questa sua fortezza, ma le parole sono parole et le pitture sono fatte con li pennelli, per il che voglio dire che le gran machine di queste fabriche non si pono immaginare quello che in effetto sono, et se li Signori Marc'Antonio Collonna¹ et Corgna² laudano tanto quella pittura et ragione, molto più laudarebbero le particolare commodità et nove inventioni delle cannonere fatte per star

¹ Born near Rome on 26 February 1535, Marcantonio Colonna was a *condottiere* who from 1553 onwards served in the armies of Charles V. His hostility to Pope Paul IV, partly caused by questions of inheritance, saw him excommunicated on 4 May 1556; he did not help matters by fighting on the Neopolitan side in the war against the Holy See which ended in September 1557. He was protected by Philip II, and became one of the leading officers of the Kingdom of Naples; after his reconciliation with Pius V, he was given the command of the pontifical fleet following the ratification of the Holy League on 11 June 1570. The extent of his part in the September 1570 decision to abandon naval operations as far as Cyprus has been debated for a long time, but he was still in charge of the pontifical fleet at the Battle of Lepanto and in the years that followed, up until Venice and the Ottoman Empire signed a separate peace in 1573. He was appointed viceroy of Naples in January 1577, and died on 1 August 1584: F. Petrucci, 'Colonna, Marcantonio', *DBI*, vol. 27, pp. 368–383. ² Born in Perugia on 13 November 1516, Ascanio della Cornia was educated in Rome, where he studied military architecture. He fought in the Italian wars for the French, for the Farneses and then for the Holy Roman Empire and the Pope, and he lost an eye fighting the Spanish at Casale Monferrato. Charles V appointed him captain-general of 4,000 soldiers and 4,000 cavaliers in May 1552, but soon after he chose to serve Rome. He went back to serving Spain, however, under Philip II, and, as part of the Order of Saint Stephen, he helped to rescue Malta, leading 8,000 Italian and Spanish soldiers; he later proposed construction projects for the fortress in Malta. As campmaster-general of the Kingdom of Naples under Philip II, he played an important part in the 1570/1571 war, writing several reports; he died in Rome on 6 December 1571: I. Polverini Fosi, 'Ascanio della Cornia', *DBI*, vol. 36, pp. 761–767.

securamente et commodamente a far li effetti suoi, senza esser possibile da esser imboccate né rovinate le cannonere; queste particolarità per la verità a me pareno molto più notabile de ogni altra cosa, ma impossibile a poter esser scritte; se non li scrivo altro, la mi perdoni perché stamo d'hor' in hora, aspettando nova che si scopri l'armata turchesca.

Per li avisi qui de Caramania et di Soria, tutto il vulgo et anco qui hanno opinione che la guerra habbia ad esser con noi, in Constantinopoli è questa voce publica per tutta la città, pallandarie qui in Settelia non potemo sapere noi che siano state, né che si facciano. Le quindeci pallandarie / [126^v] de altro loco et le cinque maone potranno portare doi millia cavalli et più in una volta, et queste bastarebbono per l'effetto presente senza le cinquanta sopradette. Potrebbe esser in Settelia il tagliar de legnami per far travi, delli quali Turchi se servono per far gabioni, per impirli de terra, come facemo noi altri in Italia de detti gabioni. Non passerà 15 giorni di questo mese d'aprile, che entra dimane, che di raggione saremo chiari et Vostra Signoria stij sicura che il farò il debito mio, essendo che per l'anteveder delli homini le cose non pareno miracolose, et a ogni cosa vi è rimedio di qualche sorte a quelli che sono abbondanti de inventioni, et me raccomando senza fine alla bona gratia di Vostra Signoria, et la prego a farme raccomandato al Clarissimo Signor Antonio Thiepolo,³ al quale ho scritto et mai ho havuto risposta. Credo che sia causa il Magnifico messer Zuane di Garzoni,⁴ per quelli suoi rumori et humori che mi fece havere in Candia, ma la cortesia di Vostra Signoria supplisse con me, quanto potrebbeno fare tutti li miei parenti insieme. Io son una persona che fino del male a qualche tempo ne voglio cavar costrutto, dico ch' l Signor Hieronimo Martinengo ogni volta che li suoi fautori in Collegio li hanno per il passato notato qualche sorte di parte per darli gradi, et che poi in Senato non sono state poste ne ottennute, sempre prende per iscusca che io ho tanto gran parentado in Venetia che, per forza di broglij a mia instantia, li miei parenti li rompeno et impediscono tutti li suoi dessegni. Da qui ananti Vostra Signoria Clarissima sarà bonissimo testimonio de quante facende che miei parenti fanno per me, et sperarò nel Signor Dio che la verità sarà sempre conosciuta se ben tarda, al dispeto dei maligni et dei busari.

Di Nicossia ultimo marzo 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

3 Antonio Tiepolo was G.S.'s nephew; in 1522 his mother, Emilia Savorgnan (Girolamo's daughter from his first marriage), married Nicolò Tiepolo, *di Francesco*, and Antonio was born in 1526. He was given the title of *cavalier*, and his career was essentially diplomatic: he was an ambassador in Spain from 1564 to 1567, as G.S. recalls: *infra*, doc. 72, then was the Constantinople *bailo* from 1573 to 1576, and was in Rome from 1576 to 1578. He sat in the Council of Ten in 1572, and died relatively young in 1582. It should be noted that a report concerning Cyprus was addressed to him when he left for Constantinople: "Scrittura per informatione del Regno di Cipro a messer Antonio Thiepolo che andò Bailo a Costantinopoli", CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3757*, pp. 400–403; Grendler, 'The *tre savii sopra eresia* 1547–1605', p. 326; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 147. 4 Giovanni Garzoni appears to have been G.S.'s brother-in-law; in 1540 he married Regina Olimpia, the daughter, born in 1516, of Girolamo and Orsina Canal: Casella, *I Savorgnan*, p. 148. He may also have been a child of this couple, and the author of a letter which was particularly hostile to the marriage of Ascanio Savorgnan and Bianca Giustinian; cf. *supra*, p. 41.

Prego Vostra Signoria Clarissima a farne deventar amico quest' gentilhommo che li presenterà questa lettera.

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. ultimo marzo 1568. nave Barbara. Replicate a 4 zugno. 26.



57 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 2 April 1568

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, f. 128^r.

The three bastions under the rettori's supervision are a constant source of problems, as the rettori are seeking to outdo everyone by employing more workers, regardless of whether or not this is justified. They blame G.S. for their blunders, and what they say about him in public is testing his patience.

Since the beginning of June [1567], G.S. has not managed to bring any more than 6,000 mozza [20,000 l] of salt into the fortress, after being promised 50,000. Word has come from Turkey that there will be no war, despite what the bailo and the Senate think.

If war comes, as everybody here thinks it will, it will come as punishment for the negligence that slowed construction up to the end of January. In Constantinople rumour has it that war is imminent as the Turks want to attack while the fortress is not ready; this rumour, fuelled by Turkish spies, Jewish merchants and the Cypriots themselves, has finally stimulated construction.

Se Vostra Signoria Clarissima sapesse quanto è stato mala cosa a questa fabrica che li Clarissimi Rettori s'habbiano tolto a fare uno belloardi per uno mai la lo potrebbe creder, perché hanno invidia alli altri che fano bene. Vogliono far soperchierie alli altri belloardi con haver loro più gente, se ben non hanno de bisogno. Mai li vano a vederli ma mandano manoli, quali hanno fatto de brutte giottonarie et io porto la pena, et sopra mercato me dicano parole molto discortese di far perdere la patientia a San Iob.

Dal principio de giugno fino adesso, che ne havemo 2 d'aprile, non ho potuto far condure in questa fortezza se non sei millia mozzi de sale de 50 millia che me haveano permesso, non per altro si è restato, se non per avisi de Turchi et de altre sorte de gente che fanno giuditio che non sarà guerra. A questi vogliono creder et non al Bailo, né alla lettera del Senato.¹

Se la guerra venirà qui, come al presente tutti questi fano giudicio che debbi venire, faccio sapere a Vostra Signoria Clarissima che non viene per altra causa se non per la schietta negligentia che de ottobre fu usata di abbandonare questa fabrica fino a genaro, essendo che

¹ Contrary to what G.S. thought, the Senate was convinced that the Ottoman threat had disappeared by late January 1568, and demobilized 1,000 soldiers set to leave for Cyprus: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 79^r. G.S. is probably referring to older letters from the *bailo* and the Senate.

quelli tre mesi primi si lavoro con tanta diligentia et reputatione della fabrica, che in Constantinopoli la fama era grandissima, ma la suspensione è stata causa (se venivano) de haverli invitati a venire, credendo di certezza di trovare la fabrica imperfetta, essendo che le spie de Turchi infiniti che praticano qui l'hanno veduta, et molti hebrei mercadanti che sempre hanno negotij in questa città, et li Cipriotti proprij, non mancano de far simili officij.² Altro per adesso non ho che scriver a Vostra Signoria Clarissima, se non che me raccomando et l'ultima nave che è gionta qui è stata la Gradeniga col capitano Iacomo Grasso.³

Di Nicossia il di 2 aprile 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 2 aprile 1568. nave Barbara. Replicate a 5 di giugno. 27.



58 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 8 April 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 130^{r-v}.

G.S. revisits the question of supplying the fortress, which he has written about several times already. Concerning the 600,000 stara of grain that were supposed to arrive, only 40,000 have to date been forthcoming. Venice, however, has fulfilled her duty by sending artillery, ammunition and troops. If the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] had been allowed to do as he wanted, 100,000 stara of grain would have been secured by now.

The peasants are to be exempted from work on Lazarus Saturday to allow them to harvest the barley. The bailo has written from Constantinople that an 80-galley fleet is headed for Alexandria. There is talk of soldiers being mobilized in Konya and of janissaries being sent to

2 In their letters from the 1560s, Venice's officers frequently express their fears of discovering Turkish, Jewish or Cypriot spies: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 7, f. 41^r (12 February 1561, concerning Cypriots posted in Constantinople), reg. 8, ff. 105^v–106^r, and Parti secreta, filza 12 (17 February 1568, concerning Armenians mining in Famagusta), reg. 8, ff. 113^v–114^v, and Parti secreta, filza 13 (26 May 1568, concerning four Cypriot renegades, summarized by Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, p. 031); ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, cc. 127–128 (14 July 1561, concerning three Cypriots visiting Constantinople), 269 (12 July 1568, concerning Cypriot ambassadors in Constantinople), 270, 272 (12 and 26 July 1568, concerning Jews who supposedly mined underneath Famagusta's walls). These fears were also held by Venetian consuls in Syria at the sight of Cypriot *parici* moving to Ottoman lands to escape their inferior social status: Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, p. 563 (report from Antonio Zane, 1559). See more in Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 143–148. 3 Captain Giacomo Grasso, mentioned *infra*, doc. 65, served in Brescia before the Senate decided on 23 August 1567 to send him to Cyprus. He set sail for Cyprus with his company on board the *Gradeniga* at the end of December 1567: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 199^v; *id.*, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 88^r.

Beirut, all in preparation for an Arabian expedition. A campaign in Yemen is also rumoured; but how could the galleys sent to Alexandria fight in the Red Sea? Spies have been dispatched to the Layas coast to find out what kinds of tree are being cut down, and whether they are to be used to build siege engines or to build a fortress in Alexandretta, as is being claimed. A great haul of treasure has supposedly been found during these preparations. The island is waiting for news and, above all, for ships from Venice.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Conoscendo io quanto che ella ama il ben publico di questo Illustrissimo Dominio, a me fa gran giovamento a scriverli et dolermi di quelle cose che tante volte ho ricordato et antevuduto anzi importunate, come anco Vostra Signoria Clarissima in tante mie lettere la le pol haver udite, circa il vettoagliare a tempo questa fortezza ch' io scrissi, che al principio d'aprile non li sarebbe posto dentro il sesto delli sei cento millia stara venetiani che tanti vengono giudicati che siano et più nell'isola tra formenti et orzi; dicevo che a pena il sesto sarebbe condotto dentro che sarebbono stati cento millia stara Venetiani. Al presente che ne havemo 8 d'aprile, havemo tra formento et orzo cento millia moza, che sono da quaranta millia stara. Voglio dir per questo che la povera Signoria ha fatto il debito suo quanto alle monitioni et l'arteglierie, maggior parte a tempo et anco maggior parte del numero delli fanti. Io ancora non ho mancato in cosa alcuna né circa il tempo né circa la spesa. Dio volesse che altri havessero fatto il debito suo ma non voleno creder cosa alcuna. Se lasciavano continuare al conte di Rochas, fino a quest' hora sarebbeno stati condotti almanco cento millia stara, ma per ogni minimo aviso si leva mano del tutto et per un' altro si vol fare poi li miracoli. Credo haver detto pur troppo a Vostra Signoria, però farò fine raccomandome alla sua bona gratia.

Sabatto del olivo che sarà passa dimane,¹ si levarà mano de tutta la fabrica perché voleno lasciar andar li villani a tagliare li orzi. Il baijlo di Constantinopoli ha scritto hoggi di ottanta galere cinquanta veniranno in Alessandria, si ha havuto aviso che a Sio erano gionte 20 galee et quattro nave grosse con tre millia et più ianizzeri, dicono per andar in Alessandria. A queste / [130^v] marine di Caramania, si sente che fra terra si fa massa di gente a Cognia, che da Damasco vengono ianizzeri a Barutti, dicono per andar in Alessandria per mare per scapollare li deserti della Rabia Petrea. Li Arabi vicini alla Balsera et a Bagadet doppo un conflitto con Turchi si sono accordati.² Dicono che la perdita del Gemen appresso a Lamech sta ancora in esser, et Turchi lo voleno andar a recuperare.³ Le 50 galee per Alessandria non quadra molto alla guerra del mare Rosso né del Gemen; il tagliar legnami in golfo della Giaccia,⁴ dicono per portar al Caijro et poi per l'armata del Sues, si ha mandato a vedere sel

1 Saturday 12 April 1568. 2 An allusion to a minor revolt against the Ottomans which shook Basra in 1567: J. de Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris 1836, vol. 6, pp. 526–527.

3 From summer 1566 onwards a large part of Yemen rose up in revolt against the Ottomans, forcing the latter to launch a military campaign to reassert their authority; the leader chosen from August 1568 onwards was the governor of Egypt, Sinan Pasha. The last of the Yemeni rebel bastions fell in January 1569: M. Tuchscherer, 'Chronologie du Yémen (1500–1635)', *Chroniques yéménites* 8 (2000), nos 55–57 [www://hdl:10670/1.uqe944].

4 The bay of Ayas / Lajazzo, which was on the Cilician coast.

legname è tagliato di rovore o de albedo, se sarà rovore la gravezza sua non è commodo a far bastioni. Se sarà albedo non quadra che habbia ad andare altramente al Sues. Dicono qui che si fabrica una grossa fortezza, con gran diligentia sopra un gran porto in golfo della Giaccia, appresso dove era Antiochia famosa. Alcuni dicono a Lessandretta et che cavando in quelle rovine vecchie hanno trovato tre pezzi d'arteglieria sotto terra et assai thesoro appresso, le quali arteglie de raggione deveno esser molto antique, dico di cent'anni et forse più. Altre nove per adesso non ho da scriverle et nave grosse da Venetia non vengano, il che ne fa pensare che grossa provisione d'ogni cosa debba venire da Venetia con il Clarissimo Signor Luogotenente.⁵

Di Nicossia alli 8 aprile 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 8 aprile 1568. nave Barbara. 28.



59 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 18 April 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 132^{r-v}.

In response to Michiel's letters, G.S. asks that nobody in Venice intercede on his behalf, as he would rather wait and see what treatment Girolamo Martinengo will receive; G.S. feels that he should be better treated than Martinengo, and that if this is not the case, due to his age he will return to Friuli and leave the service of Venice to his nephews. It is best to leave things in the hands of God, and see if Martinengo is able to build bastions without spending a lot of money.

In Cyprus, one foot of water yields over 8,000 ducats per year, and this water is easily obtained in the moats at six of the bastions. With an investment of 100 ducats, a spring of two feet of water could be obtained; G.S. wants to offer this discovery to Venice as proof of his loyal service, preferring to look mediocre than to gain a better image via intrigues.

No work has been done on the fortress for eight days; G.S. is being asked by everybody to have the patience of Job, but he feels the delay damages the interests of Venice and of Christianity itself. G.S. reiterates that he will forever be Michiel's loyal servant.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

La ringratio delle sue lettere qual ho havute con la nave Dolfina heri, che fu la seconda festa di Pasqua. La supplico a operar quanto più la potrà che non mi sij fatto alcuna sorte de remunerazione non de grado né de utile, perché per me fa di star a vedere ciò che faranno al

⁵ Nicolò Dandolo, who arrived in Cyprus in summer 1568.

Signor Hieronimo Martinengo, et se non sarò giudicato un ponto meglio de lui sarà forse la mia ventura, essendo vecchio come io son, con questa scusa mi potrò andar in Frioli a fare assettar qualche risara per la quale miei nepoti potrebbero andar a veder delle guerre, per far con tempo qualche utile a Sua Serenità, ma se saranno furfanti, poveretti mendici facilmente la necessità li farà deventar ladroni de paghe et de capisoldi¹ come si usa a fare, sì che il mio andar a star in Frioli sarebbe l'utile del Principe, et lasciar ch'l Signor Hieronimo Martinengo che serve meglio di me li Signori in particolare di quello che faccio io, ma nel servitio publico non direi così, però lasciamo far a messer Domenedio, et Vostra Signoria Clarissima intratenga pur la cosa fino al mio arrivare in Venetia che qualche maligno non mi faccia far qualche espeditione strania, et ch'l Signor Hieronimo pur faccia far lui delli belloardi et orecchioni con pochi danari, perché se ne intende bene et è più sortato² di me.

Voglio cominciare adesso a deventar agricoltore di San Marco, et li dico per cosa certa, che heri l'ho veduto con li occhij proprij et mesurata, che un pie d'acqua in questo Regno, sette miglia lontano qui da Nicossia, rende più de otto millia ducatti d'entrata. In questa fossa ho l'acqua in sei belloardi molto vicina et con cento ducatti di spesa la caverò per la livellatione del sito basso fori della città al piano delli campi fertilissimi ma secchi, sì che non è homo in Nicossia che non habbia opinione che faccia nascer una / [132^v] seriola grossa d'acqua, et se fosse solamente de dui piedi vorrebbe dir sedeci millia ducatti all'anno alla Serenissima Signoria, dil che questi Signori Clarissimi ne hanno scritto a Sua Serenità per quello mi hanno detto che io li voglio far un tal presente, io ho ben dette tal parole alli Signori Rettori che spero far tal effetto, ma non l'ho già scritto a Sua Serenità ma ben à Vostra Signoria sola et non ad altri, alla qual dico che sempre la cosa viene meglio. Scriverò poi a Sua Serenità quando sarà fatta, essendo che io ho più piacere di esser con li effetti buon servitor di questo stato, et parer mediocre più presto cha esser in l'effetto piccolo et in l'apparentia grande, il che non si pò fare senza inganni et astutie, qual lasciarò fare a chi è usato a farle, quali poi (in li bisogni de importantia) perdono la scrimia con danno del Principe, et se bene siamo confessati la settimana passata Vostra Signoria Clarissima dirà che cominciamo a dir male delli homini del mondo, et cominciamo libro novo.

Io li rispondo che sarebbe vero quando dicesse busie, et per dirli un'altra verità, sono 8 giorni che per santità et al mio dispetto si sta senza lavorare, et Vostra Signoria mi comanda et mi fa comandare da miei nipoti, da miei fratelli et da episcopi che io debba haver la patientia de Iob, qual se tornasse in danno a me solo sarebbe poco male, ma che colpa ne ha la Signoria di Venetia et la christianitade, sì che ho intricato il cervello; il Signor Dio me aiuterà havendo bon animo per la sua fede et per li miei patroni, et a Vostra Signoria me raccomando infinitamente, restandoli sempre servitor obbligatissimo et la mia servitù con lei ha da durare

1 In the 1560s soldiers in Venice's armies received a regular remuneration called the *paga*, a sum usually set at 3 ducats paid out eight times per year, once every forty-five days, in peacetime, and ten times per year in wartime. To this basic pay was added the *caposoldo*, a supplementary wage set at 10% of the *paga* which was given to soldiers who used certain dangerous weapons, or weapons requiring special maintenance: Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 367–371. 2 Cf. *sorte*, fate.

sempre, perché è nasciuta et cresciuta per nobili cause come quella sa meglio di me, però il Signor Dio la farà esser perpetua et sempre più bona, et alla sua bona gratia sempre me raccomandando.

Li mandai l'oglio vecchio de Cerines, qual fin hora la lo havrà havuto.

Di Nicossia alli 18 aprile 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel, del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 18 april. Della seriola. N° 29.



60 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 8 May 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 134^r–136^r.

One year, he notes, since his arrival in Nicosia, G.S. reports that letters have arrived announcing the preparation of the Ottoman fleet for an attack on Cyprus. The rettori are now full of remorse, having ignored G.S.'s reproachful reminders of the Senate's and the doge's orders, which all echoed the dispatches sent by the Constantinople bailo calling for work on the fortification to be accelerated.

The rettori are admitting their mistakes; G.S. expresses how he has been forever at the doge's service, and once again states that he has ceaselessly carried out Venice's orders, as they have always been feasible. Fortifying Nicosia could have been finished by Christmas [1567], but was completed four months later, at no extra cost for the Senate. G.S. admits that during this period Michiel's advice imbued him with the patience he needed.

When news reaches Nicosia, Greek secretaries take it and air it to the public, without first informing the rettori. G.S. has tested how quickly and how well Venetian officers react to and pass on important information, and he has concluded that they are [to use the terms of common Renaissance medical categories] cold and mundane. To avoid rumours liable to cause popular unrest, G.S. took the initiative of holding a public meeting, where he was able to display his oratory skills.

At this meeting, G.S. first deflated the tension with a witty joke, then developed a line of argument that drew a parallel between the efforts of Venice and those of Cyprus, insisting upon the need to protect the populace with three fortresses. The Nicosia fortress has been financed by the noble council, who have given 113,000 ducats; Venice has, for its part, invested 200,000 ducats in defending the island, not including the soldiers' wages. This being the case, what sense is there in arguing over whether or not Cypriots are Venice's best subjects, or whether or not Venice is the best of rulers for its subjects? In the end this reasoning calmed everyone's tempers.

G.S. goes on to state that in order to defend the fortress he is more in need of 2,000 construction workers than he is of new troops; he is convinced that he will be able to hold

Nicosia and Famagusta until aid arrives. The enemy must not be left to make off from the island with 50,000 to 80,000 peasants, and their masters must warn the peasantry that they need to get to Nicosia. The custom of abandoning the countryside to 400 Mamluk cavaliers while the peasants flee to the mountain forests must end; the peasantry cannot be given up to the enemy, as the latter will immediately use the new manpower to dig trenches and erect cavaliers during sieges, forcing the fortress defenders to shoot at their own. The peasants would be used to transport supplies, and any who refused to enter the fortress would be stabbed to death. G.S. ends his letter by stressing the need for men who know how to run fortresses.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

In questo giorno che è alli 8 di maggio, un'anno iusto che io arrivai in questa città di Nicossia,¹ sono venute lettere a questi Clarissimi che l'armata turchesca al numero di cento et cinquanta vele, col Bassa general del mare, di certezza ha da venire a questa impresa, per il che vorrei che Vostra Signoria havesse sentito in che modo che Sue Signorie Clarissime dicevano confessando de haver havuto mala opinione, mai havessimo pensato et simil facende, dubitandosi che io non li dicesse che li miei ricordi sempre erano in questa forma, che si dovesse con ogni diligentia attender ad obedire li mandati et lettere dell'Eccellentissimo Senato, et più presto obedir il Senato et far male in simili casi, dove tira dredo a sé cose di tanta importantia, che voler far giuditij da nostra posta fondati in aere et abandonar, et disobedire il mandato del Principe nostro, li quali mandati di Sua Serenità però non erano contrarij alle lettere del Baijlo nostro, qual diceva sempre le cose sono in tali termini, ma non restate però li di celerare la fortificatione et mettervi in perfetta fortezza del tutto, perché non bisogna stare alla fede né alla discretione d'altri potenti et diversi di religione, sì che queste parole per ogni man di lettere sono state tale non repugnante alle comissioni di Sua Serenità.

Io però, per obedire alli commandamenti di Vostra Signoria, non ho voluto mai rimproverare l'error passato, ma come dico da sé stessi pubblicamente andavano confessando il suo errore. Mai ho detto altro, se non che la mia natura è di tenerme al resto et al beneficio del Principe, il che è a far da qui ananti operatione tale da homini antevuduti, et che più non me habbia ad intravenire di dire non l'harei pensato, o per dir meglio non te lo volemo credere, o / [134^y] per dir peggio non havenimo voluto obedir il Senato. Crederò di certezza che io havrò poca fatica a far creder a Vostra Signoria Clarissima che io sempre son stato della opinione sopradetta di voler fare presto quello che ne era commandato dal Principe, non dico le cose impossibile perché Sua Serenità ne ha commandato cose fatibile, et che se havessero voluto, si havrebbe fatto per Natale quello che è stato fatto quattro mesi dappoi, non però con più spesa del Senato ma con più vantaggio, et al presente si attenderebbe a far delle altre cose di più, qual sempre mancano a una fortezza vecchia non che a una nova, come questa di sei mesi di età che tanto se li ha lavorato atorno, ma se Vostra Signoria Clarissima sapesse quanto che io son diventato paziente ad instantia delle sue lettere, mai la lo potrebbe credere, dil che la ringratio infinitamente.

¹ Indeed, G.S. reached Nicosia on 8 May 1567; cf. supra, doc. 25.

Da queste nove qual per gratia di Dio sempre li scrivano Greci, quali le traducono per tutte le piazze, sono lette prima che li Rettori le sappiano.² Ananti le quindeci hore tutta la piazza era piena et ho voluto vedere la discretione di questi Signori, mi fu detto a me immediate, giudicai che fusse una baia non mi mandando Sue Signorie a dir niente. Il mio alloggiamento è lontano da due³ di Sue Signorie Clarissime, manco de un tiro d'arco da ballotte.⁴ Alle 21 hora, se io non andava da Sue Signorie Clarissime, credo che induggiavano all'altro giorno, ovvero all'altra settimana, a farmelo sapere tanto sono sensitivi, non composti però di materia secca et calda ma frigida, terrea, fleumatica, melinconica, et peggio se io sapesse dirlo. Dal rumor del vulgo cominciorono a considerarvi sopra per il numero delli primarij gentilhomini che vi concorsero, et per acquiettar il strepito dimandai un consiglio publico a mia instantia per dirli diece parole, et se Vostra Signoria Clarissima avesse veduto quanto pole la forza de quindeci o vinti parole, dette da un soldato / [135'] capo de gli altri, son certissimo che la crederebbe molto più li effetti miracolosi che si leggono nelle historie de orationi fatte da soldati, senatori, et altra sorte di gente.

Li dissi prima burlando che io li havea data questa incomodità di farli venire con questo gran caldo, et che io l'havea fatto a baldezza, essendo che tante volte io andava alli belloardi per suo servitio. Questa sola parola detta, ridendo da me, fece far mutatione a tanti visi che erano diventati palidi et in fuga, immediate tornorono vivi, anzi risero, come faceva io. Poi li dissi, che si desideravano li gran cavalli da tutti li homini per portarvi sopra gran quantità d'arme, medesimamente le nave si facevano grande a fine di portarvi dentro gran copia de mercantie, et che l'Illustrissimo Senato nostro havea medesimamente fatto fare questa fortezza di Nicossia così grande a fine de cavarne gran utile di lei, in li tempi torbedi come sono questi, essendo che Famagosta et Cerines con gran fatica teniranno quaranta millia anime salve, ma ch'l resto delle anime del Regno tutte qual son più di cento millia et tante debbano in ogni modo venir tutte a salvarsi qui dentro, perché per tal effetto questi gentilhomini tutti et la universalità⁵ si hanno discomodato di dare a questa fabrica, et a Sua Serenità cento e tredici millia ducatti, et che all'incontro Sua Serenità per non si lasciar vincer di cortesia, et de amorevolezza della bontà delli animi de tutto questo Regno, lei ancora del suo ha speso fino al presente assai più di ducento millia scudi, tra monitioni et danari mandati, senza la spesa delli soldati, et che me restava in dubio nella mente, qual era difficile da rissolvere se tutti loro del Regno erano più boni servitori a Sua Serenità, ovvero se detti Signori erano migliori patroni, et

2 In June 1565 the Council of Ten had already been informed of fiscal documents belonging to the *reale* being leaked to the public; the Council called on the *regimento* to take action to prevent these leaks: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Secreta, reg. 8, f. 35^v. Ascanio Savorgnan also discussed this problem; cf. *supra*, doc. 16. According to a 1558 report, the Cypriot chancery gave responsibility to a proxy: the great councillor, whom the Senate appointed, was in essence just of formal significance, and it was the chancellor who was left with most of the administrative duties ("il cancellier di Nicosia legge le lettere di Vostra Serenità, leva le ziffre, risponde alle ziffre per questa città [Venice], et per Costantinopoli, et non dimeno è ciprioto et è del populo": CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3558/11*, f. 6^v). In 1565, Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo complained of many administrative dysfunctions: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 100–102. 3 Either a unit of distance is missing, or this is an error on the part of the copyist.

4 A bow used in bird-hunting, which fired small iron pellets. 5 This is doubtless a mistake for *università*.

amorevoli alli suoi sudditi, et che per me non mi sapeva rissolver a far giuditio qual era meglio, o il patrone o il servitore, qual cosa li fece un risentimento nelli / [135^v] animi de tutti incredibile, et alli Clarissimi proprij piacque infinitamente.

Il caso mio era questo, che il defender questa fortezza dandomi solamente doi millia homini da lavorare, et non più che stessero securi de ogni sorte forza, se ben non si havesse né più fanteria, né più arteglieria né altra monicione, et che questa defesa a me sarebbe più facile et manco fatica che fare un'altro belloardo de più, ma che il ponto stava qui, che era certissimo di conservare a Sua Serenità Nicossia et Famagosta, et che prestissimo havressimo il soccorso, essendo tanto cari a Sua Serenità, ma che io dappoi havuto il soccorso, et medesimamente il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore, qual nominai prima, quando che andremo a Venetia, et che Sua Serenità ne dovrebbe far bona chiera per haverli conservate queste fortezze et l'isola.

Quando che considerassero poi che inimici ne havessero menati via cinquanta, overo ottanta millia anime, che in quel caso non ne potrebbe esser fatta molto bona chiera a Venetia, per il che ho voluto tener tutte le vie possibile di farli sapere la intentione di Sua Serenità, qual è stata di far questa fortezza così grande a fine che sia recettaculo de tutti li popoli, et che non se ne perda pur uno, et però che tutti loro patroni delli casali debbano immediate usar ogni diligentia, et astringer li soi villani a venire qui tutti et levarli da certe fantasie antique che si usavano al tempo delle guerre vecchie tra li Re, che 400 cavalli di Mamalucchi dominavano la campagna et li contadini si salvavano in le montagne, quale all' hora erano tutte piene de boschi foltissimi, ma che al presente veniranno le quaranta millia persone et più et quattro o cinque millia archibusieri, che in una settimana tutti sarebbono in poter de inimici, quali immediate li mandarebbono sopra li ori delle fosse a farne delle trincee et cavalleri per offenderne, di modo che a noi / [136^r] convenira amazzarli con l'arteglierie et gettar via la polvere et le palle, il qual effetto lo vorrei fare molto voluntieri nelli Turchi, et non in li christiani. Però ch' io faccio sapere che se me ne avederò che qualch' uno faccia moto o segno di non voler venire, che saranno amazati da noi con le arme da mano per sparagnare la polvere contra li Turchi, et che questo era il ponto per il quale io li haver chiamati, et che questo salvarsi tutti dentro della fortezza tirava dietro a sé, il portar le vettoarie dentro; del qual effetto lasciavo l'impaccio a Sue Signorie Clarissime, essendo che Sua Serenità havea molto ben satisfatto alle due sue parte tante volte dette, et che circa le mie due parte, me ne contentava del esser nostro et che io disarcicava sopra a Sue Signorie Clarissime delle sue due per darli maggior stimolo, ma (come si dice) non giova a scuoter il freno, sì che non è stato fori di proposito questo fatto de acquiettare le conclusioni. Però non bastano le fortezze ma homini che le sappiano governare, et non fatti per broglio né de puttane né di robba, et con questo facendo fine a Vostra Signoria Clarissima sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 8 maggio 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michele, del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 8 mazo. N° 30.

61 *Regulations for the Nicosia infantry, addressed to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 20 May 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 140^v–141^r, and other copy ff. 138^v–139^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 90^{r-v}; edited by E. Skoufari, ‘Corti di giustizia a Cipro veneziana: un ambiente istituzionale di scambio interculturale’, in E. Skoufari (ed.), *La Serenissima a Cipro. Incontri di culture nel Cinquecento*, Rome 2013, pp. 85–86.

In Nicosia's fortress, the following eleven regulations are to be observed:

1. *The use of arms during any dispute within the fortress shall be punished by hanging.*
2. *Any dispute, verbal or physical, with the Greeks shall be severely punished, regardless of whether arms are used or not.*
3. *Each man shall defend with his life the honour of Nicosia's women.*
4. *Disputes instigated by armed soldiers outside the fortress shall be punished according to the gravity of the incident.*
5. *Soldiers and corporals are forbidden from leaving the fortress to settle disputes; only captains, or their representatives, may leave the fortress in the event of a fight, to prevent soldiers from killing each other.*
6. *Any man seeking conflict in the surrounding areas of the fortress will do so at the risk of being shot by the artillery, and shall be punished.*
7. *Any man who challenges another without good reason shall receive the strappado.*
8. *It is forbidden to fire arquebuses inside the fortress, except in the case of exercises ordered by captains; arquebuses may be fired from the walls, as long as no shots are directed at the city.*
9. *Any soldier who disrespects the watch or is found guilty of blasphemy, falsehood, or insulting or challenging other men, shall be punished.*
10. *At the gates, soldiers shall not lay their fingers on anything brought into the city, except for one piece of wood from each cart with which they shall feed the fires for the arquebusiers keeping watch; if there is any wood remaining when guards change over, it shall be given to the soldiers and shared between at least ten people.*
11. *Soldiers shall not challenge any of their superiors; they shall do their guard duty as their chiefs tell them to; in the event of an illegal order, they shall notify their captains, who shall protect their soldiers and punish whoever gave the illegal order; if a soldier does not receive the support of his captain, he may turn to the captain's superiors.*

Questi undici capitoli, et ordeni hanno da esser osservati da tutti li soldati che saranno in questa fortezza di Nicossia.

1. Che il primo che metterà mano ad arme per far questione dentro della fortezza sij impiccato per la gola, come sta la crida del Clarissimo Signor Proveditor Generale.¹

¹ This measure seems to have been due to a genuine need for public safety; in September 1563 the right to carry weapons was seen as the main cause of the numerous murders on the island, particularly on the roads: ASV, *Collegio (Secreta)*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from Councillor Bernardo Bellegno, f. 4^r.

2. Che sij castigato sceveramente quello che attaccherà questione con li Greci, sì de parole come de fatti, se ben non li intraverirà arme, non li tollendo pur una minima cosa sua senza pagargliela et con sua volontà.
3. Che all'honor delle donne si debba advertire tanto quanto si ha a cara la vità.
4. Che quando alcuni soldati vanno assai volte fori della fortezza per sua pazzia a far questione, se anderanno armati di arme di maglia siano castigati, secondo sarà stato il suo errore.
5. Che sia proibito a tutti li fanti, lanze spezzate et a caporali di andar fori della fortezza per metter di mezo, ovvero per vederli a far questione, ma sia ben lecito alli signori capitaniij d'andar loro ovvero mandar li suoi luogotenenti, alfieri et sergenti per devedarli che non se amazzino, ma per non far tumulto in la terra; in questo andar a vedere sia proibito andarvi altre persone che le soprannominate, sotto pena di esser castigati li disobedienti.
6. Che medesimamente siano castigati quelli che anderanno a far questione a tanto vicini alla fortezza che l'artiglieria nostra possa giungerli, et se saranno amazzati dalle dette arteglierie il danno sarà suo, sì de loro come de quelli che anderanno appresso d'essi.
7. Che coloro che faranno disfide all'altro soldato senza causa dobbia de haver la corda irremisibilmente per il manco.
8. Che non si debba tirar archibugiate per la città se non quando li signori capitaniij commanderanno a far le salve, ma nelli belloardi et sopra li terragli sia ben lecito a tirar archibugiate a suo piacere, ma non verso le case della città.
9. Che sia lecito (anzi imposto et comandato) et quando non sono loro alli suoi ufficiali primarij a quali restarà il governo della guarda, che debbano castigare tutti quelli soldati che non havranno riverentia alla detta guarda di biastemare, di dar mentite né manco sfidar alcuno né farli alcuna sorte d'ingiurie, et possano adoperare anco le arme nel castigarli giustamente, sì come sarà stata la prosuntione sua.
10. Che alle porte li soldati non debbano tore né toccare niuna sorte di robbe che vengano dentro della città né frutti, ma solamente un pezo di legno per somma et per carro, qual non sia dishonestamente grande per mantener il foco per li achibuggieri in guarda, et se al muttar delle garde sopra abbondasse qualche quantità di legne quella non sia in modo alcuno delli capitaniij né delli luogotenenti né delli alfieri, né delli sargenti né de niuno caporale, ma delli fanti privati, et compartita almanco in diece persone a fine che non siano fatte cose dishoneste dalli ufficiali.
11. Che in alcun modo non sia lecito alli soldati di venir a quella ne a disfidar alcuno suo caporale, non sargenti, non alfieri né luogotenenti, ma debbano obedire alle fattioni, che li saranno imposte et comandate senza replica alcuna, et se li sarà comandato a fare cosa non lecita per quella volta sola la debba fare per non venir in rumore con quello che commanda alla guarda, ma che immediate il soldato che si sentira aggravato che li sij stata commandata cosa inlecita, debba prima andarsene a dolere dal signor suo capitano, al qual capitano è imposto et comandato che non debba lasciar far torto alli suoi soldati, castigando qual suo ministro se havrà comandato cosa inlecita, con tal sorte di

castigo come si conviene alla sua auttorità, sì che il detto soldato obediente resti satisfatto della provisione che havrà fatta il detto suo capitano, et se per sorte (il che non è da credere) che qualche capitano non ne tenesse conto della ingiuria fatta dal suo ministro al povero soldato obediente, che in qual caso il soldato debba ricorrere dalli superiori delli capitanij, quali suppliranno molto ben loro in far giustitia contra quelli che li detti signori capitanij (per qualche suo rispetto) volessero mancare.

In Nicossia alli 20 maggio 1568.

Fu posta a tutte le garde delli soldati.

Al Magnifico Signor Francesco Michele. 1568 20 mazo. Capitoli de soldati. N° 31.



62 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 3 June 1568

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 89^v–90^r.

In Famagusta, G.S. has observed that Captain Lorenzo Bembo had little Jewish houses demolished so as to clear the areas surrounding the walls; he wishes to create a road to facilitate the movement of troops and artillery, which is currently not being accomplished. He has had the Maruffi tower destroyed in order to install four cannon embrasures, so as to reinforce the defence of the north-westerly area of the city; also, the moat near to the arsenal has been enlarged.

Out of the 5,000 newly-arrived soldiers, 2,000 have been stationed in Famagusta, and the rest in Nicosia. Famagusta has received the most experienced captains, including Girolamo da Gubbio; and the fortress is well-stocked with ammunition and provisions. Captain Bembo wants to get rid of 200 unnecessary soldiers, and the Nicosia rettori too want to dismiss 200 to 300 such men and send them back to Italy.

G.S. again sings the praises of Governor Roncone, who he believes is very gifted and should be made governor of the fortress, especially since the ordinanze he commanded are to be an essential part of the defence of the fortress. The soldiers sent from Italy will be less in number, and one must consider the tensions that may arise between an ordinanze governor with 5,000 men under his command and the city governor in charge of 2,000 to 3,000 Italian soldiers. G.S. wishes to see a unified command, insisting on Roncone's fine judgement and sense of duty and recalling that he is the oldest man still serving in the military, proof of his honour and of his loyalty to Venice. The Caraffa bastion is half-bonded; the revetments have been entrusted to two teams, one of ten Italian masons commanded by a Greek proto, the other of ten Greek masons also commanded by a Greek proto. The energy and motivation that this situation has created is producing miracles, and measures need to be taken to stop the masons from working during the hottest hours of the day. The fortress is thus set to rival any in Italy, for beauty and for quality, although it is the cost and duration of the new project that must be respected above everything

else. G.S. thanks God that he has been able to see his project through with Proveditor Francesco Barbaro and Governor Roncone.

G.S. concludes by asking once more if he can be discharged from Cyprus, providing there is no Ottoman threat (he stresses that he would never leave his post if the island were in danger).

Serenissimo Principe,

Il giorno della Sensa¹ arrivai a Famagosta, dove quel Clarissimo Capitano del Regno ha fatto gettare a terra al quante casette nelle quali stavano delli Hebrei, et per la verità erano poste in parte dentro delli terragli et stavano male.² Al presente Sua Signoria Clarissima vol haver una strada da potervi condur soldati et artiglierie tra le case et li terrapieni, et con questa occasione Sua Signoria Clarissima la fa fare, che in altri tempi per ananti ciò non si faceva, per esser quella fortezza in quel tempo sola et piccola rispetto al gran numero delle anime de tutto il Regno, et anderà continuandola in li luochi che sarà di bisogno et starà bene per ogni rispetto. / [89^v]

Sua Signoria Clarissima anco fece tagliare et desfare quel turrion qual faceva impedimento all'angolo della tanaglia dalla parte verso tramontana,³ et li ha fatto fare in quel angulo quattro cannonere, qual stano molto bene et quella parte di Famagosta al presente viene a rimanere più sicura delle altre. Dall'altra parte opposta a questa, ciò è verso l'arsenale hanno medesimamente largata la fossa et fattoli due banchette, et governata quella parte bene.

Delle cinque millia fanti in circa, dui millia sono stati posti in Famagosta et tre millia qui in Nicossia, et si ha cercato di mandar in Famagosta quelli capitani de più lunga esperienza che sia stato possibile, tra quali è stato il capitano Hieronimo da Ugubio,⁴ qual al mio giudition fin qui mi pare homo di cervello et di valore. Stano bene di vettovaglie et monicioni, et non si ha manco di mostrarli tutto quello che si ha da fare a torno quella fortificatione per il tempo che si ha in mano.

Sua Signoria Clarissima vole licentiar circa 200 soldati de quelli che sono mal conditionati, et che ogni giorno diventarebbono più inutili. Medesimamente questi Clarissimi qui di Nicossia voleno fare una eletta de altri 200 o 300 di quelli che sono manco atti a ben servire la Serenità Vostra et con la occasione de queste nave farli tornare in⁵ Italia.

A questa fabrica di Nicossia, questo Magnifico Governatore Ronchone li ha atteso tanto che io sono stato forza con quella diligentia et iuditio che sempre ho havuto opinione che deve esser in lui, et non voglio restar di scriverlo un'altra volta a Vostra Serenità come ho anco fatto, che se quella vorrà che Nicossia fornita con quella diligentia et fidelità, come è stato fatto fin' al presente, la non potrà meglio di far elettione di Governatore di questa fortezza di questo Magnifico Governatore Ronchone, qual benissimo supplirà a governare le sue ordi-

1 Ascension was on 29 May. 2 This was therefore in the Jewish area of the city, the *Zudeca*, which Arbel has described in 'The Jews in Cyprus', pp. 25–26. 3 G.S. is talking about the old Maruffi / Muzzo tower, which was destroyed during the construction of the Martinengo bastion; cf. Faucherre, 'L'enceinte urbaine de Famagouste', p. 336. 4 According to Valderio (*La guerra di Cipro*, p. 39), Girolamo da Gubbio was made commander of the Famagusta artillery in March 1570. 5 *Friuli* crossed out after *in*.

nanze et questa fortezza di Nicossia, essendo che bisogna presupponer, anzi haver per cosa ferma, che la maggior parte della difesa di questa città habbia da esser de ordinanze qui del Regno, rispetto alla incommodità, tempo et spesa che di continuo venirebbe alla Serenità Vostra. Però più facilmente de Italia si può mandar il menor numero di gente che il maggiore, dovendo esser questa difesa unita con le ordinanze, maj potrebbe stare bene insieme un governor di cinque millia ordinanze appresso un altro governatore di Nicossia, qual havesse dui o tre millia fanti più, et manco secondo li accidenti et sospetti delle guerre. A me parerebbe non convenirse che questi dui governatori separati l'uno comandasse all'altro, ma come ho detto di sopra, far tutto un corpo con una spesa sola, et io prometto a Vostra Serenità che da questo la sarà ben servita, il che io desidero somamente, et è da credere, essendo io buon servitore di Vostra Serenità per beneficio suo, et anco per il desiderio che ho che questa fortezza, nellaquale ho fatto qualche fatica, habbia buon fine, presto con poca spesa, et sia ben difesa in ogni tempo. Tutte queste cose tornano et sono di interesse del mio honor particolare, però non lo direi se conoscesse nel suo stato un'altro, che io pensasse che dovesse saper fare in questo governo meglio de questo. In quel caso io ricordarei a Vostra Serenità che quello fosse mandato qui, con quella baldezza et riverentia che si conviene a me, ch' io son il più vecchio soldato che la serve et, se questo qui sarà fatto di certezza, la Serenità Vostra sarà ben servita perché ha cervello, desideroso dell'honor et fidelissimo.

Il belloardo Caraffa, fino a questa hora, è incamisato di muro iusto la mittà con tanti pochi danari che mi vergogno a dirlo, ma quando sarà fatto tutto, li saranno mandati li conti, lavorandosi solamente con manco di diece murari Italiani, et diece Greci a un mocenico al giorno per uno, et se li tiene un proto Greco alli Italiani, et anco un Greco alli Greci, et sempre lavorano a concorrentia, vicino l'uno all'altro et fanno cose miracolose, et mi fanno ricordare delle guerre vecchie de Italia che la concorentia tra li Spagnoli con la natione italiana alli assalti delle fortezze facavano cose incredibile, così fanno questi che se robbano tacitamente ananti che sono la campana, et vanno a lavorare in questo ardente sole contra la nostra volontà, di modo che ne convien / [90^r] farli fare la guarda et prohiberli di non andar a lavorare in quelle hore del gran caldo acciò non si amalino. Concorremo così in la quantità della fabrica, quanto in la bontà et bellezza, sì che quelli che dicevano in Italia che in le cose delle muraglie non si farebbono tante facende, io dico a Vostra Serenità che sarà più cosa da meravigliarsi delle muraglie, et della poca spesa et tempo che non è stato in le cose fatte di terreno fin qui, et del tutto ne è da ringratiare la Maestà di Dio, che tien sani il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore che ne sa comandare, il detto Signor Governor Ronchone et me, et pur facciamo la nostra parte di fatica. Son certissimo che quest'estremo essercitio ne tien vivi.

Circa la mia licentia ch' io demandai a Vostra Serenità, non essendo armata turchescha, et voglio che la sappia che mai mi partirebbe di niun loco ch' io havessi carico in suo servition, se io havessi cento licentie in mano, quando che si potesse vedere un minimo sospetto di bisogno. Però tornando questa armata dentro, la supplico a mandarmela, perché quando io l'havro in mano mi pare di esser in Italia, et conoscendo il bisogno mai mi partirebbe come lo feci in Candia, che lì son stato volontariamente più de dui anni per far beneficio a quella

fortezza; il medemo et più farò a questa, se io conoscerò di farli servitio, et alla sua buona gratia sempre me raccomando.⁶

Di Nicossia alli 3 di giugno 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe de Venetia, il Signor Pietro Loredano Signor mio osservandissimo.



63 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 9 June 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 143^r–144^r.

G.S. expresses his gratitude to Michiel, who has sent letters to him on every ship bound for Cyprus and has only once failed to answer a letter from G.S. The latter feels he is a sorry correspondent, but hopes to have proved that he is a good servant to Venice. On 7 June, string and compass in hand, he accompanied Luocotenente Dandolo on his mission to measure all the bastions and curtains, in the presence of the proveditor-general and of certain councillors and captains. Dandolo announced in public that he wanted to write to Michiel to confirm that what G.S. had said about the fortress was correct, and that the fortress walls were even higher than he had thought; G.S. answered that he would be grateful if Dandolo could also write to the Senate to this end.

The island's true state of affairs having become clear, this earthen fortress is now being given stone facing; this has cost 1,279 ducats for just half of the Caraffa bastion, which is more difficult than others due to its location on the old course of the river. The last bastion to be started will in the end be the first to be finished, and will be magnificent.

Construction sees G.S. get only four hours of sleep a night, which explains why he has not been answering Michiel as quickly or as often as he would like; but it is better to put actions before words. G.S. asks his correspondent (along with his brother Ascanio Savorgnan, his cousin Morosini and other relatives of his) to commend him to other authorities, in order that his late or absent responses be pardoned; his rivals have busied themselves with letters more than with costly bastions. He is, however, convinced that his stance is more beneficial to Venice, whither he hopes to return on 23 April 1569. Like G.S., Count Germanico is in fine health; but again like his uncle, he sleeps little. All of the soldiers arriving from Italy express their amazement at what G.S. has achieved; everybody here, even the Greeks, thank God for what has been done.

⁶ The summary of a letter that is similar in content, but dated 20 June, figures in a collection of memoirs focused on the years 1558–1568: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VII 810* (7298), s.f.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Io ho causa di esser obbligato a Vostra Signoria molti anni dapoi ch' io sarò morto, usandomi lei tanta cortesia di non haver mai mancato di havermi scritto per tutte le nave, è una sola che è partita senza sua saputa, vedo che tanto li ne rincresce. Io non son tanto diligente in scriverli, ma mi sforzo ben a far le operationi tale che Vostra Signoria Clarissima non habbia causa de rimaner ingannata della bona opinione che ella ha di me, ch' io sia un bon servitore di questo Illustrissimo Dominio, et già con la raggione et con la verità, con un spago in mano da muraro, et con il passo ho guadagnato il Clarissimo Dandolo, quale alli 7 ha voluto mesurare tutti li belloardi et cortine di sua mano per scriver la verità a Sua Serenità, et presente vi era il Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro, et li Signori Conseglieri et assai delli signori capitani, la copia della qual misura sarà qui inclusa. Publicamente, ad alta voce, Sua Signoria Clarissima disse sopra un belloardo voglio scrivere una lettera al Magnifico Signor Francesco Michel, confessandoli haver trovato il vero, et assai più di quello che lui me diceva, il che io non li credeva né anco la quinta parte, essendo che io mi pensava¹ che queste altezze fusseno state alte quanto un'alabarda che pol esser 7 piedi, ma trovandone alte 6 alabarde, et più alcune, disse di certezza voglio scriverli una lettera in questa materia della verità, et io li risposi, che io havrò tanto a caro questa lettera quanto quella all'Eccellentissimo Senato.

Ecco che io con la verità al dispetto delli maligni ho fatto star questa verità di sopra, et questo Clarissimo non si pò satiare di tante gran machine, et per far dare l'anima al diavolo del tutto a quelli che dicono di terra la cosa è fatta per la verità granda, ma allo incamisare non saranno tante facende. Ho piacere, per mio maggior honore, che me sia mossa quest'altra importante difficultà alla / [143^v] quale vengo a rispondere con la prova in mano già fatta che con mille ducento e settantanove ducatti è hormai finito de incamisare iusto mezo un belloardo et più, il più difficile delli altri posto nel torrente in giara pessima dalla parte dell'altura con tutte le maleditioni, l'ultimo cominciato et prima sarà fatto et bellissimo.

Con questi effetti, per non far parer Vostra Signoria Clarissima mendace, la prego ad havermi per iscusato che non mi avanza tempo di dormir a pena 4 hore la notte de estate, però è manco male che io sij stato negligente et discortese nel risponderli con lettere, ma che questi effetti in servizio del nostro principe siano tali che se fosse al contrario la diligentia in la pena et il mancamento nelli fatti, credo che Vostra Signoria Clarissima si contenterà che la cosa sij in questo modo come è, et per finirla, la prego di gratia a far mia iscusata con tutti quelli che ella sa che mi voleno bene, con il Clarissimo Signor Antonio Thiepolo,² con il Signor Ascanio mio fratello, con il Magnifico Moresini mio coggino,³ et con tutti li miei parenti amici di Vostra Signoria, et se ben io li do tal fastidio et impaccio, la prego a perdonarme et mi par che sij meglio che Vostra Signoria me raccomandandi alli altri che far altramente, se ben la dirà che io lo faccia per poca fatica di scriver, il che già ho confessato di sopra et la prego a perdonarme, et voglio lasciar che altri mei concorrenti facciano più lettere cha belloardi con assai danari. Credo che, per San Marco, sia meglio a questo modo che

1 *di certez-* crossed out after *pensava*. 2 Already mentioned; cf. supra, doc. 56. 3 Probably Antonio Morosini, mentioned supra, doc. 30.

faccio io, et a Vostra Signoria senza fine me raccomando, et spero nel Signor Dio di esser a Venetia, per il giorno di San Zorzi del 1569,⁴ se armata non uscirà grossa.

Il conte Germanico è sanissimo come me, fa la istessa fatica et lui ancora dorme poco, quanto me, et se raccomanda senza fine a Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Tutti questi Signori conti et cavalieri et capitani venuti de Italia dicono meravigliarsi assai, non manco di usarli ogni cortesia / [144^r] a tutto mio potere. Fin qui stanno come in una religione, senza far questione, che è cosa miracolosa tanta gente tra loro et con questa natione diversa di Greci, tutti stano in cervello per gratia del Signor Dio et la giustitia giusta rege il mondo, accompagnata con li boni ordeni.

Di Nicossia alli 9 giugno 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michel fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1568 9 giugno. N° 32.

Attached to the letter is a summary of the state of Nicosia's walls compiled on 7 June 1568, which gives the following details relative to the height of the bastions:

Barbaro	40 <i>piedi</i> [13.9 m], not including the parapet
Loredano	38 <i>piedi</i> [13.2 m], including 2 <i>piedi</i> [0.7 m] of parapet
Flatro	37 <i>piedi</i> [12.8 m], including 2 <i>piedi</i> [0.7 m] of parapet
Caraffa	46.5 <i>piedi</i> [16.1 m], not including the parapet
Podocatoro	40 <i>piedi</i> [13.9 m], including part of the parapet
Costanzo	37.5 <i>piedi</i> [13 m], not including the parapet
Davila	38.5 <i>piedi</i> [13.3 m], not including the parapet
Tripoli	39.5 <i>piedi</i> [13.7 m], not including the parapet
Rochas	46 <i>piedi</i> [16 m], including 3 <i>piedi</i> [1 m] of parapet
Mulla	38 <i>piedi</i> [13.2 m], including 2 <i>piedi</i> [0.7 m] of parapet
Querini	35 <i>piedi</i> [12.1 m], not including the parapet

The 22 orillons are complete and onto them may now be positioned 44 pieces of artillery, 2 at each orillon flanking the neighbouring bastions. There are 66 cannon embrasures at the 22 flanks. The 11 curtains, each 25 *passa* [43.4 m] wide, have been finished, and work is now focused on the edges of the moat, which has been levelled; 25-*piedi* ladders are needed to get from the bottom of the moat to the top of the curtains. At the flanks of each of the 22 bastions, stone walls have been built to support the earth. Facing has now been given to half of the Caraffa bastion, near to which will be opened the first gate; the bastion's curtain will be the first to be bonded, as it faces a certain hill which, whilst no threat to the walls and bastions, could be used to bombard the inside of the city. Bonding half of the Caraffa bastion has cost 1,279 ducats.

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 142^{r-v}.

A dì 7 Zugno 1568

Il belloardo Barbaro è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 40
Il Loredano è alto piedi computando 2 piedi di parapetto	numero 38
Il Flatro è alto piedi computando 2 piedi di parapetto	numero 37
Il Caraffa è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 46½
Il Po da Cathero è alto piedi con parte di parapetto	numero 40
Il Costanzo è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 37½
Il Davila è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 38½
Il Tripoli è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 39½
Il Rochas è alto piedi computando 3 piedi di parapetto	numero 46
Il Mulla è alto piedi computando 2 piedi di parapetto	numero 38
Il Querini è alto piedi senza niente di parapetto	numero 35

Tutti 22 li orecchioni sono fatti, sopra li quali securamente se li pò mettere 44 pezzi d'arteglieria, cioè 2 per ciascun orecchione per fiancheggiare l'altro belloardo suo vicino.

Tutti 22 li fianchi sono fatti con 66 cannonere molto securamente fatte, da non poter esser imboccate da inimici con le sue piazze dentro via large, molto ben fatte et finite.

Tutte 11 le cortine sono fatte, larghe 25 passa con tanto terreno portatoli sopra che delle diece parte non vi manca una sopra l'oro della fossa, quale al presente li lavorano et si va equalizando la fossa, et finire questi / [142^v] ori delle cortine, qual tutte sono serrate et li vole di scalla per montare dalla fossa fino all'altezza del terreno delle cortine più de 25 piedi, et in alcuni lochi quanto sono alti li belloardi.

A tutti 22 li fianchi sono stati fatti diversi muri di pietre lavorate per sustentare li terreni.

È stato incamisato fin'al presente la mittà del belloardo Caraffa appresso al quale se li farà la prima porta, et quella cortina lì vicina sarà la prima incamisata, qual è quella che guarda verso l'altura, qual altura (al giuditio d'ogni uno che la vede) non pò nocere alle piazze⁵ alli

⁵ alle piazze added above with signe-de-renvoi.

belloardi né anco alle cortine, ma ben potria tirar delle cannonate per le case della città. Basta che non pò levar le difese alli soldati che staranno sopra li terrapieni et sopra li belloardi.

Fino al presente giorno è stato speso in calzina per incamisar la mittà del belloardo Caraffa ducatti 333, in pietre et maestranza ducatti 946, in tutto 1279 ducatti per questa mettà del belloardo.

7 zugno 1568. Misuri della fortezza.



64 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 17 June 1568

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, ff. 145^r–147^r.

In his previous letters, G.S. wrote of Luocotenente Dandolo's satisfaction upon realizing that the walls were not, as he had first thought, as high as one halberd, but as high as six or seven. He gave G.S. permission to tell Francesco Michiel about how amazed he was, even though Dandolo will write to him himself to silence disbelievers; G.S. doubts, however, that Dandolo's letter will be sent.

The rettori have taken the poor state of the 30 Turkish galleys now back from Alexandria as a sign that there will be no enemy attack this year, and that 600 soldiers can be sent back to Italy. G.S. has voiced his opinion, stressing that only the bad soldiers should be dispensed with, not the good ones; but to his dismay, and despite the money Venice has spent, the latter will leave due to the island's ignorance and shady goings-on. G.S. is losing patience, but will accept the situation to keep the Famagusta and Nicosia officers happy, even though they care little about the public good and have proved themselves incapable of passing any useful judgement on the affairs of the island.

G.S. is disheartened by how irrational things are; saving money on wages is no justification for getting rid of good soldiers. He deplores the situation and asks Michiel to bear witness to what is going on; he also underlines how patient he is in the face of the insults aimed at him and thus at Venice's interests. Cyprus is miraculously governed, but one day God might cease to protect the island; the Senate ought to take action, as the Famagusta officers claim to govern the whole island and frequently come into conflict with the officers of Nicosia.

In Nicosia the viscount governs and the proveditor-general commands all of the soldiers, whilst the rettori are occupied with their palace business. In Padua, Verona, Candia and Zara, the keys to the fortresses are entrusted to the captains, who are in charge of the fortresses overnight. It is imperative that Venice gets everything in order in Nicosia, as, if the city is in a state of confusion in peacetime, it will only be worse in wartime, especially in view of the disagreements over how to bring provisions into the city.

As soon as the waning of the enemy threat was accepted, the procuring of supplies slowed down and became a source of discord, and Venice now has to stipulate what Famagusta can and cannot do. G.S. begs Michiel to go, on Antonio Tiepolo's advice, and inform two or three members of the Collegio, explaining the situation to them openly and taking action. If problems

arise in Padua or Brescia, Venice is so close that they are adjudicated within two days; in Cyprus, however, it takes three months or, more commonly, half a year. G.S. leaves it to his correspondents to decide whether or not they will intervene, but reminds Michiel that great disorder will ensue if the fortresses are not supplied.

G.S. mentions that soldiers are walking around with swords and daggers at their side, Ottoman-style, which he finds unbelievable. Only one case has been observed of a soldier brandishing a weapon, a drunk German who murdered one of his comrades and was subsequently hanged; this punishment had the desired effect on the rest of the soldiers, who now leave their weapons in their quarters. Captains walk around without patrols, in a peaceful atmosphere no doubt created (despite how hastily G.S. wrote them) by G.S.'s regulations for the soldiers.

G.S. will treat the captains that Michiel has commended to him well; he deals with them fairly, and they behave courteously. G.S. reiterates that he is at Michiel's service, and hopes he will soon be back in Italy and able to thank him in person.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Per un'altra mia qual li ho mandata per via de Constantinopoli, li ho dato conto della satisfatione grandissima che questo Clarissimo Luogotenente ha havuto de questa fortezza,¹ qual mi ha detto che lui era uno de quelli che non lo voleva credere né alle lettere publiche né a quelle che Vostra Signoria li mostrava, et che pensava di trovar tutta questa fabrica di altezza quanto è una alabarda, che soleno esser 7 piedi alte, con la misura li ha trovati alti et sei, et alcuni circa sette volte tanto, quanto credeva et mi ha permesso di scriver una lettera a Vostra Signoria iscusandosi della sua incredulità et mi soggiunse, mi par di vederlo, che anderà mostrando questa lettera ch'li detto Clarissimo Signor Luogotenente scriverà a Vostra Signoria Clarissima a tutta la corte di pallazzo, et che questa sarà quella che farà tacere li increduli, essendo che, se fosse altramente, liberamente scriverebbe la verità, qual verità ha troppo gran forza et finalmente convien star di sopra. Penso che Vostra Signoria ne havrà gran piacere di questa sua lettera, se però la scriverà. Ha detto anco di scriver a Sua Serenità.

Questi Clarissimi havendo inteso che le trenta galee turchesche² tornate de Alessandria et capitate a quest'isola erano mal all'ordine, per il che fanno giuditio che per quest'anno non si può haver da travagliare, però hanno risolto di mandar via 600 fanti al presente con queste 3 nave prime, qual staranno 3 mesi in mare per il manco. Ho detto la mia opinione et dattola in scrittura che si debba far elettione della fanteria rovinata et mal conditionata, et mandar via quella et non delli buoni ma li broglij, et il non pensare sopra le cosa più che tanto farà partire delli soldati boni, et restaranno delli inutili / [145^v] con mio gran dispiacere et con pregiuditio di tanta spesa che ha fatta Sua Serenità in queste fanterie, et tanto è di spesa a San Marco a mandar via li tristi quanto li boni, mi pare pur che una tal cosa si doverebbe fare senza replica, mi fano consentire a dir de sì, di mandar via 600 inutili e poi alla essecutione voleno tener qui li inutili et mandar via delli buoni. Sono pur cose da perder la patientia et ciò si fa per voler compiacere a tutti, così qui in Nicossia come anco si fa in Famagosta, et

1 Cf. supra, doc. 63. 2 *turchesche* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

tutto precede perché è manco amore verso il ben publico di quello che ogn' homo si pensa.

Se non accaderà adoperar arme, tutte le cose passeranno bene ma non resterà però ch' io non habbia questo fastidio fino alle rresolutione di quello ha da essere questo agosto. Non hanno un fondamento almodo fin qui³ di più da poter far giuditio di quello che si sapeva in Venetia, quando partirono le nave con le ultime fanterie. Se quell'Eccellentissimo Senato le mandarono da Venetia in qua per il pensiero de assicurarsi per l'agosto, perché voleno questi saper più de quelli, senza alcun fondamento ma solamente quello che le 30 galee tornate de Alessandria non vogano bene, come queste de Suriano et del Prioli.⁴ Vostra Signoria faccia lei giuditio se io ho del irrationale. Ben ho detto che tanto potremo fare con 600 de questi fanti de manco quanto havendo li tutti anzi meglio, perché questi 600 mangiarebbono il pane et consumano il soldo delli altri, ma bisognarebbe stare saldi nel preposito di mandar via li tristi et non li boni, essendo come è detto tutta una spesa, ma diverso il fatto, per il che mi giova a lamentarmi con Vostra Signoria, et poi lo faccio anco per obedirla et acquistar credito con lei di homo paziente, et che sopporto le ingiurie che sono fatte a me, et Dio volesse che fossero fatte a me solo, ma che colpa / [146^r] ne havrebbe la Signoria di Venetia per la schietta inadvertentia de altri. Concludo che messer Domenedio governi questo stato et non altri, ma questo Regno è governato molto miracolosamente, però messer Domenedio si potrebbe un giorno straccare et non far più miracoli, però bisogna chel Senato Illustrissimo faccia qualche rresolutione presta et bona, perché tutti li Clarissimi di Famagosta pretendeno di governar tutto il Regno a suo modo, et sempre hanno querele con questi di Nicossia.

Qui in Nicossia poi li signori visconti hanno il suo governo, il Clarissimo Proveditore fino che non sono stati soldati et che havea solamente li stradiotti et le ordinanze in alcune cose solamente, ma al presente questi Clarissimi de Nicossia sono occupatissimi alle cose sue di pallazzo, et un Clarissimo Proveditor con li soldati et con le fabriche havrà da fare quanto vorrà. In Padoa, Verona, in Candia, le chiave delle fortezze stanno appresso alli capitani, et la notte è sua la cura della fortezza, medesimamente a Zara. Bisogna che Sua Serenità metta qualche novo ordine et regola, essendo questa diventata fortezza principale, altramente ogni giorno nasceranno delle confusione al tempo di pace in le fortificatione, et al tempo di guerra molto peggio, et sopra'l tutto sono discordantissimi et irressolutissimi in la materia di condur le biade in le fortezze.

Potemo dire con verità di haver veduto la confusione perché vennero alcuni avisi tanto simili al vero che tutti hebbero la cosa per chiara che la guerra fosse rotta, tutta via le provisioni furon sempre fatte lente, pigre, discordante et se rissolsero poco più di niente, di modo ch' io son chiaro che se Sua Serenità non destinguerà li carichi particolari a Famagosta, et a questi particolarmente tra loro, havrà da nascer qualche gran inconveniente non dico al tempo di pace, ma al tempo di / [146^v] bisogno, però io lo faccio sapere a Vostra Signoria chiaramente per disincar la mia conscientia per il ben publico. Se li paresse che fosse bene per le cose publiche di dir una parola a dui o 3 senatori di quelli che havessero ad accettare tal cosa, per quel verso che io la dico senza attaccar me a fatti d'arme né a inimicitie con miei patroni, ma

³ *fin qui* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁴ The two *sopracomiti* mentioned supra, doc. 18.

vorrei che Vostra Signoria Clarissima, con il consiglio del Clarissimo Signor Antonio Thiepolo, consultaste con quali 2 o 3 signori di Colleggio si potesse dir liberamente questa mia intentione, acciò la provisione sia fatta a tempo, ananti che potesse nascer la confusione, essendo che da Padoa, da Bressa in dui giorni essendo discordanti li Signori Rettori, per la vicinità di Venetia si pò fare presta decisione et regular il disordine accaduto, ma qui che siamo tanto lontani li vole le stagione, de tempi et la più piccola non pò esser manco di 3 mesi, et essendo più de una si aggiunge al mezz'anno. Rodi, Malta et per andar più da lontano di tempo, Negroponte et Modon in manco tempo furon combattuti, però son sforzato a dirlo a Vostra Signoria, et lascio l'impazzo a tutti doi se non lo volete dire, essendo che sempre me predicate con Vostre lettere a fine di farmi bene che debba andar con tutti brogliosamente. Ecco che questo è un ponto contra il broglio, pur lascio l'impaccio a Vostre Signorie di tacerlo o di dirlo, e di certezza (come ho detto) intravenirebbe grandissimo disordine, se non si farà provisione.

Non voglio restar di dir a Vostra Signoria una cosa che ha quasi del miracoloso, che queste fanterie hanno imparato a far alla turchesca che hanno le spade et li pugnali, et assai volte hanno messo man alli pugni per la riverentia che hanno di non metter mano alle arme, et di fora della città non è intravenuto se non un caso solo, et un dentro da un thedesco imbriacò qual amazzò un suo compagno et lui fu appiccato, et ha scappollato la vita a cento, et li primi che comenzano li scandali sono stati castigati, sì che tutti / [147^r] lasciano le magliette in cassa et li arcobusetti, et ogni capitano va solo, senza quadriglie, et mi dicono che li pare di esser in paradiso a viver senza sospetto, et fu causa questi capitoli quali feci scriver in un quarto d'houra senza pensarli molto sopra,⁵ et mi hanno giovato meglio che non havrei saputo desiderare. Veda 'nco Vostra Signoria quanta poca carta et ingiostro giova alle vite et anime de assaissimi homini. Quella li leggerà a qualche hora ch' l tempo li avvanzerà.

Non mancarò di haver per raccomandati tutti quelli capitani che Vostra Signoria m'ha raccomandati et più ch' io posse attendo a farli a piacere con giustitia, et liberamente li dico l'animo mio a bon hora acciò non facciano errori, et sempre li accarezzo et li honoro, et cortesamente sempre sono appresso di me tutti. Spero in Dio che Vostra Signoria resterà satisfatta di me anco in questo, essendo che io son rressoluto di volerli far piacere con giustitia, et credo che loro ancora siano chiari di non mi voler far dispiacere facendo cose iniuste. Sarà facil cosa che in tutto siamo d'accordo stante queste bone voluntà. Non vedo l'houra ad esser in Italia, appresso Vostra Signoria per poterla ringratiare del bon animo et bone opere che ella tiene et fa per l'honor mio, et per finirla fino ch' io sarò vivo, saròli sempre bon servitore.

Questa istessa copia li ho mandata anco, per via di Constantinopoli.

Di Nicossia alli 17 zugno 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo, il Signor Francesco Michele, del Signor Nicolò, Venetia. 1568 17 zugno. Della discordia di rettori, proveditor et Famagosta. N° 33.

⁵ G.S. refers to the regulations for soldiers set out supra, doc. 62.

65 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 5 July 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 149^r–151^r.

G.S. has recently received several letters, including three from Francesco Michiel, and has learnt that his fortress is arousing both jealousy and respect; he stays aloof, however, from people who do not truly have Venice's interests at heart. Those who opposed him will do so no longer; he has kept his choices balanced and has chosen tasks that have been feasible, trusting in his judgement of each situation. He has always endeavoured to follow the instructions of Sforza Pallavicino, as Michiel will confirm.

G.S. has sought to do good for nothing in return, and has served his superiors as his conscience has seen fit, so he is happy to know that his work is being praised. He will be 60 in 16 months and 6 days, and he realizes that he might not be in Venice in April 1569. He hopes to lead a philosopher's life in Friuli and in Venice with Michiel; he thinks that it will be best to retire from society before old age turns him back into a child.

G.S. treats all of the captains like his own sons, and they do their best to satisfy him, working in the dust in blistering heat, risking their sight and sweating profusely. Governor Roncone withstands everything, just like G.S.; despite being 70 years old, Captain Paolo dal Guasto is in fine health and has been named governor of Cerines. Amongst the other captains, G.S. applauds Chieregatto, who will have an excellent military career; Antonio del Berettino, an expert artilleryman; the founder Albergetto; and the head bombardier. Together they make a team capable of handling all the challenges of defending Nicosia, a fortress which now enjoys the praise of the Senate and of foreign princes.

G.S. continues his review of the captains on the island, writing that Antonio d'Ascoli is supervising the payment of the felini, that other captains are doing their jobs happily and effectively, and that Feretti has recovered from his illness. G.S. highlights that the idlers are always ill, saying he is happy to not be paid for his work as he is simply doing his duty, and the fatigue he bears is good for his health. The heat is so fierce that the sun must be avoided for 3 to 4 hours in the middle of the day. G.S. remarks that this will be his third July spent in Cyprus, after 12 others in the dominio da mar, and hopes that his next July will be in Venice. Finally, he reminds Michiel that the two novices, Alberto Scotto and Germanico Savorgnan, have been put under the captains' command.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Per la nave Barbara son stato molto particolarmente ben avisato dalle 3 lettere di Vostra Signoria Clarissima, medesimamente per tutte le altre nave dil che ho causa di pregar sempre il Signor Dio per la Sua sanità et grandezza.

Mi vien scritto da alcuni miei amici che le mie opere sono invidiate, dil che me ne allegro con Vostra Signoria Clarissima, et Dio me ne guardi quando farò servitij alli miei Signori che siano tali, che le persone me habbiano compassione, come faccio io che assai volte ho havuto compassione delle operatione de altri, che fano con tanto preiuditio della militia et con rovina estrema della borsa di San Marco, il mondo va a questo modo et per ciò è bello. Ho compassione alli altri della sua ignorantia et altri se rodeno per la invidia delle mie operatione,

sia col mal'anno che Dio li dia o suo o mio di quello che se inganna, con danno del principe.

Mando¹ questa scrittura acciò Vostra Signoria Clarissima la consideri bene che quelli maligni che mi voleno opponer convenirano tacere, essendo che io mi son governato più che sia stato possibile per il tempo, modo, loco, danari et volontà delli homini, sì come dice questa scrittura nella quale se li è stata, come è in se alcuna contraddittione, mi ho sforzato di metterla sopra la bilancia et prender di lei le parte più pendente verso al fattibile, sì come Vostra Signoria Clarissima potrà notomizarla, essendo che il Falopia² eccellente dottor di chirugia, in quelle cose della notomia delli corpi humani havea pochi pari al mondo. Ho conosciuto un'advocatto qual si domandava messer Ottonnel Pasino,³ qual non era molt' homo da renghe ma in li processi d'ogni sorte era così bon notomista delli passi principali quanto advocatto che io habbia conosciuto. Io porgo Vostra Signoria per il terzo da far notomia sopra scritture simile a questa che li mando, però me iscusò con Vostra Signoria se li ho fatto quelli segni in margine dil che poi me ne ho pentito, sappendo che lei di cer / [149^v] tezza sa più di me anco in questo. Concludo che havendomi governato più che sia stato possibile, secondo questa scrittura qual era l'opinione dell'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza mandata da Sua Serenità per nostra tramontana,⁴ dico que havendola essequita vengo ad haver Sua Eccellenza dalla mia, et per consequentia la Serenissima Signoria di Venetia, quale per le lettere che ho vedute molto se ne contenta, et se questi doi saranno dalla mia chi mi potrà esser contra.

Non stimo il gran Turcho, né quante aquile, gigli et chiave che sono in le botteghe della salizata de San Lio,⁵ essendo poi io homo ressoluto di voler far sempre benei senza alcuna inchieta di haver né grossa né piccola remunerazione. Li invidiati ambiziosi sono molto infelici, ma ringratio sia Dio che quando ben non mi fosse data remunerazione alcuna, anzi se ben fosse data ponitione per il mio bon operare, più presto desidero esser punito et haver ben operato in la conscientia mia verso li miei Signori, che se io fosse per havere una grandissima remunerazione, ma che la fosse con mia grossa et mala conscientia, ma che mi accade a dir più di questo, se io son certissimo, che assaissimi homini del mondo hanno laudato le mie operationi et mi contento di questo, ecco che io son pagato et remunerato del tutto, et Vostra Signoria Clarissima mai mi scriverebbe bugie adulatorie. In fino a 16 mesi et 6 giorni, io entrarò in sesanta anni. Pensi 'nco Vostra Signoria quanto questo che passeranno, non penso di esser a Venetia fino a San Zorzi⁶ d'aprile futuro che saranno diece mesi, sì che me ne restaranno solamente 6 nelli quali gran fatto, che non mi sappia defender da questa furfante invidia, et poi passati li 6 mesi voglio attender a far una vita filosofica, sei mesi appresso Vostra Signoria, et 6 in Frioli, dove forsi Vostra Signoria potrebbe star anco 3 di quelli 6 mesi forlani; la prego a

1 *scritta* crossed out after *Mando*. 2 Gabriele Falloppia (1523–1562), born in Modena. He was a distinguished doctor who received his education in Ferrara and Pisa, and went on to obtain the chair of anatomy and surgery at the University of Padua in 1551. He published numerous medical treatises, which were often republished all over Europe; he also wrote letters: P. Di Pietro (ed.), *Epistolario di Gabriele Falloppia*, Ferrara 1970. Concerning this major figure in Renaissance medical history: G. Belloni Speciale, 'Falloppia, Gabriele', *DBI*, vol. 44, pp. 479–486. 3 The lawyer Ottonello is mentioned supra, doc. 40. 4 A customary reference to the letter of 4 March 1567; cf. supra, doc. 17. 5 A probable allusion to the shop signs showing eagles, lilies and keys that hung in one of the streets of the San Lio area in Venice. 6 Saint George's Day, which fell on 23 April 1569.

perdonarmi se li scrivo questi leggieri discorsi, essendo / [150^f] che li vecchij convengono tornar un'altra volta alla pueritia, per il che voglio far la ritirata a bon'hora et a honesto tempo, et me raccomando sempre alla bona gratia di Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Tutti questi Signori capitani sono miei figliuoli et sempre loro pensano far piacere a me, et io a loro, stupiscono del fatto, et quelli che sono di vita attiva, da sé mi vengono a dimandar di esser adoperati in questi horrendi caldi, polvere da far perder li occhij a cento Signori Ascanij della Corgna,⁷ et venti all'improvvisa, quali ne trovano sudati et chi non sta armato la fa male.

Il Signor Governator Ronchone sopporta il sole, la fatica et la polvere quanto me.

Il capitano Paolo del Guasto⁸ di 70 anni, robustissimo, ha fatto tante fatiche che meritamente io l'ho ricordato, et è stato mandato Governator à Cerines, in loco de Ruffino Governator morto,⁹ il qual Guasto è tutto del Clarissimo Signor Merchio Michel,¹⁰ ma il Clarissimo Sagredo¹¹ li vol male, per le difficoltà di Corfù.

7 Already mentioned supra, doc. 56. 8 Captain Paulo dal Guasto served in Corfu in 1558 / 1559, and was then serving in Treviso when the Senate decided, on 23 August 1567, to send him to Cyprus; he set sail for the island on board the *Nana*, which left Venice in late December 1567. He was interim army governor in Cerines following the death of Ruffin da Spelle, and his name figures amongst the captains who were killed or taken prisoner after the events of 9 September 1570 in Nicosia: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 199^v, reg. 38, f. 86^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, f. 84^r; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δοκίμια φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 117. 9 When the Cerines governor, Ruffin da Spelle, died, the Senate chose, on 29 July 1569, to replace him with Alfonso Palazzo, who left a post in Verona. Palazzo received the same yearly pay of 300 ducats as da Spelle, and led a company of 50 soldiers: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, f. 84^r. We know that before coming to Cyprus, Ruffin da Spelle was captain of soldiers in Corfu in 1558 / 1559: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 121. 10 Merchio / Marchio Michiel, *di Tomaso*, had a particularly long and memorable career. He was born in 1487, and thanks to his wealth he went on to sit in the Senate, before becoming ambassador to Milan in 1530. He was appointed proveditor-general and cavalry superintendent in Dalmatia in 1539, replacing Alvise Badoer. Around this time he attempted to bring the captain-general, Camillo Orsino, to court for supposed theft; Michiel failed, however, and decided to return to Venice, where he was made captain of Famagusta (a position he held from 1540 to 1542). He then obtained numerous posts: he was made a captain in Brescia (elected in 1550), then *podestà* in Padua (elected in 1553), then *bailo* in Corfu (elected in 1558); even before this, his life in the circles of power saw him become *savio di Terraferma* in 1538, a member of the Council of Ten *zonta* in 1545, then a full member of the Council of Ten in 1547, *savio grande* in 1551, then procurator of San Marco *de supra* on 12 March 1558. From 1545 to 1572 he sat in all of the highest authorities but one, only failing, despite three attempts, to become the doge. From 1560 to 1569 he was *savio grande* nine times and a member of the *zonta* seven times; in 1566 he was a deputy of the fortification project in Udine, along with Tomaso Contarini and Alvise Mocenigo; and whilst G.S. was busy in Cyprus, he was captain-general *da mar*. He died in April 1572 at the age of 85: E. Cicogna, *Delle iscrizioni veneziane*, vol. 4, Venice 1834, pp. 13–14; Grendler, 'The *tre savii sopra eresia* 1547–1605', p. 304; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βατλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 103–130, 452, 457. Finally, it should be noted that in 1571 Michiel commissioned a report from Alessandro Podocatore on the 1570 / 1571 siege and subsequent fall of Famagusta: Grivaud, *Entrelacs Chiprois*, p. 273. 11 Bernardo Sagredo, *di Giovanni Francesco*, from the Santa Sofia branch of the family, was born on 30 April 1505. There were several stages in his career: during the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1537 he was captured by Hayreddin Pasha (Barbarossa) while defending the island of Paros, which belonged to his first wife, Cecilia Venier; he then became *podestà* and captain in Crema (1553), *bailo* and proveditor-general in Corfu (1557), proveditor-general in Cyprus (he arrived in Salina on 29 April 1563, and was still there on 19 March 1565). He was *sopracomito* on a Venetian galley in the 1570 war, and took part in the naval operations in the Archipelago; Sagredo was put on

Il Signor Kavalier Chieregatto¹² è per reuscire et è un eccellentissimo capitano, non conosciuto da quelli Signori, ma in tutto il suo stato non conosco un'altro Ronchone, né un'altro Chieregatto. Dico che sono generosissimi et cervelli penetrativi, et saranno degni di governar Padoa et Verona, et son certo di non me ingannare costumati, discreti et fedeli senza fine. Voglio que siano favoritissimi di Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Il capitano Antonio del Berettino¹³ è utilissimo homo et massime in le cose dell'arte-gliaria, essendoli anco il capitano Lorenzo,¹⁴ qual è molto universale; vi è anco il fonditore Albergetto,¹⁵ molto eccellentissimo homo et di bon cervello, et bonissimo da guerra. Il capo dei bombardieri mi piace sommamente,¹⁶ sì che ogni giorni li ho tutti 4 (se non mi sono disviati da altri) alla mia tavola / [150^v] negli ragionamenti della quale, con tanti altri capitani appresso a questi, se Vostra Signoria Clarissima anco li fosse qua, la¹⁷ non sie indicerebbe indegni servitori di chi siamo, ma proporcionati defensori per la difesa di Nicossia, fortezza laudata oltre a quell'Eccellentissimo Senato da Messer Antonio Collonna, dal Duca de Savoia, et dall'Imperatore.¹⁸

trial twice, after his return from Cyprus and during the aftermath of the 1570 war, but was freed and continued to be an important political figure, running for the dogship in 1595, then successfully becoming procurator *de citra* on 11 May 1596. He died on 19 February 1603 at the age of 99, the oldest member of the patriciate at that time: Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. 6, p. 507; ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, f. 30^{r-v}, 211^{r-v}, 229^v-230^f; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 65^r-67^f (*commissio* as proveditor-general in Cyprus); id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, b. 5 (dispatches from Bernardo Sagredo dated 7 June 1563 and 19 March 1565). The report on his mandate in Cyprus has been partly published by Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 540-556, and now definitively by Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 90-107. Sagredo also tried his hand at being a historian, writing a *Historia delle tre guerre de Venetiani con Turchi*: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3757*; see the recent short biography by V. Venturini, 'Lunga vita avventurosa di Bernardo Sagredo, nobile veneziano', *Notiziario dell'associazione nobiliare regionale veneta*, n.s., 2/4 (2012), pp. 51-70. 12 Captain Valerio Chieregatto, who, it is known, sold armour and arquebuses to Nicosia, was preparing to leave Cyprus in September 1568; in the years that followed he served in the *Terraferma*, and delivered a detailed report on the Friuli and Treviso region *ordinanze* (25 May 1573): ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 194^v; id., *Capi di guerra*, b. 1. Chieregatto is also mentioned infra, doc. 71. 13 A member of the military already mentioned supra, doc. 36. 14 Captain Lorenzo Badassin / Badassino was a soldier who was close to Francesco Barbaro; when Barbaro was appointed proveditor-general in March 1565, he took Lorenzo to Corfu with him. As his superiors were fully satisfied with his services, his *condotta* was renewed for seven years on 20 December 1567, and his yearly pay went from 300 to 350 ducats; he was also given 200 ducats to cover the cost of the journey to Cyprus. He very quickly became engrossed in organizing the Nicosian artillery, a field in which he already had experience: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 33^v, reg. 38, ff. 88^v, 101^v-102^v, 104^f. G.S. praised Badassino for the care he took in building the fortress gunpowder mill; cf. infra, doc. 75. In summer 1567 Lorenzo also wrote a report on Nicosia's artillery requirements, cf. infra, doc. 84, and on 24 June 1568, in Nicosia, he wrote a letter to Francesco Michiel, cf. infra, doc. 102. He wrote other reports on the fortresses in Brescia, Crema and Orzinovi: ASV, *Archivio Proprio Gian Vincenzo Pinelli*, b. 2, no. 1; see also Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 126 n. 28. 15 *et il capo* crossed out after *Albergetto*. Virgilio Albergetto, *di Sigismondo, fondator d'artiglierie*, came from Venice's most famous family of cannon founders. The family served the state from 1487 to 1793, and the *Signoria's* preference for them meant the family held a privileged position in society; cf. Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 165-166. Virgilio volunteered to go to Cyprus in February 1568, "per far la fondaria, masene et stufia"; he was sent as Nicosia's chief bombardier, with a yearly salary of 96 ducats: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 102^{r-v}. He is mentioned again infra, doc. 74. 16 From the documentation studied, it has not been possible to identify the chief bombardier. 17 Unclear: quella / qui la / qua la. 18 Although the Senate definitely praised G.S. for designing Nicosia's fortress,

Il capitano Antonio d'Ascoli¹⁹ lui questa settimana presente sta a veder pagare li ferlini, non tocca non maneggia ferlini né danari, ma sottoscrive le polize acciò che io le posso bolare fondatamente.

Il capitano Andrea del Sale²⁰ lui anco è homo da fatica et lo fà molto voluntiera.

Il capitano Francesco da Lanzano²¹ è successo a far la spianata in loco del capitano Paolo;²² questo fa lui anco bona reuscita, non ha paura della polvere.

Il capitano Iacomo Grasso²³ et il capitano Pompeo Pochipanni²⁴ si faticano molto voluntieri ma si hanno amalati.

Il conte Silvio da Porzia²⁵ è amalato, da ben gentilhomo.

Il Kavalier Clusone²⁶ di bonissima natura, è buon gentilhomo.

Il Kavalier Feretti²⁷ ha havuto il suo male ma è guarito, non ardisco a faticare li deboli ma quel Chieregatto armato con tutti li suoi soldati, tutto il giorno essercitandoli al sole mai se amala né lui né loro, et li altri otiosi sempre sono amalati, però se Sua Serenità non mi farà alcuna remunerazione, la farà bene et giustitia, una perché mai ho pensato di haver mai remunerazione alcuna ma solamente per far il debito mio. L'altra è che Cipro vole essercitio et regola del viver. La fatica che io faccio mi ha da esser messa a conto che io la faccio per mia sanità, sì che a questo modo mi vado consolando, se ben il Signor Hieronimo Martinengo

Orazio Governà's records contain no letters from any of the princes G.S. mentions. 19 Captain Antonio Emiliano d'Ascoli, also mentioned infra, docs 71 and 106, died defending the Ravelin in June 1571, during the siege of Famagusta: Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 130 n. 361, 131 n. 367. 20 Captain Andrea dal Sale, from Ravenna, departed from Cyprus in winter 1569, and left behind him 30 *corsaletti*, which were then sold. He was later given the task of recruiting 200 men in Romagna, to form a company which he was to take to Zara, under the command of Francesco Barbaro and G.S.: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, ff. 129^r, 163^r. He is mentioned infra, docs 71 and 106. 21 Captain Francesco dal Lanzano / da Lonzan, mentioned infra, docs 71 and 106, left Venice with his company of soldiers in late December 1567 on board the *Gradeniga*; he was stationed in Nicosia, and his name figures in the list of captains who were killed or taken prisoner after the events of 9 September 1570: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 88^r; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δοκίμια φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106. 22 Most probably Captain Paolo dal Guasto; cf. supra, n. 8. 23 A member of the military already mentioned supra, doc. 57. 24 Captain Pompeo Pochipanni was still serving in the guard of the Orzi Novi fortress in November 1565; the Senate decided to send him to Cyprus on 23 August 1567, and he left Venice with his company of soldiers at the end of December 1567, on board the *Gradeniga*. He was stationed in Nicosia, and he too figures amongst the captains who were killed or taken prisoner after the events of 9 September 1570: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 154^r, reg. 36, f. 199^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 88^r; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δοκίμια φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106. He is mentioned again infra, doc. 106. 25 Count Silvio da Porcia, mentioned infra, doc. 97, came from an old Friulian family which was quite often hostile to the Savorgnans. Silvio da Porcia was from the branch of the family which loyally served the *Signoria*, and he led the guard of the Council of Trent. He also led troops in various *Terraferma* fortresses and in the *Stato da Mar*, as well as staying in Friuli and taking care of family matters. He fought in the Battle of Lepanto under the command of Agostino Barbarigo, and rose to the highest ranks of Venetian military command in 1589. He was sent to Cyprus in February 1568, with a company of 20 soldiers and a yearly pay of 300 ducats; in 1585/1586 he was governor of the army in Corfu: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, f. 97^v; id., *Senato*, *Deliberazioni (Secreta)*, reg. 75, ff. 79^r, 80^v; Capodagli, *Udine illustrata*, pp. 130–133; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαλλων και προσηγών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 263; Casella, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 70–71; Conzato, 'Per un profilo della nobiltà friulana nel Cinquecento', p. 150. 26 Cavalier Clusone, mentioned supra, doc. 54 n. 3. 27 Cavalier Alessandro Ferretti d'Ancona, whom the duke of Urbino commended to G.S.; cf. his letter infra, doc. 99.

fosse messo in aere in mondo et che San Marco lo volesse pagar a giornata / [151^r] et non a ferlini.

Il capitano Poeta, il capitano Marascotto, il capitano Carrera,²⁸ et il capitano Cocapan,²⁹ tutti da bene et obedienti, a vino, avolio, otton et berlingeri, che l'uno senza l'altro mai dir non posso. Il caldo è tanto grande, è causa che io scrivo delle burle a Vostra Signoria, perché in queste 3 o 4 hore da mezzo giorno è necessario a ceder alla forza del sole, et questo è il terzo luglio, che io ho voduto in Cipro, quattro in Candia, 2 a Corfù et 6 a Zara, et luglio futuro piacendo al Signor Dio sarò appresso di Vostra Signoria Clarissima con la persona, se ben adesso son con l'animo.

Mi havea scordato del conte Alberto Scotto³⁰ et del conte Germanico, quali per esser senza barba li ho voluti poner da dietro li altri capitani per honorar prima li vecchij, et prego Vostra Signoria Clarissima a tenerme nel numero delli suoi fedelissimi servitori perché metterei mille vite in suo servitio particolare, et sempre me raccomando alla sua buona gratia.

Di Nicossia alli 5 luglio 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservandissimo il Signor Francesco Michele fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia. 1568 5 agosto. scrittura del Signor Sforza per fabricar Nicossia. qualità di capitani. N° 34.



66 Letter from G.S. to the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo II Della Rovere, Nicosia, 29 July 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 155^{r-v}.

G.S. restates that, rather than go to Famagusta, he chose to stay in Nicosia, as the fortress here is not finished and it is his responsibility to defend it; he thus needed somebody to assume the leadership of Famagusta, and hoped to find amongst the newly-arrived troops a captain capable

²⁸ These three captains were mentioned previously; cf. supra, doc. 47. ²⁹ Captain Lazaro Cocapan was leading the *ordinanze* in the Verona region in January 1567; he was stationed in Nicosia, and figures amongst the captains who were killed or taken prisoner after the events of 9 September 1570: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 126^v; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δυτικά φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106. He is mentioned again infra, doc. 106.

³⁰ Count Alberto Scotto was a teenager from a Piacenzan *condiottieri* family. He was still in Cyprus in 1570, leading a company of soldiers on Nicosia's walls during the summer 1570 siege. According to some witnesses, he died in the 9 September assault; others say he was taken prisoner and enslaved: Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 118 n. 229; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δυτικά φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106; Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, p. 214.

of governing the town. He heard good things about Feretti's company, as well as that of Captain Girolamo da Gubbio, and G.S. summoned them to the harbour. Feretti, presenting a letter from the duke, desired to stay in Nicosia, and G.S. replaced him, which aroused a certain amount of protest. G.S. is delighted to have found in Girolamo da Gubbio an able governor for Famagusta.

Feretti's company has been well received, and their leader is being treated as reverentially as the duke himself. There has been some friction between Feretti and his soldiers, which G.S. has calmed with the provveditor's help. G.S. remains, he says, a grateful servant of the duke and his whole household.

COPIA

Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor mio,¹

In questo Regno è la fortezza di Famagosta fatta con grandissima spesa et tempo, ma non con balloardi moderni, da uno in poi ma torrioni, tondi per il che sempre ho scritto a Sua Serenità che mi pareva honesto che la mia persona dovesse stare qui a Nicossia, come a loco non finito et fatto tanto in pressa, et che toccava a me a defenderla, et che havea più pensiero di Famagosta che de questa, et tanto più che io non li vedeva in quella un capo a mio modo, però io sperava che Sua Serenità nel numero delle fanterie che haveano da venire in questo Regno, vi dovesse esser fra tanti qualche capitano tanto honorato, che a un bisogno potesse esser stato Gubernator di Famagosta, et acciò che non fosse detto che io volevo tuor tutti li boni capitani et buone compagnie per Nicossia, mi parve de prima di mandarli il cavalier da Pesaro,² per farli favore come meglio di quella muda che venero all'hora, et ne scrissi a Venetia, essendo io stato tanto servitor della bona memoria del Signor suo zio.³ Dappoi fu detto tanto bene della compagnia del cavalier Ferretti, et medesimamente della persona et della compagnia del capitano Hieronimo da Ugubio, quali come meglio delli altri l'indricciai a Famagosta; il cavalier Ferretti mi mandò la lettera di Vostra Eccellenza et mi fece sapere chel

1 This letter was written in response to letters from the duke of Urbino, written on 14 and 15 of March 1568; cf. *infra*, docs 99 and 100, which were letters of recommendation for Captain Girolamo da Gubbio and Alessandro Ferretti, who had both been sent to Cyprus. 2 Cavalier Francesco Maria Leonardi, son of Pesaro, came from a distinguished family of soldiers and fortification theorists; cf. the following note. It is known that he departed from Cyprus in March 1569, leaving behind him around thirty pieces of armour, which were then sold: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, f. 76^r. He is mentioned *infra*, docs 71, 76, 106. 3 G.S. is here referring to Giangiacomo Leonardi (1498–1572), who studied law in Bologna and Ferrara and went on to be a soldier and an engineer for Francesco Sforza and other Italian princes. He was notably given the task of fortifying Pavia against the French in 1525; he was also called up by Francesco Maria Della Rovere to serve Venice when the duke of Urbino became *capitano generale* of Venice's armies, from June 1524 to 1538. It was in this capacity that Leonardi participated in fortifying Vicenza and Legnago, and was an ambassador to Venice for the duke. His career continued with more work for the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo, fortifying Senigallia in 1546, then collaborating on the restoration of Rome's walls some time after 1553. He was the author of several works on military architecture, including a *Libro delle fortificationi de' nostri tempi* that he wrote in the 1540s; this has been analysed and published by Concina, *La macchina territoriale*, pp. 50–52, 135–155. On Leonardi's works, see G. Arbizzoni, 'L'attività letteraria in età roversca', in G. Arbizzoni / A. Brancati / M. L. Brancati (eds), *Pesaro nell'età dei Della Rovere*, Venice 2001, vol. 2, pp. 47–49.

desiderio suo era di star appresso di me, a Nicossia. Rivocai l'ordine per satisfarlo et mandai dui altri capitani de questi de Ni / [155^v] cossia à Famagosta, et lì fu del rumore assai. Il capitano Hieronimo se n'ando a Famagosta, dove è ancora, et tutta la mia speranza di quel governo in caso di bisogno è posta da me in la sua persona, et ringratio Dio d'haverlo in Famagosta, et da me non mancherà di farlo esser Governatore, per beneficio delle cose di Sua Serenità.

La compagnia del cavalier Ferretti è stata molto honorata et a lui mai ho mancato per la riverentia, ch' io porto à Vostra Eccellentissima et amore a suo padre di favorirlo, honorarlo et consigliarli il suo bene. Essendoli accaduto al quanti dispareri tra lui et li suoi soldati, si ha fatto ogni potere per acquietarli, et con il Clarissimo Signor Provveditore non ho mancato di schiffare qualche romore d'importantia, come l'Eccellenza Vostra intenderà da altri, et se più havessi saputo et potuto fare, l'harei fatto, essendo io et tutta casa mia obligatissimi servitori dell'Eccellenza Vostra et de tutta l'Illustrissima Sua Casa, et me raccomando sempre alla sua buona gratia, tenendo⁴ per grandissimo favore quando che la si degni comandarme.

Di Nicossia 29 luglio 1568.

Di Vostra Eccellenza servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano
] Copia

All'Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Signor Duca d'Urbino mio Signore.



67 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 10 September 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 158^r–160^f; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 91^v–92^v.

The arrival of a 64-galley Ottoman fleet has not seen people flee as they did upon the landing of maritime guards from Alexandria or the Archipelago; nobody in Nicosia has been seen panicking and trying to escape, and the peasants are declaring that they are ready to die defending the city and Venice's interests. 140,000 of the island's 180,000 citizens can now be protected, and the building of the new fortress has changed people's mentalities. On a less positive note, G.S. is not happy with how affably the Ottoman fleet has been received.

The unforeseen arrival of this fleet has caused people to realize what needs to be done in terms of providing the fortress with adequate supplies, and now everybody is trying to help; this year has seen excellent harvests, which should provide enough food to last until September 1570, a great blessing for Nicosia. Unlike Italy, where the main concern are the fortresses, in Cyprus people think of war as entailing the desertion of the island and the relocation of its population into the fortresses, which would keep citizens and the island safe from ruin.

⁴ *sempre* crossed out after *tenendo*.

G.S. states once more his desire to leave in March [1569] if, as he has already mentioned, the Ottoman threat is gone; he would be prepared to return if he was needed.

As for the fortress, G.S. estimated the cost of bonding the Caraffa bastion at 3,000 ducats, but now that the job has been done, he has seen that it has cost less than this, and that a bastion and a curtain can be bonded for 5,000 ducats.

Serenissimo Principe,

La vigilia di San Lorenzo¹ venne a quest'isola l'armata turchesca di sesantaquattro galee et così come le altre volte vennendo solamente dicidotto o vinti galee delle garde d'Alessandria et del Arcipelago, tutti li popoli del Regno si solevano metter in qualche moto di fuga, et particolarmente Nicossia, altre volte si sono retirati quelli che hanno havuto il modo, con grandissima sua spesa in Famagosta, conducendo le sue robbe et famiglie al meglio che potevano.² Al presente, per la nova fortificatione di Nicossia, non si ha veduto né sentito un minimo moto, né qui in la città né in li casali dell'isola. Quando che una fusta è discoperta in Istria o sopra Chiozza più murmuratione si fa in quella città di Venetia che non è stato fatto in questo Regno con questa venuta non aspettata da loro. Anzi Vostra Serenità non potrebbe mai creder con che saldo animo li contadini³ lontani dalla fortezza, et molto più le ordinanze,⁴ usavano parole da fidelissimi dicendo: Se n'anderemo in la nostra Nicossia et tutti si defenderemo da valent'huomini, et volemo morire sotto San Marco con tanto buon animo, sì de bravatura come de amorevolezza verso Vostra Serenità, il che non era già prima né l'una né l'altra, essendo che sapevano certo di convenir perire et andar in mano de inimici per necessità. In tutto il Regno sono più di cento et ottanta millia anime delle quali più di cento e quaranta millia per necessità s'harebbono convenuto perder, da qualle in poi che se fussero salvate in Famagosta che non sarebbono state quaranta né anco trenta millia. Da questa securatione et speranza de potersi salvare in questa fortezza nova, sono nati questi animi et bone volontà, confirmandosi in maggior benivolentia.

La Serenità Vostra havrà inteso da altri come poi quest'armata a Famagosta se ha portata et è stata anco trattata quasi troppo domesticamente. Io per me, mai me fidarei de simil gente, et la sua amicitia è buona, ma da lontano et non in le fortezze.

È stato anco al proposito questa venuta, così all'improvvisa / [158^v] perché quelli che non volevano creder che la potesse venire se saranno chiariti che ne erano assai, dal qual effetto di non credere nasceva quel errore di non far portar quella quantità di vettoarie vecchie et nove

1 Which was on Friday 9 August 1568. Pietro Valderio puts this date one month later, cf. following note. 2 A dispatch from Nicolò Dandolo dated 19 September 1568 confirms that the Ottoman Alexandria guard stopped in Famagusta, and explains that the pashas were quite amicable. The viscount of Famagusta, Pietro Valderio, says that the guard came on 10 September, and describes in some detail how the pashas were received, he himself having been amongst the welcoming party. He also expresses his dismay at how freely the Turks were allowed to enter the city and thus see the state of its defences; as should be expected, the *bailo*, Marc'Antonio Barbaro, reports the poor reputation of Famagusta's soldiers amongst the Ottoman officers: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 274; BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VII 390 (8872)*, f. 85^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 35–36. 3 *da* crossed out after *contadini*. 4 *dalla fortezza, et molto più le ordinanze* added above.

(che harrebbero potuto) dentro della fortezza. Al presente dicono di volerne far maggior provisione, et il Signor Dio li ha dato il modo de poterlo far bessinimo, essendo che in questi dui anni passati sono raccolte tanta biade che al presente, che siamo del mese di settembre è tanta robba nell'isola qual darebbe da viver fino per tutto settembre del 1570, cioè per dui anni intieri a tutte le anime del Regno, delle quale anime (accadendo il bisogno) se ne potranno salvare cento millia qui in Nicossia.⁵ Et bisogna havere in questo Suo Regno un rispetto che non si suol havere in Italia né in le altre guerre tra christiani, delle quale basta alli principi che fanno guerra tra loro di conservare le fortezze, et tengono poco conto delli popoli, non essendoli menati via schiavi, perché passata la guerra in pochi anni dalle città circumvicine si tornano a popolare le città et le ville, ma qui menati che fossero stati via una volta cento e cinquanta millia anime de questo Regno, come di certezza sarebbe avvenuto in caso di guerra avanti la fortificatione di Nicossia, il Regno sarebbe restato talmente deserto et dishabitato de contadini, presupponendosi che quelli di Famagosta soli s'havessero conservati, la mittà della quale et più sarebbe stata piena de gentilhomini et cittadini. Quindecimillia villani poi non sarebbero atti mai né anco in cento anni a reharbitarla, non atti a guardarla dalle fuste de corsari, non al seminar le biade, gottoni, et a far li sali manco sarebbero stati bastanti; di modo che il perder le anime o perder le fortezze a tutti doi li modi sarebbe stato la rovina certa del Regno.

Senza le fortezze non sono secure le anime et senza le anime il Regno diventerebbe un deserto. Il Signor Dio ha dato il modo a Vostra Serenità di nutrire le anime et defender le fortezze. Bisogna però farlo et metterlo in essecutione che tutti facciano la parte sua.

La Serenità Vostra per sua / [159^v] benignità non ha mancato, né io medesimamente in conto alcuno son restato di fare quello che son obbligato in servitio suo, et la Maestà di Dio me aiuta a mantenerme vivo et sano⁶ in questi soli, credo certo acciò che io li possa far maggior servitio, sto ben con speranza di partirme questo marzo con bona gratia di Vostra Serenità per tornarmene in Italia, con quella conditione però, come fu l'anno passato, se armata turchesca grossa non venisse fora et vennendo, se io fosse in Frioli vorrei tornar in Cipro per farli servitio, sapendo certo di esserli utile servitore.

Quanto alla fabrica, io credeva che si dovesse spender a incamisar tutto il balloardo Caraffa, li muraglie di calzina, tre millia ducatti, et sono stati spesi 400 ducatti manco et pur sono finite tutte due le fronte, tutti doi li orecchioni, et tutti doi li fianchi che voleno dire ducento e vintidui passa di longhezza di muraglia, mesurandoli al piano della fossa et dalla

5 The exact amounts of the 1568 harvests are unknown, but were substantial enough for Cyprus to be able to send 2,000 Venetian *stara* (5,000 Cypriot *mozza*) of barley to Venice in January 1569: ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 251. 6 After *sano*, an entire long paragraph has been crossed out (f. 159^v): *et si sa che ne moreno tanti che non fanno la decima parte di fatica che faccio io al sole, al vento, et alla polvere, et torno a dire a Vostra Serenità che con sua bona gratia di marzo, vorrei poter tornare in Italia, se però armata turchesca grossa non venisse fora, et se venirà et chel Turco venga ad invernare in Aleppo, come si dice qui, se io fosse in Frioli, vorrei tornar in Cipro per farli servitio, credendo io, et sappendo certo di esserli bonissimo servitore per poter defender questa fortezza con assai manco fatica che non è stata fabricata*. This has been replaced by another paragraph, written on a piece of paper stuck over the top with four dots of red wax.

cima del parapetto di terra, fino al piano della fossa, li vole undeci passa di scala, sì che ciascun balloardo, per la esperienza fatta in questo, costarà manco di tre millia ducatti et una cortina assai manco. Cinque millia ducatti suppiranno a un balloardo et a una cortina in pietre, calzina, sabione et maestranza, et questa esperienza è fatta, come Vostra Serenità intenderà da tanti Signori et altri gentilhomini che vengono de li, con questa muda de nave, et me raccomando sempre alla sua buona gratia.

Di Nicosia 10 settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Serenissimo. 10 settembre 1568. Il belloardo Caraffa incamisciato costa ducati 2600. un belloardo et una cortina per la esperienza costerà ducati 5000 in tutto.



68 Report from G.S. on the defence of Cyprus, Nicosia, 10 September 1568

ASV, Archivio Proprio Contarini 4, ff. 161^r–162^v; id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 94^{r-v}.

Cyprus' geographical location is not ideal, 2,000 miglia [3,477 km] away from Venice and surrounded by countries ruled by the Turks, who could start a war easily; it would take three months for Venice to receive the news, and another three for a Christian fleet to be gathered and sent to rescue the island. Defending Cyprus should thus be thought about on a scale of six to eight months.

The Ottoman methods of warfare are both taking over fortresses and taking civilians as captives.

Before Nicosia was fortified, only Famagusta had the status of a fortress, as Cerines is too small. Famagusta is encircled by fine moats and good old-fashioned walls; there is only one modern bastion, which cost over 100,000 ducats. Famagusta has not been fortified to the standards of modern warfare, but it may be hoped that with God's help the city will resist the Turks, as did Malta, where fortifications were also imperfect. As for Nicosia, if it is defended properly, it will be impregnable.

Another reason why the war would have been lost without the work that G.S. has overseen is that the island's population would have been left unprotected; Famagusta alone would not have been able to protect any more than 30,000 people, and so 150,000 citizens would have been given up to the enemy, the sparse mountain woods providing no safety from the Ottoman arquebustiers. The Turks would thus have been able to deport the whole population, and Famagusta would eventually have fallen.

Now that Nicosia has been fortified, an extra 80,000 to 100,000 people can be protected; thoughts should now turn to saving the 50,000 remaining citizens by building a fortress along the Limassol coastline, with five bastions on the landward side and two half-bastions on the

seaward side. If this can be achieved, getting the populations of each of the eleven contrade to the three fortresses will be easy. When in two to three years the fortification of Nicosia is complete, work may begin at Limassol, a place that is physically well-disposed to construction and where the healthy commercial activity could generate enough money from taxes to adequately finance the garrison. If there are no fortresses, the enemy will take the people; if there are no people, the enemy will take the island.

Concerning provisions for the fortresses, the last two harvests will keep the island fed for two years, as long as no grain is exported and as long as the supplies are brought to the fortress in a well-organized and punctual manner. Such is the current state of the operation to defend Cyprus, this little place far from Venice and surrounded by a powerful enemy. This report was given to a small number of captains leaving for Venice, in October 1568.

Discorso del Regno

L'isola de Cipro è posta 60 miglia lontana dalla Caramania, cento dalla Soria et non molto lontana dal Porto d'Alessandria et de tutte queste tre parte, il Turco ne è Signore, et è questo Regno doi millia miglia lontana da Venetia, di modo chel Turco, per la vicinità et commodità di questi tre suoi stati che lo circonda, li puole molto commodamente farli la guerra, 3 mesi ananti che a Venetia si sappia la nuova, essendo l'armata turchesca fora, et altri 3 mesi li vole per il manco a mettersi in ordine armata christiana per venirla a soccorrere, sì che bisogna pensarse de potersi defender da sé in quell'isola per sei mesi, et anco per otto, et più.

Li modi di farli la guerra sono dui: l'uno è l'espugnar fortezze, et l'altro è a desertar il paese, menando via tutte le anime, come è solito a fare la natione turchesca.

Quanto all'espugnatione ananti che Nicossia fosse fortificata, era sola Famagosta fortezza di momento rispetto a Cerines, che tutto non è capace, quanto un solo delli balloardi di Nicossia, laqual Famagosta è circondata de bonissime muraglie et di buone fosse, secondo che si usavano al tempo delli torrioni tondi, delli quali torrioni tondi simili a quelli di Crema, o qualche cosa più grandi, è ben fornita. Ha un solo balloardo fatto alla moderna, ma giudicato da tutti troppo piccolo et angusto, ancore che costi più di 100 millia ducatti, con tutto ciò che Famagosta non sij fortificata alla moderna si può dire, che anco Malta era diffettiva, pur con l'aiuto di Dio et con il valore, et numero grande de buoni soldati, è stata difesa. Il simile si può sperare di Famagosta, havendolì dentro gran quantità de buoni soldati et buon governatore intendente. Di Nicossia, per esser ordita alla moderna, chi la difenderà con giuditio, è cosa impossibile a prenderla, per le sue difese realissime, sì che queste due sarebbero secure.

L'altro modo di perder questo Regno era che essendo in tutta l'isola più di 180 millia anime, delle quali poco più di 30 millia potevano salvarsi in Famagosta, di modo che ananti che Nicossia fosse stata fortificata, ne sarebbero remaste di fora 150 millia anime in poter de inimici, da condurle forì di questo Regno a suo piacere, et non vale più quella ragione antiqua delle guerre de Mamalucchi che le persone si salvariano in le montagne per longo tempo, quale all'hora tutte erano piene di boschi folti, il che non è al presente, et l'arcobuseria turchesca in pochi giorni se impatronirebbe de tutte le montagne sopradette. Andata via che fosse l'armata turchesca, conducendo via l'essercito suo et traghettando le 150 millia

anime dall'isola in Caramania, tutto il Regno (restando solamente, con le 30 millia anime salvate in Famagosta) sarebbe stato se non perduto, o poco meno, chi vorrebbe governar le terre per le biade et per li gottoni, et far li sali, che tanto importano. Non sarebbono atti a defenderse dalli corsari di modo che ogni giorno si andrebbe più annichilandose, tanto che per necessità, col tempo, si harebbe convenuto abbandonare anco Famagosta.

Ma con la fortificatione capace di molta gente che è stata fatta in Nicossia, nella quale per simili bisogni vi si potranno salvare 80 et anco 100 millia anime, onde in tutto al presente se ne ponno salvare 130 millia in tutte due. Ne restano in pericolo senza dubbio alcuno 50 millia anime, et quando si vorrà assicurarle, non vi è più sicura strada quanto far una fortezza alla marina di Limissò de cinque balloardi intieri et dui mezi sopra il mare, in quel caso si potrebbe dire certamente, che fosse securato del tutto quel Regno, essendo che li popoli della contrada del Carpasso et della Messarea benissimo si salvaranno in Famagosta. In Nicossia tutta la contrada del Viscontado, di Saline, di Masattò, di Pendaia et di Cerines, et in Limissò la contrada di Avdimo, di Baffo, Crusocco et la sua propria di Limissò, qual Limissò si dovrebbe fare, dappoi incamisata Nicossia, li danari per farla sono a sufficiencia di 110 millia ducatti, che ha donato il Regno / [94^v] et li 75 millia che ha mandati Sua Serenità da Venetia, se si vorranno scoderli, et non spenderli in altro, in dui o 3 anni si potrà finire Nicossia di muraglie, et all' hora poi pensare a Limissò, quale Limissò si farebbe immediate tanto pieno di case, per il suo buon aere, buona acqua, buon viver d'ogni cosa et tutte le mercantie di valuta se andarebbono ad assicurare li dentro, et delli datij che si cavarebbono in quella fortezza, potrebbe pagar la spesa della guarda ordinaria. Senza le fortezze non si può salvar le genti, et senza la gente il Regno è più che perso et questo è il ponto, essendo che alle guerre di Milano, Bressa et Verona, basta solamente a conservar le fortezze, et delli popoli, delli villaggi et delli castelli, quelli si salvano in altri paesi vicini, overo dano obedientia alli patroni della campagna, il che non sarebbe nel Regno di Cipro.

Circa a vettovagliare queste fortezze, non è dubbio che in questi dui raccolti passati è nata tanta quantità di biade che supplirebbe per l'avenire per dui anni, fino al settembre del 1570, se ben non li nascesse da viver in questo tempo per supplire alle 180 millia persone, non volendo lasciar andar le biade fuora del Regno et haver cervello, et governo de farle condur a tempo dentro delle fortezze. Questi sono li discorsi che si fanno per la conservatione di quest'isola tanto lontana da Venetia, et posta fra li stati de così potente nemico, con tutto ciò porta la spesa benissimo a farlo, rispetto alle gran utilità et commodità che Venetia cava de questo suo Regno, come molto bene si sa dalli huomini intendenti delle cose del mondo.

Informatione qual fu data ad alcuni delli signori capitani, quali andavano a Venetia del 1568, del mese d'ottobre.



69 *Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 11 September 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 91^r.

G.S. reports on the service rendered by Count Silvio of Porcia, who is returning to Venice; he assures the doge that the count led a company of soldiers that carried itself honourably and with discipline. G.S. says that the count treated his men well, and they never complained of having to pay for their weapons; this is in contrast to other soldiers whose captains made a business out of their position, an attitude that Proveditor-General Barbaro opposes.

The count has been serving the Signoria for a long time, and his post in Cyprus has cost him financially and physically; he thus deserves some kind of recognition from Venice, and in saying this G.S. is not merely helping a fellow Friulian.

Serenissimo Principe,

Partendo de qui il Signor Conte Silvio de Porzia¹ per la regulatione fatta da questi Clarissimi,² non ho potuto far di manco di non darne conto alla Sublimità Vostra delli portamenti suoi, quale di prima ha menato honorevole compagnia de soldati, delliquali mai si ha sentito un minimo rechiamo, obedientissimi in tutte le cose, in che sono stati adoperati, liquali soldati sono stati trattati tanto nobilmente dal detto Signor Conte, che non hanno patito niente, né mai si sono lamentati d'una minima cosa né per conto d'haverli vendute le arme, anzi glie lo ha prestate senza spesa alcuna, il che non è stato fatto da alcuni capitani, delli quali mai si havrebbe pensato, quali fanno questo esercizio della guerra in foggia di mercantia, vendendo le arme più di quello li hanno costato, et cavando dalli poveri soldati più utile che hanno potuto senza rispetto alcuno dell'honor suo con rovinarli, al che il Clarissimo Signor Proveditore Barbaro ha havuto assai che fare per non lasciarli far torto. Io anco non ho mancato di tenere la raggione delli poveretti per la giustitia, facendo conoscer il tutto a Sua Signoria Clarissima qual ne è fatta molto ben chiara.

Delle qualità et bontà d'animo del sopradetto Signor Conte non li dirò altro, essendo che è hormai servitor vecchio di Vostra Serenità et che ha fatto questo viaggio così lungo et fastidioso con allegro animo intaccando la sua facultà per la spesa che ha fatta, di modo che oltre la buona gratia di Vostra Serenità nella qual era anco prima, è degno di esser riconosciuto, sì come ella suol fare sempre a chi la serve allegramente in tali viaggi, con la vita et con la robba sua propria. Et se bene è gentilhomme forlano della mia patria, credo che la intenderà l'istesso da tutti questi Clarissimi Signori suoi Rettori, alla buona gratia dellaquale sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli XI settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.

Giulio Savorgnano

1 Count Silvio da Porcia has already been mentioned supra, doc. 65. 2 The *rettori* dismissed several companies of soldiers at the Senate's behest; G.S. was not happy and complained; cf. infra, doc. 72.

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo principe di Venetia il Signor Pietro Loredano mio signor sempre osservandissimo.



70 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 11 September 1568

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 91^v.

Captain Chieregatto, who is returning to Venice, led a company of soldiers that G.S. was very pleased with; moreover, the captain displayed the qualities of a valiant soldier, a man of great judgement and one not troubled by the sun. He gets what he wants from his men, and they are very fond of him; and he takes care of them financially, paying his chiefs out of his own pocket. G.S. was prepared to make a request to the rettori that they help Chieregatto, a man of much experience but few words, who will be remembered as a great Venetian soldier.

G.S. chose robust men to take care of paying the workers, and Chieregatto performed this duty from dawn till dusk; G.S. stresses to the doge how good a soldier he is.

Serenissimo Principe,

Il cavalier Chieregatto¹ ha menato in questo Regno una de quelle compagnie qual mi ha piaciuto, essendo che il detto cavalier li ha tenuti sempre in tal modo essercitati che si può sperare di lui ogni gran bene, anzi si può esser certi perché in le guerre che è stato, ha lasciato bonissimo nome di valente soldato, et per la verità è homo di giuditio, et ha bonissimo ingegno, et è di una vità che mai è stracco, et armati per li soli grandi che sono qui, mai restavano di esercitarsi non li stimando. Et la Serenità Vostra non potrebbe creder come è atto a fare che le sue fanterie, facciano ciò che vole. È molto ben voluto dalli suoi soldati et da tutti, ancora che li affaticasse tanto, ma con la libertà sua di darli da viver a più de 50 continui, et dava di capo soldo più di 60 ducatti del suo per paga, et se non fosse stato, per non lo lasciar andar in rovina della robba, havrei pregato questi Clarissimi Signori che lo havessero intertenuto qui, essendo homo da comandare, di cuore et di esperentia se ben non ha gran presentia né eloguentia, son certissimo che² ha da esser gran soldato appresso Vostra Serenità, quando che ella lo conoscerà per quel homo d'honore et intendente del mestiero, come è.

In queste fabriche, per li estremi caldi et polvere, se io havesse mandato alcuni capitani ad attender et sopraveder che in li pagamenti non si facessero poltronarie in danno di Vostra Serenità in 4 giorni si sarebbero amalati et morti, ma perciò ho adoperati solamente alcuni robusti et da strapazzo, et si hanno conservati li delicati et deboli. Questo Magnifico Chieregatto ha voluto lui ancora stare dalla mattina alla sera sopra li pagamenti alla fabrica, per fare come li altri capitani da fatica, di modo che per le sue bone qualità di soldato mi

1 Already mentioned supra, doc. 65. 2 *ella lo conoscerà* crossed out after *che*.

parerebbe mancar del debito mio se io non lo scrivesse chiaramente a Vostra Serenità come faccio, et li dico certamente che li homini di questa sorte sono rari. Altro al presente non ho che dirli, se non che me raccomando alla sua buona gratia.

Di Nicossia alli XI settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe di Venetia il Signor Pietro Loredano mio Signor sempre osservandissimo.



71 *Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 11 September 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 163^r-164^v.

The Ottoman fleet of 64 ships that arrived on 9 August did not cause people to panic and flee to Famagusta; everybody wishes to get to Nicosia to defend themselves and fight in the name of San Marco. This is proof of the people's favourable disposition towards their leaders, without whom the new fortress would not exist. One effect of this phenomenon is that the cost of transporting families and supplies to Famagusta (15,000 to 20,000 ducats) has been avoided; the wealthiest on the island have benefited from this, but not the citizens of Famagusta, who had kept houses empty in order to rent them at a cost of 20 ducats per room to people in need. To make up for this loss, the Turks have been allowed into Famagusta to buy from the boutiques; many are not happy about this.

In Famagusta, people are amazed that Nicosia has been fortified so quickly and for so little money, and this has aroused discontent with respect to Venice. G.S. asks Michiel to inform four or five senators of the situation so they may resolve the disputes, another cause of which is the fact that, whereas the captain of Famagusta was the sole authority (except for when the proveditors were around) when Famagusta was the island's only fortification, now the latter must negotiate with the Nicosia officers and the proveditor. Relations are complicated further, in summer and in winter, by the distance between the two places, and disputes have occurred; the Senate needs to clarify each party's responsibilities.

G.S. pressures Michiel to enlist the help of six members of the Collegio in this matter. Officers in Crete work together, and the captain of Famagusta must put a stop to the intrigues in order to protect Venice.

G.S. raises once more the subject of Captain Chieregatto's departure for Venice, and then lists eight of the current captains whom he considers good soldiers; one third of the island's captains are mediocre, he says, and another third are unacceptable.

The revetment at the Caraffa bastion has cost 2,600 ducats, but for the other bastions the cost will be less. There are now enough supplies to last the next two years, the only task now is to get them to the fortress on time.

G.S. hopes to be in Italy next March, despite noticing that his letters do not achieve a thing, and that his chances of returning are partly dependent on contradictory opinions of him, which he cannot avoid.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

L'armata turchesca di 64 vele venne la vigilia de San Lorenzo in questo Regno, et così come le altre volte per le garde solamente d'Alessandria et de Rhodi tutti li popoli si solevano metter in fuga per scampar a Famagosta, questa volta non è stato fatto pur un minimo moto ma tutti (non la stimando) dicevano andaremo in la nostra Nicossia, et volemo combatter da valenti homini per viver et morrir sotto San Marco; ecco un gran bon effetto che già si è veduto, anzi sono dui, per che prima mostravano viltà et dalla disperatione mal animo, adesso hanno mostrato generosità d'animo et benevolentia alli suoi patroni per causa de questa fortificatione nova, qual hà fatto un altro beneficio et maleficio; con questa venuta dell'armata tutti concludeno che almanco quindici o vinti millia scudi et anco più sarebbono stati gettati via in condutture de donne, putti, mobili, et vettoarie che si harebbe convenuto portar in Famagosta per salvarsi,¹ et poi li non haver da venderle né da poterle cavar fora, essendo che la spesa non lo comportava delle vettoarie, il danno è stato sparagnato dalli gentilhomini et ricchi del Regno, l'utile è stato perduto da quelli de Famagosta, quali haveano infinite case fabricate a posta, et li portava la spesa a tenerle vode per affittar poi una camera a simil bisogni de sospetti vinti ducatti. Al presente questi se alegrano et quelli si disperano, et hanno tanto forza quelli di Famagosta con il suo Rettore² che per farli guadagnar ben le sue botteghe lasciano intrar tanti Turchi in una volta dentro di Famagosta che la quarta parte sarebbe troppo. Vostra Signoria intenderà da altri in questa materia cose che non li piacereanno come dal conte di Rochas et da altri.

L'hanno messo anco a rumore in quattro o 6 capi di difficoltà / [163^v] con questi clarissimi, ma il Signor Luogotenente li chiarisse li dubij senza rispetto di broglio, et così come quelli de Famagosta si meravigliano che qui a Nicossia con pochi danari habbiamo mossi tanti terreni et fatti tante quantità di muraglie, così all'incontro come sia possibile che habbiano fatto a Famagosta così poca muraglia et mosso tanto poco terreno con haver spesa tanta gran³ quantità de danari, sì che stamo di continuo in queste meravigliationi diverse, et il povero di San Marco tole di mezo come si suol dire, però Vostra Signoria, in mio nome, ricorda a quattro o cinque de quelli gran senatori che facciano provisione de regolare li governi de questo suo Regno. Altramente la Republica patirà, essendo che l'auttorità del Capitano del Regno al tempo che Famagosta era sola fortezza era una cosa,⁴ essendoli li Signori Proveditori quelli attendeno alli stradiotti, alle ordinanze et alli soldati, et fortezza di Nicossia et di Cerines. Puol molto ben stare che il Reggimento ciò è il Signor Luogotenente,

¹ *per salvarsi* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ² There was no *rettore* amongst Famagusta's civilian officers; G.S. probably means the viscount, at that time Pietro Valderio. Concerning Famagusta's municipal government under Venetian rule, see Pietro Valderio's introduction, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 12–15. ³ *gran* added above with signe-de-renvoi. ⁴ *era una cosa* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

Conseglieri, et Signor Proveditore habbiano li suoi negotij particolari et specificati, et alcuni maggiori, tutti 4 insieme, ma che habbiano a negoziare et a far deliberatione unitamente insieme questi con il Capitano del Regno qual stà a Famagosta, 36 miglia lontano. D'estate, per il gran caldo strada da brusarsi, de inverno per li fanghi bona da negarsi, con lettere mai concludeno niente ma stanno sopra li duelli et cartelli, poco manco lunghi di quelli che correvano tra Fedrigo Savorgnano morto con Martio Colloredo,⁵ et come ho detto di sopra quelli de Famagosta fano diventare li suoi Rettori quasi simili a loro, quali in carità et amorevolezza verso questi de Nicossia sono molto simili a quelli de Cividale verso quelli de Udene, et mai questi redditori faranno bene insieme per San Marco, però bisogna che quell'Eccellentissimo Senato non li dia negotio alcuno che habbiamo a far insieme, et sempre se faranno danno l'uno all'altro, se ben fossero doi fratelli amorevoli mai se accordarebbono. / [164^r]

Se Vostra Signoria vol bene, come credo alle cose del publico come gentilhomo venetiano, io la prego che la lo voglia far sapere almanco a 6 di quelli Signori di Colleggio, a quelli che a lei pare che siano amorevoli al bene publico, et la non se impaccia per mio parere con quelli che hanno tanta paura del broglio.⁶ Il governo di Candia non mi dispiace che questo Signor Luogotenente facesse come quel Duca, questi consiglieri come quelli, questo proveditore come il Capitano di Candia; in Candia⁷ havendo il governo di questa fortezza, soldati, stradiotti, ordinanze et Cerines, quel di Famagosta in conclusione sempre intrigarà questi altri di certezza, et mai sarà possibile che io possa tacere dove vedo l'interesse del Principe, et se non si farà provisione, almanco Vostra Signoria se 'l tenghi a mente che sorte de gran desordini nasceranno.

Se ne viene il Kavalier Chieregattino molto stimato et amato da tutti, per la sua bontà et valore, il quale io stimo assai, il capitano Antonio d'Ascoli, il capitano Andrea del Sale da Rhavena, il capitano Antonio del Berettino, il capitano Francesco Lanzano, il capitano Paolo del Guasto che è Governator hora à Cerines; in Famagosta, il capitano Hieronimo da Gubbio, il cavalier da Pesaro. Questi otto soprannominati sono da me giudicati bonissimi capitani di valore, et sempre li torrei per elettione. Ne sono poi un'altra mano de mediocri, et poi la terza più bassa quali farebbono meglio à far altro mestiero.

5 G.S. is referring to a duel which signalled a resurgence of tensions between aristocratic factions in Friuli in the 1560s. Following the violent death of Francesco Savorgnan, from the Savorgnan della Bandiera parent branch of the family, in Udine in 1561, his nephew Federico pursued a vendetta against certain members of the Colloredo and Strassoldo families; several incidents occurred, then peace came after a duel between Federico Savorgnan della Bandiera and Marzio Colloredo on 15 June 1564. Concerning this whole affair, see Casella's detailed analysis, *I Savorgnan*, pp. 123–127. 6 A *broglio*, meaning a kind of trafficking or scheme, was a part of Venetian political life; cf. D. Raines, 'Office seeking, *broglio*, and the pocket political guidebooks in *Cinquecento and Seicento Venice*', *Studi Veneziani* 22 (1991), pp. 139–140. It is known, more precisely, that this trafficking was traditionally done in the lodges of the ducal palace; cf. *Venezia e le sue lagune*, Venice 1847, vol. 1, p. 128: "Anticamente, i nobili se radunavano sotto le loggie del palazzo ducale, collocato sull'antico bruolo, per trattare i proprii e gli affari pubblici, prima di sedere nei consigli." 7 The copyist has made a mistake; this sentence should read *Cipro*, not *Candia*.

Con doi millia et 600 ducatti è stata finita la camisa di muraglia del balloardo Caraffa, il più difficile che sia stato fatto delli altri, et per dirlo più chiaro a Vostra Signoria ciascuno delli altri saranno più facili de esser incamisati. Anco in questa cosa, non me ho ingannato, havendo sempre detto come la sa.

Circa le vettoarie de questo Regno ne sono al presente⁸ per 2 anni intieri à 180 millia anime, che sono nel Regno. Se ne vorranno poner in le fortezze a tempo, faranno bene et ne raccomando sempre alla bona gratia di Vostra Signoria.

Se piacerà al Signor Dio, doverei pur io ancora venir questo marzo in Italia, et non me star a romper il cervello come faccio / [164^v] che mai posse ottennir alcuna cosa, se non per forza de cridar et dir di voler scriver a Venetia. In tutti li negotij che io ho da fare, mai per bontà posso ottenner niente. Pensi Vostra Signoria che infelicità è la mia, credo che mi vogliano mal di morte, et se per mala sorte scrivessero bene di me à Venetia mi parerebbe un miracolo, se scriveranno male, diranno la busia perché son bon servitor di San Marco, et per li brogli mai mi faranno consentire a cosa mal fatta.

Di Nicossia alli 11 settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor Francesco Michele Signor mio osservandissimo, Venetia. 11 settembre 1568. qualità di capitani. differenza de rettori di Nicossia et Famagosta. error di lasciar entrar Turchi in Famagosta.



72 Letter from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 16 September 1568

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 165^r–167^r.

G.S. was summoned by the rettori, the captain and the proveditor-general, who presented him with a letter from the Senate asking him to cut back on military spending, inasmuch as the Constantinople bailo's dispatches and G.S.'s own opinion allow. The five officers explained the financial situation, relating that 15,000 ducats are needed to pay 4,000 soldiers, and that 1,600 soldiers could be discharged and sent back to Venice on three ships (despite the fact that the ships are already full of cotton and passengers).

G.S. replied that the latest news from Constantinople was no cause for alarm, and that the Ottoman fleet had headed beyond the Peloponnese; in view of the budgetary restrictions, soldiers must be dispensed with and advantage must be taken of the boats leaving for Venice, particularly the Gradeniga, which will be taking back to Italy the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico], Antonio Davila, Captain Giacomo Grasso (a friend of Councillor da Mulla) and the count of

⁸ *al presente* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

Porcia, who is scared of malaria. These last two captains persuaded the rettori to grant them leave, and managed to obtain the same for Captain Chieregatto, who was, however, prepared to stay in Cyprus.

G.S. deplored the dismissal, on grounds of collusion, of good soldiers and the keeping of bad ones. He expresses his discontent at the attitude of Captain Grasso, and of two other captains who followed suit, ordering the soldiers to give back their cuirasses, despite there being no storeroom for them to be kept in; G.S. accepts the idea of buying 500 arquebuses and 500 helmets to be given to the 15 ordinanze captains, but he refuses to buy back the cuirasses. In the end, the five officers stuck to the previous arrangements, and, claiming it was on G.S.'s advice, wrote a letter to the doge asking him to sign it.

After three days G.S. sought the advice of the Grand Chancellor, who intervened trying to persuade the five officers to remove G.S.'s name from the letter sent to the doge; but one of the officers refused, and G.S. was forced to back down. G.S. is horrified at the idea of people in Venice thinking he is involved in the shady dealings that are costing the Signoria so dear (2,000 to 3,000 ducats).

G.S. implores his correspondent to show this letter to Antonio Tiepolo, so that the Collegio may know the truth; far more worrying than an enemy threat is indiscipline, theft and an absence of justice.

G.S. knows that if he does not react money will evaporate, construction and the soldiers will suffer, and he will be seen as a fanatical torturer. He hopes that Venice will understand his attitude; in thirteen months he will be 60 years old, and after that he will stop seeking promotions and responsibilities. He can feel the ravages of time, and fears that this mess that has arisen at the last hurdle might tarnish 44 years of service; if this happens, he will be devastated.

Along with the letter, G.S. has been given a list detailing the commands of each captain; in order to save Venice money (one captain costs 500 ducats per year), the captains are to be given 150 men and the Famagusta captains 100. In view of all the scheming and collusion, the captain of Famagusta wishes to give only 50 men to each captain; though the rettori agree with G.S., it is impossible to know what course of action will be taken. G.S. ends by asking Michiel to show this letter to the Collegio.

Questi Clarissimi Signori di Nicossia mi chiamarono un giorno all'improvvisa, et mi fecero vedere una lettera dell'Eccellentissimo Senato qual cometteva al Signor Luogotenente, Capitano del Regno, al Signor Proveditore et alli Conseglieri, come si ha sempre scritto a tutti cinque, che dovessero fare regulatione de fanterie sì come li pareva, l'occasione per non far superflua spesa, et governarse principalmente sopra le lettere et avisi del Bailo de Constantinopoli,¹ et che² facessero la regulatione col parer mio, et questa cosa è replicata in detta lettera 3 volte con il parer di quel Governator generale. Però detti Serenissimi Clarissimi mi

1 The Senate wrote to the leading Venetian officers at least three times ordering them to deploy as many soldiers as were necessary, bearing in mind the opinions of the Constantinople *bailo*: ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 88^{r-v} (19 March 1568), 89^{r-v} (29 March 1568), 91^r (10 April 1568). 2 *haveano* crossed out after *che*.

domandavano l'opinione mia, astretti dal mancamento de³ danari per non intaccar quelli della fabrica, quali sono hormai intaccati in pagar soldati li quali sono più de 4 millia, et importano da 15 millia ducatti per paga, et che 3 nave sono⁴ hormai cariche qual erano a questo Regno per voler partire a pena harebbono potuto levare mille et 600 fanti, havendo per ciascuna nave 200 et più homini, tra mercanti, fanti, passeggeri et marinari, sì che saranno 700 per nave, il che li farà star più stretti et discomodi di quello che starebbono mille homini a venire da Venetia in Cipro, perché all'hora le nave vengono vode et che queste tre nave ananti San Michel⁵ tutte 3 volevano partirse, perché haveano havuto tanti gottoni che erano più che cariche, essendovene nati infiniti quest'anno in Cipro.⁶

Io risposi a Sue Signorie Clarissime che l'ultimo aviso de Constantinopoli era chel Bassa li faceva molti favori et carezze, et che l'armata turchesca havea passato il brazza di Maijna,⁷ et attendeva a quelle cose di Ponente et l'armata era già stata qui, di modo che non era da far fondamento sopra detta lettera, et che manco li era aviso alcuno fondato che quest'armata fosse andata in Alessandria, overo in Arcipellago, sì che si era molto scarsi de avisi ma astretti dalla necessità del danaro, et dalla partanza delle nave si dovesse far una eletta de / [165^v] tutte le fanterie cattive et manco buone, et assignarle a questa prima nave Gradeniga, sopra la quale se ne veniva il conte de Rochas et il Signor Antonio Davila, il capitano Iacomo Grasso, qual è il piu timido homo che sia al mondo, omnipotentissimo per amicitie vecchie con il consigliere Mulla et il conte da Porzia, qual temeva quest'aere et diceva d'haver molto desiderio di andar a veder sua moglie et suoi figlioli, erano tutti doi due tarme⁸ continue attaccate alli Clarissimi Rettori, et qualch'uno de questi hanno tanto operato per manco suo dishonor di far che li Signori mandino via ancora il cavalier Chieregatto, qual per conto dell'animo li stava voluntieri, ma per la necessità della spesa non essendo bisogno, diceva che andrebbe voluntieri via et sono andati tutti tre per montar in nave.

Dissi che era ben fatto a mandar via le fanterie cattive et non le buone, il che non è stato eseguito, ma per li broglj fatto al contrario con mio grandissimo dispiacere, lasciando le tristi fanti et menando via li boni. Per broglio anco, il detto capitano Iacomo Grasso ha fatto tore li suoi corsaletti da questi Signori Clarissimi per metterli in monitione, et con l'esempio di questo ha fatto così il secondo, il terzo et lo faranno tutti contra mia volontà, et peggio è che non ostante ch' io li habbia detto già dui mesi, sono che per mio consiglio non si debba tore corsaletti fino che non siano fatte salle et habitatione da salvarli, essendo li corsaletti venuti da Venetia per monitione, non stanno bene come stanno, tanto manco si potrà governare questi altri ma che solamente assentiva che si dovessero comprare 500 arcobusi et 500 celade,⁹ et immediate darne 33 per cadauno delli quindecim capitani de ordinanze, acciò che il numero delle 4500 che sono diventino cinque millia senza dar spesa de capi a San

3 *lli* crossed out after *de*. 4 *sono* added above. 5 Saturday 6 September 1568. 6 An anonymous report probably written in 1568 says that the gross (*in boccola*) cotton harvest was 7,000 cantars, plus 100 cantars of bleached (*in filadi*) cotton, the equivalent of 150 sacks: CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/16*, f. 4^r. 7 The Mani Peninsula, in the Peloponnese. 8 A little worm; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. 9 A helmet; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v.

Marco, perché ho assentito de questi 500 arcobusi, hanno passato anco alli corsaletti et per broglio tolti ancora, che io liberamente in consulto li habbia detto che da Venetia se ne havrà vergogna, con tutto ciò hanno scritto una lettera a Sua Serenità / [166^f] et detto d'haver fatto questo col mio consiglio, et mi mandano a mostrar questa lettera, sotto scritta de man propria de tutti quattro questi Signori.

Non ho voluto darli altra risposta, né de sì né de no, ma li ho tolto la lettera, et l'ho portata 3 giorni in scarsella, finalmente l'ho data al Magnifico Canciliero Grande¹⁰ dolendomi di questa busia scritta, essendo stato buon testimonio lui di quello che io havea detto a Sue Signorie Clarissime, et anco lì era presente il Signor Governator Ronchone. Il Cancilier Grande ha fatto prova et pregato uno de questi Signori che vogliano esser contenti de non nominar me in questa cosa di tor le arme, essendo di contrario parere. Mi ha tornato la risposta che uno de loro non voleva per niente che questa lettera andasse a Venetia se io non fosse nominato dentro, et che quando io fosse ostinato che voleva far tornar tutte le arme in dietro alli capitanij, quali le haveano hormai tutte consignate al sopramassaro delle monitioni, il qual Magnifico Cancilier Grande, mio amico et homo da bene al mio giuditio, mi ha dato consiglio che io debba tacere et non me tor roverso in una volta, per questa cosa tutti quanti li capitanij et tutti 4 li Signori Rettori, sì che Vostra Signoria intende che io ancora comincio a deventar un cattivo homo, et ad assassinar la Signoria di Venetia per broglio. Mi convien sopportar una tal busia al mio dispetto. Queste arme importaranno 2 o 3 millia ducati.

Prego ben Vostra Signoria che la mi voglia far almanco questo servitio de avisarne 2 o 3 gentilhomini de Collegio suoi amici, non il Signor Paulo Thiepolo¹¹ per esser tutta cosa di quel capitano Iacomo Grasso. La prego anco a far legger questa lettera al Magnifico Signor Antonio Thiepolo, se per sorte non fosse deventato lui ancora brugliesco, il che non era quando andò in Spagna, non so però se quelli Spagnoli l'havessero fatto muttare. Io me confido in Vostra Signoria et nel detto Signor Antonio che dobbiate far in Colleggio qualche defensivo, che se quelli Signori murmuraranno de questo tuore de arme con il mio consiglio et parere, che sia dechiarita la verità. A me basta che doi Signori di Colleggio boni lo / [166^v] sappiano, Vostra Signoria consideri se io ho causa di desiderar di tornar in Italia, essendo che il fastidio de combatter con li inimici è niente. Se uno della città da delle botte a un soldato, li poveri soldati

¹⁰ Piero Albino, *di Francesco*, was elected chancellor of Cyprus on 11 September 1563, and took office in March 1565: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 71^r. His wife, Belisandra Maraveglia, is held by some to be the arsonist who, just off Famagusta on 6 October 1570, blew up an Ottoman ship full of young Nicosian noblewomen bound for slavery: CMC, *cod. Gradenigo* 192, f. 158^r. ¹¹ Paolo Tiepolo, *di Stefano*, was a *cavalier* and led a mostly diplomatic career: he was an ambassador in Mantua in 1549, an ambassador to Ferdinand I, king of the Romans, from 1554–1557, an ambassador in Spain from 1558 to 1562, and an ambassador in Rome from 1565 to March 1568 and from 1572 to 1575. Between these missions he was made salt proveditor and fortress proveditor in 1563–1564, was named a *savio* in 1568 and became a member of the Council of Ten in 1569. He was made a San Marco procurator, and attempted to become duke in 1578; he died in 1587: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 16^v–17^r; id., *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 45^r; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. VII, p. 84; Grendler, 'The *tre savii sopra eresia* 1547–1605', pp. 316–317. Paolo Tiepolo left several reports concerning his embassies, and also wrote a history of the Cyprus war, *Storia della guerra contro i Turchi 1570–1573*: CMC, *cod. Correr* 238.

hanno pena la vita de metter mano, et se soldati fanno dispiaceri a questi della città, et ch' io faccia dar in mano della giustitia o l'uno o l'altro, mai vengono castigati, non quelli che robbano li ferlini, non li desobedienti che non voleno venir alla fabrica di modo che sarebbe un caos.

Se io voglio tacere non si fa cosa alcuna, il tempo scorse, li danari hanno le ale, alli camerlenghi mai li signori li direbbono una parola, di modo che la fabrica et li soldati vengono a patire. Son stato sforzato a cridar con tutti, tanto che li ho fatto far qual cosa al suo dispetto, et se ben mi volessero male, alla fine non ponno tacere di non me laudar et honorar, ma l'esser sempre rabioso et boia, et che li altri non si vogliono pigliar un fastidio al mondo, questo non me piace. Son ben certo che questi Signori tutti al suo dispetto mi conveniranno voler bene, perché sanno almanco la mia buona intentione, et non facendo cose cattive in questo modo vanno passando la mia vita, et me conforto che manca solamente 13 mesi ad entrare in li 60 anni, et così come al Caijro cessa la pesta per lo entrare che fa il sole nel primo grado del segno del Leone, così farò io che il primo giorno che entraro in li 60 anni, non voglio più gradi né governi de sorte alcuna, et lascerò andar ogni cosa in mal'hora che mi troverò in mano all'hora, perché mi sento mancar gli occhij, l'udito, li denti, le gambe, la indispositione del stomaco, et per dirlo in una parola sola la vecchiezza, per la qual si perde la memoria et il cervello se indebelisse, et si crede far bene et si fa male, uno errore all'ultimo guasta tutte le fatiche passate di 44 anni. Bisogna attender all'anima, et a conservare il corpo quanto si pò per non morir desperati. Passarano pur ancora questi 13 mesi se 'l piacerà al Signor Dio.

In la regulatione mi hanno fatto dar una poliza delli capitanij / [167^r] che io tenerei qui a Nicossia et con quanti fanti, l'uno et il medesimo de Famagosta et di Cerines. Io facevo li capitanij di Famagosta di 100 fanti l'uno, questi di Nicossia con 150 a fine di sparagnar a San Marco assai ducatti, essendo che un capitano qui nel Regno de Cipro tra lui et il suo alfiero, zamburo, ragazzi et servitori costano più di 500 ducatti l'uno. Il Clarissimo de Famagosta vol dar solamente 50 fanti per capitano per causa de broglj. Questi Signori qui hanno laudata la mia opinione, quel di Famagosta ha bravato con questi Signori, et con me facciamo 'nco ciò che li pare. Io consigliava la regulatione come sta questa poliza fatta, con bona ragione et con utile del Principe. Se li broglj fanno far altramente la colpa non sarà mia. La faccia pur veder questa poliza a quelli Signori di Colleggio, et per che son stracco di scriver, farò fine raccomandome a Vostra Signoria Clarissima.

Di Nicossia alli 16 settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitore.

Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor Francesco Michele, Signor mio, Venetia. 16 settembre 1568. parla de soldati.



73 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 21 September 1568

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 92^v.

G.S. confirms that Count Orazio Martinengo, who began serving in Famagusta in 1564 and was scheduled to stay for a minimum of five years, has gone. Considering how well he performed his duty (as excellently as his father), he deserves to be discharged.

Serenissimo Principe,

Ritornando il Conte Horatio Martinengo¹ in Italia ai piedi di Vostra Serenità ha voluto accompagnarlo con questa mia, facendo intender a Vostra Sublimità che mal volentieri l'ho veduto partire da quella fortezza di Famagosta, nella quale era destinato di stare cinque anni et tanto più, che li mancava un'anno e mezo di tempo a finire, nelqual tempo che è stato ha fatto tal servitio, come si conviene a gentilhomo nobile et benemerito di questo Illustrissimo Stato, et in diversi tempi che io son stato a Famagosta, ho veduto et udito che le operationi sue sono state tale, che è degno di haver la gratia sua, imittando lui la bona memoria del Signor suo Padre,² qual fu tanto bon servitor suo come la sa, alla quale non dirò altro, se non che io ancora me raccomando alla buona gratia di Vostra Serenità.

Di Nicossia alli XXI settembre 1568.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe di Venetia il Signor Pietro Loredano Signor mio sempre osservandissimo.



74 Letters from G.S. to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 26 December 1568 and 7 January 1569

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 169^r–171^r.

G.S. has learnt that Astore Baglioni will replace him and free him from Cyprus after fifteen years of overseas service; he takes advantage of the count of Rochas not yet having left Paphos to get this letter to Michiel.

G.S. thanks Michiel once again for being his correspondent, assuring him that when he

¹ Orazio Martinengo was given the command of a fifty-soldier company in Famagusta (and a pay of 25 ducats) which had been without a leader since the death of Captain Camillo Ferro in September 1564. In August 1569 he was granted permission to leave Famagusta and go back to Corfu: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, f. 189^v, reg. 39, f. 85^v.

² Count Ercole Martinengo; cf. *supra*, doc. 6 n. 12.

receives a packet of 25 to 30 letters, he always reads Michiel's first. He tells of how relieved he is to be going back to Italy after all these idle years in Cyprus; if anyone ever asks him why he accepted this mission, he will answer that it was God's will, then that Michiel and others in Venice asked him to become the mother of the lamb and work miracles. He did so, giving Cyprus 11 earthen bastions, 11 curtains, 22 orillons, 88 cannon embrasures and 44 parapets, greater in dimension than any in Italy. The bonding of the Caraffa bastion has cost 3,000 ducats, and half of the curtain between the Rochas and Tripoli bastions is finished, allowing the watercourse from the river that used to cut through the town (where the Rochas Gate will be opened) to be controlled.

Over the last five months 100 to 200 men have worked on construction, a shameful statistic; but it only took half a month to finish the demi-curtain between the Rochas and Tripoli bastions. A gunpowder mill with four millstones has been built, both excellently and cheaply (by anyone's standards, not just those of the Signoria, for whom 5,000 ducats is a small expense).

A working foundry, large and splendid, has also been built, for such little cost that it will not even figure in the account books; the materials and manpower will rather be counted as part of the bastions. G.S. applauds Captain Lorenzo, who has taken charge of the foundry, and the founder Albergetto, who ten days ago founded his first cannon for Germanico Savorgnan (paid for by G.S.), and is now working for Venice.

Another new building is the 60-passa-long [104.3 m] and 11-passa-wide [19.1 m] storehouse, made to store the artillery; a similar storehouse is to be built nearby to keep weapons and ammunition. Between the two storage buildings a 60 × 18-passa [104.3 × 31.2 m] courtyard is being installed, on one side of which will be another storehouse for timber. Access to the courtyard will be provided by a door leading to a 40 × 6-passa [69.5 × 10.4 m] lodge; the lodge is to be occupied by the men in charge of the arsenal, which will be the finest in all the Venetian State, after that of Venice, of course.

Having been notified that G.S. is leaving in two and a half months, the rettori have decided to grant him 2,000 men per day for January and February; however, they have known since October that he would be leaving... There is harmony between the captains, and fraternity between the soldiers, especially the soldiers in the city. G.S. concludes his first letter by announcing that Germanico Savorgnan and Captain Andrea dal Sale want to go back to Italy with him.

The Viviana ran aground at Cape Kormakitis, whereupon Captain Fusaro went immediately to its aid; G.S. was not happy about this, as he does not want the island's captains to get involved in such matters. After four days of the ship being stranded, a council of twelve officers, including G.S., decided to send Captain Antonio del Berettino to rescue it; but Fusaro was already there, and vulnerable, in G.S.'s opinion, to the many bandits in that region. Fusaro made off with lots of merchandise; G.S. is happy that del Berettino did not get involved. G.S. asks that he be pardoned this act of piracy; he did not give del Berettino permission to go, and Fusaro did not inform his superiors of what he was doing for four whole days. On 4 January construction resumed with a workforce of 1,000 men.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservandissimo,

Mi sono venute le lettere da Vinetia con la nova che l'Illustrissimo Signor Estor¹ havea da venir in questo Regno al governo delli soldati, liberando me in capo de quindici anni da questo benedetto Levante et all' hora che la nave con questa nova giunse a Saline, il conte di Rochas non era ancora partito da Baffo, di modo che di marzo Vostra Signoria Clarissima haverà a pena questa lettera che dui giorni più presto che fosse gionta la sopra² detta lettera, quattro mesi avanti Vostra Signoria harebbe potuto haver questa risposta che faccio al presente, tanto importa un giorno alle cose da mare.

Li dico ringratiandola prima delle molte sue lettere a me sommamente carissime, et ancora che sia superfluo non posso far di manco di non dirglielo che quando mi vengono 25 o 30 lettere in una volta, sempre voglio prima leger et studiar bene tutte quelle di Vostra Signoria avanti che io mi³ metta a lezer quelle delli altri. Le cause le lascio considerar al buon giuditio suo, et mi riporto a farli riverentia. Il mese di maggio piacendo alla maestà del Signor Dio, che io venga a goder un poco quella Italia che a me pare tanto lontana, mentre che io son stato in otio, non voglio dir mesi ma anni in questo Regno. Se lei mi domanderà perché, io li risponderò perché Dio vol così, et parte anco perché Vostra Signoria et altri m'hanno comandato che io diventi la madre d'un agnello et così ho fatto, et se sempre havebbe fatto così undeci balloardi non sarebbero fatti di terra né undeci cortine né 22 orecchioni, né 88 cannonere né 44 merloni, che ciascuno è più grande d'alcuni belloardi che ho già veduti in Italia in fortezze, che sono giudicate inespugnabile. Non sarebbe fatto tutto il belloardo Caraffa de muro orecchioni et fianchi, come hanno d'andare con assai manco di tre millia ducatti. Non sarebbe / [169^v] fatta meza cortina de muraglia del conte di Rochas verso il balloardo Tripoli, per assicurarme dalle acque dalla parte che prima entrava il torrente nella città, in mezo della qual meza cortina viene a cadere la porta detta Rochas,⁴ alla qual porta si darà una bona stretta.

Della venuta dell'armata turchesca⁵ fino al presente, che sono poco manco de cinque mesi, non si ha lavorato se non con cento fino a 200 homini cosa vergognosa da dire, et quanto si ha fatto di bene è stata questa meza cortina in quindici giorni.

Si ha fatto una masina da metter quattro mole da masinar polvere con 3 man⁶ de volti, tanto ben accomodata et bella, et con si poca spesa che non parerà in libro alcuno che sij stata fatta tal spesa, et in altri lochi sarebbe stato bon mercato a San Marco se li fosse stata messa a conto per cinque millia ducatti, ma costa tanto poco, che per non torli la riputatione, non lo voglio dire.

Medesimamente è stata fatta una fonderia tanto onorevole, commoda, grande, bella et fatta con le camere del fonditore, con tanta poca spesa come è detto di sopra della masina, che non apparirà in libro neanche questa spesa, essendo che il tutto si fa passar per li libri ordini

1 Astore Baglioni; cf. supra, doc. 4 n. 3. It should be noted that the Senate chose G.S.'s replacement in May, and that it took six months for the news to reach Cyprus. 2 *la sopra* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 3 *mi* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 4 The modern-day Paphos Gate. 5 Around 10 August or 10 September 1568, depending on which version of events is believed; cf. supra, doc. 67 n. 2. 6 *man* in the sense of *strato*, a layer.

della fabrica, delli belloardi, quali sono tenuti con li mei ordini, sì che le istesse pietre della fabrica delli balloardi, calzine, sabion, maestranze, opere d'ogni sorte, il tutto passa per li libri delli balloardi, ma il capitan Lorenzo⁷ ha havuto la cura particolare di attender alla masina dall'alba fino a notte, et io li faceva dar tutto quello li è stato de bisogno, et messer Virgilio Albergetto⁸ eccellentissimo fonditore, homo santo et miracoloso di bontà, et di eccellenzia, ha sempre atteso alla sua fonderia, et fin diece giorni ha da fonder il primo pezzo qual sarà un pezzetto d'artegliaria del conte Germanico, con mettallo comprato della mia borsa di 200 lire di peso, et butterà anco un paro di pezzotti per conto della Serenissima Signoria di circa / [170^f] 3 miara, et non dispiaceranno a Vostra Signoria per conto della foggia et nova inventionione.

È stato anco mezo fatto un magazzino longo 60 passa et largo undeci, proporcionato a Nicossia et alla gran quantità della bella artiglieria che li ha a star dentro, et 18 passa appresso di questo è stato fondato da farne un altro simile da tenerli dentro li corsaletti, le picche, le arme d'hasta, li arcobusoni, li arcobusi et in fine la più bella monitione che sia al mondo stata mandata in una volta da niun Principe. Li ho voluto far l'honore che meritano per poterle ben conservare et governare. Fra un magazzino et l'altro, come ho detto, li restarà questa corte di 60 passa longa et larga 18, in capo della qual corte si avanza un magazzino 18 passa longo et largo undeci, solamente da salvar legnami da monitione che bisognano per una tal fortezza. Ha de entrare a tutti tre questi magazeni et corte si anderà per una porta sola, qual entra in una lozza 40 passa longa et larga 6, qual si ha fatto a posta per starli sotto li maestri che governano li arcobusi, li corsaletti, le rode d'artegliaria, et altri servitij infiniti, sì che questo loco è domandato l'arsenale di Nicossia, ma per la verità in tutto il Stato di Vostre Signore Illustrissime non sarà la più bella cosa, non parlando però de Venetia, et con quella clausula però della poca spesa in fabricarlo come è detto di sopra della masina, et della fonderia et questa è la terza cosa notabile. In tutte vi va calzina, pietre et maestranze, con tutto ciò delli danari della fabrica ne sono stati imprestati dicinove millia ducatti alla camera reale, perché non voleno scoder come li scrissi altre volte per mie lettere, sì che il mondo va al contrario.

Scrivo questa lettera a Vostra Signoria Clarissima in questo giorno che è il di de San Steffano, seconda festa di Natale.⁹ Questi Signori al presente se ne hanno aveduto / [170^v] che fino a dui mesi e mezo, io sarò in punto per partirme et questi gentilhomini di Nicossia li hanno pur tanto rotto il cervello, o per dir meglio conzato che si hanno risolto di volermi dar per genaro, febraro doi mille homini al giorno. Se lo faranno mi sarà molto caro et beno per questa fortificatione, et per San Marco, et del mese di ottobre pur hebbero la nova che io doveo andar via, et come ho detto con il mio star paziente per obedire Vostra Signoria Clarissima, lascio far a loro ciò che li piace. Tanto li posso scriver fin al presente giorno di quello è stato fatto fin qui, i tutti li capitani in bonissima concordia insieme obedientissimi; li soldati sono tanti fratti et con quelli della città domesticati maravigliosamente, et non li voleva niente manco di quello è stato fatto per tener in cervello l'una et l'altra parte. Il Signor

7 Lorenzo Badassino, mentioned supra, doc. 65, and infra, doc. 75. 8 Already mentioned supra, doc. 65. 9 Friday 26 December 1568.

Dio sempre aiuta chi fa le cose per grande che siano, pur che siano fatte con qualche poco di giuditio, et con animo sincero a fine di ben operare.

Queste nave ancora non partano et aggiongerò qualche altra cosa che si farà avanti il partir di dette nave, et per adesso me raccomandando sempre a Vostra Signoria Clarissima et al Clarissimo Signor Lucca Michel¹⁰ mio unico patrone, et la sarà contenta di dirle che 'l capitan Andrea del Sale, più mio che non è il conte Germanico vol venir in Italia con me, qual se raccomandando infinitamente a Vostre Signore Clarissime.

Di Nicossia alli 26 decembre 1568.

La nave Viviana senza fortuna dormendo tutti con vento in puppa ha dato in terra à capo Cornacchijtti, qui su l'isola di Cipro non molto lontano da Cerines, et subito lì andò per soccorso il capitan Christoforo Fusaro,¹¹ con mio gran dispiacere per che non havrei voluto che capitani ne soldati se havessero impazzato in simil cose, però lo dico chiaro a Vostra Signoria che fu fatto consiglio di dodici, nel qual intraveniva il Clarissimo Luogotenente, il Clarissimo Proveditor, il / [171^r] Consigliero Loredano et io, et molti altri, nel quale contra mia volontà fu ballotato il capitan Antonio del Berettino, et per che la nave era rotta già 4 giorni avanti, et il capitan Christoforo Fusaro lì era stato atorno con alquante barche de Cerines, giudicai che così come atorno a Cerines alquante miglia non erano securi li capretti delli villani né le capre, agnelli et ogn'altra cosa, come si conviene alli eccellentissimi ladroni, ma la bontà delli Signori è tanta che non voleno aprire gli occhij né anco le orecchie. Facevo questo argomento se le capre non erano secure manco sarebbe stato il pevere, la cannella, le nose muschiate, li tapeti caierini, le casse di penne de struzzi, et manco le buste di zoiije, et però dissi che non voleno chel capitan Antonio del Berettino andasse a far nominar soldati in simil facende, et che se bene lui fosse homo da bene, in 4 giorni persone tale havranno fatti tanti mali et la colpa sarebbe stata de altri. Facevo tal giuditio et non me ho ingannato, perché il detto Fusaro ha benissimo empito li suoi fusi et se ha accommodato molto bene de diverse cose, come vien detto et ringratio Dio per bene del capitan Antonio del Berettino, et per honor mio che non vi sia andato, et se Vostra Signoria Clarissima sentirà a murmurar qualche cosa sopra questa andata del capitan Fusaro, che la voglia far mia scusa con li interessati delle mercantie dicendoli la verità, che non ho consentito chel capitan Antonio lì vada per esser

¹⁰ Luca Michiel, *di Salvador*, from the San Geminiano branch of the family, was born in February 1519, and during the 1550s was an administrative magistrate. Later he became a *rettore* in Chania, from October 1564 to winter 1567, then was proveditor-general in Crete during the 1570 war. He was elected councillor and to the Council of Ten several times in the 1570s, and especially in the 1580s; on 20 October 1587 he became procurator of San Marco *de citra*. He died on 10 March 1596: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 179^v–180^f; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 177^v–178^f, reg. 38, f. 100^f; Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. IV, p. 99; Grendler, 'The leaders of the Venetian State, 1540–1609', pp. 77–78; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, pp. 79–80. Copies of his reports concerning his two terms as proveditor in Crete can be found in the BNF, *ms. ital.* 427, ff. 197^f–256^f.

¹¹ Captain Christoforo Fusaro, from Brescia, was posted to the Cerines guard by the Senate on 9 September 1564; he had a company of 25 soldiers and a yearly pay of 25 ducats. He was still in the same position in August 1565: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 28^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 70^v. He is mentioned again infra, doc. 106.

stato corsaro, che è tanto peggio. Quest'altro Fusaro non ha lasciato venir la nova a noi se non 4 giorni dappoi, tanto li dico di più et in 3 ore potrebbe venire.¹² Hoggi che ne havemo 4 di genaro si ha cominciato a lavorar con circa mille homini.

Di Nicossia alli 7 genaro 1569.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano

Al Clarissimo Signor mio osservandissimo Il Signor Francesco Michel fu del Signor Nicolò, Venetia a Santa Lucia. 1569 7 genaro. con la Contarina. N° 35.



75 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 9 January 1569

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 92^v–93^r.

G.S. thanks the doge for the letter he sent discharging him from Cyprus and authorizing his return to Italy, and assures him that he will do his utmost to keep construction going in Nicosia until Proveditor Bembo arrives. Over the last four months there have only been 100 to 200 men working on the walls each day.

A gunpowder mill, 25-passa [43.4 m]-long, 10-passa-[17.3 m]-wide and capable of housing four millstones, has nearly been finished; it is a fine and practical building, like no other in the Venetian State. The foundry is finished, and in two weeks will be ready for the burning of old metal lying around in the area. It has been built in proportion to the fortress, as has the gunpowder mill; the latter's construction has been carefully supervised by Captain Lorenzo Badassino, and for the construction of the former, the founder Alberghetto has also proved well up to the task.

Two large storehouses have been built, one to house weapons and ammunition, and another to hold the 142 artillery pieces, which are of very fine quality; but the latter storehouse's walls are currently only half-finished due to a lack of lime (much lime has been kept for those who lost their houses during construction and are now building new ones within the fortress walls).

The flanks and orillons at the Caraffa bastion have now been bonded, and the necessary amounts of lime are being prepared to build the curtain linking this bastion to the Podocatoro bastion. Work has also finished on a demi-curtain next to the Rochas bastion; the former coincides with one of the three gates, at the point where the old river used to enter the city. The demi-curtain cost little, having been built following the example of the Rochas bastion, which was the least expensive of all the bastions. It would seem that God helps those who serve their masters, such as the count of Rochas, who did with 800 men the work of 2,000, and who at the very beginning gave the impetus needed to begin the construction of the fortress.

¹² *in 3 ore potrebbe venire* added above with signe-de-renvoi.

Serenissimo Principe,

Per una lettera di Vostra Serenità scritta a questi Clarissimi Suoi Signori che governano questo Regno, ho inteso che la Serenità Vostra si ha degneta di concedermi licentia ch' io possa tornar in Italia, dilche le rendo quelle maggior gratie ch' io posso. In questo mezo tempo che mi avvanzarà fino alla venuta del Clarissimo Proveditor Bembo,¹ non mancherò di far tutto quello ch' io potrò in servitio di questa fabrica, sì come non ho mancato per il passato. Li 4 mesi passati non si ha havuto più che 100 o 200 homini alla fabrica al giorno. / [93^r]

È stata fatta una macina da metterli dentro quatro gran mole, longa la casa 25 passa et larga diece, qual è tanto commoda et bella che in niun loco del stato di Vostra Serenità non ne è una così fatta, et delle cinque parte ne sono finite 4 con pochissima spesa.

Medesimamente è stata fatta la fonderia finita, et fino quindici giorni si butteranno alcuni pezzotti de alcuni metalli vecchi che sono qui. Dico a Vostra Serenità che questa fonderia è stata fatta commoda, et bella proportionata alla fortezza di Nicosia, sì come è anco la macina, allaqual macina con grandissima diligentia li ha atteso il capitan Lorenzo Badasino, il quale, sel non havesse fatto altro in questo Regno cha questa macina, merita laude appresso Vostra Serenità.

Messer Virgilio Albergetti fonditore ha havuto la cura di far fare la fonderia a suo modo. Lui ancora è eccellentissimo homo nel suo mestiero, et tanto da ben persona quanto si può desiderare in un homo.

Sono stati fondati dui gran magazeni, ciascuno longo 60 passa et largo 11, uno per tenere le balle delle artiglierie li piombi, corsaletti, archobusi, picche et altre simil monitioni, qual sono tante che a pena vi potranno capire dentro, questo è solamente fondato. L'altro nelquale li ha da star dentro li 142 bellissimi pezzi d'artiglieria. Questo della istessa grandezza, li suoi muri sono alzati a quest' hora più della mittà di quello che hanno d' andare, et per mancamento di calzina si è andato un poco più lenti in questa, essendo che tutti quelli delle case rovinate, attendono a fabricarne dentro della fortezza, a quali è honesto concederli parte delle calzine.

Fu fatto qui fino al partire del Conte di Rochas di muraglia tutte 2 le fronte del balloardo Caraffa, tutti doi li suoi orecchioni et tutti doi li suoi fianchi, pur di muro, et si ha preparata in la fossa tanta monition di calzina che si potrà fare tutta la cortina vicina a questo balloardo Caraffa verso il balloardo Po' da Cathero, allaquale si attenderà al presente.

È stata fatta ancora et finita di muro come ha d' andare ottanta passa che è meza cortina iusta vicina al balloardo del Conte di Rochas et si ha cominciato da questa, essendo che alla mittà di questa meza cortina vien a cadere una delle tre porte della città, et in questa parte soleva entrare il torrente, et per assicurarsi dalle acque è stata fatta in tanti pochi giorni, con così pochi maestri et con tanta poca spesa che è vergogna a dirlo, et è molto ben honesto che si habbia spesso poco, essendo che si ha tolto l'esempio dall' balloardo li vicino del Conte di Rochas, qual fu fatto da lui con manco spesa di ciascuno delli altri et la machina più alta, et pare chel Signor Dio aiuti miracolosamente tutti coloro che fidelmente servono il suo Patrone,

¹ Lorenzo Bembo, who replaced Francesco Barbaro, arrived in Cyprus on 26 April 1569: Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 36.

come ha fatto il detto Conte, il quale se fosse qui, così come si lavora con 800 homini già 4 giorni si lavorarebbe con doi millia, et detto Conte fu cause principalmente di far nascere così presto questa fortezza in servitio di Vostra Serenità, così nel far venire li homini a lavorare, come nel far havere il donativo delli cento et tanti millia ducatti dal Regno. Si attenderà come è detto di sopra, in questi pochi giorni con questi 800 huomini a fare quel più che si potrà per servitio di Vostra Serenità, alla buona gratia della quale sempre me raccomando.

Di Nicossia alli 9 genaro 1569.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo principe di Venetia il Signor Pietro Loredano, mio signor sempre osservandissimo.



76 Letter from G.S. to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 7 March 1569

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 93^v.

The cavalier captain da Pesaro delli Lionardi has asked G.S. to write for him a letter of recommendation, and G.S. complies; he assures the doge that this is a man who boasts an excellent upbringing, and is bound for a fine career, already displaying many of the qualities a captain requires.

G.S. also assures the doge that da Pesaro delli Lionardi had no part in the sedition that recently occurred in Famagusta, aimed at Governor Piacenza; the cavalier's attitude is upstanding, and he would make a fine governor.

Serenissimo Principe,

Il Signor Cavalier da Pesaro delli Lionardi¹ venne in questo Regno con una honorata compagnia de soldati et fu destinato a Famagosta per l'importantia di quella città. Al presente che spera di venir in Italia con buona gratia di questi Clarissimi Signori, quali hanno da far la regulatione, sì come Vostra Serenità li ha ordenato, mi ha richiesto ch' io voglia con questa mia darne conto alla Sublimità Vostra per il grado ch' io tengo in suo servitio. Li dico che è soldato di bonissima speranza et intelletto, intende fondamente la fortificatione tanto che de quanti capitani che Vostra Serenità ha mandati in questo Suo Regno in li dui anni passati, niuno non li è superiore, et a quelle guerre che è stato mostra di haver fatto buon frutto, et è medesimamente frutto degno del collonello Antenar suo padre,² et alevato da suo zio l'ambasciatore che fu tanto galant' homo et bonissimo marchesco.³

¹ Captain da Pesaro delli Lunardi, *cavalier*, is mentioned supra, docs 66 and 71. ² Antenore Leonard, the *cavalier's* father, is said to have fought in the 1537–1540 war between Venice and Turkey, in Crete: C. Marcolini, *Notizie storiche della provincia di Pesaro e Urbino dalle prime età fino al presente*, Pesaro 1868, p. 308. ³ *Mar-*

Questo Cavalier mai si ha ingerito in quella seditione che è stata fatta da alquanti capitani contra quel Magnifico Governator Piasenza⁴ di Famagosta.⁵ Anzi questo Magnifico Cavalier da Pesaro, il Capitan Hieronimo da Ugubio et il Conte Horatio Martinengo hanno patito tutti tre delli travagli, non per altro se non perché erano obedienti, honoravano et accompagnavano il suo Governatore, sia di che sorte si voglia, se ben fosse di troppo bontà, basta che la Serenità Vostra glie l'ha dato per suo Governatore. Però quelli che hanno fatto il debito suo, son sforzato a farglielo sapere et quelli che hanno mancato et che sono di natura seditiosi, non ho mancato di advertirli et admonirli, et in conclusione dico che è degno della gratia di Vostra Serenità, allaquale sempre me raccomandando.

Di Nicossia alli 7 marzo 1569.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano

All' Serenissimo et Eccellentissimo Principe di Venetia il Signor Pietro Loredano, signor mio sempre osservandissimo.



77 Report from G.S. on the defence of Cyprus, addressed to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Venice, 15 January 1570

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 98^v–100^v; other version, almost entirely destroyed by fire: id., *Materie Miste Notabili* 17, s.f.

In response to the doge's injunction to put into writing what he presented orally before the Collegio, G.S. reiterates that, along with Proveditor Barbaro, he scrupulously followed Sforza

cesco as in a supporter of San Marco, Venice; da Pesaro's uncle was Giangiacomo Leonardi; cf. supra, doc. 66 n. 3. 4 Governor Scipione Piacenza, from Crema, served in France's armies for many years before serving Venice. It is known that he was a governor of soldiers in Corfu, in 1558 / 1559, then in Udine before going to Cyprus; he stayed on the island for a long time by a military man's standards, beginning his duties in spring 1563 (he was given the command of the island's *ordinanze*, and also the task of organizing a *mostra generale* of the *Regno's* cavalries; his annual salary was 480 ducats). His work as *ordinanze* governor received unanimous praise, giving him the impetus to try for the position of grand chancellor in April 1565; he was unsuccessful, but on 29 September of that same year he replaced Nadal da Crema as commander of Famagusta's army (*fantaria*), heading a company of 150 soldiers and receiving an annual salary of 600 ducats. He asked to be relieved of his duties at the end of 1569, and was replaced by Dioniso Naldi; he did not leave Cyprus, however, staying to defend Famagusta in 1570, and died in the battle fought in the winter of that year: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 43^v–44^v, reg. 37, f. 84^{r-v}, reg. 39, f. 132^r; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 103 n. 68, and passim; Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κύπρου*, pp. 107, 112, 121. 5 There is no clear information pertaining to this captain-led sedition in Famagusta, and neither the details or the duration of the events are known; it was possibly a mere surge of indiscipline directed against the town's governor, Piacenza, or maybe a more serious revolt which was intentionally covered up after the fact, and which may not be connected to governor Malatesta's sedition in 1564: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 119^r, 128^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 139^v–140^v; id., *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 97^v.

Pallavicino's instructions, despite not being given much time, and that he constantly endeavoured to save Venice money; in view of its commerce and its salt flats, Cyprus is vital both to the State and individuals.

Venice can now keep 130,000 Cypriot citizens from harm (100,000 in Nicosia and 30,000 in Famagusta), but 50,000 will still be left unprotected; a new fortress ought thus to be built, on the coast near to Limassol.

With a new fortress all 180,000 citizens would be protected, but they will also need supplies. The island currently has enough grain to last eighteen months, if exports cease; wheat and barley are hard to preserve for any longer than two years, but Cyprus could adopt the Northern European method of removing moisture from grain by drying it out in special ovens.

Concerning the troops stationed in Cyprus, only 600 soldiers are needed to guard Famagusta, and the same for Nicosia; the number of mounted stradioti has been raised to 1,000, but only 600 would be necessary to destroy the island's harvests in the event of a war.

The 5,000 ordinarze soldiers, who thanks to Governor Roncone are now on a par with their Italian counterparts, need Italian commanders, but the Italian soldiers could be given Greek commanders to ensure their loyalty; this would give the island 10,000 soldiers in all.

Regarding Famagusta, G.S. recalls the measures he recommended in May 1567, and, having nothing new to add, refers back to a letter he sent in 1562 and the plans he sent to the proveditori alle fortezze.

In its current state, Cerines would not be able to resist an enemy attack for longer than 24 hours, and strengthening the town would make no sense when Nicosia's fortress is so nearby. The Cerines garrison and the 30 artillery pieces are good enough to merit being sent to Famagusta.

Proveditor Barbaro has asked G.S. several times to look at the problem of the salt flats, as something must be done to save the salt harvest from being lost. Captain Bernardin Polani has delivered a report on the matter, and although Luocotenente Dandolo disagrees, G.S. thinks the captain's opinions are sound.

Shortly before returning to Venice, G.S. was approached by Zuan Sozomeno, who explained to him his proposal of hiring out the water currently unused by the reale, an idea that could make thousands of ducats in profit; G.S. judges Sozomeno to be a clever and able man, and supports his proposal.

The defence of Cyprus should above all be focused on the safety of civilians, and should therefore be based around adequately supplied fortresses. The Cypriot countryside is very fertile and capable of feeding 300,000 people, providing the harvests are not exported and providing drying methods are applied to the grain; otherwise it will be impossible for Venice to support such a far-off island.

Such strong and well-stocked fortresses will oblige the enemy to resort to lengthy sieges; this will allow Venice to launch diversions, and in the summer the Ottoman troops will be weakened by a lack of water. A handicap for the enemy in the winter will be not having a harbour in which to protect their ships, giving Venice time to send help. G.S. thinks it would be a mistake to prevent an enemy landing, as this would risk endangering the island's soldiers or cavalry and thus weakening the fortresses' defences.

The enemy may choose to land large numbers of cavaliers, which would be a threat to the

stradioti, as Turkish horses are tougher than Cypriot horses. The stradioti could be used to watch the enemy's movements and burn fields in the countryside, but otherwise they will have to stay inside the fortresses and possibly partake in skirmishes against the enemy. Experience has shown, in Nauplia and in Koroni, that hatred of the Turks can work wonders.

G.S. ends his account by reiterating how much he himself has done for Venice, following in the footsteps of his ancestors, who gave Friuli to Venice and who defended Osoppo from the Holy Roman Emperor's Army. He recalls the first steps of his military career, starting in 1526; his role in the War of Rome in 1527; then his enrolment as a Venetian soldier in the fight against the Turks in Dalmatia. He spent six years in Zara, and has been twice to Corfu, twice to Crete and twice to Cyprus. He has strengthened fortifications with a gift for thrift, in Candia, for example: here the walls had been abandoned for fourteen years and then the subject of absurd initiatives such as the bastion built by Gabriele Martinengo, who spent 28,000 ducats on fortifying 28 passa [48.6 m]; G.S. fortified 500 passa [869.3 m], with flawless walls of both earth and stone, at a cost of just 10,000 ducats.

On several occasions in Venetian territory, 1,000 ducats have been spent on just one passo [1.7 m]; one of Famagusta's bastions cost 125,000 ducats, more than all of Nicosia's 11 bastions and 11 curtains put together, plus a gate capable of protecting 300 soldiers, storehouses, a foundry, a gunpowder mill, etc... If not for G.S., Venice would have spent fortunes on the 4,100 passa [7.1 km] of Nicosia's enceinte. During his forty-four years in the service of the Signoria, G.S. has built 22 bastions, 18 in the Levant and 4 in Lombardy; now he is 60 he can say with certainty that his efforts have never been motivated by ambition or a quest for promotion, but merely by a desire to serve Venice.

Serenissimo Principe,

Esseguirò volentieri, io Giulio Savorgnano, il commandamento che mi fu fatto dalla Serenità Vostra di metter in scrittura ciò che ultimamente li fu riferito da me nell'Illustrissimo Suo¹ Collegio, sì perché debbo ubedirla come per dar conto della fortificatione di Nicossia che si è fatta, et che dal Clarissimo Signor Provveditor Barbaro, et da me, sono sta eseguiti tutti li ordini che Vostra Serenità ne ha imposti, et medesimamente è stata eseguito quella scrittura del Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza allaquale lei si riportava,² et che rispetto al breve tempo non si ha potuto far più di quello è stato fatto, né si poteva far cosa più conforme alle commissioni né con manco spesa della borsa di Vostra Serenità per la conservatione di quel Suo Regno importantissimo di Cipro, tanto lontano per l'utile che lei ne cava, per il comertio con Turchi, per la navigatione delle navi che senza esso Regno saria perduta in gran parte, con grandissimo danno del publico, et de particolari, rispetto a quelle saline, et per la conservatione de gl'altri suoi Regni, che manchando questo si perderebbe la reputatione che tanto importa, come a bocca credo haverglielo fatto ben intender, et per che le molti raggioni che io li dissi in quella sera sarebbono per la sua longhezza tediose a questo Illustrissimo³ Senato,

1 *Consiglio* crossed out after *suo*. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 17. 3 *Stato* crossed out after *Illustrissimo*.

perciò le ho poste in una mia scrittura separata, et data alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze, nella quale si può vedere particolarmente il tutto.⁴

Mi resta dire che al presente Vostra Serenità ha modo di conservare 130 millia anime in quel suo Regno, cioè 30 millia in Famagosta, 100 millia in Nicossia et 50 millia restarebbono per sé, ma io ancora son dell'istessa opinione, come dice l'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza in quella sua scrittura, che con tempo si debba fare un'altra piazza alla marina, nellaquale si potrà conservare quel restante delle anime del Regno, ma Sua Eccellentia non specifica il sito per non esserli stato. Io dico alla Serenità Vostra che dovendosi fare, come sarà cosa necessaria al mio giudizio, non si può migliorare di farla mezo meglio lontana di Limissò verso ponente, riportandome alle ragioni dette in la mia scrittura data alli Signori delle fortezze.⁵

Dapoi finite le 3 fortezze sopradette Famagosta, Nicossia et Limissò, nelle quali si potranno salvare tutti li popoli del Regno, che sono 180 millia anime in tutto, non voglio restar di ricordarle che il maggior pensiero che ha d'havere la Serenità Vostra, è quello delle vettovaglie per la lontananza che è da Venetia fino a quell'isola, ma la natura ha supplito con farlo esser tanto abbondante de biade che in un'anno nasce il vivere per 18 mesi almanco, et non le lasciando andar fori del Regno in / [99] poco tempo la monitione si potrà fare si grossa che si potrà stare con l'animo contento, non solamente per mesi ma anco per anni. Nasceva una difficoltà che li fermenti et orzi, passati li doi anni, mal si potevano conservare, ma la industria humana è tale che in parte dell'Alemagna, alla volta di Prussia, Frisia et in Inghilterra, per conservare li fermenti et segalle le seccano in certa sorte de forni col foco, cavandoli fori la humidità del grano, per il che se conservano l'età d'un homo in loco fresco.⁶ Vostra Serenità potrà ordinar questo modo et haverne consideratione anco in altre sue fortezze, et in questa materia de deripamento di biade miste con qualche mal governo, con quest'occasione di permuttarle spesso. La Serenità Vostra ne sente ogn'anno interesse et botte grandissime in la sua borsa, et questo è uno delli ricordi, come principalissimo per la conservatione dei Regni, che per debito mio li ho voluto dire, come suo buon servitore.

Quanto alla guarda ordinaria di quell' Regno, dico a Vostra Serenità che non lascierei in Famagosta, ritrovandosi nell'esser che è al presente, in tempo di pace manco di 600 fanti, essendo che per le malatie et altro non se saranno assai volte 300 utili. A Nicossia medesimamente altri 600, et si può haver per certo che quel suo Regno sta molto più securro essendo detta Nicossia fortificata, et che nel Regno fossero solamente 600 stradiotti di quello, che era l'altra volta quando ch' io fui mandato da Vostra Serenità, che si ritrovavano all' hora esser mille cavalli et la spesa di 300 o 400 stradiotti, manco satisfa de largo alla guarda ordinaria delle fanterie di Nicossia, per ilche non li sarà cresciuta spesa ma ben maggior sicurezza. Delli cavalli stradiotti al mio giuditio non bisogna più di 600 che tanti bastano

⁴ Cf. supra, doc. 78. ⁵ This letter does not appear to have been preserved, but the plan to fortify Limassol once work in Nicosia had been finished is set out supra, doc. 68. It should also be remembered that Ascanio Savorgnan wished to see Limassol fortified; cf. supra, doc. 16. ⁶ Later on G.S. recalls the talks he had in Nicosia with German nobles, returning from the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, on the best way to save grain: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 6, f. 1^r.

all'ordinaria custodia, et in tempo di guerra all'abbrusciare tutto quello che non possa esser condotto tostamente nelle fortezze, et è appresso questi cavalli un'apparecchio per obviare qualche tumulto che potesse nascer fra nostri, laqual commodità se avesse havuto in sul principio il Re di Spagna non sentirebbe forse Sua Maestà quel tumulto importante de Mori.⁷

Quanto a quelle cinque millia ordinanze che sono ridotte al par delle bone d'Italia per la diligentia et intelligentia del Governator Lonardo Ronchone, non ho da dir altro senon che tanto in tal stato si conserveranno et augmentarano quanto havranno buon governatore et boni capi, i quali stimarei doveressero esser Italiani per quei rispetti che si possono considerare, dando se li paresse a quelli capi greci il governo dell'ordinanze d'Italia, dellequali ordinanze io per me accompagnate con altri cinque millia Italiani, me ne vorrei servire sì per la fidelità et valore quanto che io farei se tutti X millia fossero Italiani, perilche la Serenità Vostra con poca spesa ne caverà sempre grandissimo costrutto, adoperandoli però unitamente con altri tanti Italiani, come è detto di sopra.

Circa a Famagosta et modo di diffenderla et fortificarla, per quello che si può fare quest'anno, alla Serenità Vostra ho già detto quello che si deve fare in continuare la deliberatione, che fu fatta in Famagosta del 1567 li ultimi giorni di mazo dalli Clarissimi Bembo, Barbaro, et da me.⁸ Quanto a far li balloardi di novo et del numero delli soldati, che li vole in tempo di guerra, et le qualità sue et di che sorte che deve esser un tal governatore, me riporto a quella mia littera scritta del 1562 a Vostra Serenità in questa materia,⁹ et alli miei disegni quali sono all'ufficio delle fortezze,¹⁰ sopra laqual materia non saprei dirle niuna cosa più particolare di quella alla quale come dico in tutto me riporto.

De Cerines dico che, essendo nell'esser che è al presente, non è atto a tenirse 24 hore, et a farlo grande non porta più la spesa, essendo Nicossia fortificata nella quale si salverano quelle genti che prima s'havea animo di salvare in detto Cerines, et per esser altri lochi li vicini commodi alle smontate meglio che a Cerines, come per le ragioni appare in la scrittura delli Signori delle fortezze.¹¹ La spesa della qual Cerines di fanteria et arteglieria per adesso le farei poner in Famagosta per la sua importantia fino che sij meglio assetata, et poi con / [99^v] tempo servirse de quelli 30 pezzi d'arteglieria et guarda de Cerines per la fortezza, che con tempo Vostra Serenità farà in altro loco di quel isola, come è detto di sopra.

Più volte il Clarissimo Barbaro m'ha comandato che io dovesse havere consideratione sopra la conservatione delle salline diquel Regno et anco Vostra Serenità me l'ha ordenato, dopoi la partità di Sua Signoria Clarissima¹² ho havuto tempo di poterlo fare, et dico esser

7 A reference to the conflict in Granada which began in 1568, at Christmas time, and saw the Muslim *moriscos* rise up against Philip II throughout 1569; this war can be seen as a preliminary to the wider conflict between Christian and Ottoman armies which continued up until the Battle of Lepanto on 7 October 1571: Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, vol. 2, pp. 359–370. 8 Cf. supra, doc. 27. 9 Cf. supra, doc. 7. 10 The inventory of the *provveditori alle fortezze*'s archives made in 1759 confirms that G.S. did draw a "Pianta di detta [Famagosta] con li progetti, secondo l'idea del Co. Giulio Savorgnan del 1562. Con particolari annotazioni ne' piani all'intorno, di livellazioni formate; nonché di alcuni scandagli nell'attinente littorale, in cui vi scorge figurato un recinto, circoscrivendo un Porto contiguo alla Piazza, con scala e Bussola, con varie diligenti osservazioni relative a que' pensamenti": Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, p. 202. 11 Cf. supra, doc. 78. 12 Francesco Barbaro left Cyprus once his replacement,

cosa necessarijssima, altramente si solveranno in far pochissimo sale. Ho veduti tutti li discorsi, et opinioni delli più periti del Regno, finalmente dico che la opinione del Magnifico Monsignor Bernardin Polani Capitanio di dette Saline,¹³ a me pare per quello che ho veduto la più sensata et fattibile di tutte l'altre, et una scrittura di questo ho veduto in mano del Clarissimo Luogotenente Dandolo, qual si confronta con la mia opinione.

Messer Zuan Susomino gentilhome cipriotto nelli ultimi giorni del mio partire, m'ha detto che farebbe grandissimo utile alla camera reale di quel Regno in materia di affittar diverse acque, delle quali la Serenità Vostra non ne cava utile alcuno, et mi diceva che tal cosa importarebbe molti migliara de ducati accennandomi di volerlo fare havedone lui per sua inventione et fatica qualche portione, et è persona di gran ingegno et giudicio, molto intendente più d'ogn'altro che sia in Cipro in questa materia d'acque con lequali s'ha fatto richissimo, perilche io giudicio che parli con fondamento. Parendo a Vostra Serenità d'haver sopra ciò qualche consideratione per cavarne qualche buon vide quella faccia quanto li pare, non ho potuto mancare di ricordarlo per giovare a Vostra Serenità in ogni cosa, come io son obligato.

Mi restar a dir a Vostra Serenità che la difesa di quel Regno, per mia opinione, si deve governar principalmente a metter tempo longo a tutte le operationi che siano per fare li nemici, et cercar di prima de conservare li popoli, senza liquali il Regno sarebbe perso, et a conservarli è stato necessario ad havere delle fortezze capaci, lequali fortezze et popoli senza vettovaglie non si ponno conservare in niun loco, però (rispetto alla lontananza et incommodità di mandar soccorsi) col antiveder et diligentia farli per tempo le provisioni gagliarde et grandissime, lequali per il passato parevano alquanto difficili, et da poter si fare per pochi mesi a tanta gente, con tutto ciò che l'isola sij fertilissima da notrire 300 millia persone, pur che non si lasci portar fori del Regno le vettovaglie, et con il modo detto di sopra, di seccarle col fuoco dureranno, perilche si può stare di buona voglia, che quelle sue fortezze (volendosi) se empiranno di tanta grossa quantità de monitione da viver che si starà poi con l'animo tanto contento di quell'isola così lontana, quanto de Candia, Corfù, et anco di Zara, vicina a Venetia in ogni occasione.

Onde havendo l'inimico a dover fare assedij così lunghi, sarà tempo che Vostra Serenità li potrà fare tal sorte di diversione che si potrebbero pentire d'haver cominciato tal guerra, et la estate li nemici hanno un malissimo guerreggiare da star in campagna per mancamento delle acque, et del sole horrendo, la invernata hanno poi quest'altro contrario, che armate nemiche per non osservi porto a torno l'isola staranno sempre in evidentissimo pericolo, sì che vi sono delle difficoltà grandissime, quali deventeranno sempre maggiori alli nemici

Lorenzo Bembo, reached Famagusta, on 26 April according to Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 36. 13 Bernardin Polani, *di Marin*, was *castellan* in Corfu in 1558/1559, and then appointed captain of Salina on 4 October 1566, to serve until October 1569; he was still serving there in early May 1569 and took part in the defence of Nicosia during the summer of 1570; one of his letters appears infra, doc. 96: ASV, *Segretario alli voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consiglio, reg. 4, ff. 183^v–184^r; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3596/22*, f. 28^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 41 and 106 n. 9; Pagnatis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαϊλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, p. 114; Grivaud, *‘Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς’*, p. 125.

mettendosi tempo longo di mezo; et de inverno sarà più facile a Vostra Serenità in mandar li soccorsi che d'ogni altro tempo con vasselli grossi, non vi potendo star armata nemica, come è detto a torno l'isola, et mai consiglierei che si menassero fanterie né italiane né greche, né grossa cavalleria per voler devedar le smontate alli nemici, il che sarebbe un perderle di certezza, et poi causa con quel disordine di perder anco le fortezze, con invilire alla prima, sì la nazione italiana come la greca, non usi a quella guerra turchesca.

Se nemici hanno da venir in quell'isola, hanno modo di¹⁴ menar tanta grossa quantità de cavalleria, che se li nostri stradiotti si lasciaranno trovar lontani dalle fortezze / [100'] 15 o 20 millia, pochi de loro potranno salvarsi in quelle, et la causa è questa che li cavalli turchi sono gagliardi et di gran lena, più che altri cavalli del mondo, dalli arabi in poi, perilche maj sono strachi di correre, et tutti li cavalli del Regno di Cipro, se ben sono belli da vedere, sono tanto più deboli et di manco gagliardezza et lena, che non sono li cavalli italiani né le tedeschi, di modo che se havranno da tore una carica de 15 o 20 miglia, tutto restorano per strada fiacchi, che pur uno potrà arrivare alla città, però li vorrei adoperare se non pochi alla volta, tanto che sapessero dar nova delli andamenti delli nemici, et attender a brusare la campagna et le ville per non lasciarli commodità alcuna, et con salvar il tutto dentro delle fortezze, et domesticar poi li soldati con li nemici in alcune piccole scaramuzze, per lequali se li soldati italiani come li Greci vengono poi a prender tant'animo contra Turchi, che faranno delli miracoli che facevono quelli de Napoli de Romania, et medesimamente a Coron, che cento christiani cacciavano ananti se mille Turchi. Però bisogna guardarsi da quel primo furor suo, et non col veder devedar le smontate (cosa impossibile) metter in evidente pericolo tutto quel Regno, et con un poco de patientia et tempo si farà quello si vorrà. Ho voluto dir questo a Vostra Serenità acciò la sappia qual sia stato l'animo mio, governando gente italiana et greca non solita maj a veder guerra de Turchi, et poca d'altra sorte.

Doppo le cose per me narrate in servitio di Vostra Serenità quanto s'appartiene a quel Regno di Cipro, resta che ella si degni d'udire quanto s'aspetta a me, che così mio padre ad immitatione delli suoi vecchi quali diedero il Frioli a Vostra Serenità. Medesimamente da lui fo conservata quella patria in diverse occasione, intertenendo molto tempo l'essercito imperiale nell'oppugnation d'Osopo,¹⁵ et fatto opere tanto segnalate che merito d'esser fatto da Vostra Serenità alquanti anni del Suo Eccellentissimo Senato, ad immitatione del quale io ancora fui mandato del 26 all'espugnation di Cremona fatta dal Duca d'Urbino et poi sotto Milano. Alla presa di Roma del 27, doi volte a combatter Pavia fino alla guerra ultima di Cassano, nelle quali guerre il Signor Alvise Pisani¹⁶ et Signor Zuan Vitturi¹⁷ scrissero da Roma, che fino all'hora io cominciai (combatendo con Spagnoli) a relevar delle ferite in

¹⁴ *montar* crossed out after *di*. ¹⁵ A reference to the 1514 imperial siege of Osoppo held off by his father, Girolamo Savorgnan; cf. *supra*, p. 30–31. ¹⁶ Alvise Pisani was proveditor-general from 1527/1528, notably taking part in the campaigns led against Charles V's troops in Italy: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 3, pp. 275, 286, 303. ¹⁷ Zuan Vitturi was proveditor-general of the Venetian fleet in 1524 and 1526, then proveditor in Creta in 1541/1542: Gerola, *Monumenti veneti nell'isola di Creta*, vol. 1 / 2, p. 317; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 3, pp. 233, 264.

servitio di Vostra Serenità, per impiegarmi poi nei suoi servitij, sì come feci alla guerra turchesca in Dalmatia, che servandola con 400 fanti me offersi et andai nei lochi pericolosi da altri capitaniij rifiutati, per ilche poi la Serenità Vostra mi fece governatore di Zara, nella quale son stato sei anni, doi volte a Corfù, 2 in Candia et doi in Cipro, 16 anni de la del Quarnaro passato da me 20 volte in suoi servitij, mettendo tutto il mio pensiero in tempo di pace di farle tutte quelle fortificationi secure et con poca spesa, come quella de Candia, qual era stata da tutti abbandonata 14 anni per disperata et impossibile, et alcuni balloardi, come quello de Gabriel di Martinengo che circondava 28 passa costo 28 mille ducatti, et in mio tempo con diece millia ducatti soli di spesa furon fatti 500 passa di fortificatione perfetta di muraglia et di terra, laqual se fosse stata fatta con la spesa come gl'altri harebbe costato 500 millia ducatti, ilche pare cosa meravigliosa da veder come sanno li Clarissimi Signori Suoi Rettori, et fortificata detta Candia inespugnabile da quella parte che prima era tenuta impossibile.

In assai lochi del Stato di Vostra Serenità è stata fatta questa spesa de mille ducatti il passo, che tanto costa il balloardo a Famagosta 125 millia ducatti, et con manco danari de questi dal Clarissimo Proveditore Barbaro, et poi dal Clarissimo Bembo sono stati fatti li XI balloardi di terra et XI cortine di Nicossia, in camisati 4 balloardi et 3 cortine / [100v] de muro fatte, una porta d'allogiarvi dentro 300 soldati, grandissimi magazeni per salvar le artiglierie, salle per monition d'arme, una fondaria finita, 4 gran macine da polvere, magazzino per salvarle, altri gran magazeni da formenti, assaissime case per alloggiar soldati, condutture d'arteglierie, legnami, et altre infinite monitioni dalle navi alla città, et divertire il torrente che prima passava per Nicossia, et la incamisatura del balloardo Caraffa bonissima fatta da Clarissimo Barbaro costa solamente 12 ducatti il passo, et il Clarissimo Bembo et il Governatore Roncone alli balloardi Rochas, Tripoli et altri fanno dette camise a raggion de 8 ducatti il passo, sì come erano prima de mille il passo. La Serenità Vostra può pensare da sé, quanto avantazzo di tempo et quanta utilità siano state queste mie inventioni alla sua borsa; in Nicossia solamente, che circonda la sua muraglia più di 4100 passa, nella qual spesa li sarebbero andati li thesori. Mi è accaduto in 44 anni, che io l'ho servita farli 22 balloardi, cioè 18 in le terre di Levante et 4 in Lombardia, et essendo certo che le mie operationi li siano state grate, non ho voluto mancar di ricordarle come hormaj mi trovo esser vecchio in li 60 anni, come li ho detto, havendola servita sempre senza alcun pensiero d'utilità né d'ambitione de gradi, ma solamente per puro servitio della Serenità Vostra, in buona gratia dellaquale sempre me raccomando.

Di Venetia alli 15 genaro 1570.

Di Vostra Serenità buon servitor.
Giulio Savorgnano



78 *Report from G.S. on his mission in Cyprus, addressed to the provveditori alle fortezze, Venice, 15 January 1570*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 96^r-98^v; id. *Materie Miste Notabili* 17, s.f.

In response to the doge's injunction to put into writing the report he presented orally before the Collegio upon returning from Cyprus, G.S. writes a letter more specifically addressed to the proveditors. To begin with, he reminds them of how he was nominated, and of his journey from Corfu to Nicosia, where instructions awaited him regarding his mission. He cites several passages from Sforza Pallavicino's letter enumerating the tasks he was to accomplish.

In Nicosia the only citadel that had been conceived of was one of seven bastions and 30-passa [52.1 m] flanks, to be built on the nearby hills in order to allow the bombardment of the city in the event of it being captured by the enemy; this plan was, however, abandoned due to there not being enough water available and to the terrain being too rocky. A new proposal was to build the citadel on one of the plains, but such a fortification would not have driven away the enemy from such a large city. People were at a loss, but doing nothing would have been a breach of orders.

People therefore turned to Cerines, which could not be made secure in time for March [1568], especially in view of how small the site was. G.S. had already proposed in 1562 a six-bastion fortress; the main problem with this was the moat that would have needed digging by Italian sappers. Moreover, the nobility would not have contributed to a fortress in Cerines, even though it was they who asked for it in 1559. This being the case, G.S. and Proveditor Barbaro were struggling to find a way of protecting the 150,000 citizens who would have no place of refuge if war came; Famagusta could only hold 30,000, and transporting supplies there from Italy was unfeasible. Repopulating Cyprus in the event of citizens being deported would have been impossible.

In the end, after reconsidering Pallavicino's opinion on Nicosia, G.S. made a proposal to fortify the city in the given time limit, providing that, for eight months, he received 500 men per bastion and 15,000 ducats per month; the end result would be an eleven-bastion enceinte situated far from the hills. This enceinte would, the proposal went, protect the 22,000 Nicosians plus a further 100,000 citizens, the city being situated amidst plains inhabited and farmed by many people. G.S.'s eleven-bastion project immediately appealed to the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico] and Proveditor Barbaro, which prompted the rest of the nobility and the università to lend their support too; altogether they donated 110,000 ducats and provided the whole workforce.

Regarding the fortress to be built along the coastline, G.S. opts for the Limassol site, which not long ago would have won the support and participation of nobody, but which will receive the support of the nobility once Nicosia's walls are finished. After seeing how Nicosia has been fortified, people now believe in G.S.'s ability to build a fortress quickly and inexpensively, compared to Famagusta's bastion which took ten years and cost 125,000 ducats. Limassol boasts all the material conditions needed to build a fortress rapidly, and the taxes on commercial exchanges could finance the garrison.

If Cyprus can be endowed with the three fortresses of Famagusta, Nicosia and Limassol, no further fortification will be necessary; especially not at Cerines, which would not withstand an enemy attack for any longer than 24 hours, and from where the 30 artillery pieces and ammunition being kept in storage could be moved to Famagusta. Getting supplies for the three fortresses will be easy. Cerines could be demolished with three mines, and then the wells within the courtyard would need to be destroyed too. The Limassol coast would be made more accessible for the enemy fleet, but the winds along the northern coastline are a danger to large ships, which prefer, even if it necessitates a detour, to land via the south. Seen in this light, Cerines is of no use whatsoever, especially now that Nicosia is fortified.

In Famagusta there are round towers which could easily be neutralized by the enemy, as their flanks are undefended; the challenge in Famagusta is to defend as well as possible an imperfect fortress. The rockiness of Famagusta's terrain causes a bastion to be three times as expensive as in Nicosia. Despite all this, the fortress is vital to the defence of Cyprus and should not be disregarded. The curtains have already been restored, and four bastions could be built, as G.S. proposed in 1562.

G.S. concludes by underlining how important it is to impose some kind of monitoring of the ammunition superintendents, after firstly ordering them to do their job properly; since it is hard to check the stock they are in charge of, there is a possibility of theft or other forms of underhandedness when things are replaced. It would also be a good idea to give the stockroom keys to a rettore or a bombardier commander, in order to reduce the risk of treachery.

Alli Clarissimi Signori sopra le fortezze,

Clarissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori miei osservandissimi,

Havendome comandato Sua Serenità alla presentia di Vostre Signorie Clarissime che io dovesse metter in scrittura alcune di quelle cose che io dissi quella sera nel Suo Eccellentissimo Colleggio, in questo ultimo mio ritorno di Cipro dappoi la fortificatione di Nicossia, ho voluto drizzar quel mio ragionamento in doi scritte, l'una a Sua Serenità¹ et l'altra più particolare all'ufficio di Vostre Signorie Clarissime sopra le fortezze, et non darli tanta molestia per la quale dico che ritrovandomi del 67 Governator a Corfù, vennero le doi bonissime galere Suriana et Priula, quali me condussero immediate in Cipro, dove che a Nicossia il Clarissimo Signor Proveditor Barbaro mi fece veder una lettera di Sua Serenità, dalla quale dipende tutta la resoluzione d'assicurar quel Regno per l'ordine preso nell'Eccellentissimo Senato del 67 di marzo,² che dice queste formal parole.

Vi commettemo col Senato, che così dobbiate eseguire ma in un medesimo tempo attenderete al restante delle cose di Famagosta, di Cerines et di Nicossia, di quel modo che si contiene nella scrittura che hora vi mandamo qui occlusa dell'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza nostro Governator General.

¹ Cf. supra, doc. 77. ² The decision the Senate made on 7 March 1567: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 26^r–27^r. The text of the decision is given in full in a letter the doge wrote on the same day; cf. supra, doc. 18.

Nella qual scrittura del Signor Sforza sono anco queste parole.³

Il mio parer saria che l'intentione di Vostra Serenità havesse ad esser solo fermare il piede in quel Regno con il mezo di qualche fortezze, fortificate et monite di sorte che fossero secure di non esser espuguate. / [96^v]

In un'altro loco dice.

Quando però si fosse certi d'haver tempo a bastanza, ma perché li tempi che correno al presente non ricercano questa longhezza ma rimedij, se non si perfetti almeno molto più presti. Ricordarò riverentemente a Vostra Serenità che non havendo altra terra di conto in quel Regno che Famagosta, Nicossia et il castello di Cerines, voglia almeno per il presente assicurarsi di quelle in questo modo, cioè a Famagosta far reasettare diverse cose pertinenti a quella fortezza. Quali poi dalli Clarissimi Bembo et Barbaro col mio parere furono ordinate et bona parte fatte.

Più oltre dice Sua Eccellenza.

A Nicossia la quale non prevedendo, sarebbe la vera sede del nemico, et che per la grandezza sua non si può fortificar, se non con gran tempo (essendovi sito al proposito) farli una grande et gagliarda cittadella, la quale possi battere tutta la città, et salvare la nobiltà di quel Regno.

Io considerato da Sua Signoria Clarissima et da me, che questa grande et gagliarda cittadella non poteva esser di manco che di sette balloardi, volendola far inespugnabile come è sopra-detto, il che non può esser senza havere li fianchi di 30 passa, et quanto al sito per poter battere tutta la città, a fine di impedire quel commodo alloggiamento al nemico qual sarebbe la sua vere sede, sì come dice Sua Eccellenza, era molto meglio a farla nella propria altura vicina alla città. Qual veduta et considerata da noi fu giudicata cosa impossibile, sì per la spesa et tempo, come per non esserli acqua, essendo che tutta detta altura è di rocca et sasso duro impossibile a farli una piccol fossa in diece anni di tempo, et questa impresa fo abbandonata da noi come impossibile.

Di far questa cittadella in qualche altra parte piana, cosa chiara sarebbe stata che la non harebbe dislogiato il nemico di tutta la città per la grandezza sua, et sì come la fortezza nova et posta dentro della città vecchia et è sicura di non essere offesa dalle alture sopradette, qual sono otto passa e mezo alte sopra il piano della città nova, tanto più facilmente in la città vecchia grande s'harebbe potuto habitare commodamente et securamente senza esser disloggiato dalla cittadella fatta nel piano, per il che havendosi fatta in qual loco si havesse voluto non harebbe fatto effetto alcuno, come era l'intentione di Sua Eccellenza di non lasciar quel commodo alloggiamento al nemico.

Il far niente era un disobedere del tutto alli commandamenti di Sua Serenità, lasciando quella città in mano de' nemici.

³ Cf. supra, doc. 17; G.S. quotes Pallavicino's letter four times in this report.

Il voler spianarla tutta havea d'impossibile.

Si volto dunque tutto il pensiero a Cerines, per esser vicino alla marina nel quale si trovarono diverse difficoltà, ciascuna delle quali faceva quella impresa difficile, anzi impossibile, per il marzo futuro.

La prima causa era questa che volendosi fortificar piccolo, è cosa impossibile che sia forte.

A volerlo far grande di sei balloardi verso terra si come sta il mio disegno fatto del 62,⁴ et laudato dall'Illustrissimo Signor Sforza per la sua scrittura,⁵ era anco impossibile a farlo a tempo, essendo che do balloardi delli sei sopradetti venivano a cadere sopra la marina et sopra la rocca nella quale era necessario a cavarli la fossa, et anco in gran parte alle doi cortine vicine a questi doi balloardi, et sì come io dicevo del 62 che senza un grosso numero d'Italiani non si poteva tagliar detta rocca, essendo che a Famagosta la maggior parte d'essa vien tagliata da galeotti et altri Italiani, trovandosi pochissimi Cipriotti atti a quel essercitio, per il che non havendosi Italiani né tempo di mandarli a tore fo giudicata anco quella impresa di Cerines impossibile.

La seconda impossibilità era anco che niuna persona del Regno voleva contribuire né aiutare alla fortificatione di Cerines, né con huomini né con danari, sì come fecero l'altra volta del 62 al tempo del Clarissimo / [97^r] Proveditor Signor Zuan Mathio Bembo,⁶ et pur loro medesimi erano stati tre anni avanti a supplicare tal fortificatione a Sua Serenità.⁷ Anco per questa ragione fu lasciata quella impresa per disperata. Per il che Sua Serenità Clarissima et io restavimo molto mal contenti di convenire lasciar in preda de nemici 150 mille anime, di 180 mille che sono in tutto nel Regno, delle quali 30 millia sole sarebbono potute salvarsi all'hora in Famagosta, di modo che senza combatter et senza interposition alcuna di tempo, Sua Serenità poteva restar priva di quell'isola essendoli menate via le 150 millia anime dette di sopra, per il che in pochi anni poi ella sarebbe stata necessitata ad abbandonar anco Famagosta, qual non si harebbe potuta nutrire de frutto alcuno, che fosse nato in quel Regno, per che il saria stato devedato et impedito da nemici.

Il convenir poi portare tutte le vettoaglie d'Italia per mantener Famagosta sarebbe stato effetto troppo difficile, et finalmente la necessità harebbe astretta Sua Serenità ad abbandonarla, sì come Carlo Quinto abbandono Coron in la Morea alli nostri giorni,⁸ et pur dalla

4 Mentioned supra, doc. 11; this is probably the map listed in the *provveditori alle fortezze's* 1759 inventory: "n° 24. Altra pianta di detto [Cerines], con grandioso progetto di opera regolare (onde occupare stessamente maggior spazio) con quattro Bastioni Reali, e due mezze per le estremità del mare, e cingendo la parte stessa, abbattendo l'antico recinto di detta piccola Città, e riducendo a guisa di Citadella il picciol Castello. Figurate nella pianta medesima, la gran Piazza d'arme, ed abitazioni interne, colla regolarità che praticasi. Con varie diligenti annotazioni, rapporto alle elevazioni de' piani, e del Fondo del Mare. Il tutto secondo l'opinione del Conte Giulio Savorgnan del 1562. È disegnato con esattezza dall'ingegnere Zuanne Magagnati con Scala e Bussola"; cf. Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, p. 203. 5 Cf. supra, doc. 17. 6 G.S. was the first person to tell of the Cypriot nobility openly refusing to contribute to the work done in Cerines in 1562. 7 A reference to the 1559 Nicosia *università* embassy; cf. supra, p. 114. 8 This is a simplification, one which points towards political scores to be settled and illustrates the hostility some of Venice's leading officers bore towards Charles V's Spain. G.S. implicitly raises Spain's

Cicilia, dalla Calavria et dalla Puglia era molto più comodo il soccorrer Coron di quello che è da Venetia fino a Famagosta.

Il tornar a repopolare un'altra volta il Regno di Cipro tanto distante d'Italia, questo ne pareva molto difficile et impossibile, tollendo l'esempio dall'isola di Corfù qual fu di manco numero di persone vicinissimo a Italia, et non si può rehabitare come era già 30 anni avanti che fosse dispopolata da Turchi.⁹ In tal disperatione si ritrovava il Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro et io.

Pur releggendo la commissione di Sua Serenità a Sua Signoria Clarissima in quella parte che dice.

Ben volemo dirvi che conoscendo per prudentia vostra quanto importi fare quest'essecutione con prestezza et in tempo, dobbiate attendervi con ogni diligentia possibile et tutto quello che si ha a fare a Cerines et Nicosia che va fatto di terreno, sia del tutto finito et all'ordine per tutto il mese di marzo dell'anno venturo alla più longa per potter esser in tempo per ogni bisogno, non lasciando però quelle si deve fare in Famagosta, sì che a un tempo medemo anco questa fortezza sij redutta in quella maggior sicurtà che si possa, con libertà d'alterare et acconciare quello che vi paresse rispetto al tempo che haveste, et alle occasioni che venissero le quali noi non potemo vedere, et però si remmettemo a voi che sette sopra il fatto.

Da questa libertà della commissione ristretta nondimeno dal tempo, considerai quella parola che Sua Eccellenza dice.

A Nicosia, la quale non vi provvedendo sarebbe la vera sede del nemico, et che per la grandezza sua non si può fortificare se non con gran tempo.

Io all'houra dissi che mi harebbe bastato l'animo di fortificarla in tempo et grande, se mi fossero stati dati 500 homini per belloardo et 15 millia ducatti al mese per 8 mesi, et discostarsi da quelle alture troppo vicine alla città vecchia con far alla nova undeci belloardi, quattro solamente più di quelli che sarebbono andati in la cittadella, della quale quelli del Regno non la volevano intender né dar un'aiuto al mondo, né de homini né de danari,

controversial status in the Holy League, which the Christian powers had formed against the Ottoman Empire on 8 February 1538; even though they took from the Ottomans the Castelnuovo fort on 27 October 1538, the Spanish were held responsible for the naval defeat at Preveza when they refused to engage in combat. Spain's refusal to give Castelnuovo back to Venice caused the dissolution of the League and led to the *Signoria* signing a humiliating separate peace with Suleiman the Magnificent: Hale, *L'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '500*, pp. 36–37; Cozzi, 'Venezia nello scenario europeo (1517–1699)' pp. 43–45; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 3, pp. 445–448. ⁹ Between 25 August and 16 September 1537, during the 1537–1540 Ottoman-Venetian War, the Ottoman fleet landed at Corfu and laid siege to the island's fortress; 15,000 to 18,000 people were taken prisoners, and Venice was forced to destroy several hundred houses situated near to the fortress, in order to deprive the enemy of protection: Pagratis, *Οι εκθέσεις των βενετών βαίλων και προνοητών της Κέρκυρας*, pp. 91, 147; E. Yotopoulou-Sisilianou, 'Οι Τούρκοι στην Κέρκυρα. Επιπτώσεις στη μορφή της πόλης από τις τουρκικές πολιορκίες', in E. Concina / A. Nikiforou-Testone (eds), *Κέρκυρα. Ιστορία, αστική ζωή και αρχιτεκτονική 14ος–19ος αι.*, Corfu 1994, pp. 51–52.

dicendo che ciò era un trattarli da ribelli, il che non è vero, anzi sono fedelissimi et conoscevano molto bene che al primo sospetto di guerra era necessario a spianarli tutta la città, et che in questi undeci balloardi vi havrebbe potuto alloggiar commodamente tutta la gente di Nicossia, come si vede, che hanno fatto dappoi fabricandola tutta, nella quale oltre l'impedir li nemici di quel comodo alloggiamento, si sono salvate li ventidoi millia anime della città et più, fino alla summa di cento millia si potranno salvare dei lochi circonvicini alla città in quel paese fertilissimo, et spesso di ville et gente nel centro del quale è nata Nicossia et questo grasso paese, e poi posto nel centro de tutta l'isola, molto comodo a salvare immediate questo gran numero di gente et vittoaglie in detta fortezza nova come si vede poi tal effetto, quando venne l'armata turchesca giudicata nel principio nemica. / [97^v]

Il conte di Rochas buon servitor di Sua Serenità disse che cinque o sei millia homini ne sarebbero dati et che danari non mancherebbono, pur che la fortezza fosse stata grande.

Io dissi che mediante questi doi fondamenti d'haver gli homini et li danari per otto mesi, li prometteva di far il tutto a tempo, dil che il Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro ne senti allegrezza grandissima, vedendo che con questa via dalle sette alli undeci si prese le animi di tutti quelli del Regno, come si ha visto poi dall'effetto che hanno donato a Sua Serenità per tal fabrica cento et diece millia ducatti. Il detto Conte di Rochas fo il primo a donar diece mille ducatti molto presto. Il Conte de Tripoli lui ancora diece millia, il signor Davila altri diece millia, la università da questi essempli sesanta cinque millia et altri signori dappoi in tutto li 110 millia ducati et li suoi parici, il qual effetto è venuto solamente per haver fatto li undeci belloardi, et non li sette et come è detto di sopra, se si voleva star ostinato sopra li sette, non si harebbe fatto niuna sorte di fortificatione fino a quest'hora né assicuratione per cento millia anime, qual al presente stanno secure oltre le 30 millia in Famagosta.

Dico quell'istesso che dice Sua Eccellenza.

Far ancora una bona piazza alla marina che possi ricevere con facilità il soccorso in quel sito che havrà quelle bone qualità che se li convengono.

Io son dell'istesso parere et sarà cosa necessaria a farla per compiuta securtà di quell'isola, sì per finir di salvare le 50 millia anime qual al presente non hanno loco sicuro da salvarsi come per le ragioni proprie, che dice Sua Eccellenza, et il sito al mio giuditio non può esser in altro loco meglio in tutta quell'isola che a Limissò, il quale se si havesse voluto far all'hora non si harebbe havuto un aiuto al mondo manco di quello che harebbono fatto per Cerines né per la cittadella di Nicossia, ma quando Sua Serenità vorrà far Limissò, di certezza quelli del Regno li daranno grosso aiuto per doi cause, l'una per che vedeno chiaramente che le 50 mille anime stanno in pericolo manifesto di esser menate via et l'altra.

Poi vedemo il modo di lavorare a Nicossia, oltre la fortezza et brevità di tempo et anco di pochissima spesa et con speranza certa di vederli il fine, il che non era prima quando è stato fatto il balloardo a Famagosta, nel quale li sono andati più di diece anni di tempo et 125 millia ducatti di spesa, per il che haveano ragione di mettersi in disperatione, et dall'esempio di Nicossia aiuterano allegramente a far Limissò, et poi il suo sito è tale che fortificandosi facilmente per esser buon terreno, bon'acqua, bon'aere et vicino ad haver legni per fabricare in pochissimo tempo, detta fortezza sarà tanto empita di case et di habitatori, che mettendose li

datij ordinarij come a Famagosta et Nicossia, si caverà tant'utile di detti datij che pagherano benissimo la guardia ordinaria, rispetto al gran concorso di navilij che vengono a far scalla di quel loco.¹⁰

Et sì come Sua Eccellenza discorreva in la scrittura sua,¹¹ che Sua Serenità dovesse poi con tempo assettar Famagosta realmente, Cerines in quella gran forma, non sapendo le difficoltà sopradette per causa del tempo, la cittadella di Nicossia per la terza fortezza et la quarta piazza alla marina. Dico che per li accidenti sopradetti et per la grandezza di Nicossia, delli quattro belloardi più tre sole fortezze suppliranno alla conservatione di quel Regno, Famagosta assettata bene, Nicossia per la seconda, et Limissò alla marina verso ostro per la terza, senza far al presente né per l'avenire alcuna sorte di spesa a Cerines et tutta quella che sarà fatta sarà gettata via, essendo tanto debole che non potrebbe far resistentia a una picciol forza per spacio di 24 hore, sì che Sua Serenità non può far meglio quanto mandar quelli trenta pezzi d'artegliaria et monitione per adesso a Famagosta, et non lasciarla in quel loco in mano di nemici, quali habbinno / [98^r] a adoperarla poi contra Famagosta istessa et non far quella spesa delli soldati inultimente. In queste tre fortezze si potranno commodamente metter tutte le vettoaglie del Regno essendo situate in le tre parte più grasse et fertile di tutta l'isola, nella quale più commodamente che in ogn'altro loco che si potesse far elettione, non si potrebbe trovar meglio per condur le vettoarie et gente, et senza li popoli il Regno sarebbe perso, essendo che quelle guerre sono molto differente da quelle del stato di Milano et di Lombardia, li cui popoli si vanno a salvare in li paesi vicini et finite le guerre ritornano alle sue possessioni, ma in Cipro se non hanno loco da salvarsi sono menate via del tutto.

Quanto a Cerines se potrebbe smantellare con doi o tre mine dalla parte verso terra et decipar tutti li pozzi et acque che sono dentro del castello, et quelli che vi habiteranno si potranno servire delle fontane che son fori del castello, transferrendo poi questa spesa a Limissò fortificato, et lasciarli solamente quelli fanti pagati de Cerines proprio per la guardia et securtà del Clarissimo Capitano, contra le fuste.

Li nemici hanno un'altra smontata 10 miglia lontana di Cerines a un loco molto più grosso nominato L'habito,¹² del quale si servirebbono molto più commodamente che non di Cerines ma tutte le smontate dalla parte di tramontana verso Caramania sono pericolosissime da vasselli armati et grossi, quali sempre smonteranno più securamente de qua del Capo delle Gatte, a Limissò, Saline et Famagosta, se ben la navigatione è più longa che non verso tramontana per le fortune di quel mare pericoloso, non vi essendo nell'isola porti né lochi da poter scorrere, sì che per questo non si sia da restare di non smantellare Cerines, come inutilissima nel modo che sta al presente et a farlo grande non porta più la spesa a farlo, stante

¹⁰ Taxes levied in Limassol are listed, for the late 1550s, in CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 203^v: 'Gabelle di Limissò, cio è datio del cerame, del vin, del pan, della carne, del bestiame, delle carobe, delle canute, et tutti altri datii soliti de scodersi dal scrivano della real a Limisso'. The leasing of these taxes raised 201 ducats in 1556, a year when leased taxes put 11,700 ducats into Famagosta's coffers: id., *cod. Cicogna 3596/30*, f. 3^v. ¹¹ In the other version of the letter available (ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 17*) this first part of the sentence reads: *Et così come l'Eccellenza del Signor Sforza discorreva in la sua scrittura.* ¹² Most definitely Lapithos.

Nicossia fortificata nella quale staranno quelle genti che prima s'havea animo di salvare in detto Cerines fortificandose.

Dirò a Vostre Signorie Clarissime quanto a Famagosta, qual non ha fianchi boni ma torrionzini tondi et non balloardi, et altra differentia non è da torrion a balloardo, se ben tutti doi sono stati fatti a fine di fiancheggiare, se non che al torrion tondo immediate vien levato via dal nemico con l'artegliaria la difesa, non restando sito da poter adoperar l'artegliaria di dentro, il che non avviene alli balloardi che sono stati fatti con giuditio alli quali si ha per cosa impossibile a levarli li fianchi imbocciandoli le cannonere conservate dalli orecchioni, di modo che si può chiamarla senza fianchi et bisogna haverla per imperfetta, et provederli et presto et meglio che si può, et se bene uno de quelli balloardi costerà a Sua Serenità per causa della rocca tre volte quanto uno de quelli di Nicossia, et tanto manco quanto saranno fatti con l'ordini della fabrica istessa di Nicosia. Non bisogna però restar di farli, il che non parerà tanto difficile mettendosi avanti gl'occhi l'importantia di un tal Regno, dal quale Sua Serenità ne cava infiniti utili, commodità et reputatione, et l'Eccellenza del Signor Sforza dice queste formal parole prudentemente in la sua scrittura.

Non restarò anco di dirle che, per queste provisioni, non si devrà restare che, dapoï havendo tempo commodo, non si finisca di fortificare Famagosta veramente.

Il che non vol dire altro che, che farli quattro belloardi da novo essendo già le cortine fatte bonissime, come nelli miei disegni all'offitio delle fortezze et reassetare gli altri doi, et star poi con l'animo contento di Famagosta per conto di forza, et più particolarità ancora si pò vedere in la mia lettera scritta a Sua Serenità del 62.¹³

Non voglio restar di ricordar a Vostre Signorie Clarissime per far un grandissimo sparagno alle sue borse di tener a tutti li suoi sopramassari di monition un scontro, et de prima commetter espressamente in tutte le sue fortezze che detti sopramassari facciano loro proprij tali officij et non affidarli ad altri, essendo che la monition de Nicossia, Famagosta, Candia, della Canea, de Corfù et anco de Zara, in le quali la quantità delle polvere, salmistrij, solferi, piombi, balle menute, corde et tante altre sorte et gran quantità de diverse arme, che mai se li può vedere il fine, et chi volesse iustificarle vedendoli il fondi numerandole / [98^v] overo pesando le cose, li vorrebbe 6 mesi di tempo et 600 ducatti non farebbe una tal spesa in ciascun loco, di modo che ogni sopramassaro che entra in quell'offitio per da ben persona chel sia, li vien voglia di diventar un tristo, sapendo che non porta la spesa a vederli mai li suoi conti, per il che quasi tutti diventano grandissimi ladroni et al suo cambiarsi, o per morte o per giottonarie che fanno, Sua Serenità in quelli casi ne sente danni de migliaia de ducatti, et poi se tutte le cose starano sotto a doi chiave et non a description d'un solo, si potrà fugire quel piccolo di qualche tradimento che potrebbe esser fatto alle polvere. Anzi alle polvere, li vorrei tenere la terza chiave, qual stesse in mano del Clarissimo Rettore, et che Sua Signoria la consignasse al capo dei bombardieri ogni volta che s'ha d'aprire li magazeni di polvere. Gran cosa sarà che tutti tre s'accordino a far un tradimento, onde che un solo

13 Cf. supra, docs 7 and 8, but it would seem that a letter addressed specifically to the *provveditori* has disappeared.

potrebbe esser causa con questa via de far perder una fortezza notabil a Sua Serenità in Levante alla uscita d'una armata. Tanto li ho voluto dire in questa materia, riportandome del sapientissimo giuditio di Vostre Signorie Clarissime, alla bona gratia delle quali sempre me raccomando.

Di Venetia alli XV genaro 1570.

Di Vostre Signorie Clarissime servitore.
Giulio Savorgnano



C. OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S MISSION

79 *Letter from Marco Michiel, captain of Famagusta, to G.S., Venice, 20 March 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 73^r.

Having learnt that G.S. has been sent to Cyprus, Marco Michiel, the captain of Famagusta, expresses how delighted he is that they will be working together, in a partnership based on mutual respect and fondness. Michiel informs G.S. that he too has been elected to go to Cyprus, and will set sail for Famagusta in August.

Magnifico et Illustre Signor mio,

Dapoi ch'apparso a l'infinita liberalità di questi Signori Illustrissimi darmi il carico di Capitano a Famagosta et Regno di Cipro,¹ et di più havermi compitamente concessa la gratia con havermi dato la persona di Vostre Signore Illustre per compagnia in quel Regno da me molto desiderata, sì per l'infinito valor suo come per l'amor che la mi porta, non ho voluto restar d'inviarli queste poche righe con allegarmi con esso lei, essendo certo che le sarà gratissima questa nova, sì com' a me è stato sempre grato intender cosa ch' habbi portato a Vostre Signorie Illustre honore et satisfattione, la partità mia sarà con le navi de la muda d'agosto, fra tanto la mi conserverà ne la sua gratia et conoscendomi buono per farli servitio, la mi farà signorilissimo favor a commandarmi.

Di Venetia adi XX marzo 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustre servitor.
Marco Michele

Al molto Magnifico et Illustre Signor il Signor Julio Savorgnano meritissimo Governator General nel Regno di Cipro Signor osservandissimo.



80 *Letter from Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro to G.S., Nicosia, 8 May 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 73^v.

Barbaro has received letters from G.S. announcing his safe arrival in Cyprus; G.S.'s only complaint from the journey is the weary legs it gave him. Barbaro is delighted that he will soon be able to discuss island matters with G.S., and invites him to stay in his palace in Nicosia until G.S. has his own residence. Barbaro underlines that he is at G.S.'s service and will endeavour to meet his every need.

¹ Marco Michiel, mentioned supra, doc. 36 n. 9, was elected Captain on 2 February 1567.

Illustre Signor mio honorato, ho le lettere di Vostra Signoria che mi dicono il giunger suo salvo a questo Regno, se ben con un poco di risentimento delle gambe, che spiero si risolvera in bene in breve, et così come ella desidera di esser con me, così io all'incontro faccio per poter et goderse, et comunicare insieme delle cose di questo importantissimo Regno, l'esperarò adunque con il suo commodo a smontar qui al mio pallazzo, fin tanto che si accomoderà la stantia sua, et occorendole cavalature o altra cosa per il suo venir qui, mi ne dij subito aviso che procurarò di far che sia servita di tutto, raccomandandomele et offerendo.

Da Nicossia li 8 di maggio 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustre [?]
 Francesco Barbaro
 Proveditor General dil Regno

All' Illustrissimo Signor il Conte Giulio Savorgnano dignissimo Governator Generale della militia dil Regno di Cypro come fratello honorato. Cerines.



81 *Letter from the luocotenente, the proveditor-general and the Cyprus councillors to G.S., Nicosia, 8 May 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 73^r.

In response to G.S.'s letters, Venice's leading officers express how happy they are that he has arrived in Cyprus, and also how dismayed they are by the pain his legs are causing him; they offer to arrange transport and accommodation for his stay in Nicosia.

Dalle lettere di Vostre Signorie Illustre habbiamo inteso il felice suo arrivo a questo Regno, et se ne allegramo di core, dicendoli che occorendoli cavalature o alcuna altra cosa per suo commodo la vogli farcilo saper, che saremo sempre pronti in accomodarla di quanto li farà bisogno, et ne spiace che la sia risentità alquanto delle gambe, ma speramo che giunto che la sarà de qui la starà bene et sana, accomodandosi della sua venuta de qui come le parerà, et quando acciò non patisca disturbo, et a ciò se li offerimo et raccomandando.

Da Nicosia alli 8 maggio 1567.

Di Vostre Signorie.
 Locustenens Proveditor Generalis
 Consiliarij Regni Cipri

*All' Illustrissimo Signor Conte Julio Savorgnano Governator General della militia del Regno di Cipro come fratello honorato. Cerines.
 a tergo.*

82 *Letter from Giacomo de Nores, count of Tripoli, to the rettori and the proveditor-general, Nicosia, 13 May 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 23^r–24^v.

Giacomo de Nores, the count of Tripoli, reminds the rettori and the proveditor-general that his household has only ever sought to maintain the Signoria's power and to serve Venice unconditionally. During the War of Rhodes [in the summer of 1522], his uncle, Count Zuane, sold his property and led many soldiers to Famagusta to aid the regimento, which had withdrawn in fear of an Ottoman attack. In 1534, when the island was fearing another enemy expedition, Count Alvisè, Giacomo's father, was elected capitano generale and spent much of his own money and resources on defending the Regno.

During the last war with the Turks [1539–1542], the de Nores family had a great many soldiers and cavaliers in its pay, as well as providing large amounts of wheat and cotton to the public markets, as shown by the rettori's and the syndics' trading licences, and by letters from the Senate. Since 1557, Giacomo de Nores has been entrusted with the command of one of the four feudal cavalry companies; and in 1565, when the Turks were beginning to prepare for war, Giacomo followed in his relatives' footsteps by proposing to the Collegio that he lead a thousand soldiers, financed by his uncle.

Now that the Signoria have decided to fortify Nicosia, Giacomo has requested a tax officer from Venice in order to make an inventory of all of his possessions (silverware, jewels, money), excepting only the jewels belonging to his wife; this inventory will represent 7,000 to 8,000 ducats, on top of which the count will give to Venice the yearly income from all of his villages, only keeping back enough to cover day to day needs. He will continue to finance the fortification project as much as is necessary over the coming years.

Clarissimi et Excellentissimi Signori Rettori et Proveditor General, padroni colendissimi,

Con quanto spirito et industria habbino li pregenitori mei per cacciata la gratia dell'Illustrissima Signoria Nostra se può manifestamente vedere fino a quei prossimi di, che i cieli per nostra rara ventura ne fecero cader in grembo di Sua Serenità, et cossì poi di giorn' in giorno fino al presente non havendo altra mura ne altro desiderio, se non di perpetuar sotto il suo felice imperio, e pretermetter mai occasione alcuna ove si trattasse della conservation et esaltation sua, che non esponerò non solo prontamente ma allegressimamente le facultà et le vitte persi, come se le potrebbe constar con atti publici et d'esser stati i primi che allegressimamente le giuriano fedeltà, et eseguito con ogni prontezza i suoi comandamenti, come nel tempo della guerra de Rhodi,¹ chel Conte Zuane mio avo² non solo spese quello

¹ An allusion to the 1522 Ottoman siege and conquest of Rhodes, concerning which the reader should see the analysis given by N. Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem, l'Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes, 1480–1522*, Louvain / Paris 1994, pp. 342–360. ² Zuane / Giovanni de Nores, Giacomo's grandfather, helped Venice's officers to carry out a large-scale census (*pratico*) from 1503 to 1504, which allowed the *reale* to take back land, water, gardens and *parici* that had been usurped. In 1513 he leased *reale* villages, and on 1 March 1529 he leased the Pachna bailiwick. In 1529, in return for his service to Venice, and encouraged by

che havea ma s'impegno la vitta per condur grosso numero de fanti in Famagosta, ove si era ridotto il Clarissimo Reggimento per il dubbio anzi certeza che si havea chel Turco dovesse venir alli danni di questo Regno, et sì ancora del 34 che si havea sospetti grandissimi che infideli dovessero venir a devastare questo Regno,³ per il che fu eletto Capitano Generale la buona memoria del Conte Alvise mio padre,⁴ ove si deportò di maniera che se ben spese gran parte delle nostre sustantie, riportò pur amplissime laude da Sua Serenità, premio veramente maggior di quanti tesori et gioie che se può trovar in tutt'Oriente.

Tacerò poi quello che facessimo nella ultima guerra turchesca,⁵ nella quale oltre l'haver tenuto continuamente grosso numero de fanti et cavalli pagati del nostro, servidimo il publico gran quantità di biave et gottoni, come parlano ampiamente / [23^v] le patente delli Clarissimi Signori Rettori et sindici che s'attroverno in quel tempo, et quel che più importa le lettere dell'Illustrissimo Senato, et medemamente tacerò io Iacomo de Nores Conte de Tripoli,⁶ humilissimo servitor di Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime, quel ch' io ho speso, et operato in diversi tempi dal 57 in qua, che gli è parso confidar sotto la mia condotta il quarto delli feudatarij et provisionati di quello Reggimento, per che li Clarissimi Signori proveditori che sono stati in tempi passati possono dar buon testimonio.⁷ Restami a dir che non havendo mai pensato ad altro che di non parer figliolo indegno di tali parenti, anzi desiderando con

Zegno Singlitico's example (Singlitico was granted the title of count of Rochas in 1521), he made a request to buy the title of count of Tripoli; the Council of Ten granted it to him on 14 September 1529, and also gave him the right to pass the title on to his legitimate heirs; he died in 1544. In 1531 Giovanni was part of the commission given the task of translating into Italian the *Assizes of Jerusalem*: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti comuni, filza 9, c. 184, filza 10, c. 15; id., *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 289, c. 47, f. 1^r; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 45*, f. 130^v; Jason de Nores, *Apologia contra l'auctor del Verato...*, Padova 1590, f. 13^{r-v}; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 2, pp. 115–117, 162, 176–177, 265–266, 284; Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, pp. 492–493; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', pp. 47–48; Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', p. 492; Grivaud, *Entreclacs chiprois*, pp. 241–242. See his medal in J. Durand / D. Giovannoni (eds), *Chypre entre Byzance et l'Occident, IV^e–XVI^e siècle*, Paris 2012, p. 331 fig. 2. 3 This fear was probably a result of the Ottomans capturing Koroni in April 1534: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 3, p. 392. 4 Alvise de Nores, son of Zuane and father of Giacomo, succeeded his father some time before 1542; prior to that, he leased the bailiwick of Askeia, by privilege, on 8 March 1529, sold cotton in Venice, and in 1532/1533 was appointed *proveditore alla sanità* and helped to fight off a plague epidemic that broke out in Famagusta. During the 1537–1540 Ottoman-Venetian War, he paid out of his own pocket for the upkeep of many soldiers and horses, and, lending more money, helped to secure grain and meat supplies for Famagusta. In 1543 the Council of Ten granted him the right to sell directly 6,000 *stara* (about 20,000 hl) of barley to Venice; then in 1544 he accepted the position of viscount of Nicosia in 1544. A series of bad harvests led him to spend his private income on helping his peasants survive, and this left him 5,000 ducats in debt to the *reale* in 1546; however, on 11 June he was given five years to pay this debt off. According to Rey, Venice made him captain of a company of 100 soldiers; finally, he was sent on an embassy to Venice by the Nicosia *università* in 1559. He died in 1565: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti comuni, filza 33, c. 262, filza 40, c. 176; CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 215*, ff. 95^r, 118^r, 170^r; Jason de Nores, *Apologia contro l'auctor del Verato*, f. 13^{r-v}; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 3, pp. 255–258 n. 128, vol. 4, pp. 131–132; Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, p. 492; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', pp. 47–48. 5 The 1537–1540 war, cf. previous note. 6 Giacomo de Nores, count of Tripoli; cf. supra, doc. 31 n. 9. 7 In 1562 he was indeed commander of one of the four feudal cavalry companies: Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 194.

qual che servitio esemplar sodisfar al debito mio et aprir la strada ad altri che cognoscessero, quanto siamo obligati alli Nostri Signori, l'anno del 65 ritrovandomi in Venetia per miei particular servitij et rasonando chel Turco faceva grandissimo preparamento per moversi contra i miei Signori, m'offersi a tutti li signori di Collegio ch'era pronto d'andar con mille soldati pagati dal mio ove paresse a Sue Signorie Illustrissime che fosse maggior il bisogno, il che si harebbe anche esseguito quanto i rumori sparsi fussero caminati più avanti.

Quello che al presente l'ho a dire è che havendo Sua Serenità deliberato fortificar questa città di Nicosia per sicurtà di questo Regno, a lei tanto caro come si sa et come meritamente lo deve tenere, io Iacomo de Nores Conte de Tripoli sudetto supplico le Sue Vostre Eccellenze, come bene le suplicai a boccha, che mandino per un coadiutor della cancelleria a tuor per inventario tutta la mia facultà cossì de danari, gioie, argenti et altro di bono che si attrova, non mi lassando né anche gli ornamenti della mia moglie, che di tutte queste cose glie ne fazo un libero dono, che a mio aviso importarano in sette otto mille ducati, et insieme tutte le entrate delli mei casali dell'anno presente, lassandome parcamente / [24^r] il viver mio, et cossì anchora negl'anni venenti se le parerà che vi sia il bisogno, le quai voglio che spendano a suo beneplacito in tutte quelle cose che le parerà concernir il servitio del mio Principe, pregandolo appresso che accettino insieme⁸ questa mia povera vita et delli mei duoi figlioletti, disponendo di noi come di cose et fatture sue, conoscendo et l'essere et le facultà doppo Dio, da Vostre Signorie Illustrissime alla buona gratia della quale humilmente in sua buona gratia mi raccomando.⁹

Scrittura del Conte de Tripoli
1567 13 maggio




83 *Decision of the Nicosia università council, 20 May 1567*

CMC, *cod. P.D. C2669/4 A*, ff. 14^r–18^r.¹

The università council convened by the rettori brought together 167 people, and reaffirmed the councillors' loyalty to Venice. The council recognizes that while the Signoria accords it nothing but grace and kindness, it has not always met her expectations; it resolves to do more to please and satisfy her.

Having learnt that Nicosia is to be fortified, and that its houses and families will be kept safe from new enemy rulers, the università, via its procurators, considered the plan

⁸ *insieme* repeated in the manuscript. ⁹ G.S. explains *supra*, doc. 31, why Giacomo de Nores did not keep his promises; however, in one of his last letters G.S. no longer distinguishes the count of Tripoli from Cyprus's other feudatories in terms of donations made; cf. *supra*, doc. 56.  ¹ This document was transcribed in Venice some time after 1570 by Alvise Garzoni, and was put into a file concerning litigations between the members of the Cornaro family pertaining to the division of their Cyprus estate incomes.

presented by the rettori, the provveditor-general and the army governor, G.S. Despite not being particularly wealthy after five years of hardship, the università displayed its willingness and chose to support the plan, having been convinced by the Venetian officers and their paternal sentiments.

To turn the city into a fortress as G.S. plans, the università will donate 65,000 ducats (60,000 for construction and 5,000 for the poor who will lose their homes); the money is to be given in two halves, one in October 1567 and the other a year later. Four deputies will be chosen to check the accounts and set the tax to be imposed.

This decision was approved by 158 votes against 9. The election of the four deputies was contested by thirteen candidates, and the winners were the count of Rochas [Eugenio Singlitico], Zuffre Babin, Ugo Flatro and Andrea di San Zuane.

1567 Die XX maij.

Essendo sta convocato il Consiglio della Magnifica Università di ordine delli Clarissimi Signori Rettori del Regno di Cypro, nel quale sono intravenuti al numero di 167, fu proposto ut infra colla assistentia delli Magnifici Procuratori.

Non è alcuno in questo Magnifico Consiglio che chiaramente non sappia et non conosca quanto sia stato grande in ogni tempo il desiderio che questa magnifica et fidelissima Università ha sempre havuto che sia fatta chiara et manifesta, in ogni occasione, appresso la benigna mente della Serenissima et Illustrissima Signoria di Venetia la candida et incorotta fede, l'humil devotione, la pronta dispositione di essa Università verso il giustissimo imperio della Soa Sublimità, perciò che ogni uno ha potuto vedere che da questo istesso desiderio spinti molti di questi magnifici nobeli, cavallieri feudatarij et altri, per esplicar in parte questo desiderio universale, proponendo dal tutto le / [14^v] considerationi degl'interessi proprij et particolari, hanno cercato et si sono affaticati in diverse occasioni di spender le picciol forze soe in servitio di Soa Serenità. Ma con tutto questo l'istesso Magnifico Consiglio può conoscer apertamente che la medesima Magnifica Università non ha potuto in alcun tempo pienamente soddisfare a questo incomparabil desiderio suo, per ciò che non gli è paruto mai di haver potuto far la millesima parte di quel che si conosce et si sente obligata di far in servitio di Sua Sublimità, tanti et così grandi sono gl'oblighi soi, per li ampli beneficij ricevuti, et per le copiose gratie che con benigna et larga anemo Sua Sublimità va sporgendo ogni giorno sopra questa soa devotissima et suisceratissima Università, dal che nasce et deriva ch'ogn'uno delli compresi in questo Magnifico Consiglio deve star tanto attento, come in effetto sta per / [15^r] far tutto quello che possi esser di piacere et di satisfatione della Soa Serenità.

Però essendo novamente venuta occasione che la città di Nicossia metropoli di questo Regno, patria et habitatione propria et particolare di questa Magnifica Università, con il nome della santissima et gloriosissima trinita Pade,² Figliolo et Spirito Santo, sia ridotta in fortezza, dal che haverà a pervenire, che con l'aiuto della Soa divina Maestà in uno stesso

tempo questa Magnifica Università potrà vedere le case, le habitationi proprie, le moglie, li figlioli, et le fameglie soe assicurate dall'impeto et rabia de nemici, et medesimamente potrà veder assicurata et consolata se medesima per il potersi stabilir di [perpetuo?] sempre con sicurezza maggiore sotto così felice et giusto imperio, come è questo della Soa Serenità, et essendo per ciò stata fatta rissoluzione / [15^v] che con le provisioni et ordini mandati da Soa Sublimità, si dia buono et felice principio a questa santa et salutifera deliberatione per metter essa città di Nicossia con ogni celerità al sicuro, secondo che più particolarmente, et prudentemente è stato considerato, et concluso dalli Clarissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori Rettori, Proveditor General et dall'Illustrissimo signor Iulio Savorgnano Governator General in questo Regno allo affetuar et facilitar, della qual operatione essendo stati chiamati dall'anteditti Clarissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori Rettori, et Proveditor General, li Magnifici Procuratori di questa Magnifica Università³ insieme con molti altri magnifici nobeli, et per nome di Soa Serenità ricercati et persuati che debbino operare, che questa Magnifica Università si come in tutte l'occorentie et occasioni passate ha sempre dismostrato l'amor, la / [16^r] fede, et la devotione soa verso l'inclito stato di Soa Sublimità, così in questa presente occasione, la quale riguarda così divetamente il comodo et beneficio suo, voglia far qualche affettuosa dismostrazione della sua bona volontà in coadiuvar questa santa deliberatione, porgendo per o senza alcun preiuditio over interutione⁴ dell'ordeni, delli immunità et delle leggi sue, quella parte di spesa che li pare che possa ricercare una sì fatta occasione, il qual officio essendo stato fatto per essi Clarissimi Signori Rettori et Proveditor Generale con sì caritative et affettuose parole, che più presto rapresentavano la persona di pietosissimi et amorevolissimi padri, che de signori et patroni di questa Università come sono, confermandosi in questo come in ogn'altra cosa al benigno valor / [16^r] della Serinissima et Illustrissima Signoria nostra. Però se ben questa devotissima et fidelissima comunità si ritrovi nelle necessità, nelle calamità et angustie, ad ogni uno molto ben note, per cagion della perversità di quattro o cinque anni passati,⁵ per li molti carichi nelli quali si ritrova di presente esser involtre, non dimeno superrando le forze et le necessità proprie per far in parte qualche dismostrazione della ferma fede, et devotione sua come è tenuto di fare.

L'andera parte qual propongono li Magnifici Procuratori di essa Magnifica Università, con la presentia et assistentia delli Clarissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori Rettori et Proveditor Generale del Regno se'l pare a questo consiglio, che par il fabricar et ridur in fortezza la città di Nicossia nella maniera et grandezza che si vede / [17^r] già ddesignata dall'anteditto Illustrissimo Signor Iulio Savorgnano, questa Magnifica Università habbia da offerir et contribuir⁶ in dono per una volta tantum ducati sessanta cinque mille, quali habbino ad esser estratti dall'entrate et beni particolari, a ratta et portione secondo le stime et modi soliti et conser[?] di questa Magnifica Università, con condition et dechiaratione che li sessanta millia ducati siano et s'intendino offeriti et dati per tuto quello che può dar essa Università per il

³ According to the notes in the margin of the manuscript mentioned *infra*, one of the procurators was Scipio Podocataro. ⁴ *senza* crossed out after *interutione*. ⁵ A reference to the consecutive drought years that hit the island from 1562 onwards; cf. *supra*, doc. 7 n. 12. ⁶ *et contribuir* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*.

fabricar et ridur a perfettione questa fortezza, et li ducati cinque mille s'habbino a dispensare a persone povere et miserabili di questa città,⁷ in restauratione delli danni che conveniranno patire per le ruine delle loro case che doveranno cascar nel far delle fosse, delli spalti, et delle spinnate di fuori, da esser divisi / [17^v] detti ducati cinque mille a soldo per lira et secondo la conscientia et cognitione delli⁸ Procuratori ordinarij et li quattro deputati che servanno per scrutinio eletti da questo Consiglio, et che questi sessanta cinque mille ducati habbino ad esser esborsati et dati da questa Magnifica Università in due rate, videlicet la mità per tutto il mese di ottobrio prossimo in anno 1567, et l'altra mittà nel mese di ottobre subsequante del 68, con tutti li modi et conditioni che suole essa Università pagar l'altre tanse che si propongono per questo Magnifico Consiglio, et li medesimi quattro che saranno eletti per la dispensa di cinque mille ducati habbino etiam il carico di far la tansa et di dar esemtionone nel resto alla presente parte insieme con li Magnifici⁹ Procuratori, la qual tansa debbano far quanto più presto et fatta presentarla alli Clarissimi Signori Rettori et Proveditor General. / [18^r]

Della parte che è [andata?] 9 dissero de non et de sì 158, et è presa.

Li nominati per scrutinio per la elettione di quanto sono l'infrascritti

Il Signor Hieronimo Bustron¹⁰

Il Signor Zuffren Babin¹¹

Il Signor Thomaso Synglitico¹²

7 The Senate decided to give another 5,000 ducats for the poor who will lose their houses on 11 October 1567: ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 68^r. 8 *Proveditori* crossed out after *delli*. 9 *Magnifici* added above with *signe-de-renvoi*. 10 Girolamo / Hieronimo Bustron came from a family that made its name from the number of its members who held office in the Lusignan administration and the Venetian colonial government. Girolamo, a cousin of the chronicler Florio, leased the Kouklia bailiwick in 1539. He was viscount of Nicosia from 1549 to 1551; he tried for this office again in January 1555, but was unsuccessful; in February 1557 he did succeed and became viscount for the second time; then in February 1565 he was a candidate one last time, failing again. In June 1566 he was elected to the eleven-member council charged with assisting the viscount: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 30, f. 49^{r-v}; id., *Senato Mar*, filza 13; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 1 (dispatch dated 4 February 1557, dispatch from the *università*, early January 1559), b. 3 (dispatch dated 9 February 1565); id., *Materie Misti Notabili I*; id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Parte di elegger undeci aggiunti; Florio Bustron, *Historia overo Commentarii di Cipro*, p. 464; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 4, no. 153; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Recherches sur les familles chypriotes', pp. 41-46; Grivaud, 'Ordine della secreta di Cipro', pp. 533-537. In this text, a note in the left-hand margin next to Bustron's name reads: *desenato come socero del Signor Sippo Procurator*, meaning that he was not allowed to be a candidate as he was related to a *università* procurator (one of his daughters was married to Scipio Podocataro). 11 Zuffre / Gioffre Babin came from a Frankish family that was still around, quietly, in the sixteenth century; about Zuffre / Gioffre, it is known that he was a *università* procurator in the first trimester of 1565: ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 3 (dispatches dated 1 February and 22 March 1565); W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Études de prosopographie généalogique des Chypriotes mentionnés dans les registres du Vatican 1378-1471', *Μελέται και Υπομνήματα* 1 (1984), pp. 565-568. 12 Tomaso Singlitico, brother of Eugenio, the count of Rochas, was viscount of Nicosia from 1 July 1563 to 30 June 1565, then became a *università* procurator on 17 June 1566. On 14 April 1569 he was appointed viscount once again, and took office on

Il Signor Antonio Davila	Il Signor Thomaso Ficardo ¹³
L'illustrissimo Signor Conte di Rochas	Il Signor Marco Zacaria ¹⁴
Il Signor Hieronimo Antari ¹⁵	Il Signor Ugo Flatro
Il Signor Iulio Podochataro ¹⁶	Il Signor Hettor Chivides ¹⁷
	Il Signor Hieronimo Zappe ¹⁸ quondam messer Alessandro
	Il Signor Andrea di San Zuane ¹⁹

1 July. He led a company of soldiers during the summer 1570 siege, and was killed during the Ottoman assault of 9 September: ASV, *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Parte di elegger undeci aggiunti; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 39, f. 53^r; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 121 n. 251; concerning the Singlitico family in the sixteenth century: Arbel, 'Greek magnates in Venetian Cyprus', pp. 325–337. 13 Tomaso Ficardo was one of the capital's eminent figures; he was viscount of Nicosia from 1 July 1559 to 30 June 1561, then was made a member of the *università* council in June 1566. His *palazzo* near to the Loredan bastion was demolished during the fortification project; cf. infra, doc. 85; ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 34, f. 105^r; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (dispatch dated 12 February 1561); id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Parte di elegger undeci aggiunti. 14 Marco Zaccaria / Zacharia, though not at the 1557 *mostra generale*, attended the April 1560 *mostra*, as he had recently inherited a fiefdom from his father. In February 1561 he became one of the *università*'s three *procuratori alle pompe*, and was charged with imposing a sumptuary law; it was most probably this Zaccaria / Zacharia who attended the April 1570 gathering at Askeia: Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 191; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 104; Grivaud, 'Les enjeux d'une loi somptuaire', p. 370 n. 17 (which explores the possible existence of a different man of the same name). 15 Girolamo / Hieronimo Antari / Attar came from a family of small fortune, two members of which served Venice directly in the 1520s and 1530s, one as a historian (Francesco Attar) and one as a cartographer (Leonida Attar). Concerning this family, see Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, pp. 19–30. Girolamo Attar was made *università* vice-procurator in early January 1559, as well as ambassador to Venice. He served in the *Regno*'s paid cavalry in April 1560, and tried for the office of viscount in February 1561 and again in February 1565. He made an unsuccessful attempt to become a *università* procurator in 1561, but succeeded in 1564; then in June 1566 he was elected to the eleven-member council charged with assisting the viscount. A plan to secure wheat harvests for several years earned him praise, but he was also criticized by Proveditor-General Bernardo Sagredo in 1565 for supposedly selling documents from public archives. Girolamo also caught people's attention around 1556 when he discovered the Amazon sarcophagus in Soloi. He died in September 1570 when the Ottomans captured Nicosia: ASV, *Materie Misti Notabili I*; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (minutes of 10 February 1561), b. 3 (dispatches dated 1 and 9 February 1565); id. *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 260; id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Parte di elegger undeci aggiunti; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 196; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, *Cyprus 1542*, p. 24. 16 Giulio Podocataro's siblings included Pietro, abbot of Saint John of Montfort, and Scipio: W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae* accordées par les papes en faveur de la rédemption des Chypriotes captifs des Turcs (1570–1597) d'après les fonds de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano', *Επιτηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 11 (1981–1982), pp. 60–61. A note next to the name in the left-hand margin reads: *desenato come fratello del Signor Sipio Procurator*. Scipio was a *università* procurator to Venice in August 1562: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, ff. 63^v–64^r. His name, as a witness, appears in a file in 1547: AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 11, no. 16; he is also mentioned infra, doc. 85. 17 Hettor Chivides served in the *Regno*'s paid cavalry in April 1560: Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 192. 18 Girolamo / Hieronimo Zappe was made *deputato* of the *università* in early January 1559, and did not attend the April 1560 *mostra generale*: ASV, *Materie Misti Notabili I*; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 193. 19 Little is known of Andrea di San Zuane, apart from his *università* activities: he was a procurator, and ambassador to Venice in August 1562; then in June 1566 he was elected to the eleven-member council charged with assisting the viscount: ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta),

Quali tutti ballottati ad uno²⁰ ad uno sono rimasti gl'infrascritti quattro videlicet

Il Signor Zuffren Babin
 Il Signor Andrea di San Zuane
 L'Illustrissimo Signor Conte di Rochas
 Il Signor Ugo Flatro



84 *Report from Captain Lorenzo on Nicosia's artillery requirements*¹

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 27^{r-v}.

The list identifies three categories of ammunition needed for Nicosia's fortress:

- *for the artillery, projectiles, powder, rope, tools, planks and wheels;*
- *for the foundry, cannon and culverin moulds, pieces of iron and iron thread;*
- *for the foundry, pieces of timber, beams and furnaces.*

Finally, it is recommended that 50 arquebuses plus the necessary ammunition be sent on all ships transporting soldiers to Cyprus.

Memoria di quello al presente fa de bisogno per il servigio dell'artellaria in Nicosia

Forme da buttar' balle duo para per sorte delle grande et quattro delle piccole con le sue tenaglie.

Tre moschetti da gioco forniti oltra quelli che si hanno mandati per esercitar' li scolari, balle per li detti n° 3000.

Balle di ferro vote da 12 et da 100 tutte quelle che sarà possibile a gettarsi in questo tempo che staranno a partir' le nave, di quelle da 50 per le doi colombrine per potersi servir' di esse in nave occorrendo il bisogno n° 200. Dadi di ferro di più sorte n° 4000.

Polvere per l'artellaria da metter' su le nave miara 6 per nave, alla Gradiniga miara 10 per haver le doi colombrine da 10 et una da 20.

Corda forcina et spago lire 100. Canavazza braza 200 per far fuochi artificiali. Fustagno di vele vechie da far scartozzi per tutta l'artellaria brazza n° 1000.

Taglie para n° 12 con le sue corde per il servigio della artellaria.

Un paro de mantici grandi per accomodar' una focina per adoperarla in tutto quello ne

reg. 73, ff. 63^v–64^r; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 2 (minutes of 10 February 1561 and dispatch dated 20 August 1562); id. *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, Parte di elegger undeci aggiunti. ²⁰ *sono* crossed out after *uno*.

¹ This is an undated document, which in the archive of letters addressed to Francesco Michiel appears after the letter G.S. sent to the *provveditori alle fortezze* describing artillery requirements; cf. supra, doc. 33; it may thus be surmised that this report was written at the beginning of August 1567, and that it complements G.S.'s report.

fara bisogno. Una ancudine, doi para de tenaglie, quattro martelli grossi, ferramenta de più sorte per il servigio dell'artellaria miara 4, azzale² lire 200.

Bastardelle o scorzi di esse et altre simil sorte de maieri delli più inutili per la casa per far paglioli per l'artellarie pezzi n° 600.

Legname de più sorte per far letti rode et assi de rispetto per l'artellarie. Tavoloni de noghera³ per far casse per li archibusi da posta et archibusi da mano pezzi 25. Tavole d'albeo et di largese per far coperte alle artellarie et alloggiamento per soldato et altro miara 6. Chiodi vechi per li sopradetti paglioli dell'artellaria miara cinque.

Trombe da fuoco fornite per ciascuna nave ove anderan soldati n° 50. Manuelle per l'artellarie per ciascuna nave n° 50. / [27^v]

Rode da beri de rispetto para sei, doi martinetti, seghe n° 12, 6 da scavezzare et 6 longhe.

Memoria di quello fa de bisogno per la fondaria

Duo maschi da 50, uno da colombrina et l'altro da canon.

Duo maschi da 20 per colombrina uno et l'altro da canon.

Duo maschi per colombrine da 14 et duo per falconi da 6.

Due aste da trivellar', una grande et una piccola.

Duo ferri d'annettare dentro l'artellaria. Un ferro per la spina.

Tre ferri per le sticiadore,⁴ doi cerchi per le portelle colle sue forcade, et due burechielie di creda da fornace.

Più sorte de ferri per incerchiar' le forme et per il fornello.

Doi balle de fil de ferro. Una cassa de zimadura.⁵

Legnami per la fondaria

Un fuso per colombrine da 50, doi per colombrine da 20, doi per colombrine da 14 et doi per falconi da 6.

Quattro travi per la cavria⁶ con doi fusi et quattro galtele con le sue manoelli et tresci.

Per accomodar' da far' i salmitrij, caldiere doi grande di tenuta de 30 sechi l'una, quattro tine cerchiare di ferro, quattro albolì.

Riverentemente anco ricordo che saria bene per ogni occasione potesse occorrere a mettere per ciascuna nave, ove anderan soldati, archibusi da posta n° 50, balle per li detti archibusi et altri affari potriano occorrere, incontrandosi con nemici miara sei, che veneria ad esser un miara de piombo per ciascuna nave, polvere di archibuso per li archibuseri et archibusi, lire 500 per nave.

Memoria di quello arricorda il capitano Lorenzo⁷ per il bisogno di Nicosia

² Steel; cf. Concina, *Pietre, parole, storia*, p. 41. ³ Walnut; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, p. 442.

⁴ Cf. *steccare*, to fence in, to palisade. ⁵ Most probably horsehair; cf. G. Angeli, *Piccolo vocabulario veronese et toscano*, Verona 1821, s.v. ⁶ A machine used to hoist masts; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, p. 154.

⁷ A Captain Lorenzo is mentioned supra, doc. 65, probably Captain Lorenzo Badassino; cf. supra, docs 74 and 75, infra, doc. 102.

85 *Letter from Bartolomeo Nogiero, Nicosia, 12 August 1567*

BNF, *ms. ital.*; 1465, ff. 221^r–223^v; document already published with commentary in the author's study 'Nicosie remodelée (1567). Contribution à la topographie de la ville médiévale', *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών* 19 (1992), pp. 281–306, to which the reader is referred for further analysis.

Upon learning of G.S.'s arrival in Cerines on 8 May, the count of Rochas and Governor Roncone went to meet him; the three got to Nicosia on Saturday 10, and while his own residence was being built, G.S. stayed for 14 days with the luocotenente. For a month starting from 19 April, Cyprus was hit by earthquakes affecting the whole island, leaving considerable damage in the Limassol region.

On Sunday 1 June at 12:15 mass was held at the cathedral in the presence of Venice's officers, the nobility and the Latin, Greek, Armenian, Jacobite, Maronite and Copt clergy; this was followed by a great procession up to the Barbaro bastion, where an altar and chairs had been set up under a shelter made of branches. After praying, the Latin archbishop, the Greek bishop of Modon and the Armenian bishop blessed baskets filled with earth dug up at the bastion, which the leading Venetian officers and nobles then poured over the ground. After a blessing given to the people of Cyprus, the procession returned to the cathedral.


The city is situated in the centre of the island with a hill to the south-west called Santa Marina, which it was not possible to fortify. The enceinte will be circular, with 11 bastions and 11 flanks, and Nogiero gives a series of measurements pertaining to the various parts of the fortress. Each bastion has been bestowed upon, and named after, a proveditor: Barbaro, Querini, Mula (near to the Carmelite monastery), Rochas, Tripoli (near to the Misericordia), Costanzo, Davila, Podocatoro, Caraffa, Flatro and Loredan.

After these negotiations, the count of Rochas showed how much he loves his homeland by offering a basket containing 10,000 ducats worth of silver crockery, to which he plans to add his incomes from the grain and cotton harvests; Antonio Davila followed suit and gave 2,000 ducats in ready money, as well as promising 8,000 more over the two coming years; the rest of the island's lords promised to donate as much as they could. At the rate at which construction is going, the enceinte will be fully operational by September, provided that soldiers, artillery and ammunition are forthcoming.

The Nicosians have straight away understood that the fortification project will cause great damage to the city, for no sooner had the poles been put into the ground than houses, churches and palaces were destroyed and gardens were ruined and uprooted. Nogiero makes a list of the main buildings demolished at each bastion, and warns that the moat and the esplanade will entail further destruction, which he will report accordingly when it occurs. Despite all this, people are confident that the fortress will be the most splendid and best designed in Europe.

To the peasantry's delight, this year's grain harvests have been excellent. To the eleven bastions have been assigned the workers of the island's eleven contrade; 500 to 800 labourers, men and women, are working at each site, and will all be paid. On Monday 21 July Luocotenente Querini passed away, and was immediately replaced by Councillor Mulla.

1567

Copia d'una lettera scritta de Cipro, circa la fortificatione di Nicosia alli 12 Agosto 1567,¹
 principia qui, finisce al segno 

Con questa seguio a darle ragguaglio delli successi di qua, cominciando dal gionger dell'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano a Cerines sopra le due galee de condannati, la qual intesa che fu alli 8 di maggio montò a cavallo l'Illustrissimo Conte di Roccas con suoi gentil huomeni, et con il Governatore Roncone, et cossì si transferirono, giongendoli la sera et vi dimororono il venere; il sabato mattina a buon' hora partimo con esso signore et venimo a Nicosia,² et per 14 giorni continui alloggiò Sua Signoria con la sua famiglia in casa nostra, fin che fu provisto di habitatione. Fratanto Sua Signoria andaro più volte fuori et di dentro della città, riconosendo il sito si risolse di far forma alla fortificatione, secondo che a basso vi dinotarò, essendosi prima che ciò avvenisse sentito per tutta l'isola grandissimi terremoti cominciati alli 19 di Aprile, et durorono per tutto il mese, venendo dalla terra un tuono, poi un mugito come di torro, poi cominciava la terra a tremare con grandissimo spavento di ciaschaduno, et è stato tal giorno che fra 'l dì e la notte nella contrada di Limissò, la quale ha patito più delle altre se ne sono sentiti 20 et 25 con rovina di molte case, ne ha lasciato chiesa in quel contorno che non habbia aperta o rovinata a fatto tanto Greca come Latina, et per ciò furono per tutta l'isola ordinate processioni pregando Nostro Signor Dio ad usar la solita sua misericordia sopra di questo Regno.³ Et cessorono.

Con questi (non se io debba dire) partenti, fu dato principio alla fortificatione, la domenica il primo di giugno 1567 a hore 12 et minuti 15 al belloardo Barbaro, essendo a giorno convenuti al domo li Clarissimi Rettori et altri Signori et Reverendi, con la chieresia Greca et Latina, Armeni, Giacobiti, Maroniti et Cofiti, dove fu detta una messa del Christo Santo, la qual finita si cominciò una processione sino al loco del belloardo predetto, dove sotto una gran frascata era stato drizzato un altare con molte sedie et banche intorno, dove li primari sedevano; et poi che l'Illustrissimo et Reverendissimo Archiepiscovo⁴ con quel di Nicosie,⁵ di / [221^v] Modone Vescovo Greco,⁶ et quello de gli Armeni,⁷ con le [alitee?] in

1 The writer of this letter is mentioned in a note on f. 224^r: *Aviso da Cipro per la fabrica novamente fatto in Nicosia per una lettera scritta dal Reverende fra Bartholomeo Nogiero capellano del Clarissimo Barbaro*. Nothing more is known of Nogiero. 2 Nogiero thus gives the following itinerary: G.S. disembarked at Cerines on Tuesday 8 May, stayed there for the next two days, then reached Nicosia on Saturday 12 May. 3 These earthquakes are also mentioned by Étienne de Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, f. 211^v. 4 Filippo Mocenigo; cf. supra, doc. 32. 5 The island's Greek archbishop, normally called the bishop of Solia, was Neophytos Logaras. He was an *oikonomos* at the Saint George of Manganes monastery in 1543; he disapproved of the Council of Trent's decisions, and opposed Mocenigo throughout the year 1567, even going to Venice to argue his case before the Council of Ten: C. P. Kyrris, 'The noble family of Logaras of Lapethos, Cyprus: Some new informations about their careers, activities and landed properties', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Ellenici* n.s. XIV/4 (1967), p. 113; Skoufari, 'L'Arcivescovo Filippo Mocenigo', pp. 222-224. 6 Marco Dionisio, bishop of Coron, is known to have been in Nicosia in the spring of 1567: *ibid.*, p. 224. 7 Friar Giuliano Stavriano, *Ordo Praedicatorum*, was appointed bishop of the Cypriot Armenians in 1561: C. Longo, 'Fr. Giuliano Stavriano vescovo armeno di Cipro (1561–1571) e vescovo

testa hebbero finite molte orazioni et salmi, et benedettizo cesti di terra stati cavati dall' istesso luoco, esso Arciepiscono prima con il Luocotenente Querini presone uno,⁸ l'altro tolto dal vescovo di Nicossia et dal Clarissimo Barbaro, et così di mano in mano da gli altri vescovi et consiglieri, et poi dalli Illustrissimi Signori Giulio Savorgnano, Honorevoli Conti di Roccas et Tripoli, et altri di mano calati in un poco di bassa votorono le ceste nell' hora sopradetta, et ritornati alla frascata data la beneditione al Populo, si ritornò in processione, cantando il Te Deum et letanie al Domo, et de qui cadauno se ne ritornò a casa.

Il sito della città è in mezo l' isola posto in piano, ha una collina dalla parte di ostro che comincia alle Saline, che sopra sta alla città da 500 passa et manco, dalla parte dove sono posti li bellovardi del Signore Scipio Caraffa,⁹ Livio Podocattaro,¹⁰ del Signore Antonio Davila, il Signore Tutio Costanzo,¹¹ la qual però non poteva nocere alle difese et chiamasi Santa Marina.¹²

La forma della fortificatione e rotonda da XI lati co XI bellovardi reali. Et dal centro del bellovardo all' altro centro ove furono piantate le pertiche, vi sono passa 230.

Dalla porta del bellovardo al fianco dell' altro sono passa 215, ogni bellovardo nell' orecchione ha di spalla 19 passa di larghezza, et XI di fianco per le cannoniere che sono dalla cortina per linea retta al fine dello recchione passa 30, con passa XI di fianco et di spalla 19 et ogni fianco ha 4 cannoniere, una coperta cavata dalla cortina, le altre 3 dal fianco della pertica

latino di Bova (1571–1577)', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 58 (1988), pp. 196–209. **8** Orazio Governa reveals (infra, doc. 115) that it was his duty to fill and carry the basket of earth that Archbishop Mocenigo scattered. **9** Scipio Caraffa was paid an estimated 400 ducats a year in 1554, and in 1556 he obtained the fiefdom of Mia Miglia. On 9 February 1565 he failed in his attempt to become viscount; but in the 1570 war he led the Troodos *cernide* and fought off an Ottoman landing in Amargeti. Following the fall of Nicosia, he surrendered to Lala Mustafa Pasha: ASV, Senato, *Dispacci di rettori*, b. 3 (dispatch dated 9 February 1565); CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 215, f. 165^r; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 111 n. 139 and passim; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 973, 985; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 193. **10** Further on in the text this bastion is attributed to Giulio Podocattaro, mentioned supra, doc. 83; but this is not entirely convincing, as the dominant member of the Podocattaro family at that time was Livio. The latter is difficult to identify with certainty as there were at least three Livios around at the time: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 60–61, 104–105, 140–141; the most important amongst them would appear to have been the Melissi and Lizzato fief holders (in the year 1556): CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose* 215, f. 165^r. **11** Tutio Costanzo was an important political figure in the 1550s. He was married to Maria Flatro, and his yearly income was an estimated 2,000 ducats in 1554. He was obliged to serve in the feudal cavalry as a knight, in 1557 and 1560; also in 1560 he led one of the four feudal cavalry companies. In October 1556, following Diomedes Strambaldi's resignation, he was elected vice-viscount of Nicosia; then in early January 1559 he became a *università procurator*. During the 1566 food shortage, the rettori ordered him to procure wheat stocks in the Paphos and Chrysochous regions: ASV, Senato, *Dispacci di rettori*, Cipro, b. 1 (dispatch dated 8 October 1556), b. 3 (dispatch dated 23 October 1566), b. 5, special file, f. 2^v; id., *Materie Misti Notabili I*; id., *Collegio*, Relazioni, b. 84, report from the captain of Famagusta, Domenico Trevisan, c. 16^r; BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 184^r; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 196. He escaped the Ottoman slaughter of Nicosians when the city fell on 9 September, becoming a slave of Lala Mustafa Pasha. It is not known how he was freed, but in June 1573 he was back in Venice; cf. infra, doc. 114. He died sometime after 1580: Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 116 n. 205. **12** This hill is the modern-day area of Pallouriotissa; its highest point, near to Aglangia, is 174 m.

che nel centro del bellovardo, et cadaun fianco sarà passa 36 et dalle pertiche, et punta del bellovardo passa 51.

Il dritto di cadauna parte di fronte di bellovardo sarà di passa 68, non vi computando la rotondità dello recchione, et dalla porta del bellovardo / [222^r] alla punta del fosso sarà 21 piedi, non computandosi la strada coperta, et due banchette d'affacciarsi a diffendere la contra scarpa che occuperà passa 5 della mezaria, della cortina alla riva del fosso sarà passa 30, in mezzo di questo fosso sarà una cunetta profonda di larghezza di 6 piedi et la cortina da fianco a fianco resterà di passa 158, le reculate per le piazze delle artiglierie con lo recchione saranno passa 18, la gola del bellovardo resterà di passa 48, tal che uno di questi Bellovardi pare più presto uno campiello che una gran piazza.¹³

Et perché si avesse ad usare ogni maggior diligentia di ridur questi bellovardi et cortine in difesa con più prestezza possibile furono con guiditio eletti XI proveditori, una per cadaun bellovardo et cortina.

Et il primo¹⁴ fu al Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro, qual bellovardo è posto verso greco contra Campo Santo.¹⁵

Il secondo al Clarissimo Querini Luocotenente, posto alla quarta di tramontana verso greco.

Il terzo al Consegliere Mula verso maestro tramontana, contra il convento del Carmeno.¹⁶

Il quarto all'Illustrissimo Conte di Roccas, posto alla quarta di maestro verso ponente.

Il quinto all'Illustrissimo di Tripoli, verso ponente quasi contra la Misericordia.¹⁷

Il sesto al Signor Tutio Costanzo, posto alla quarta di garbino verso ponente.¹⁸

Il settimo al Signor Antonio Da Vila, alla quarta di garbino in ostro.¹⁹

L'ottavo al Signor Giulio Podocattaro,²⁰ posto in ostro.

¹³ These measurements do not match those given by G.S.; cf. supra doc. 63. ¹⁴ The list of bastions begins at the north of the enceinte and goes anti-clockwise; the list of the damages caused by the new walls goes clockwise.

¹⁵ The old Nicosia cemetery, evidence of which goes back to 1251; poor people of both Latin (the cemetery was joined to the church of Saint Michael) and Greek (the cemetery was used by the Saint Saviour monastery, probably a *metochion* of Saint George of Manganes) faith were buried there: Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, p. 263; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 173–177. ¹⁶ The Saint Mary of Mount Carmel convent is first mentioned in a March 1261 letter from Pope Alexander IV, but can be traced back to the 1230s. Some authors put the convent where the modern-day Sarayonu mosque is situated; others choose the site of the Arabahmet mosque: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 250–256. ¹⁷ According to chroniclers, the *Misericordia* tower was built by Peter I: Leontios Machairas, *Χρονικό της Κύπρου. Παράλληλη διπλωματική έκδοση των χειρογράφων*, M. Pieris / A. Nikolaou-Konnari (eds), Nicosia 2003, p. 205; Amadi, *Chronique*, pp. 422–423, 495; Strambaldi, *Chronique*, p. 102; Florio Bustron, *Historia overo Commentarii di Cipro*, pp. 271–272; Étienne de Lusignan, *Chorograpfia*, f. 59^v, and *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, f. 153^v. Nogiero situates the tower near to the Tripoli bastion, and is backed up by Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, p. 179, and Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 1, p. 371, vol. 2, pp. 52–53. Concerning the *Misericordia* church, see the reservations expressed *infra*, doc. 75. ¹⁸ As Leventis points out (*Twelve Times in Nicosia*, p. 35), it should be noted that the Davila and Costanzo bastions are switched around in this letter. ¹⁹ Cf. supra, doc. 13. ²⁰ Should read Livio Podocattaro, according to what Nogiero says *supra*.

Il nono al Signor Scipio Caraffa, alla quarta de sirocco verso ostro.

Il decimo al Signor Ugo Flatro, posto a sirocco levante.

Il undecimo et ultimo al Consigliero Loredano, posta alla quarta di levante verso greco.

Fatta tal deliberatione, l'Illustrissimo Conte di Roccas per mostrar con certi effetti l'animo che tien verso il Serenissimo Dominio, et quanto le fosse cara la sicurtà della sua Patria, fatto portar in'una coffa²¹ tutti li argenti della sua credenza, li consignò in camera, non si ritrovando dannari contanti, et / [222^v] della valuta di essi fino alla summa di 10 000 scudi si fece debitore di haver a pagar al ricolto in tante biade et gottoni. Questo essemplio fu immitato dal Signor Antonio Davila, esborsando in camera in contadi 2 000 ducati et gli altri 8 000 a pagar in doi anni, et gli altri baroni del Regno ancor essi porgeranno le mani adiutrici secondo il poter loro.

Il recinto et fortificatione è ridotto in termine che per tutto il mese che siamo, o al più longo per settembre sarà in termine di potersi diffendere contra ogni sforzo, essendovi soldati, artegliaria et monitioni.

Le cortine saranno di larghezza di 30 passa, parapetto passa 10, strada passa 10, di salita passa 10, restando altri passa 10 di vacuo, per commodo di strada da soccorso.

Li miseri Nicossiotti non s'accorsero mai del danno grande che patirebbono per tal fortificatione, se non dappoi che dricciate le pertiche, si diede principio a ruvinar case, chiese et palazzi, tagliando et estirpando giardini, abbattendo ogni cosa, di che restorono tanto attoniti et mal contenti, che forse a tal'uno di essi ha causata infirmità et morte. Et accioché di passo in passo ne ressiate informatissimo di quanto che ho raccolto.

Cominciando dal bellovarado Quirino, posto alla quarta di tramontana verso greco contra villa Traceona²² fuor delle mura, va per terra tutta la villa.

Nel secondo bellovarado del Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro contra Campo Santo posto in greco, si sono rovinate case di molti poveri et la chiesa di San Biasio.²³

Nel terzo bellovarado del Clarissimo Loredano Consigliero contra San Luca,²⁴ posto alla quarta di Levante verso greco, si rovinano molte case de poveri, et di consideratione quella del Signor Thomaso Friacdo,²⁵ di messer Marco Culea,²⁶ di messer Giovanni Maria Cazzato, et le chiese di San Luca, quella de Giacobiti,²⁷ et di San Giovanni Prodocimo cioè è Precusore.²⁸

21 A two-handed wicker basket; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. 22 Different from the neighbouring area of Trachonas? 23 The Cistercian *Sancti Blasii* priory dates back to 1348; Nogiero is the only person to have located it. Concerning the history of the priory, see Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 223–225. 24 This church is mentioned only in a 1468 act; Trélat claims it was a church of Greek faith; *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 30–31. 25 This name has been misspelt; it should read *Ficardo*. Concerning Tommaso Ficardo, see *supra*, doc. 83 n. 12. 26 Marco Culle became a *raisonato* officer of the *reale* on 10 May 1546, and was paid 36 ducats per year: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 32, f. 95^v; his name appears in different files as a witness in 1547 and 1556: AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 11, no. 16, b. 12, no. 25, f. 21^r. 27 Most probably the main church of Nicosia's Jacobites, called the church of Our Lady, if this is the church Antoine Audeth mentions in his will: J. Richard, 'Une famille de "Vénitiens blancs" dans le royaume de Chypre au milieu du XV^{ème} siècle. Les Audeth et la seigneurie du Marethasse', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* 1 (1980), pp. 118, 121; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, p. 102. 28 Should read 'San Giovanni Prodro'no'; there is no other mention of this church anywhere: *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 123.

Ne quarto bellovarado consignato al Signor Ugo Flatro, posto a sirocco levante, si rovina una moltitudine di case di poveri et di consideratione, quella di Pazzali²⁹ mercanti, et di messer Batholomio da Furi, et quella del Signor Zacco dell'Agabetto,³⁰ et quella di molto valore delli magnifici Laze.³¹ Et le chiese / [223']

Santa Croce ³²	Santa Gratia ³³	Santo Thoma ³⁴
Santo Acristratio ³⁵	Santo Theodoro ³⁶	Santo Andronico ³⁷
Santa Catherina ³⁸	Santo Zorzi ³⁹	Santo Giovanni ⁴⁰
Santo Andrea ⁴¹	Santo Petiro ⁴²	Santo Tiffi ⁴³
Santa Anna ⁴⁴	Santo Giacomo ⁴⁵	

29 This name is hard to make out in the manuscript; it may be *Dazzali*. 30 Maybe Agapite, the name of a noble family, according to Étienne de Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, f. 82^v. 31 A family of Frankish nobles, known since the late thirteenth century: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Études de prosopographie', pp. 581–583. The family was still around in Venetian Cyprus, surviving notably by renting the Cypriot estates of Jerusalem's Latin patriarch; on 10 February 1570, following the 1567 expropriation, Pietro Lasse bought a palace and garden in Nicosia from the Cornaro brothers for 3,500 ducats: ASV, *Senato Mar*, filza 24 and 40; AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, reg. 37, no. 12; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, '“Il zardin della regina.”', pp. 223–226. 32 A church of unknown faith, not to be confused with the Jacobite church of the Holy Cross: Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, p. 137. 33 Most probably a Latin church, if it is accepted that the name is a reference to the Augustinian doctrine of grace. Nevertheless, no Augustinian church bearing this name is known of: id., 'L'ordre des frères ermites de Saint-Augustin en Méditerranée orientale et leur couvent nicosiate (XIII^e–XVI^e siècles)', *Augustiniana* 62 / 3–4 (2012), pp. 277–282. 34 This church, of unknown faith, is not mentioned anywhere else to anyone's knowledge; it should not be confused with the Melkite church of the same name located in the Saint Augustine area: id., *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 110–111. 35 This (misspelt) name indicates that this was a church dedicated to Saint Michael the Archistratege, most probably of Greek faith. 36 This church, situated to the northeast of the enceinte, was thus different from the abbey of Cistercian nuns of the same name located in the western area of the city, which has recently been searched by archaeologists. Concerning this abbey, *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 311–313. 37 All that is known of this Greek church is that it received a donation in June 1548: J. Darrouzès, 'Autres manuscrits originaux de Chypre', *Revue des études byzantines* XV (1957), p. 140 [reprint in J. Darrouzès, *Littérature et histoire des textes byzantins*, London 1972, study no. XII]. 38 This church is mentioned in a 1435 act, which situates it near to the wool market: Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 71–72. 39 There are so many religious establishments dedicated to Saint George that this sanctuary is impossible to identify; concerning the different churches and chapels of Saint George, see *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 54, 103, 120–122. 40 Most probably the Saint John of the Hospitallers church founded at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and well-documented ever since: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 270–273. 41 This church, of unknown faith, was thus situated in the Saint Andrew Gate area, mentioned by the chroniclers of the medieval kingdom: *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 115. 42 This should probably read *San Pierro*, a church about which nothing is known. 43 This could be a contraction of either Triphyllios or Eutychios, two Greek saints worshipped on the island: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 35, 119, 134. It may also be connected with the San Tithalli church, which records show existed in 1567: N. Patapiou, 'Νέα στοιχεία για τη βενετοκρατούμενη Λευκωσία από το Κρατικό Αρχείο της Βενετίας', *Κυπριακαί Σπουδαί* 61 (2007), pp. 57–58. 44 The Benedictine abbey of Saint Anne was first mentioned in 1321, and, indeed, disappeared in 1567, having at some point been abandoned by its nuns, according to Étienne de Lusignan, *Chorographia*, f. 15^v; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 300–301. 45 Probably the Saint John the Apostle church founded in 1368 by Jacques de Nores, to which a hospital was attached: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 58–59.

Nel quinto bellovarado designato al Signor Scipio Caraffa, posto al Tempio⁴⁶ alla quarta di sirocco verso ostro, si ruvinano gran numero di case et botteghe et di mercanti ricchi, et fra le altre di molto valore quella di Signor Rason di Nores⁴⁷ et le infrascritte chiese, ciò è il Tempio antiquissimo per la memoria della religione d'i Templari hora estinta, et San Zorzi,⁴⁸ Santo Simeone,⁴⁹ Santa Maura,⁵⁰ et Santo Marco.⁵¹

Nel sesto bellovarado, designato al Signor Giulio Podocattaro⁵² al campo del Laviaro,⁵³ posto in ostro, si ruvinano molte case de poveri, et le chiese

Santa Veneranda⁵⁴ Santa Barbara⁵⁵ Santa Penafocusa⁵⁶
Santo Cognati⁵⁷ Santo Romano⁵⁸ et giardini assai

Nel settimo bellovarado⁵⁹ dassignato al Signor Antonio Davila, posto alla quarta di garbino in'ostro, vanno per terra assai case de poveri, et di momento quella di messer Catherin Tinto,⁶⁰ et le chiese delli Armeni,⁶¹ Santa Catherina,⁶² Santa Madalena,⁶³ Santo Nicolò,⁶⁴

46 This church, possibly dedicated to the Virgin, dates back to the beginning of the thirteenth century and was taken over by the Hospitallers in 1311; it survived under the same name until 1567. Concerning the church's history, see *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 282–287. 47 Should read *Jason de Nores*; he was the uncle of Giacomo de Nores, count of Tripoli, and was also related to the Singliticos after marrying the count of Rochas' sister Caterina. After 1570 Jason became an important name in Renaissance humanism, in Italy and in Crete: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', pp. 51–52; A. Nikolaou-Konnari, 'L'identité en diaspora. Vies et œuvres de Pierre de Nores (avant 1570? – après 1646) et Georges de Nores (1619–1638)', in S. Fourrier / G. Grivaud (eds), *Identités croisées en un milieu méditerranéen. Le cas de Chypre (Antiquité–Moyen Âge)*, Mont-Saint-Aignan 2006, pp. 332–333; ead., 'Κύπριοι της διασποράς στην Ιταλία μετά το 1570. 1: η περίπτωση της οικογένειας Δενόρες', in A. Nicolaou-Konnari (ed.), *Η Γαλινοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη. Η Βενετία στην Κύπρο και η Κύπρος στην Βενετία / La Serenissima e la Nobilissima. Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice*, Nicosia 2009, pp. 227–228. 48 Cf. *supra*, doc. 37.

49 Nothing more is known about this church. 50 This church is mentioned in 1457, but no details are known; it was most probably of Greek faith: Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 142–143. 51 Nothing more is known about this church; maybe it was built or renamed during the period of Venetian rule. 52 Should read *Livio Podocattaro*. 53 The name of this place is given in 1538 and 1559 by Patapiou, 'Νέα στοιχεία για τη βενετοκρατούμενη Λευκωσία', pp. 56–57. 54 This is most probably a Latin name given to the Greek Saint Paraskevi church, situated on the Lycabettus Hill: Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, p. 372; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 36–37. 55 First mentioned in 1357, the Benedictine Saint Barbara abbey was one of Nicosia's smaller religious establishments, and was attached to Our Lady of Tyre by the Senate. This document mentions another church of the same name, situated near to the Rochas bastion; this makes it impossible to precisely locate the monument: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 302–303. 56 This name is false; the real name may be related to the Virgin Pechiusa, mentioned in 1538, by Patapiou, 'Νέα στοιχεία για τη βενετοκρατούμενη Λευκωσία', p. 56. 57 Nothing more is known about this church dedicated to Conon, a Greek saint. 58 Another church not mentioned anywhere else. 59 Cf. *supra*, doc. 13. 60 Caterin Tinto came from a family of Venetian administrative officers; in 1559 he was *scrivan salariato a levar le bolette*, and was paid 900 bezants: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 183^r. 61 The Holy Cross Armenian cathedral, first mentioned in 1468: Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, no. 195; Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 94–95. 62 Not to be confused with the church mentioned *supra*, doc. 38; this is probably the Latin church situated, according to a 1385 act, near to the new La Cava cemetery: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 70–71. 63 The Cistercian foundation which dates back to before 1222, and which fell further and further into disrepair during the course of the sixteenth century: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 308–310. 64 Given the number of religious establishments dedicated to Saint Nicholas, this one is hard to identify; Leventis (*Twelve Times in Nicosia*, pp. 370–371) proposes that it is the Saint Nicholas *tu Soulouany* church mentioned by Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, nos. 167 and 206, whilst Trélat thinks it is the Saint

Santo Ayanargiri,⁶⁵ et il convento et la chiesa delle reverende monache detto Paluriotissa,⁶⁶ ridotto di molte gentildonne nobili con molti giardini.

Nel nono bellovarado dassignato all'Illustrissimo Conte Giacomo di Tripoli, posto a ponente, sono ruvinati molti giardini, et chiese Santa Marina,⁶⁷ et la chiesa et monasterio delle reverende di San Dominico,⁶⁸ benche ancor non sia in terra.⁶⁹ Et la casa della Signora Andriana.⁷⁰

Nel decimo bellovarado dassignato all'Illustrissimo Conte di Roccas, posto alla quarta di maestro verso ponente, vi sono ruvinati giardini, et la chiesa di Santa Barbara,⁷¹ et anderà in terra Santa Mama,⁷² per esser sopra la fossa. / [223^v]


Nel ottavo bellovarado,⁷³ dassignato all'⁷⁴ Signor Tutio Costanzo, sonno poste a terra case de poveri, giardini et le chiese della Misericordia,⁷⁵ Santa Chyrabunsa⁷⁶ et Santa Eleussa.⁷⁷

Ne undecimo et ultimo bellovarado designato al Clarissimo Mula, sopra il convento del Carmino posto a maestro tramontana, son battute a terra poche case ma molti giardini et le chiese di Bethelhem⁷⁸ et San Giovanni.⁷⁹

Su'l fosso, strada coperta et spianata si rovinano molte altre case et chiese,⁸⁰ che quando si eseguirà ne terrò memoria, ma con tanti danni si possono confortare che questa serà la più bella fortezza et meglio intesa di tutta Europa.

Nicholas of the Jacobites church, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 104–105. ⁶⁵ This is the only mention of this Greek establishment, possibly a monastery, if the note highlighted by Darrouzès is to be believed: 'Les manuscrits originaires de Chypre à la Bibliothèque nationale de Paris', *Revue des études byzantines* 8 (1950), pp. 175, 177, 183 [reprint in Darrouzès, *Littérature et histoire des textes byzantins*, study no. XI]. ⁶⁶ A monastery of Greek nuns, first mentioned in 1231: Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 205–207. ⁶⁷ Nothing more is known about this church. ⁶⁸ The famous Dominican foundation, mentioned in a 1244 text, and relatively well documented, having been patronized by the Lusignan family: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 235–243. It was not, as this document says, inhabited by nuns, but by monks. ⁶⁹ A precious piece of information showing that demolition work was done progressively. Saint Dominic, outside the enceinte, was not immediately destroyed; its demolition was delayed for a long time, and still had not been finished in July 1570 when the Ottomans laid siege to the city, which allowed them protection behind the ruins: Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 50; Zuan Falier, *Relazione della presa di Nicosia*, ff. 6^r, 8^r, 9^r, 10^v. ⁷⁰ Adriana Cornaro, according to N. Patapiou in a press article. ⁷¹ Most probably the church mentioned in 1376 in Leontios Machairas' chronicle: Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, p. 135. ⁷² Also mentioned in 1376, the Saint Mamas monastery of Greek nuns is documented right up until its demolition: *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 202–204. ⁷³ Cf. *supra* n. 13. ⁷⁴ *Illustrissimo Conte Giacomo di Tripoli* crossed out after *all'*. ⁷⁵ Nothing is known about this church; it should not be confused with another church of the same name; cf. *supra*, n. 17. ⁷⁶ This name has been misspelt. ⁷⁷ The Virgin Eleousa was the name of a monastery mentioned in 1393: Darrouzès, 'Notes pour servir à l'histoire de Chypre. I', *Κυπριακαί Σπουδαί* 17 (1953), p. 89 [reprint in J. Darrouzès, *Littérature et histoire des textes byzantins*, study no. XIV]; Patapiou, 'Νέα στοιχεία για τη βενετοκρατούμενη Λευκωσία', pp. 62–63. ⁷⁸ A church about which nothing is known, but which, according to Trélat, could be related to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, which the Franciscans put to new use in the fourteenth century: *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, pp. 48–49. ⁷⁹ This common name makes it impossible to identify the church. ⁸⁰ It should be remembered that in his letter of 28 July 1568, G.S. tells of around 80 demolished churches; cf. *supra*, doc. 28. Although he did not witness the demolition work, Étienne de Lusignan gives the same figure: *Chorograffia*, f. 15^r, and *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, f. 32^r. For his part, in this letter Bartolomeo Nogiero lists 43 churches and monasteries.

Et per non mancar di ogni particolare, Le dico che questo anno è stato un fertilissimo raccolto d'ogni sorte di biave, per il qual beneficio li contadini del paese vivono grassamente. Et mi estenderò anco a dirle, come alli XI bellovardi fussero distribuite le XI contrade dell'isola, di sorte che cadaune bellovardo vi lavorano ogni giorno 500, 600, et 700 et 800 persone, fra donne et huomeni tutti pagati.⁸¹

Il lunedì alli 21 di luglio,⁸² il Clarissimo Luocotenente Querini doppo haver patito un flusso cattivo per molti giorni rese l'anema al suo creatore. Et nel governo del luoco fu posto il Consigliero Mula. 



86 *Letter from the regimento and the proveditor-general to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, [Nicosia], 20 August 1567*

ASV, *Annali veneti 1566–1570*, ff. 24^r–25^v.

The officers confirm that they have received the letter telling of G.S.'s mission and also received the sum of 20,000 ducats. Immediately afterwards they called a meeting of the università, where the announcement of the decision to build a new fortress was met with great joy; the università members thanked the Lord that their wives, daughters and possessions would be protected, and offered to donate 65,000 ducats to the cause (including 5,000 ducats to be given to the poor), the first half to come in October of this year and the other in October 1568. The count of Rochas was the first to offer 10,000 ducats, giving 200 marks of silverware and promising more funds from his further incomes of the current year.

The count of Tripoli also came forward with a donation, offering silver, gold, jewels and (he too) his further incomes of the current year, all to be collected from his home; he also made a verbal promise of 10,000 mozza [3,200 hl] of grain from his village's harvests to supply the capital's fontego.

Antonio Davila, who returned sooner than expected from Paphos, promised 2,000 ducats in silver and gold plus 8,000 ducats of his private income, to be delivered in two instalments. The archbishop also vowed, exceptionally, to make a donation. Learning of all these promises, the Signoria was able to appreciate how dear she is to her subjects; the assembly was overcome with emotion at the sight of forces being gathered and everybody offering without hesitation to spill their blood and give their life for Venice. In response to this, the Venetian officers thanked everybody on Venice's behalf, but also calmed the people's fervour, to prevent a return to the ruin and debt of previous years.

Soon after, G.S.'s plan for the fortress was examined, and impressed people by its unique-

⁸¹ This is false, showing that the main organizational aspects of the fortification project were not explained to the general public; thus Nogiero associates the eleven bastions to the eleven *contrade*; in fact, the defence of the bastions was later entrusted to the *cernide* of the eleven *contrade*; cf. infra, p. 543. ⁸² 20 July, according to G.S.; cf. supra, doc. 28.

ness. On 1 June, a solemn procession was led up to the Barbaro bastion, depicted in the drawing attached to the letter; this drawing also shows which bastion has been assigned to which of the men agreeing to carry out G.S.'s orders. G.S. is sparing no effort in his work, and people involved in the project are praying that God will keep him strong; Governor Roncone and Zuan Sozomeno are at his side, and are doing all they can to help him.

Il Reggimento et Proveditor general di Cipro alla Signoria. A 20 d'agosto.

Serenissimo Principe,

Gionse l'Illustrissimo Conte Giulio Savorgnano, come già scrivessimo alla Serenità Vostra colle galee di questa guarda, et per quelle havendo havuto le sue lettere in la materia di questa fortezza, et li ducati 20 milla. Prima osservando gl'avvertimenti che per gl'Eccellentissimi Signori Capi ne sono sta dati / [24^v] facessemo venir a noi li magnifici procuratori di questa università, et gli altri principali nobili, alli quali havendo publicata l'intentione della Serenità Vostra, diedero tutti quel segno di alegrezza che non si potrebbe maggiore, rengraziando la Maestà di Dio di questa inspiratione, che concerne la salvezza loro, delle mogli, filgioli et facultà, et per contribuir alla spesa, nel consiglio loro come sono soliti di fare in simili occasioni, presero di dare per tansa generale ducati 65 milla per una fiata [tra?] li 60 milla per la fabrica, et gl'altri 5 milla per restauro in alcuna minima parte di quelli miserabili a chi fossero ruinate le case, et di pagar tutta questa quantità in due rate, l'una questo ottobre prossimo, et l'altra il susseguente 1568, non arrivando a maggior prestezza le forze loro, come la intenderà della qui occlusa copia della parte.¹ In particolar, poi vederà la Serenità Vostra come il Signor Conte di Rochas benemerito collateral general, guidato dalla fede et solita soa liberalità è stato primo d'ogn'altro, etiam primo di essa magnifica università ad offerirci in dono ducati 10 milla a questo effetto, et di haver effettivamente dato in poter nostro a buon conto tutti gl'argenti soi che sono marche circa 200, et obligatosi supplir al rimanente con l'entrate sue di quest'anno.

La vederà come il magnifico Conte di Tripoli supplicò che si mandasse a levar di casa soa al medesimo effetto tutti i suoi denari, ori, zoglie et argenti per l'amontar di 8000 ducati, oltra tutta la sua entrata pur di quest'anno, solo da trahendosi il viver, et già a bocca ci ha fatto intender che mandiamo a levar per questa città a nostro libito dal suo casale 10 milla moggia di biave per metà intra frumenti et orzi, et tutta via facemo condur il frumento a questo fontego.²

La intenderà finalmente come il magnifico messer Antonio d'Avila vene in fretta da Baffo, ove in quel tempo si trovava per soi affari ad offerirci et dar in camera due mille in contanti, et altri tanti in ori et argenti che hora si trovano similmente in poter nostro, con suo obbligo di 8000 ducati apresso in due rate dell'entrate sue. Havendoci anco questo Reverendissimo Archiepiscopo fatto oblatione di contribuire straordinariamente. Et sebbene dalla lettura delle / [25^r] scritture presentate da ciascuno delli predetti lequali serano con

1 Cf. supra, doc. 83. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 82.

le presente, la Serenità Vostra sia per penetrare nella radice dell'affetto loro, anchora noi non habbiamo voluto per obligo ometter di attestarle, come il fervor di questi, et di tutti gl'altri in poter aggjonger forze a forze per maggior espressione della prontezza loro, gli spingeva le lachrime da gl'ochij, et noi in quel ponto non potessimo contenersi di fare il medesimo, quando che in giunta ci offerivano per nome della celebrazione vostra il sangue et la vita istessa, non essendo noi mancati di corrisponpergli con quella più grata forma di parole che habbiamo potuto, et tenemo giusta intentione quando così piacesse alla Serenità Vostra di moderar insino ad una honesta quantità queste offerte particolari, et andar in tanto scodendo a bon conto quella parte che potremo, aspettando ordine da lei, perché anchor che le siano conformi al desiderio loro, però le sono eccedenti le forze in maniera che hanno al presente, che senza gran disconcio anci ruina, non le potressimo in tutto esequire, attesi li debiti et incomodi in che li ha posti il corso adverso di questi anni precedenti.³

Hor espedito questo negocio, l'Illustrissimo Conte Giulio non manco curioso che solicitò, al solito del suo proceder, immediate c'hebbe consultato con tutti noi sopra il disegno della pianta della fortezza formato da sua Signoria, che veramente è stata giudicato singular in ogni sua circostantia per conservar questo suo Regno in ogni occorrentia, havendo ben disposte le provisioni circa il fabricar, et la spesa del denaro con ottima regula.

Col nome del Spirito Santo precedente solenne processione et la celebration della Santa Messa fece dar principio il primo del mese di zugno passato (che possa esser con perpetua felicità) nel baloardo designato a me Proveditor Barbaro sopra la predetta pianta, che è di quella qualità et del numero di baloardi che la Sublimità Vostra vederà in esso disegno, che hora gli indriccia esso Illustrissimo Signor Giulio, sopra il qual disegno vederà anchora la Serenità Vostra la distributione de gl'altri baloardi et in qual personaggi, oltra le persone nostre per solitudine maggior dell'opera, i quali personaggi havendo / [25^v] intermesso ogn'altro particolar affare, s'affaticano et sono diligenti sempre prevalendo in ciascuna attione la disciplina et ordini del detto Illustrissimo Signor Giulio, la cui Signoria sostiene tanta fatica et peso che ben dovemo pregare Dio che ce lo conservi et augumenti in vigor a corrispondentia dell'animo suo, faticandosi anchora non poco il Signor Governator Roncone, et messer Zuan Sozomeno il cavallier in esequir come pratici le commissioni intorno essa fabrica del ditto Signor Giulio, con molta satisfation di Sua Serenità.



³ It may be assumed that this is a reference to the difficulties there had been in delivering grain and taxes to the *camera* during the drought years, from 1562 to 1566; cf. supra, doc. 7 n. 12, rather than to the cases of fraud denounced by Proveditor Bernardo Sagredo in 1565: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', pp. 105–106.

87 *Letter from Eugenio Singlitico, count of Rochas, to the heads of the Council of Ten, Nicosia, 24 August 1567*

ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e alter cariche, b. 290, c. 249.

Eugenio Singlitico reports that, at the behest of the luocotenente and the proveditor-general, he spoke before the università on the subject of the donation the Senate has decided to make to the fortification project. Accepting their mediation, Singlitico thanks the heads of the Council of Ten for the trust they have once again showed in him.

At the università meeting of 12 May, fearing that the assembly might be irked by his request that they donate 50,000 ducats, Singlitico took the initiative of immediately giving to the project all the money he had; the count of Tripoli followed suit with a written promise, then Antonio Davila, who gave money and promised further payments. Singlitico then managed to convince the rest of the nobility to prove their willingness to help Venice.

In the end the università gathered 60,000 ducats, in a spirit of sincere good will; furthermore, the assembly agreed to donate 5,000 ducats to the poor whose houses will be demolished during construction. This is a feeble sum in relation to the damage foreseen; demolition has nevertheless begun without protest, as there is much less popular unrest since the events of the previous year.

Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori Capi, Padroni colendissimi,

Essendomi stato commesso dal Clarissimo locotenente Querini di buona memoria, et dal Clarissimo Barbaro Proveditor Generale in questo Regno, con ordine come Sue Signorie Clarissime dissero di Vostra Signoria Eccellentissima ch' io dovessi trattar con questa Magnifica Università, disponendola di venir allegramente alla contributione pertinente a questa fortificatione che ha piaciuto allo Eccellentissimo Senato che si faccia in questo Regno, io ne reso infinite gratie a Sue Magnificenze Clarissime supplicandole che fussero contente di ringratiar Vostre Signorie Clarissime dell'opinione che hanno di me, il quello di buon animo et di fidel servitù verso qual sempre felicissimo stato. Io non cederò a nessun altro suo fedel Signor, se bene conosco chiaramente non essere quelli parti in me che si richiedono alla servitù di tanto et così sublime Principe. Ma non essendo questo difetto mio, pregherò continuamente Iddio che mi dia tanto di la sue, ch' le operationi mie verso Sua Sublimità aggualgino in parte, se non in tutto, il buon animo mio.

Prima dunque ch' io comincjassi a trattar cosa alcuna, ricordai alli Clarissimi sudetti che facessero quella parte della lettera che limitava li ducati 50 milla, impero che io vedeva che da essa ne nascerebbe non poco scontento a questi fedelissimi sudditi di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima, onde havendo veduto Sue Signorie Clarissime che di ciò non si rissolte robbe se non buonissimo effetto lo fecero, io presentai dopo quella scrittura insieme con quelli pochi argenti che mi attrovano haver sotto li 12 di maggio, la qual credero che questi Clarissimi Rettori manderanno a Sua Serenità, venne poi il Signore Conte di Tripoli con una scrittura, et anco il Signor Antonio Davila parimente con una scrittura, argenti et danari. Trattai dopo con quella destrezza che miglio / [249^v] seppi il negotio con questi Magnifici gentilhuomeni,

et ritrovaj gli anemi loro così disposti et inclinati che se le forzo corrispondessero alla buona volontà loro, prometto a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime da fedel servitor che haverebbero contribuito assai più.

Si sono dati poi li 60 milla ducati per la fortificatione così volontiera, et con quella prontezza d'animo, come Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime intenderanno dalli Clarissimi Rettori et dalla parte presa circa ciò nel consiglio di questa università.¹ Mi parse ultimamente di trattare come feci, et ottenni da questi gentilhuomeni li ducati 5 milla per sollevamento di questi poveri miserabili, a quali sono stato rovinato le case. Et se bene questa summa a comparatione del danno che han patito è pochissima, non dimeno si sono tutti racconsolati, onde questi rovinamenti si sono fatti quetamente senza alcun mormoro che rispetto all'interesse grande, et l'iccessive povertà saria potuto occorrere come accade in tutte quelle città, dove si farono di tal rovina. Et massimamente per li passati accidenti, ben noti a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime quali sono in tutto sopiti, ne se ne parla più imediante la prudente provisione della felice memoria del Clarissimo Locotentente Querini et del valor del Clarissimo Barbaro Proveditore in questo Regno, ben noto a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime.² Al quale piaccia a Dio di concedere longa vita gli virtù sue, et acciò che questo Regno non resti del tutto sconsolato, essendo non poco afflitto per la perdita del Clarissimo Querini, che certo questi tempi ne haverero grandissimo bisogno, et a Vostre Signorie Eccellentissime con quella reverenza che io debbo humilmente mi raccomando.

Alli 24 di agosto 1567 di Nicosia di Cipro.

Di Vostre Illustrissime et Eccellentissime Signorie Devotissimo servitor
 il Conte di Rohas
 Eugenio Singlitico



1 Cf. supra, doc. 83. 2 An allusion to the riot that occurred in Nicosia on 26 February 1566, during the carnival: the Nicosian masses gathered at the *piazza di basso* and protested against the shortage of bread. A rumour saying a ship full of wheat had left for Venice infuriated the crowd and saw people cross the city to the palace of Proveditor-General Antonio Bragadin, where they hurled stones and insults; however, the situation did not escalate into a general uprising, and tension was immediately diffused by a call for calm from various noblemen, including Tuzio Costanzo, Giacomo de Nores, Ugo and Filippo Flatro, Francesco da Milano, Gualtier Sozomeno, Antonio Davila, Livio Podocataro, Viscount Zuffre Corner; cf. the file prepared by the chancery secretary, Zuan Francesco Stella, contained in ASV, *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 5. The trial saw three ringleaders blamed for the events, a Greek priest, a fencing master and a saddler; they were all hanged on 13 April 1567. According to *Luocotenente* Nicolò Querini, this execution satisfied the Cypriot nobility and re-established order: “la qual essecutione ha messo in questo populo un terrore et spavento così grande che si può creder al fermo che non sia più perseguire tumulto simile, sendo totalmente sbogosi da questo improviso essemplio”: id., *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 236 (dispatch dated 16 April 1567). See supra, pp. 260–262.

88 *Letter from Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro to the doge, Girolamo Priuli, [Nicosia], 27 August 1567*

ASV, *Annali veneti 1566–1570*, f. 25^v.

Immediately upon reaching Cyprus, the proveditor-general wrote to the doge to inform him of the condition of the stratia. After inspecting it several times, he decided to dismiss 70 stradioti, all too old and riding inept horses; the stratia now contains 730 horses.

Regarding the cernide, they are improving day by day, and are as good as their Italian counterparts; in contrast to what was formerly said of them, they are resistant and well-disciplined, and their numbers ought to be increased to 5,000. G.S. has inspected them, and has praised Governor Roncone, who is working tirelessly to achieve this level of quality.

Il Proveditore general di Cipro a 23 agosto

Serenissimo Principe,

Nei primi giorni ch' io arrivai in questo Regno, per mie lettere dissi alla Serenità Vostra in che termine si trovava questa sua strathia.¹ Hora le dico che havendola più volte vista, et fattagli la resegni, ho cassato circa 70 cavalli ch'erano inutili, per esser più vechij et cavalli non atti ad alcuna fattione, onde è redutta essa strathia a numero di cavalli 730 che in ogni occasione sarebbono atti ad ogni impresa.

Quanto alle cernede,² ho voluto vederle più volte et certo riescono ogni giorno meglio, et posso con verità dire alla Serenità Vostra che non cedono a quelli di Italia, essendo huomini assuefatti alle fatiche, al sole et ad ogni incommodo, et così ben disciplinati che pareno soldati veterani che è totalmente contrario alla sinistra informatione ch' io per inanzi havea di essi, onde a me parrerebbe meglio (parlando con ogni riverentia) di accrescer più tosto questo numero fino a 5000 essendo al più 4500 che sminuirne alcuno, perciò che in ogni occasione la Serenità Vostra potrebbe dire di haver in questo suo Regno tanti buoni soldati. Li ha veduti anco l'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano et li ha commendati assai, attribuendo summa laude a questo magnifico Governor Roncon, il qual non sparagna fatica.³



89 *Letter from Antonio del Beretino to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 1 September 1567*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini 4*, f. 64^r.

Antonio del Beretino has been ill for three out of the four months he has spent in Cyprus since his arrival; his condition became so desperate that he was given Extreme Unction. Happily he

1 Concerning the *stratia*, see supra, doc. 2. 2 Concerning the *cernide*, see supra, doc. 14. 3 This document is followed by a short note concerning the opinion of Eugenio Singlitico: *Il collateral general a 17 settembre di Cipro scrive che si farebbe in Cipro 20 milla homini di ordinanze, se vi fossero arme et chi li instruisse.*

regained his health, and his spirits were lifted when G.S. arrived with his highly innovative fortification plan, proposing a city enclosed within a circular enceinte capable of protecting a great many people. In January, the walls will be completed, and will just need bonding, which is for the most part merely aesthetic. The walls will be resistant to artillery fire, and will not topple into the moat. The Cypriot nobility is united in a spirit of cooperation towards the work being done, helping both physically on the ground and financially with their donations. To better persuade his reader, the captain sends a plan of the fortress along with his letter.

Clarissimo Signor sempre osservantissimo,

De quattro mesi che se, che nui semo giunti sun quest'isola, son stato più deli tre mesi amalato, dico confessato e comunicato, et habuto l'oglio santo in ponto di morte, ma laudato sia Iddio, mi son riuto e adesso sto bene, massime da poi che in questo Regno è venuto l'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano, qual con il suo divino ingegno si ha messo ha edificare una città, cioè a fortificare Nichosia, in una forma nova non mai più vista¹ in altra città, qual è capatiosissima, secondo la sua grandezza per essere in forma circolare, e secondo il mio² pocho giuditio sarà una delle gran fortezze che sia nel mondo e forse inespugnabile, e penso certo che alla più longha per tutto il mese di dicembrio la sarà in difesa, e per tutto genaro la sarà fornita di fare di terreni quel che li bisogna, poi giornalmente et con facilità si andrà incamisando, per che fra le pietre delle mura vecchie e delle case, qual son state dirupate per fare la città nel miglior e più forte sito, penso che mancharà pocho per incamisare ditta città, per che la grossezza del muro non sarà più di doi piedi,³ rispetto che una parte del fosso è cavato in vivo tereno, et quella parte che vi è sta posto da poi, è di modo fatto a scharpa, che facilissimamente è atta a sostentare ogni gran batteria senza cader pocho over niente di tereno nel fosso, per che in fatto li muri servano più per bellezza e per sostentare li terreni dalle piogge che per resistere a batteria, sì che giudico come vi ho detto che prestissimo si finirà, per che si vede in questi gentilomeni del Regno un bonissimo animo, e con gran solecitudine non manchano con la vita e con la borsa di favorir tal opera, et ogni giorno vi si lavora a furia, sì che l'opera va facilmente avante e fin adesso la è in bonissimo essere, et per debito mio non ho voluto manchare di mandarvi una pianta del muodo che è Nichosia con una instrutione di tutte le misure, e se la non fusse tanto ben fatta quella, per sua benignità acetterà il buon animo mio e con questo faccio fine, basandoli le mane, pregando nostro Signor Iddio la prosperi e felici. Vostra Signoria Clarissima sarà contenta per sua benignità di farne parte al Magnifico messer Francesco Cornaro⁴ et al Clarissimo messer Giandonato di Famagosta, el dì primo settembre 1567.

Dalla Vostra Magnificentia Clarissima fidel servitore
Antonio del Beretino

1 *vista* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 2 *mio* added above with signe-de-renvoi. 3 2 *piedi* = 0.69 m.
4 Mentioned supra, doc. 31 n. 12.

Al Clarissimo messer Francesco Micheli Signor sempre osservantissimo, Venetia. 1567 primo settembre. Antonio Berettino. N^o.



90 Letter from Giulio Contarini to G.S., Venice, 10 October 1567

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 81^r.

Giulio Contarini reports that letters sent by G.S. and by the rettori to the Senate concerning the decision to fortify Nicosia have arrived safely. The Senate has expressed its satisfaction, and Contarini prays to God that the city will be secure by March 1568. Venice is busy organizing the sending of money, artillery and ammunition. Contarini assures G.S. that he never forgets loyal servants of the Signoria.

Illustre Signor mio per le lettere sue, et quelle delli Clarissimi Signori Rettori scritte al Senato con grandissima mia satisfatione, ho inteso la honorata et necessaria deliberatione di haver unitissimamente tutti deliberato di fortificar la impotantissima città di Nicossia, il che similmente è stato udito con universal satisfatione, et contenteza di tutto il Senato,¹ sì che io son astretto con la presente mia ringratiar Dio, et poi allegrarmi con Vostra Signoria, sì per il beneficio publico come per il molto honor suo, che certo ogni uno al presente è constreto a pregar Dio per la vità di Vostra Signoria, conoscendo questa così bella opera tutta parte delle sue mani. Hor sequitate Signor mio, sì come fate, et se si può superate voi stesso per poter atender alla promessa che si spera, che per tempo novo senza dubio la sia tutta riduta in fortezza, se ben molti vogliono dir fra dui mesi, voglia pur Dio che sia per tutto marzo, che si potrà ringratiar la maiestà di Dio. De qui, questi Signori non mancano di continuar alla missione di danari, munitione et artegliarie. Ho voluto farli da mia mano queste poche righe, acciò la sappia che io non mi domentico di questi serveno questa Republica come fa Vostra Signoria, pregando il Signor Dio li doni fortezza per beneficio publico et, facendo fine, me li offero per sempre.

Di Venetia alli 10 ottobre 1567.

Buon Fratello di Vostra Signoria Julio Contarini procurator di San Marcho.²

Allo Illustre Signor Julio Savorgnano Governator General del Regno di Cipro. In Nicossia di Cipro

¹ Giulio Contarini seems to have written this letter the day before the Senate, in an official session, expressed its delight at the news from Cyprus, alluding to dispatches sent by the *regimento* and Francesco Barbaro on 20 and 28 August: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 66^v–68^f. ² Giulio Contarini, son of the *cavalier* Giorgio, from the branch of the family to which the counts of Jaffa belonged, was born around 1501; thanks to his considerable fortune, he was elected procurator of San Marco *de ultra* on 21 June 1537. He was a *savio del Consiglio* several times, in 1559, 1565 and from 1570 to 1572; he died in 1575: Barbaro, *Arbori*, vol. VII, p. 515; ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni in Maggior Consiglio e in Senato, registri sec. XVI (Banca Dati) Indice degli eletti lettera C.

91 *Letter from Daniele Barbaro, the patriarch of Aquilea, to G.S., Venice, 13 October 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 81^{r-v}.

On the occasion of the departure of the cavalier Antenoro, Daniele Barbaro expresses his happiness at the news that Venice and Cyprus are to be served by G.S., knowing that he will bring to this project all of his skill and know-how. The patriarch assures G.S. that his letters won over the senators, and he hopes God will continue to inspire him. Explaining that he has always been a fine servant to the Barbaro family, Daniele Barbaro commends the cavalier Antenoro to his correspondent, and hopes the latter will appreciate his services.

Barbaro also mentions that during construction G.S. must scour the earth, as there is gold, silver and jewels to be found, which should all be given to the Signoria; if he finds any antique objects, such as medals or marble, Barbaro requests that they be offered to him, and is ready to pay generous amounts.

Illustre Signor come fratello carissimo,

Con la comodità che mi porge il Signor cavallier Antenoro, io ho visto la Signoria Vostra, et mi allegro, et mi consolo insieme, così per i rispetti pubblici come per i privati, che ella si ritrovi in quelle parti con tanta satisfatione et utilità della Eccellentissima Republica nostra et di quel Regno, a servizio delquale ogn'uno non solamente spera, ma è certo che lei sia tutto in un tempo per adoperar la industria et valor suo. Io certifico Vostra Signoria, sì come a me è stato riferito fidelmente che le sue lettere scritte al Senato ultimamente,¹ hanno per dolcezza inteneriti gl'animi di tutti. Nostro Signor Dio accresca a lei le forze et li doni il suo lume, col quale possa sempre mai virtuosamente operare. Io credo che Vostra Signoria conosca il cavallier Antenoro per gentil'huomo et per servitore, grato per molti rispetti a questi Illustrissimi Padri nostri, desidero anchora che ella sappia chel medesimo e congiuntissimo di amicitia con tutta la nostra casa, et io specialmente l'amo come figliolo, mi persuado che possano venire molte occasioni per lequali più intimamente Vostra Signoria sia constretta di amarlo per i suoi meriti, desidero insieme che in tutti i tempi la Signoria Vostra consideri anco di far cosa grata a me sempre, che le / [81^v] piacerà di riconoscerlo (come ho detto) per mio intimo amico, et come figliolo.

Signor mio carissimo io aggiungo questo di più, che io so che havrete da vuolger molto terreno nelle vostre fortezze, et che sotto terra si ritrova oro, argento et gioie, ferro et pietra, le gioie, et le cose preziose sono del Principe, le altre cose sono come si conviene alla distributione della sorte. Io prego Vostra Signoria che ritrovandosi qualche cosa atta al mio humore delle antichità, come di medaglie et altre antichità di metalli et marmi, si voglia ricordar di me, che mi farà cosa gratissima et ne restarò obligato et memore, et non guardi per questo né a spesa né a altri interessi, che io supplirò al tutto, secondo gli avisi che mi darà Vostra

¹ Letters that must have followed on in content from those sent in late May and early August; cf. supra, docs 25–26, 29, 31, 33.

Signoria allaquale di nuovo supplicando il Signor Dio per ogni sua felicità, affettuosamente mi raccomando.

Di Venetia alli XIII di ottobre M.D.LXVIIJ.

Di Vostre Signor Illustre
Affettuosissimo come fratello il Patriarca d'Aquilea²

All'Illustre Signor mio come fratello carissimo il Signor Giulio Savorgnano dignissimo Governatore del Regno di Cipro.



92 Letter from Marc'Antonio Barbaro to G.S., Venice, 15 October 1567

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 82^r.

Barbaro is delighted to have received a letter from G.S. accompanied by a drawing of Nicosia's fortification. G.S.'s news makes him even happier in the light of his recent nomination to the Collegio, for which he has left his post of provveditori alle fortezze. In his new position he will make certain that the fortress is provided with adequate ammunition, and tells G.S. not to hesitate in requesting his help, if need be.

Illustre Signor mio honorissimo,

Gratissima mi è stata la lettera di Vostra Signoria, insieme con il disegno della fortificatione di Nicossia ridutta nel termine che hora si trova con tanta sua faticha diligentia, di modo che molto mi ralegro con esso lei delle degne operationi sue, et di vederla accumulare

² Daniele Barbaro, son of Francesco (and the brother of Marc'Antonio, who wrote the next letter, doc. 92), was born in Venice on 8 February 1514, and was an important figure in Venetian humanism. Daniele frequented the *scuola di Rialto*, then, around 1535, went to Padua, where he studied philosophy, mathematics and medicine; he received his university diploma *in artibus* on 19 September 1540. He helped to found the *Accademia degli Infiammati* in 1540, and frequented the literary cenacles of the Badoers in Venice, forming friendships with several men of letters. In 1545 he designed the University of Padua's Garden of the Simples, but it is not known how much real influence he had on its installation. He then left Padua for a career in public office in Venice: he was *provveditore di comun* in 1548, then ambassador to England from the end of 1548 to the beginning of 1551. Although he was never made bishop, he was elected patriarch in spring 1550, and was part of the Council of Trent's work in 1562 / 1563; he was also behind the construction of the Maser villa, along with his brother Marc'Antonio. Furthermore, he researched and published works of philosophy, in particular a voluminous critical edition (to which Andrea Palladio also contributed) of the *Dieci libri dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio* (see fig. 69). Daniele Barbaro died in Venice on 13 April 1570: G. Alberigo, 'Barbaro, Daniele Matteo Alvise', *DBI*, vol. 6, pp. 89–95; M. Tafuri, 'Daniele Barbaro e la cultura scientifica veneziana del '500', in *Giovanni Battista Benedetti e il suo tempo. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi*, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere e Arti, Venice 1987, pp. 55–81; M. Azzi Visentini, 'Daniele Barbaro e l'architettura: considerazioni sulla villa di Maser', in M. Marangoni / M. Pastore Stocchi (eds), *Una famiglia veneziana nella storia: i Barbaro. Atti del convegno di studi in occasione del quinto centenario della morte dell'umanista Ermoalo, Venezia, 4–6 novembre 1993*, Venice 1996, pp. 397–433.

in questa maniera i menti con questi signori, liquali si chiamano satisfattissimi di lei, tanto in questa occasione, quanto alle altre, dove Vostra Signoria si ha trovata. Recevei con mio grandissimo piacere un'informazione et instruzione di quella fortezza hauta copiosamente nella sua lettera, et tanto più, quanto questi Signori Illustrissimi mi haveano dato carico delle fortezze di maniera che nell'occasioni, che mi potevano avvenire, io ne potrò esser pienamente instrutto, ma havendomi quelli Signori levato da quel carico et messomi in Collegio, non manco cara mi è stata detta informazione, accioché per quanto s'estenderà le forze mie non manchi di procacciare che sia munita di tutti quelli guarnimenti et munizioni che a tal luogho si richiedeno. Io fra tanto me gl'offerò, et pregola a servirse di me in quello che gl'occorrerà, che di ciò non potrò haver maggior favore, massime sapendo far servitio a Vostra Signoria, laquale, per le rare sue virtù et qualità, ci ha obligati tutti a desiderarli honore et gloria, con il che facendo fine me li aricomando.

Di Venetia il giorno XV di ottobre 1567.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima servitor
Marc'Antonio Barbaro¹

All'Illustrè Signor Giulio Savorgnano Governator General nel Regno di Cipri Signor osservandissimo. Nicosia.



93 *Letter from the doge, Pietro Loredan, to Benedetto da Mula, Francesco Barbaro and the Cyprus councillors, Venice, 7 December 1567*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 83^{r-v}.

The doge confirms that he has received the letters his correspondents wrote on 3 September, and writes that he is most satisfied to see how quickly people are getting involved in the fortification project led by G.S. and following his instructions. He assures his correspondents that Venice will supply whatever is necessary to make a perfect fortress; he and the Senate bind the officers to

¹ Marc'Antonio Barbaro, son of Francesco, was born in Venice on 22 September 1518. His career was often spent serving Venetian diplomacy; he was ambassador to France from 1561 to 1564, then the Constantinople *bailo* from 1568 (he was elected on 19 May, and left Venice to take office in July) to 1574. He was elected *provveditore alle fortezze* on 8 October 1567, but never took office as he left for Constantinople; in 1583 he met up with G.S., to inspect the Friuli fortifications. He was elected *savio di Terraferma* in 1560, and was an important member of the central councils of Venetian government in the 1570s, becoming procurator of San Marco on 27 April 1572. Along with his brother Daniele, patriarch of Aquilea (cf. supra, doc. 91), he built the Maser villa and *tempietto*. He died on 4 July 1595. It should also be noted that he was close to several Cypriot nobles; a Livio Podocatoro was his secretary when he lived in Constantinople, in February 1571: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Senato, reg. 3, f. 45^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 38, ff. 124^v, 142^v–143^r; Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, vol. 9, no. 326; Ch. Yriarte, *La vie d'un patricien de Venise au XVI^e... d'après les papiers d'État des Archives de Venise*, Paris ²1883; F. Gaeta, 'Barbaro, Marcantonio', *DBI*, vol. 6, pp. 110–112; Grendler, 'The leaders of the Venetian State, 1540–1609', pp. 71–72.

meet G.S.'s demands, be it in silver or any other form of help he might need. The Signoria will supply the requested soldiers and ammunition, and has already taken the decision of sending a further 1,000 men after the 2,000 soldiers already making the journey to Cyprus.

2,000 ducats worth of millet and rice, amounting to 10,000 stara [83,310 l], are to be sent, and powder and ammunition is already on its way. In addition to all of this the items mentioned on a list enclosed with the letter will be sent, and will be forwarded to the arsenal proveditors; as long as the convoys reach the island unhindered, this will see Cyprus and its gentlemen kept safe. The doge asks the officers to tell G.S., the collateral general [Eugenio Singlitico] and the feudatories that Venice is supporting them in their efforts. Finally, the officers are also asked to secure grain and food supplies as soon as possible.

Petrus Loredano Dei gratia Dux Venetiarum, etc. Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Benedicto de Mula, de suo mandato vice locumtenenti, Francisco Barbaro Provisori Generali nostro, et consiliarijs Regni Cipri fidelibus dilectis salutem, et dilectionis affectum. Havemo ricevuto le lettere Vostre di 3 di settembre, fino 12 ottobre prossimi passati inviate con diverse navi, et da qualle havemo inteso, fra l'altre cose, con molta nostra satisfattione la diligentia che insieme con quel Magnifico Governator Generale usate intorno a quella fortificatione, et le provisioni di diverse cose che per ricordo di esso Magnifico Governatore ne richiedete, conforme a quanto ne è stato richiesto anco da lui medesimo, dellaqual diligentia, se ben ne confidamo che non siate per mancare, non di meno per il desiderio che tenemo di vedere un'opera di questa sorte, tanto necessaria et importante, ridotta a perfettione, non potemo far di meno di sollicitarvi, commettendovi col Senato, che continuando voi nel modo che haveti fatto fin'hora, debbiate somministrar al detto Magnifico Governator, così il numero delle opere che fino al presente li havete somministrato, come il danaro et ogni altro aiuto, et favore che li sarà di bisogno et che da lui sarete ricercati, sì che egli habbi il modo delle cose necessarie et possi ridurre essa fortificatione a quel termine che si conviene in tempo debito, secondo l'intentione datane, et secondo il desiderio nostro che quanto spetti a soldati et a monitioni, artiglierie, legnami, danari et altre cose necessarie che ne richiedete, sì come non vi havemo mancato fin'hora, così non vi mancaremo nell'avenire, imperoché oltre li doi mille fanti che già vi havemo inviati, sì come havete inteso per altre nostre, havemo deliberato mandarvine altri mille, liquali faremo partire quanto prima.

Oltre di ciò havemo tra inviati et deliberato inviarvi fino a diece mille starà di megli, risi, per l'amontar de ducatti doi mille, et oltre le polvere, arteglierie, balle et legnami che già sono cargati, et vederete dalla nota che con queste vi mandamo. Havemo etiam deliberato mandarvi quello che vederete dall'inclusa lista, sì come sarete avisati anco per lettere a parte delli / [83^v] Proveditori et patroni all'Arsenale, sì che non vi mancaremo di alcuna cosa che conosceremo esser necessaria et di beneficio, et securtà di quel Regno nostro et di quei nobili feudatarij et fidellissimi nostri, a noi sempre carissimi, et vi mandaremo ogni cosa, tanto in tempo che volemo sperare nel Signor Dio, che li concederà felice navigatione et senza disturbo o impedimento alcuno. Questo tanto volemo, che facciate intender al prefato Magnifico Governator, al Magnifico Collateral Generale, et a quei altri nobili et feudatarij nostri per confirmarli

nella diligentia che usano nelle cose nostre, et per accrescer la prontezza loro in continuare in quella, et a far quanto conoscerano convenirsi alla molta fede, et devotione loro verso la Signoria nostra, laudando le operatoni di cadauno d'essi, secondo che vi parerà convenirsi et affimarli per nome del Senato nostro, che di tutte esse siamo per tenerne quel conto che si conviene. Voi fra tanto attenderete a introdurre in quella città quella maggior quantità de formento, orzi et altre vettoaglie che potrete, acciò che ella resti abbondante et copiosa, et così ben fornita che non habbi in alcun caso a patire, nel che se ben confidamo che non habbiate a mancare, potendo voi molto ben per vera prudentia, conoscere di quanta importantia sia una simil provisione, non dimeno non restaremo di dirvi che tanto farete cosa di nostra maggior satisfattione, quanto intorno a ciò usarete maggior sollecitudine et diligentia.

Dati in nostro Ducali Palatio die V decembris indictione XI. M.D.LXVIJ.

Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Benedicto de Mula vice locumtenenti, Francisco Barbaro Provisori Generali et Consiliarijs Regni Cipri.



94 *Letter from Marco Michiel to G.S., Famagusta, 2 January 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 84^{r-v}.

Marco Michiel, the captain of Famagusta, has received the plan of Nicosia's fortress that G.S. sent to him via Captain Zuan Battista. He writes of how eager he is to come as soon as possible and see the work being done; work that will see G.S. honoured like a Roman chief, as he has designed the most splendid fortress in the world and is going to save Cyprus from the enemy. He assures G.S. that he will praise him and what he is doing unceasingly. Furthermore, he has brought in all of the men from Messarea and the Carpass who have been sentenced to work on Famagusta's walls, exempting nobody and refusing to grant them eight days off for the harvests; only a small number of them have been kept aside to cut wood for the town's ovens.

Dal Capitano Giovanni Battista¹ mi è stata data la pianta di quella fortezza che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima mi ha mandata, et insieme rifferito nel buon termine et bell'essere in che si ritrova, c'havendomi et l'una et l'altro acceso di voglia di vederla per più pienamente sodisfarmi con la prima commodità che mi sia concessa, voglio transferirmi fin da lei, acciòché vedendo l'istessa forma mi compiacci più nell'essenza che nel disegno, et se li capitani romani nel edificar una sola città hanno acquistato nome immortale che doverà merita- / [84^v] re, Vostra Signora Illustrissima nell'haver fatto si honorata fortezza, et la più bella del mondo, nellaquale consiste la salvatione di questo Regno. Sia dunque sicura che non solamente dalli nostri Signori la sarà laudata come la è, ma da tutti gli altri principi somma-

¹ Captain Zuan Battista is mentioned supra, doc. 28.

mente commendata, me ne godo et ralegro tanti per il bene che le voglio, et per l'amore che le porto, che con tal allegrezza voglio dar fine alla mia lettera, et senza fine raccomandandomi a lei et al Clarissimo Signor Provveditore. Non restarò per ciò di dirle ch' ho fatto comandare gl'huomini della Messarea et Carpasso per la fabrica senza essentarne alcuno, me ne ho solamente reservati certi pochi che conduceno brusche per cuocer del pane per il vivere di questa città, et se bene mi domandavano tempo otto altri giorni per il seminare, non gli ne ho voluti concedere, anzi se qualche uno ne resterà lo castigarò secondo le proclame mie di Famagosta. Alli 2 di genaro 1567. Il Capitano Giovanni Battista le bacia le mani.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima come Fratello
Marco Michel Capitano del Regno di Cipro²

All'Illustrissimo Signor il Signor Giulio Savorgnano meritissimo Governator della Millitia del Regno di Cipro come fratello Nicossia.



95 Letter from Sforza Pallavicino to G.S., Zara, 14 January 1568

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 86^r.

Sforza Pallavicino tells of how happy he was to receive letters (forwarded to him from Venice) from G.S., and to learn that Nicosia is to be fortified. He imagines that with G.S.'s wise leadership, the support of Venice and the suitability of the chosen site, the work must be moving along nicely. He is delighted that G.S. has been chosen for this mission, as he possesses all of the skills needed to accomplish it fully. Sforza Pallavicino himself is overseeing construction of Zara's little fortress, which should also be operational by spring; at this site, G.S.'s nephew, Girolamo Savorgnan, has nearly brought a bastion to completion.

Molto Illustre Signor,

Io mi trovo dopo ch' io son qui in Zara haver havute tre lettere di Vostra Signoria, due mandatemi gia aperte da Vostra Serenità et l'altra ricevuta al presente serrata de 7 ottobre passato, lequali mi sono state gratissime et di molto contento, così per haver inteso nove di lei che tanto desidero, come per li minuti raguagli che la mi da della buona riuscita delle cose di quella fortificatione, laquale a quest' hora credo che sia in buonissimo essere et anche sicurezza, essendo governata dalla sollecitudine et prudentia di Vostra Signoria, accompagnata poi dalla volontà di Sua Serenità et dalle commodità che vi sono, et dalla dispositione del sito. Onde io mi rallegro con questi Signori che habbino fatta elettione della persona di lei a tanta impresa, et seco mi rallegro delle commodità che si accompagnino con la prontezza et desiderio suo in esserguirla et ridurla in perfettione, come credo che in buona parte si ritrovi

² Concerning Marco Michiel, see supra, doc. 36 n. 9.

a quest' hora. Sono ancor io a far spezzar sassi, condur terreno et simili per ridurre in sicurezza con nova fortificatione questa fortezzetta di Zara,¹ laqual fin qui con tutte le difficultà che habbiamo havute, è in assai buon principio, essendoci almeno favorevoli li buoni tempi che vanno et anche la dispositione del sito, et a questa primavera ho speranza che si debbi trovare in qualche buon' essere et difesa. Il Signor Hieronimo suo nipote,² qual è qui, ancor lui ha ridotto a quest' hora quasi a fine un balloardo, et con questo a Vostra Signoria bacio le mani.

Di Zara a xiiij di zenaro M.D.LXVIIJ.

Di Vostra Signoria molto Illustrate servitore
Sforza Pallavicino

Al molto Illustrate Signor, il Signor Giulio Savorgnan. Nicosia.



96 *Letter from Bernardin Polani to G.S., Salina, 29 January 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 86^{r-v}.

Bernardin Polani, the captain of Salina, thanks G.S. for his praise-filled letters; he does not believe himself deserving of G.S.'s compliments on his reports concerning the salt flats (of which he sent copies to G.S.), which he had to write in great haste as a matter of urgency. His decision to intervene in transporting the artillery pieces was motivated by a desire to strengthen G.S.'s honour; G.S. has proposed to him that the Savorgnan family be his protectors, and that he work for G.S.'s nephews. Polani accepts the offer, expressing his eternal gratitude, and writes that of all of G.S.'s nephews he hopes in particular to work for Germanico.

Illustrissimo Signor mio osservandissimo,

Sì come l'humanissime lettere di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima, et li caldi officij sui fatti a pottetione delle cose mie, superando et l'ingegno et le forze mie, mi dano tanto menor speranza di poterla in alcuna parte ringratiare quanto più desidero et brammo; così anco accrescono et accampano in me l'animo, et desiderio di darli alcun segno di quella molta riverentia et devotione che li tengo.

Et se bene la benignità sua col penello della sua cortesia mi dipinge, per tal quale non mi conosco, ma desidero d'essere, emmi però Carissimo sopramodo di vedere che ella Signore di

1 Sforza Pallavicino supervised the restructuring of Zara's defences from 1567 onwards; he drew up the plans himself, as well as a model showing his transformation of the old city with a new, demi-lune-shaped enceinte containing several bastions. Features of his work were the walling up of old gates and the opening of new access points, protected by bastions and platforms: A. Deanovic, 'Architetti veneti del Cinquecento impegnati nella fortificazione della costa dalmata', in Cresti/Fara/Lamerini (eds), *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, pp. 132–133 (see fig. 53). 2 Girolamo Savorgnan, son of Marc'Antonio and G.S.'s nephew, was born in 1551; like his brother Germanico, he oversaw a fortification project at a very young age, cf. supra p. 51 n. 106.

tante gratie et doni facci alcuna stima di me; delquale argomentando io dalla fortuna et dalla cognitione de me medesimo, non potrei né doverei, per dir il vero, cavarne giuditio che mi piacesse.

Li mei scritti in materia di saline nati veramente prima che concetti forono già da me mandati a quelli mei Illustri Signori, più per segno d'obediencia che per voglia che ne havessi, havendome loro 5 data una sola notte, per il pocco tempo che havevano di scriver per Venetia, nellequali non hebbi tempo non diro di disporli o vestirli compitamente, ma di ligarli a mala pena o fasciarli. Et però grande veramente è la gratia che ella si degna di farli, poi che le è piaciuto d'haverne copia.

L'attioni mie quanto alla condotta de munitioni de quei tempi nuvolosi forono, sì però hebbero alcun merito guidate solamente dall'alta mira di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima ritratto di vero honore, et nato solamente alla gloria nella qual chi tiene gl'occhi et animo fisso difficilmente può errare. / [86^v]

L'umanità, sì come le piace di dire usata da me verso quel povero suo servitore capitano Trittone, fo così conveniente ad esso per esserli stato et arlievo, et servitore come debita a me per essermi padrone et signore.

Et perché ella eccedendo meravigliosamente ogn'uno di vigilanza, prudenza, providenza et valore, non può anco mancare di non dare mille segni di cortesia et humanità. Però le piace d'offerir mi, non solamente la prottettione dell'Illustrissima Casa et nepoti sui, ma la relatione anco dall'istessa sua propria bocca della persona mia appresso quelli mei Signori Illustrissimi, catenandomi perciò con mille oblighi et nodi.

Et sa Dio che non mento, che stimando io molto più in ogni occasione luoco et tempo il testimonio di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima et prottettione di Casa Sua, che qual si vogli cosa che mi potessi o donare fortuna o meritare ingegno et valore, le dico che accetto dalle sue et potentissime et benignissime mani, et l'uno et l'altro dono per li dui maggiori et più desiderabili beni che possi havere a questo mondo.

Et poi che in me non trovo che altro offerirli, che degno sia, l'offerisco quella parte dell'huomo che è migliore et che anco suole più aggradire a nostro Signor Dio, che l'animo pronto, devoto, et reverente, pregando Sua Maestà divina degnarsi di conservar Vostra Signoria Illustrissima felicissima per molti anni, poi che li concede gratia di restar viva per molti secoli. Con che le faccio fine supplicandola ad offerirmi per servitore al Signor Conte suo nepote, mio Signore.

Da Salina adi 29 di zenar 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima servitor
Bernardin Polani¹

All'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano meritissimo Governator General del Regno, suo osservantissimo.

¹ Mentioned supra, cf. doc. 77 n. 12.

97 *Decision from the Senate, addressed to the luocotenente, the provveditor-general and the Cyprus councillors, Venice, 4 February 1568*

ASV, *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 79^v.

Through letters from Cyprus, notably from G.S., the Senate has learnt of how construction is progressing, and has been especially happy to read that Nicosia will be a fully operational fortress in two months. In one of his letters G.S. proposes bonding a bastion and its curtains, so as to leave a model for his successors to follow once he has left. The senators praise this idea and order that G.S. begin as soon as possible, certain that he will do the work with the efficiency and effectiveness he has already displayed on other occasions. G.S. has asked to be repatriated, and the Senate says it will see to it that this happens. To allow fortification to proceed uninterrupted, the provveditori alle fortezze will send 25,000 ducats on the next ships leaving for Cyprus.

Die quarto februarij

Locumtenenti Cypri, Provisori Generali Barbaro & consiliarijs ibidem

Dalle molte mano di vostre lettere ricevute ultimamente, havemo inteso il termine nelquale si attrova la fortificatione de Nicosia, et daquelle poi del Magnifico Conte Giulio Savorgnano governor general di quella militia li particolari de cadaun balloardo;¹ il che tutto, sicome è stato inteso da noi con grandissima satisfatione, così è con molta laude vostra, del detto Magnifico Conte Giulio, et altri che si sono adoperati in essa, et tanto maggior satisfatione è stata la nostra, quanto che per esse sue lettere detto Conte Giulio scrive et afferma che in doi mesi la serà ridotta in securtà.² Et perché nell'ultima parte di lettere del detto Conte Giulio, el dice de far de muraglia uno delli balloardi, et cortine, perché vi sia la forma et ordine per il far delli altri diese, et questa è anco la nostra intentione a fine che quelli che haveranno a continuar la fortezza, dapoi la partita del detto Conte Giulio possino farla come si deve, vi commettemo con il Senato che quanto prima si potrà, si debba dar principio a far de muraglia uno delli balloardi, et medesimamente una cortina secondo chel detto Conte Giulio scrive, et finirli come deveno stare, accioché quelli che resteranno de lì come è ditto, vedendo la forma et ordine non possano errare; et siamo certi chel detto Magnifico Conte Giulio farà il tutto con la solita diligentia, et virtù sua dimostrata in ogni loco dove si è attrovato con molto beneficio delle cose nostre; onde che desirando anco noi gratificarlo della licentia, che con ogni rispetto el ne ha ricercato, per altre nostre vederemo di satisfarlo. Et perché possiate continuar a quella for- / [80^r] tificatione, li Proveditori sopra le fortezze vi mandaranno per li primi passaggi ducati XXV milla, delli quali farete tener conto, et non spenderete in altro per alcun modo.

Et damo che sia preso che delli danari della Signoria nostra, siano dati alli provveditori sopra le fortezze per mandar in Cipro detti ducati 25 milla, da esser mandati per questi passaggi che parerà al Collegio.

1 Some of the letters mentioned appear to have been preserved; cf. supra, docs 31, 33, 35. 2 Cf. supra, doc. 44.

De literis	160
De non non	3
Non sinceri	1



98 *Letter from Marc'Antonio Savorgnan to G.S., Belgrado, 24 February 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 87^r.

It has been announced that the Turks are preparing an imposing fleet believed to be bound for Cyprus; Marc'Antonio Savorgnan is most excited by this news as, certain that the enemy will be defeated, he awaits the glory that will come to the family – the fate of Christianity rests on a Savorgnan's shoulders! He recommends that G.S. keep a close eye on Germanico, and regrets not being able to go with his children to Cyprus, where Venice has just sent 3,300 soldiers. The count of Porcia, who has always been friendly towards the family, has come back from the island.

Illustrissimo Signor fratello,

È venuto qui in un medesimo tempo nova da molte parte della grossa armada et esercito turchesco per aquistar quel Regno, per il che Vostra Signoria puol pensar come stano li animi nostri, perché reuscendone bene come speramo per valor suo, ne risulterà a casa nostra quelli che non fu mai tanto di gloria ma massime che si sa, che sul colmo del fabricarli è sta mancato di opere et di ciò che li bisognava che Dio perdoni etc. In somma io vedo che tutto il peso de nostri Signori Illustrissimi, anzi di tutta Christianità, è posto sopra alle spalle de un Savorgnanao, seguane quello si vole sarà sempre laude sua, se ben si intertenisse il nemico una hora sola, però allegramente facisi tutto che si puole; poi che si è in balo, bisogna balare et quanto a Germanico, cometto et ordeno, che stij sempre appresso Vostra Signoria et con la sua fortuna, et mi dole non potervi esser io ancora con il resto della mia generation, perché ove è il nome de Giulio alcuna cosa non può perir. Però io prego Vostra Signoria che per niuna cosa ella lassi absentar da sé esso Germanico. Et Vostra Signoria haverà inteso la espedition de 3300 fanti fatta da questi Signori Clarissimi per difesa di quel Regno, et cosa certa è che metterano tutte da dovero et grandissimi moti vederemo di tutto il mondo per questo. Viene de lì il conte Silvio Porcia¹ che per esser mostrato sempre amorevole a casa nostra, et essendo di quella bontà che Vostra Signoria sa, io son certo che ella lo favorirà et anco per amor mio la farà qualcosa di più, che così la prego et li prego felicità, et sempre me raccomandando.

Di Belgrado adi 24 febraro 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Fratello
Marc'Antonio Savorgnanao

All'illustre Signor Giulio Savorgnanao Conte di Belgrado, et Governator General del Regno di Cipro

¹ Mentioned supra, doc. 65 n. 26.

99 *Letter from the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo II Della Rovere, to G.S., Pesaro, 14 March 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 87^r.

The duke of Urbino commends to G.S. Girolamo da Gubbio, one of his subjects who is now a servant of Venice; he is leaving for Cyprus in a company of 300 men, and the duke takes this chance to salute G.S.

Illustre Signore,

Venendo a quelle bande il presente capitano Hieronimo Gabrielli di Ugobbio,¹ suddito et creato mio, per servire la Signoria Illustrissima con l'ispeditione di trecento fanti che ha havuto, mi ho voluto soddisfare per la buona volontà che li porto di accompagnarlo a Vostra Signoria con questa mia, laqual sarà per raccomandarle questo gentil'homo mio quanto più posso, et farla certa che sì come di luj per la isperientia et ogn'altra buona qualità sua, può prometter ogni honorato servitio, così a me farà molto piacere, se si contenterà vederlo volontieri per mio amore ancora, et fargli quei favori nelle occorenze sue, che son che è solito della cortesia sua et del buon animo che teni verso di me. Il che tutto conserverò a memoria come cosa accettissima. Il Signor Dio la facci contenta sempre come desidera.

Di Pesaro a 14 di marzo 1568.

Suo buon amico il Duca d'Urbino²

All'illustre Signore il Signor Giulio Savorgnano



100 *Letter from the duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo II Della Rovere, to G.S., Pesaro, 15 March 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 87^{r-v}.

The duke of Urbino commends to G.S. the cavalier Alessandro Feretti d'Ancona, who is leaving for Cyprus in a company of 300 men; his family have always been the duke's friends, and the duke would like him to be treated well.

1 A captain already mentioned supra, doc. 62 n. 4. 2 Guidobaldo II Della Rovere, son of Francesco Maria Della Rovere, duke of Urbino, and of Eleonora Gonzaga, was born in 1514. He frequented Venice at a very young age, and it was there that on 22 June 1524 his father was promoted to the rank of *capitano generale* of Venice's armies. When his father died on 20 October 1538, Guidobaldo replaced him both as duke of Urbino and *capitano generale* (elected on 20 March 1539, he served until November 1552). He later served the pope, as prefect of Rome in 1555, and Philip II of Spain, who in December 1558 named him captain-general of the soldiers of the Kingdom of Naples. Towards the end of his life he mostly occupied himself with his dukedom; he died in Pesaro on 28 September 1574: G. Benzoni, 'Guidobaldo II Della Rovere, duca d'Urbino', *DBI*, vol. 61, pp. 478–488.

Illustre Signore,

Viene a servire la Signoria Illustrissima in quell'isola il Cavaliere Alessandro Feretti d'Ancona¹ con l'ispeditione c'ha havuta di trecento fanti, et essendo egli da me amato assai per esser di casa che sempre è stata amorevolissima alla mia, et per le molte buone qualità che ho conosciute in lui; l'ho voluto accompagnare a Vostra Signoria di questa mia, con laqual io le raccomando questo gentil' homo come mio creato che così è da me tenuto, et la prego con quella confidenza che so di poter / [87^v] havere nela cortesia sua, che voglia vederlo volontieri per amor mio anchora, et nelle occorenze che possono portargli honore et commodi, essergli cortese del suo favore et prottione, che sì come io son molto desideroso, che egli riporti da lei ogni buona dimostrazione che si può, così riceverò per piacere accettissimo che se ne contenti, et ne conserverò quella grata memoria che conviene. Il Signor Dio la faccia contenta sempre come desidera.

Di Pesaro a 15 di marzo 1568.

Suo buon amico.
Il Duca d'Urbino

All' Illustre Signore il Signor Giulio Savorgnano.




101 *Letter from Philipppo Mocenigo, archbishop of Cyprus, to G.S., Paphos, 15 March 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 87^v.

Archbishop Mocenigo confirms that he has received the letter G.S. wrote to him on 5 March (brought by Francesco Patrizi). He was greatly displeased by what he read; he implores G.S. to overcome the deficiencies of the people he is working with and ensure that his expert judgement, vital to Nicosia's safety, continues to benefit the city. In Venice, the archbishop will be sure to speak in G.S.'s favour, and will support his request to be repatriated to Italy; finally, he says that he has received the scale model of two bastions, and will take it to the Signoria.

Molto Illustre Signor osservandissimo,

Sì come ho sempre laudati et celebrati i disegni e l'essecutioni di Vostra Signoria in questa sua fortificatione, et preso del continuo inestimabile consolatione, così la lettera sua di 5 del presente¹ portatami dal Patritio² mi ha portato grandissimo dispiacere che le opere sue

¹ A captain mentioned supra, doc. 65 n. 28.  ¹ This letter has not been preserved; it must have been similar in content to the letter G.S. wrote to Francesco Michiel on 4 March 1568; cf. supra, doc. 53. ² Francesco Patrizi, the archbishop's secretary, was preparing to go back to Venice after nearly seven years in Cyprus; with him would go a rich library of Greek manuscripts, which must have allowed him both to earn money and to make a name for himself

incomparabili non siano conosciute da quelli che le dovrebbero aiutare et essaltare, né in questo caso so dirle altro, se non che io la prego, quanto posso, acciò con l'ardente sua charità voglia vincer li difetti de gli altri, sì che quella città, laqual riconosce da lei ogni sua sicurreza et pace, conseguisca anco da lei qualche bellezza, et di ciò io ne haverò a Vostro Signor Illustre particolar obbligo, alla qual però per altro mi ritrovo obligatissimo, havendo conosciuto con gli effetti il suo valore infinito e l'affettione e la diligentia, et la fatica incredibile che ella ha usato et dimostrato in questa sua opera, dellequali cose io non mancherò di render sempre in ogni luogo buon testimonio. Quanto al suo ritorno in Italia, si renda sicura che io vi metterò tutte le forze mie, perché ella ne resti sodisfatta di che et d'ogni altra opera che io potessi fare, et hora et sempre per l'avenire in suo servitio, si prometta di me tutto quello che d'ogni altro suo charo potesse prometersi. Ho havuto li due belloardi di rilievo sani, deliquali rendo gratie a Vostri Signori Illustrissimi, et gli goderò in luogo di tutto il dissegno che aspettano. Il Signor Dio doni quella riuscita alla gloriosissima impresa sua, che il suo cuor stesso desidera, che io con tutto l'animo me li offero, et raccomando.

Di Baffo alli 15 marzo 1568.

Di Vostre Signorie Illustre
Phillippo, Arcivescovo di Cipro

All'Illustre Signor Conte Giulio Savorgnano, Governator Generale del Regno suo osservandissimo. Nicosia.



102 *Letter from Giacomo Soranzo to G.S., Pera, 17 June 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 88^f.

Giacomo Soranzo has learnt of what G.S. is doing in Cyprus, and applauds both this service and the honour it will bestow upon G.S.. He then offers his help, hoping that God will give him enough strength to serve his homeland.

Illustrissimo Signor mio,

Sì come ho sentito contento infinito dalle preclarissime operationi di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima fatte in quel Regno, et che perciò ho giudicato ch'ella si habbia guadagnato non meno ogni supremo honore, che fatto alla Serenissima Signoria il più segnalato servitio che la potesse ricevere, così le amorevolissime lettere sue mi sono state singularissimamente grate, et se fusse alc'una cosa in me che non fusse già gran tempo tutta di Vostra Signoria Illustre, me gli offerirei hora con tutto l'animo, ma poi che nissuna cosa gli posso offerire, la prego a

amongst Italian humanists: G. Grivaud, 'Une liste de manuscrits grecs trouvés à Chypre par Francesco Patrizi', in Arbel / Chayes / Hendrix (eds), *Cyprus and the Renaissance (1450–1650)*, pp. 125–155.

valersi del suo istesso liberamente, sì come è da me sommamente desiderato di vederla in ogni amplissimo et principalissimo grado di honore, et a Vostra Signoria Illustrissima mi raccomandando pregando il Signor Dio che la conservi, et gli aggiunga forza et vigore, per potere tanto più longamente servire la comune Patria.

Di Pera alli 17 giugno 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima affettuosissimo
Iacomo Soranzo¹

All'Illustrissimo Signor il Signor Julio Savorgnano. Nicossia.



103 *Letter from Captain Lorenzo Badassin to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 24 June 1568*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, ff. 153^r–154^r.

The captain reports that, after a problem-free 29-day journey, he arrived safely in Cyprus, only to fall ill six days later due to the extreme heat. He was bed-ridden for eight days and thought he was going to die; but he survived and his health returned. Due to the fears of an enemy attack, he has been sent to Cyprus to do what he has done for other princes; however, as there is no precise threat, he hopes that Venice will not ask him to spend another summer on the island. He is willing to serve Venice for as long as necessary, but if he stays in Cyprus he will die, and thus asks to be repatriated to Italy, asking Michiel to find him another office.

In order to give Michiel as precise a description as possible, Badassin has toured the walls of the new fortress six times, and has even taken some measurements: he gives the height of each bastion, explains that the parapets are more or less finished, then describes how the curtains are under construction, and how G.S. has ordered that they be 30 passa [52 m] thick. G.S. wants the bastions to be bonded with plite, and wants the curtains to be made of earth. If 400 to 500 men work at each bastion, the fortress will be completed in a month; the Caraffa bastion is now being given a stone facing.

Thirty Ottoman galleys stopped in Cyprus on their way to Chios from Alexandria; they were given the customary offerings, then resumed their journey without disembarking.

¹ Giacomo Soranzo, son of Francesco, *detti Tocco d'Oro*, was born on 1 April 1518. He spent most of his career serving Venetian diplomacy; he was an ambassador to Edward VI and Mary Tudor (1551–1554), then to Henry II of France (1555–1558), to Ferdinand I (1559–1561), in Rome (1562–1565) and finally in Constantinople (1566–1568), an office of which he requested to be relieved in January 1568. He was ambassador extraordinary to Maximilian II in 1570, then to the Sublime Porte, in 1575 and 1582. He held other important offices: he was elected *savio di Terraferma* in 1558, captain of Brescia in 1562, and captain of Padua in 1568. He was made proveditor-general *da mare* in October 1571, and was taken prisoner in battle; he was released, however, and became procurator of San Marco on 12 July 1575. However, he fell into disgrace in 1584, and died in April 1599: Grendler, 'The leaders of the Venetian State, 1540–1609', pp. 75–76.

Clarissimo Signor mio osservantissimo,

Non ho voluto mancare con questa commodità scrivere questo pochi versi a Vostra Signoria Clarissima prima per farli riverenza et basarli le mani, appresso per darli aviso del prospero et felice viaggio che havemo havuto, che per gratia del Signor Idio in 29 giorni semo gionti tutti a salvamento in Cipro, dove havemo trovato un estremissimo caldo, alquale non possendo resistere dalli, a sei giorni dopoi che fu gionto cascai amalato, et son stato da otto giorni risentito in letto con un po di febre che quasi mi ha messo pensiero della mia vita, ma poi che mi feci cavar sangue, subito per gratia de Idio mi lasciò la febre et quantunque adesso mi sento bene, pur non mi sono anchora rihavuto et questi crudelissimi caldi molto mo travagliano. Et Vostra Signoria Clarissima sa che il desiderio di questi Illustrissimi Signori di mandarmi cqua¹ fu per il sospetto che havevano, acciò sendo venuta occasione io mi fussi trovato qui, et havesse fatto quel servizio che Vostra Signoria Clarissima et essi sperano da me, et quel ch' io sempre ho soluto far' nel servizio de gl'altri mei passati principi et signori, hora sendo di cqua non ci essendo occasione né sospetto nesciuno ci sto mal volontieri, et quel tanto ch' io ho da farci si spedirà in breve tempo, et non voria che questi Illustrissimi Signori mi facessero restare un'altra estate di cqua, perché sarei certo di perderci la vita, et Vostra Signoria Clarissima perderei un suo fidelissimo servitor'. Quando occasione vi fusse vi starei mille anni per servizio di noi altri mei signori, ma non ci essendo non voria restar di cqua con grandissimo pericolo della mia vita, sì che prego Vostra Signoria Clarissima et lo supplico che non comporti ch' io resti di cqua, et che procuri per ogni modo ch' io retorni in Italia, acciò occorendo occasione di lla io me ci possa trovare, et possa esser' di qualche beneficio a questo Serenissimo Stato, sapendo che Vostra Signoria Clarissima harei havuto a caro saper' in che termine si retrova la nova forteza de Nicosia.

Io ho cavalcato quattro o sei volte intorno di essa per dentro et per fora guandardo, et considerando molto bene ogni cosa per posser dar aviso a Vostra Signoria Clarissima della verità et per più assicurarmi, l'altra matina me ne andai, et con un spago con le mie mani mesurai l'alteza de tutti li baloardi, et incominciando dal Barbaro / [153^v] lo trovai esser' alto senza parapetto piedi numero 40. Il Loredano alto computando dui piedi di parapetto piedi numero 38. Il Flatro alto computando 2 piedi di parapetto piedi numero 37. Il Carrafa alto senza parapetto piedi numero 46 ½. Il Po da Cathero alto con parte del parapetto piedi numero 40. Il Costanzo alto senza parapetto piedi numero 37 ½. Il Davila alto senza parapetto piedi numero 38 ½. Il Tripoli alto senza parapetto piedi numero 39 ½. Il Rochas alto computando 3 piedi di parapetto piedi numero 46. Il Mula alto computando 2 piedi di parapetto piedi numero 38. Il Quirini alto senza parapetto piedi numero 35. Quali tutti son pieni di massizzo² da capo a bascio et tutti han tre canoniere per banda in li fianchi converte et molto bene intese. Le sue piazze ancho tutte piene et a l'ordine da impiantarci l'artellaria, le cortine che similmente sono XI. Sono de largheza over grosseza de passa alcune de 30 alcune 28, 27, 26, et il manco deve esser' da 25 passi. L'ordine del Illustrissimo Signor Giulio è che tutte giongano a 30 passi. L'alteza delle quelle no ho possuto mesurar' per non esser' fornite le

1 This is what appears in the manuscript. 2 Thickness; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v.

fronte di esse di plitte, ma sono secondo che di foravia cavalcando ho mesurato con l'ochio nel alteza delli baloardi sopradetti poco più o meno. L'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio ha atteso a compire li baloardi et incamisarli de plitte et alle cortine, ha atteso a metterci terra dentro di modo che habbiamo terra a sufficienza per quello potesse far' bisogno venendo occasione, e a mio parere se si desse una stretta secondo che fu fatto da i principij con 400 o 500 homeni per baloardo, in un mese se tiraria a perfectione di tutto quello che a questa forteza fa bisogno per opera di terra così parapetti como alteza et largheza. Ancho si è dato principio ad incamisar' di piera il baloardo Carrafa, et è fatta tutta una fronte et un fianco, et da 12 giorni in qua si è voltata la punta, et si è dato principio a l'altra fronte, dove si va lavorando allegramente, et spero che fra breve tempo sarà fornito.

Questi giorni passati, capitorno su l'isola 30 galere turchesche quale venivano d'Alexandria in le quale vi erano tre fano, et hebbero i suoi presenti et li fu fatto carezzi, et senza dismontar / [154^r] se n'andaro la volta de Scio, dove vi erano altre 35 o 40 galere con il bassa,³ per qualche si ha possuto intendere da essi, et non mi occorrendo altro, resto baciando le mani di Vostra Signoria Clarissima raccomandarmeli sempre, pregando il Signor li conceda lunga et felice vita.

In Nicosia a 24 giugno 1568.

Di Vostra Signoria Clarissima
Umilissimo servo de chore
Il capitano Lorenzo Badassin⁴

Al Clarissimo Signor il Signor Francesco Michieli suo servitor et padron sempre osservandissimo, Vinegia. Cipro Badassin. 1568 24 giugno.



104 *The Senate relieves G.S. of his duties in Cyprus, Venice, 21 August 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 90^v–91^r, copied from: id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 75, f. 111^r.

G.S. asked to be discharged from Cyprus in November; his agents have relayed his request, and the Senate feels that, in view of how much he has done for the Signoria, it is only right to grant it to him.

His replacement will be Astore Baglioni, currently the light cavalry general; Baglioni will go to Cyprus with the proveditor-general and, as did G.S., he will carry out the duties of governor-general and will have the final word on all fortification matters. G.S. may leave his post once Baglioni has arrived; the latter will bring with him 100 soldiers, and has been given money for his mission in advance.

³ Is this the visit of the Alexandria guard that Nicolò Dandolo is alluding to when he writes, on 19 September 1568, that the Ottoman officers were friendly? Cf. ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 274. ⁴ Already mentioned supra, doc. 65 n. 15, docs 74, 75, 84.

M.D.LXVIIJ a XXI d'agosto in Pregadi,

Dal Magnifico Conte Giulio Savorgnano Governator Generale della millitia del Regno nostro di Cipro fu richiesta licentia alla Signoria nostra di poter repatriare fino il mese di novembre passato, et facendo hora li agenti suoi la medesima instantia è cosa conveniente dargli questa honesta satisfatione, dapoï haver così utilmente et honoramente servita la Signoria nostra, sì come da molte mani di lettere di quei representanti nostri questo consiglio ha inteso. Et essendo necessario proveder in luogo suo di persona di auctorità et esperienza per ogni occasione, che potesse occorrere.

L'andera parte che al detto Magnifico Conte Giulio sia concessa licentia di venir a repatriare, dovendo esser mandato in luogo suo l'Illustre Signor Astor Baglione Generale nostro de leggieri, qual debba partir col Proveditor nostro Generale,¹ che anderà in quel Regno, et habbia il medesimo carrico et autorità di Governator Generale dell'isola, et di quella fortificatione che ha al presente il sopradetto Magnifico Conte Giulio, e gionto che sarà di là, il detto Illustre Signor Astor, debba esso conte Giulio venir a repatriare, habbia carrico di condur fanti cento per quella custodia, et li siano pagate X paghe doppie per poter far di quei servitij che li sono necessarij per il suo carrico, et massime per quella fortificatione, sì come vengono pagati al sopradetto Conte Giulio Savorgnano.

Julius Girardus Ducalis Notarius²




105 *Letter from the doge, Pietro Loredan, to Nicolò Dandolo and Francesco Barbaro, Venice, 26 August 1568*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 91^r.

The doge informs Luocotenente Nicolò Dandolo and Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro of the Senate's decision to allow G.S. to return to Italy, as soon as his successor, General Astore Baglioni, reaches Cyprus.

Petrus Lauredano, Dei gratia Dux Venetiarum etc. Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Nicolao Dandulo, de suo mandato locumtenenti et consiliarijs, nec non Francisco Barbaro Provisori nostro generali Cipri fidelibus dilectis salutem, et dilectionis affectum.

Havemo deliberato col Senato nostro a XXIX¹ del presente di concieder grata et buona licentia al Magnifico Conte Giulio Savorgnano Governator Generale della millitia di quel Regno di poter venir a repatriare, gionto che sarà di là l'Illustre Signor Astor Baglione Generale nostro

¹ Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro's successor was Lorenzo Bembo, who was elected the night before, on 20 August 1568; cf. supra, doc. 18 n. 1. ² The original version of reg. 75 of the Senate's *Deliberazioni* gives the result of the vote: *De parte 104 – De non 1 – Non sinceri 6*.  ¹ Probably an error on the part of the copyist, should read XXI August; cf. the date of the preceding document.

de leggieri, sì come vederete dalla copia della parte presa nel sodetto Senato, che vi mandamo qui occlusa. Però vi commetteremo che debbiare far saper la sopradetta nostra deliberatione al detto Magnifico Conte Giulio affermandole che noi da molta virtù et assidua diligentia con la quale egli s'è adoperato in quel Regno con tanto beneficio delle cose nostre, restamo grandamente satisfatti.

Data in nostro Ducali Palatio die 26 augusti indictione xi M.D.LXVIIIJ.

Nobilibus et sapientibus viris Nicolao Dandulo, de suo mandato locumtenenti et consiliarijs, nec non Francisco Barbaro Provisori nostro generali Cypri.



106 Letter from Marco Michiel to G.S., Venice, 4 October 1568

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 88^{r-v}.

Marco Michiel, now procurator of San Marco, writes of how overjoyed he is at G.S.'s amazing work in Cyprus, which has left the Signoria most satisfied. He also thanks G.S. for his letters, and is particularly happy to have learnt that Captain Paulo del Guasto has been appointed army governor in Cerines; Michiel has had the pleasure of meeting the captain, and has seen how talented a man he is.

Illustre Signor, prima con queste mie lettere voglio rallegrarmi seco delle honorate, degne et incredibili operatione che dalle virtù et valor suo sono, si può dire, nasciute, cresciute et sollevate nel Regno di Cipro con tanta lode della persona della Illustre Vostra Signoria, et con molta et grandissima sodisfattione de questo Serenissimo Dominio, che non si potria dir quanto gli siano state grate. Poi la voglio ringratiar delle lettere che la mi scrisse, con le sue carissime et dolcissime offerte, la terza è, che havendo voluto, chel Capitanio Paulo dal Guasto,¹ qual porta dignissimo nome di soldato, sia posto a custodia della fortezza de Cerines et al governo di quella militia, che dentro si ritrova questo fatto, mi è stato di grandissimo contento, perché io amo questo capitanio Paulo del Guasto, havendolo conosciuto in tutte le operationi et fattioni sue, dove mi son ritrovato io haver carico homo tale che sperarsi in / [88^v] ogni fattione de importantia haverne ottimo servitio. Voglio adunque anche io ringratiar di questa cosa la Illustre Signoria Vostra, et farle intender per sua contentezza che so che gli sarà cara, che io ne ho havuto grandissima consolatione, perché quando io vedo esaltar li homini che meritano, io sempre per beneficio di questo Stato ne ricevo grandissima allegrezza, et alla Illustre Signoria Vostra mi offero, et raccomando.

Da Venetia adi 4 ottobre 1568.

Affettuosissimo Marchio Michel Cavalier Procurator de San Marco.²

¹ A captain mentioned supra, doc. 65 n. 8. ² Concerning Marco Michiel, see supra, doc. 65 n. 10.

All'Illustre Conte Julio Savorgnano dignissimo Governator General nel Regno di Cipro quanto fratello honorandissimo. Cipro.



107 *List of the captains stationed in Cyprus, [Nicosia], October–December 1568*¹

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 105^r.

Capitani che sono nel Regno

Nicosia

Il Capitano Antonio d'Ascoli ²	150
Il Capitano Andrea del Sale ³	150
Il Capitano Francesco Lanzano ⁴	150
Il Capitan Antonio del Berettino ⁵	150
Il Capitan Pompeo Pochipanni ⁶	150
Il Capitan Lazaro Cocapan ⁷	150
Il Conte Alberto Scotto ⁸	150
Il Capitan Alessandro Poeta ⁹	150
Il Conte Germanico Savorgnano	100
summa	1300

Famagosta

Il Signor Governator Piasenza ¹⁰	numero 200
Il Signor Cavalier Hieronimo da Ugubio ¹¹	190
Il Signor Cavalier dalle Haste ¹²	100
Il Signor Cavalier da Pesaro ¹³	100

¹ This unsigned and undated document figures in the archive of letters addressed to Francesco Michiel, amongst a group of letters not placed in any chronological order. The list was definitely drawn up during the final trimester of 1568, as G.S. mentions the arrival of several of these captains in the letter he wrote on 11 September 1568; cf. supra, doc. 71. Furthermore, Paolo del Guasto is listed as governor of Cerines, which was a fairly recent promotion; cf. supra, doc. 104. However, Captain Orazio Martinengo was relieved of his duties on 21 September; cf. supra, doc. 73. ² Antonio d'Ascoli is mentioned supra, docs 65, 71. ³ Andrea del Sale is mentioned supra, docs 65, 71. ⁴ Francesco Lanzano is mentioned supra, docs 65, 71. ⁵ Antonio del Berettino is mentioned supra, docs 36, 88. ⁶ Pompeo Pocchipani is mentioned supra, doc. 65. ⁷ Lazaro Cocapan is mentioned supra, doc. 65. ⁸ Count Alberto Scotto is mentioned supra, doc. 65. ⁹ Alessandro Poeta is mentioned supra, doc. 47. ¹⁰ The Famagusta governor Piacenza is mentioned supra, doc. 76. ¹¹ Girolamo da Gubbio is mentioned supra, docs 62, 97. ¹² On 4 January 1567 the *cavalier* dalle Haste, who was serving in the Brescia guard, was ordered to Cyprus with 100 soldiers, to serve in the Famagusta guard: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 35, f. 41^v; id., *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 249^r, reg. 38, f. 29^v. ¹³ The *cavalier* Leonardi da Pesaro is mentioned supra, docs 66, 71, 76.

Il Conte Horatio Martinengo ¹⁴	100
Il Capitan Giovanni Battista Triomfi ¹⁵	100
Il Capitan Marco Crivelatore	100
Il Capitan Vincenzo Pamprega ¹⁶	100
	990
summa	
Cerines	
Il Signor Governator Paolo del Guasto ¹⁷	numero 80
Il Capitan Christoforo Fusar ¹⁸	numero 25
Il Capitan Conforto Franco	numero 25
	130
summa	
summa in tutto	2420

Capitani che sono nel Regno]



108 *Letter from Luocotenente Nicolò Dandolo to Francesco Michiel, Nicosia, 10 January 1569*

ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini* 4, f. 103^r.

Luocotenente *Nicolò Dandolo underlines that Nicosia may now be considered one of the world's greatest and most beautiful fortified cities, unequalled anywhere else; this was only to be expected from a fortress designed by G.S. He received a letter written on 27 August [1567] telling him of how satisfied the Signoria was to see that work had been finished. He is awaiting the arrival of the new proveditor-general [Lorenzo Bembo] and of Astore Baglioni.*

Molto Magnifico come fratello,

Per altre mie scritte a Vostra Magnificentia, gli dissi in che termine si trovava questa fortezza et che, per mio parere, questa era una delle belle et forte città che hoggi di fosse al mondo, et certo altro aspettar non si poteva essendo sta fondata dall'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano in questa professione, et sia detto con pace di ciascuno, unico et senza pari al mondo. Hora trovandomi questa sua de 27 agosto, per la qual la mi scrive che le nostre lettere fono gratissime a Sua Serenità per la buona diligenza che usanno de qui nel metter in somma perffettione questa fortezza, io di ciò ne ho sentito sodisfacione grandissima, et così mediante l'agiuto del Signor Dio non habbiamo mancato, et non mancamo di far ogni forzo.

¹⁴ Orazio Martinengo is mentioned supra, doc. 73. ¹⁵ Giovanni Battista Triomphi, from Ancona, was sent to Cyprus by a Senate decision of 15 May 1567, to replace Captain Lunardo Regolini: ASV, *Collegio*, Notatorio, reg. 36, f. 164^{r-v}. ¹⁶ On 4 January 1567 Vincenzo Pamprega, who was serving in Cythera, was ordered to Cyprus with 100 soldiers: ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 37, f. 249^r. ¹⁷ Paolo del Guasto is mentioned supra, docs 65, 104. ¹⁸ Christoforo Fusar is mentioned supra, doc. 74.

Stiamo in espettazione dil novo Clarissimo Proveditor General,¹ et dell'Illustrissimo Signor Astor,² qualli sono Signori honorati, et spero che anchor essi non mancarano al debito loro. Et con questo facendo fine, alla Maestà Vostra mi raccomando et offro, preghando il Signor Dio che li doni la sua gratia.

Di Nicosia a X zenaro M.D.LXVIIJ.³

Nicolò Dandolo Luogotenente dil Regno di Cipro

Al molto Magnifico messer Francesco Michiel fo del Clarissimo messer Niccolò quondam Francesco, Venetia. 1569 15 april. Messer Nicolò Dandolo locotenente di Cipro.




109 *Letter from the Constantinople bailo Marc'Antonio Barbaro to G.S., Pera, 18 April 1569*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 94^v.

The bailo writes of how satisfied he was to read the letter that G.S. wrote to him on 7 March, a progress report on the fortification of Nicosia; he congratulates G.S. on what a success this fortress, built rapidly and cheaply, has come to be. The bailo hopes that this letter will find G.S. getting ready to leave for Venice, and expresses his delight at G.S.'s imminent return.

Molto Magnifico et Illustre Signor mio honorissimo,

Con mia grandissima satisfatione et contento ho letto la lettera che Vostra Signoria mi ha scritto alli 7 di marzo et tanto più, quanto particolarmente la mi ha informato del essere nelquale, con la sua diligentia et opera è ridutta quella fortezza, et veramente se ben molto tempo era ch' io conosceva il suo valore, et che l'operationi sue erino degne di qual si voglia cavaliere, voglio con verità confessare che dal veder il gran progresso che si è fatto costi nel fortificare con il mezo suo, et in sì puocho tempo, et con sì puocha spesa, et con sì gran satisfatione di tutti che ne ragionano, io non habbia maggiormente havuto cognitione di quello che per avanti non mi persuadevo che potesse esser più di quanto vedevo. Io me ne ralegro dunque con Vostra Signoria infinitamente et tanto più, quanto che spero che al gionger di queste presenti mei, la sarà insieme con il Clarissimo Proveditore¹ su il partire, havendo per ultime lettere di Venetia hauto che il Clarissimo Bembo partirebbe fra pochi giorni, essendo sicuro che la ripatriarà con tanto suo honore et con tanta satisfatione di quel Serenissimo Dominio, quanto la possa desiderare, il che essendomi di summa consolatione di nuovo con tutto il core, mene voglio seco ralegrare, et non dovendo per altro fine servire faroli

1 Lorenzo Bembo; cf. supra, doc. 18 n. 1. 2 Astore Baglioni; cf. supra, doc. 4 n. 3. 3 This is the date according to the Venetian calendar; conventionally, it was 10 January 1569.  1 Francesco Barbaro; cf. supra, doc. 18 n. 2.

le mie raccomandationi, pregando nostro Signore che li dia ogni felicità et honorevolezza, sì come richiedeno le sue honorate qualità.

In Pera il giorno XVIIJ di aprile 1569.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrre come fratello
Marc' Antonio Barbaro Bailo²

Al molto Magnifico et Illustrre Signor mio honorandissimo il Signor Giulio Savorgnano dignissimo Governatore di Cipro. Nicossia.



110 *Letter from the count of Rochas, Eugenio Singlitico, to G.S., Venice, 24 April 1569*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, f. 95^r.

The count of Rochas tells G.S. how much pleasure he has taken in reading his letters again and again; he can answer him only by thanking him for speaking in his favour before the rettori. Holding G.S. ever dear, the count remains indebted to him and, reiterating the offers he made to G.S. in person, offers to serve him in any way he can, using his powers in Cyprus and those of his brothers.

Illustrissimo Signor mio osservandissimo,

Dalle gratissime sue ho inteso quanto mi scrive, et con¹ supremo piacer mio le ho lette et rilette come frutti ch'escono dal fertile et cortese animo suo, onde non sapendo io con ch'altro corrispondere per hora all'amorevolezza sua, ho voluto almen con questa fargli reverentia, et ringratiarla quanto debbo della memoria tiene di me, et de gl' honorati officij che gli è piaciuto fare presso questi Signori Eccellentissimi a favor mio, intorno a che non m'estenderò a dirgli altro, se non che tutto ascrivo, non ad alcun merito mio che so non convenirsi, ma sì bene alla molta affettione di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima bontà sua, mi porta che gli presenta assai più di quello che è in me, ma qual son resti sicura che non cedo a qual si voglia che desideri fargli servitio, essendo in me una immensa volontà che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima sappia che io son d'esser gli grandamente tenuto, et che chara mi sarà sempre ogni occasione di servirla, io la sto aspettando con summo desiderio, et prego il Signor Iddio che la riconduca prospera, et felicemente a consolation mia, non restando di dirgli che s'avanti la partita sua di là, conosce che le cose mie o de Signori mei fratelli² gli possono esser di servitio

² Mentioned supra, doc. 91. ¹ *piacer* crossed out after *con*. ² Count Giacomo Singlitico is believed to have had ten children from his marriage with Helena Podocataro: aside from Eugenio, and five sisters, sources mention Tommaso, Girolamo, Nicolò and Matteo: Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, p. 313; Arbel, 'Greek magnates in Venetian Cyprus', p. 332.

verano, voglia valersene liberamente et con quel affetto ch'a bocca gli furon da me offerte, et hora consacrate per via di questa, che tutto riputarò per giunta de segnalati favori provenuti dalla molta cortesia sua in me, et signori mei fratelli, diedi fido ricapito alle vostre ch'ella mi mandò, et con tal fine gli bascio le mani raccomandandomi a sua bona gratia.

Di Venetia li 24 d'aprile 1569.

Di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima Affettuosissimo servitor
Il Conte di Rochas

All'Illustrissimo Signor il Signor Giulio Savorgnano Conte di Belgrado Governator generale dignissimo del Regno di Cipro Signor mio osservandissimo. Cipro.



111 *Letter from Luocotenente Nicolò Dandolo and the Cyprus councillors to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 5 May 1569*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 95^{r-v}; id., *Senato*, Dispacci di rettori, Cipro, b. 4.

After two years spent working in Cyprus, G.S. is preparing to leave the island; he has finished one of the city gates next to the Caraffa bastion, which has amazed everybody, as have all his other works that appear on the drawing he is leaving for his successor. Now that he is leaving, the luocotenente and the councillors want to have him publicly praised; the Venetian officers returning to Italy will vouch for his talents. The capital now secure, the island's inhabitants are optimistic about their future under Venetian rule, and thank God that the Signoria sent them G.S., whose departure is a cause of sadness for all.

Serenissimo Principe,

L'Illustre Signor Giulio Savorgnano, doppoi le degne et incomparabili operationi soe intorno a questa fortificatione, et le fatiche insopportabili sostenute nel corso di questi dui anni, dellequali operationi per i tempi è stata data noticia alla Serenità Vostra, et doppo anco lo haver fatto diricciar et finire una delle porte della città a canto dil belloardo Caraffa, dal cui magisterio vi nascono veramente stupor et meraviglia, et il far di quell'altre fabriche, ch'ella intenderà et vederà sopral dissegno, per lassar più forma et più facile essemplio nel continuar al suo illustre successore. Partendo di presenti da questo Regno mediante la grata et benigna licentia della Sublimità Vostra, haveressimo voluto con tal occasione diffonderci per sodisfattione dil nostro obligo in laude et giusta essaltatione di Soa Signoria Illustra con quel fervore, et con quella maniera che ben convengono ad'attioni così segnalate et singolari, havendo Soa Signoria nel ordinar dato saggio di suo sublime intelletto nel far eseguir somma diligentia et nel far spender il danaro, quel avvertimento per l'avantaggio publico che si potesse desiderar maggiore, et lo faressimo con larga mano quando non ci corresse sicurtà, che il Clarissimo Barbaro stato qua Proveditor General, et gl'altri rapresentanti, che ritornano

informatissimi dil fatto per repatriare, sieno per far con viva voce officio, così efficace et così ardente che corrisponda al merito delle virtù et dil valor di Soa Signoria Illustra presso la Clarissima Vostra, le presenti però saranno non per altro che per sola espressione di questa intentione nostra, et della molta sodisfattione che ci resta dil suo procedere, et dell' amorevolezza insieme, che di già si è veduta et vi si scopre via più impressa negl'animi generalmente di tutti di esso Regno, iquali havendo hora la certezza della sicurtà in ogni caso adverso propria della posterità et facultà loro, alciano con grande affetto gl'occhi al cielo et pregano per il mantenimento perpetuo di quell'inclito Dominio auttore per Divina Spiratione di tanto bene, et con altro tanto affetto rendono gratie a Soa / [95v] Maestà che alla Sublimità Vostra habbi posto inanci per essecutore uno soggetto tale, quale è esso Illustra Signor Giulio, della partenza delquale così tutti danno segno di mestitia, come che fosse voluto et desiderato più a lungo il dimorar suo in questa opera di fortificatione. Raccommandomi humilmente in buona gratia della Sublimità Vostra.

Di Nicossia li 5 di maggio 1569.

Nicolò Dandolo Luogotenente et li consiglieri dil Regno di Cipro
 Marcus de Blanchis Notarius cancellarie
 Clarissimi Rettoris Cypri mandato

Seconda lettera al Serenissimo nel ultimo partir mio di Nicossia scritta dalli Rettori.



112 *Letter from the regimento and the proveditor-general to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 6 May 1569*

ASV, *Materie Mistre Notabili* 11, f. 95^v.

The doge is informed of the departure, this same day, of Proveditor Francesco Barbaro and G.S., who have been accompanied by the università and Nicosia's entire population, all come to honour them. Francesco de Nores, the università procurator, gave a praise-filled speech thanking Venice for the fortification of the island, and two other procurators presented the city's standard to each of the two officers. This ceremony shows the level of unity that has been achieved on the island these last few months, which must be recognized.

Serenissimo Principe,

Facendo hoggi partenza dalla città per condurvisi a nave il Clarissimo Proveditor Barbaro et l' Illustra Signor Giulio Savorgnano, questa Magnifica Università, cittadini et popolo come che si sentivano obligati alle operationi loro valorose et utili, perciò et per quella devotione che hanno mantenuto sempre verso la Serenità Vostra, furono con tanto concorso ad accompagnare et honorarli, che con tal prontezza insieme diedero espressione della molta

fede loro, et per segno più evidente et chiaro, supperando questa fiata, et in questa nova occasione ogni ordinario de gl'altri tempi. Il Signor Francesco de Nores¹ fratello del Signor Conte de Tripoli, uno de 3 Procuratori di essa Magnifica Università, recitò al conspetto nostro una oratione nel suo soggetto assai ingeniosa et bella, et tutta voltata a ringratiar quel Serenissimo Dominio per li felici successi della fortificatione, et li dui altri Magnifici Procuratori, uno per mano sostenendo dui stendardi sontuosissimi fatti fare a spesa loro, presentarono l'uno al Clarissimo Barbaro Proveditore, et l'altro al Illustre Signor Giulio² come a representanti, et in vece della celsitudine vostra et per memoria ancora delle virtù loro non senza spargimento di lacrime in quest'alto a ponto. Noi veramente da sì fatta dimostrazione et più dalla unione che per così lungi mesi ci è interessa, in ogni occorrenza publica et particolar, et così dal merito della diligentia d'ambi dui, essendo eccitati, non havemo voluto restar di fare l'officio che facemo, con queste brevi presso la Serenità Vostra et raccomandarle humilmente, non ne dicendo altro circa il stato di questa fabrica, ma ci reportiamo a quanto refferiranno li sopradetti dui Signori.

Alli 6 maggio 1569.

Nicolò Dandolo Logotenente, Lorenzo Bembo Proveditor General,
et Consiglieri del Regno di Cypro.³

Prima lettera al Serenissimo nel ultimo partir mio de Nicosia scritta dalli Rettori.



113 *Letter from the regimento and the proveditor-general to the doge, Pietro Loredan, Nicosia, 14 August 1569*

ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 95^v–96^r.

News from Constantinople received in late June told of forces being gathered in Caramania, which put Venetian officers in Nicosia on their guard; seeing as the Gradeniga, the ship aboard which G.S. had set sail for Venice, was stuck in Limassol, they asked G.S. to return to his post. G.S. did not hesitate, and despite the heat he returned to the island on the morning of 2 August to hear the latest news; he declared that he was ready to give his life for Venice like his ancestors

1 Francesco de Nores, brother of Count Giacomo, is believed to have held ecclesiastical offices at the beginning of his career: he was archdeacon in Paphos in 1547, and then canon at the Nicosia cathedral in 1551. However, he switched to the secular sphere, and was killed fighting in the Nicosia fortress in September 1570 in command of a company of soldiers: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Familles chypriotes apparentées', p. 49. 2 G.S. kept this flag all his life, as he left it to Orazio Governa in his will on 19 January 1595: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 150^v. 3 The two councillors are Piero Pisani, *di Benedetto* – Piero was elected on 18 July 1568 and took office on 8 May 1569 – and Marc'Antonio di Priuli, *di Andrea* – Marc'Antonio was elected on 31 October 1568 and took office on 17 April 1569: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Elezioni, Maggior Consilio, reg. 4, ff. 183^v–184^r.

did, and like he has done continuously for over forty-three years. Given that Astore Baglioni was in Nicosia, he proposed that he go to Cerines or Limassol, an appreciated gesture. When the news of preparations in Karaman turned out to be false, G.S. was once more discharged and offered a new journey home to Italy aboard the Cypriota; he would have been sent to Famagusta had the captain of Famagusta needed him.

Serenissimo Principe,

Per li avisi che havessimo ultimamente da Constantinopoli, et per la relatione di quel cernicoto,¹ che parlava di cavalli sopra la Caramania havuta li ultimi giorni di luglio et mandata in copia alla Serenità Vostra, parendoci che così sia bene et per consiglio, et per quel servitio che ci fusse potuto bisognare, chiamassimo all' hora con nostre lettere qui il Signor Conte Giulio Savorgnano da Limissò,² ove per un mese inanci era smontato dalla nave Gradoniga con assai di soi amalati, et principalmente el Conte Germanico suo nepote di male d'importanza che poi si è rihavuto,³ sopra laqual nave era stato pocho meno di dui altri mesi per i tempi, et sì come Sua Signoria abonda in pron-/ [96^r] tezza, et in ogni altra qualità, così superando la longhezza del camino et li caldi eccessivi, in diligentia vi si condusse alli 2 del corrente la matina et comparse dinanci noi, essendovi presente l' Illustre Signor Astor, dalquale et da tutta questa nobiltà, et altri è stato veduto allegramente, et doppo che hebbe inteso quanto tenivimo di novo, disse che come obedientissimo servitor di questo Stato era pronto di ponere la vità soa in ogni sorte di pericolo, sì come hanno fatto i soi antecessori et lui medesimo nel spacio di quaranta tre et più anni, et che essendo esso Signor Astor Governator Generale, nel loco che Soa Signoria haverebbe a stare per il carico, et per il suo molto valor, non vi era bisogno dil suo aiuto né consiglio, ma che egli andrebbe in quel altro loco che ci piacesse mandarlo per servitio di Vostra Serenità et lo farebbe molto voluntieri, se ben fosse Cerines o Limissò per dir le sue formal parole; lo laudassimo con quella efficacia et affettione, che conveniva della prontezza soa, et fra tanto essendoci sopraionta l'altra relatione che revocava la prima di cavalli nella Caramania, con nostra buona licentia egli Signor Giulio è ritornato per imbarcarsi sopra la presente nave Cypriota, et lo dinotiamo alla Serenità Vostra con agiongerli che noi, se fosse occorso bisogno, havevimo animo di mandarlo a Famagosta per recchiesta, che ci havea fatto il Clarissimo Capitano. Raccomandandoci humilmente alla buona gratia della Serenità Vostra.

Di Nicossia 14 d'agosto 1569.

Nicolò Dandolo Logotenente, Lorenzo Bembo Proveditor General,
et Conseglieri del Regno di Cypro

Terza lettera al Serenissimo nel ultimo partir mio de Nicossia scritta dalli Rettori.

¹ This must be an error on the part of the copyist, and should most probably read *Cerignoto* (an inhabitant of Cerines). ² Orazio Governa's diary explains that the ship G.S. had left on departed from Salina on 9 May and, after several mishaps, returned to Limassol on 26 July. It is confirmed infra, doc. 115, that G.S. went to Nicosia on 2 August. ³ *sopub* crossed out after *rihavuto*.

114 *Accounting documents concerning the donations made to the fortification of Nicosia, Venice, 1567–1573*CMC, *cod. P.D. C 2669/4A*, ff. 21^r, 72^r, 74^r.

The three documents come from a file concerning a financial litigation which took place some time after 1570 between members of the Cornaro family who owned property in Cyprus. The first document, which follows our document 83 and was attached to letters dated 11 December 1567, is a projected statement of the Venetian nobility's contributions to the fortification of Nicosia, copied in Venice by Alvise Garzoni. The two other documents are acknowledgements of payments from the università of the tax on fortifications; they were written in Venice on 1 June and 7 August 1573.

[21^r]

Nota di quelli che hanno offerto nell'Eccellentissimo Collegio a contribuir per la fortificatione di Nicosia

Ser Zorzi Contarini ¹ conte del Zaffo in dui anni	ducati 1 200
Ser Nicolò Giustinian ² conte di Carpasso da poi la morte di Madonna Cherubina Rechesens ³ sua ameda ⁴ di età di anni 80 a ducati 1500 all'anno	ducati 10 000
Ser Marco Antonio Corner et fratelli quondam Zuane ⁵	ducati 800

1 Giorgio Contarini, *di Tomaso* (count of Jaffa) and Helena Malipiero, was born in 1531 and was vested in his father's estates in December 1560. He was first married to Elisabetta Priuli, *di Giovanni*, in 1559; then to Laura Vendramin, *di Bertolo*, in 1564; and finally to Marietta Contarini, *di Francesco*, and the widow of Alvise Priuli, who was procurator of San Marco in 1572. Giorgio died in Italy in 1573: Étienne de Lusignan, *Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre, Armenie & lieux circonvoisins*, Paris, Robert Fouet, 1613, f. 50^r; L. de Mas Latrie, 'Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du XII^e au XIX^e siècle', *Revue des questions historiques* (July 1879), pp. 38–39.

2 Nicolò Giustiniani, *di Leo*, married Nicolò Benetti's daughter; they lived in Venice with their children some time after 1570: Étienne de Lusignan, *Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, f. 61^r; Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, p. 262.

3 Cherubina d'Acre married Calceran Requesens, who was made seneschal by James II; they bore a daughter, Melisina, who went on to marry Eugenio Singlitico. On an icon of the Virgin in the church of Chrysopantanassa in Palaichori, Cherubina's name is given as the donator: Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, p. 467; Grivaud, 'Παλαϊχώρι / Palaichori', pp. 46–47. Concerning the Acre family in the fifteenth century, see Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, p. 203.

4 Aunt; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. *amia*.

5 Giovanni Corner, from the San Polo branch of the family, was the nephew of Queen Caterina Cornaro; he married Alvise Priuli's daughter Adriana, and together they bore four daughters and five sons: Francesco Maria (1525–1570), who stayed in Cyprus to take care of his brothers; Alvise (1517–1584), who was the abbot of Saint John of Montfort in 1524, a member of the grand hospitaller commandery in 1527, and cardinal in 1551; Marc'Antonio Corner (1520–1571), who lived in Cyprus and married the count of Jaffa's daughter, Cecilia Contarini, worked with his parents in estate administration from 1567 to 1570, and was the only one of the children to build a family; the two other brothers were Giorgio (1524–1579) and Federico Maria (1531–1590). The brothers mostly administered their Cypriot estates via the *fraterna* system: AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 13 nos 16–17, b. 15

Ser Zorzi Corner quondam Giacomo procurator ⁶	ducati 480
Ser Lorenzo Giustinian quondam Leonardo ⁷ per ser Leonardo suo figliolo	ducati 800

a pagar del 1568

Signor Zorzi	} quondam Giovanni	ducati 800
Signor Marco fratello di Antonio ⁸		
Ser Francesco Corner et nepoti quondam Fantin ⁹		ducati 748
Dona Marieta relitta del quondam Philippo Corner ¹⁰ in anni tre principiando del 1569		ducati 1000
Il cardinal Cornaro ¹¹ con un poco di tempo		ducati 1500
Il Reverendo Domino Francesco Contarini vescovo di Baffo ¹²		ducati 800

In dui anni dapoi pagati li ducati 840 che li suoi agenti pagano in Cipro

no. 56, b. 17, nos 70, 79, 87; CMC, *cod. P.D. C 2669 / A*, ff. 48^r, 55^r; G. Liberali, *Le «dinastie ecclesiastiche» nei Cornaro della Chà Grande*, Treviso 1971, pp. 10–11 and *passim*; B. Arbel, 'A royal family in republican Venice: The Cypriot legacy of the *Corner della Regina*', *Studi Veneziani* n.s. 15 (1988), pp. 141–146; id., 'The reign of Caterina Corner (1473–1489) as a family affair', *Studi Veneziani* n.s. 26 (1993), pp. 82, 86–87; M. Gaier, 'Falconetto – Palladio – Contin. Tentativi di erigere un monumento alla regina nella Repubblica di Venezia', in C. Syndikus / S. Rogge (eds), *Caterina Cornaro. Last Queen of Cyprus and Daughter of Venice / Ultima regina di Cipro e figlia di Venezia*, Münster 2013, pp. 91–92. 6 Zorzi Corner / Cornaro, *di Giacomo* – who was procurator of San Marco (†1542) –, from the San Maurizio branch of the family, inherited several Cypriot estates from his father; although Zorzi's life and work is not well documented, it is known that his father rented some of his villages to Eugenio Singlitico in December 1536, and that in the early 1560s he worked with other members of the Cornaro family in property administration; however, sometime after 1570 he went into litigation with these family members: Venice, AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, filza 36 n. 2; CMC, *cod. P.D. C 2669 / 4A*, ff. 2^r, 3^v, 23^{r-v}; Arbel, 'The reign of Caterina Corner', appendix. 7 It has not been possible to identify Lorenzo Giustinian, *di Leonardo*, and father of another Leonardo, who belonged to a many-branched Venetian family renowned amongst Cyprus's noble households, and held the title of count of Carpasso: Étienne de Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, ff. 37^r, 83^r, and *Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, ff. 60^v–61^v; Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 498–499, 531; Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, pp. 261–262; Grivaud / Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', p. 189. 8 This branch of the Cornaro family seemingly belongs to a distinct branch of the Corner family, bearing no apparent relation to those mentioned in notes 5, 6 and 9. 9 Francesco Corner came from the Corner Piscopia branch of the family, which had been in Cyprus since the 1360s. Fantin Corner and his brother Gabriel, *di Girolamo*, worked their Cyprus estates as a *fraterna*, which their children also appear to have adopted. Concerning the Corner Piscopias: Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 3, pp. 815–817; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 2, pp. 148–149 no. 69, pp. 160–161 no. 76, vol. 3, pp. 68–69 no. 24, vol. 4, pp. 194–195 no. 94; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, "Il zardin della regina", pp. 221–223. 10 Marietta was already the widow of Piero Corner, son of Marc'Antonio and not of Philippo Corner, in a contract dated 9 April 1561: AMPM, *Archivio Cornaro*, b. 16, no. 46; Cavazzana Romanelli / Grivaud, "Il zardin della regina", pp. 221–222. 11 Alvise Cornaro, *di Giovanni*, from the San Polo branch of the family, cf. *supra*, doc. 5, was born on 12 February 1517, and studied law in Padua before travelling to the Holy Sepulchre and frequenting the courts of Charles V and Henry II. He became a knight of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, and also grand prior of the Cyprus commandery, an office which he passed on to his brother Federico. He was ordained cardinal on 20 November 1551, and became archbishop of Zara in June 1554. He was a key supporter of the pope's reforms and of the Holy League created in 1570. He died in Rome on 10 May 1584: P. Frasson, 'Alvise Cornaro', *DBI*, vol. 29, pp. 146–149. 12 Francesco Contarini, bishop of Paphos, was praised by Proveditor-General Ber-

In lettere scritte per pregadi alli 11 di dicembre del 1567, il reggimento di Cipro et [rettori?] et per una informatione qui occlusa, vi mandamo la suma di quelli che sono / [21v] di qui et hanno beni nel Regno et hanno fatto offerte di danari per conto di quella fortificatione, oltre però quello che sono stati tassati di lì, et vi comandamo col detta scrittura che dobbiate far debitar cadauno di loro in quella camera del denaro per loro offerto, et procurar che sia fatta la¹³ sodisfattione alli tempi debiti come li sopradetti signori hanno affermato haver dato ordine alli suoi comessi che si faccia, avvertando che quelli danari et tutti li altri offerti per questo officio, non volemo che siano per alcune spese ni alcuna altra cosa che in detta fortificatione, et che di essi non sia tenuto conto a parte.

[72^r]

1573 adi primo zugno in Venetia

Faciamo fede noi che, qui sottoscriveremo qualmente con ogni diligentia, si scodeva in Cipro la tansa delli ducati sessantacinque milia che fu posta del anno 1567 per la fortification della città di Nicosia, et per quello che pubblicamente si diceva detta tansa da tutti è stata pagata et satisfatta eccetto pocchissima parte della quale restorono debitori persone molto miserabili, che non havevano il modo di pagare.

Io Tutio Costanzo¹⁴ facio fedde come è la verità quanto di sopra si contiene.

Io Zuan Mistachiel¹⁵ facio fede come è la verità quanto di sopra si contien.

Io Antonello Dicressi¹⁶ facio fedde come è la verità quanto di sopra si contiene.

Io Zuan Francesco Buon' Haver¹⁷ già sopramasser Nicossia faccio fedde quanto in questa scrittura si contiene.

nardo Sagredo in 1564 for the pastoral work he did in his diocese: Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', p. 96; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, p. 110. He was back in Cyprus in summer 1569, and is most well known for his bravery during the summer of 1570 siege of Nicosia. He was taken prisoner in the assault of 9 September, and must have quickly been bought out of servitude whilst still in Cyprus, as he went to Rome in April 1571: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 153*, f. 199^r; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 952–953; Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 62–63, 67, 82, 135; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', p. 26; Coumariou, *Ενημερωτικά δοτικά φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 108. ¹³ *fortificatione* crossed out. ¹⁴ Tuzio Costanzo, most probably the man mentioned supra, doc. 85 n. 11. ¹⁵ Zuan Mistachiel's position in a family of Syrian roots is not clear. The family can be traced back to the 1360s, and was around in Cyprus up until the end of the Venetian era; several of its members were taken prisoners by the Ottomans after 1570: Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, p. 150 n. 6; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Études de prosopographie', pp. 658–660; id., 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 70, 150–151. ¹⁶ Antonello Dicressi came from a family about which little is known. A Gualtier Dicressi, who leased taxes for the viscount, died in 1532; Nicolò and Antonio Dicressi were killed in Nicosia on 9 September 1570, whilst Angelo and his brother were still prisoners in 1574: ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispacci di rettori e altre cariche, b. 290, c. 150; Aristidou, *Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα της κυπριακής ιστορίας*, vol. 3, pp. 214–215 no. 108; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 72, 118–119. ¹⁷ Zuan Francesco Buon' Haver, who was in Famagusta when Ottoman troops landed in June 1570, was in Venice in December 1571; he came from a little-known family, several members

Io Roberto Cariotum¹⁸ facio fede come he la verità quanto di sopra si contiene.

Io Alvise Scebba¹⁹ facio fede.

Io Matheo Agapito²⁰ affirmo quanto di sopra.

Io Battista Cappa²¹ già coadiutor in cancelleria di Clarissimi Signori di Cypro confirmo quanto di sopra si contiene.

Io Mutio Costanzo²² facio fede.

[74^r]

1573 7 agosto

Faccio fede io Alvise Zaccaria²³ fo de messer Marco già raggionato della camera real de Cypro, come si è sempre usato in Cypro grandissima diligentia nel scuoder la tanssa che fu posta in qual Regno l'anno 1567 per la fortificazione della città di Nicossia, et tutti i cavalieri

of which served Venice; Luca Buonaver was a *secretaria* scribe in 1558: CMC, *cod. P. D. C 2669/4A*, f. 56^r; BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 183^r. **18** Roberto Cariotum came from a little-known family, mentioned at the end of James II's reign. A Marco Carioti was a feudatory in 1558; several members of the family were taken prisoners by the Ottomans after 1570: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VI 80 (5767)*, f. 183^v; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Études de prosopographie chypriote', p. 670; id., 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 58–59, 128–129, 146–147, 152–153 (where, in a letter dated 28 March 1589, Rubertus Cariotus is introduced as "nobilis Nicosiensis, patricius et feudatarius"). **19** Like Zuan Mistachiel, Alvise Scebba came from a family of Syrian roots, but his position therein is not clear; several members of the family were taken prisoners after 1570: Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, p. 184; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Études de prosopographie chypriote', pp. 661–663; id., 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 61, 142–143. **20** Doubtless a member of the Agapite family, which Étienne de Lusignan claims was of noble origins, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, f. 82^v. **21** Possibly should be linked to Georgius Coppa, a prisoner of the Turks in 1574/1575: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 114–115, 118–119. **22** Mutio Costanzo was the name of a Neopolitan galley captain who served James II and from 1461 onwards acquired titles, offices and estates in Cyprus; the man in our text was probably the son of Tutio Costanzo: Étienne de Lusignan, *Histoire générale des royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, f. 71^{r-v}; Rey, *Les Familles d'outre-mer de Du Cange*, pp. 664–665; Richard, *Le Livre des remembrances*, pp. 179, 214–215. **23** Probably Alvise Zaccaria, *di Marco*. Marco was a fiscal lawyer for the Cyprus camera, and in 1545/1546 was paid 70 ducats; he held this position until at least 1563, and arranged for the office to be passed on to his son Alvise after his death: ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti secrete, reg. 5, f. 150; ASV, *Consiglio dei Dieci*, Parti comuni, filza 40, c. 121 / II; ASV, *Capi dei Dieci*, Dispaçi di rettori e altre cariche, b. 289, c. 269–270, b. 290, c. 112; Zorzi, 'La relazione di Bernardo Sagredo', p. 101; F. Mavroïdi, 'Appalti e produzione a Cipro nel 500. Il caso della famiglia dei Paleologi', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* II (1982), pp. 229–231. About Marco it is also known that he was judged by the court of the Venice Inquisition in 1563; the investigation file describes him as a father of five sons, Andrea, Alvise, Giovanni Battista, Francesco and Paulo: P. Kitromilides, 'Βιβλία και ανάγνωση στη Λευκωσία. Η μαρτυρία της βιβλιοθήκης του Μάρκου Ζαχαρία', in Ch. Maltezos (ed.), *Κύπρος-Βενετία, κοινές ιστορικές τύχες*, Venice 2002, pp. 263–275; E. Chayes, 'Carriers, companions, accomplices. The Zaccaria network', in Arbel / Chayes / Hendrix (eds), *Cyprus and the Renaissance*, pp. 231–272; F. Ambrosini, 'Inquietudini religiose e intrecci familiari tra Cipro e Venezia nel secolo XVI', in Skoufari, *La Serenissima a Cipro*, pp. 29–33, 44–46. An Alvise Zacharia, most probably from another branch of the family or another family altogether, is mentioned as a prisoner in Constantinople: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Litterae hortatoriae*', pp. 57–58.

et gentilhuomini et altri d'onore eccetto alcuni miserabili hanno sempre pagato le sue porzioni di essa, et so che il signor Ugo Flatro ha fatto contar più volte danari in quella camera per questo conto, et credo certo che habbia pagato intieramente tutta la porcion di essa tansa, cossì per conto suo come per conto delli clarissimi Corneri, et cossì affermo esser la verità. Di 7 de agosto 1573 in Vinetia.

Io Alvise sopradetto



115 *Extracts from the diary of Orazio Governa, 1606*

BCJ, Fondo Joppi, *cod. 689c*, vol. III, document attached to the *Supplica del Capitan Horatio Governa da Pordenone*, 1606, s.f.¹

DIARIO DEL CAPITAN HORATIO GOVERNA²

1558 Io venni al servitio dell'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano il mese di luglio il giorno del Corpo di Christo.³

Alli 10 di settembre del detto mellesimo mancò la Signoria di Modena.⁴

Alli 21 del detto mese mancò l'Imperator Carlo V.⁵

1560 Fui scritto caval leggiero di Sua Signoria Illustrissima et si andò alla ricuperatione di Lore, terra occupata da Tedeschi sopra Attimis,⁶ et si andò anco del detto millesimo alla mostra del Barcon presso Cittadella sul Trivisano.

1561 Si fece la mostra general del Barcon, et de ditto millesimo de mese di luglio alli 25, si andò a Venetia per la consulta della fortification di Bergamo, et alli 31 del detto mese si andò

1 A note written by Vincenzo Joppi in 1860 explains: "Questa supplica e il consecutivo Diario di Horatio Governa furono da me trascritti dal vol. XXXIII dell'Otium Forojuliente di Monsignore Giandomenico Guerra, che li transcriveva il secolo decio to dall'Archivio Calcaterra di Grapignano, eredi della facoltà Governa". The pages given here are the unabridged text of the diary up to the year 1571. 2 The diary is preceded by a request for a payrise; therein, Orazio gives biographical details showing his close dependence on G.S. Born in 1546, Governa began to serve G.S. in 1558, and was enlisted as a soldier in the *Crovati* company. The rest of his career was spent at his master's side. He explains that his request comes after forty-eight years of serving Venice, including six in Palmanova; finally he points out that his brothers Lazaro (who was in the *lancie spezzate* of the collateral general, Singlitico) and Bonifacio (under the command of Colonel Scipio Piacenza, governor of Famagusta) died in Cyprus. 3 The copyist must have made a mistake with the month; in 1558 *Corpus Christi* was on Sunday 14 June. 4 Ercole II d'Este, duke of Ferrara and Modena, died on 3 October 1559. 5 Charles V died on 21 September 1558. 6 Lore/Loch, in Tyrol, and Attimis, in Friuli, marked the border area between Venice and the Holy Roman Emperor; G.S. was notably entrusted with the defence of Lore in September 1558: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 23^r.

a fortificarlo con l'Eccellentissimo Signor Sforza, Signor Giulio, Signor Hieronimo Martingeno et il Clusone, stando a detta fortezza sino li 30 decembrio del detto millesimo, et poi si vene a Venetia et fu cresciuto all'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio mio Signore la condotta di 100 huomini d'arme e la provigione de' ducati 1200, et d'aprile alli 4 si andò a Belgrado, et alli 7 di detto mese si tornò a Venetia, et alli 26 del detto s'imbarcassimo sopra la nave Ballanzeta sopra porto per Cipro. Di maggio di detto millesimo alli 18 arrivassimo alla Vallona, dove stessimo sino li 25, et alli 27 al Zante et si stete sino li 30.

Alli 9 del detto millesimo di zugno arrivassimo presso Saline in Cipro, et alli 13 a Nicosia, et alli 22 a Famagosta.

Alli 10 di luglio arrivassimo a Cerines.

Alli 18 agosto a Nicosia.

Alli 29 di settembre a Saline.

Alli 12 ottobre in nave per Candia.

1562 Alli 3 di novembrio a Girapetra sopra l'isola di Candia, et alli 25 di detto mese mi rappi il braccio dritto in viaggio, stando in Candia sino il 2 di luglio.

1563 A questa fortificatione disparata di Candia, et alli 2 del detto si andò alla Canea a quella fortificatione, et alli 14 si ritornò in Candia.

1564 Alli 12 di agosto fu un gran terremoto che si vedeva la cima delli campanielli quasi tocar terra, et di novembrio si montò in nave per Italia, stando in detta nave dalli 19 sin li 26, che non potessimo partire del porto per li cattivi tempi, dove si statto aspettar le galere sino li 4 april.

1565 S'imbarcassimo nel porto di Candia sopra la galera dell'Illustrissimo Signor Polo Nani. Alli 10 detto si arrivò alla Canea, stando fino alli 20, et poi si tornò a Rettimo, et poi alli 24 in Candia d'ordine di Sua Serenità per sospetto di guerra.

Et di mese di ottobre la Serenissima Signoria mandò a donar all'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio ducati 1000, stando a Candia sino a marzo 1566.

Adì 10 si montò in galera del Clarissimo Signor Polo Loredan, et alli 14 si arrivò alla Canea.

Alli 25 a Cerigo, alli 27 al Zante, et poi a Corfù.

Alli 3 aprile stando sino li 26, che si andò a Casopo.

Alli 29 alla Vallona paese del Turco.

Al primo maggio si arrivò a Budua, et alli 2 a Cattaro, et alli 5 a Ragusi, adì 7 a Lesina, alli 9 a Spalatro, alli 10 a Traù, alli 11 a Sebenico, alli 12 a Zara, alli 16 a Venetia, stando sino li 20 luglio di detto millesimo, et si tornò in Dalmatia con tanto honore quando l'armata turchesca venne in golfo a Lissa.

Adì 24 Sua Signoria Illustrissima arrivò a Zara Governator Generale della Dalmatia con 1600 ducati di provisione, di agosto si venne a Capodistria, adì 27 e 28 a Piran.

Adì primo settembre a Venetia sino li 24, che si venne a Belgrado in Friuli.

Adì 4 decembrio si torrò a Venetia, et alli 22 si torrò a Belgrado.

1567 Li primo di gennaro a Udene, alli 16 a Belgrado, alli 25 a Venetia.

Adì 14 febraro si toccò la prima paga per Corfù, et fatta vela alli 20.

Adì 3 marzo a Corfù sino li 16 aprile, che Sua Signoria mandò a donar all'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio ducati 500, et mandò l'Illustrissimo Signor Paulo Orsino con la galera Priula et Suriana a dar cambio al detto Illustrissimo Signor Giulio, acciò andasse alla fortificatione del Regno di Cipro come andò.

Adì 23 marzo a Cerigo, adì 25 alla Canea, alli 26 in Candia.

Adì 2 maggio alla Citia, alli 4 al cao San Sidero, alli 6 alla Fontana amorosa, et alli 8 a Cerines sul Regno di Candia,⁷ alli 10 a Nicosia, alli 24 a Famagosta, et alli 16 si tornò a Nicosia.

Adì primo giugno fu portata la prima cesta di terra dall'Illustrissimo e Reverendissimo arcivescovo Mocenigo ajutato da me, et cantò la messa solenne.

Adì 28 di settembre a Famagosta, adì primo ottobre a Nicosia.

1568 Adì 9 agosto l'armata turchesca de' 64 vele venne a Famagosta a spiar quella fortezza, dove era capitano di quella l'Illustrissimo Signor Marco Michel.

1569 Adì primo maggio a Potamia, alli 7 alle Saline, et alli 9 si montò in nave per Italia.

Alli 12 fatta vela, alli 13 a Limissò, alli 22 fatto vela, alli 30 la nave dette in terra a Capo delle Gatte verso ponente, et si stette 7 hore con la prova sopra uno scoglio, et miracolosamente a 24 hore fu liberata con l'arzane senza offesa alcuna.

Alli 17 giugno fossimo assaltati da Scirocco capitano della guardia di Alessandria con cinque galere sopra Baffo.⁸

Alli 9 luglio la guardia de Rodi con 5 galere in quell'istesso loco ne assaltò il giorno il usto (sic)⁹ della nave che eravamo sorti. Alli 14 detto si fece vela ritornando indietro a Limissò per causa della falla della nave che ardava a fondo, et alli 26 smontassimo di detta nave pur a Limissò.

Alli 2 agosto ritornassimo a Nicosia, chiamati da quel reggimento per sospetto dell'armata,¹⁰ et adì 8 si tornò a Limissò.

Adì 2 settembre si smontò in nave per Venetia,¹¹ adì 6 si fece vela, adì 10 dato fondi, adì

⁷ Probably should read *Cipro*. ⁸ Mehmet Culuk/Sirocco was the *beg* of Alexandria and commander of the Ottoman guard of the city; indeed, according to a letter dated 13 June 1569 from the *rettori* to the *bailo*, Marc'Antonio Barbaro, he was a menace to Venetian ships and captured several sailors. He took part in the blockade of the Famagusta harbour in the 1570/1571 war, and fought in Lepanto, where he was taken prisoner by Giovanni Contarini before being executed two months later: BNM, *cod. ital. cl. VII 390 (8872)*, f. 140^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 108 n. 110; M. Lesure, *Lépante. La crise de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris 1972, pp. 129–132, 152.

⁹ As Joppi points out, this is a strange spelling of *asta*, meaning the keel of a boat; cf. Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto veneziano*, s.v. ¹⁰ Cf. supra, doc. 112. ¹¹ He travelled with Francesco Barbaro on the *Giustiniana*,

13 fatto vela, adì 29 alla Sfachia, nell'isola di Candia, adì 22 ottubrio al Zante, sortì con grande fortuna arando a nave et rompendo li asti.¹²

Alli 6 novembrio fatto vela par la Zefalonia, et adì 28 per Venetia.

1570 Il primo marzo in Dalmatia con la fusta del Consiglio di X per sospetto dell'armata turca, alli 2 in Istria, alli 4 al Sansego, alli 7 a Zara.

Adì 13 giugno alli Levrosi, a Sebenico li 15, a Traù li 16, a Spalatro li 17, a Salona li 19, a Traù li 20, a Sebenico ed a Zara li 27, a Nona a Zara alli 29, a Nona alli 30.

Adì primo luglio a Zara, alli 5 a Provichio, alli 6 a Capocesta, alli 9 a Spalatro.

Alli 19 agosto a Sebenico, alli 24 a Zara.

Alli 7 ottubrio fu combattuto con doi mille cavalli hore 3, et noi non arrivamo 200 fanti et 170 cavalli, che con l'ajuto et favor dell'artiglieria fossimo superiori.

Alli 14 marzo a Sebenico, alli 17 a Brazza, alli 18 all'Almissa, alli 19 a Spalatro, alli 21 a Traù, alli 27 a Zara.

1571 adì 10 aprile la Serenissima Signoria mandò a donar all'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio ducati mille, essendo Governator Generale in Dalmatia.

[...]

according to the commander of the galley accompanying the ship: CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 153*, f. 199^r (the lieutenant's son's 1556 memories; this was a son of Marco Grimani or Alessandro Zorzi, appointed *sopracomito* by the Grand Council in 1564, at the age of twenty-two). ¹² Filippo Pigafetta tells an anecdote concerning the storm that hit the ship near Zakynthos, remembering that G.S. asked to be fastened to his seat: BAM, *R 125 sup.*, fasc. ff. 91^r–108^v, and inside f. 9^v.

NICOSIA AFTER NICOSIA

When in May 1569 Giulio Savorgnan relinquished the project he had been supervising for two years, the fortress which he left behind him was not entirely finished. The *Regno* capital was unquestionably protected by its new enceinte, but there was still work to be done before it could be called impregnable, to use the terminology of the time. Upon his departure, Giulio had to leave precise instructions for his successor, Astore Baglioni, and for the city governor, Leonardo Roncone, in order that they continue the project, as had been the procedure in Candia and Chania;¹ in the case of Nicosia, however, it is not wholly clear what Giulio recommended, aside from a few short indications scattered around the relevant documents. It is certain that Giulio advised Giovanni Sozomeno to structure the defence of the city by entrusting the military command of each bastion to the nobles who had overseen their construction; he also ordered a contingent of peasant militia (*cernide*) to be stationed at each bastion, with each of the city's *contrade* providing its own *cernide* contingent, the eleven *contrade* thus defending the eleven bastions.² The architect-soldier's return to Italy nevertheless robbed the project of its driving force, as was made evident in the leaving ceremony organized by the *università*'s members, wherein the realization of Giulio's unifying role was clear; the three eulogies written in his honour by Giovanni Podocataro, Paolo Flatro and the Carmelite friar Nicolò Robusto expressed the feeling of profound gratitude Nicosia's elite bore towards the man behind the work that had been done in their city, as Evangelia Skoufari underlines below.³

Savorgnan's absence was further accentuated by the departure of his closest assistants, such as Orazio Governa and Giulio's nephew, Germanico, who was captain of a company; both men relayed his ideas, his principles and his energy on the construction site. Other men were repatriated to Italy too, several officers reaching the end of their mandates on the island, Proveditor-General Francesco Barbaro, for example.⁴ The obligatory rotation of public duties within the Venetian administration saw positions of responsibility occupied by men of contrasting characters. For example, Astore Baglioni boasted, aside from his evident military talents, sound technical knowledge in the field of fortifications; furthermore, this was a military leader who held the rank of cavalry colonel and had reached one of the highest positions in the Venetian *Terraferma* army, but who also held strong religious beliefs, and envisaged establishing the Jesuit Order in Cyprus.⁵ Francesco Barbaro was succeeded by

1 Concerning Candia and Chania, see ASV, *Senato Mar*, reg. 36, ff. 188^v–189^r; id., *Senato*, Deliberazioni (Secreta), reg. 73, f. 110^v, and supra, p. 61. 2 Sagredo, *Istoria delle tre guerre*, pp. 307–308. It should be noted that the post-1570 literature contains numerous misunderstandings, the dividing up of defensive duties *contrade* by *contrade* being assimilated with the dividing up of workers in the construction of the enceinte. 3 Cf. infra, pp. 609–638. 4 Barbaro left Cyprus with G.S. in early May 1569. 5 BNM, *cod. it. cl. VII 224 (8309)*, p. 25; BAM, *cod.*

Lorenzo Bembo, who arrived in Cyprus on 26 April 1569; this officer, whose experience and military skills were beyond question, was also well schooled in the island's affairs, having served as captain of Famagusta in 1565.⁶ His sudden death on 1 January 1570 prompted a radical change, however, in the form of the momentary transferring of his duties to *Luocotenente* Nicolò Dandolo, an officer whose military career had been spent mostly in the navy, which hardly predisposed him to supervising a fortification project; moreover, the authority over troops of a man whose nickname was “pia cappa” seemed quite flimsy.⁷

The lack of determination amongst the officers who ruled over the island's military affairs seems to have been behind the incompleteness of work on Nicosia's fortress, if most of the criticisms voiced in the months following the fall of the city are to be believed.⁸ The delays suffered pertained to improvements that did not require any great financial investment, nor any large-scale manpower requisitions; one year after Savorgnan's departure, the parapet of the curtain linking the Caraffa and Podocataro bastions had yet to be completed, a fact well observed by Lala Mustafa Pasha, who had made up his mind to exploit this weakness by situating his cannon batteries in front of these bastions, in late July 1570. Faced with this emergency, it only took the Venetians two days to install a parapet; other work was also done, in order to ensure the protection of the men defending the enceinte.⁹ Moreover, portions of the moats from the old Lusignan fortress were not dug out well enough to leave a clear shot from the bastions, and the cunette, when not absent entirely at certain points, turned out not to be deep enough. Diffuse ruins, notably those of the Saint George of Mangana monastery, were not totally cleared from the surrounding areas of the new fortress, offering enemy arquebusiers heaven-sent cover; the glacis evidently did not fully perform its protective function.¹⁰

F 114 inf., no. 188, f. 377^{r-v}; Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, vol. 8, no. 352. 6 Concerning the career of Lorenzo Bembo, see *supra*, doc. 18 n. 1; Bembo's successor as proveditor-general was Sebastiano Venier, elected on 17 June 1570, which was too late for him to be able to reach the island: ASV, *Segretario alle voci*, Senato, reg. 4, f. 106^v; Grivaud, ‘*Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς*’, pp. 49, 128. 7 CMC, *cod. Donà dalle Rose 153*, f. 198^r (‘pia cappa’ [holy coat] is a play on words stigmatizing Dandolo's religious nature); BNM, *cod. it. cl. VII 224 (8309)*, p. 25; according to Bernardo Sagredo, Dandolo may have been granted this promotion thanks to the intervention of Andrea Badoer: Sagredo, *Istoria delle tre guerre*, p. 204; concerning Dandolo, see *supra*, doc. 30 n. 10. 8 ASV, *Capi di guerra*, b. 1, a letter from Astore Baglioni, dated 28 August 1569, gives a list of works to be done after G.S.'s departure. An inventory of later criticisms, with bibliographical references, is given in Grivaud, ‘*Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς*’, pp. 159–161. 9 Falier, *Due lettere*, f. 5^v; id., *Relazioni della presa di Nicosia*, ff. 7^r, 8^r; Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro*, pp. 9–10; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 54; according to Giovanni Sozomeno, transcribed by Bernardo Sagredo, Nicolò Dandolo delayed work as a cost-saving measure: Sagredo, *Istoria delle tre guerre*, pp. 307–308; further on, Sozomeno states that the announcement of the Ottoman armada's arrival instilled chaos in the Venetian camp: “si persero d'animo in modo che non sapevano che partite prendere, vedendosi la fortezza imperfetta, senza alcun cavalliero, senza alcuna traversa, senza la stradda coperta, senza la spianata, et quello che più importava senza soldati, senza capo d'autorità, et di valore, et con pochissime arme [...]”: *ibid.*, p. 310. 10 Falier, *Relazioni della presa di Nicosia*, f. 10^v; Pietro Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, pp. 50, 113 n. 180; Paolo Tiepolo, for his part, restates imprecise criticisms of the incomplete state of the fortress; see his *Guerra di Cipro*, pp. 30–31; Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro*, p. 10; CMC, *cod. Cicogna 3757*, p. 308.

These material imperfections paled somewhat in comparison to the deficiencies in troops and weaponry. Though supplies for the fortress were procured without difficulty thanks to the abundant harvests in 1569, Nicosia was lacking in soldiers, weapons and ammunition when Ottoman troops landed.¹¹ In the year following Savorgnan's departure to Venice, the Senate, split into two factions, procrastinated over the sending of troops, aware that they had to entrust the defence of the new enceinte to experienced men, but also anxious to avoid provoking the new sultan, and to spare the San Marco treasury from excessive spending. Consequently, in the year before the enemy attack, there was a succession of orders and counter-orders from Venice, if Bernardo Sagredo is to be believed; he claims that 1,000 Italian soldiers were sent to Cyprus in winter 1569, instead of the 4,000 initially planned. The reality seems to have been more nuanced, as a troop of 500 Italian soldiers bound for Nicosia's fortress arrived on 7 March 1570, followed by another 500-soldier contingent three weeks later, led by the collateral-general, Eugenio Singlitico; finally, a further 2,000 Italian soldiers set sail on 3 May, many of whom were weakened by illness, and whose commander, Girolamo Martinengo, died en route, off the coast of Corfu.¹²

According to the figures given by Zuan Falier, one of the most trustworthy sources on the subject, in the end the defence of Nicosia, in July 1570, rested on 1,570 Italian soldiers and 3,000 of the city's *cernide* militia; they were assisted by 2,600 men in the pay of the *reale* and a further 2,100 contracted soldiers in the pay of private individuals, which gave each bastion 840 men on average, some way short of Savorgnan's recommendation of 1,000 men, spearheaded at each bastion by a core of 300 experienced Italians. There were, certainly, around a thousand nobles on horseback fighting alongside these men, along with their men at arms, plus 500 mounted *stradioti* and 200 more on foot, but these soldiers, better prepared, were to be deployed first and foremost for sorties.¹³ The shortage of genuine war professionals was thus clear, most of the troops still being men who had never experienced the heat of battle. On top of these manpower deficiencies came the problem of supplying the fortress with weapons and cuirasses, there being only 4,000 arquebuses, pikes, lances and halberds available when troops were mobilized. There were even insufficiencies in the provision of cannonballs; starting on 10 July, after two weeks of firing, cast iron projectiles were rationed and stones used.¹⁴ Finally, the scarcity of coins, which had already caused tensions on the fortress construction site, became apparent anew, necessitating the striking of new billon coins to meet the needs of a siege economy.¹⁵

11 Falier, *Due lettere*, f. 3^v; Sagredo, *Istoria delle tre guerre*, pp. 307–308. 12 Ibid., pp. 203–204; A. Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, vol. 9 (26 marzo 1569 – 21 maggio 1571), no. 93; Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 50–51, 54. Orders and counter-orders were also usual in 1568: ASV, *Senato*, *Deliberazioni* (Secreta), reg. 75, ff. 80^v–81^r, 88^r–89^v, 91^r, 110^v. 13 Falier, *Relazioni della presa di Nicosia*, f. 6^r; Zuan Falier's figures are reproduced by Paolo Tiepolo, *Guerra di Cipro*, p. 26. Bartolomeo Sereno, for his part, gives lower figures for the number of troops in Nicosia: 2,500 Italian soldiers, 500 mounted feudatories and 500 *stradioti*: Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro*, pp. 54. For further estimates of troop numbers: Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 952–955; Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 153–154. 14 Falier, *Due lettere*, ff. 3^v, 4^v; id, *Relazioni della presa di Nicosia*, f. 13^r. 15 Id., *Due lettere*, f. 4^{r-v}; Valderio, *La guerra di*

This piling up of problems, pertaining to both construction and punctuality, called for quick and firm decision-making; however, the Venetian leadership's ineptness in defending Nicosia was condemned almost unanimously by direct observers of operations on the ground. San Marco's men were accused of being shamefully slow to admit the imminence of the enemy threat, and were also criticized for the material deficiencies on the fortress construction site in the months preceding the arrival of the Ottoman troops, the lack of coordination between officers in Nicosia and Famagusta, and the military incompetence when it came to launching sorties, repelling attacks and maintaining troop morale at crucial moments. The absence of experienced leaders in Nicosia was systematically underlined; in the Venetian camp, neither *Luocotenente* Dandolo, nor the *rettori*, nor the collateral-general, Eugenio Singlitico, nor the Cypriot leaders in charge of the bastions had any real experience in siege warfare or in how to resist troops as powerful as those of a great continental empire. As Bernardo Sagredo remarked, the task of defending Nicosia's fortress ultimately lay with civilians, whereas Famagusta's fortress was defended by genuine soldiers.¹⁶ The determination and coherence of Giulio Savorgnan's leadership was thus succeeded by hesitation and muddled responsibilities, which sapped the unity and cohesion of the Nicosian camp, creating conflicts from which Lala Mustafa Pasha tried to benefit on several occasions.¹⁷ In these conditions, the fortress could not put up any kind of dogged resistance; after six weeks of siege and intensive bombing, the city was taken following the Ottoman troops' fourth attack, on 9 September 1570.¹⁸

Designed to hold out for several months against a siege led by batteries of powerful cannons, Nicosia's fortress fell into enemy hands sooner than expected, as the Christian fleet which was supposed to bring aid to the besieged population assembled close to Crete very late on, in October.¹⁹ The strategy devised by Sforza Pallavicino and Giulio Savorgnan crumbled, proving unsuited to the scenario created by the mass arrival of armies capable of gathering 60,000 to 100,000 men outside Nicosia's enceinte and of keeping up fierce bombardments uninterrupted for several weeks. The tactics of the Ottoman camp were based upon an abundance of human and technical resources, and these tactics proved victorious; the island, excepting Famagusta, fell to the enemy in less than three months.²⁰ The Ottoman success illustrated the difference in the forces available to each side, which rendered void the principle of a bastioned fortress inaccessible from the sea.

Savorgnan's fortress consequently lost its intended defensive functions in the new Otto-

Cipro, pp. 48–49, 113 n. 174; concerning this wartime currency, see Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 803, 959; A. G. Pitsillides, 'The copper besant of 1570', *Numismatic Report* (1976), pp. 11–14; Michaelidou, 'Τὰ βενετικά νομίσματα', pp. 258–262; Michaelidou / Zapiti, *Νομίσματα της Κύπρου*, p. 203. 16 Falier, *Due lettere*, f. 4^r; id., *Relazioni della presa di Nicosia*, f. 27^r; Sagredo, *Istoria delle tre guerre*, pp. 307–309, 325, 327. 17 Valderio, *La guerra di Cipro*, p. 57; G. Grivaud, 'Une société en guerre. Chypre face à la conquête ottomane', in Nicolaou-Konnari (ed.), *Η Γαληνοτάτη και η Ευγενεστάτη / La Serenissima e La Nobilissima*, pp. 198–199. 18 Day-by-day details of the siege of Nicosia are given in Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 66–85. 19 Ibid., pp. 133–134. 20 Ibid., pp. 151–161.

man strategic system. Logically, the need to maintain the enceinte and the moat disintegrated, and the only addition the Ottomans made was the embellishment of three gates with plaques commemorating the reign of the sultans; these were, however, gates that allowed the Ottomans to control the traffic of people and goods.²¹ This absence of repair work thus saw the enceinte slowly begin to decay, and in the 1740s Richard Pococke struggled to recognize Savorgnan's original layout: "it is fortified with very large ramparts, but has no fosse, and consequently is a very indifferent fortification; the ramparts are faced with the hewn stone of the old walls; the circumference of them is about two miles. The walls of the ancient city, which were built with semicircular towers, may be traced all round, and they seem not to have been much less than four miles in compass".²² When Cyprus came under British administration (1878), George Jeffery observed that the fortress was falling into ruin, the carved stone revetment having long been torn down to be used in the building of the city's houses; the unprotected earthen walls slowly crumbled under the combined effect of rain, heat and wind (figs 74–76). Moreover, the English built several openings into the enceinte's walls, throwing up bridges to enable people to go between the *intra muros* city and the adjacent suburbs; another part of the enceinte was deliberately taken away by this modernization of the city's roads.²³ Without Jeffery's determined efforts to restore the fortress in the 1920s and 1930s, the walls would have dwindled to mere embankments, gradually being worn away by the joint forces of nature and the indifference of the city's inhabitants towards their historical heritage.²⁴ Indeed, it was not until the 1990s that Savorgnan's enceinte became the object of real scientific excavations, led first by Despina Pilides, then by Chrysanthi Kounnou; this work was an essential part of the salvaging of the monument.²⁵ In its present state, Nicosia's fortress has lost nearly all of its original bonding, and gone is the powerful impression the fortification once gave, numerous openings having broken the proud enceinte, and the moat having been partly filled in.

Although Savorgnan's fortress lost all its strategic value in the Ottoman defensive system, the principle of the bastioned enceinte remained relevant in late-sixteenth century Venice and Italy. During the two years of the construction of Nicosia's enceinte, the plans drawn by Giulio Savorgnan circulated in Venice, in the *Terraferma* and elsewhere in Italy, often at the

21 Marangou, *Πύλη Ἀμμοχώστου / Famagusta Gate*, pp. 142–155; E. Rizopoulou-Egoumenidou, 'Nicosia under Ottoman rule 1570–878', in D. Michaelides (ed.) *Historic Nicosia*, Nicosia 2012, pp. 268–269; G. Violaris, 'Οι βενετικές οχυρώσεις της Λευκωσίας: διαχρονικό σύμβολο και χωροταξικό στοιχείο της πόλης', in Pileidou / Alfa (eds), *Οχυρωμένες πόλεις*, p. 134. No space will be given here to opinions attributing the abandoning of the fortress's upkeep to the laziness and neglect inherent amongst the Turkish people, common arguments of Christian, anti-Muslim propagandists. 22 R. Pococke, *Description of the East and Some Other Countries*, London 1743–1745, p. 209. 23 D. Markides, 'Nicosia under British rule 1878–1960', in Michaelides (ed.), *Historic Nicosia*, pp. 335–337; Violaris, 'Οι βενετικές οχυρώσεις της Λευκωσίας', pp. 137–139. 24 Pilides, *George Jeffery: His Diaries*, vol. 2, pp. 530–537, 543–547, 565–566. 25 Chr. Kounnou, 'Ανασκαφές στον προμαχώνα D'Avila (Πλατεία Ελευθερίας 2008–2009)', in Pileidou / Alfa (eds), *Οχυρωμένες πόλεις*, pp. 157–176; D. Pileidou, 'Ιστορικές και αρχαιολογικές μαρτυρίες για τον προμαχώνα Podocataro των βενετικών τειχών της Λευκωσίας', in Pileidou / Alfa (eds), *Οχυρωμένες πόλεις*, pp. 177–189.

instigation of Giulio himself, eager to self-publicize and better his rivals. The diffuse mentions he makes of this in letters he sent from Nicosia, along with other references scattered around in various archive documents, establish that over twenty plans of the eleven-bastioned enceinte were sent to Italy in 1567 / 1568, before Giulio even arrived back in Venice.²⁶ In other words, Savorgnan's ideas immediately found an audience, made up of certain officers and senators who were experts in fortification, and also of patricians and engineers interested in technical progress, as was the case with the circle of intellectuals that formed around Giacomo Contarini.²⁷ Several letters sent to Savorgnan while he was still supervising work in Nicosia testify that his pioneering project immediately met with the praise of several renowned patricians, such as Giulio Contarini, Daniele and Marc'Antonio Barbaro, Giacomo Soranzo, Marco Michiel and, of course, Sforza Pallavicino; as Antonio Manno has stated, before it was even finished, Nicosia's enceinte was already proclaimed the first ever perfect fortification.²⁸

A greater contribution to the success of the project than the plans, drawings and correspondence sent from Nicosia was made by witnesses of the construction work, even the most reticent amongst them, such as Nicolò Dandolo.²⁹ In spring 1568, in Paphos, where he was preparing to set sail for Venice, Archbishop Filippo Mocenigo stated he would back Savorgnan's project before the Senate, where he would present the scale model of the two bastions that he had been given; the archbishop kept his word, and, upon his arrival on 6 June, he declared the fortress to be "bellissima et fortissima".³⁰ The Nicosia project also left its mark on Filippo Pigafetta, a man of a less prestigious public presence due to his young age; Filippo returned to Italy on the same ship as Savorgnan, and the mechanics enthusiast and future great navigator left few written recollections of his Cypriot experience aside from a small number of allusions in the correspondence he later had with the Osoppo master, wherein he flattered the architect by comparing him to Amphion.³¹ An acquaintance of Giacomo Contarini, Pigafetta was asked to give precise details of the eleven-bastioned enceinte. Two other attentive observers also closely studied the technical specifications of a fortress that they would continue to be used as a model twenty years later: Germanico Savorgnan and Buonaiuto Lorini.

When he landed in Venice on 28 November 1569, Giulio Savorgnan was without doubt a figure of immense prestige thanks to the project he had designed and brought to comple-

26 Marchesi, *Fortezze veneziane*, pp. 202–203; G. Grivaud, 'The drawings, plans and models of Venetian military engineers of Cyprus', pp. 115–117, 121. 27 Cf. supra, pp. 21–22. 28 Cf. supra, docs 90, 91, 92, 95, 102, 106; Manno, 'Politica e architettura militare', p. 129. 29 Cf. supra, docs 108, 111. 30 Cf. supra, doc. 101; Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, vol. 8, no. 223. 31 BAM, *cod. C 64 inf.*, ff. 84^{r-v}, 86^v; id., *cod. R 125 sup.*, f. 11^r, et fasc. "Cose Raccolte in Osopo da ragionamenti col Signor Giulio Savorgnano", wherein, on f. 3^r, Pigafetta reports: "Che Anfione col suono edificò le mura di Tebe, cioè col suono alleggiava le fatiche a i lavoratori, comme fece egli in fabricando gli undici baoloardi di Nicosia che per ciascuno faceva pagare un sonatore, acìo che li operatori sentissero tedio minore in lavorar mediante la musica"; concerning the relationship between G.S. and Pigafetta in the 1580s: Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars* fortificatoria in Venezia', p. 238; Casella, 'I Savorgnan o Delle piccole corti', p. 391; Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 203; see also supra, p. 62 n. 171.

tion in Nicosia, the prototype of a perfect fortress. Nevertheless, the report he delivered before the *Collegio* on 15 January 1570 shows that the officer did not expect any particular recompense beyond some well-earned rest on his estates, after the many years of overseas service; Giulio explained how his work on the ground in Cyprus was part of a family tradition, confirming the strength of the bond between the Savorgnans and Venice. He did not stress how great a feat it had been to build a fortress in such a short amount of time and for such a modest cost, preferring to portray himself as a disciplined soldier who had accomplished to the letter the orders given to him at the start of his mission.³² There is no evidence of Giulio seeking to derive any immediate profit or personal glory from the success of his project; he seems to have been more concerned with returning to Friuli and the pure air of Osoppo than with involving himself in the *Signoria's* military or political affairs.

However, the imminence of war with the Ottoman Empire dragged Savorgnan out of a premature retirement, and the officer had to organize the defence of Dalmatia in March 1570. The conflict with the Ottomans put Savorgnan in an especially delicate position, as his fortress had to prove its ability to withstand fire. Nicosia had, by way of its innovative structures, become a groundbreaking fortress, and the prospect of large-scale battles on the island engendered spontaneous proposals from engineers seeking to take advantage of these confrontations in order to test out their inventions, a well-known example being Girolamo Maggi.³³ An author of several treatises and with an interest in fortifications (figs 68a–d), Maggi proposed to the Council of Ten a series of inventions he wanted to be tested on the ground, in the fields of weaponry and siege machines; arriving in Famagusta on 5 May 1570, Maggi remained in the harbour in the service of the town's captain, Marc'Antonio Bragadin, and though he played no part in the siege of Nicosia, the work he did well reflects the hopes at that time of the Italian military, who wanted to counter the Ottomans with brand new methods and techniques (fig. 63).

The hopes placed in Maggi's experiments were not borne out by reality, just as Nicosia's rapid fall cast a shadow over Savorgnan's achievements. Giulio's fortress fulfilled its protective function, some 75,000 people taking refuge inside its walls; this was an illustration of the peasantry's belief in the new enceinte's defensive capabilities, and of the success with which supplies were procured.³⁴ The thick earthen walls did indeed resist the enemy cannons, which were unable to breach the fortress,³⁵ forcing Lala Mustafa Pasha to resort to four assaults in

32 Cf. supra, docs 77, 78. 33 Promis, 'Vita di Girolamo Maggi d'Anghiari', pp. 109–143; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 3, pp. 954, 1009, 1018; J. R. Hale, 'Girolamo Maggi: A Renaissance scholar and military buff', *Italian Studies* 40 (1985), pp. 31–50; L. Carpanè, 'Maggi, Girolamo', *DBI*, vol. 67, pp. 347–350; M. Dal Borgo, 'Le *inventioni militari* di Girolamo Maggi per la difesa di Famagosta (1570)', in Ch. Maltezos / A. Tzavara / D. Vlasi (eds), *I Greci durante la dominazione veneziana*, Venice 2009, pp. 395–408; Grivaud, 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', pp. 14–15. 34 Falier, *Relationi della presa di Nicosia*, f. 6^r; Tiepolo, *Guerra di Cipro*, p. 28. 35 In a letter dated 23 March 1594, Giulio Savorgnan states "l'artegliaria nemica con una batteria che li fusse fatta dentro, non li potesse far' cascar' giù pur' una cesta di terra, come è stato veduto a Nicosia in Cipro fatta da me, qual si perse per mancamento d'huomini": ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5; the same opinion is given in an undated text kept in the BAM, *cod. D 167 inf.*, f. 3^r.

order to conquer the city, a decision which cost the lives of a great many of his soldiers; in summer 1570, the only weakness observed in the fortress was when the defending troops built cavaliers (*retirate*) on the Davila and Tripoli bastions, where the ground proved too soft to support the new structures.³⁶ Never was the eleven-bastioned enceinte's design otherwise called into question, and Giulio was made certain of this when he asked Giovanni Sozomeno to give him a truthful account of events in the Cypriot capital, fully trusting the engineer who had assisted him on the Nicosia project for two years.³⁷

Savorgnan heard the news of the fall of Nicosia whilst serving in Zara, but it would be foolish to expect the proud officer to have reacted with any rash remarks.³⁸ Long after, in a letter dated 3 September 1588 and addressed to Filippo Pigafetta, Giulio delivers an analysis of the failure suffered in Nicosia, attributing it mainly to the disagreement between Venetian officers and their lack of credibility before the *Signoria* when attempting to secure the human and material resources needed to defend the fortress. At the end of his life, Giulio still firmly believed in the quality of his enceinte, built in record time, for little cost and with a labour force of just 5,500 men; he was convinced that with his influence the military authorities would have accorded the troops needed to keep Cyprus in Christian hands.³⁹ In his correspondence from the 1580s and the early 1590s, Savorgnan regrets none of his choices, and remains adamant that his Nicosia fortress is a model to be followed throughout Venice's territories.

36 Falier, *Relationi della presa di Nicosia*, f. 17^v; this flaw was shared by all earthen fortresses, whether in Peschiera, Casale Monferrato or Palmanova, as Presotto (*Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 4.4) underlines.

37 Cf. supra, docs 43, 53, 77, 86; Sozomeno thus seems to have left two accounts of the siege of Nicosia: the most interesting of the two is that written at the behest of G.S., of which Bernardo Sagredo gives a copy (see his *Storia delle tre guerre*, pp. 307–311); also: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 201^v–207^r; id., *Materie Miste Notabili 16*, ff. 46^v–56^v; the second was written at the behest of Sagredo, *Storia delle tre guerre*, pp. 311–318; the latter report is the origin of the text that was printed and widely disseminated under the title *Narratione della guerra di Nicosia, fatta nel regno di Cipro da' Turchi l'anno MDLXX*, Bologna 1571, and which went on to inspire several other texts: G. Grivaud, 'Ο πνευματικός βίος και η γραμματολογία', in Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. 5, pp. 1172–1174; id., 'Η κατάκτηση της Κύπρου από τους Οθωμανούς', p. 12; P. M. Kitromilides, *Κυπριακή λογιόσνη 1570–1878. Προσωπογραφική θεώρηση*, Nicosia 2002, p. 256. 38 On 10 September, in Zara, G.S. remained very confident in the capabilities of his fortress, writing: "qual Nicossia, se è stata fatta presto, se con pochi danari, se sarà stata ben intesa, et fatta in loco a proposito per conservatione di quel suo Regno, l'effetto et la prova si vederà di breve": ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 138^v–139^v. 39 BAM, *cod. C 64 inf.*, ff. 86^v–87^v: "et se li Signori Illustrissimi mi lasciavano in Nicosia, se ben io mi l'haveva fortificata in sette mesi et mezzo, come Vostra Eccellenza sa, col mio scrivere a Venetia, Sua Serenità menando 5 milla fanti, buone munitione d'ogni sorte per dui anni, 5 milla fanti di quell'ordinanza, et tanta altra sorte di buona gente, quando che venne l'armata del Gran Turco, che lei si trovava in Cipro, senza dubio con quella gente che io haveva all'hora, haverrei difeso Nicosia, et conservato quel Regno alla Christianità, ma la cattiva fortuna di christiani volse che murisse il proveditore Bembo, et chel Dandolo venisse in discordia col Signor Astorre, et che per le discordie et negligenza sua, in Nicosia non fussero se non 600 fanti, et non persona alcuna di guerra, con tutto ciò a fatica il Turco l'hebbe non combattendo ma dormendo quei de dentro, di modo che se io vi fusse stato, haverrei hauto dalli Signori Illustrissimi doppio numero de soldati di quelli che io hebbe allora, et se io havessi difeso quel Regno, sarrei stato nominato di ragione per l'histoire, et tanto maggiormente havendomi io medesimo fatto quella fortezza in cusi poco tempo et tanta quantità di baluardi, come lei sa, et ridutti in buon termine".

Thus, as brutal as the fall of Nicosia and the loss of the *Regno di Cipro* may have been, it did not hide the scale of Savorgnan's achievement, even if his attitude during the 1570/1571 war may have been called into question.⁴⁰ Savorgnan was consulted on other defence projects right up into the 1580s, in the Venice Lido as well as in Verona, Bergamo, Corfu and Brescia, but his most deeply held desire was to see a new fortress built in Friuli, and to see the project entrusted to his nephew Germanico.⁴¹ The latter boasted all the necessary qualities: he had received solid on-the-ground schooling in defensive architecture in Nicosia, Modon and Cythera, and army experience from serving with his uncle in Dalmatia in 1572, then on the galleas of General Giacomo Foscarini in the Adriatic, and finally in Candia in 1577, where he commanded a contingent of 600 men.⁴²

The young Friulian, born in 1554, ruined his exemplary career when he murdered two men, revealing his violent nature. On 13 September 1580, in Verona, he assassinated a sergeant from Giulio's company, but escaped punishment thanks to his uncle's influence. However, when Germanico stabbed his youngest uncle Ascanio, on 2 October 1581, he had to flee Venetian lands for good to escape the death penalty imposed upon him by the Council of Ten.⁴³ He took refuge in Flanders, and fought for the Spanish, joining the armies of the duke of Parma, Alessandro Farnese, from 1581 to 1584; he then went to Lucca, in Tuscany, and secretly returned to Friuli in 1585. Back in Flanders in 1587, he continued serving Farnese, who appointed him offensive fortification superintendant in the autumn 1588 siege of Bonn; during these operations, Germanico became close friends with the sons of the duke of Mantua, Vincenzo Gonzaga. Germanico ended up settling in Mantua at the beginning of 1590, at the duke's behest and to the great satisfaction of Giulio Savorgnan, who was happy to see his spiritual heir back in Italy and reviving the traditional association between the Savorgnan and Gonzaga families dating back to the late fifteenth century.⁴⁴

Thanks to his military and technical abilities, Germanico was accepted into the court of Mantua, serving Vincenzo Gonzaga uninterruptedly until his death. Very quickly, on 26 June 1590, the duke appointed him artillery captain-general and fortress superintendant-general of Montferrat. He was charged in particular with overseeing the construction of the Casale Monferrato citadel, but the duke also gave him various other confidential military missions,

⁴⁰ Panciera, *Il governo delle artiglierie*, p. 202. ⁴¹ G.S.'s opinion was constantly sought after upon his return to Italy, as evidenced in ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, introduction f. 13^r; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria a Venezia*', pp. 228–229. ⁴² ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, ff. 175^r, 183^r; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 3.1. ⁴³ Cf. supra, p. 41. ⁴⁴ Studies concerning the relations between the Savorgnan and Gonzaga families have been made by F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo: 'Gonzaga e Savorgnan: rapporto tra le due famiglie', *Archivio veneto* 98 / 115 (1967), pp. 5–18; 'Gonzaga e Savorgnan: seconda memoria sui rapporti tra le due famiglie', *ibid.* 100 / 121–122 (1969), pp. 5–21; 'Gonzaga e Savorgnan: terza memoria sui rapporti tra le due famiglie', *ibid.* 101 / 125 (1970), pp. 27–40; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 2.3 and 3.1, with supporting documents at the end of the volume. Germanico was solicited by the court of Mantua as early as September 1575: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili 11*, f. 186^r. Concerning the life of Germanico Savorgnan, the reader is referred mainly to F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo, 'Germanico Savorgnan, architetto militare a Mantova', *Atti e memorie della accademia virgiliana di Mantova* 35 (1965), pp. 129–149, and Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*.

authorizing him to provide expert assessments of fortification matters to the Republic of Genoa; on 12 February 1594 the duke thanked him for his services by granting him the fiefdom of Ceserato Monferrato, which became part of the Savorgnan del Monte heritage. In late summer 1595 Germanico accompanied the duke of Mantua on the reconquest campaign launched in Hungary by Rudolf II; after taking part in the siege of Visegrád, Germanico ended up serving the emperor, who entrusted him with the superintendancy of Hungary's city fortifications. Kept away from Mantua by the Gonzagas, and unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain a pardon from Venice, despite the incessant efforts of his uncle Giulio,⁴⁵ Germanico died of the plague in mid-summer 1597, in Vienna.

As tumultuous as it may have been, Germanico Savorgnan's life bore the mark of the upbringing he received from his uncle, both a soldier and an expert in military architecture. Germanico's main achievement in construction, built on the orders of Vincenzo Gonzaga, was realized in Casale Monferrato, a small, long-disputed town in Piedmont, on the border with the Duchy of Savoy, where the duke wanted to have a citadel built.⁴⁶ To this end, Germanico proposed a hexagonal plan for a fortress adjacent to the town (figs 56, 57); this was thus a project of far more modest proportions than that of Nicosia, as the medieval town proper was not concerned. Nevertheless, the Nicosia fortress did serve as a prototype, Germanico replicating several of its characteristics: he opted for a radial star-shaped plan, and limited the height of the earthen walls to the field of vision available from the moat. Likewise, the organization of the construction work was based on Nicosia, Germanico using *ferlini* to boost the workers' productivity and having a sophisticated administration take care of the payment process in order to avoid misappropriation; also as in Nicosia, Germanico split the teams of labourers into contingents of 500 men, recruiting peasants during periods when they were not busy working their fields. Furthermore, he deftly adapted his uncle's techniques to fit with the materials available to him, replacing the Cypriot *plite* (πλιθάρι) with bitumen, used to consolidate the fortress walls, but also to make them more supple when under fire. He also envisaged doubling the enceinte's terrepleins, an idea that in the end was not pursued in Casale Monferrato but was used in Palmanova, giving the two fortresses a very similar outline. Finally, as in Nicosia, Germanico designed the buildings constructed within the citadel, whether to store ammunition, weapons and grain, or to house the governor, the artillerymen and the soldiers. The citadel was completed in early 1595, for an overall cost of around 200,000 ducats, according to the calculations of Agnese Presotto, although the figure that Giulio Savorgnan retained was that of the initial estimate, 120,000

⁴⁵ In his will, G.S. again begs Venice's clemency towards his nephew: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 142^v; other occurrences are identified by Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, scheda 26. ⁴⁶ Concerning the construction of the Casale Monferrato citadel: E. Marani, 'Un'anticipazione di Palmanova (La Cittadella di Casale Monferrato)', *Civiltà mantovana* 26/5 (1970), pp. 89–100; C. Perogalli, 'Dall'adozione del bastione alla fortezza di Palmanova', *Palmanova da fortezza veneta a fortezza napoleonica*, pp. 19–22; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 4.3.

ducats; in Giulio's eyes, the need to save money was sovereign, justifying the decisions which, after Casale Monferrato, were taken in Palmanova.⁴⁷

The Palmanova fortress marked the pinnacle of the art of defensive fortification, bringing together designs that Giulio Savorgnan had been working on all his life. As early as 1566 he stated several principles concerning the organization of Friuli's defences, stressing the need to protect the eastern border which was under threat from the Ottomans, and proposing Brazzano or another site on the Isonzo River as a fortress location.⁴⁸ Giulio reiterated this opinion in later correspondence, first hoping to be granted supervision of the project, and then that the project be entrusted to his nephew Germanico; after 1581, without giving up hope that the sanction on Germanico would be lifted, Giulio tried hard to make his other nephews, Mario and Marc'Antonio, continue the family tradition. The project had thus been fermenting for a long time in the minds of officials, and the outbreak of war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans precipitated San Marco's decision; an incursion of Ottoman irregulars in Carniola reminded Venice of how vulnerable its eastern borders were and, on 17 September 1593, the Senate approved the construction of a new fortress, on a new, untouched site.

Giulio Savorgnan's involvement in the project remains a subject open to discussion; nearing eighty-three years of age, the artillery and fortress superintendent-general no longer had the strength to oversee such a large-scale construction project, but his opinion continued to be sought even when he was bed-ridden, right up until the last day of his life.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Giulio never doubted his decisions, confident that his experience was superior to whatever ideas may have been put forward by politicians or other architects and military engineers;⁵⁰ endowed with this self-confidence, he provided inspiration, advice and recommendations concerning Palmanova throughout the draft phase of the project, and the shadow of Nicosia hung over the design of the new fortress in several ways.⁵¹ One member of the collegium of five proveditor-generals in charge of the construction of the fortress was

47 Ibid., ch. 4 and 5, where it is stated that the citadel victoriously resisted four sieges before being dismantled in 1695; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria in Venezia*', p. 233; E. Molteni, 'La scienza del fortificare', in Concina / Molteni (eds), "*La fabbrica della fortezza*", p. 196. Concerning the citadel, G.S. wrote on 14 January 1593: "La cittadella di Casal al Signor Duca di Mantova non li costa più di 120 milla ducati, pagando tutti li operaij, la qual cittadella è di 6 baloardi fatta al modo mio con la cavation della fossa nel terreno naturale con gran scarpa, e muraglie sottilissime, più assai delle mie, causato alla inventionione del Conte Germanico, che ha lavorato di calcistruzzo, o bittume, che si dimanda cosa che si potrà far benissimo anco a questa nova fortezza in Friuli, inventionione non più trovata d'altri che causa grandissimo sparagno, e questo soggetto a imparato da me la fortificatione in Cipro, in Candia, Corfù, Zara, che non è puoco, né è maraviglia se ha trovato questa inventionione che potrà prestar tanto servitio, et avantaggio di Vostra Serenità": ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5. This eulogy did not stop G.S. from criticizing certain decisions made by Germanico in the construction of the citadel: *ibid.*, a letter dated 18 June 1594; Presotto, *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 4.7. 48 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 51^r-52^v, 56^r-62^v. 49 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5, letter from G.S. dated 8 May 1595; the batch of letters also contains many more of G.S.'s opinions on Palmanova. 50 As Manno ('Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio e ars fortificatoria in Venezia*', pp. 228-229) and Presotto (*Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 4.7) underline. 51 He was consulted many times, notably on the Palmanova budget: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5, letter from G.S. dated 14 January 1593.

Marc'Antonio Barbaro, the Constantinople *bailo* who had praised Giulio's work in Cyprus, in the letter he sent to him from Pera, on 18 April 1569.⁵² Amongst the four engineers assigned to the Palmanova project was Orazio Governa, who had been Giulio's day-to-day assistant in Nicosia, and above all the Florentine engineer Buonaiuto Lorini, whom Giulio had persuaded to come to Osoppo after meeting him in Venice, in Giacomo Contarini's intellectual circle.⁵³ Lorini, whose name went on to be associated with the design of Palmanova, openly recognized his indebtedness towards Nicosia's prototype fortress, having travelled to Cyprus in spring 1570 (fig. 71f).⁵⁴ Also involved in the Palmanova project were three members of the Savorgnan family: two of Giulio's nephews, Mario and Marc'Antonio, the latter having followed the Casale Monferrato project from start to finish with his brother Germanico; and Giovanni Garzoni, Giulio's nephew by marriage, who produced drawings for the Palmanova fortress on his uncle's orders when the latter could no longer get around, and who later became one of the secretaries assigned to the Friulian fortification project.⁵⁵ In other words, Giulio Savorgnan's death, on 13 July 1595, did little to prevent the dissemination of the soldier-architect's principles, subsequently carried on by other members of the Savorgnan family and, above all, by his true spiritual heirs, Orazio Governa and Buonaiuto Lorini.

Palmanova was a major undertaking for Venice; though the decision to build the fortress was taken in September 1593, after the project had been studied the previous winter, the enceinte was completed in 1623, after twenty years of work, at a cost of 3.5 million ducats, further defensive reinforcements being added throughout the seventeenth century.⁵⁶ Its main function was to defend the eastern areas of Friuli against the Ottomans, but also to create a point d'appui to be used against the Habsburgs of Austria, in the event of the latter attempting to take hold of the Marano Lagoon in order to access the Adriatic coastline. The site

52 Cf. supra, doc. 109. 53 Cf. supra, p. 70 n. 204. 54 "Fu la Fortezza di Nicosia vista de me due mesi avanti che il Turco vi andasse sotto col suo esercito & d'ogni intorno molto ben considerata. Dove non senza maraviglia vidi la più reale & meglio intesa opera (benché in terra) che al parer mio si potesse fare; e tanto più vedendomi detto esser stata fabricata dall'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnan solo in otto mesi di tempo, e con tanta facilità, dove che restai molto affettionato al nome di un così Eccellente & Illustrissimo Signore. Ma perché Dio molte volte permette che seguino così fatti disordini, acciò chiaramente si veda la instabilità di queste felicità e grandezza mondane: e però permesse che quella fortezza fusse poi così debilmente difesa": Buonaiuto Lorini, *Delle fortificazioni...*, Venice 1596, p. 70. 55 ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 5, letters from G.S. dated 23 March 1594 and June 1595; in his will, G.S. revealed that he bequeathed his instructions for the Palmanova project to Garzoni: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, f. 142^r. 56 Palmanova today boasts an imposing bibliography, highlights of which are: H. De La Croix, 'Palmanova. A study in sixteenth-century urbanism', *Saggi e memorie di storia dell'arte* V (1966), pp. 23–41; P. Damiani, *Storia di Palmanova*, 3 vols, Udine 1969–1972; L. Olivato, 'Contributti alla genesi progettuale di Palmanova. Il ruolo di Giulio Savorgnan', *Memorie storiche forogliulesi* LVI (1976), pp. 93–110; L. Di Sopra, *Palmanova, analisi di una città-fortezza*, Milan 1985; S. Ghironi/A. Manno, *Palmanova. Storia, progetti e cartografia urbana (1593-1866)*, Padua 1993, and more particularly the study by A. Manno, 'Utopia e politica nell'ideazione e costruzione di Palmanova', pp. 11–47, in *Palmanova da fortezza veneta a fortezza napoleonica* (exhibition catalogue), Venice 1993; C. Visentini, 'Analisi del sistema fortificato della città di Palmanova', in *L'architettura militare veneta nel Cinquecento*, pp. 146–150; P. La Penna, *La fortezza e la città. Buonaiuto Lorini, Giulio Savorgnan e Marcantonio Martinengo a Palma, 1592–1600*, Florence 1997; Molteni, 'La scienza del fortificare', pp. 187–207.

chosen, untouched by people or houses, displayed Venice's twofold territorial ambition, the fortress and the town being expected to structure the defence of the region and its economy. The original project contrasted sharply with that of Nicosia, as the constraints of a pre-existing urban perimeter were absent; in Palmanova, architects enjoyed complete spatial freedom to give the town a layout suited to its defensive functions, using a system of harmonious rules that reflected the debates over the ideal city perpetuated throughout Renaissance Italy.

The analogies between Nicosia and Palmanova are, of course, centred on the defensive enceinte's structure; along a polygonal outline, Nicosia's eleven bastions at 400 m intervals became in Palmanova nine bastions at 347 m intervals, this distance being calculated in accordance with the range of an average-sized cannon. In both projects, the bastions were designed to offer mutual protection to the defending soldiers and to keep the enemy at a distance; this made the appearance of the two fortresses similar in many respects.⁵⁷ Moreover, in both projects the bastions were named after the officers who oversaw their construction, which saw the Savorgnan name given to a part of the Palmanova fortress, whereas Giulio did not give his name to any part whatsoever of Nicosia's enceinte. The Nicosia perimeter (5.5 km) and that of Palmanova (3.12 km) both contained three gates, but in Nicosia these were built on the reverse side of the orillons, in accordance with the old military tradition, whereas in Palmanova the gates were situated in the middle of the curtains.⁵⁸ Again in both projects, the enceinte was designed to allow cannon batteries to be installed in the rounded projection of each bastion, and barracks for the soldiers and storehouses for arms and ammunition were all built. The walls of both enceintes were very thick, earthen, and made up of several layers of mixed or humidified earth, their height being calculated in relation to the depth of the moat; both enceintes boasted parapets, and Palmanova was given cavaliers, a covered way and a guardhouse, structures which Nicosia did not have. Over the course of twenty years, the Palmanova walls reached a level of perfection that could have been obtained in just eight months in Nicosia.

A comparison of the two fortresses shows that Palmanova most definitely benefited from a design and construction process far superior to that of the Nicosia project; in Cyprus, working urgently and in a context presenting multiple constraints, whether of a technical, human or political nature, Giulio Savorgnan proposed alone the final hendecagonal plan, which he was particularly fond of, submitting it again to the Senate in 1593, during one of the preliminary reflection phases of the Palmanova project. If it is accepted that the plan drawn by Lorini, in the 1596 edition of his fortifications treatise, concerns a later proposal for Palmanova (fig. 71a), similarities can be identified with the sketches for the Nicosia fortress (fig. 40); in both cases, the bastions are directly linked to the town and city's central squares. The experience Savorgnan had accumulated and his determination saw him oversee and

⁵⁷ A profile of the Palmanova fortress attributed to G.S. and dated 1594 can be found in the AST, *Architettura militare*, vol. V, f. 44^r. ⁵⁸ It should be noted that Palmanova's three gates were named after the towns and cities towards which they faced (Udine, Cividale, Maritima); cf. fig. 58.

bring to completion the project in Nicosia, whereas in Palmanova the venerable artillery and fortress superintendent-general gave opinions that were debated and compared with the opinions of other fortification experts. The definitive plan chosen for Palmanova shows that in the end a nine-sided polygon was favoured, though it is not clear whether this idea came from Savorgnan, from Buonaiuto Lorini, from both of these architects together, or from a collective decision taken by a collegium of experts (fig. 58–59).⁵⁹ True to her traditional approach of achieving consensus between specialists before taking military decisions, in Palmanova Venice brought together commissions made up of greatly talented personalities, in which the authority Giulio Savorgnan could exert was diluted.

In the history of Venetian fortifications, Nicosia appears to be the only example of a fortress whose design and construction may be attributed to a single man. As a general rule, reinforcement work done on urban enceintes or fortresses over the course of the sixteenth century consisted in the modernization of a section of the enceinte and the construction of bastions and monumental gates, all of this work being entrusted to experienced men, whether soldiers, architects or engineers; the multitude of such jobs accumulated and complemented each other to give the towns and cities in question coherent defensive systems that met the demands of modern warfare, but none of the enceintes in the *Terraferma* and the *Stato da Mar* can be attributed to a single individual, and it is definitely the particular context of the mission entrusted to Giulio Savorgnan in March 1567 that explains this singularity.

Nicosia marked an essential step in the maturation of Venice's defensive system, fitting into a culture of *ars fortificatoria* that dated back to the awakening brought about by the defeat at Agnadello in 1509. The reactions from the doge, Andrea Gritti, and from Francesco Maria Della Rovere stimulated reflection on the subject uninterruptedly right up to the end of the century, from *capi di guerra*, from engineers, from politicians and from patricians interested in humanism, who debated at length the supremacy of art over practice.⁶⁰ Far from being confined to the offices of the *provveditore alle fortezze* magistrature, the discussion produced a progressive modernization of all of the Venetian fortified enceintes. The innovations seen in Peschiera, Verona, Padua, Bergamo, Corfu and Candia were disseminated throughout Venice's territories, at varying speeds, reaching Cyprus much later than other *Stato da Mar* territories. Nevertheless, the particular context of the years 1566 and 1567 was favourable to the construction of the Nicosia fortress in an extraordinarily short amount of time and at an unprecedentedly low cost, illustrating that saving large amounts of time and money could facilitate a reorganization of Venice's defensive system. Giulio Savorgnan's

59 Concerning the role of G.S., Buonaiuto Lorini and other military leaders in the design of the Palmanova fortress, opinions have for a long time been divided, for example: Promis, *Biografie di ingegneri italiani*, pp. 417, 643; La Penna, *La fortezza e la città*, pp. 7–12; Molteni, 'La scienza del fortificare', pp. 190, 195. 60 Regarding this question, see the detailed or general analyses in P. Morachiello, 'Da Lorini a de Ville. Per una scienza e uno statuto dell'ingegnere', *L'architettura militare veneta del Cinquecento*, pp. 45–47; Manno, 'Giulio Savorgnan: *machinatio* e *ars fortificatoria* in Venezia', pp. 229–230; id., 'Politica e architettura militare', pp. 131–137; Molteni, 'La scienza del fortificare', pp. 204–207.

ability to turn numerous constraints to his advantage in the space of a few weeks was unquestionably a result of his previous experience on other projects.⁶¹ Nicosia represented the synthesis of all the work done in the field of defensive architecture before 1567; however, though Nicosia was a fundamental step in the process of perfecting Venice's fortresses, it was in Palmanova where this progress really materialized, when public space was successfully joined to military framework, and the ideal city that Renaissance humanists had dreamed of was made a reality.

61 A future subject of debate shall be whether or not G.S., in devising his plans for fortresses, thought in exclusively Italian terms, or if he rather took into consideration the progress being made in northern France and in Flanders, where star-shaped citadels were built in the 1540s by the Bolognese architect Girolamo Marini, the plans of which G.S. most probably knew of via his brothers Mario and Ascanio (supra, p. 62); other direct sources of information available to him were engineers who had travelled around France and England, such as Giovan Tommaso Scala, who began serving Venice in 1547 and who worked in Cattaro and Corfu: A. Coppa, "Quanto ala fortificacion jo ui dicho che el si bisogna intender lauera". *Guerre e fortezze di un ingegnere veneziano del XVI secolo tra Francia e Inghilterra: Giovan Tommaso Scala*, in M. Vigano (ed.), *Architetti italiani all'estero dal XV al XVIII secolo*, Leghorn 1999, vol 2, pp. 175–185. See also Presotto's observations in *Vita e carriera di Germanico Savorgnan*, ch. 4.7; Molteni, 'La scienza del fortificare', p. 196.

ILLUSTRATIONS



1. Giacomo Castaldi, “Adriatico settentrionale” (detail), 1566.

2. Medal belonging to Girolamo Savorgnano (1465–1529), believed to have been made by Fra Antonio da Brescia, sometime after 1514. Diam.: 50 mm - 60.31 gr. Obverse: D. HIERONYMVS SAORNIANVS OSOPI, showing Girolamo's left profile, with long hair and wearing a cuirass.

Reverse: OSOPVM IN IESVDEFENSVM, showing a soldier sat upon trophies of weapons, being crowned by Victory and holding a model of the castle.



3. The Savorgnan family tree according to Marco Barbaro.

13: Girolamo (1465–1529),
the *fraterna's* father.

Girolamo's sons:

17: Marc'Antonio (1515/20–1592).


18: Germanico (1514–1555).


19: Giulio (1510–1585).

20: Ascanio (1520–1581).


21: Girolamo (1515 / 20–1591).

22: Mario (1511–1574).






4. Simplified Savorgnan family tree (after Casella, *I Savorgnan*, tables 1–6).




5. The Savorgnan's Friulan estates, 15th–16th century. [Adapted from Giovanni Andrea Vavassori, 'La vera descrizione del Friuli', 1553]



6. Mario Savorgnan, proposed fortification, c. 1533; ink drawing, watercolour on paper.

7. Proposed bastioned fortification in Udine, attributed to Mario Savorgnano; ink drawing on paper.



DELL'ARTE MILITARE,

Composta

DAL SIGNOR CONTE MARIO

SAVORGNANO,

Per i Signori Orlondeo, E. M. I. O. N. I. O.

A. S. I. G. N. O. R. I. C. O. N. T. I.

Gieronimo, Giulio, Mario, Germanico, Marcantonio,

& Hettore suoi nepoti.

NON è dubbio, che il huomo volendo riuscir eccellente in qualche arte, o facoltà, si mestieri, ch'egli habbia non pur la propria natura per guida, e per maestra, ma bisogna insieme, ch'una radunanza di precetti infallibili, o consistenti almeno in ragioni probabili, & anche vn più che ordinario esercizio

Quali cose
necessarie
a divenir
eccellente
in vna pro-
fessione.

intorno ad essi, lo conducano sicuramente a quel fine, ch'egli principalmente si propone nell'azione sua. Percioche ben si vede ogni giorno, quanto così haoratoria, così anche in quella del nauigare, del medicare, & altre si fatte facoltà, ouer arti, a picciol grado di bode per uenir buoni, & acuti ingegni, che senza vnde progetti opportuni, si persuadono di voler molto, doue cō esso felice mente arrivano a terminar di gloria singolare, a quella guida, che veggiamo generosa piantata in felice terreno, & quindi ottimamente da dotta mano coltivata, produr frutti di vna, o tal bontà, ch'auanzano spesso la speranza del proprio agricoltore. Questa è la ragione, che conoscendo io, quanto voi, Conte Gieronimo nepote carissimo, siate di non mediocre speranza, da dover ualere a loro, & intendente Capitano, se ben hora vi introuate nell'Conte di Spagna, doue non sono veramente maggiori huomini, che con molte già nel mestier della guerra, & i quali hauendo militato sotto l'Imperador Carlo Quinto, di gloriosa memoria, & poi al seruijo del Re Filippo suo dignissimo figliuolo, hanno in diuersa maniera fatto conoscere, che era sciu di essi, non che da paraggiare, ma da preporre anche a chi si fa de gli antichi, nondimeno, per


8. First page of the preface to Mario Savorgnan's treatise, *Arte militare terrestre e maritima...*, Venice 1559. Just above the decorated initial can be seen the author's dedication to his nephews Girolamo, Giulio, Mario, Germanico, Marcantonio and Hettore.

9. Extract from p. 4 of the preface to Mario Savorgnan's treatise, *Arte militare terrestre e maritima...*, where Mario writes of both the Savorgnano nephews' responsibility to carry on fittingly their ancestors' glorious heritage, and of their duty to maintain it, enhance it and pass it on to their own descendants.

Voglio in somma dirlo, ne potrei sanissimo, che debito uostro è, per non degenerar da uostri uolli, & per non mancar all'occasione grandissima che ui si porge, di diuenir tali, che non solo conferirete questa degna possession di gloria, ma che l'aggrandirete in che, & ampliarete di molto, come fat sogliono le persone prudenti dell'heredità legitime, e porre di mano in mano da loro progenitori. Et perche m'auiso questo esser di tanta efficacia, ch'aggiunto al natural uostro istinto, di caminar a gran passi per la strada dell'honore, debba non ch'accendermi ma infiammarmi di nobilissimi desiderii.



10. Portrait of Giulio Savorgnan wearing armour in an interior, attributed to Domenico Tintoretto, 1595(?); oil on canvas, 120 × 93 cm.



11. Pietro Gregorio Carrara, 'Pianta della fortezza di Osoppo', mid-18th century. Although drawn some time after the construction of the fortress was completed, this plan shows how the *rocca di Osoppo's* natural defences were reinforced with walls and bastions. Within the fortress can be seen the church at the centre (shown by a cross), several residential buildings to the south, and military buildings to the north. To the northeast can be identified the terrace on which Giulio Savorgnan's funerary monument, not shown on this plan, was built.

Legend: Dichiarazione delle lettere e croce – A. Porta primo recinto del castello – MA. Primo recinto – B. Porta che va nel secondo recinto – C. Porta che conduce nel 3o recinto – CC. Mura del 3o recinto – † [Santo Nicolò?] – Dichiarazione di tutti i numeri – no. 1. Abitazione del governatore o [?] del castello – no. 2. Quartieri delli soldati – no. 3. Case dirrocate dietro la chiesa – no. 4. Abitazione del signore del castello – no. 5. Abitazione de capi – no. 6. Deposito dell'artiglieria – no. 7. Armamento – no. 8. Pallazo dirrocato con entro la chiesa de Santa Colomba – Capitan Pietro Gregorio Carrara fece il presente.



12. The Tagliamento meridional valley, viewed from the Osoppo hills; the fortifications that can currently be found on the *rocca* date from the 19th and 20th centuries.



13. Giulio Savorgnan's burial complex at Osoppo.

14. Giulio Savorgnan's tomb, damaged several times, still bears the lion of St. Mark hammered onto each corner.

15. Stone inscription near the tomb, dated 1576, which recalls that Giulio Savorgnan was successively Governor General of Cyprus, Crete, Corfu, Dalmatia and the Venice Lido.





16. The register of documents retracing Giulio Savorgnan's life, compiled in 1576.

17. The first page of the table of contents of the register compiled by Orazio Governa.

18. Orazio Governa's subscription, dated 12 November 1576.

1527

A. c. 1. 1527. Due lettere del Marchese Federico di Mantua, et una del sig.^o Gio: Prospero Lettera de una fattione seguita sotto Roma contra spagnoli scritta dal principal secretario del Marchese di Mantua, et un capitolo del Trionfo d'Alouf Tigris in campo sotto Roma.

A. c. 2. 1528. Li capi del vecchio Comoglio di A. sinuato, et Giulio dal campo de castana et ne uenga in Trulli.

A. c. 3. 1529. Marzio Michel President general della zalmatia, et Tomaso Aluonico general da Moro sinuato della condita, et Gio: Giulio, et Marcantonio successore al servizio di Cathari in quella guerra Turchea.

A. c. 4. 1532. Giulio è licentato honoratamente da Sua Ma.^{està} del suo primo governo di Zena.

A. c. 5. 1540. Condita di 120. Cavallo Leggeri, et 200. Ducati de Soldo appiano a Giulio.

A. c. 6. 1547. Sentenza fatta da Giulio in proposito della giustificazione de zena.

A. c. 7. La ragione de Giulio in fare una Condita in Tadea.

A. c. 8. Parer de Giulio circa il duero Josephus Terchiera, et un.

A. c. 9. Argomento della condita a Giulio de 120 Cavallo Leggeri a 150 et di soldo per 200. Ducati, dopo tornato da Corfu, et era stato governatore li quel solo due anni.

A. c. 10. Justificatione della giustificazione de valore al Cavallo Turco Jugoslovic.

A. c. 11. Volendo li sig.^o il collegio regular la sua milizia, demantaron il parer suo ad alcuni Capitani, et tra gli altri, Giulio dete questa.

A. c. 12. Consul di giustificazione sopra Terchiera, e Morona.

A. c. 13. De Jamagita.

A. c. 14. Di Corfu.

A. c. 15. Di Candia.

A. c. 16. Di Cipro.

A. c. 17. Sopra la giustificazione di Tadea, dove entra l'acqua alla Sarsinaglia.

A. c. 18. Ordine dato a Giulio per il mantenimento del palazzo d'Alone Valle, che l'atogli occupavano in Trulli.

A. c. 19. Sentenza data sopra la confirmatione del Regno di Cipro.

A. c. 20. Argomento de 120 huomini di arme de condita dat a Giulio, et 1200. Ducati de Soldo.

A. c. 21. Ricordi sopra il finis dati da Giulio nel suo andar in Cipro la prima uolta.

A. c. 22. Diversi sopra il regular Soldati.

A. c. 23. Parer sopra Bergano.

A. c. 24. Cijolutione in Cipro, et in Candia de Giulio.

A. c. 25. Resolutione fatta da Giulio a Sua Ma.^{està} di che hauea fatto in li 50. mesi, et era stata in Cipro, in Candia, et in tutto il stato da Moro.

A. c. 26. Lettera alla Sua Ma.^{està} sopra Jamagita.

A. c. 27. Alla Sua Ma.^{està} sopra Bergano sopra Jamagita del 1562.

A. c. 28. A Sua Ma.^{està} sopra Cipro.

A. c. 29. Al sig.^o sopra Cipro, et capitan sua.

intanto de v. s. molto più si potrà far una scuola, e un altro sopra l'educazione de' suoi governi, si delle potenze, uno delle lettere del 5. del 10. del 15. del 20. del 25. del 30. del 35. del 40. del 45. del 50. del 55. del 60. del 65. del 70. del 75. del 80. del 85. del 90. del 95. del 100. del 105. del 110. del 115. del 120. del 125. del 130. del 135. del 140. del 145. del 150. del 155. del 160. del 165. del 170. del 175. del 180. del 185. del 190. del 195. del 200. del 205. del 210. del 215. del 220. del 225. del 230. del 235. del 240. del 245. del 250. del 255. del 260. del 265. del 270. del 275. del 280. del 285. del 290. del 295. del 300. del 305. del 310. del 315. del 320. del 325. del 330. del 335. del 340. del 345. del 350. del 355. del 360. del 365. del 370. del 375. del 380. del 385. del 390. del 395. del 400. del 405. del 410. del 415. del 420. del 425. del 430. del 435. del 440. del 445. del 450. del 455. del 460. del 465. del 470. del 475. del 480. del 485. del 490. del 495. del 500. del 505. del 510. del 515. del 520. del 525. del 530. del 535. del 540. del 545. del 550. del 555. del 560. del 565. del 570. del 575. del 580. del 585. del 590. del 595. del 600. del 605. del 610. del 615. del 620. del 625. del 630. del 635. del 640. del 645. del 650. del 655. del 660. del 665. del 670. del 675. del 680. del 685. del 690. del 695. del 700. del 705. del 710. del 715. del 720. del 725. del 730. del 735. del 740. del 745. del 750. del 755. del 760. del 765. del 770. del 775. del 780. del 785. del 790. del 795. del 800. del 805. del 810. del 815. del 820. del 825. del 830. del 835. del 840. del 845. del 850. del 855. del 860. del 865. del 870. del 875. del 880. del 885. del 890. del 895. del 900. del 905. del 910. del 915. del 920. del 925. del 930. del 935. del 940. del 945. del 950. del 955. del 960. del 965. del 970. del 975. del 980. del 985. del 990. del 995. del 1000.

Di Cipro alli 12. Nouembre. 1576.

Di v. s. molto più.

Honor. Scrittore
Horatio Governa.




Al Conte Girolamo Savorgnano il Secondo

Oltre l'hauea messa in mano per li tempi li Scrittore sopraddetto del sig.^o suo zio, ho uoluto auer cauor dalla sua Almatichi, dove che stato de tempo in tempo si come v. s. molto più et che sempre ha usato di fare, anzi comincio a far fare l'istesso a v. s. sig.^o essendo bella cosa, et li gran satisfatione in necessitate de voi sig.^o con ogni pace, fatica, et particolarmente tutti li uinigi della uita, perche qui stato in tutto solamente li milioni per me arrivare a maggior.

19. Record of several inscriptions from Osoppo tombs related to the Savorgnan family in the 16th century; on the left-hand page, the four inscriptions found around Giulio Savorgnan's tomb.

20. Giulio Savorgnan's signature at the bottom of the letter he wrote to Sforza Pallavicino in Nicosia on 27 May 1567; see doc. 26.

21. Extract from a copy of Giulio Savorgnan's will, wherein he bequeaths to Orazio Governa a table engraved with a map of Nicosia, along with the city's standard given to him upon his departure in May 1569.



Sc. no. Quinto

29

Alla no. del presente mese di maggio sui giorni qui in Nicotia
 et alla no. e stato rifatto da gthi elmi s.ⁿⁱ li abbacozze
 et una forte tutte le bucali cast. di Nicotia dirattandoli
 da gthi allora et. e vicina alla muraglia vecchia uero
 altro. Se cause et sono mono gthi elmi s.ⁿⁱ a fare
 tal deliberatione p. lettere di loro sig.^{ta} come la sig.^{ta}
 v. sarà inclusa. Io no. manco di starli alla medesima
 di loro sig.^{ta} et me. così come v. sig.^{ta} ha comandato
 si in Amagosta a gthi elmi s.ⁿⁱ et gthi particolarmente vi
 alla fortezza manda qui inclusa una mia lettera
 aperta all' ecc.^{ta} v. sig.^{ta} forza general suo, accio
 li elmi s.ⁿⁱ rappu. le fortezze, volendo posare subito
 ogni particolarità. Et circa il tempo di esser messi in
 fortezza p. tutto marzo, come la sig.^{ta} v. ha scritto
 et si debbono fare, gthi no. dubito. Et il tutto sarà
 fatto a tempo, se p. gthi elmi s.ⁿⁱ mi attendiaro
 di dar il numero delli. Sei mille homini a tempo
 et et no. me. ma copuro, et intorato l'ordine del
 fabricare, ma continuerò et molto anaro li s. meri
 faremo fatti in scorta benissima, et a mano spem
 a cortezza di gthi et colta un soldado solo a v.
 sig.^{ta} in gthi me. 2. ogni mese in altri altri anni
 et suo stato, neortandoli nel 1580 a quando ho
 detto di sopra et in la sua gratia di v. sig.^{ta}
 sempre me. lo accio.

di Nicotia alla no. 22 maggio 1587,
 di v. sig.^{ta} mio feutor

Giulio Savorgnan

NICOTIA

100

Il Capitano Antonio d'Arcofi	150
Il Capitano Andrea del sale	150
Il Capitano Francesco Longano	150
Il Capitano Antonio del Crocino	150
Il Capitano Demetrio Pochipanni	150
Il Capitano Lorenzo Coccaro	150
Il Conte Alberto Scotto	150
Il Capitano Nicotio Preza	150
Il Conte Germanico Savorgnan	150
Suma	1300

Amagosta:

Il S. ^{to} Governador Diacoletta	200
Il S. ^{to} Cavalier Nicotio da Vignolo	100
Il S. ^{to} Cavalier Dale habte	100
Il S. ^{to} Cavalier da Pelaro	100
Il Conte Hierato Martinengo	100
Il Capitano Gio. Battista Bianchi	100
Il Capitano Marco Conchadon	100
Il Capitano Vicerio Brampega	100
Suma	900


C. Cines:

Il S. ^{to} Governador Diacoletta	50
Il Capitano Constanzo Lucar	25
Il Capitano Constanzo Franco	25
Suma	100

Suma: 2200



25. Letter from Giulio Savorgnan to the doge, Girolamo Priuli; see doc. 25.

26. List of captains stationed in Cyprus; see doc. 107.



27. Measurements and sketch of the Cerines castle made by Leonardo Donà, 1557. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: P[onente] – (porto) – Baloardo nuovo – Porta – S. Nicolo – O[stro] – soccorso – Mare – Tra[mon-tana] – torrione del spiron – S. Zorzi – Levante.

28. Sketch of the Famagusta harbour by Leonardo Donà, 1557. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Mare – Le navi – le secche – gallie sottili e grossi – barche – scogli – scogli – muolo – porto de catena – porporella – catena – torre dell'occa – fossa – torrion del diamante – castello – mura – Famagosta.



29. "Famagosta". Map of the city walls, with the San Marco/Martinengo bastion project, 1557–1558. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Porta da terra – Revelino – Cavalero – Fossa sutta – Chavalero – Fossa sutta – Fossa sutta – Fontana de S[an]to Giorgio – Fossa sutta – Chavalero – Famagosta – Scala di passa cento – Chavalero – Fossa sutta – Chavalero – Resanale – Porta de marina – Mollo – Fossa – Castello – Fossa – Porto – Mare.

30. "Famagosta". Map of the city walls and its harbour, showing the San Marco/Martinengo bastion project, 1557–1558. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Pasi 250 di piedi geometri – Famagosta – Porto – Bocha del porto – Aqua ma bassa – Mare – Scoglio.



31



See overleaf

32

575

Previous page:

31. "Famagosta". Map of Famagusta showing the seven-bastion fortification project, probably related to the proposals made by Gulio Savorgnan in summer 1562.

32. Paolo di Ferrari, map of Famagusta's enceinte and harbour, 1562. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Scalla passa 100 – Paulo di Ferrari ingegniero – Fontana – Lagetto – a di fondo piedi 13 – piedi 24 – piedi 12 – Scolio del buo – Padula – Padula – Scolio grande – Padula cio sabionira – Porporella – Bocha – Bocha – Seche – Bocha. The towers: To[rrione] dell'Arsen[nale] – To[rrione] del Campo Santo – Cavaler Martinengo – To[rrione] del Andruzzi – To[rrione] della Zudecha – Ravelin de Limiso – Porta di Limiso – To[rrione] del Minio – To[rrione] del Priuli – To[rrione] del Pasqualigo – To[rrione] de Carmeni – Bel[oardo] S[an] M[arco] – To[rrione] del Cavaler – To[rrione] del Muzzo – To[rrione] Mastici – To[rrione] del Diamante – To[rrione] del Diavolo – Porta del Mollo. Larger insert: In questo traverso l'aqua è di alteza piedi 2, qual alteza si discende per longeza passi 50 a trovar la rocha va giù con l'aqua et pontano fino in 8 piedi et mezzo – il restante per rivare dove è la linea a di aqua piede 1 palmo 1 a trovar il fondamento de la rocha va giù fino 3 et 4 piedi. Smaller insert: In questa bocha a di aqua piedi 3 et 4 a trovar la rocha con l'aqua et pontano va giù fino in 7 et 8 piedi, quello che attraversa et sera detta bocha è purpurella.



33. "Famagusta". Proposals for new walls in Famagusta, 1560–1567. [AST, *Architettura militare*, vol. V, ff.261^v–262^r]. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Famagosta – Passi n° 50 di piedi 5 luno geometri.



34. "Maina in Morea". Model of Famagusta's enceinte, 1550–1555.



35. "Fortezza di Famagosta". Model of the Famagusta enceinte with part of the harbour, 1562 (?).




36. Georg Braun / Frans Hogenberg, "Famagusta", 1572.




37. Mateo Neroni, "Famagosta nel' isola di Cipro", 1602. Legend: A. S[anto] Giorgio Domo de Greci – B. S[anto] Nicholo Domo de Franchi – C. S[anti] Pietro e Paolo – D. Palazzo del Clarissimo – E. Piazza – F. Castello – G. Mollo – H. Colle delli hebrei – I. Pretipoli Casale – K. S[anto] Cessio Casale – L. Torre del Ocha – M. Casa di S[anta] Chaterina – N. Secche.



38. Nicolas Faucherre, “Plan chronologique de l’enceinte de Famagoste”.



a




b

39. “Le misure della fortezza di Nicosia”, 1567.

(a) Legend from top to bottom, from left to right: Rochas – Pon[en]te – [?] – Quirini – porta – Tripoli – 30 – 158 – 31 – 10.10.10 – Barbaro – [?] – 30 – case de soldati – strada – Case et boteghe di cittadini – Costanzo – cav[allier]o – baluardo – 05 – ponte – Podochataro – Caraffa – Leva[n]te – strada – porta – Besa[n]te.


(b) Da gola a gola passa n° 280 – Da gola a fianco n° 36 – Dalla punta del baloardo al fianco passa n° 214 – El fianco con la strada n° 30 – El fianco solo n° 11 – [D]a fianco [a] fianch[o] n° 158 – A far la fronte dil baloardo si piglia la mezzaria della cortina con le 30 passa della spalla – A far lo rechion si fa otto passa de dentro [...] alli 11 passa de dritta linea al principio del altro rechion et in capo dalle otto passa si mette una squadra, et si fanno passa sette et mezzo, et li nasce il centro del rechion, si fa per diametro passa n° 15 – La larghezza della [...] appresso il per[a]pedo passa n° 15 – La larghezza del parapetto passa n° 10 – La molada appresso la strada n° 10 – La fossa si fa passa fondi n° 6 – L’altezza del terren retirado di sopra n° 6 – La larghezza della fossa alla punta del baloardo in squadra passa n° 21 – La ditta fossa alla mezzaria della ditta cortina n° 31.



40. Germanico Savorgnan, sketch of the Nicosia enceinte, 8 August 1567. Legend: Scala di pasa venetiani n° 230 – Disegno della nobelissima città di Nicosia fatto di mano di me Germanico Savorgnano, per dar al Capitano Gregorio Pantea, per mandarlo al Magnifico Signor Felipo Roncon governor di Maran, sì come il Signor mio zio la fa fortificar al presente di 11 gran beloward, il dì 8 agosto 1567. In Nicosia. The bastions: 1. Querini – 2. Barbaro – 3. Loredan – 4. Flatro – 5. Carafa – 6. Po da Cataro – 7. Costanzo – 8. Davilla – 9. Thripuli – 10. Rocas – 11. Mulla.




41. Aerial photos of Nicosia; above: 1931.



42. Houses in Nicosia designed by Alessandro Magno during his tour of Cyprus, c. 1557.


43. "Nicosia città regal combatuta da Turchi", 1571 (?).



44. Giovan Francesco Camocio, "Nicosia", c. 1570. The engraving shows the river still running through the city, as it did before autumn 1567, instead of being diverted to the north.




45. Stefano Lusignano, "Nicosia", 1573.




46. Giovan Francesco Camocio, "Nicosie", in his *Isole famosa*, Venice c. 1574, pl. 16.



47. "The Turks land in Cyprus", from the *Codex Magius*, Venice 1578, pl. 6.




48. Giacomo Franco, "Nicosia", 1598.



49. Mateo Neroni, "Nicosia nel isola di Cipro", 1602.



50. Marcello Alessandri, "Nicosia nell' isola di Cipro", 1620.



51. Marcello Alessandri, "Baffo fortezza et porto nell' isola di Cipro", 1620.



52. Domenico de Rossi, “Disegno della fortificatione de la città di Candia, fatto per me Domenico de Rossi di Este, a instentia de ... Moretto Calabrese, Governator di questa città ..., fatto adì VIII ottubrio 1567”, showing Giulio Savorgnan’s work on the western part of the enceinte.




53. Map of Zara, showing the fort built in 1566–1567 by Sforza Pallavicino (marked ‘D’), with the *pontone* on the left-hand side.



54. The Terraferma Gate at Zara, built by Michele Sanmicheli in 1543.

55. Sforza Pallavicino's coat of arms at the central gate of the fort built in Zara in 1567.






56. "Casale di Monferrato". The bastions: Austria – S[an] Giorgio – La Madona – Gonzaga – S[an] Francesco – S[ant]a Barbara.


57. Germanico Savorgnan (?), Casale Monferrato. The bastions: S[an] Francesco – S[ant]a Barbara – Austria – Gonzaga – Porta – La Madona – S[an] Giorgio.


Legend: Il n[umer]o 1 si è la munitione da legnami et casa di falegnami et bo[m]bardi – 2 Il palatio del Governadore et munitione d'artelaria et altri armame[n]ti – 3 et 4 Doi fili di alloggiame[n]ti de soldati – 5–8 Doi fili di alloggiame[n]tu de soldati – 9 Chiesa et granari – 10 Molini, forni et munitione da farina – [schala de passi n[umer]o 200 da 5 passi l'uno].

58. "Pianta della fortezza di Palma", 1606. The bastions and the gates: B[aloard]o Contarino – B[aloard]o Villa Chiara – Porta Maritima – B[aloard]o Foscarini – B[aloard]o Savorgnano – B[aloard]o Grimani – Porta de Udine – B[aloard]o Barbaro – B[aloard]o Donato – B[aloard]o Monti – Porta di Cividali – B[aloard]o Garzoni.




59. Map of Palmanova, 1609. The bastions: Garzoni – Contarini – Villa Chiara – Foscarini – Savorgnano – Grimani – Barbaro – Donado – Monti.






60. Giulio Savorgnan, drawing of two bastions annexed to a letter dated 4 August 1584.




61. Giulio Savorgnan, profile of a defensive system annexed to a letter dated 4 August 1584. Legend: A. Piano della campagna – B. Due banchette per commodita de' soldati – C. Muretto della contrascarpa – D. Piano pendente della fossa di fuoravia della cunetta – E. Il tiro degli archibugieri amici, che havranno da star in capo delli fossetti che vengono a capitare sopra la cunetta – F. La cunetta larga quindici piedi con due muretti sottili per sossentare il terren naturale, et alta tanto – G. Il perno della fossa dalla cunetta al balloardo – H. La contramina larga quattro piedi, discosta due passi dalla fundamenta delli balloardi, dalla quale nascono tanti rami, quanti l'huomo vuole con simili volti per condursi sopra alla cunetta per tirar archibugiate – I. La muraglia del piede del balloardo sottilissima appoggiata al terreno naturale, niente più alta del piano della campagna per non ricever batteria, e senza spironi – K. Terren ritirato senza frasche quando si sa il modo di bagnarlo senza pistonni, ma solamente dal zappar degli huomini si fa star così rato e poi vi nasce l'herba – L. La grossezza del parapetto di terra, sei passi grosso col suo pendente in dentro per due ragioni notabili – M. La dismantata del parapetto nella piazza del balloardo al tempo di pace – N. La piazza del balloardo pendente in dentro – O. Fossetto della prima ritirata che si dovrebbe fare in tempo di guerra con il suo parapetto, segnati con ponti.


62. Title page of Nicolo Tartaglia, *Quesiti et inventioni diverse de Nicolò Tartaglia, di novo restampati con una giunta al sesto libro...*, in Venetia: per N. de Bascarini, 1554.

63. Girolamo Maggi, in his *Ricordi*, draws an external moat during a siege, indicating the importance of a cavalier in ensuring the defence of a fortress, 1570. Legend from left to right, from top to bottom: Cavalieri fatto con nostra inventionione – Mura della città – Il fosso – Il fosso – Il fosso – Via fuori del fosso – Via – Via – La campagna – Il terreno voltato, et gettato da gustatoti.







64. Plan of an eight-bastioned enceinte, with moat, which Giovanbattista Zanchi (da Pesaro) considered the perfect form for a modern fortress, 1554.



65. Elevation of an eight-bastioned enceinte with moat, Giovanbattista Zanchi (da Pesaro), 1554.




66. Prospective view of an eight-bastioned enceinte with moat, Giovanbattista Zanchi (da Pesaro), 1554.







67a–b. G. Lanteri, *Duo libri di M. Giacomo Lanteri, ... del modo di fare le fortificazioni di terra intorno alle città e alle castella per fortificarle...*, In Vinegia: appresso B. Zaltieri, 1559.

a. Plan of a bastion in an hexagonal fortress, showing the platform cavalier (H), the parapet (O) and the two gorges allowing defending soldiers to protect the curtains (marked G/H); *ibid.*, pp. 102–103.




b. Profile of a defensive system containing an escarpe, composed of a terreplein (marked R) and parapet (marked P/O), a moat (marked F/G), a counterscarp (marked I/K) and a glacis (marked M/N); *ibid.*, p. 99.




68a–d. *Della fortificatione delle citta di M. Girolamo Maggi e del Capitan Iacomo Castriotto, ingegniero del Christianissimo Re di Francia*, Venetia: appresso Camillo Borgominero, 1583.


- a. Plan and elevation of a cavalier; *ibid.*, f. 41^r.
- b. Plan and elevation of a bastion; *ibid.*, f. 41^v.
- c. Proposed positioning of cannons in the demi-gorge of a bastion; *ibid.*, f. 65^r.
- d. Proposed plan of a fortified town with a double enceinte and eight bastions, in a radial star shape; *ibid.*, f. 49^v.




69. Proposed plan of a fortified town with eight circular towers, given by Daniele Barbaro in his interpretation of Vitruvius, plates with drawings by Andrea Palladio; the plan envisages two gates, a moat and a uniform grid of roads emanating from the central square. Although Barbaro's work was first published in 1556, the great principles of Vitruvian architecture were disseminated via the 1567 second edition.




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


b





d

70. Pietro Cataneo, 1567.

a-b. Plans for hexagonal and heptagonal enceintes.
c-d. Plan and perspective view of a maritime town
with an enceinte covering land and sea.






62 LIBRO


mi, fredo flati imboccati, & rovinati i fianchi, e beragliati i fuoi bombardieri da gli archibugieri nemici, che coperti stanno sotto la contrascarpa, donde ne causo tanta timida d' difensori, che si perfero in breue tempo validissimamente. Si che se la Fortezza haue i suoi fossi due baluardi reali per ciascuna delle due parti da Terra ferma, e dalle due verso il Mare, e fregano, le sue cortine fatte angolarie i ogni angolo con grossi difese fabbricate con buona terra, che di li possa portarsi, le bun di sostano le sue piazze farcbbono venute grandi, e sicure, come all' opposto erano piccole, e mal difese, benché da molti fuisse tenuta Fortezza insuperabile, per hauer i baluardi, e solo con cento palia di difesa. In quanto alla Fortezza di Famagolla fortificata all' antica co' fuoi torrioni, onco mure bassi, di ottima materia per resistere contro le batterie, & per esse: la sua muraglia grossissima fatta col fango indurissimo per hauer poca piazza restarono facilmente indifesi, e particolarmente per la poco lunga difesa di essi torrioni, onde non solo venivano impedito le sue artiglierie per essere da quelle del nemico imboccate, e casualate, ma i bombardieri beragliati, e morti dalle archibugierie tirate da nemici, che stanno coperti sotto la detta contrascarpa, & altri più fatti per offendere, che non fazzo no difendersi, si come lei stessa non può far fede, etendosi restata presente alla sua espugnatione, deche se ne deve gloriar per il molto valore viato da tutti i fuoi difensori. In quanto all' espugnatione di Nicosia (che segui prima) che pure era Fortezza modesta, e fabbricata co' fuoi baluardi, e difese realissime, e bene intesi dico, non essere seguita espugnatione se non dal poco numero de' fuoi difensori, e massime soldati pagati, quali non ammontano il numero di mille trecento, che non erano anzi a guardare vndici baluardi, con che era fortificato il circuito della Fortezza, ma ne sono vn folo, come è noto a tutti, e paraceua forte più a leache ad alcun altro, che hauea villa, di che mi faro parer me stesso il suo parere. Cio. Fu la Fortezza di Nicosia villa da me, due mesi avanti che il Turco vi andasse sotto col suo esercito, e d' ogni intorno molto bene considerata. Doue non senza marauiglia vidi la più reale, e meglio intesa opera, benché di terra, che al parer mio il potere fuisse, e tanto più venendosi detto esser stata fabricata dall' Illustri. Sig. Giulio Sanseverino solo in otto mesi di tempo, e con tanta facilità, doue che restai molto affettionato al nome di esso Signore, & desidero anco da voi sapere dell' esser suo, e poterlo farli rincentra, mi farà gratissimo con l'acertare non solo sua Sig. Illustri, ma ogni altro ancora, che se in quella Fortezza fuisse stato quella quantità di difensori necessaria a piazza così grande, non si faria peria. Ma fin doli intrepida, la incommoda di cui lungo viaggio, a compagnia della contrarietà de' tempi non buoni per quella nauigatione mi fuo il conuolto del procedere al bisogno di quella Città, fern do stato anzi annuoluto, e proiuito da questi Eccellentissimi. Semozzi, atteso, che quando fuisse arriato il fuoco per se certo essa Città non si faria peria. Ma flante al poco numero de' difensori, che ci ritrovauamo, e alla così improuisa venuta del nemico, era impossibile il poterla difendere, benché speraui nel aiuto dell'armata Christiana, la quale si pretendeua douer difendere, & auicurar non solo Nicosia, e Famagolla, e tutto quel Regno. Ma perche Dio nostro Signore molte volte permente, che se guiso così fatti difensori, accio chiaramente si veda la instabilità, di quelle febolti, e grandiose mondanie non è per di marauiglia che gli huomini, benché fami perfino fallire co' loro giudicij, che anco i tempi ne siano contrari. A V. Giu che le cause de' disordini occorsi son note a tutti, non replichero altro, se non che ella non è deca marauigliare che la Fortezza di Nicosia sia la più bella, e meglio intesa, che habbia visto, & anco fabricata con facilità in ordine in così poco tempo, ferdendo stato l'auere l' Illustri. Sig. Giulio Sanseverino, il quale con infinite esperienze ha mostrate sempre mostra il molto suo valore in tutti questi exercitij appartenenti a vn ottimo soldato, e particolarmente in materia di fortificare, onde accompagnati molti fuoi meriti, con le heriche virtù de' fuoi antecessori, così bene meriti di quella Scrittura. Sig. come è noto a tutti haueudo gli qualità, e più volte felicissimamente confidato la patria del Friuli, mercantolmente se gli aspetta ogni supremo grado, e massime di Generale delle artiglierie, e sopra intendente di tutte le Fortezze di quello Serenissimo Dominio, conferuan doli ancora in vita di età di ottantacinque anni, quali ha fite fe, e continuamente spende i suoi giorni. Cio. Si. Sendo questa Signoria così necessaria, e per me tanto, & ogni tanto che parca per coti trimeri, e giugna vna perpetua felicità, e per honorar il proposito nostro, che fu della lunghezza delle difese, dico, che non per altra causa hò fatto tale oppositione, se non per intendere, e certificarci delle cause particolari, e con le ragioni sapere, perche sia meglio operare più in vn modo, che in vn altro, benché se sopra il bisogno delle difese, haueo fiamente lunghe, e quanto importa il vantaggio dell' arma di difensori, però restò molto soddisfatto, & massime con l'esperienza da me villa nell' ufficio, & espugnatione di Famagolla, doue furono effequiti dal nemico tutti i particolari, che di già haueo detto, e se ben quella non era fortificazione reale, non fiammo il rischio di un disordine di quelle difese corte, fatte tra Trino, e l'altro di quei torrioni, onco me ne lene, & ogni buona banda di moutore, e agguogo può giudicare quanto maggior resistenza, e difese haueuero fatto tal Fortezza a ella fuisse stata fabricata alla moderna co' fuoi baluardi, perche haueudo fatto si gli altri difese in quel modo, che flano (e con tanto valore) il nemico non se ne

71a-f. *Delle fortificazioni di Buonaiuto Lorini, nobile fiorentino*, Venetia: appresso Gio. Antonio Rampazetto, 1597.


- Plan of a circular eight-bastioned enceinte; *ibid*, pp. 10–11.
- Proposal to surround an old polygonal enceinte with an eight-bastioned circular enceinte; *ibid*, p. 155.
- Plan of an arsenal courtyard; *ibid*, p. 134.
- The tools required in the building of an enceinte; *ibid*, p. 119.
- The system used to transport earth excavated at a moat and brought up to a terreplein; *ibid*, p. 195.
- Buonaiuto Lorini recalls his visit to Nicosia in April–May 1570; *ibid*, p. 62.




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b



d

72a–d. D. Lamberini, *Il Sanmarino. Giovan Battista Belluzzi architetto militare e trattatista del Cinquecento*, Florence 2007, vol. II.

- a. How to dig and work the earth according to G. B. Belluzzi; *ibid*, p. 251.
- b. The tools required in the building of an enceinte; *ibid*, p. 259.
- c. Wood and nails needed during construction; *ibid*, p. 279.
- d. Special bridges for building the walls; *ibid*, p. 263.



A: lead, 4,20 gr, 21 mm., diam. 9; obverse: St. Mark's lion to the left; reverse: PP (Podocataro).



B: lead, 6,77 gr, 30 mm, diam. 12; obverse: St. Mark's lion to the left; reverse: tree leaf with a ring in the middle (Barbaro's coats of arms).



C: lead, 6,55 gr, 21mm; obverse: St. Mark's lion to the left; reverse: M (Mulla).



D: lead, 11,25 gr, 23 mm, diam. 7; obverse: St. Mark's lion to the left; reverse: two crosses (Querini ?).




E: lead, 9,99 gr, 22,5 mm, diam. 9; obverse: St. Mark's lion to the left; reverse: T (Tripoli).

73. *Ferlini* used during the Nicosia project, 1567–1568.



74. Nicosia, Loredano bastion, the angle before repairs, 1937.
75. Nicosia, Flatro bastion, the left face before repairs, 1939.
76. Nicosia, Flatro bastion, the west wall before repairs, 1939.
77. Nicosia, the *Porta del provveditore* / Keryneia Gate, condition before removal of ramps, 1931.





78. Nicosia, the Paphos Gate.

79. Nicosia, the Famagusta Gate.

80. Famagusta, Diamant bastion,
the Cavalier, 1939.

81. Famagusta, Citadel mole,
part of the mole, 1937.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THREE EULOGIES FOR GIULIO SAVORGNAN AND HIS NICOSIA MASTERPIECE

by
Evangelia Skoufari

During the sixteenth century Nicosia was one of the most populated towns in the Venetian Republic.¹ The Cypriot capital was the seat of the island's institutional and religious authorities, and its inhabitants constituted a multicultural community with elements of various ethnic and religious origins. It was traditionally the favourite place of residence for local feudal lords, who drew their income from farming done by tenants and serfs in the countryside. The Nicosian nobility was made up of around 180 to 200 families, mostly indigenous; some were more prominent and powerful, while others relied on paid assignments from the Venetian authorities.² Over time the nobles had succeeded in obtaining a number of privileges from the Venetian authorities, who considered them their most important support in establishing their authority in the kingdom. Many members of the island's most important noble families were students at the University of Padua from the fourteenth century onwards;³ there they came into contact with the major exponents of Venetian erudition, and went some way to introducing the Italian Renaissance upon their return to Cyprus. Although the Venetians were not acquainted with the old feudal constitution of the kingdom, they did not make any significant changes to it. Furthermore, the officials elected by the Senate as representatives of the Republic stayed in Cyprus for only two years at a time, often not long enough to become acquainted and accustomed to the local traditions. Nevertheless, for everyday administration they could count on the valuable collaboration of Nicosia's two urban councils, where the upper and lower social strata of the capital's population were represented,⁴ and Venice often delegated decisions on significant administrative matters to the locals.

The great financial contribution of Nicosia's nobility to the town's new fortification and their personal involvement in the construction project illustrate the importance they still held in the governance of the island at the end of the sixteenth century. A better fortification for one of the island's coastal towns had for a long time been considered a necessity by various Venetian military engineers and officials, sent periodically to Cyprus in order to review its defences.⁵ However, the Venetian treasury

1 At the end of Venetian rule, Nicosia's population was 25,000; see B. Arbel, *Colonie d'oltremare*, in A. Tenenti / U. Tucci (eds), *Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, vol. V: *Il Rinascimento*, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1996, pp. 947–985: 958. 2 W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, *Δομή και προέλευση της τάξεως των ευγενών*, in T. Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, vol. IV: *Μεσαιωνικό Βασίλειο – Ενετοκρατία*, Nicosia, *Ίδρυμα Αρχιεπισκόπου Μακαρίου Γ' – Γραφείον Κυπριακής Ιστορίας*, 1995, pp. 785–841: 831, 835. 3 On Cypriot students at the University of Padua in the late medieval and early modern period, see G. Fabris, *Professori e scolari greci all'Università di Padova*, in *Archivio Veneto* IV/30 (1942), pp. 121–165; B. Betto, *Nuove ricerche su studenti ciprioti all'Università di Padova (1393-1489)*, in *Θησαυρίσματα* 23 (1993), pp. 40–79; Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 136–140. 4 B. Arbel, 'Urban assemblies and town councils in Frankish and Venetian Cyprus', in *Πρακτικά του Δεύτερου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, vol. II: T. Papadopoulos / B. Englezakis (eds), *Μεσαιωνικών Τμήμα*, Nicosia, *Εταιρεία Κυπριακών Σπουδών*, 1986, pp. 203–213 [reprint in B. Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th centuries*, Aldershot, Ashgate Variorum, 2000, study IV]. 5 In a letter sent to the Venetian Senate from Nicosia on 10 September 1568, G.S. calculated that

was experiencing financial difficulties, and no construction could begin without the locals' contribution. That is why the wealthy Cypriots residing in Nicosia had such an influence on the final decision to renovate the walls of the capital instead of building a fortress by the sea.

During the early years of the establishment of Venetian rule in Cyprus, the population of Nicosia was, as mentioned, represented by two distinct councils, both aiming to make sure their interests and privileges would be protected by the new government. However, the last decades under *La Serenissima* seem to have brought a feeling of unity and concord among all of Nicosia's social strata, underlined by their acceptance of the important decision to reduce the area of the town to be surrounded by the new walls, and hence of the need to demolish all buildings and premises lying outside this area. In addition to the eighty churches and monasteries,⁶ 1,800 private houses were demolished, leaving 10,000 people homeless; practically half the town's population suffered from the fortification project, including nobles, merchants and religious institutions, although the great majority were of humble status. The sum of 10,000 ducats, gathered partly by the Nicosian nobility and partly by the Venetian authorities, was allocated to them in aid.⁷ Giulio Savorgnan himself, the Friulian engineer and designer of Nicosia's new walls, felt sorry for them, and expressed his admiration for their loyalty to the Venetian Republic, and the patience, or rather stoicism, with which they accepted being deprived of their property, enduring homelessness for almost a year and then the speculation of rich Nicosians who sold them land to build their new houses.⁸

The building of Nicosia's new fortress was a great event for Cyprus and revealed the cohesion among the population. From the nobility and the wealthy down to the lower social strata, all contributed as much as they could to gathering provisions and funds, and provided manual labour to get the town fortified before the Ottoman invasion,⁹ the imminence of which was greatly feared both by the locals and the Venetian central administration. It may simply have been the sense of imminent destruction that established the unity and collaboration between Nicosia's inhabitants and the Venetian authorities. However, this alone would not have deterred potential upheavals; there was also a genuine acceptance of the Venetian government's decisions and of the defensive work required long-lasting sacrifices on the part of the entire Nicosian population.

Spectacular public events were frequent in the capital of a kingdom with such an historic chivalric tradition as Cyprus; the construction of Nicosia's new fortress, long hoped for among the nobility, was a perfect occasion for a sumptuous ceremony, celebrating the completion of the project and praising what

Nicosia's new walls could shelter 110,000 people and the fortress of Famagusta another 30,000, while suggesting the erection of a circular, five-bastioned fortification in Limassol to hold the rest of the island's population: supra, doc. 68. ⁶ Forty of the lost churches are identified in a report from Father Bartolomeo Nogiero, a chaplain accompanying Francesco Barbaro, who was elected *provveditore generale* in 1567: Grivaud, *Nicosie remodelée (1567)*, pp. 285–294; see also Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Chypre*, f. 32^v; id., *Chorographia et breve historia universale dell'isola di Cipro*, f. 15^r. ⁷ Grivaud, *Aux confins de l'empire colonial vénitien*, pp. 272, 275–276. ⁸ “The people of this town, merchants and citizens, accept with all the readiness in the world those who do not bring them injustice and govern them with reason, and never have I heard from them a negative word. The populations of Candia, Canea, Famagusta, Corfu and Zara are all more troublesome to govern than the Nicosians, who endure the destruction of their houses and gardens with all the patience one could ever desire; this endurance brings to me such pain and compassion, as it is an incredible thing to watch them cut down their orchards and level their houses and churches, even if military concerns do make all of this necessary”. ASV, *Archivio Proprio Contarini*, reg. 4, ff. 98^{r-v}, from Nicosia, 15 November 1567 (author's translation from the original Italian); cf. supra, doc. 45. ⁹ N. Conti, *Delle historie de' suoi tempi*, vol. 2, translated by G. C. Saraceni, Venice, D. Zenaro, 1589, pp. 60^v–61^r. On the subject of the Cypriots collaborating with Venice, see Arbel, ‘Résistance ou collaboration?’, pp. 131–143; Grivaud, ‘Une société en guerre’, pp. 194–203.

the Venetian authorities had done for Cyprus. This special occasion, plus the fact that Giulio Savorgnan was about to leave the island to return to Venice, saw three (or maybe more) eulogies read to an audience of Nicosia's leading figures, who had largely participated in financing (some of them also in supervising) the project, offering their almost unconditional cooperation to the Venetian officials.¹⁰ In fact, as early as 1563, Bernardo Sagredo, visiting Cyprus as *provveditore generale*, had suggested that the Venetian government could count on the nobility's loyalty when planning defence measures against a potential Ottoman invasion; he underlined their chivalric virtues of honour and abnegation, and proposed that armed defence operations be entrusted to them instead of to groups of peasants, whom he believed to be of questionable loyalty and competence.¹¹

Sources indicate that a sort of gathering was organized, most probably on 6 May 1569,¹² by the population of Nicosia, or more precisely by the Council of the town's leading figures, to honour Giulio Savorgnan and the other representatives of the Venetian government in Cyprus. The sentiments of the local people were of gratitude and relief, since they felt their town had been made impregnable by the star-shaped fortification designed and executed by Savorgnan, sent to Cyprus to govern the island's military. The new shape given to Nicosia's walls, later copied and enhanced for the fortress built in the Friulian town of Palmanova, was widely admired, and Giulio Savorgnan became known as the "inventor of the perfect fortification".¹³

Here we publish the eulogies written for Giulio Savorgnan by Giovanni Podocataro, Paolo Flatro and Nicolò Robusto, all held in the Italian archives. The first two writers belonged to the Cypriot nobility,¹⁴ more specifically to two of the various Greek families that rose to the upper ranks of society during the Lusignan kingdom in the fifteenth century.¹⁵ The Podocataros and the Flatros helped finance Nicosia's new fortress and saw two of its bastions named after them (the eastward bastion for Podocataro, and the southeastward bastion for Flatro). Members of these two families occupied some of the highest administrative and ecclesiastical offices in the kingdom, and several of them had studied at the University of Padua or had some other close contact with the Italian language, thus becoming largely bilingual.¹⁶ The third writer, Robusto, was a representative of the Cypriot clergy, from the Carmelite order. Reading their eulogies shows that both Podocataro and Flatro clearly knew Giulio Savorgnan personally during the latter's time in Nicosia, while Robusto's text indicates less personal acquaintance with the Italian engineer and his work. Both Flatro and Podocataro, being among the Council of Nicosia's most

10 Nicosia's richest families raised the sum of 80,000 ducats for the new fortress; this included 10,000 offered by the Count of Rochas, Eugenio Singlitico, and 10,000 by his brother-in-law, Antonio Davila: supra, doc. 26; ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci, Lettere di rettori e altre cariche*, b. 290, n. 244, Nicosia, 17 August 1567. G.S. suggested that the Venetian Senate recognize the contribution of Giovanni Sozomeno, a gentleman of great intellect and an excellent mathematician ("Zuane Susomino gentiluomo di bonissimo ingegno e matematico eccellente"), who worked with G.S. on supervising the demolition of Nicosia's old walls and the outlying buildings; G.S. hoped this public recognition would encourage others to follow suit in collaborating with the authorities: supra, doc. 43, from Nicosia, dated 29 October 1567. He was nevertheless largely disappointed in the Nicosian nobility, who did not keep to the agreed time schedule for their financial contributions to the fortification project; ASV, *Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci, Lettere di rettori e altre cariche*, b. 290, n. 244, letter from Benedetto da Mulla and Francesco Barbaro, 17 August 1567. **11** Skoufari, *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 183–184. **12** This is the date annotated at the beginning of the eulogies by Paolo Flatro and Giovanni Podocataro: ASV, *Secreta, Materie Miste Notabili*, reg. 11, ff. 189^r, 193^r. **13** *Oratione del Signor Giovanni Battista Leone*, p. 3. **14** On the Cypriot nobility and its various economic and social strata under Venetian rule, see Arbel, 'Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία', pp. 489–498. **15** Rudt de Collenberg, 'Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes', pp. 9–24; id., 'Études de prosopographie', pp. 552–553, 648–653. **16** Grivaud, *Entrelacs chipriotes*, p. 31.

important representatives, stress the population's gratitude towards Savorgnan for the new fortress and the increased safety it gave them; furthermore, they both place very little trust in the island's lower social strata, who they believe would readily side with the invading Ottoman forces against the Cypriot nobility and the Venetian authorities. Podocataro and Flatro's eulogies are full of personal sentiments, whereas Robusto's, though displaying great erudition, is more detached and formal. All three compare Savorgnan to the great rulers and benefactors of Antiquity, and underline the qualities of the new fortification, calling it a perfect piece of military architecture.

1. GIOVANNI PODOCATARO

The name *dominus Ioannes Podacatarus Cyprius Nicosiensis* is mentioned as a witness to the graduation of various students of law at the University of Padua from 1556 to 1559.¹⁷ In the document attesting to his own successful graduation, on 20 February 1559, he is referred to as “the son of the late Ercole”.¹⁸ There is no archival evidence of the precise relationship Giovanni had with his brothers Livio and Cesare Podocataro, who were both elected archbishops of Nicosia, for the years 1524–1553 and 1553–1557 respectively. Livio was also elected viscount of the town for the period 1561–1563,¹⁹ succeeding Tommaso Ficardo. In a report on the fall of Nicosia to the Ottomans, Giovanni mentions that his brother Livio was in charge of one of the groups of 250 soldiers during the siege,²⁰ and there is evidence that he was taken to Constantinople as a slave.²¹

Giovanni Podocataro's eulogy follows the general structure of a rhetorical speech, and is free from emotional outbursts, although the feelings of the writer are often evident when he stresses his personal involvement with both Giulio Savorgnan and his project. He gives various details of the fortification's characteristics, explaining what is needed to render it impregnable to enemy attacks. He begins his oration by expressing how out of place he feels addressing his audience with a speech of such “great and honourable” importance, acknowledging that many of those in attendance are far more learned than him and could do a far better job. He says that he was asked to fulfil this duty as a representative

17 At the graduation of *dominus Antonius Seraphinus filius domini Baptiste alias de Tavoleto Patavus* on 28 July 1556; of *dominus Bartholomeus Campagnarius Novalensis filius domini Nicolai diocesis Tarvisii*, on 5 October 1557; and of *Nicolaus Christinianus filius quondam domini Raphaelis civis Amocostensis Cyprii*, on 26 January 1559, though the latter studied arts and medicine. Also present at this graduation were “reverendus dominus Petrus Podacatarus Cyprius abbas Verecrucis, reverendus dominus Andreas Zacharias Cyprius archidiaconus Leucosie, reverendus dominus Cesar de Nores canonicus Naerosie [sic], reverendus frater Damaseus Perodio Cyprius ordinis predicatorum, dominus Daniel Sanuto patricius Venetus; dominus Marchus Singritico, dominus Bernardus Bustrono [sic], dominus Ioannes Podacataro, dominus Solomon de Rubeis nobiles Cyprii scholares”: see E. Dalla Francesca / E. Veronese (eds), *Acta graduum academicorum Gymnasii Patavini ab anno 1551 ad annum 1565*, Roma / Padova, Editrice Antenore, 2001, pp. 229, 280, 343–344. On 3 February 1551 one *Ioannes Podocataro* together with *Mario Podocataro*, both law students, were witnesses to the graduation of *Ioannes Finetus filius iuris doctoris domini Andree civis Veneti*. However, this might not be the same *Ioannes* that appears in later documents, because after 1551 there is no further mention of him until 1556, whereas *Mario* is seen graduating on 31 March 1552: *ibid.*, pp. 6–7, 54. 18 Witnesses to his graduation were “dominus Paulus Trivisanus nobilis Venetus, dominus Cardinus de Capitibusvacce Patavus, dominus Cesar de Nores, dominus Bernardus Bustronus, dominus Salamon de Rubeis, dominus Nicolaus Christianus artium doctor Cyprius, domini Achilles, Leonelus et Ludovicus de Galeardis fratres Patavi, domini Leonardus et Franciscus Butironi Veronenses, dominus Alexander Businelus Patavus”: Dalla Francesca / Veronese (eds), *Acta graduum academicorum*, pp. 346–347. 19 ASV, *Senato, Mar*, reg. 35, c. 78^f. 20 ASV, *Secreta, Materie Miste Notabili*, reg. 11, f. 202^v. 21 Arbel, *Η Κύπρος υπό ενετική κυριαρχία*, p. 498 n. 180.

of the Council of Nicosia, which wished to express its devotion and gratitude to Giulio Savorgnan, and he accepted because of the “special affection and reverence” he felt towards the Friulian engineer. He states that according to the rules of rhetorical speech he should begin his eulogy by praising the Savorgnan family and their homeland, where “unique seeds and well-cultivated fields yield perfect fruits”. He does not, however, because discussing the great, fertile land of Friuli along with the illustrious members of the Savorgnan family and their nobility, virtue and wealth, would take too long. He underlines that some of the greatest military men from almost all of the Venetian Republic’s wars in Italy came from the Savorgnan family. As do Flatro and Robusto, he mentions the fearlessness of Giulio’s father, Girolamo Savorgnan, who in 1513 saved the castle of Osoppo for the Venetians against the Ottoman troops, and was later named Count of Belgrado in recognition. Podocataro shows his erudition when he mentions the works of historians who have written of either Friuli or of members of the Savorgnan family: Flavio Biondo (1392–1463), Marcantonio Coccio, known as Sabellico (1436–1506), and his successor in Venetian historiography, Pietro Bembo (1470–1547), as well as the most recent (at that time) historiographical work by Giovanni Tarcagnola from Gaeta, published in 1562.

Podocataro then discusses Giulio Savorgnan himself, extolling his virtues and rare qualities: despite his family’s wealth and all the comfort and entertainment he had in Friuli, Giulio left his homeland to serve Venice in warfare, and already at an early age displayed exemplary levels of military knowledge and competence, to the extent that “it could be said he was first a soldier, then a child; first an official, then a soldier”. He should be compared to the most important figures in Roman history in terms of self-restraint and dexterity, glorified and commemorated for his achievements. He could serve as a role model not only to good, brave soldiers, but also to observant and pious men of religion.

Podocataro speaks of the time he spent with Savorgnan personally during the construction project, saying that the Friulian engineer always tried to imitate and learn from past military tactics, but was at the same time unique in his architectural and military techniques. Podocataro is sure that the beauty, strength and perfection of Nicosia’s fortress will bring eternal fame and honour to its designer, whose merit is such that no other collaborator or councillor was needed to aid the project. Having participated in some of the construction, Podocataro testifies that everything was executed according to Savorgnan’s orders, and other opinions were always either less helpful or totally unimportant. Having witnessed the difficulties that occurred, Podocataro praises Savorgnan’s brilliance in dealing with the complications which arose while building the Caraffa bastion, and in finding solutions to rocky soil, underground waters, and the many buildings and gardens impeding the project; and Podocataro praises him above all for protecting the town from the risk of the enemy using the surrounding hills.

His speech continues with an oration to a personified Nicosia fortress, Savorgnan’s “legitimate daughter”, praising its construction which no one could ever dare criticize or in any way undervalue, knowing how great an engineer its “father” is; it can be considered a prototype for the perfect fortification, and its perfection will always see others try to emulate its assets. Podocataro then points out the improvements Savorgnan has made to the town’s defences, and explains the innovations he has brought to traditional fortification techniques. He expresses the conviction, shared by all of Nicosia’s inhabitants, that the enemy would have to besiege this invincible fortress for such a long time that he would eventually give up. The innovative design will be met with admiration and contemplation by all observers, who will easily identify the difference between Nicosia’s bastions and old-style bastions like those of the Corfu fortress, which have multiple platforms, but less room for artillery pieces. Any doubts the Cypriots had about their defences, for example the concern that the enemy might build retrenchments or cross the moat with movable wooden joists, or fears that they might install mines, have been resolved by Savorgnan’s ingenuity. The relatively modest cost and duration of the project are further proof of the engineer’s great and admirable genius.

Reaching the end of his speech, Podocataro addresses the town of Nicosia again, saying its inhabitants should rejoice, as the new walls will not only defend them against any enemy, but also discourage altogether any enemy's plan to attack it, assuring a peaceful and prosperous life for its inhabitants, with the protection of the Christian faith and under the caring guidance of the Venetian Republic. Podocataro is probably speaking also for himself when he says that Savorgnan's departure would deprive the Nicosians of his esteemed presence. He again seizes the chance to praise the Venetian Republic, "the most pacific in the Christian world", and concludes his eulogy by exhorting Nicosia's nobility to cultivate the glorious memory of Giulio Savorgnan's virtues, rather than build statues and monuments in his honour.

THE TEXT²²

[193^r] Oratione di Giovanni Podocattaro allo illustrissimo et eccellentissimo signor Giulio Savorgnano Governator general del Regno de Cipro nella sua patria

A 6 di Maggio.

Io non mi posso persuadere illustrissimi et nobilissimi signori ascoltatori, che voi non vi siate in fin hora maravigliati a vedere, che fra tanti che nella patria mia vi si trovano di dottrina, et intelletto singolarissimi; io che d'ingegno sono assai meno, che mediocre, di poca arte, di mala essercitatione di bene, et legiadramente parlare, sia venuto qui a ragionarvi di cosa molto alta, et honorata, nè meno posso à me stesso persuadere (come consapevole del poco saper mio), ch' io non habbia hoggi tolto sopra le spalle una molto grave somma et in tutto soperchia alle mie forze et vedendo il loco ove io mi trovo et avanti quai persone et di che materia raggonar debbia, conoscendo quanto più mi fosse convenevole hora l'ascoltare, che il dire, non posso far, ch' io non divenga tutto con la faccia pallida, et con la voce tremante. Ma poichè all'Università de Nicosia è pur così piaciuto, in pormi carico di ragionar di voi illustrissimo et eccellentissimo signor Giulio Savorgnano, et raccontare in parte qualche cosa delle vostre virtù; et con le mie parole anchor che humilissimamente cerchi manifestare, et scolpir vivamente al devoto animo di essa verso voi, non potendo, né dovendo non ubbidirle, mi è convenuto sott'entrare in questa impresa; la qual anchor che sia gravissima, tutta via la particolar affettione, et riverentia ch' io vi porto, et il desiderio, et piacer ch' io tengo di continuamente pensar, et raggonar di voi, me la fa parere assai piacevole, et leggiera. Et quanto ch' io conosca cotal ufficio dover esser indebolito dalla tiepidezza delle mie parole, et debolezza della mia lingua, tanto mi confido, che la somma bontà vostra accrescerà nell'animo suo, et farà maggiore tutto quello che da me sarà rozzamente et imperfettamente narrato.

Sogliono il più delle volte, et quasi sempre, coloro, che lodar intendono alcuno, primeramente lodar la patria, ove ei nacque, et la famiglia dove ei discese, et ciò facciono certo non senza ragione. Imperochè i buoni, et perfetti frutti si conoscono per il più da lor singular semi, et da lor ben coltivati terreni. Ma io ho presuposto tener più breve maniera, contentandomi dir qualche cosa solo delle virtù del animo vostro, percioché volendo parlar della grandezza della patria del Friuli, del salutifere aere, della fertilità de paese, delle tanti così belle città, et castella, che ei sostiene, de tanti chiari, et illustri personaggi, che produce, certo troppo lungo, et folle sarei, s' io presuponessi poter ciò degnamente fare, et della illustrissima famiglia Savorgnana, qual è colui, che non sapia quanto per antichità, et nobiltà, per valore, et per ricchezza sia non pur per tutta Italia, ma quasi anco per tutta / [193^v] Europa

²² ASV, *Secreta, Materie Miste Notabili*, reg. 11, ff. 193^r–196^v. In this text, and in the two that follow, the capital letters found in the manuscripts are not given in the transcription.

notissima, chiarissima, et celebratissima; chi potrebbe raccontare, quanti da quella illustrissima casa siano usciti honoratissimi, et liberalissimi personaggi, valorosissimi, et esertissimi capitani, che non così tosto nasceva in quella famiglia un huomo, che non si sperasse, et aspettasse un eccellente capitano; chi potrebbe dir quante volte, la felicissima et ben nata Republica Venetiana, si habbia nelle importanti sue occorrentie servito di quella nobilissima famiglia! Che quante volte, in diversi tempi con diversi principi ha havuto guerra in Italia, altre tante ne servitij suoi sono stati gli Savorgnani. I quali sempre, et con la facultà loro, et con il proprio sangue, quando soccorrendo esserciti, quando spengendo nemici, quando diffendendo città, quando recuperando castella sempre fermissimi, sempre constantissimi si sono mostrati, et perseverati nell'amor, et divotione di quella gloriosa Republica.

Finalmente qual è colui, che non habbia letto o almen inteso dire con quanta prudenza, et valor, con quanta magnanimità, et fortezza l'eccellentissimo et valorosissimo conte Hieronimo Savorgnano padre di voi illustre signore, habbia, oltre le altre infinite sue degne operationi in tempo pericolosissimo difeso et conservato Osopo; et che quella occasione insieme tutta la patria del Friul sia stata sovenuta, et ricoperata! Hora io non mi affaticarò dir del valore, et nobiltà di questa famiglia, quello, che quasi ogn' un sà, né mi affaticarò raccontare gli infiniti meriti suoi, et gli honorati guiderdoni havuti dalla benignissima, et felicissima Republica. Percioché à voler ciò fare, più tosto mi verrebbe meno la voce, et il giorno, che la materia, o il soggetto. Tanto più che di tutte queste cose hanno honoratamente, et leggiadramente scritto il Sabellico, il Bembo, et di lor prima il Biondo, et ultimamente il Tarchagnotta.

Ma vengo a voi illustrissimo et eccellentissimo signor Giulio, il qual con le vostre rarissime qualità non solo conservate lo splendor et grandezza de vostri maggiori, ma à guisa di vivo lume continuamente con le vostre virtù accrescete la chiarezza del sangue vostro. Voi da primi vostri anni, non curando le vostre ricchezze, delle quali ne sete senno come cupido, almeno come fortunato abbondantissimo, né usando esse come quasi tutti i giovani sogliono far, nelli piaceri, et solazzi loro, lassata la patria vostra, seti andato ad essercitar la gloriosa arte della militia, et quasi continuamente in essa attendendovi, et immergendovi, vi havete acquistato tanto, et tal frutto, che di voi ragionevolmente si può dire, che sete stato prima soldato, che fanciullo, prima capitano che soldato, et havete acquistato tanto della fortezza dell'animo, che un esemplare specchio potete essere a qualunque in questa arte volesse far la debita professione.

Imperoché lassamo star, che havete sì fattamente assuefatto la persona vostra nelli continui essercitj dell'armi; et fatta l'havete prontissima, vigilante, et destra a sopportar ne bisogni ogni faticosa impresa, vi havete ornato l'animo di tutte quelle heroiche virtù, che ogni cuor generoso deve desiderar d'acquistare. Onde se alcun merita à nostri tempi, esser lodato di giustitia, di prudenza, di continenza, et di perseveranza, voi sete da esser fra gli altri lodatissimo, et essaltatissimo. Percioché chi considera bene la vostra vita, la honestà, et continenza che possedete, la giustitia, che amministrare, il disprezzo, che fate di piaceri, et solazzi di questo mondo, la prudenza, et perseveranza, che usate nel far cose grande, honorvoli et utili alla Republica, et alle genti, conoscerà parimente quanto appar sopra gli altri, quanto avanza gli altri, quanto splende più de gli altri, colui che fonda tutte le sue attioni nell'insegnar operando la virtù, come fatte voi, et perché debb' io maravigliarmi tanto della continenza di Scipione Africano, et / [194^f] della vigilanza, et prestezza di G. Cesare, come molti gravissimi scrittori mi persuadeno, se amendue queste virtù sono principalissime in voi? Et se Scipione per un alto continente, che ei fece nel restituir al suo sposo quella bellissima giovane Spagnola, il qual atto facilmente dovea ancho esser fondato in qualche ambitione di gloria, è stato tanto predicato, et essaltato, perché non si dovrà havere in qualche degna consideratione voi, che dal bel mezzo fior della vostra etade in fin hora sete vissuto, et vivete con tanta honestà, et continenza, applicando solo l'animo vostro ad ogni virtuosa impresa, che meritamente, et con ragione potrebbero pigliar esempio da voi, non solamente gli buoni, et honorati soldati, ma ancho i più osservanti, et regolati religiosi. Et se Cesare per la gran prestezza che usava in tutte le sue attioni, fu tenuto glorioso, et maggior di quanti ne siano stati alli suoi tempi; perché in questa

nostra etade considerando le vostre operationi amministrare con tanta prestezza, et industria, che paiono quasi miracolosamente fatte, ognuno non cerchi ammirarvi, comandarvi, et essaltarvi?

Hora si come io vi comprendo, et conosco vero immitatore d'ogni Eccellente et Virtuoso Capitano degli antichi, così ne nostri tempi nell'arte del Fortificare, et della Architettura, io vi posso chiamar unico, et senza paragone. Onde per tal conoscendovi il nostro Principe, continuamente ha doperato il vostro aiuto, et parere ne bisogni delle sue Città, Isole e Castella; et perché non è hora mia intentione di parlar delle altre vostre utili operationi, fatte in molti luoghi della Republica, per non intrar in tanto profondo Pelago, dove difficilmente poi adietro potesse ritornar, dirò solamente qualche cosa della presente Fortezza di Nicosia, la qual essendo non meno utile, et necessaria, che maravigliosa, et bella, darà per l'avenir degna materia ad honorati Scrittori di far il nome vostro glorioso, et immortale. Et qual è colui di nobil ingegno, che vedendo, o intendendo la bellezza, et grandezza di questa Fabrica con quanta prudenza, et diligentia, con quanta solecita prestezza, sia stata, da voi dissegnata, espurgata, fondata, et posta nel esser, che si trova, che non usi ogni arte, et sapere in lodarvi et essaltarvi? A' me veramente manca l'arte del ornato parlar, per poter far questo officio, ma non mancherà già mai il desiderio, ch' io tengo di far saper à chiunque non lo sapesse, ch'a questa così bell'opera non è stato mestieri di concorso d'altri maestri, non di varietà d'opinioni o consiglio, non molto spatio di tempo, non di gran spesa perché voi solo sete stato l'inventore, voi solo l'ingegnere, voi solo l'artefice, et maestro, in pochissimo tempo, con grandissimo sparagno di spesa, havete creati, et allevati questi undeci Baloardi, undeci vostri legitimi figlioli, fortissimi, et formidabili campioni, fermissimi, et securissimi difensori di questa patria.

Nella costrution di cotant'opera non havete havuto altri compagni, che i vostri pensieri, non havete havuto altri consigli, che le vostre fatiche, et vigilie, tutti gli altri aiuti sono stati estrinseci, et di nullo momento, anchor che per vostra modestia siate solito spesso di dire, che molti gentil'huomini di quella città siano stati di assai alleviamento delle vostre fatiche; ma in ciò io stesso posso render vera, et indubitata testimonianza, come quello che sono stato assistente in una parte di questa fabrica, et sò quello che io ho fatto, et parimente quello che gli altri poteano far, ch'è stato poco meno, che nulla. Percioché assai era a noi tenersi à mente i vostri disegni, assai ci era non scordarsi di vostri ordini, assai ci era raccordare à maestri i vostri commandamenti, altro del nostro non vi potemo dare, che conservar il vostro, altro aiuto non vi havemo dato, che commettere à gli artefici, che non si partissero punto dalle vostre commissioni, percioché tutto quello, che si operava di vostro ordine, era ottimo / [194'] et perfetto, et tutto quello che per avventura, gli altri o per ignorantia, o per arrogantia, faceano di sua mente, era mestieri di subito ruvinare, et rificare. Adunque cotali aiuti sono stati di sì poca importanza, che quasi insensibili chiamar si pono. Et come potemo noi con nostri bassi pensieri arrivar, et penetrar già mai i vostri alti disegni, per aiutarvi o consigliarvi. Se quello che voi nel principio di quest'opera ci promettete di voler far vedere, ci pareva non solamente difficile, ma incredibile, et impossibile, nulla di meno in spatio di tre mesi noi vedemmo, secondo la vostra promessa, quello di quella fabrica, che prima haveriamo più tosto potuto desiderare che sperare.

Et qual sarebbe stato (di voi in fuora) colui anchor che esertissimo in questa professione che dissegnando il baloardo Carafa, non si avesse del tutto perduto l'animo, considerando quanto arenoso terreno, quanta giara, quante acque, quanti edificij, quanti arbori, et piante et quante altre difficoltà, che vi erano intorno la sua foundatione, et pur voi solo con la vostra grand'arte, saper, et industria, havete reso ogni cosa possibile, ogni cosa facile, et l'havete ridotto in così picciol tempo alla maravigliosa forma, ch' ognun vede. Finalmente, qual era colui in questo Regno, che prima non avesse havuto terribil spavento per le grande alture, che sono fuori di questa città, parendo ad ognun impossibile il potersi schermir da esse. Tutta volta solo il vostro perfetto ingegno, sola la vostra divina prudenza ha fatto sì, che il baloardo Podocattaro manifestamente, et chiaramente dimostra quanto sia debole, quanto sia vana la opinion di coloro, che pensassero, il nemico potersi prevaler ultimamente di quelle montagne, per farci alcuna offesa.

O bene avventurata fortezza, poichè con verità leggitima, chiamar ti posso, essendo generata da un sol padre, poi che sicura sei, ch'altri adietro, non verranno a lacerarsi o il petto o i fianchi, per mutarli del esser tuo, come spesso suole avvenire di molte altre. Percioché qual sarà colui, che sapendo ti esser figliola di così gran genitore, che ardisca non pur offenderti, o lacerarti, ma riprenderti o biasmarti? Io son certo, et sicuro, che dovendosi honoratamente pubblicare per il mondo, che il parto di questa fortezza è generato della mente, et saper di così glorioso padre la diffenderà sempre, da qual si voglia ardimento, che potesse nascere nell'animo d'alcuno, che si pensasse d'offenderla con alcuna sorte di riprensione, o d'oppositione, ma quando pur il stimolo dell'emulatione accompagnata da quella certa affettata curiosità de gli huomini, con la qual spesse volte, si va penetrando, et toccando fino i luoghi sacri, et religiosi spengesse alcuno a voler far l'ufficio di Mommo intorno a questa fortezza, io mi rendo certissimo, che sarà cosa impossibile, che non si astegna, vedendo et conoscendo espressamente, con sì profondo saper situata, che più, che vi si mira a dentro, più vi si vedono rissorgero, d'ogni parte le regole tutte, che pono insegnar la vera via delle fortificationi.

Io per me non ho quella pratica, né quella esperienza, che saria necessaria ad'un che volesse compitamente contemplare li misterij di questa forteza, tutta volta a me pare, che quella picciol parte, che può esser scorta, et intesa da me potria dar copiosa materia, di farne sopra integri libri, et copiosi volumi. Io vedo, et considero il mirabil artificio, et modo, che havete voi illustrissimo signor usato, in construir tutte le parti di questa nova fabrica, che quanto è più differente da gli altri, tanto più, porge materia, a riguardanti di ammiratione, et contemplatione. Io so che gli altri baloardi ordinariamente si faceano prima con due piazze a ciaschedun fianco, et erano nominate le piazze / [195^r] da basso, et quelle d'alto, et ve n'erano anco delli baloardi con tre piazze una sopra l'altra, come a Corfù, et questo si faceva a fine, per haver più quantità d'artegliaria, che in un tratto sparassero verso la fronte del baloardo a se opposito, et vicino per difesa di quello. E questi nostri, fatti con una sol piazza, ponno meglio, et più commodamente far l'intendione, et effetto del fiancheggiare, et diffender l'altro baloardo con assai più numero de pezzi, che non si faceva di prima nelle altre fortificationi, con tutto che havessero due, et ancho tre piazze. Percioché per la grandezza di questi nostri, per la grandezza del fianco et della ben situata cortina, in un tratto ponno sparar commodissimamente sedeci pezzi de artegliaria grossa, se ben fossero da cento con le sue piazze tanto ampie, et spaciose, che di meglio desiderar non si poté. Oltra ancho, che in quelle più piazze delli baloardi di prima quelli di sopra causavano spesso impedimento, col fuoco a quelli da basso, il che a queste nostre non può in alcun modo avvenire!

Io veggio quanto industriosamente sono poste queste nostre cannonere. Come perfettamente scoprono tutta la cortina, et fronte del baloardo a se opposito, et anchora che quatro soli pezzi siano alle quatro cannonere, et dui alla barba dell'orecchione rispetto alli suoi orecchioni, et rispetto alla lunghezza delle trombe delle cannoniere, non ponno esser imboccate tutte sei, senno da un sito, lontano 260 passa. Nel qual sito anco non vi ponno star senno dui pezzi d'artegliaria al più, et le cannonere, che ponno esser imboccate, se intendono, quando il nemico possa commodamente mettere quatro, o sei pezzi degli suoi per poter imboccar una sola della fortezza, cento o al più 150 passa di lontananza, ma in questi nostri, come s'ha detto, nasce contrario effetto, perché la distantia è di 260 passa, et il sito del nimico è capace solamente di dui pezzi, o per dir meglio di due cannonere, et che questi dui pezzi soli del nimico habbiano a imboccare sei cannonere del nostro fianco, questo parerà ad ognuno impossibile, essendo che la minor forza sempre ha da cedere alla maggiore.

Considero un profundissimo antiveder vostro in formar questa notabile, et così ben intesa fortezza per viettare, et render vano ogni disegno del nimico. Imperochè una delle principal cagioni, che si havea opinione di potere espugnare tutte le fortezze, fatte per inanti (anchor che si spendesse qualche poca lunghezza di tempo) era perché quelli di fuori, essendo superiori di quantità d'artegliaria grossa, sì per far le battarie, come per imboccare, et essendo superiori di archibuggiaria, la qual per la commodità della campagna, immediate fuori delle fosse comparando levava talmente le difese, che quelli di dentro delle

fortezze, poteano contra l'espugnatione adoperar pocca artegliaria, pochissima archibuggiaria, et solamente la prima o seconda fila de fanti poteva combattere per far resistenza alle battaglie delli assalitori. Questa nostra fortificatione nuova, rende tutti questi effetti contrarij debolissimi, et vani. Percioché la numerosa artegliaria nemica, non ha muraglia, in che battere, non potendo vedere, quella, che è fatta per esser bassa, et posta sotto il pian della campagna, et non la vedendo, non la può offendere. Il voler imboccare i nostri fianchi è vano, sì per la distantia et lontananza, come per il pocco sito del nemico, come s'ha detto di sopra.

Del levar le difese alle battaglie delli defensori di dentro delli baloardi parimente, ha del impossibile, perché loro stanno alquanto più bassi del primo gran parapetto, della fronte del baloardo sopra l'orlo del contrafosso, che in un subito si può fare vicino al parapetto sudetto, et di dentro tra la Piazza, et in tutte due le meze cortine vicine al detto baloardo, si puonno accomodar perfettamente in battaglia, le migliaia de fanti, et le migliaia d'archibuggieri per combattere. Onde li nemici assalitori ponno combattere solamente con la sua prima fila della battaglia. Et le difese per il sito restano tolte da quelli di dentro a / [195^v] gli nemici di fuori, di modo che gli molti di dentro ponno combattere in un tempo contra li pochi primi, li quali venissero di fuori all'assalto, et convenendo la minor forza cedere alla maggiore, la qual maggiore sarà sempre in questa fortezza, et la forza del nemico di fuori venendo esser minore, li converrà cedere col tempo.

Oltra ciò jo scorgo in questa bellissima fortificatione, quando il nemico havesse intentione di far cavalieri con montagne di terra, il gran vantaggio, ch'ella hà, et della comodità, et del tempo. Imperoché li nostri baloardi, essendo altissimi, et spaciosissimi, con poca materia, et con gran prestezza ponno superar ogni disegno del nemico, et se alcun dicesse, ch'esso nemico di fuori può adoperar facilmente le diece migliaia d'huomini alla volta per lavorare, io rispondo, che X millia homini vogliono un gran spatio di terra, et sito per travagliarsi, di modo che maj potranno star coperti dalle artegliarie della nostra fortezza, la qual per la sua gran circonferentia molti baloardi incrosano la campagna, se veramente vorrano lavorar con pochi, poche facende faranno, oltre poi, che havendosi di dentro grandissima copia di terreno perfettissimo, et dovendosi ridur per salvarsi 100 millia anime, sempre ne saranno 40 millia pronti per poter lavorare, alzarsi et far ogni sorte di provisione per ostar all'intention del nimico, et se per sorte ancho venissero i far traverse in le fosse gli assai nemici non ponno star coperti dalle artegliarie de nostri fianchi, né da quelle delle cortine, le quali son tutte cavalieri per le sue altezze, se saranno pochi, le sortite grosse, le quali si poteano far commodissimamente dalle cannonere delli orecchioni, che sono 22. Non è dubio alcuno, che dove si ponno far le sortite commode, gagliarde, et grosse, che li nemici di fuori non habbiano per haver sempre il peggio.

Ma che dire se essi se immaginassero di far mine. Certo ogni lor opera vanissima, et con nullo effetto riuscirebbe, percioché nella mettade di questa nostra città, essendo fatta la cunetta profonda infino all'acqua, cotal fatto l'assicurato l'altra sua mittade, ha l'acqua viva tanto vicina al piano del fosso, che non vi si ha d'haver pensiero alcuno. Io cerco continuamente contemplando investigar l'alto giudicio vostro, che nella construction di questa fabrica havete adoperato, et veggio oltra gli altri gran misteri vostri, che quelli che con molta quantità de danari, et in spatio di molto tempo sogliono far gli altri nelle altre fortezze, voi con pochissima spesa, con grandissima celeritate fatte l'istesso effetto, et assai meglio. Imperoché oltra il non haver composti questi baloardi con due piazze, cosa soperfloa, havete scansato la spesa, et il tempo di 22 sortite, le quali sortite in altre fortezze sogliono costare li duo, et tre millia ducati l'una et voi in questa nostra le havete fatti con 12 travi l'una che vagliono 12 ducati, quali travi conserti insieme sono così mobili, et trattabili, che 15 huomini securamente mettono detta scala per la sortita, et la levano con quella facilità, et tempo che sogliono le galere metter et levar la loro scala, la qual poi resta tanto comoda et facile che li fanti ponno correre in su, et in giù commodissimamente a tre per fila, tanto che havete sopra una di queste sortite voi illustrissimo signor fatto ancho salire l'istesso vostro cavallo.

Queste operationi considerate in se stesse sono grandi, et maravigliose, ma tanto si fanno maggiori,

quanto è stato minor il tempo, che si ha speso intorno alla construction di quelle. Mi ricordo haver letto, che tra / [196^v] li fatti illustri et ammirandi di Giulio Cesare, vien connumerato, un gran cavalier di terra che fu fatto dal suo essercito, nell'espugnation, della fortissima città d'Avarico, oggi detto Viaron, il qual cavaliere per esser stato di lunghezza di passa sessantasei, et di altezza di passa sedeci, et fatto in spatio di 25 giorni, con haver continuamente affaticato, et notte, et giorno 40 millia delli suoi soldati, tutto il mondo il tiene, et commemora per un grandissimo fatto. In un baloardo de questi nostri senza dubio alcuno è stato portato maggior quantità di materia, essendo che le due fronti di ciascun baloardo sono lunghe più di 140 passa, et la circumferentia d'un sol baloardo con li suoi orecchioni, et fianchi è apunto 222 passa, et le altezze sono undeci in 12 passa. Tutti composti di terra, et acqua, materie greve, et non miste con fassine, et altri legnami leggieri, come l'istesso Cesare scrive in quel fatto, et se fosse alcuno, che non satisfacesse, né si contentasse di quello, aggiunga a ciaschedun baloardo la sua cortina, laqual è pur longa 158 passa, et larga 25 passa, et alta tanto che sopra domina la fronte del baloardo, et è pur cosa chiara, che una di queste cortine è più che non fu quel cavalier tanto nominato, et famoso. Hora havendo voi signore in questa nostra città fatto 11 effetti simili a quel gran cavaliere, anzi 22 connumerando le cortine, et tanto più degne di quello, quanto che in questi si scorgono bellissime misure, et regole, misterij, et secreti mirabilissimi, dove che in quello non vi era senno una massa per far una semplice altura, et li havette fatti in pochissimo tempo rispetto al maggior numero degli effetti, et con pochissima gente rispetto a quella di Cesare, è ben raggion, che l'età nostra, contemplando ancho, et ammirando cotali vostre operationi studi, et attenda con ogni sorte di degna essaltatione farle famose, et immortali.

Felice città di Nicosia, poi che a questi tempi ti ha concesso Iddio, vederti circuito, da così nobili, potenti, et maravigliose difese, percioché prima, che ti giovava l'esser posta sotto temperato cielo, sopra terreno di dolcissime acque, et delicatissimi frutti, fertile, habitata da molti nobili ricchi, et valorosi cavalieri. Se le tue mura erano debole, et fiacche, se le tue torri ruinate, et meschine, se le tue porte sconquassate, et quasi aperte. Se tu eri ad ogni incursione, non solo de potenti nemici, ma anchora de vilissimi corsari, ognora, et ogni tempo sottoposta. Se ad'ogni picciola sospetione di guerra, ti converria vederti abbandonata da tuoi cittadini, i quali per non aspettar la barbarica, et crudel furia, et per salvar la propria vita, et i figliuoli, non curando altre facultà, converria loro fuggendo proccacciarsi di qualche roccha, o castello. Quanto felice mutata sei dal primo stato. Quanto ti dei allegrare, et gloriare, vedendoti hora non solamente atta à diffenderti da qualunque forza, et adietro ributtar qualunque grande, et numeroso essercito. Ma anchora con la fama delle tue forze scemar, et rivolger adietro ogni disegno, et pensiero di qualunque potente nemico, che voglia havesse di far tua impresa. Quanto contento sentir ne dei, vedendo hora, i tuoi cittadini assicurati viveri, i lor giorni lieti, et tranquilli, dormirsi quieti, et riposati le notti, godere con allegro animo le facultà, et ricchezze loro, nudrire, et allevare, i cari figliuoli, securi, et certi, che habbiano a morire sotto il vessillo della vera fede di Christo, et sotto la felice, et benigna protectione del glorioso Imperio Venetiano.

Io non posso far valoroso signore considerando, che per le vostre continue fatiche, et continua perseveranza, la mia patria habbia conseguito, un così fermo, et perfetto stato, di non dolermi meco medesimo, a non potere / [196^v] esprimere con parole, il riconoscimento, che tutta quella città tiene di tanto ricevuto beneficio da voi. Percioché se in me fosse, quella arte del bel dire, quella efficatia di parole, che in cotal materia si richiede, et io stesso desidero, già vi saria palese, qual animo sia de tutti verso voi, già vedreste qual indissolubil nodo d'obbligo, et d'amore ci tiene strettamente ligati con voi, già hareste sentito tanti, et tali reingratiamenti, che quasi il guidardone andrebbe pari col beneficio. Ma poiché per difetto del mio ingegno, et per debolezza delle mie parole ciò far non posso, siate contento voi prendendo esempio dal Signor Dio, qual si paga più della pura et bona intentione, che delle molte opere, penetrando nell'intrinseco de nostri cuori appagarvi della nostra bona voluntà, et in questa vostra partenza siate certo, et sicuro, che già mai da noi si partirà la memoria delle vostre alte virtù, et grande

opere, la qual partita, si come a noi è di grandissimo dolore, restando privi della vostra dolcissima, et utilissima conversatione, così all'incontro ci è di non picciola consolatione, vedendovi andare in quella inclita città di Venetia, da quelli benignissimi, et sapientissimi padri, i quali si come sono i più pacifici, i più riposati principi christiani del mondo, così conoscendo loro per vostra virtù esser partorito quasi una ferma pace, et una riposata quiete a questo suo fidelissimo, et carissimo Regno, non si satiarano, di accogliervi, abbracciarvi, lodarvi, et honorarvi, et noi de qui udendo i vostri gradi, et honori, sentiremo quella allegrezza, che si richiede al grande amore, et obbligo nostro verso voi. Voi poscia nobilissimi cavalieri in questa partenza con le braccia della mente corrette ad abbracciare questo signore, et in vece di statue, archi, et trofei (che gli si devriano meritamente fare) tenendo scolpita, et impressa l'immagine delle sue rare virtù nelle viscere di vostri cuori, cercate di edificare negli animi vostri, et di vostri figliuoli, et posterì, una di lui honorata et sempiterna memoria.

2. PAOLO FLATRO

We do not have much information on Paolo Flatro: he was the son of Fabrizio, and in 1556 attended the University of Padua,²³ graduating in arts on 20 December 1557.²⁴ He might also have been part of the Cypriot historiographical renaissance; according to Enrico Caterino Davila, he was the author of the work *Diarii*, later used by Giovanni Francesco Loredano in his *Historie de' re Lusignani*.²⁵ While Giovanni Podocataro's speech addresses the honoured Giulio Savorgnan directly, Flatro refers to him in the third person. His speech is full of sentimentality and often powerful and realistic images, especially when expressing negative emotions. Flatro often refers to the need for respect and obedience to one's homeland, family and religion; in fact, his speech displays a more pious character than that of Nicolò Robusto, who was a cleric.

The central theme of Flatro's eulogy is the satisfaction the Cypriots felt with Savorgnan's work, "made with divine inspiration", for which he should be praised and acclaimed. The fortress is an accomplishment of "great judgement, prudence and mastery that will remain unique and exemplary [...] for centuries to come". He points out the fact that Cyprus has over time become the last Christian state in the Eastern Mediterranean, and asserts that there is nothing his fellow citizens could be more grateful for than the completion of this "infinitely desired" work, which means they no longer need to worry about being surrounded by the enemy so far from Venice. The new fortification was a much-needed protection against the Ottomans' barbarity and ferocity. He obviously does not want to offend the Venetian authorities, whom he acknowledges as wise and vigilant with regard to the safety of their subjects, but he remembers that for many decades Cyprus did not possess adequate defences, even though its geographical position, so close to "the mouth of such a great serpent", meant they were a necessity. He then addresses the people of Nicosia, urging them, in a slightly dramatic and extremely vivid way, to imagine the suffering and destruction that would have been wrought had the Ottomans invaded an unfortified town. Their barbaric fury would have seen them ruin, steal and burn everything,

23 Dalla Francesca / Veronese (eds), *Acta graduum academicorum*, p. 239; Rudt de Collenberg, *Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes*, p. 18. 24 "Promotores: d. Marcus Antonius Ianua insignivit, d. Hieronymus Maripetrus, d. Speronus Speronus, d. Odo de Odis, d. Franciscus Frizimelega, d. Paulus Crasus, d. Bernardinus tomitanus, d. Ioannes Baptista Balneatus, d. Valerius Terentius, d. Iacobus Zabarella comes. Testes: rev. d. Andreas Zacharias archidiaconus et d. Franciscus Maria de Nores canonicus Leucosienses Ciprii, d. Andreas Ericius Venetus, d. Matheus Singlitico Leucosiensis, d. Solomon de Rubeis, d. Nicolaus de Christianis Amocostenses Cyprii, d. Hieronymus Iulianus Veronensis artium et medicinae doctor": Dalla Francesca / Veronese (eds), *Acta graduum academicorum*, pp. 285–286. 25 Grivaud, 'Ο πνευματικός βίος', pp. 1153–1154 n. 116; id, *Entrelacs chiprois*, p. 257.

“snatching the virgins from their mothers’ breasts and separating wives from their husbands”; they would have used every kind of violence imaginable, since they are believed to be “rapacious wolves, greedy for prey and blood”. Had such great destruction occurred in Nicosia, the people would have lamented their inability to defend their loved ones and their property, both public and private. Flatro remarks that the fortress of Famagusta alone would not have been able to contain much of the population or to repel the great numbers of invaders. The orator believes deeply that, seeing the risk that such disasters might fall upon a pious Christian population, God gave the Venetian governors the wisdom to send Giulio Savorgnan to Cyprus and make the capital secure enough to confront the infidel enemy. He presents the Friulian engineer as Nicosia’s saviour in the face of atrocious Ottoman warfare. His descriptions of the destruction and torture that he believes would have ensued if Cyprus had been conquered suggest that he may have heard or read some of the contemporary European literature on the brutality and uncivilized nature of Ottoman soldiers.²⁶

As a member and representative of the council of Nicosia’s nobles and leading figures, Flatro expresses their satisfaction with the final decision, also supported by Savorgnan himself, to build a new fortification for Nicosia instead of enlarging the existing fortress of Famagusta or creating a new one at the coastal towns of Limassol, Cerines or Baffo. Flatro remembers that initially there was the plan to build a citadel that would contain only the noble inhabitants of Nicosia, but after the intervention of the Venetian *provveditore generale*, Francesco Barbaro, the choice of constructing a bigger fortification prevailed. Flatro explains that what made the newly-built walls of Nicosia so impregnable and admirable was the fact that the external curtain wall was covered with earth; in this way the impact of the cannon balls fired at it could be largely absorbed, rendering the walls more compact and solid.²⁷ If, on the other hand, the fortification had been built with stones and mortar alone, the enemy artillery would have been able to break it and use the debris as a ladder to climb up the walls and enter the town. Furthermore, the enemy could never launch an assault on the fortification for two important reasons: firstly, because Nicosia’s new walls have “big, strong and secure” flanks, as various experts have said, and secondly, because of the innovative character of the bastions, which, unlike other bastions elsewhere, had been built with an obtuse angle, not acute, making any enemy operations extremely “difficult and dangerous”.

The orator then speaks of the short duration (seven to eight months) and modest cost (115,000 ducats) of Savorgnan’s fortification project, both of which were “incredible but true, and part of the reason the fortress and its shape were so unique”. Nicosia’s new fortress was admirable not only for its perfect form, but also because the construction of its eleven bastions cost less than just one of the Famagusta fortification’s bastions;²⁸ also, contrary to the norm, the new fortress used no timber, thus preserving the island’s woods. Savorgnan’s contribution to the success of the project was overwhelming: he worked tirelessly, controlling every single aspect of the construction, day and night, in cold and hot weather, as a supervisor and as a labourer, together with other praiseworthy men, such as Leonardo Roncone,²⁹ the captain of the infantry who helped Savorgnan in his task of analysing the island’s defences and deciding on what was needed to secure it against an eventual Ottoman invasion. The

26 L. Libby Jr., *Venetian views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus*, in *Sixteenth-Century Journal* IV/9 (1978), pp. 103–126. 27 Nevertheless, this earthen cloak was not fully finished, nor was the moat filled with water before the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus; see *supra*, pp. 541–542. 28 On the expense and the mistakes involved in the fortification of Cerines and Famagusta, see Hale, ‘L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel ’500’, pp. 298–302; on the general Cypriot defences before 1570, see V. Costantini, *Il sultano e l’isola contesa. Cipro tra eredità veneziana e potere ottomano*, Torino, UTET, 2009, pp. 46–51; see also *supra*, pp. 79–90, 113–121, 259–276. 29 Listed among the paid officials and infantrymen who died or were imprisoned by the Ottomans, in Coumariou (ed.), *Επιμεροτικά δοτικά φύλλα (1570–1572)*, p. 106.

new fortification turned Nicosia into a perfect town; to its already considerable assets of a healthy climate and abundant water could now be added security. Fortune or providence was also favourable to Nicosia's new fortress: no impediments arose, no errors in measurements were made, no difficulties were encountered in digging the foundations, no bad weather conditions delayed the works, and Savorgnan enjoyed good health from the start of the project to the finish.

Throughout his speech, Flatro highlights the desperation of the Cypriots, who were totally aware of an imminent Ottoman attack on their island. The completion of Nicosia's walls put the local population's minds at rest: the appearance of an enemy vessel in Cypriot waters had previously been enough for the islanders to flee their homes and seek refuge in the mountains or in Famagusta's small fortress. But when, at the beginning of the Nicosia fortification project, in the summer of 1568, the whole Ottoman fleet sailed near to Cyprus, no one ran away, neither from within the town nor from the countryside, due to the great sense of security created by the overall military policy Venice had introduced. Flatro is well informed on the recent history of the Venetian Republic, and recalls in detail the episode of the war against the League of Cambrai, when Giulio's father, Girolamo Savorgnan, defended his Osoppo castle in Friuli against the troops of Emperor Maximilian, who had already conquered almost all of the Republic's territory on the Venetian mainland; Giulio is roundly acknowledged as being as valiant and brave as his father. Flatro regrets not being able to fully express the gratitude all Cypriots have towards him, even those whose houses had to be demolished in order to reduce the circumference of the walls, as they can now forget their despair and enjoy the safety the new fortification gives them. He concludes his eulogy with warm wishes for Savorgnan on his departure, also underlining the Nicosian nobility's devotion to and affection for the Venetian Republic, to whom Savorgnan should report the Cypriot population's obedience upon his arrival in Venice. Should the enemy try to attack the island, the Cypriots would readily fight and die for the flag of the "just and virtuous Republic", and Savorgnan's fortress will always stand in his memory and to his eternal glory.

THE TEXT³⁰

[Oratione di Paolo Flatro fatta all'Illustrissimo Signor Conte Giulio Savorgnano per la fortificazione della città di Nicossia sua Patria]

[189^r] Alli 6 di Maggio

La sicurezza, et tranquillità che i popoli di questo Regno s' hanno acquistato per opera delle virtù di vostra signoria illustrissima, eccellentissimo signore; et l'immortale beneficio, che noi riconosciamo dall'altezza del suo sublime et divino ingegno; ricerca, et vuole, anzi oblige per ragione, et costringe, in questa partita sua dall'isola, dopo tante fatiche intraprese per tutta questa Università; che noi non possiamo con silenzio i suoi degni, et prestanti meriti; non già per meglio con le parole esplicarli, che son sì fattamente espressi nell'opere vive del magnanimo suo valore, che né fortuna, né morte in verun tempo non è possente di cancellarli; ma per mostrare a vostra signoria illustrissima in vece degli infiniti honori, che noi le dobbiamo, oltre tutte le forze nostre, qualche buon segno almeno della gratitudine de nostri cuori. Imperoché per quale altra occasione doveremo più grati, et ricordevoli dimostrarci noi cittadini dell'isola, et regno di Cipro, posti in queste ultime parti di Oriente; lontani per tanta distantia di terra, et di

³⁰ ASV, *Secreta, Materie Miste Notabili*, reg. 11, ff. 189^r–192^v and Archivum Sancti Eremiti Camaldoli, *cod. 1711*, ff. 185^r–202^r. For this transcription we have followed the text held in the Venetian archives, giving the differences present in the Camaldoli text in the footnotes.

mare dal seggio dell'imperio de nostri Signori; attornati dalla potentia de Turchi atrocissimi inimici del nome, et della fede nostra; che per esser fatti securi col mezzo di una fortezza infinitamente desiderata a poter vivere, et conservarsi con la posterità nostra nella religione di Giesù Christo, sotto l'ombra, et governo della Republica Vinitiana, ove il servire è libertà, et signoria? Conciosia che, se bene dalla sapientia, et vigilantia di quel eccelso Dominio, che ha tanta cura di suoi fideli, fossimo continuamente con ogni industria riguardati; nulladimeno la qualità del paese, senza alcuna fortezza, ove si havessero potuto salvar le genti nelle occasioni; la potentia, la vicinità et il veleno di questo gran serpente, nelle fauci del quale si ritroviamo; la lontananza delli sperati sussidij, rendevano lo stato nostro pericolosissimo et mortale. Et avegnadio, che havessero potuto ricorrer nella città di Famagosta et X et XX et XXX mila³¹ persone; nelle restanti che è habitata, et ripiena l'isola, rappresentatevi voi o' cittadini, et con l'esempio di molti regni, di tanti popoli esterminati dalla ferocità, et rabbia degli infedeli, ponetevi avanti gli occhi, che sorte de stratij haverebbero essi fatto contra noi, quando havessero posto il piede in terra, di volontà del Signor Iddio.

A me pare per mia fede, non solamente veder sottosopra, et in estermínio tutte le possessioni nostre fuori per il contado; ma penetrando in questa città di Nicossia nostra patria, dissinta di mura, priva di ogni difesa, et esposta finalmente tutta al barbarico lor furore; o prenderla, et fortificarsi in essa, come in sedia principale; o deliberando di partirsi ruinar, et ardere tanti nobili habitatori, tante commodità della vita fatte con infiniti sudori da noi, et da nostri progenitori; rubbar, et saccheggiar tutte le cose pubbliche, et private con desolatione estrema; et procedendo più oltre rapir dal seno delle madri le virginelle, i piccoli figlioli dal braccio de padri loro; scompagnar le matrone dal lato de lor mariti, et contra tutti usar mille nefandi vituperij, et vergogne. Et come rapacissimi lupi solo di preda, et di sangue bramosi, non perdonar né a sesso, né a età, né cessar mai dalla crudeltà loro, insino attanto, che non habbiano contaminato il tutto della barbarie loro, con riempir ogni cosa di confusione di corpi morti, et di sangue. Immaginatevi appresso Signori quante voci, quanti gridori, quanti pianti, et ululati mestissimi si haveriano in tali avvenimenti uditi delle donne, de fanciulli nostri figliuoli cordialissimi, et d'ogn' altra qualità di persone, co i capelli sparsi, con la barba bruttata, con battersi il viso, et il petto, chiamando l'un l'altro, ma in vano, con voce piena di compassione, interrotta da profondi sospiri. Discorrete finalmente in che stato si sarebbero ritrovati i pochi assediati nella città di Famagosta, che lacrimevole, et pericolosa guerra sarebbe loro stata fatta con tanti / [189^v] esserciti, et con l'aiuto principalmente de paesani captivi! Et se pur in ultimo non havesser potuto espugnarli, che ben saria restato loro doppio l'haver perduto l'honor de suoi, la facultà, alzar gli ochij, et mirar il fumo delle ruine, et dell'incendio della patria, ascender fino al cielo! Et desolato poi il paese di habitanti, et agricoltori, veder menar via tante anime tutte captive, incatenate, fori della patria, et de nidi loro in alieni paesi non conosciuti, et sforzarli con ogni sorte di crudeltà, et tormento a rinegare la fede di Giesù Christo! O' spettacolo abbominevole pieno di infinita commiseratione; et tale che l'animo si sgomenta, la lingua né può, né vuole più raggonarne.

A queste cose, et a mille altre profonde miserie, et inenarrabili calamità, nelle quali per opinione saldissima de tutti gli huomini che si governano con vero discorso di ragione, saressimo potuti con molta facilità miserabilmente traboccare; l'alto et eterno Iddio, che sopravanza infinitamente con la sua misericordia tutti i peccati nostri, rivolgendo gli ochij della pua Pietà, ha posto in animo a quelli christianissimi, et pietosissimi nostri padri, et protettori di mandare voi signore illustrissimo dotato di quella virtù, grandezza, et nobiltà di spirito, che è nota a ciascheduno, per riparare a tante afflittioni, a tanti mali, et pericoli, che ci soprastavano con qualche oportuna fortificatione. La quale essendo novellamente incominciata, et perfetta con pochissima incommodità, et spesa, con incredibile prestezza, con nobilissima riuscita, non in aggrandir Famagosta, non in Cerines, non nelli promotorij di Limisso et di Baffo,

31 *Mila* in the Venetian text reads *millia* in the Camaldoli text.

ma nella città propria di Nicosia nostra patria, nelle antiche habitation nostre, nella terra, ove noi siamo nati; in quella che copre i nostri parenti sotto la temperie di questo cielo, che ci ha nutriti. Quanto dobbiamo esser allegri? Quanto contenti? Quante gratie render dobbiamo a nostro Signor Iddio? Quante a sua Serenità? Et finalmente quante a voi signore illustrissimo authore di un tanto bene? Se dunque la contentezza de noi è d'ogni parte per ciò grandissima, come si vede, in quanta gloria dovremo tener, che sia per salire, et innalzarsi vostra signoria illustrissima per tutti i secoli nella memoria de buoni; poi che ella con sì ardente inclinatione ha operato, et riposto in un reame antichissimo, verso tanti popoli christiani, esposti ad infiniti pericoli, un beneficio per grandezza, et dignità incomparabile, solo rimedio della salvezza, et conservazione de tutti noi?

Hora è ben ragione, che in questo passo del mio parlare con grata memoria si ricordi, che mentre si discorreva intorno ad una materia tale, et se in questa terra si dovesse fare o una cittadella per conservazione di pochi, et di nobili; o reder la città in fortezza, et farla grande, et capace delle genti dell'isola; et dependendo il tutto dall'eccellentissimo signor Francesco Barbaro Proveditor generale del Regno; se bene i ricordi, et pareri havuti in tal materia fossero per diverse cause ristretti, et varij molto; fu non dimeno tanta la consideratione, che sua eccellentissima Signoria hebbe all'interesse, et al commodo di questa patria riguardata sempre con occhio di paterna charità; et tanta la prudentia sua nel discorrer, et giudicar di tutte le cose necessarie, et debite, che non si partendo punto dalla intentione di sua Serenità, laquale finalmente si rimetteva alla prudentia, et al giuditio di chi havea da essere personalmente in sul luogo; fece [tal rresolutione] con voi signor illustrissimo confidandosene, et riposando nella grandezza del valor vostro, che pare indubitamente dall'essito delle cose, che l'alta maestà del Signor Dio con lo Spirito Suo vi fosse principio, mezzo, et fine.

Per la qual cosa voglio creder che in questa parte d'oratione qualcheduno desiderarebbe, che io mi fermassi, / [190^e] et per officio convenevole, et debito io rivolgessi il parlar mio alle laudi di sua eccellentissima signoria in dimostrare non tanto le cose fatte da lei per tutto il corso della sua honoratissima vita ne [i] tempi di pace, et di guerra gloriosamente; la giustitia et humanità sua singolare; la somma religione, onde ella va adorna fra tutti i senatori christiani. Ma principalmente in essaltar la prudentia sua divina, con la quale si è governata in istabilire le cose di questo regno con la presente fortificatione. Ma io considerando il soggetto, onde io mi son mosso a ragionare essere suo proprio, et particolare, non mi distorrò dal cominciato proposito; perché mentre io ragiono del alto valor dell'illustrissimo signor conte Giulio Savorgnano tanto diletto da sua clarissima Signoria et delle degne, et pellegrine operationi di lui, nelle quali ella tanto si è compiaciuta; che altro di gratia vengo io ad essaltare, che gli effetti, et la nobilissima riuscita della ottima deliberatione del clarissimo Barbaro Proveditore general del Regno? Et finalmente che altro vengo io a preparare con la oratione mia, che un quasi specchio di cristallo chiarissimo, nel quale a ciaschedun, che vi mira, riflettendo suoi raggi, apparisca ammirabile la faccia, et lo splendor delle sue divine virtù; alle quali presso la sua illustrissima patria, palma, et corona convenevole, sarà preparata, et offerta.

Continuando dunque la oratione per lo suo camino; quantunque io sia certo, esser cosa sommente difficile specialmente a me homo di assai meno che di mediocre intelletto, lo agguagliar con parole, et arrivar con degni passi le rare qualità, et conditioni di questa fortezza nuova di Nicosia; et niuno altro poter con dignità ragionarne, che voi illustrissimo signore, et eccellentissimo solo, che nella idea del vostro sapientissimo animo la dissegnaste, et con tanta virtù la conduceste a perfettione; nondimeno per dimostrare in qualche parte la grandissima cagione, che noi habbiamo di rallegrarsi con noi medesimi, et render gratie a vostra signoria illustrissima, trascorrendone toccherò qualcheduna delle infinite sue laudi non commune con altre, se non come io devrò, come almeno saprà dettarmi la picolezza del mio ingegno. Ma come potrò io già mai con la bassezza del mio stile alla grandezza, et meraviglia di una tal opera sodisfare? Perché opera di grandezza, et meraviglia è veramente il vedere piantata una fortezza tutta nuova, senza haver alcun riguardo alla circonferentia della vecchia città di

forma rotonda perfettissima con XI gran castella, per non dir beloardi³² attorno, di misura, et equalità simigliantissimi. Onde dalla proportion, et corrispondenza che ha ciascuna sua parte inverso l'altra resuscita una bellezza singolare, che fa stupire chi la riguarda.

Opera di grandezza, et meraviglia; parimente è da considerare con quanto arteficio, et magisterio si difenda, quasi valentissimo schermidore, che hor ripara alli colpi dell'inimico, hora con impeto lo percuote, et offende. Si deffende mirabilmente, mentre per quella parte, che si può scoprir dal piano della campagna in su, tutta è formata di terragli di segnalata grandezza, senza alcun muro di pietra, et calcina, et china indentrovia, come si vede, in maniera, che batta pur l'inimico, quanto vuole, non solamente non causerà mai ruina per farsi scala nelle fosse, ma più tosto battendo assoderà il terreno, il quale per qualità sua, et per la forma, che gli è stato dato, riceverà, et salverà in se quante palle di ferro verrà in opinione all'inimico di trargli incontra. Cose et effetti, che non avvengono alle ordinarie forme delle mura di tutte le altre città forti, che siano hoggidi al mondo; le quali havendo le cortine, i beloardi, et tutta la circonferentia loro da capo a piedi murata di pietra et calcina, eminente, et diritta, si fanno li inimici per le facili ruine, et cadute nella fossa, causate dall'artegliaria / [190^v] una quasi scala commodissima per salire. Appresso questa rara, anzi singolar forma delle muraglie, onde si può difendere così gagliardamente, come si è detto; essendo per ragion, et per regola di guerra infallibile, et indubitata, che l'inimico per grande, et poderoso che sia, non ardisce mai di farsi inanzi, et rappresentarsi verso le cortine per dare assalto; se prima non habbia levato a forza di cannonate le difese; le quali comunemente parlando non sono altro principalmente che quelli, che noi fianchi chiamiamo.

Hor questi essendo nella nostra fortezza (per giudizio degli intendenti, et di quanti capitani, et soldati ci sono stati) grandi, forti, et securi, oltre ad ogni comparatione; ci nasce conclusione fermissima, et indubitata, che l'inimico non potrà assalir mai la città nostra per mezzo delle cortine, essendo quelle gagliardamente difese dalle cannonere de fianchi inconvincibili. Et quando pur volesse combatter la terra per mezzo la fronte de beloardi, l'impresa sua si renderebbe difficile, et pericolosa; conciosia che quella parte, oltre la difesa che essa riceve delle cannonere de fianchi, è difesa ancora mirabilmente dalle cortine, per l'arteficio, et magisterio divino, di che questo signore eccellentissimo oltre l'ordinario de tutte le fortezze del mondo, per haver fatto i beloardi, non acuti, ma ottusi ha dotato questa di Nicosia, in maniera, che come le cortine sono difese dalli fianchi de beloardi, così per rendere quasi il contracambio, tutta la metà di ciascuna cortina batte sì impetuosamente, et scova con tanta gagliardia ogni machinatione, che si volesse far nella fronte et fossa di ciascun beloardo, che è quasi impossibile, che l'inimico vi possa dare assalto alcuno. Ma quando si potesse, superando ogni difficoltà, assalire per le fronti de beloardi; le fosse, che s'apparechiano di dentro via presso il parapetto di ciascun beloardo, et la offesa, che si potria fare per entro via di quelle, all'inimico da tutta la altra metà di ciascuna cortina, che sarà eminente, et alta tanto, che scopre commodamente tutta la piazza del beloardo; aggiunta la resistentia delli archibugi, et delle picche che stanno in mano de valorosi soldati; rendono difficile, anzi vanissimo qualunque sforzo, et assalto dell'inimico.

Breve parlo Signori, ma non sì oscuro, che chiaramente non si comprenda in qual modo le forze et le gratie tutte d'una perfetta providentia, et arte siano concorse dall'alta virtù incomparabile dell'illustrissimo Savorgnano per far quest'opera inespugnabile da forze humane. Ma chi ha veduto, letto, o sentito dir mai, che in sì breve spatio di tempo di sette in otto mesi, che tanto fanno posti insieme tutti, i giorni del lavoro, con cento e quindici mila ducati, cosa incredibile, ma verissima, s'habbia fondato una pianta di fortezza tutta nuova in beltà, et in magisterio rara, anzi singolare al mondo! Chi non ammirerà infinitamente l'ingegno, et l'eccellenza dell'autthore, vendendoli a notitia la eccessiva spesa, che vi è andata nella fortificatione de diverse città, non solo d'altri principi, et potentati, ma della Serenissima

32 *Beloardi* in the Venetian text reads *balloardi* in the Camaldoli text.

Signoria nostra al paragone di questa di Nicosia! Chi non stupirà a sentire, che in uno beloardo solo della nostra città di Famagosta vi sia corso spesa di cento vinticinque mila ducati, et in questa di Nicosia con XI grandissimi beloardi, capace ogn'uno de quattro mila soldati, da starvi in battaglia in sua difesa; fino al presente non ci sia³³ corsa spesa di maggior momento?

Hor le caggioni di così gran miracoli, che apparvero al mondo a tempi nostri, sono stati le forze dell'alto, et sublime ingegno di questo eccellentissimo signore, non solo per haver fatto fare li suoi lavorij, nella maniera, et con quel bell'ordine, che è noto a ciascheduno; et l'esempio mostrato in buona parte per incamisciarla con le mura sottili, senza speroni in dentro, non più alto, che quanto viene / [191^r] a corrisponder alla scoperta del piano della campagna. Ma l'haverla costrutta, et fabricata tutta (invention nuova, et rara, anzi sola, et unica al mondo) senza pur un palo, per non dir senza quell'infinito consumamento de pali, de fascine, et d'ogn'altra qualità di legnami, che fitti, et concatenati per entro via li terragli delli beloardi, et delle cortine hanno usato tutti gli altri fortificatori, et capitanti d'intraponere per fondamento principalissimo delle fabbriche loro con infinita spesa di precipi, et con ruina di boschi, delle selve, de regni et de paesi. Nelle qual operationi chi potrebbe raccontare a pieno con quanta industria, et sollecitudine si avolgesse? Quante cure, quante vigilie, quanti studij, et pensieri v' habbia consumato, et speso? Con quanti sudori si afficasse? Si meravigliavano, et stupivano tutti a vedere, et considerare con quanta assiduità, et costantia si travagliava in girar di continuo la città tutta a smontare, a dissegnare, a ordinare, a rivedere, a remesurare, a emmendare, a redur ogni cosa, benché minima a perfezzione, senza mai riposo alcuno; anzi come il cielo nel suo continuo uniforme giro, in queste fatiche sole si riposava. O quante altre cose da lui fatte a riuscita di questa nobile, et magnanima sua impresa nella mente scritte, vo trapassando io in particolare, che sono uno fra la innumerabil turba, che levai al miracolo della sua virtù da principio gl'occhi? Dirò solo, non potendo con debile, et imperfetto ragionamento, qual è il mio, sodisfar alla aspettatione di tanti nobilissimi huomini, i quali per haver veduto, et con meraviglia osservato tutte le sue laudevoli attioni, per avventura non piacerebbe loro, che da me veruna di quelle sia scordata o tacciata; che riconosciuto con providentia il sito, dissegnato con le proprie mani, et co'l suo altissimo intelletto illustrato dalli studij della philosophia, la meravigliosa forma della fortezza; informato per esperienza delle cose del mondo, et di tutte le famose fortezze; et del modo di difenderle, et di oppugnarle; diede principio, et così bene avventurosamente egli in persona mattina, et sera, al freddo, al caldo, alla polvere, alle pioggie continuò, et fornì l'opera incominciata; che come ha prudentemente, et con verità detto, et predicato più volte l'illustrissimo signor Lonardo Roncone dignissimo Governador delle ordinanze del Regno, gentilhuomo raro a tempi nostri, et capitano, in cui risplende infinita virtù, informatissimo per esperienza delle operationi del signor Giulio, havendo accompagnato, come ogn'un sa, le infinite fatiche di lui con altre tante fatiche a servizio di sua Serenità. Non solo fece questo signore et essequì compiutamente l'ufficio di Capitano illustre, di Governador Generale, d'ingegnere giudiciosissimo, et sapientissimo, ma per servire al prencipe suo condescese con dignità all'ufficio di proto, di maestro, di scrivano, di soprastante, et finalmente all'infimo ufficio di lavoratore istesso per inalzare gloriosamente il servizio fatto alla Republica Vinitiana. O fatti, et gesti di pregio, et di singular essistimatione, da esser non solamente attesi, et mirati, ma ancora raccolti, et scritti ad uno ad uno con degna, et essemplar exaltatione.

In questa fortezza dunque dotata da così rari privilegij non communi con alcun'altra; inespugnabile per forze humane; capace per dar ricetto nelle occasioni a più di cento mila persone; commodissima da habitare rispetto al sito, all'aere soavissimo, et sano, et all'abbondanza, et perfezzione dell'aque; felicemente incominciata, et perfetta; nelle tempeste della navigatione del viver nostro, in tempi torbidi, et procellosi per sottrarsi dalla robbia de crudeli, et impetuosi inimici, come in uno sicuro, et tranquillo

33 In the Camaldoli text *fu* instead of *sia*.

porto haverem da ricorrere, et da riposare. Percioché in essa alloggiati commodamente li figliuoli, le moglie, le famiglie, et le sostantie nostre, fatti liberi d'ogni sospetto, possiamo in ogni occasione con li animi securissimi, o star fori in campagna alle difese necessarie del paese, o se costretti da forza maggiore a ritirarsi; possiamo combattendo uniti con segnalato ardore per la fede, et religione di Giesù Christo, per l'honore, per la degnità del prencipe, per la patria, per li figliuoli, per la vita, et facultà, difendersi sotto lo scudo, et riparo di questa ammiranda fortificatione, et sperar certa, et indubitata vittoria con l'aiuto del magno, et eterno Iddio. Con la santa beneditione del quale, creder certo dobbiamo, che'l tutto sia previsto, cominciato, et condotto a fine, volendo che per mezzo / [191^v] le virtù di suoi eletti, i popoli suoi fedeli siano in questa vita dalla Sua gratia conservati. Segni di questa verità ci sono tutti i successi delle cose avvenute per il passato; lasciamo star quell'ova, che di permissione della divina volontà ci sono nate in su'l principio della fortificatione, segnate d'una circonferentia de XI angoli, quasi volesser significare li undeci grandissimi beloardi, percioche parrà forse ad alcuno consideration dell'antichità, fondata nel Paganesimo. Che diremo di questi altri veri misteri, onde furono favoreggiati tutti i disegni di questo Signore Illustrissimo da principio fin alla fine; in non haver preso in così grandi, et perplesse mesurationi errore di alcun momento? In haver trovato il terreno, et le profondità, dove a punto operava corrispondenti al desiderio suo; là dove che un pocco più oltre passando, sarebbero stati rissorti da rocche, da giare, et d'altri accidenti impedimenti non mediocri; in essere stato il cielo benigno sempre, et largo nel vivere humano; et esso signore illustrissimo per tanto spatio di tempo in così ardenti soli, in un aere non usitato, in tante et sì smesurate fatiche, sempre sano, sempre gagliardo, sempre senza risentimento alcuno? Ma qual più chiaro, et migliore augurio, o misterio della sicurezza nostra ne potrebbe essere dimostrato, che la dove altre fiatae per la comparitione di pochi legni di corsali si mettevano le genti dell'isola in tanta fuga, et spavento, che non c'era alcuno, che non abbandonasse il tutto, et solo pensasse di ricorrere per salvarsi, o nelle montagne, o nella piccola fortezza di Famagosta; l'anno passato, benché eravamo in grandissimi dubbi, et sospetti di guerra, et sia anco tantosto che la fortezza si ridusse in qualche stato, comparsa sprovvedutamente in questi mari, et ne' liti di quest'isola (cosa strana, et insolita) tutta l'armata del Gran Signor Turco col suo Generale; nondimeno non fu alcuno, che tanto o quanto s'impaurisse o che si distogliesse dagli affari, et essercitij suoi così dentro nella città, come di fuori. La qual sicurezza, et tranquillità non è alcuno così privo di lume, o di così maligno giudicio, che ad altri la possa, et debba ragionevolmente attribuire, che alla certezza, che ogn'uno haveva viva in mezzo il cuore di poter esser difeso, et salvato da questa fortezza ammirabile, et dal singolar valore di questo eccellentissimo capitano; il quale come l'ha prudentemente, et con elevato giudicio da principio fondata, così con virile animo l'havria difesa fin alla fine, ad imitatione et con l'esempio dell'illustrissimo signor conte Girolamo Savorgnano suo padre, huomo come dicono le historie del mondo, et dicono il vero, valorosissimo, et in pace, et in guerra.

Questo Signore fra le sue altre gloriose operationi l'anno del 14 nel tempo che la illustrissima Signoria per la Lega de tutti i prencipi fatta già sin del 9 venne a perder quasi tutto il suo Stato; si era messo a difendere Osopo suo proprio castello, solo rimasto nel Friuli nella devotione della Republica. All'assedio del quale, quantunque Christophoro Francapane valoroso Tedesco, et atrocissimo nemico del nome de Vinitiani, si aventasse per l'Imperator Massimiliano con cinque mila soldati veterani affinati per lungo tempo nelle guerre d'Italia, et altri con una grossa banda di cavalli scielitissimi, et lasciata ogni altra impresa da canto si rissolvesse di non partire dal Friuli fino che non havesse espugnato Osopo, per non lasciarsi adietro un luogo sì forte, et guardato da sì valoroso huomo. Il conte nondimeno tantosto che seppe l'intentione degli inimici, si fortificò col presidio che havea seco, nulla stimando lo sforzo de i furibondi Tedeschi; i quali avvicinatasi finalmente cominciarono a battere, et la terra, et la rocca del castello con trenta pezzi de artiglieria per molti giorni con tanta furia di palle, che aprendosi la muraglia in diversi luoghi fu per più di quattro volte in diversi tempi dati ferocissimi assalti. Ma il Savorgnano vigilantissimo capitano, et soldato, che havea non solo alla difesa fatto con le armi il debito apparecchio,

ma con gli altri artificij da guerra di oglio bollente, di calcina, et di simil altre cose, se gli oppose sempre in tutti gli assalti con tanta bravura, / [192^r] che non potendo i Tedeschi resistergli, si ritirarono dall'impresa. In Vinegia andata la nuova dell'assedio, et di questi successi, non si satiavano i padri di essaltare con mille laudi la fede, et l'ardire di uno tanto huomo; il quale quantunque non facesse instantia grande in domandar soccorso; o' bontà incredibile; o' confidentia di capitano, et cavaliere antico, temendo che per veder le cose de suoi signori ridotte a mal termine, non si havessero a ruinare affatto con volere in tante difficoltà dare aiuto a lui. Ma il generoso Senato così per la importantia di Osopo, la conservatione del quale fu cagione, che è tornata tutta la Patria del Friuli alla Republica Venetiana; come per non abbandonare un sì eccellente capitano, fece resolutione, che si soccorresse. Et a questo fine l'Alviano andò con prestezza nel Friuli, ove diversamente operando fece che' l'Francapane si ritirò a dietro, ma non sì presto che' l'Savorgnano non venisse fuori di Osopo col presidio, che havea seco, et battendolo per fianco lo ruppe, et pose in fuga, togliendoli sette pezzi d'artegliaria, i quali donò poi al Serenissimo Dominio, et egli ne fu remunerato di molti honorati doni, oltre la fama³⁴ che gli fu retribuito.

Basti questo, che detto havemo del gloriosissimo, et magnanimo suo padre, un di chiari lumi della illustrissima sua famiglia; quando non come propria materia, ma come essemplio domestico tolse a trascorrerlo la oratione. Al figliuolo nato al mondo di un tanto padre, et alle degne attioni di lui tornando; lungo sarebbe a commemorare ad una ad una le salutifere provisioni, che questo signore, et capitano illustrissimo che noi vediamo, infiammato il cuore del desio della vera lode, seguitando gli alti vestigi paterni, fece, et propose che si facessero alla nuova della comparitione dell'Armata turchesca; onde nacque negli animi, et ne i cuori de cittadini in così grandi, et sproveduti rivolgimenti, una sicurezza inusitata, et lasciando da parte ogni timore; essi tutti attendevano a laudare la cura, che egli principalmente prendeva nel raffrenare colla quasi sola authorità l'insolentia, che poteva nascere da tanti strani soldati a commune quiete. Si gloriavano della illustrissima Signoria, che in una simile mutatione di cose, in tempo di tanta importanza, ci habbia mandato per governadore, et per capitano un cavaliere di tanta virtù, così vigilante, et di sì ardito cuore. Si preparavano tutti sotto 'l riparo di così gran fortezza con la scorta di così saggio, et valoroso guerriero superar ogni difficoltà; non istimar pericoli, non avversità di alcuna sorte.

O' chiara, et eccellente virtù di capitano illustre! Chi verrà mai signore che le vostri doti possa a pieno non imitar, ma ammirare? O' fortezza, et opera senza essemplio, altiera, et rara! Con quante laudi v'inalzaremos? Con che affetto, et benevolentia vi abbracceremo? Queste sono operationi, l'author delle quali non solo si deve paragonare colli più eccellenti cavalieri, et capitani, che siano, et vivano hoggidi in christianitade; ma colli più laudati, et gloriosi heroi, che siano stati in ammiratione per il passato.

Non è adunque ingegno, ne lingua sì felice, et copiosa che possa adeguar con giuste laude le vostre eccelse virtù, et degne operationi illustrissimo, et magnanimo signore. Et di quà potrete conoscere apertamente quanta sia la laude, et la gloria vostra, essendo il beneficio, et la contentezza di noi, che gli habbiamo ricevuti grandissimi, anzi infiniti. Et se bene molti per le ruine delle loro habitationi siano rimasi sconsolati; pare nondimeno, che' l Signor Iddio gli habbia apportato una certa intrinseca consolatione; la quale opera, che essi di loro passati danni scordandosi, pieni d'un allegro pensiero, rinfrencando gli spiriti, a questo lor futuro bene, drizzan la mente. Noi dunque tutti per tante, et tanto grandi, et salutifere operationi, come infinitamente debitori a vostra signoria illustrissima le rendiamo infinite, et immortali gratie, et altre tante le serbaremo nell'animo perpetuamente. Et poscia che voi chiamato dall'amor della patria, de parenti, et d'altri maneggi del Stato della Serenissima Signoria in Italia, ad ubbidir loro vi si ricerca, et conviene; ite felice illustrissimo et valorosissimo signore. Il mare, i

34 In the Camaldoli text *l'honor*.

venti, et i cieli vi siano placidissimi, et / [192^v] sereni. Prosperi Dio ogni disegno vostro; favorisca ogni deliberatione; et tutte le vostre operationi col lume della sua gratia per buoni mezzi a fine glorioso conduca. Vivendo sicuro, et certo, che noi, i figlioli, i nepoti et i posterì nostri, à quali, oltre quel che essi conosceranno; lasceremo chiara, et ferma testimonianza del grande obbligo, che doveran haver sempre mai alle divine vostre alte virtù; qualhora mireremo queste nuove mura, questi alterissimi beloardi, queste difese ammirabili; che sarà per tutte le future età, et nella lunghezza, et perpetuità del tempo a venire; sempre si ricorderemo degli alti vostri beneficij, et meriti, et celebrando il vostro glorioso nome, quello si consacrerà all'immortalità con gratissima memoria sempiterna.

Hor quantunque noi siamo certi, che come a questo ufficio convenevole, et debito di essaltare, et magnificare il nome, le laudi, et la dignità vostra, non è per ritrovarci alcuna età stanchi, né satij già mai; così vostra signoria illustrissima nel giunger suo a piedi di quel Serenissimo Dominio, appresso gli altri buoni ufficij, che haverà a fare di questa città di Nicosia nostra patria restaurata così nobilmente da lei; onde et sua ragionevolmente dee nominarsi; sia per fare ampia fede della fede, et devotion nostra verso il suo felicissimo Stato; nondimeno perciocché noi grandemente desideriamo, che quest' ufficio di verità si faccia con quel più ardente animo, che si possa, siamo ad un certo modo sforzati di ricordargliele nella presente occasione; che havendo lei con veri, et reali effetti conosciuto la somma fedeltà, et ubbidientia di tutti i nobili, cavalieri, feudatarij, et altri gentilhuomini et cittadini del Regno verso sua Serenità, et la prontissima inclinatione di tutti in servirla, et aggradirla; sia contenta renderne, ove sarà bisogno, quella testimonianza, che si conviene; con accertare l'animo di tutti quelli illustrissimi, et gravissimi senatori; che sì come per le molte, et segnalate dimostrazioni fatte a tutti i tempi, et nelle presenti occasioni, a beneficio delle cose nostre, essi hanno acquistato, et possiedono l'affetto de nostri cuori; avisando null'altra cosa di questa dover loro essere, né più onorevole nella pace, né più sicura, ne pericoli delle guerre così noi accesi, et infiammati di reale amore per natura, et per elettione non siamo inclinati di vivere, et morire sotto altra signoria o corona, che sotto il temperamento della Republica Vinitiana, pregio, et splendor de principati christiani.

Tentino pur li inimici a machinar contra noi. Adoprino ogni lor forza; essi con tutta la crudeltà, et barbarie loro non potranno ismover mai, l'altamente fondato proposito nostro di amare, et riverire la giustitia, la benignità, et l'altre divine virtù di quella eccelsa, et santa Republica, et non ostante alcuna tribolatione o angustia, alcuna fame, nudità o pericolo che ne soprastasse, a lei sempre ubbidire in qual si voglia fortuna. Voi poscia signore illustrissimo potrete di cotesta vostra sì eccellente virtù, et di sì lieta fortuna infinitamente allegrarvi; et quante fiata vi venirà a memoria, ovunque vi troverete, d'haver così bene, et sì felicemente impiegate le vostre fatiche intorno a così nobile impresa, tante vi doverà sovenire della vostra gloria, et illustre fama; la quale mossa già dalle più belle, et fortunate Isole di Oriente, dalle qual parti, quasi risorgente sole, nasce la chiarezza della sua origine; porterà il vostro nome ornato di chiare, et grandi, et meravigliose opere alla notitia di tutte le nationi del mondo; et acquistando per le lingue di ciascun popolo, et delle genti, che dopo noi nasceranno, vigor dagli anni, et dal tempo, con le ali della immortalità, ella si vedrà finalmente salire, et consecrarsi in cielo.

3. NICOLÒ ROBUSTO

Nicolò Robusto studied theology in Padua. He is mentioned in the *Acta graduum academicorum Gymnasii Patavini* on 14 January 1550 as a Cypriot student already accepted into the Carmelite order.³⁵ On 24 August 1551 he witnessed the concession of the "privilegium doctoratus reverendi

³⁵ E. Martellozzo Forin (ed.), *Acta graduum academicorum Gymnasii Patavini ab anno 1538 ad annum 1550*, Padova, Editrice Antenore, 1971, p. 382.

domini fratris Petri Arloti”³⁶ and, on 13 May, the graduation in civil law of “dominus Michael Angelus Gallus Cyprius Amocostensis filius iurisconsulti domini Constancii”.³⁷ He himself was granted the “privilegium doctoratus in sacra theologia et philosophia” on 15 August 1557.³⁸ On 6 April 1569, as the abbot of the Carmelite order in Cyprus, he participated in the committee held at the Nicosia archbishopric to award to “dominus Fabricius Benedeus quondam magnifici domini Victorii” the scholarship established by Pietro Cafrano’s 1393 will for Cypriot students at the University of Padua.³⁹

Robusto’s text bears no date, and it is unsure that it was ever pronounced in public before the Cypriot people, maybe being simply gifted to Savorgnan, although the latter possibility would probably have seen the speech included among Savorgnan’s reports and correspondence kept in registry no. 11 of the series *Materie Miste Notabili* in the Venetian State Archives. Right from the start, the speech seems to take after classical rhetorical eulogies, and is written quite solemnly.

Robusto begins his eulogy by recalling the primitive conditions in which people used to live (“if we are to believe the ancient writers”), with no rules or organization, almost animal-like, before gradually coming to live together in communities and build settlements. He then speaks of the island’s fertility, its fresh waters, its mild climate and rich fauna, also free from ferocious animals. He underlines that classical writers, particularly Homer, held Cyprus to be the birthplace of Aphrodite, an allusion to the island’s beauty. He then briefly explains how those writers traditionally believed a group of great heroes had founded the island’s biggest and most famous towns (later considered individual kingdoms), which helped to increase the importance of Cyprus and its civilization. This excursus is illustrative of his erudition and his knowledge of Ancient Greece and its writers.

Robusto goes on to compare Giulio Savorgnan to these ancient heroes; he believes that the island’s great history has now been overshadowed by the admirable fortress built in Nicosia, where all the island’s rulers have always lived. He then looks at the recent history of Cyprus, listing its rulers from the Byzantine emperors to the brief period under the Knights Templar and the Lusignan dynasty. He subscribes to the Venetian version of events regarding Caterina Cornaro, explaining how, after the premature death of her husband, King James II, and of her son, she “freely and magnificently” donated the kingdom to the Venetian Senate, recognizing she could not properly protect the island’s population, and thus sacrificing the wealth and comfort she could have enjoyed as a queen. This is an opportunity for

36 He is referred to as “reverendus dominus frater Nicolaus Robustus sacre theologie cursor ordinis carmelitarum Padue”: *ibid.*, p. 25. 37 He is referred to as “reverendus pater et sacre pagine magister dominus Nicolaus Robustus ordinis carmelitarum Amocostensis”. Also present on this occasion were “comes Cesar de Noris Cyprius Leucosensis [sic] scholaris”: *ibid.*, p. 216. 38 “[...] reverendus frater Nicolaus Robustus Cyprius ordinis carmelitarum provinciae Terre Sanctae professus et sacerdos ac sacre theologiae bachalarius, qui per solita tempora curricula labori inherens in facultatibus sacrae theologiae et philosophiae acurate studuit Senis primo et ultimo loco Paduae studium suum perfecit, lectiones et alios actus scolasticos – solitos – audiendo et se exercendo [...]”. The ceremony took place at the Carmelite church of Padua, in the presence of “reverendi patre Damaseno Parodio Cyprio ordinis predicatorum, reverendi baccalario Petro de Terminis Siculo ordinis minorum, reverendi Ioanne Iacobo Troia Apuleo baccalario ordinis heremitarum, reverendi patre Ioanne Baptista Butrio Cyprio ordinis carmelitarum, domini Cesare de Nores Cyprio filii domini Alovissii comitis Tripolis, domini Andrea Zacharia Cyprio filii domini Marci Zachariae, Paduae studii gratia ambobus moram trahentibus, domini Camillo Thalamatio quondam domini Lucae et domini Alovissio de Carrariis quondam domini Antonii, ambobus notariis collegii notariorum civitatis Paduae, domini Ioanne Petro Celegato filii domini Mathei, testibus, et aliis quampluribus usque ad numerum quadraginta et ultra”: *ibid.*, pp. 267–268. 39 He is referred to as “Nicolaus Robustus Sacre Theologie doctor provincialis Terre Sancte Carmelitarum”: A. Tselikas, ‘Η διαθήκη του Petro de Cafrano και οι πράξεις εκλογής Κυπρίων φοιτητών για το πανεπιστήμιο της Πάδοβας (1393, 1436–1569)’, in *Επετηρίς Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών XVII* (1988–1989), p. 278.

Robusto to repeat to his audience how *La Serenissima* never conquered Cyprus by force, and that the Venetian government never forced the queen to abdicate, but that she voluntarily gave up her ambitions and personal comfort for the security and prosperity of her people, placing the kingdom under Venetian rule.⁴⁰ Knowing that it is always wise to flatter the governors, Robusto underlines that the Venetian Republic has always governed Cyprus fairly and peacefully, keeping the population satisfied and content, as proven by the total absence of unrest since the Venetians came into power. In fact, Robusto claims, the population's wealth, honours and benefits have increased under Venetian rule, although, he explains, these privileges only concern the nobility; he omits to mention the living conditions of the rest of the population. Furthermore, he states that although the Republic has often had to fight against various opponents, at times even against an alliance of all the Christian powers together, Cyprus has always been protected from the enemy; this is also because the Venetians have always considered that losing the island would be very detrimental to all of Christianity.

Robusto states that the people of Cyprus are faithful and obedient to the Venetian authorities; yet, again, he refers only to the island's feudal lords, who are tasked with keeping varying numbers of battle horses, squires and foot soldiers, the quantities depending on their wealth;⁴¹ this is at once a kind of taxation and a form of indirect participation in the island's defences against enemy attacks during peace time. At this point of his speech, Robusto excuses himself for having spoken only of the ancient splendour of Cyprus and not yet of the famous engineer behind the new fortress, stating that he might be considered a historian rather than an orator; but he also explains that speaking of the island's greatness and nobility is in itself a celebration of Savorgnan's virtues and tireless efforts in making Nicosia a much more secure town. Robusto, like Flatro, stresses that it was "prudent and wise" of the Venetian Republic to delegate the *Provveditore Generale* Francesco Barbaro to decide whether a citadel should be built, enabling only a small share of the population, namely the local nobility, to be sheltered; or to create a bigger fortification, and to choose the best location. He opted for the latter, and made sure to consult the island's most important figures, who had proposed to contribute 100,000 ducats in the event of a fortress being built in Nicosia, as this was the people's "universal wish".

Robusto then speaks of Savorgnan's "divine intelligence and heroic merit"; he was the sole architect and founder of Nicosia's new fortification, a most excellent engineer recruited alone by the Republic for this very important mission, contrary to the Venetian tradition of obtaining multiple expert opinions, especially for important State administrative matters. Robusto expresses his admiration not only for Savorgnan, but also for his art, explaining that architecture is just as important as the art of war, and criticizing those who in ancient times spent great amounts building huge works of architecture in the hope of leaving their mark on history, instead of building things that their people needed. They cannot be compared to Savorgnan, who managed to build a monumental fortress in Nicosia quickly and cheaply. Giulio Savorgnan should instead be compared to great statesmen like Xerxes, Alexander, Scipio and Augustus, who gave their people immense structures that improved the local economy and quality of life. What makes the Friulian more impressive, however, is that these people were rulers of empires, while Savorgnan was, though a most capable and admirable architect, merely a private individual; here, Robusto says, lies his greatness. He created a perfectly secure town, "stronger than steel or diamond", extending its circumference to contain the majority of the island's population, improving the streets, and

40 E. Skoufari, 'Caterina Cornaro e la corte cipriota', in D. Perocco (ed.), *Caterina Cornaro. L'illusione del regno*, Verona, Cierre edizioni, 2011, pp. 57–71; ead., *Cipro veneziana*, pp. 47–54, 161–163. 41 B. Arbel, 'Venice's maritime empire in the early modern period', in E. R. Dursteler (ed.), *A Companion to Venetian History 1400–1797*, Leiden, Brill, 2013, p. 204.

building a variety of necessary military buildings. He deserves all the glory of his namesake Caesar for having made Nicosia invincible to enemy attacks.

Robusto reminds his audience how difficult it was to design and erect Nicosia's walls, since the town had previously been a labyrinth of houses, buildings, churches and gardens. Of course, the orator exalts the virtues of the local nobility, who contributed to the funding and construction of the project, together with the Venetian officials. In fact, Savorgnan assigned supervision of each of the eleven bastions to the four Venetian officials and then to seven Cypriot nobles. This desire and enthusiasm spread to the Nicosian population, who actively participated in the project day and night, to the tunes of their flutes and trumpets, and showed impeccable stoicism when watching their own houses be demolished for the cause; such was their respect and appreciation for Savorgnan and their desire to see their town's fortification brought to perfection.

Robusto ends his speech with the remark that, contrary to other occasions, when the Ottoman fleet arrived in Cyprus soon after the completion of Nicosia's fortress, no one fled the town to hide out in the mountains or caves; everyone felt safe inside Savorgnan's strong fortress. The Italian ought now to be honoured with the same admiration usually reserved for the ancient divinities and heroes. Robusto's talk of building temples and worshipping Savorgnan's divine intelligence sounds somewhat awkward and surprising to the modern reader, and may have done so to his audience too, since he was a cleric; nevertheless, we should remember that he studied at a particularly liberal university when it came to religion, and that as an exponent of humanism he was highly influenced by the traditions of classical literature, as is evident throughout his speech.

Robusto does not refer to the projects that, according to the Venetian Senate and its archives, Savorgnan had worked on previously elsewhere in the Republic; nor does he mention anything regarding Savorgnan's family or ancestors. Though he is a clergyman, he does not often invoke, as the other two writers do, God's help for the Republic, for the Cypriot population, or for Giulio Savorgnan himself. Most importantly, he makes no mention whatsoever of the large number of churches and other religious buildings that Savorgnan ordered to be demolished when they were found to lie outside the town's circumference.

THE TEXT⁴²

[206^r]Oratione al Illustrissimo Signor Conte Giulio Savorgnano sopra la fortificatione di Nicosia di fra' Nicolò Robusto Carmelitano / [206^v blank]

[207^r] La città antiquissima, et nobilissima di Nicosia, novamente fortificata a perpetua conservazione della sua pace, et ad essere propugnacolo inespugnabile d'ogni straniero nemico; non è dubbio che darà come anco sin hora ha dato, ampia materia, et soggetto degno a molti intendenti, et dotti huomini di scrivere, et dire di lei, quali con lor vivaci et purgati inchiostri, narando, et celebrando, le moltissime laudi, de così ben composta, ben intesa, et ben monita città; la fede, et pronta obedientia de cittadini, et populi suoi; il divino ingegno et heroico valore di voi illustrissimo signor conte Giulio Savorgnano, suo unico architetore, et fondatore; la prudentia, et sapientia del clarissimo magistrato, et specialmente del eccellentissimo signor General proveditore Barbaro; la infinita benignità, et liberalità, del eccelso Dominio Veneciano, quale con somma providentia ha in questi presenti tempi deliberato di far costruir nelle estreme parti del suo Imperio, la maggior, et più forte fortezza che per lo passato, o al presente in tutto el mondo sia veduta, o si veda, et / [207^v] finalmente la immensa bontà, et misericordia d'Iddio,

42 Archivum Sancti Eremiti Camaldoli, *cod. 1711*, ff. 206^r–221^r.

fautore, et propiciatore a questa così santa, et ottima deliberatione, sarà causa che di lei la fama viva eternamente nella bocca degl' huomini (ma, o' gran Dio) chi sia mai fra coloro che hoggi di sono, et sanno di così svelto et sublime ingegno, a cui dia l'animo di prender così grande et smisurata fatica! Fatica invero difficilima, et alle humane forze quasi impossibile; imperoché ogni uno capo di questi per sé solo potrebbe ammutire ogni lingua, stancar ogni penna, et sgomentar ogni saldo intelletto. Et chi non sa che effetti assai minori di questi hanno fatto sudare, et consumare gl'anni, et lustri a Quintiliani, a Ciceroni, a Demosteni! Io, se bene chiaramente conosco, che non può esplicare la mia lingua dove non aggiogne l'intelletto, et che altra vivacità d'ingegno, altra energia di parole, et altra consumata cognitione bisogna a così alta et difficile impresa; essendo non dimeno spronato da questo tanto universale / [208^r] beneficio, quale può più in me di quello che io possa in me stesso, per non parere io solo fra tanti altri avaro, et ingrato, poiché altro potere non è in me, dirò almeno, se ben con poca arte, et assai rozamente alcune semplici, ma vere parole. Questo solo desiderando, et pregando da voi signor illustrissimo che con quel grato animo co' l quale magnificamente a guisa di Dio, accettate più l'affetto del cuore, che l'estrinseca apparenza, vi degnate d'accettare, et ascoltare, questa mia qual si sia oratione, nascente et espressa, più dal animo che dalla lingua; promettendo io di dire assai, ma con brevità cose difficili, ma facilmente, et sopra il tutto, con verità, et senza adulatione per esser inteso, et creduto, ma per incominciar ho mai quanto più alto so et posso, dico che,

Solevano gli huomini ne' primi scecoli (se però s'ha da credere a gl'antichi scrittori) viver solitarij nelle campagne, et nelle selve, / [208^v] a guisa di salvatiche et indomite fiere, senza religione, senza legge, et senza conoscenza di Dio. Non v'era padre che conoscesse i proprij figliuoli perché non erano certi né legittimi i congiugij loro, erano lontani da ogni humana operatione senza ragione, senza giustizia et senza pace; sino che piacque a colui che havea lor dato l'essere, et che li havea creati per natura non meno amichevoli, et associabili animali che d'intelligentia et di ragion capaci; svegliarli da così ottuso et lungo sonno; in tanto che a poco, a poco venendo in cognitione del suo errore che longamente gl'haveva tenuti oppressi, abbandonarono gli inculti boschi, gl'aridi deserti, et i precipitosi monti, et si ridussero ad habitare unitamente nelle più amene, et più temperate parti della feconda terra, dove con assai roza arte fabricando, et accomandando alcune capannucie di frondi, et quelle cingendo di sieppi, di fossa, et talhora di / [209^r] mura per difendersi dalle rapaci fiere, et assicurarsi da stranieri, et vagabondi huomini, che cercavano a forza d'occupare le altrui comodità; et facendo pian piano della esperientia arte, ne segni poscia colla miglior successione de tempi, la fondazione di tante bellissime terre quante già sono state, et sono, d'innumerabili castella d'infinite città, di moltissimi regni, et di diversissime provincie di che n'è pieno et ornato questo nostro mondo. Così aponto, per lassare hora di dire d'ogn' altra sua parte, per quello che c'hanno lassato di fede l'antiche memorie hebbe principio ad esser habitata quest'isola di Cipri, la quale se bene, è piccolissima parte della grande habitata terra, non è però mai stata inferiore di fertilità, et di bellezza a qualunque altra si voglia grandissima parte da Dio et dalla natura benignamente dotata. Et avegna che ella sia circondata dal mare che la disgiugne / [209^v] et separa dal altra terra attendendo nondimeno gl'huomini, alle tante commodità che lor prometteva questo fecondo sito, ricco, et pieno de campi spaciosissimi, facili da coltivare et da produrre ogni sorte d'entrata, de monti fertilissimi quasi tutti vestiti de fruttiferi alberi, di quattro fiumi che dal monte Troidos descendono, i quali irrigano la maggior parte d'essa, di doi rapidissimi torrenti, et di molte amenissime fonti sparse a guisa di vene in un corpo per tutta l'isola, le quali tutte con loro copiosissime et dolcissime acque fecondano questo felicissimo sito; l'aere scereno, et puro per lo continuo spirar de suavissimi venti, et specialmente di zefiro, vento certo a questo regno zoifero et vitale. Quivi il cielo è abundantissimo d'uccelli, el mare ricco de pesci et la terra d'animali d'ogni specie salvo che di lupi, et altre fiere cattive.

Considerando dico gl'huomini tante belle doti deliberarono / [210^r] que primi volando per modo di dire per l'aere, di venire ad habitare questo fecondo sito. Ne settero molto che a tale stato lo ridussero, che fu celebrato da maggiori, et migliori scrittori per una delle più belle parti del mondo, di che ne fa

fedè il grande Homero, et molti altri sapientissimi filosofi, i quali volendo lasciare perpetua memoria della bellezza di Cipri, scrissero che Venere Cipria fu la Dea della beltà, volendo inserire che Cipri era degno ricetta delle delizie et comodità humane. Fu poi successivamente per caggione della sua continuata et augumentata bellezza, et opulenta habitata da diversi illustrissimi et potenti huomini, quali le diero nome da sè diversamente. Quindi fu detta alcuna fiata Acamantida, Filonida, Colonia, Xenagora, Aspedia, Amatusa, Chripton, Sfichia, Cherusia, et se si deve dar fede alle antiche medaglie, et statoue, che in essa vi si son ritrovate, et si trovano, con verità si può dire che a moltissime parti del mondo per antichità è superiore, per ricchezza et nobiltà / [210^v] a molte eguale, et a nessuna inferiore, di ciò ne è testimonio Libano, afirmando che antecede la superba et anticha Troia, et sino al tempo de Minos re di Creta figliuolo di Giove che fu figliuolo di Saturno, il qual diede principio ad habitare et coltivare l'Italia, era Cipro signoreggiata da Salamis re potentissimo. Ma per tacer hormai d'ogn'altra sua anticha nobiltà, giovami di dire questo solo colla testimonianza di Tholomeo, di Strabone et di Plutarco, che oltre che in uno istesso tempo vi siano stati in essa sette re coronati, hebbe anco moltissime città, et castella populatissime. Ma, o' alti et gran principij che hanno havuto tutte: Pafo fu edificata da Pafo figliuolo di Pigmalion, figliuolo di Cilie dal qual ne nacque Cinara che con la propria figlia generò il bello Adone che fu tanto amato marito di Venere. Palepafo fu edificata da Agapinore, figliuolo di Agro, figliuolo di Licurgo re et legislatore de Lacedemoni. Curio, che hora è detta Piscopia, et Amatusa che al / [211^r] presente vien nominata Limisso vecchia furon ambe edificate da popoli Argivi. Cition che hora è Saline, fu edificata da Citin figliuolo di Giava, figliuolo di Giafet, figliuolo di Noe, quel secondo gran padre della nostra specie, serbato in vita dal universal diluvio; questa fu patria di Zenone filosofo capo della stoica setta, et inventor della stoica. Salamina, che al presente vien detta Famagosta vecchia, et altre fiata Costanza, fu edificata da Teucro fratello di Agiace, et figliuolo di Telemone doppo il ritorno della guerra Troiana. Questa fu et lei (come alcuni vogliono) patria del divino Homero. Carpasia fu edificata da Sarpedone. Cerine da Ciro re di Persia, Lapitho da Praxandro di Liconia. Solia da Demofonte figliuolo di Teucro, la qual prima era detta Miratusa, ma poi che Solone essule d'Athene fu ricevuto da Filocipro re di questa et che a sua persuasione ridusse la città a più felice sito, vole anco nomarla da tanto illustre huomo et chiamarla come è detto Solia.

Ma che sto io a commemorare tanti nobili huomini fondatori, et autori di queste città! Tanti inviti capitaniij! Tanti / [211^v] passati heroi, lasciando il principal mio proposito! Se a questi presenti tempi voi illustrissimo signor conte Giulio Savorgnano superate in infinito tutti li sopra nominati insieme, unico riformatore, et ristauratore de Nicosia, et non solamente di questa; ma per mezzo suo voi sete perpetua salute et conservatione di tutto questo bel regno.

È questa città (come ogni uno sa) posta et situata quasi egualmente in mezo del isola, a guisa di cuore in vivo, et ben composto corpo, la qual da migliori et più saputi huomini è stata sempre habitata, et eletta per loro patria, attendendo al suo ameno sito, al aere temperato, et alle acque anzi liquori soavissimi che in essa vi risorgono; indi per consequente è stata sempre la più riccha, et più nobile città di questo bellissimo regno. Et avvegna che in que primi tempi ella fosse dicinta, et sfasciata di mura, non è accaduto però che sia stata tralassata già mai, sì che quei passati re, et signori che la ressero, non habbino fatta in essa più volentieri che altrove la ressidentia loro.

Tenero habitazione in questa, i duchi mandati / [212^r] da gli imperatori mentre era posseduta l'isola da essi. Fu seggio de cavalieri Templarij, anco che pocco tempo, fu de tutti i re sino a Giacomo, re ultimo figliuolo pur di re Giovanni, ma naturale, il qual per virtù et forza d'armi scacciandone la regina Carlotta sua legitima sorella, et indi i Genovesi di Famagosta ne prese valorosamente l'assoluto possesso; ma poco tempo dopo, nel fiore de gl'anni suoi, et nella maggior sua gloria morì, lasciando di sé gravida la regina Catherina sua moglie, quale havendo per suo testamento istituita hereditatrice del regno insieme col figliuolo che havea a nascere, accade che nascendo egli premorisse alla madre, onde ella poscia ne restò unica, et assoluta regina. Ma conoscendo che per se stessa non l'havrebbe potuto sostenere, et

diffendere, però preponendo la sicurezza et tranquillità de suoi popoli, alla sua grandezza, et comodità, ne fece libero et magnifico dono al serenissimo, et potentissimo Senato Veneto essendo stata essa Veneciana nata della illustrissima famiglia Cornara. / [212^v] Dal qual poscia invitissimo Dominio è stato continuamente retto, et governato con somma giustizia, et pace, et con molta sodisfazione et contentezza de sudditi, senza che mai habbia pronato veruno travaglio, ne tumulto di guera anzi sempre li ha accresciuto, et augumintato la sua nobiltà, i suoi honori, le sue preminentie, le sue ricchezze. Et se bene ad essi signori Veneciani sono state mosse più fiata atrocissime guerre, et alcuna volta in un medesimo tempo da tutti i principi Cristiani congiurati a danni suoi, quasi in ogni parte del suo imperio, è stata nondimeno tale, et tanta la loro potentia, et sapientia, che hanno trattenuto lontano da esso regno ogni sorte di nimico che li poteva esser infesto, non già per l'utile che ne trahessero, ma solo per havendo riguardo alla gran perdita che harebbe fatto il Cristianesimo col mancamento d'esso. Et chi dubita che se d'ogni altro prencipe christiano fosse stato posseduto che sino adesso non avesse mutato legge et fede! /

[213^r] Questo felicissimo dominio a nessun altro secondo di potenza et di giustizia possedendo dico questo suo regno, non già mosso da timor alcuno per la lontananza del loco perché ogni uno sa che l' braccio suo invito agiugne in ogni estrema parte del mondo colla sua armata di galee, et navi; né meno anco perché essa isola non sia munitissima d'ogni presidio, et de populi fedelissimi, essendo chiaro ad ogni uno che essa è habitata da molti illustri et nobili conti, et cavalieri, et da populi tanto fedeli, et obediendi al suo prencipe, quanto ogn'altro popolo fedelissimo, et devotissimo, i quali conti, et cavalieri tengono per loro obbligo feudale una bella et grossa cavalaria, oltre alla stipendiata a difesa et guardia delle marine; vi è di più sino ad hora una gran somma d'ordinanze essercitatissime, al presente sotto il general governo del illustrissimo signor Leonardo Roncone, capitano certo valorosissimo, et intendentissimo degno per le sue singular virtù di grado maggiore di questo. Son vi anco molti capitani valorosi italiani, et soldati essercitatissimi mandati al presidio / [213^v] delle fortezze. Vi sono di più due galee, et tal fiata quattro et più guardia di questo mare, onde veramente si può dire che questo potentissimo Dominio non ha mai temuto, o dubitato di forza, o potere altrui, anzi come già cento anni l'ha conservato in tranquilla pace, et senza sospetto alcuno, così era per conservarlo eternamente, però che infiniti occhi ogni cosa vedono, molti re ogni cosa possono, tanti padri ad ogni cosa provvedono. Dico adonque con verità che l'haver voluto fortificar questa città, non è stato dubbio o timore, ma semplice permissione di Dio, che ha destinato che questo suo religiosissimo regno habbia a perpetuarsi co gli anni del mondo sotto l'ombra et tutela di questo felicissimo Senato, et però ha mosso et ispirato l'animo di quelli gravissimi, et sapientissimi padri mentre nel suo secreto sacrario, trattavano le cose di maggior portata del suo Imperio, di far costruire, et fabricare, senza haver riguardo a qual si voglia spesa od altro, una fortezza / [214^r] reale, et quella munire sì che avesse ad esser scudo et unica difesa et salute di questo suo regno in sempiterno.

So che qui mi si potrà imputare, che havendo meco proposto, et promesso de recitare oratione, io habbia fatta così gran digressione, narrando alcune antichità et primi principij di detto regno, che ragionevolmente io dovrei esser detto più tosto storico che oratore; ma chi vorà meglio considerare, s'avvederà che mentre io mi distondo nella grandezza et nobiltà di Cipri, non faccio altro, che celebrare li laudi di cui co' l'eterne sue fatiche et virtù l'ha reso securissimo col mezzo della fortificatione di questa regal città di Nicosia.

Ma o gran segno celeste, non fu apenna accennata non che proposta questa volontà che subito ne seguì l'effetto, et per la essecutione eletti et creati doi eccellentissimi et sapientissimi huomini ad essequire con la asistentia sua la deliberata volontà del Senato, l'uno fu et è il clarissimo signor Francesco Barbaro General Provveditore di questo regno, l'altro foste voi illustrissimo signor conte Giulio / [214^v] Savorgnano Generale Governatore del medesimo. Ma è invero senza occhi et senza intelletto chi non mira et non ammira i fatti et le operationi vostre. Non così tosto poneste ambi el piede in terra, che il

clarissimo signor Proveditore tutto c'havesse general commissione di poter da se tanto deliberare quanto al suo maturo giudicio meglio paresse, cioè o far costruire una cittadella a salute de pochi, o una grande città capace in occorrentia di molta gente, et questa anco in qual parte di quest' isola che a lui piacesse, ma, o' prudentia et bontà d'huomo singulare, non però ha voluto se bene poteva pigliare d'intorno a ciò alcuna deliberatione, senza el consenso, et comune desiderio de maggiori et migliori huomini del paese onde fatto radunare subito general consiglio non fu apena questo proposto che fu da tutti concordemente pregato che havesse da far fortificare una città grande già molto tempo desiderata capace di quanto più numero di popolo che possibile fosse, et non in altra parte / [215^r] del regno, ma questa fosse Nicosia patria, et madre de tutti, offerendogli oltre il loro personal agiuto cento mila ducati appresso del loro havere, et con tanto maggior istantia n'era pregato da tutti, quanto che voi n'offerivate darla ispedita (sicome havete fatto poi) in otto mesi soli. Il che udendo esso sapientissimo Proveditore con affetto paterno, et maestà di prencipe tanto aponto decretò, quanto vide essere universal desiderio. Al hora ne prendeste voi il carico a questo mandato dal Serenissimo Dominio, già fatto certo et assicuratosi della virtù et molto saper vostro. Gran cosa è invero da ammirare in voi, che quegli sapientissimi padri, che con tanta sapientia, et providentia reggono, et governano tanto loro Imperio non fidando mai della unità d'alcuno; ma per natura in ogni espeditione amando el consiglio et opinione de molti; non dimeno conoscendo l'eccellentia, et valore vostro a voi solo senza ponto di difidentia, hanno fidato questo tanto importantissimo carico o' singular virtù d'huomo incomparabile, et qual mai de gli antichi filosofi, o de moderni capitani eccellentissimi / [215^v] nelle fortificationi si può comparar a voi!

È certo questa bella scientia del architettura disciplina non meno utile che necessaria all'arte militare, et apporta seco assai utilitate, et ornamento al mondo, tanto ne privati quanto in publici edificij, però che orna et diffende ogni cosa, colle misure, et metri suoi, lasciando memoria de suoi intendenti per molti sceccoli. Quindi si sono veduti molte fiata alcuni huomini che con infinite spese, et fatiche, per lassar solo nome di sé hanno fatto con questa cose ammirande, et quasi impossibili. Ma ad alcuno de questi non mi è lecito di compararvi, perché essi, o poco o nulla con le loro operationi, et sapere hanno giovato al mondo, anzi han causato notabilissimo dano, et detrimento havendo con immensa et ociosa spesa consumati infiniti tesori, et fatiche senza haver dato beneficio a sé o alla posterità. Come sono stati li miracoli de gl'Egittij, de Babiloni, et de Greci, gl'obilischi, i colossi, i laberinti, le piramidi, i mausolei, le statoue mostruose di Rapsinate / [216^r] di Sesoste et quella meravigliosa in che è sepolto el re Amasi; ne meno assimiglierovi, a Dinocrate, se bene si vantò (come dice Plutarco et Vitruvio) di far l'effigie d'Alessandro del Monte Atos, la quale tenesse in mano una città capace di diece mila huomini. Taccio le case Godiane, gli archi trionfali, il tempio di Diana Efesia fabricato da tutta l'Asia in ducento anni, et quello di Lotona nel Egitto. Perché questi artefici et loro artificij non possono esser comparati a voi et alle illustri operationi vostre però che voi solo havete ritrovato le dispositioni, et finimenti veri di questa utilissima et nobilissima scientia, la quale come tutti i filosofi affermano per utile orna et opera, et non per sola pompa, anzi chi non attende a giovare per essa; la destrugge et annulla, perché essendo il bene, et buono oggetto della nostra volontà, et nascendo gl'effetti di questa dalla volontà nostra, ne segue per necessità che quelli habbino ad essere beneficosi, et utili, et non vani et dannosi; / [216^v] quanto adonque maggior beneficio, et utile alcuno apporta con questa, tanto è degno di maggior laude.

Posso io adonque concludere che voi signor illustrissimo sete dignissimo d'honore, et di laude; havendo tanto giovato, et beneficiato il mondo co' le infinite operationi vostre. Et specialmente colla presente della fortificata da voi Nicosia. Tralasciando adonque i sopra detti et li attioni loro; a quelli soli m'appiglerò di compararvi, con vostra buona gratia, che hanno giovato, o almeno hanno havuto desiderio di giovare altrui. Come fu Sippione, Serse, Ottaviano, Alessandro, et simili, i quali colle loro virtù, et valore, sì d'armi come d'edificij in molte maniere operati, cioè col fortificare tal hora siti, et regni, col aprir, et tagliar monti, et colli, co'l'abboccar scogli, penetrar le viscere della terra, rimover fiumi

dal suo corso, giunger mari a mari per seccar, et votar paludi, et laghi, ritener golfi, far nove isole giugner terra a terra per farla continuata hanno fatto beneficio al mondo, datto nome a sé, et acquistatossi corone regali, et imperatorie, essendo pur / [217^r] nati la maggior parte d'essi di privata nobiltà come voi. A questi dico giovimi di assomigliarvi, se non pur anco a maggiori, né sia meraviglia ad alcuno che io compari la heroica persona vostra a questi, et le opere vostre alle loro; perché se bene pare a molti che eglino habbino fatto miracoli; che meraviglia sarà quando consideraranno che essi havevano molti regni che li obediavano, et infiniti popoli che al nomi loro s'inclinavano. Voi, voi dico più che essi sete degno d'immortalità, et corona, però che non essendo imperatore o re, né assoluto signore, ma dipendente, col vostro sapere, et diligentia, facendovi amare, et temere, havete fondata, et ridotta a perfettione, in otto mesi soli con spesa di cento quindicimila ducati una città intiera con tutto ciò che in lei si può desiderare; di circonferentia tale, quale può capire o tutta o la maggior parte della gente di tutto questo regno, et questa con tanta industria et arte fatta forte che l'acciale, et il diamante le cede. Voi signor illustrissimo rinovate a questo nostro scecolo quel gran nome di Giulio, anzi lo fatte molto maggiore, poichè con le digne operationi / [217^v] vostre vi fatte tanto più degno di laude che non fu egli quanto è maggior et più lodevol cosa il conservar, et diffendere i regni et gl'huomini che il soggiogarli, et distrugerli, et chi non sa che se a tempi suoi vi fosse stata una città forte, come questa da voi fatta, la quale s'havesse opposta alla potentia, et fortuna sua che egli non sarebbe riuscito tanto glorioso come è. Onde può dirsi con verità che voi solo, sì come havete il nome così meritate anco le laudi di Cesare. Voi solo sapete quanto si può sapere di questa divina arte dell'architettura! Et chi mai ne seppe più di voi! Forse Agatarco, Democrito, Anassagora, Sileno, Archimeneide, Aristotele, Theofrasto, Catone, Varone, Plinio, Vitruvio. Voi solo havete saputo, et sapete ritrovare gl'artificij et modeli, i ponti et le linee rette et curve con nova inventione, quale tutti non si sono imaginato. Chi dunque vuole immitare et sapere quest'arte nobilissima perfettamente, venghi a vedere et studiare Nicosia, libro vostro, parto vostro, figliuola vostra, fondata, fortificata / [218^r] et ridotta perfetta da voi con undeci bellovardi et altre tante cortine, di fossa, di terra pieni, di parapetti, di difese, et offese, et altre sue perfettioni tanto simili, et con tanto magisterio perfette, che tutti i capitani, tutti i filosofi et tutti li architettori del mondo non le havrebbero saputo aggiognere o diminuire un ponto, non che cosa di maggior portata. Et perché questa non è professione mia, né so io estendermi in parlare di essa, et delle sue perfette misure, per non avvilire, et abbruttare con mie parole tanta bellissima bellezza, et fortissima fortezza, lasserò parlare di lei a gli intendenti, et altrove volgerò io la mia oratione.

Al hora dico quando deliberatamente prendeste el carrico di costruire questa città, dopo il decreto del clarissimo Proveditore, nella idea del vostro fecondo et scientiato intelletto / [218^v] in meno che io vol dico la concepeste, et compartiste, poi quella, in otto giorni in un gran caos, et labirinto di case, palazzi, chiese, et giardini, senza mai cader errore nelle misure, la piantaste, et designaste, et giustamente la compartiste dandone la cura, et sollecitudine, ad undeci illustrissimi signori, et gentilhuomini, però che undeci sono i belloardi suoi, senza ritenerne in particolare per voi alcuno, per poter esser sempre in ogni parte equalmente padre. Li quattro designaste a clarissimi signori rettori, et li sette ad illustrissimi signori conti et cavalieri, i quali tutti con pronta diligentia personale, non havendo riguardo a freddo, a caldo, a poggie, né a venti o ad altra incomodità colla continuata sollecitudine vostra li hanno tutti ridotti a perfettissima perfettione.

O cavalieri, et / [219^r] baroni honoratissimi degni certo d'ogni gran laude, et d'altra lingua, et inchiostro che'l mio non è! A questo clarissimo magistrato, et a voi signor illustrissimo s'aspetta di testificare questa verità, et far fede certa al Serenissimo Prencipe, della fede, obedientia, et divocione di questi suoi gentilhuomini, et dire con verità che può questo eccelso Senato havere cavalieri equali a questi, ma non già maggiori; et chi vide mai di gratia cittadini, et popoli di più uniforme volere, di più obedientia! quali antipongono sempre le cose publiche alle private, né attendono mai alle commodità et agi suoi; ma a quelli che apportano universal beneficio. Questi signori nella presente occasione, oltre la

loro personal opera hanno unitamente tutti esborsato prontamente cento mila ducati offerendo se stessi, et i figliuoli in altra occasione, dal cui bel esempio / [219^v] mosso tutto il resto del popolo mentre colle proprie mani gettava a terra i suoi palazzi, esso anco spianava le sue commodità et case, et dove (o' immenso Dio) fu mai populo alcuno che non si lamentasse, che non si querellasse, che non piangesse vedendosi privare, et porre a terra la casa, et quanto di sostantia possedeva salvo che a Nicosia! Questo solo colle proprie mani, colle proprie fatiche prima che si preparasse un tugurio, una capanna o di frondi, se ben si vedeva percotere dal sole, et bagnar dalla pioggia, tutta via sempre laudando, et magnificando Dio parendogli far grande guadagno impoverendo spianava da se la sua casa. Ammiranda cosa era poi vedere a correre unitamente a bellovardi, et donne, et huomini, et vecchi, et fanciulli, ricchi, et poveri, et brevemente tutti, a portar volontariamente la terra, cantando, et sollazzando, a suon di fifari et corno-muse l'intiero giorno, et gran parte della notte solo per veder finita questa desiderata fortezza; la qual finalmente voi havete ridotta perfetta, et ispedita, con spesa assai / [220^r] minore che non s'è fatto molte volte in un privato palazzo, ornando, et fortificando quella non solo de bellovardi, et mura. Ma nel medesimo tempo facendo in essa moltissimi altri edificij, cioè la macina delle polveri, le conserve di quelle, la fonderia delle artiglerie trovando novo modo di fonderle, havendone già formate due, et insegnato el modo a farle in occorrentia, i magazini per conservarle, molte sale per riponer l'arme, et monicioni, molte molina, et brevemente ogni altra necessaria cosa ad ogni ben munita città. Et con tutto ciò havete anco abbellito, et dilatato le strade di essa città con tanto et sì bel ordine che riempie di diletto, et meraviglia chi la mira.

A Dio dunque si rendi laude, al Dominio gratie, et a voi signor illustrissimo honore, et a noi ne resti il beneficio, che già lo conosciamo, et lo proviamo, anzi l'habbiamo colla esperienza conosciuto et toccato con mano; però s'in altro tempo, dieci o pocco più fuste o galee de pirati et d'altri che attendono a depredar il mondo s'applicavano ad alcuna parte di quest'isola, se bene essa / [220^v] col braccio di così potente dominio era atta a difendersi et rimaner in vita, tuttavia i popoli che non discorrevano più oltre, si ponevano in confusione et fuga, et con spese intollerabili, et pericolo d'esser saccheggiati et morti andavano per assicurarsi chi a Famagosta, et chi a Cerine, altri correvano a i monti, et altri si nascondevan nelle grate, et caverne. In quest'anno presente essendo venuta tutta l'armata del gran Signor Turco cosa insolita, né mai più udita, non vi' e però stato pur uno de noi che non conoscesse di esser securissimo in casa sua, et in questa città sì per la sua fortezza, come per la confidentia che havevamo in Dio in questo Clarissimo Regimento et nel valor di voi che con l'amabile, et formidabile presentia vostra a noi davate vigore, et a nemici promettevate horrore et morte.

Ma per conchiuder hormai, dico che s'in que primi secoli gl'huomini adoravano per Dio, colui che col sapere suo havesse loro apportato qual che agio et comodità; drizzandoli ben spesso statue, et altari, noi a questi presenti tempi / [221^r] che altari, che tempj consacreremo al divin vostro nome, per tanti et sì notabili beneficij, et per tante singularissime virtù vostre? Le quali quasi celeste nume consacreranno la fama vostra alla immortalità. Ma invece di ciò, noi tutti pregheremo continuamente Iddio, dalla cui santa volontà ne viene questa desiderata città che allungando, et felicitando l'età vostra, la conservi, et la munisca per sempre, ispirando l'invittissimo Dominio Veneciano che la diffenda et regga con gl'anni suoi felici, quali siano perpetui, et sempiterni.

APPENDIX B

GIULIO SAVORGNAN'S PUBLISHED WORKS

- 5 September 1548, in Venice: *Sulla fortificazione di Peschiera*.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Giulio Savorgnano e le sue scritture sulle fortificazioni della veneta repubblica', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* 106 (1969), pp. 29–36.
- 18 December 1553, in Belgrado: Letter from Giulio Savorgnan to the *luocotenente* Bollani.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Le fortificazioni del Friuli e di Udine in particolare', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* vol. 114 (1971), pp. 201–224 [source: ASV, *Materie Miste Notabili* 11, ff. 9^r–11^v].
- 2 November 1557, in Venice: *Di Marano*.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Giulio Savorgnano e le sue scritture sulle fortificazioni della veneta repubblica', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* 106 (1969), pp. 19–20.
- 10 June 1566, in Venice: *Di Cerigo*.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Giulio Savorgnano e le sue scritture sulle fortificazioni della veneta repubblica', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* 106 (1969), pp. 15–18.
- 15 December 1570, in Zara: *Discorso circa la difesa del Friuli*.
V. J. [Vincenzo Joppi] (ed.), Udine, tip. G. Seitz, 1869 (nozze Belgrado-Colombatti), 14 p.
- 31 January 1570, in Zara: *Sulla difesa di Zara*.
E. Salaris (ed.), *Ateneo veneto* XXXII / 22 (1909), pp. 249–261, and in *Una famiglia di militari italiani*, pp. 86–90.
- 12 May 1577, in Osoppo: *Giulio Savorgnan a Varmilio di Varmo*.
G. B. di Varmo (ed.), Mortegliano, tipografia commerciale, luglio 1922, 4 p.
- 11 March 1583, in Venice: *Lettera alla Serenissima Signoria di Venezia sui confini del Friuli*.
V. Joppi (ed.), *Archivio storico italiano*, n.s., XIV / 1 (1861), pp. 33–38.
- 1 September 1583, in Venice: *Lettera sui confini del Friuli scritta alla Signoria di Venezia*.
L. and M. Toscano (ed.), Udine, tip. G. Seitz, 1872 (nozze Moro-Gera), 12 p. [copy established from a BNM manuscript by V. J. = Vincenzo Joppi].
- 21 August 1589, in Venice: *Discorso sopra la fortification degli Orzi*.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Giulio Savorgnano e le sue scritture sulle fortificazioni della veneta repubblica', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* 106 (1969), pp. 20–24.
- 1590: *Raccordi del Signor Giulio Savorgnano*.
F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Giulio Savorgnano e le sue scritture sulle fortificazioni della veneta repubblica', *Istituto storico e di cultura dell'arma del genio* 106 (1969), pp. 24–27 [source: ABS, b. 52, fasc. scritture militari].
- 15–30 May 1592, in Venice: *Scrittura sul canale Ledra-Tagliamento*.
Udine, s.e., 1876 (nozze Occioni–Bonnafons–Crisicopulo), 24 p.

- 1 October 1593, in Venice: *Su Palmanova*.
 F. Bonati Savorgnan d'Osoppo (ed.), 'Palmanova e il suo creatore: Giulio Savorgnan', *Memorie storiche forogiuliesi* XLVI (1965), pp. 184–188 [source: ABS, *Libro di varie scritture sopra le fortificazioni*].
- 18 June 1594, in Venice: *Scrittura del Signor Giulio Savorgnan in materia di Palma fatta al Serenissimo Prencipe et eccellentissimi Senatori veneti*.
 L. Olivato (ed.), 'Contributo alla genesi progettuale di Palmanova: il ruolo di Giulio Savorgnan', *Memorie storiche forogiuliesi* LVI (1976), pp. 104–108 [source: BNM, *cod. it. cl. IV 181 (5111)*, ff. 219^r–224^v].
- 1594: *Avvisi intorno la fortificazione della fortezza di Palmanova dal Signor Giulio Savorgnano al Serenissimo prencipe di Venezia*.
 M. G. Sandri (ed.), 'Nascità di Palmanova', in *Palmanova da fortezza veneta a fortezza napoleonica*, Istituto italiano dei castelli (ed.), Udine 1982, pp. 207–211 [source: CMC, *Cicogna 1466/2*].
- 5 July 1595, in Venice.
 M. G. Sandri (ed.), 'Nuovi contributi: la lettera-testamento di Giulio Savorgnan al Doge', in *Palmanova da fortezza veneta a fortezza napoleonica*, Istituto italiano dei castelli (ed.), Udine 1982, pp. 230–234 [source: BAM, *cod. Q 122 sup.*, ff. 140^r–143^r].
- Undated: *Scrittura dell'Illustrissimo Signor Giulio Savorgnano. In materia di far fortezze et fortificazioni sicure*.
 A. Gambuti (ed.), 'Invenzioni ed ammaestramenti di scienza militare nell'archivio mediceo', in C. Cresti / A. Fara / D. Lamberini (eds), *Architettura militare nell'Europa del XVI secolo. Atti del Convegno di Studi, Firenze, 25–28 novembre 1986*, Siena 1988, pp. 356–364 [source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, *Mediceo del Principato*, filza 1817, ff. 441^r–447^r]; Greek translation by I. Steriotou, 'Giulio Savorgnano: 25 κανόνες τεχνικής στη σχεδίαση και την κατασκευή των φρουρίων', in *Τεχνολογία στη Λατινοκρατούμενη Ελλάδα, Πολιτιστικό Τεχνολογικό Ίδρυμα ΕΤΒΑ* (ed.), Athens 1997, pp. 128–138.

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With a few exceptions, dialectical variations or latinized forms of Italian / Venetian names are not given in the Index. Ancient Greek and biblical names are given in their established English form. Roman numbers refer to pages of the English text; numbers in bold refer to the Venetian documents; numbers in italics refer to pages with illustrations; n. refers to notes to the documents. Giulio Savorgnan, Venice and Cyprus have not been indexed.

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